

* Cape Times
â\200\230Political Staff

activities. cmmi-â\201an' e .bad

In a statement, its political objectives and
Justi rou was ced â\200\230United Party
Justice G P rmm, g i munly by stands for the main-
tenance of the rule of law,
and the United Party com-
missioners have con-

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l interim report, the
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demanding that_the
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- should be safegu by
;dndependent judicial
procedures

â\200\230The various aections of
the â\200\234commissionâ\200\231s report
were intended to be con-
- sidered as a whole but, to
remove any doubts caused
by the fact that their at-
~ titude was not restated in
the sixth interim report,
~ the TUnited Party com-
missioners â\200\234again pub-
~ lically confirmed . - that

their demand applaed to
~ the report as a whole.â\200\235

) 3 1 MAY 1975

power
transfer

By RICHARD WALKER

, NEW YORK.

SOUTH AFRICA must agree to "an

orderly transfer of power" in
South West Africa by "solemnly de-
claring her intention to withdrawâ\200\235
and accepting a United Nations role
in a fair national election, the Secu-
rity Council was told when the long-

In what could be a breakthrough speech
with few fiery phrases, Mr Rupiah Banda,
Zambiaâ\200\231s future Foreign Minister, appea
ed to drop any demand for an immediate
South African exit. e e

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ation political frÃ©edom o
movement â\200\230so as to demon-
strate that its rt does
not merely lie ~ the
Ovambo tribe as is often
allegedâ\200\231.

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Â® â\200\234Implement â\200\230with in- |
tegrity and honourâ\200\231 and
â\200\230not grudginglyâ\200\231 the deci-
sion to give independence
to Namibia,

@ â\200\230â\200\234Accept a â\200\230United Na-
tions role to ensure a fair

national electionâ\200\231.â\200\235

Mr Banda handled the

awaited debate began yesterday. | M P T

kid gloves, but voiced the
official OAU line that it

was the only body with |

which South Africa must
deal.

He seemed to suggest
Swapo must be given the
chance to prove itself.

And he appeared-to ac-
cept South African warn-
ings that an immediate
South African withdrawal

g . woulg. b_e Qangero_xs.

THE CAPE TIME sy

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Mrs Suzman â\200\230nâ\200\230:_i';sioners not say sop

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COLLEAGUES fact of the matter

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31 MAY 1975

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the Le Grange to -â\200\230--i~\202th!â\202~ltthm'9t&.: :

THE latest report of the
Le Grange (Schlebusch)
Commission is a singular-
ly unimpressive docu-
ment which is unlikely
to damage the standing
of the Christian Institute
in the eyes of people
whose respect is worth
having.

. As the Institute is now to
be prohibited from receiving
funds from overseas, the
scale of its activities will
have to be considerably re-
duced. The Institute will be
thrown back on its own local
resources.

But Dr Beyers Naude, the
Rev Theo Kotze and their
people who are deter-
mined to achieve much in
public opinion = for the
radical change that is in-

evitable in South Africa.
They have helped to create
the climate in which Mr

Mr Vorster's tentative policies

become viable.
whole Schlebusch.

exercise must also be seen in
the perspective of - party.
politics. From the start, it
has been notable as an
example of Mr Vorster's
political skill. One of the

Prime Minister's objectives
is to: secure bipartisan par-
liamentary support for an
assault on the radical
element in 'South 'African
. politics. 3

UP split sought

At the same time, Mr
Vorster. has wanted to split
the United Party into its
conservative and progressive
elements so that he could
look to the former, in due
course, to bolster his own

tion ~against right-wing

xtremists. -

posi
- Nationalist e

. Mr_Vorsterâ\200\231s - strategy so far has been remarkably successful. Internal =United Party tensions over its attitude to the Commission have already led to Mr S J Marais Steyn crossing the floor to the Nationalist ben-

ches. And it will be most -

su msmi ing if Mr Steyn is not fâ\200\230;lrl%wed y others.

On the other flank, the:

Schlebusch tensions have shoved Mr Harry Schwarz

and his ;lo(mgâ\200\230 men into the arms of the Progressives.

Meanwhile, Mr Vorster is

looking on with great satis-
- faction as the United Party goes into- another series of

|_internal convulsions.

Political

SUrvey

Vorster is having increasing difficulty in containing his right wing, a political re-alignment may be â\200\234closer than now seems likely, The right wing has had to absorb .2 series of shocks < South West Africa, ' the - Nico Malan, sports: -policy, ; the cool Vorsterian attitude to lan Smith.â\200\224 and may be near its breaking point. Against - this, it. must be noteq that. Mr. Vorster's sense of just how far he can 8o without a split has been unerring, If he was, seriously prepareqd to risk such a split, it may be argued, the pace of reform would have en _gugch faster than it has een.

Fusion discussed
For ' whatever reasons,

people who move in â\200\230political circles are now discussing

â\200\230the possibility of some sort

of a National Government on the traditional pattern of fusion or coalition. - .

