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DE KLERK LOSES CONTROL OF NEGOTIATIONS .

Two events over the past 30 days h?:'\e shatter~d State President FW de Klerkâ\200\231s carefully laid plans to guide South Africa into 2 new dispensati; 1. The fic : was the governmentâ\200\231s dismissal of the two Cabinet Ministers responsible for security in response to revelalions that it had given limited funds to Inkatha. The second was the violence which erupted at a meeting at Ventersdorp, addressed by De Klerk, which resulted in the death of three Whites. The former could give the revolutionary alliance of the African National Congress, the SA

m i yan joint control over th rity forces before the end of the veear, The latter ings th ivil confli much near

DE KLERK RESHUFFLES HIS CABINET

In order to allay the controversy which erupted following newspaper relevations that the government has made

two pavments totalling R250 000 to Inkatha 18 months earlier, De Klerk announced on July 29 that he was

removing General Magnus Malan from the Defence portfolio and Adriaan Vlok from Law and Order. The

changes are to come into effect on Aug 30. Although the dismissal of these two men had long been demanded

-~by the ANC, De Klerk denied that this was the reason for their removal. i

Malan (61) had been Minister of Defence since 1980 and had frequently spoken out against the intransigence of the ANC. He particularly rejected suggestions that the ANCâ\200\231s military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), should be merged with the defence force. As recently as July 18 he attacked ANC president, Mandela, for accusing the security forces of slaughtering people and criticised the ANC for insisting on developing MK.

In the minds of many, his removal opens the way for the merging of the two opposing forces.

In fact, there is much speculation that Malanâ\200\231s successor, Roelf Meyer, (44) (formerly Deputy Minister of Constitutional

Development) was appointed specifically to preside over the integration of the two forces. Certainly Meyer is

regarded as a progressive National Party (NP) member who fully supports the path De Klerk has taken. Days

before his appointment, Meyer had endorsed moves towards an interim government. Political analyst, Prof

Lawrence Schlemmer, described him as â\200\234a very much less experienced personâ\200\235 than Malan. In his first full

ministerial appointment, Meyer combines Defence with Communicator, the one-time Bureau of Information.

Malan was given the minor portfolio of Water Affairs and Forestry.

Ten days after the Cabinet reshuffle, Lt-Gen JPB van Loggerenberg, the head of the SA Air Force was

replaced on the grounds that he was â\200\234due for retirementâ\200\235. Many considered his retirement to be premature.

Vlok (54) has been Minister of Law and Order since 1986 and had also strongly attacked the ANC. He was given the lower profile Ministry of Correctional Services, the new name for the Prisons Dept. According to a senior aide, Vlok "was extremely emotional" when his transfer was announced. In undiplomatic language, this means he burst into tears! Vlok was replaced by Hernus Kriel, (49) formerly Minister of Planning, Provincial Affairs and National Housing, another progressive Nationalist.

Curiously, Foreign Minister Pik Botha was not affected by the scandal, even though the money for Inkatha came from his ministry and he admitted on July 25 that he had given R100 million to about seven anti-Swapo parties in Namibia to fight the November 1989 elections. Malan's ministry, on the other hand, was not involved in secret financing which, in the eyes of many, confirmed that he was axed as a result of ANC pressure.

#### REACTION TO THE DEMOTIONS

Both new ministers, especially Mr Roelf Meyer, will have a hard time winning the trust of the people around them," said Prof Herman Giliomee, head of political studies at the University of Cape Town. Prof David Welsh of the University of Cape Town's Dept of Political Studies, described Kriel as "a De Klerk clone" and Meyer as "modern-minded tough politician, who is solidly behind De Klerk's initiatives. He has both the intelligence and the initiative to clean up the mess that apparently exists in some quarters of the Defence Force."

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The demotion of General Malan and Mr Vlok is shocking proof of the weakness of the De Klerk government

in giving in to Communistic pressure," said HNP leader, Jaap Marais, on July 30. "Mr De Klerk's reforms

have made him a hostage of the ANC/SACP. ... His cabinet now has to get approval from the ANC/SACP. At the same time, it is a big encouragement to the revolutionary forces in their fight to make the country ungovernable and to seize power by force. Ironically, it is the best reference General Malan and Mr Vlok could give/

have - that they no longer fit into the De Klerk-Mandela-Slovo setup." Bt

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Correspondence should be addressed to Reca, U

The Citizen (31/7/91) described Vlok as an excellent minister who faced a complex and difficult situation. He tried his best to maintain a balance between the reform intentions of his government and the maintenance of

