

We all welcomed the decision taken at Mprogorro tht emphasis should be moved from Internationa Solidarity to internal re-organisation. This did mean that we did not see the value of international solidarity but only that many of our best cadres were being utilised in this field to the detrimnet of the very important aspect of work at home. Previously there appeared to have been a believe tha both could be done without any real loss of efficieney etc. to one or the other, however realities have shown that people who are involved in internationa solidarity work can become bogged down in it. It is important that at our coming meeting this aspect is not only stressed but that serigus ~~max~~ steps are taken to ensure this. While it is true that one can not transform the decisions of Morogoro into action cvernight, and while it is also true that some steps have been take to concentrate on internal work, much too many of our leading personnel are still bogged down in solidarity work. I feel that if we are to forge ahead priority must be given to this decision and if need be, especially in the case of our Party, which is the supreme authority, as far as its members are concerned, we should act ruthlessly.

There has been much talk about a coreectb political line, we can be proud that on the whole our Paty, despite some errors have consistently mntained a correct poli ical line. However a correct political line is not needed as a declaration, but as something to be carried into effect. For this we need cadres, people who understand the political line of the Party, who accept it as their own line, who are prepared to carry it into effect, who are able to put it into practice and are capable of answering for it, defending it and fighting for it. It is to this end that we must direct our attentions. The "ocumrnt has stated that initially atleast cadres will have to be found outside and than sent back home to organise. While we have found many difficulries in carrying out this important task it is vital that much of our Partys attention and work must be continued and incrrased in this field. We must ensure that our cadres are equiped ideologically, that they feel ever guidance in thier activities, that they are actively drawn into the work of the Party, and they become politically hardened. Theory gives one the power of orientation, clarity of vision, assurance of work, and belief in the triumph of our cause. But in the words of "enin "Our theory is not a dogma but a guide to action", therefore our members shoud be taught to apply the "arxist-"eninist method to the concrete situations in particular countries, tp definite conditions, not to struggle against an "enemy" in general" but against a particular definite enemy. We must also enaure that our cadres receive ade quate and extensive training in practice work (whereever this is possible). To gawe effect to "enins words that

there are no people -yet there are enormous numbers of people, it is important that we take steps to compile dossiers of all South Africans externally. It is important that we do not limit ourselves to London, our activities must include Dublin, Scotland, Canada, India, Egypt, Pakistan in fact to every country where there are South Africans. These must be classified in terms of profession, work, whether they have passport family commitments, students, holidaymakers, etc., these categories can be broken down further. Once we have such a dossier we can then work in the field of recruitment and training. I feel that if we want to carry out this and other work related to internal re-construction as effectively and adequately as the tasks demands it will be necessary for our Party to have people working on this aspect on a full time basis.

Training.

Our personnel must be given training that is best suited to our illegal work at home. They must be trained to set up underground structures, the art of propaganda material, sabotage, techniques of infiltrating front organisations, survival under most trying conditions and the ability to organise and lead. It is imperative that any individual who is utilised in the underground work, on whatever level, receives training which will enable him to face the tasks that he is expected to do.

Security.

The Document has correctly emphasised the very important nature of this. Working in the relative safety of London, there could develop an attitude of mind which while ~~maximising security~~ talking of security does not really carry out these measures. It is essential and vital for the existence and survival of not only our Party but also the National Liberation Movement that our Party directs its immediate attention to this. Firstly we should ensure that "we know our people". A very systematic study of all our cadres as well as personnel of the ANC etc must be made. The experiences of many of the Socialist countries has proven that on carrying out such studies they have uncovered agents, people who were doing harm to the Party by their actions, e.g., Celer and Barbe in France. Such a study will also enable us to discover personnel unnoticed before, and from this we could also determine whether our cadres were being used to the best advantage of the Party, it will help us to overcome the wrong utilisation ^{if any} of personnel.

We must make an extensive study of all our aspects of our security arrangements and determine whether they are adequate and more significant whether our members are carrying out the Party's instructions.