It is a fact of history that South' Africa has never changed a government simply by voting a single party into the majority at an election. Even in 1948, Dr Malan's Nationalists took over in association with

the Fusion and the Hertzog-Labour Pact.. y

If the - Southern African situation deteriorates, the pressures for another Fusion-type exercise might become irresistible. -

The question will then be which of the United

Party are likely to go in

with the Nationalists and which of them would stay out, joining the Prog-Reform alliance in opposition. .
~ More than anything else, perhaps, the question of attitudes to civil rights could be the deciding factor,)
The Leader of the Opposition himself. Sir De Villiers Graaff, might have thought lay in a National Government with Mr Vorster.
And the Natal English-speaking conservatives and Messrs Radclyffe, Vause Raw and Bill Sutton

'~ might also find them-

selves drawn in the same direction, = Atk

safeguards, .

. Mr Havenga's African Party, And earlier decades saw the Smuts-Hert-

W problems. It is a com-

mendable ambition, -

But the facts of South African political life suggest that Mr Vorster's approach to civil liberties and the attitude traditionally upheld by the United Party are poles apart. If there is to be

a approach to security, it could only be on Mr Vorster's terms.

The attachment to civil

liberties is strong in - the |

United Party, a historical thread that runs back to the Cape liberal tradition. of John X Merriman, whose political battle. for constitutional = liberties in the Cape Colony at the turn of the century is a glorious chapter in Cape parliamentary history.

Rule of Law

. So it was not to be expected that the United Party

could equivocate on the !

Rule of Law without considerable pain and suffering of the sort which it has experienced since . Schlebusch started and which it seems destined to endure until the exercise ' reaches ' its inglorious end. 4 : No one is suggesting that the. question of civil lib-

-erties in times of crisis is a

simple one; there are certainly times when law and order is obviously breaking down and emergency action

s necessary. But there must

be clearly defined emergency

must be of defined duration and the authorities must be fully accountable to the legislature for everything they have done. ! .

There are very good reasons why - absolutely watertight . safeguards are essential when * officialdom . and particularly military officialdom . is given Sweeping . powers over individuals, : : :

This is not because of Some . abstract theory. It is

because of the very concrete |

fact that such power is ALWAYS abused. There are

examples enough in Southâ\200\231

African history, notably the
application of martial law in
the Cape Colony under Kit-
chener in 1900-1901. -

You cannot do this sort of |

thing without paying the
consequences. en citizens
lose confidence in the forces
of law a order, when
_security lsiderations are
made a pretext for bloody-
minded political repression,
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â\200\230turns 62 this year and the

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gress takes place in Novem-
ber, there: will naturally he

'@ renewal â\200\230of interest.â\200\231 â\200\234He:

â\200\231wm be nearly 64 when the
next congress takes place;
â\200\230and 65 or 66 at the next
! ed general election.
This is

In. mos nesses â\200\224 al-
though South Africa is more
in]&ei-\'201, towards â\200\230its
cal leaders. - - -
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fit. On health â\200\224 ang to a

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there are other factors.
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Progressives first broke in
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There is no immediate
Drospect of the UP making
the electoral breakthrough
Diecessary to become .even a
formidable opposition force,
let alone the government o
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. And there is a wide
belief that Sir De Villiersâ\200\231s
statements, however well
reasoned, excellently re-
searched and fully quoted in
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Herculean hours of work,
little = public appreczâ\200\230ati,on.
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De Villiers has conducted
â\200\230his political life with a good
cmper and a charm given
to few politicians. This, -of
course, might be part of the
â\200\230 em; many people sa
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Yet it is unlikely that Mr
Basson could commang the
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Mr Basson : i

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Mr Cadman, the man with

e â\200\234fretsaw mindâ\200\235, from

Natal, is regarded as too sec-
onal and not ' sufficiently

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mances, â\200\230

The succession problem is
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MOZAMBIQUE â\200\224

.~ TWO STORIES

Faced with similar circumstances, others ' might have disappeared quietly from the scene -partj:

larly if they were men p;;; d

means, and when even some Sympathetic quarters were gently hinting that perhaps it's time to go. &

But Sir De Villiers hag

always shown a remarkable
i R T N
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l& And his fighting re. Ga00
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n this week to the- Pr

gressive-Reform merger t

plans and his - announced
trip to Black Southern African
states are indications
that he intends to stick to

nothing to give rise to-con-

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The couni!ry, y is' approach-
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might mean that. after- all

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illiers wï¬\202l be robbed of

his guns â\200\224 or at Teast to do th

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There might he com- â\200\230tha
pelling -political reasons for al
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TWO stories are coming
out of Mozambi â\202¬, where
the first potentially Marxist
State bordering on â\200\234South
achieves
pendence on June 25,
â\200\230One has it that President:

Samora Machel will almost
immediately adopt a. total
hostile attitude .to bot
South Africa ang Rhodesia
= cutting :

ica- in.

-Other â\200\224
> more likely
he will do all he can
0 destroy Mr. Smithâ\200\231s
Rhodesia but will defer a
confrontation with South
Africa, at least until he has
established Frelimo control
roughout the-: country, a
major problem. ol

South Africa
Watching the- historie events
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N usual interest, ang
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