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law and order. But the ANC was determined to get rid of him - an decision to relieve him of the portfolio - it has succeeded. Noting that, as the fiercest critic of the ANC, Malan

was an ANC target, The Citizen continued, The ANC mounted a deliberate campaign against him and the armed forces intending to weaken SADF morale. To the extent that ANC pressure has influenced General Malan's removal from his portfolio, the ANC has succeeded in its aim of ridding the security forces of its toughest and most outspoken opponent. ... He was an outstanding Minister of Defence, who will be sorely missed by the SADF and the officers and men who were so loyal to him. ... We are afraid that the dropping of Mr Vlok and General Malan will be seen by the ANC as a victory and will encourage it to apply similar pressure in other directions. It will also create dissatisfaction in the police and Defence Force and further undermine their morale. ... The suggestion that the government has capitulated to the ANC will further erode its support among Whites, particularly Afrikaners, and the future will look even more uncertain.

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#### INKATHAGATE

The secret funding debacle, dubbed Inkathagate by the media, broke on August 19, when the Weekly Mail, a member of the alternative media, published confidential police documents indicating that a total of R250 000 had been paid to Inkatha in November 1989 and March 1990 towards the expenses of two public rallies. The police made the initial request but the funds came from a secret Foreign Affairs account designated for the countering of sanctions. The Inkatha-affiliated United Workers Union of SA (Uwusa) also received R1.5

million. In vain, government spokesmen pointed out that at the time the sanctions campaign was raging fiercely, that the ANC had not renounced the armed struggle and that Inkatha was then a cultural movement, not a political party.

The ANC received R270 million from just one European country since the 1960s, De Klerk told a press conference on July 30. It also received:

R54 million this year from Swedish Development Aid, up from R 3 000 in 1972;  
R520 000 from Norway for its national conference in July;

R 6.4 million from Denmark this year;

R4.8 million from Finland this year;

R 33.7 million in pledges from Australia for the period 1990-93.

By contrast the ANC had only been able to raise R11 341 598 from internal sources of which R9 824 569 came from donations. Thus the vast majority of its funds came from foreign sources.

According to The Citizen (24/7/91), the financial report at the ANC's national conference showed its foreign assets exceeded R655 million of which R41 million were cash reserves. Spain gave the ANC R15.8 million for its health and education programme as well as financially supporting its office in Madrid.

The media ignored all this information for it had scented blood and were baying for it. The initial revelation was followed by a major international media campaign.

At a press conference on July 30, De Klerk admitted that, in addition to the funds given to Inkatha and Ufesa, the Federal Democratic Alliance (Fida) and the Free State youth organisation, Eagles, had been assisted. He specifically denied that secret funds had gone to any other political party or organisation. He said the United Municipalities of SA (Usnsa); the Urban Councils Association (Ucasa) and the National Forum had not received secret funds. Umsa and Ucasa got open support on a moderate scale to meet administrative expenses.

Fearing more leaks, De Klerk announced that more than 41 secret projects were being terminated and ordered that all secret projects be reviewed. The National Student Federation, a moderate body seen as a counter to the radical National Unions of SA Students (Nusas), disbanded on Aug 1 after admitting it had received government funding. De Klerk also promised to appoint a committee from the private sector to investigate the projects. Both Cosatu and the employers' federation, Saccola, called on businessmen not to become involved.

#### GOVERNMENT PLANS SHATTERED

There are clear indications that since the release of Mandela in Feb 1990, the government has been following a two-fold strategy. Initially it believed ANC propaganda that it had been forced to take up the armed struggle because the government had refused to talk to it. Clearly, if this were the case, it would stop the armed struggle and moderate once it was unbanned and the government opened discussions. Under these circumstances the National Party and the ANC could form some kind of alliance and run the country jointly.

However the ANC has refused to moderate. Last month's conference underlined its hardline stance (see Roca Report-31). It did not distance itself from the SACP and the radicals. It again refused to abandon the armed struggle. Instead it recommitted itself to building up MK through fresh recruits and more extensive training. It

did not reconstitute itself as a political party.

The NP therefore fell back on its alternative strategy, namely drawing closer to the Inkatha Freedom Party.

Thus Gerrit Viljoen, Minister of Constitutional Development, was a key speaker at the Inkatha conference on 22-24 July.

