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## POLITICS AND THE ARMED STRUGGLE: THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMY

- Ronnie Kasrils

### 1. INTRODUCTION

Since the creation of Umkhonto We Sizwe our Movement's basic positions on armed struggle have amounted to:

- commitment to a strategy of revolutionary armed struggle to achieve our goal - the seizure of political power and the creation of a liberated South Africa based on the Freedom Charter;
- MK is the instfument of the ANC and our liberation movement and takes its leadership, direction and command from the ANC;
- political policy and strategy determines our military etrategy;
- armed struggle must complement mass struggle and we seek to combine all forms \_ of struggle - violent and non-violent, legal and illegal;
- e the development of the armed struggle is dependent on its being rooted among the peOple - our MK combatants and organisers must therefore base themselves amongst the people in order to involve the masses in a Peeple's war.

There are numerous consequences and tasks that flow from the above. For example it has always been clear to us that our trained cadres \_ our combatants and organisers - must be imbued with political theories and ideas, must understand that politics guides the gun and gives the motiVation and courage for successful struggle. The question of the political preparation of these cadres - their discipline, devotion, determination, morale and political consciousness is the subject of another oaper. Their preparation for their organisational and operational tasks - whether political, military, intelligence or security functions is another question that requires special attention.

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I have stated that there are numerous consequences and tasks flowing from the basic positions on armed struggle already expressed. Our struggle is a most complex one. Problems have mounted and have often been shelved owing to the exile years; the fact that we are based largely abroad; that we lack an underground political base at home. How many of the consequences and tasks flowing from our positions on the armed struggle have not been addressed, tackled or maybe not even perceived?

This is not simply a problem for the High Command of Umkhonto We Sizwe, but for our entire movement. Anything that relates to our fundamental strategy - the seizure of power through the force of arms - is a fundamental question for us all, and that includes the leadership and activists of our mass democratic movement at home as well as the various sectors of our movement abroad, whether military or political.

The fact that we proclaimed our armed struggle on December 16, 1961 and that it is still at an extremely low stage of development must force us to frankly and critically examine the problem areas.

It is certainly true that the blows MK has delivered to the enemy and the heroic sacrifices of our combatants have played a vital role in inspiring our people and popularising the ANC. Yet despite the tremendous upsurge of mass resistance over the past three years we were not able to take full advantage of the favourable conditions that materialised. We were unable to deploy sufficient forces at home; our cadres still found big problems in basing themselves amongst our people; our underground failed to grow sufficiently and our people were left to face the enemy and his vigilantes with sticks and stones; the incredible mass resistance and strikes were consequently not sufficiently reinforced by armed struggle.

It is therefore clear that although we have long formulated theoretical positions

such as "the armed struggle must complement the mass struggle" and "the guerrilla must be rooted among the peOple" etc, etc, it is one thing to state the theory and quite another to put it into practice.

The fact that nearly three years since the Kabwe Conference of the ANC we still await a fresh strategy and tactics document does not help our military strategy and tactics. It is also clear that most people at home, including within the mass democratic movement, still regard MK as some kind of external force that must come and defend them from the vigilantes and destroy the Boers. They do not see themselves as having to be an integral part of the armed struggle.

Highlighting these defects one asks: is it possible that we are incorrect in believing that the armed struggle is the way forward? When Govan Hbeki was released from prison Die Beeld gloated that he had 23 years to ponder on the incorrectness of his belief that armed revolution was possible.

If anything, however, the events of the past three years have unmistakably demonstrated just how possible and necessary it is to advance our struggle through a combination of armed and mass uprisings. The people have demonstrated just how ready they are to take up arms. In fact one might say that "insurrection has been knocking on the door".

## 2. THE SUBJECTIVE FACTOR

This period of township uprisings, which also spilled over into some rural areas and bantustans, has revealed strengths and weaknesses. On the one hand it showed the existence of certain objective elements of a revolutionary situation in our country: the ruling class being unable to rule in the old way; the oppressed masses not being prepared to live under the old conditions; the heightened mass struggle and general crisis in the country. On the other hand the situation revealed our

organisational weaknesses, both inside and outside the country - what is referred to as the subjective conditions.