Front Organisations.

The Document makes mention of these but it is important that we put this into practice. We will be able to do this more effectively when we have established a network internally because it is people on the si-

not that ^{can} make this decision.

To do the work of internal re-construction most effectively it is important that our Party is aware of all the trends and developments in our Country. We should be aware of structures being formed not under the direct command or instructions of the ANC or the Party. These could be either pro-Congress or anti-congress. The recent trial of Winnie and the others revealed an extensive network, as well as many interesting aspects in terms of activities, education, recruitment etc. They also distributed a number of leaflets and arranged speeches at funerals etc. The interesting question here is whether this structure was set up by their own initiative and if so what was our attitude to it and how much if any assistance did we render to it. Some time back I was informed of a group being formed amongst the Indians in Johannesburg and in Natal. These were very critical of the Congress Movement, they were very anti-Soviet etc. It is important that we act quickly not only to prevent any disruptionist activities but also to safeguard many cadres who are being misled.

The presence of Golding in this country provided us with a very good opportunity to get some detailed information of the structure set up by Winnie and the others. We must ensure that Golding and the many others that come over should be thoroughly "de-briefed", I am sure that we will be able to obtain valuable information especially from those who were active.

As the struggle intensifies we can be sure that the SA govt. will increase its threats and pressure on the neighbouring African States. It is therefore urgent that we immediately take steps to remedy a very unfortunate situation, viz., the politisization of The African people. For too long have we simply kept in touch with the leadership in these countries. From various reports received it is clear that generally the mass of the people in Africa are unaware of the real nature of Apartheid. We should distribute material exposing S. and its threat to the security and lives of the rest of the African continent. Our propaganda should be distributed widely, it is ridiculous that the number of people that read Sechaba in Africa can be counted on your fingertips. If Sechaba is not considered to be the proper medium than other methods should be chosen. Apparently our contacts with African newspapers are also practically non-existent. We must take steps to see that some of our vast resources that we have dealing with International solidarity is directed to this purpose. This must be done especially with the Protectorates, we have no doubt that in time to come these areas will have to be used by our forces etc., in fact one gathers that some of the Lesotho territory provides excellent conditions for guerilla warfare. The recent events in Lesotho gives us an opportunity to address ourselves to the mass of the people, in the final analysis it will be their support that will be important. Here we could also consider utilising the Un agencies, i.e., have them distribute some of the voluminous

literature that they produce.

Recently a Anti-Apartheid group has been established in Ghana which could utilise their assistance.

There are various church and other international organisations that produce material these could be utilised.

We tend to spend so much time in Europe trying to set up anti-apartheid groups trying to get support and generally exposing the SA regime, why can't ^{some of} this be directed to Africa. A study will reveal that SA is making tremendous inroads economically into Africa, and I feel that in the long run our insistence on solidarity work in Europe ^{to the exclusion} will prove to be disastrous. The Director of Publicity should be asked to direct his attentions elsewhere. It is important that we try to stimulate an overhaul examination of our work through the publicity Dept. as any study made as to the distribution of Sechaba or the AG., what systematic and organised steps have been taken to remedy this. My own view is that the circulation of Sechaba is nothing compared to what it should be and it should be remedied. (Consider the fact that in Britain, Europe and America we merely have about 2000 subscribers, here I am not referring to the bulk)

General.

We should consider the distribution of some of the UP literature within SA. This organisation is not banned and therefore people will be less scared to handle it and we could possibly get them to pay for the postage. If need be we could supply them with lists, eq. they have lists and addresses of all banned personnel, these could probably gather much more names which we could then utilise.

It appears that Indian traders travel to Swaziland regularly, the well known ones are hardly ever searched, these people as well as the hundreds others of all groups who regularly make trips to Swaziland, whether on holiday or business provide us with some good opportunities.

After the second world war Balloons were used to distribute propaganda by the Imperialist forces in the Socialist countries, we should also consider this.