July 18. The alternative plan appeared to be to form an alliance with Inkatha. In addition, the government was building up a number of small Black parties with valid constituencies but with no money or expertise and no ability to attract foreign funds. So the government undertook to provide their needs. In themselves, they were not very significant but were moderate and each would draw thousands of votes from the ANC. This was a replay of the Namibian strategy where the DTA alliance and other smaller parties prevented Swapo from winning two-thirds of the votes thus forcing Swapo to moderate its stance. This seemed an easy goal for an

1: /Inkatha alliance, assisted by a number of smaller regional parties. Ly

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Now the alternative plan lies in ruins. Inkatha's credibility has suffered badly. NP/Inkatha relations have cooled considerably with Inkatha accusing the NP of funding it secretly in order to weaken it and discourage Buthelezi's growing political support when the funding was exposed. The funding for the smaller parties was cut abruptly. They are floundering and feel betrayed. There is now virtually no alternative voice to the radical groups in many areas, political, student, church, etc, who receive large amounts of foreign funds. -

Up to the present, the NP had seemed to be controlling the negotiation process. Now it is reeling. It has lost moderate Black support. Its credibility has taken a pounding, both internally and externally. The ANC claims that the NP cannot be both the referee in the negotiation process and a player because it cannot be trusted, suddenly sounds a lot more credible. Now the ANC/SACP alliance is dominating the whole negotiation process and an ANC-dominated interim government looms as a distinct probability within the next few months.

The NP seems to have no alternative but to revert to the idea of a NP/ANC power sharing coalition. But the ANC is not interested in power sharing. It is determined to seize power from the NP.

#### ANC MOVES TO SET UP AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT

Seeing themselves in a strong position, the ANC is increasing pressure for negotiations believing that it can force further concessions. It demands an interim government in which it will be able to exercise effective control over the security forces and the broadcasting media.

We are now going to dictate terms on the national political scene, said ANC National Executive Committee (NEC) member, Patrick Lekota on July 25, following the first meeting of the enlarged NEC. We are going to push for an interim government now. ... Unless there is an interim government, the National Party will use its

monopoly on power as a leverage to influence the political process. The ANC is pushing to get an all-party congress, which it sees as the lynchpin in the negotiations, set up as soon as possible, he said. The NEC again called for the dismissal of Vlok and Malan among other demands, but did not insist on the resignations of De Klerk and Pik Botha. Sources close to the ANC threatened that if De Klerk did not go a long way towards meeting these demands, the ANC could break off all negotiations.

The revelations of the government's funding completely rules out its suitability to serve as both referee and player, said the ANC's NEC in a statement on Aug 1 in response to De Klerk's speech of July 30 in which he said the government had no desire to be player and referee at the same time. The scandal had raised the issue of an interim government of national unity to the top of the agenda. ... The present government must resign. Details about the structures and leadership of the interim government would be decided through negotiations at an all-party conference. The ANC sees two conferences leading to the interim government. First, the patriotic front conference to be held in Cape Town from Aug 23-25 (subsequently postponed to Sept 6-8) which will be attended by those organisations within the so-called patriotic front, namely, ANC, SACP, Cosatu, PAC, Azapo, the SA Council of Churches, the National Olympic Committee of SA, the SA Council on Sports and others. The meeting will discuss the second conference, the all-party conference, and how the interim government can be installed.

The NEC said Inkatha's receipt of secret funds brought its legitimacy as an independent force into question. The ANC was therefore reviewing its bilateral contacts with Inkatha. It accepted, in principle, Inkatha's presence in an interim government, but with strong reservations. It also condemned the retention of Vlok and Malan in the Cabinet. Answering questions at the subsequent press conference, ANC deputy president, Walter Sisulu said the ANC had shifted its focus to the removal of the government itself. We have become more convinced than ever that the De Klerk government is the obstacle that stands between us and the installation of a democratic government, said ANC secretary general, Cyril Ramaphosa. He added that the all-party conference should be called by a neutral body like the church peace initiative (see Roca Report 81). Å

Mandela called for the immediate installation of an interim government, on his return from an overseas tour on Aug 7. The idea of an interim government with sovereign powers over all the organs of government and not the co-opting of certain individuals, is our demand. We are not prepared to be co-opted into the existing structures of government. We want a transfer of power from this government to an interim government. Å Å

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are already moving closer to the government on this question," he added, noting that De Klerk had said he is prepared to discuss interim arrangements with the ANC. But De Klerk "must accept the idea of an interim government which is going to supervise the whole process of transformation from an apartheid state to a non-racial democracy." He complimented De Klerk for removing "the two ministers from their portfolios and that was what we asked him to do." - n PRI RIS -t i 151

"For an interim government to assume office will require that the incumbent government resigns and hands over power to the transitional administration," said Mandelz in the keynote address at MK's 30th anniversary conference on Aug 9. "The interim government would have to take charge of all armed and security forces in the country, adopt an interim bill of rights and supervise and conduct the elections for a Constituent Assembly in addition to implementing other measures necessary to prepare the country for democracy."