History teaches us that a revolutionary situation will persist for as long as a ruling class is unable to resolve its contradictions. But its persistence is conditional on the mood of the masses, their confidence in the revolutionary movement and its organisational ability to lead them out of the current impasse to the seizure of power. In the absence of the subjective conditions the revolutionary situation will pass. Success is dependent on the subjective factors. When we are speaking of the subjective conditions we are referring to the presence of revolutionary organisations, and of their ability to organise and lead the masses in all forms of struggle - armed struggle included. The subjective factor is organisation. It is the existence of a revolutionary party or movement which is capable of providing the correct strategic and tactical guidance, having created the forces and means to carry out the tasks of the struggle. This includes also the political and military readiness of the advanced masses who become part of the revolutionary army. When the masses fight with stones it shows the absence of revolutionary organs!

The past three years have shown us how relatively underdeveloped the subjective factor is. To overcome this weakness is the key task of our movement. We have had endless discussions and meetings about how this should be done. We have experimented with different structural forms. Differences of approach exist between military and political organs of the movement. He appears to agree in meetings but differ in practice. Confusion exists among rank-and-file comrades going home as to what structures to create, and between externally trained cadres and those activists who have never left home. In fact there are extremely few policy positions of either the ANC or SACP on how power is to be seized. And this is central to the problem. For unless we have a clear vision on how power is to be seized we cannot

effectively address the question of what type of organs are required for such a task. We cannot effectively address the subjective tasks.

What is demanded is a vision of how power is to be seized and a plan for the building of the forces and means to carry out this task. This vision and this plan must be clearly understood by all activists, at home and abroad, within the terms of their tasks and responsibilities so that all have a clear and common understanding of their own role within the machinery of struggle.

Central to the creation of the subjective factor is Umkhonto We Sizwe. For to achieve our goal - the seizure of political power through our strategy of revolutionary armed struggle - it is necessary to create a Revolutionary Army. The main obstacles on the way to power are the SA Defence Force and SA Police. These obstacles can only be defeated or removed through a Revolutionary Army. At present MK is only the nucleus of such an army. It has to be extended and developed to embrace all potential revolutionary forces;

### 3. THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMY

A Revolutionary Army must be composed and structured in such a way that it can be situated among the masses. The problem facing us is that the bulk of our army is recruited, trained and remains outside the country. As referred to already we face considerable problems in the infiltration and rooting of our combatants inside the country. The enemy understands this and his security forces work overtime to prevent this occurring. For once we succeed in basing our forces within the country the armed struggle will merge with the mass struggle and this will really spell the end of white supremacy.

An ex-Rhodesian farmer who has settled in the northern Transvaal border area said that our land mines, whilst creating a nuisance, would not really change the situation because we simply run in and out of the country. What caused the problem in Zimbabwe was that the "terrorists" were living among the people. And one might add that-until Zimbabwean guerrillas learnt how to live among the people their struggle remained in the doldrums as they engaged in hit-and-run raids into and out of their country.

My contention is that a clear conception of what the Revolutionary Army could and should be will help solve this problem.

Clearly the Revolutionary Army is the armed forces of the revolution. But we should not see it as a single uniform organ. It must consist of three component parts.

Firstly there are the Organised Advanced Detachments - the nucleus of the Revolutionary Army;

Secondly, the Revolutionary Armed People - who are the most active elements within the mass struggle who in time swell the ranks of the Revolutionary Army; Thirdly, there are the elements of the enemy Army and Police which are won over to the side of the Revolution.

It is essential to identify each of these components and have an organisational plan as to how to recruit them, prepare and train them, and bring them into the Revolutionary Army. Each of these components represent different levels of political and combat readiness and they require different forms of organisational work.

(i) The Organised Advanced Detachments

This is the nucleus of the Revolutionary Army. It is the base or core around which the Revolutionary Army must be built. The trained, full-time combatants of MK are

central to this core. But these combatants must themselves have different specialisations. They must be grouped into combat units of various types and specialities such as:

- a) Guerrilla units of the countryside - whose size and mode of operation will depend on the terrain. They aim to link up with the villagers and farm labourers.
- b) Underground combat groups of the urban areas - They base themselves in the factories, townships, residential areas and other work places. They may be combat groups, sabotage units, elimination squads; those who are not full-time MK combatants who "work by day and operate by night" (and this is preferable).
- c) Self-defence units - based in the factories, townships and rural areas.