We must study very closely the establishment of a Russian Embassy in Botswana.

SA infiltration into the rest of Africa, means that there are more visits contacts, this will provide us with some opportunities which we must exploit, eq., SA ships are regularly visiting African ports of Ghana, Tanzania, Gabon etc.

We should consider whether it would not be better to set up some front structures, eq., business, in either the Protectorates or Malawi. As there is much trafficking of goods between these areas and SA., it could possibly be easier for us to get our stuff through these channels.

MARCH 1970

Document.

At the outset one must comment on the very frank and informative document that came from the Centre. ^{unfortunate} While it is true that the security measures made it impossible for individuals to keep the document and so enable us to do a justice to a document of such value and importance, however ~~therefrom~~ even an unsatisfactory reading of it and the discussion that we had was very enlightening and stimulating. It is ^{regrettable} unfortunate that when discussing a document of this nature it sometimes appears that one is simply using the occasion to launch out on an attack against the leadership etc. Lenin taught that the best way of training and educating the members is conscientiously to disclose the mistakes of the Party, to study the causes that have given rise to these mistakes, and to indicate the paths necessary for overcoming these mistakes. Lenin said:

"The attitude of a political party to its mistakes is one of the most important and surest criteria of the seriousness of the Party and of its fulfillment in practice of its obligations to its class and to the masses of ^{working} its people. Openly to admit error, to reveal its causes, to analyse the situation that gave rise to it, attentively to discuss the means of correcting the error - this is the sign of a serious Party, this is the fulfillment of its obligations.....

This document is further evidence if any is needed that our Party has always and will continue to work in the traditions of Marxism-Leninism. It is the duty of all our members, if they are genuinely interested in the liberation of our people and the vanguard role of our Party that they also work in this spirit.

The Document admits that one of our major weaknesses was that we had failed to ~~make~~ organise many of our best cadres into units, and it appears that this was due largely to the new conditions under which we worked, which made it very difficult for us to form ⁹ collectives, Leadership. One of the consequences of this failure was the "leadership crisis" not only in the National Liberation Movement but also amongst the Party. This manifested itself in tribalism, regionalism, indiscipline etc. In the discussion it was interesting to note that

Apparently many of our difficulties stem from the fact that after

Alivonia our entire internal structure was destroyed and that for all intents and purposes our leadership function had to be transferred outside, a event for which we had not bargained and which brought tremendous organisational and other difficulties in its wake. One of the major ones was the fact that our Party was unable to function as a collective and under a "Collective Leadership", ^{& I feel that} Today it is simple ^{it is this that led to certain shortcomings in our work} for ~~own~~ to look back and say that we should have established such a leadership, however this assumes that we are working in a vacuum ~~xxxx~~ or in a laboratory situation. ^{However while} There must have been tremendous objective and other difficulties and undoubtedly the Party must have made strenuous attempts to try and rectify the matter, ~~however~~ it is important that this is brought to the notice of the rank and file, such information and discussion will enable us to see the development of our movement and the struggle as a whole rather than as isolated incidents, which tend to give rise to many erroneous ideas etc. The failure to establish a "collective leadership" led to a "leadership crisis" not only in the National Liberation Mvt. (which led to Morogoro) but also in our Party. Here I would briefly like to comment on Morogoro. Previous to Morogoro very few people appeared to have had any knowledge of all the difficulties that the movement was undergoing etc. In fact it was only after Morogoro that one realised that the crisis was so great that the very existence of ~~xxxx~~ the National Liberation Movement was at stake. I don't know what the reasons for the lack of information etc was, but it is difficult to understand how the vanguard of the struggle, which we are supposed to be, were so uninformed about the situation. Of course not all of us could possibly have all the knowledge, but it appears that up to the time of Morogoro much too much information was regarded as taboo, it is imperative that in the coming decade the CEC takes the membership into confidence and that whenever necessary and whenever the occasion arises we are given information which will enable us to have comradely and frank discussions on various issues, organisational, theoretical, practical etc.