The Inkathagate scandal had transformed the political scene in South Africa and opened the way for an all-party conference to begin the real task of negotiations, Ramaphosa told the Weekly Mail in an interview published on Aug 10. The prime areas of joint control the ANC was aiming at included the security forces and the broadcasting media. "By an interim government, we are talking about a sovereign body which will be vested with the instruments of state power. ... We do not want to go through the transitional period with a De Klerk government." He said the ANC would like the international community to be directly involved in the transitional phase. At a meeting between the government and the ANC agreement would have to be reached to hand over "to a neutral party that could convene a planning committee where all parties are represented." That neutral party could be the church peace initiative. Ramaphosa believed the all-party conference could sit this year or at the beginning of next year, -Â« Â» v L -0 Â\$ e S e LR

Under no circumstances would there be an interim government, Minister of Constitutional Development, Gerrit Viljoen, said in a BBC interview on Aug 8. However, he admitted that it had not yet been decided whether the ANC and NP would hold equal portions in a transitional arrangement! Clearly this is exactly what the ANC demands in its interim government and by not explicitly rejecting the concept, Viljoen implicitly accepts it! The government was willing to consider changes to the constitution in order to give the ANC real power and influence in the interim government, Viljoen told a press conference on Aug 10 in the government's clearest statement on the issue. He believed the government and the ANC were moving closer together on this question and stressed that interim measures would have to be agreed to at a multi-party conference which, according to some sources, could begin within two months. Options he put forward were: :

1. appointing members of other parties to the Cabinet;

2. giving the multi-party conference or constituent assembly veto rights over legislation;

3. appointing a committee of "wise men", or multi-party working groups, to "filter" legislation and actions by government departments.

â\200\234The National Party is set to accede to a key ANC demand for an interim government following revelations of Inkatha funding,â\200\235 said Mike Robertson, The Sunday Times political correspondent on July 28. â\200\234Senior government members are openly conceding their image has taken a massive knock from the â\200\230Inkathagateâ\200\231 revelations. ... Government members now believe that real confidence in the security forces will only be re-established once a multi-party conference agrees on mechanisms to ensure joint control and supervision of the police and military. (They are now considering) effective joint control of the executive (and) the appointment of members of the ANC .., to key positions in the public service, the police and the military,â\200\235 He hinted that the church peace initiative could play a major role in the laying the groundwork for the interim government.

The first talks on negotiations could take place in September, said Brian Stuart of The Citizen on Aug 4, - quoting government sources. The multi-party conference could be under way in October. ;

â\200\234We have said it, and we say it again, that Mr De Klerk must under no circumstances agree to an interim government,â\200\235 said The Citizen (9/8/91). â\200\234And he must not agree to interim arrangements, either, that would turn his government, de facto, into an interim government, This is the most crucial period in the whole process of bringing about change. The government must not fail itself or the people of this country .â\200\235 '

#### THE BATTLE OF VENTERSDORP

It was against this background of confusion, uncertainty and the imminent transfer of power to an ANC-dominated interim government, that De Klerk decided to speak at the small farming community of Ventersdorp in the rural Western Transvaal on Aug 9. In the heart of Conservative Party/ AWB territory and

the hometown of Eugene Terreâ\200\231Blanche, the fiery AWB leader, Ventersdorp is near the Goedgevonden farm,

the scene of a clash between White farmers and police in April over illegal squatters. Three farmers-were - - wounded by the police (See Roca Report 29). The dust created by that incident has still not settled. ' a

De Klerkâ\200\231s motive for wanting to speak there is not clear. Officially he was exercising his right to speak freely

anywhere in South Africa. â\200\234The brutal reality is that the Ventersdorp affair suits De Klerk,â\200\231ii~\201\_g{d~-the SA

Communist Party (SACP) on Aug 12. â\200\234He would like its rumbling to persist for as long as possible. He is -  
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hoping that Inkathagate will be forgotten by the world.â\200\235