\_ These have already begun to emerge out of necessity as the popular democratic organisations have been forced to defend themselves, their leaders, their homes, offices and meetings from the enemy forces. Self-defence units can be organised by legal or semi-legal organisations, as well as the underground, and form the basis of a people's self-defence militia. Trained MK cadres must merge into the

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self-defence units and lead them.

Creating the Advanced Detachments is the first necessary step to building the Revolutionary Army. For over 25 years we have concentrated on building one element of this core - MK. This has been done under extremely difficult and problematic conditions and has been a tremendous achievement which should not be belittled. Conditions have now developed which gives us the possibilities of extending MK into the Advanced Detachments spelt out above. The example of the emergence of the self-defence units illustrates this point.

By creating underground combat groups in the urban areas, and especially the factories; by developing the self-defence units in towns and villages; and by basing small units amongst the rural people we will begin to recruit combatants inside the country, amongst the workers, the women, the rural people and the youth, and overcome the most problematic consequences of having been based externally for

so many years. We will lose our dependence of having to recruit only those who are prepared to leave the country for training. By being locally based we will also considerably restrict the enemy's possibilities of infiltrating our ranks.

The development of the Organised Advanced Detachments, from their MK base, will enable us to root the armed struggle amongst our people within our country. This will enable us to arm our people and realistically prepare and plan for the armed seizure of power.

(ii) The Revolutionary Armed People

These are the most conscious, active elements from amongst the masses who have shown their readiness to confront the enemy with whatever means are at hand, from stones to petrol bombs and knives, to the building of barricades. They must be drawn into the Revolutionary Army. It is the task of the nucleus - the full-time combatants and guerrillas - to recruit, prepare and train them. These are the street fighters who in their tens of thousands have already engaged the enemy in numerous pitched battles. They are not only willing to take up arms but have been calling for arms. They must be given military skills and weapons and organised into disciplined fighting units under the organised command and leadership of the advanced detachments, to take part in the armed struggle for political power.

As the armed struggle develops so more and more activists from among the mass political struggle will be reached and drawn into the ranks of the Revolutionary Army. In this way the nucleus - or the vanguard - bridges the gap between itself and the masses, finds ways of the arming the people and creating the Revolutionary Army.

(iii) Units of the Enemy Armed Forces

These are elements from within the enemy Army and Police who are won over at decisive moments to side with the Revolution. It is a vital task to work within



the enemy forces, to agitate and politicise soldiers, police, vigilantes and other auxiliary forces of the enemy, in order to show them whb the true enemy is, thus rendering them ineffective to the state. Some sections will be neutralised, while others will be won over. Those who are won over to the side of the revolution bring their arms with them and become part of the Revolutionary Army.

Recent developments at home show the potential for such work particularly among black soldiers, officers and police. Some examples are the Transkei coup; the abortive coup in Bophuthatswana; mutinies among municipal police in Sebokeng and Lekoa; mutinies among Namibian troops on the Angolan border. Clearly there is considerable scope to win over these elements making the enemy pay the price for utilising black troops as cannon fodder.

The disaffection of many white conscripts with the SADF creates possibilities of at least neutralising significant sections of the white soldiers and possibly winning over to our side, at the decisive moment, some elements. Given the enemy's acute white manpower shortage the mere neutralisation of even, let us say, one-tenth of the white conscript army at a decisive moment could make all the difference to the balance of forces.

we have to move away simply from encouraging whites to refuse to serve in the SADF, to getting them actively involved in the SADF for purposes of clandestinely organising and agitating from within, no matter how difficult such a task may appear to be. In a lecture on the 1905 Revolution, Lenin remarked that "it is foolish peacefully to refuse to perform military service". It is necessary to struggle to win over or neutralise the enemy forces, for revolutionary movements seldom achieve their objectives unless they can convert or weaken the spirit of the soldiers whose duty it is to uphold the existing regime.