Clearly both the NP the Rightwing expected trouble at Veniersdorp. The meeting place was surrounded by razor wire and between 1 500 and 2 000 policemen, some with dogs. Only NP supporters were allowed in. Thirty-two defence force RatÃ©1 armoured personnel carriers and 240 soldiers were deployed within 8 kms of the town. De Klerk arrived by helicopter and travelled the few metres between the helicopter and the hall in an armoured police riot control vehicle. The AWB and the Conservative Party threatened to mass 6 000 supporters in the town. In the event, 2 000 showed up. Many carried licenced firearms, including hunting rifles and shotguns. Others had defence sprays, bats and pickhandles. A number of metal arm guards, sharpened at ieach end, were confiscated from one man. . o

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. Conflicting accounts of what happened next have been published. It seems that the crowd, noisy and 'boisterous, tried to force its way into the hall, but was repulsed with teargas. Then three vehicles, two mini-bus taxis and a light pick-up, all driven by Blacks, crashed into the crowd, killing two men. The mob attacked the vehicles, overturning at least one. Blacks were beaten up. Shots were fired. The police tried to intervene. The crowd turned on them. Seven policemen were hurt, four of whom were hospitalised. The commanding officer, Brigadier Adriaan de la Rosa, gave the order â\200\234Shoot to kill!â\200\235 A man took a full shotgun blast from close range and was killed instantly. In all, 48 people were injured, including 15 Blacks. Terreâ\200\231Blanche claimed he intervened and stopped the fighting. .

Recriminations continue to fly from all sides with the NP and the AWB blaming each other for shedding Boer blood. â\200\234We believe that State President De Klerk was badly advised when he agreed to hold the meeting in Ventersdorp of all places,â\200\235 said The Citizen (12/3/91). â\200\234In the eyes of the Rightwing, Mr De Klerk has become one of the most hated political leaders this country has ever had,â\200\235 said political scientist Prof Willem Kleynhans. â\200\234The Afrikaners are willing to use all means at their disposal to ensure the survival of the White man - even violence.â\200\235 He blamed the NP for failing to take their supporters with them by not listing the laws they intended to scrap in the 1989 election manifesto. â\200\234If the Nats had done this and still succeeded in winning the election, only then could they claim to have a legitimate mandate from the electorate.â\200\235

The depth of the feelings stirred up was shown by the demonstrators who called De Klerk a traitor and \* murderer of the people (volk) when he arrived at a NP fund-raising banquet at Alberton on Aug 15. Also by the uniting of 17 different organisations to hold a memorial service for the dead in Ventersdorp on Aug 16.

#### PRIVATE ARMIES

The battle of Ventersdorp raised the question of banning private armies and highlighted the governmentâ\200\231s dilemma in this regard. It cannot force private armies to disband without prohibiting their parent organisations. In order to keep the negotiation process going, the government cannot ban the ANC or force it

to dismantle MK or even its self-defence units. Because it cannot take action against the ANC/MK, it has to treat the AWB and its Wenkommandos on the same basis. All it can do is to appeal to both organisations to be good and behave themselves! â\200\234The government scolds MK as if it is a naughty child, but it does nothing to force the organisation to do its bidding,â\200\235 complained The Citizen (13/8/91). â\200\234It is because the government never tried to force MK to give up its arms that the White Right decided it would train its own forces.â\200\235 The ANC rejected the comparison on the basis that MK is building a post-apartheid army whereas the White Right aimed at derailing the negotiation process.

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Instead of banning private armies, the government believed it was preferable to persuade private armed were unacceptable because it could give them dr advantage

13. It apparently never occurred to him that this is precisely the reason they maintain private armies!

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Appealing to the government to take the necessary steps to ban private armies which were â\200\234a great threat to peace and stabilityâ\200\235, an Inkatha spokesman warned on Aug 13 that if the government failed to take action, other parties would be compelled to set up their own armies. Another Inkatha spokesman called on the ANC to practice what it preached. â\200\234The ANC is always talking peace while they continue fermenting violence by building up arms caches.â\200\235 He was referring to the discovery of a large arms cache, including 50 AK-47s, in the house of an ANC member in Greytown, Natal.