#### 4. THE UNDERGROUND AND THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMY

Prior to the Rivonia setback, when we had a strong underground network at home, the idea was that trained MK cadres, returning to the country, would be received by and fall under that structure. The logical development of a Revolutionary Army based on that underground would have resulted. The underground would have carried out the all-essential political tasks of organising the masses, building mass democratic, trade union and underground structures, developing illegal means of propaganda, engaging in all-round vanguard activity. The underground would have been the backbone of our Revolutionary forces and Army, recruited for it and given it leadership. Such an underground would have been clear about the use of revolutionary violence in which MK is the main striking force. After all it was the underground that created MK!

The intervening years have seen many problems building up. The lack of such an underground at home and the presence of a large guerrilla force outside the country, waiting to come to the defence of the people and punish the enemy, has, I feel, clouded our vision. In the most pragmatic sense the need to deploy MK cadres at home for combat work could not wait on the reconstruction of our internal underground. In the process this has helped to create a serious imbalance between our political and military structures. It has not been possible to suspend combat actions and concentrate on the building of the underground network, although it could be argued that greater talent, energy and resources should have been put into redressing this balance. For it is an incontrovertible point that a strong underground presence at home would help solve all the problems we face.

The reality, however, is that such an underground scarcely exists. We are not talking about a few score units and operatives able to partially influence the mass democratic movement. We are talking about an underground that can bring the masses into action, that can work for a nationwide general strike, that can help

build and lead the revolutionary armed forces.

Where an underground structure does not exist, or only partly exists, we must build both the underground structures and the Revolutionary Army. Such a structure must be capable of organising our people for political work and combat work. For this purpose we must use the best MK cadres as organisers. There is no need to have an artificial division between political work and combat work as long as we follow the principle that the ANC gives leadership to MK and that the Movement's structures control the Revolutionary Army.

At present we have incomplete structures, anyway. We have politico-military structures at our national headquarters and at regional command levels. These have to be developed at city, district and rural-area levels at home. In order to overcome the lack of an underground base we ought to concentrate on creating local committees at these levels. We must concentrate our effort at those localities where the mass struggles have been the fiercest. The political underground and combat forces will grow side by side, with the combat forces of course falling under the leadership of the local Politico-Military Committee. Attention will be paid to all forms of struggle with the activists and combatants ready to show the masses how to raise the struggle to the higher forms of armed struggle. The Politico-Military committees must ensure against both 'leftist' and 'opportunist' tendencies, i.e. against employing purely military or purely peaceful/legal forms of struggle.

The creation of these local underground bases will not only assist in the building of the Revolutionary Army, but will help to overcome the problems bogging us down at HQ. A network of local FMCs, with the responsibility to deal with tactical questions and other details, will bring to an end the myriad of links to Lusaka, the weak communication lines open to enemy penetration, the mass of paperwork and unnecessary reports, the complicated structures, the parallelism

and separatism of departments, the squandering of resources. It will end the problem of leaders overloaded with too much detailed work and free them to strategise, plan, direct, check and to organise support! reinforcement and resources.

Such local structures must be built from the bottom up using our most talented and experienced cadres - from local to city to regional to provincial committees. Communication must be organised from the top (i.e. Lusaka) down. In time we would require only four lines of communication - from Lusaka to the provincial PMCs.

True, the idea of FMCs has been tossed about for some time. But what is needed is a big shake-up in our approach from the top. We need to be frank, open and courageous. 'Perestroika' is fashionable nowadays. It is all about changing structures that do not work! We must avoid becoming like a factory with workers and managers who seem busy but do not produce the goods - only paper!

#### 5. THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMY AND INSURRECTION

During the process of developing the Revolutionary Army, we build our combat units, mercilessly attack the enemy forces, concentrate on eliminating his personnel which he cannot replenish and which is his Achilles' heel, demoralise his forces and all the time gather our own strength. We develop from 3 nucleus to a fully-fledged People's Army waging a People's war.