#### ANC STRENGTHENS ITS MILITARY WING

The MKâ\200\231s first ever legal conference on South African soil was opened by Nelson Mandela at the University of Venda, Thohoyandou, on Aug 9. He emphasised that the ANC had chosen negotiations, not because it was tired of fighting or incapable of defeating the government, but because it wanted to exhaust every possibility of getting rid of apartheid. â\200\234We have always insisted that, depending on the level and intensity of the struggle, the Pretoria regime would one day find it advisable to seek negotiations.â\200\235

MK would be transformed into a regular army by 1993, said Joe Modise, MKâ\200\231s commander on Aug 11, at the close of the conference, which was attended by 240 MK members from 10 regions inside South Africa. Five

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African states, including Tanzania and Uganda, would train MK combatants for a regular MK, including ground, air and naval forces. He ruled out any idea of MK being integrated with the SA Defence Force, because MK viewed it as the military wing of National Party. He therefore did not believe it was committed to the new democratically could be more open minded

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change but felt some SADF elements were prepared to meet and work with M  
â\200\224--elected government--would form its own army~Chris Hani-hoped Roelf-Meyer w  
than Malan in debating a new defence force.

â\200\230The conference also resolved to strengthen its underground structures by stepping up the flow of arms from outside, and the infiltration of soldiers. The recruitment't)fj'dutixs would also be increased. However, it turned down a request from the SACP to release Hani from his position of chief of staff to allow him to take up a fulltime position in the SACP. Hani said the ANCâ\200\231s NEC would decide his future. He believed he would remain a member of the ANCâ\200\231s NEC. '

South African intelligence sources said the move is designed to enable Hani to take his place at the negotiating table as SACP leader. They believed Joe Slovo would take over the chairmanship from the ailing Dan Tloome, thus vacating the position of general secretary for Hani. Haniâ\200\231s popularity among the youth would boost the SACPâ\200\231s membership which stands at less than 10 000. Haniâ\200\231s proposed move would strengthen the party both during negotiations and in future elections. Hani topped the poll of candidates for the ANC's NEC, with a 94 percent vote just a few weeks earlier.

Three senior MK members arrested for illegal possession of firearms had infiltrated from Transkei and were carrying Transkei Defence Force (TDF) identification cards, said the SA police on July 31. Other informants indicated that MK members were being trained at TDF bases and storing weapons in the Government Guest House in Umtata. Police therefore suspect that Transkeian plans to enlarge its army are intended to absorb MK members into its ranks. Both the Transkei and ANC denied that MK is being integrated into the TDF.

#### MANDELA PRAISES CASTRO

â\200\234We have admired the sacrifices of the Cuban people in maintaining their sovereignty in the face of imperialist-orchestrated campaigns,â\200\235 said Mandela on July 26. He was in Cuba as the guest of honour at national celebrations to mark the 38th anniversary of the start of Castroâ\200\231s revolution. â\200\234We too want to control our own destiny.â\200\235 He praised Communist Cuba, saying its 32 years of revolution offered a lesson for South Africans. â\200\234The most important lesson that you have for us is that no matter what the difficulties you are under ... there can be no surrender. ... It is a case of freedom or death.â\200\235 He hailed â\200\234Revolutionary Cuba, internationalist Cuba, the country that has done so much for the peoples of Africa.â\200\235 He ended his speech with the words, â\200\234Long live the Cuban revolution. Long live Comrade Fidel Castroâ\200\235 and

was engulfed in an embrace by the Cuban leader. Castro decorated Mandela with Cuba's highest award, the Order of Jose Marti. Cuba is our second home, enthused Winnie Mandela. We just feel we have always belonged here.

Thousands of South African national servicemen fought Cuban troops in Angola between 1975 and 1988.

Mandela's praise for Castro will further alienate them and make them more determined than ever to prevent a Cuban-type regime being imposed on their country.

IS SOUTH AFRICA MOVING TOWARDS A LEBANESE SITUATION?

Martyrs were created at Ventersdorp and the gulf between the progressive NP supporters and the hardline Right wing now seems unbridgeable. The latter claim they are being sold out and will fight to defend their land and their freedom. It must be remembered that there are many thousands of trained and battle-harshened Whites between the ages of 25 and 40 with access to weapons. There are indications what they are now grouping in informal, uncoordinated groups in different parts of the country. Should they coalesce, they would be a formidable force, especially if credible leaders were to emerge. Should that happen, the loyalty of the security forces would be severely tested. Already army morale is reported to be low and that of the police far lower.

Moreover the ANC is strengthening MK and demanding that it would form the basis of the defence force in the New South Africa. Noting that the private army of the ANC is being tolerated and that the White Right is mobilising, Inkatha is clearly considering following suit. Remember, too, that four of the homelands have their own armies. :

The pieces seem to be falling into place which will push South Africa into a major confrontation along the lines of Lebanon. The driving force is the international community which is determined to impose its solution on the country, using the ANC and the NP, the former with very little support on the ground and the latter rapidly losing credibility.

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