As to which of the components of the Revolutionary Army will give us the best results, the likely force, given South Africa's industrial base, will in all probability be the underground combat units based in the factories and townships - the very forces that have reminded us these past years of our people's industrial and urban insurrectionary strength.

Although the fierce reoppression unleashed by the enemy appears at the moment to have turned the tide of resistance of the past few years, we must bear in mind that mass resistance comes in waves. The struggle ebbs and flows. The people have learnt a great deal about their potential strength in this period. We must prepare our forces and means so that when the next waves of mass struggle rise to again batter the Apartheid system we must ensure that the armed struggle coincides with and reinforces the high tide of resistance. And the nature of the revolutionary situation that still persists in our country is such that the next waves of struggle will surely reach higher peaks than ever hitherto witnessed. As indicated earlier on, building the Revolutionary Army is the key to creating the subjective conditions of a revolutionary situation. As the forces and means of our revolution become more powerful, so the possibilities of seizing power will materialise.

How will power be seized? We cannot say exactly, but we must have a developed strategy. Yet in our policy documents and official statements surprisingly little guidance is given. One is left with the impression that a combination of mass struggle, strikes and armed blows will somehow create so much pressure on the regime that it will collapse and our Movement will take power. The impression is also created that such a situation might come about through some form of negotiation.

While there have been some lively debates and articles written about the role of insurrection, sometimes counterpoised to protracted guerrilla struggle or seen as a culmination of guerrilla struggle, no conclusions have yet been drawn in our strategy documents.

I stated at the outset that we need a clear vision of how power may be seized if we are to sort out our organisational problems and structures, as well as

motivate our cadres. Because structures must be geared to the strategy of seizing power, and that means not only leadership organs but structures at the grass roots.

An Armed Uprising or Insurrection has always been considered by revolutionaries as the main way to seize power. The onset of guerrilla struggles in colonially dominated countries from the 1950's on, usually resulting in negotiations and national independence, has perhaps created the impression that Insurrection is nowadays something far-removed from the realm of possibility. Tom lodge, in assessing the ANC's military potential in Work In Progress 50/51, writes that guerrilla insurgency's "importance will remain chiefly psychological", that "the probabilities are against a military based seizure of power". He is wrong of course, but can be excused because we have given him no cause to assume otherwise.

Of course we do not dogmatically claim that the seizure of power from one group by another must entail violence. History shows that a peaceful way is possible. But what is necessary to both - whether violent or peaceful - is the presence of the Revolutionary Army. The ruling class or group will never give up power voluntarily. If the ruling power in South Africa ever reaches a stage where they are hopelessly divided and are forced to negotiate, it will only be in the circumstance of a major crisis from which there is no other escape, and because of the presence of a Revolutionary Army.

On the other hand the possibility of a national armed uprising of all our people can only be open to us if we have the necessary forces and means to carry out the Insurrection. Every revolution which must depend for its ultimate success upon popular support demands an active revolutionary situation before insurrection can be safely launched. It also needs a movement which has the forces and means powerful enough to overthrow the existing order.

Insurrection is an open armed action taken by certain classes or social forces against the existing political power. It is the highest stage in the revolutionary process - the culmination of the objective and subjective factors into a decisive moment which, if the revolutionary forces are properly guided, leads to the seizure of power.

A successful insurrection requires necessary planning and preparation. Among these preparations are: the presence of a political underground; the presence of the Revolutionary Army; and work within the enemy forces to weaken their effective capacity.

The events of the last three years in our country, more particularly the fighting mood and spirit of our people and the strength of the working class and urban masses, together with the rising spirit in the countryside, has reminded us of the insurrectionary energy of our people. The gathering of our forces so that the subjective elements of our revolution are strengthened may be protracted or more rapid than we imagine. If we take advantage of the favourable conditions and are clear as to what organs we need to create, then it may take a much shorter time than we imagine. Building the Revolutionary Army, and with it the underground, with the insurrectionary seizure of power in mind, is an objective which can be achieved by planned, purposeful organisational work in a relatively short period of time (such as five years) where the conditions are favourable and where the Revolutionary Army is waging the war. One final point. The Revolutionary Army is not only the organ for building up the revolutionary forces and for seizing power, but it becomes the organ for defending and guaranteeing the revolution. If power came prematurely, through some negotiated formula imposed by circumstances beyond our control, and we had no Revolutionary Army at our disposal, we would find our people cheated of real

power. So whatever way we look at it, our most crucial task is the creation of a Revolutionary Army.

NOTE: The plan and method of creating the Revolutionary Army and preparing it for the seizure of power is called Military and Combat Work, or simply MC". Military Work is the task of undermining the Enemy Forces from within. Combat Work is the building of the combat forces of the revolution. MCW should not be confused with Secrecy - the techniques of underground work - which is . an essential tool for the implementation of MCW.

Lusaka 14/02/88



## POLITICAL EDUCATION AND THE AGRARIAN QUESTION

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The agrarian question is a much neglected front in our struggle.

It is not merely an important subject for political education, it should be treated as a priority because it is key to both the seizure of power and the success of the national democratic revolution.

1.1. For most of us the agrarian question is remote. We know something about an aspect of it, for instance, that whites own and blacks work, but we do not generally know what whites own, how much they own or if they own equally. Who works the land? Are there peasants or aspirant peasants? And where do the millions of landless people in the bantustans fit into rural relations? All these questions have answers which must be part of our political consciousness if the voice of the oppressed in the countryside is to find material space in our revolution. We need political education to make room for them.

1.2. If the essence of political education is to educate people about politics, what does the agrarian question have to do with politics? Is the social organisation of natural and human resources in the countryside a matter for state intervention which some argue undermines so-called 'natural economic laws'? The answer is that land is both a natural and political resource; a source of power and authority and that is why, as our history shows, control over the way land is distributed is first and foremost a political question. It is always politically determined, never less so than when it involves land and agrarian reform. The agrarian question is therefore a necessary subject of political education.

Within agrarian reform there is a complex and often contradictory interplay of forces which the state will suppress if it cannot reconcile. That is why the agrarian question is bound to be a terrain of struggle now and in the future. The strategy adopted by the new democratic government towards it will therefore be crucial for maintaining the momentum of the revolution.

2. What is meant by the agrarian question? It involves two distinct questions which are interwoven: the land and its usage.

The land question is about ownership. This covers urban as well as rural land and includes what is produced on the surface as well as the mineral resources below it. .I

The agrarian question is about the way production is organised and is shaped in large measure by the terms of ownership.

Key Issues

3.1. Paramount is the national dimension of the unequal distribution of land. Whites monopolise access to land throughout the country, with African access being confined to a fraction of the territory. Even the grossly disproportionate 87/131 division between white and black has taken 53 years to materialise from the time when the 1936 Natives Trust and Land Act decreed that the reserves should be increased from a little more than 7% to 13,81. During this time the African population has grown from approximately 8 million to some 26 million.

White monopoly of ownership is even greater. There are virtually no 'Coloured' land owners and apart from 2 000 Indian land holders who own a mere 72 000 ha, whites own the 85 million ha of farmland outside the reserves. Even within the so-called 'homelands' whites own most of the land through the SA Native Trust, a state institution created by the 1936 Act. Not more than 12% of the land acquired by the state during the period 1936-69 belonged to Africans. They were able to buy it only with the permission of the State President and on agreement to accept Bantu Authorities. The exact number of African landholders is unknown, although it is likely to be far fewer than the 50 000 target set by the state, despite the fact that during the past decade the state has been encouraging individual "freehold" tenure.

White monopoly of land shapes all other issues of importance to the question.

3.2. After the Anglo-Boer War, the British left their former enemies in possession of their conquered land and made no provision for the black majority. These conditions persisted under the South Africa Act of 1910 which transferred absolute power to the white minority. In 1911 the Labour Regulations Act was passed to satisfy the demand for cheap labour from mining capital. And in 1913, the Natives Land Act was passed in response

to farmers' demands to break competition from African peasants and to prevent competition for black labour from the mining houses. These Acts were to shape land and labour relations right up until the present day. Through its monopoly of land and political power associated with it, the white minority has been responsible for the perpetuation and entrenchment of the migrant labour system, the grievous distortion of African social demography, the concentration of women and children in the reserves, the expulsion and shoring up of a substantial proportion of the country's surplus population within their boundaries and the alienation of large sections of the working class.

Without going into detail about each of these aspects, there are three points that need to be stressed:

a) political education must bring out the connection between African landlessness and other features of apartheid;

b) the implications of these distortions must be borne in mind when we consider land and agrarian reform;

c) the land issue has the potential of being the stumbling block of minority rule and the building block of popular power. To unleash it we need a strategy.

3.3. I distinguish between white power and class power. Both provide the white minority with a monopoly of power but in different ways. To discuss class relations on the land we have to consider how production is organised. Agricultural production is overwhelmingly capitalist, the dominating social forces being the big landowners and the black proletariat.

The main characteristics of the land-owning class is that:

i) it is numerically very small, representing a mere 0,172 or 58 000 of 34 million South Africans.

ii) Most farmers run small or medium sized holdings but production is dominated by a small group of capitalists. The average net income of 20% of farming enterprises was R146 200 (1981/2) or 16 times greater than for the remaining 80%.

iii) It is overwhelmingly white.

iv) Big land owners are closely linked with mining and industrial capital

v) The white farming establishment is closely tied up with the state, and especially its security forces.

The main features of the agricultural working class are that:

- i) It is large. Approximately 1,09 million black men, women and children work in the sector outside the bantustans, and it is the third largest source of employment for Africans.
- ii) It is black. There are no white farm workers. The majority of farm workers are African, although in the Western Cape a large proportion are 'Coloured'. The few Indians who work in the sector are mainly employed in managerial positions.
- iii) Women and children make up a large proportion of the farm labour force. Workers are also divided by colour and whether they are employed in 'full-time' or 'part-time' jobs.
- iv) The majority of workers have been made into migrants or 'commuters' with a decreasing proportion who are resident on the farms.
- v) Farm workers' contact with the industrial and urban proletariat is relatively weak and they remain a somewhat isolated and poorly organised section of the working class.
- vi) Farm workers labour under very extreme conditions of oppression and exploitation and they are very, very poor.

In addition to land-owners and farm workers, there are intermediary classes, particularly small farmers and peasants. There is little to distinguish between them, although small family farming is strictly a capitalist relation whereas peasant production is not. A number of white land owners are small family farmers who barely produce enough to cover their debts each year. Many of the Indian and African farmers are also small family farmers, although they are generally not referred to as such.

The term peasant is used in South Africa to refer to Africans only. Because of the systematic destruction of peasant production outside the reserves, with few exceptions, it is mainly confined to within their boundaries. The exact number of people engaged in peasant production is not known, but it contributes less than 8% to the gross domestic product of all the bantustans put together. The majority of peasants are landless and without livestock and although they look for any means of survival, they are also extremely land hungry.

3.4. The isector is characterised by capitally intensive production built on super-exploited black labour. These extremes are possible because of white minority domination. African national oppression and the general rightless of the black working class. But they are also the result of capitalist production relations, so that even when colonial domination is broken, capitalism will try and find every means to increase profits.

3.5. The state, as the political instrument of class power, has been very active in shaping relations on the land. It has systematically sponsored white farmers at the expense of black, outlawing African commercial and peasant production to the reserves. And even there it has set the limits to which they might aspire. The state has sponsored intensive capitalisation of production at enormous economic and social cost in order to reduce the dependency of white farmers on black labour. It has ruthlessly encouraged and provided the means for farmers to exploit forced labour, to this day denying farm workers their status as workers and robbing them of their elementary rights. The state has forced the further dispossession of African peasants within the bantustans through its so-called 'betterment scheme' which robbed thousands of land and livestock. And during the past decade it has sponsored commercialisation within these areas, becoming a direct exploiter of African farm labour on its agricultural estates.  
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National and class relations, how production is organised and the role of the state are the main issues on the land and agrarian question. If the even more than this because the political message is inescapable:

- there is a need for fundamental change;
- there are social forces capable of bringing about this transformation;
- and transformation - whether it occurs at all and the direction it takes - depends on the strategy of the political vanguard organisation.

## Agrarian Transformation

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4. The initiative for agrarian transformation lies with us. Political education has a very important role to play in formulating our strategy by providing structured discussion around the main problems.

Agrarian transformation is not a new or particularly South African problem. It was hotly debated in Europe during the 19th and 20th century and today, it is the centre of concern for those countries struggling to develop. Until recently, it had not received much attention in our country, but now it has become another terrain of sharp ideological struggle.

It is relatively easy to identify the essential issues and root causes behind the problems on the land. It is harder to effectively organise against the existing social order in the countryside, but it is particularly difficult to carry out the complex process of transformation once political power has been won. Even when we arrive at theoretical solutions to the problem, these are often far from their practical realisation. This means that our strategy must be built on the assumption that agrarian transformation is a process which will only achieve its goals in struggle.

The framework of our Strategy

4.1. Our strategy should encompass two stages: the first is now, in the struggle for power; the second if after we have won power, when we begin to implement change. Although they are interrelated, each stage has different priorities. Nevertheless, what we are fighting against must be linked with what we are fighting for in the countryside. We should strengthen political and social alliances to create a firm base on which agrarian reconstruction can be carried through. This means locating agrarian transformation in the front line of rural struggle - amongst the peasants and farm workers.

Already work has begun with initiatives to form a farm workers' union, to organise the unemployed, to organise rural areas into civics, youth and women's organisations, to organise cooperatives of various types etc. But to link the two stages of our strategy we need more organisation. We are constrained in our actions over the rightlessness of farm workers and the general conditions of landlessness because we can't physically defend popular seizure of land or politically mobilise mass protest on a national

scale in support of farm worker strikes and other rural popular actions. We need to strengthen and expand our underground and armed capacity and at the same time, actively raise the land question as a national grievance throughout the country.

4.2. If we do this, we must also have a clear idea about the alternatives we propose. What options do we have?

The priority must be to redress the grossly unequal distribution of land between black and white; Even the apologists of white power recognise this.

The necessary first step is to repeal all the laws which restrict access to land by reason of colour, especially the Land Acts and the Group Areas Act. All people will be able to live in the country without restriction.

Abolishing the Land Acts will definitely alter African access to land.

A fraction of the population will be able to buy land, but the majority will be forced into tenancy relations with land owners, who mostly will be white. In other words, as sections of monopoly capital have been keen to point out, land ownership patterns will not be fundamentally altered by repealing these laws.

In order to change ownership patterns, it is therefore not enough to discard racist land laws. There has to be direct intervention on the question of private property. Some form of nationalisation has to be contemplated. It is a fundamental error to think that nationalisation of land has anything in common with socialism. At a certain stage of development nationalising land can be in the interests of capitalists, because it frees capital that is uselessly tied up in property for productive expansion. But it is definitely in the interests of the majority of the people for a number of reasons:

a) Nationalising land abolishes the m a r k e t in land, putting an end to land speculation and the inflationary effects this has on the economy.

b) If all land is nationalised, then all access will be through tennacy.

The state, as landlord' can overcome national and social barriers to access to land by establishing a fixed and nominal rent.

c) It will ensure that the earnings of tenants will not be misdirected into unproductive activities, like enriching private landlords, but rather can be channeled into productive agricultural activities.

d) Land rent will go directly into state funds for social redistribution.

It is in the interests of the new, democratic government to nationalise

all the land, thereby bringing under its control all unoccupied and underutilised land.

Nationalising this 'rimland', most of which is marginal and borders on the bantustans, although a white farmer's dream, would hardly begin to meet popular demands for land or increased output that the new state will face. The white farming establishment would be left untouched while the state would be left to grapple with urban and rural discontent.

In order, therefore, to quantitatively and qualitatively change relations on the land it is necessary to go a step further. It is not enough to change the terms of land tenure. The dominant relations of production in the sector have to be changed, and this means expropriating white owned enterprises. A popular government has several options.

a) It can nationalise small and medium sized enterprises. This would release a large proportion of farm land for redistribution, whilst leaving the largest and presently most productive enterprises in tact. Production could be sustained at the same time as the land needs of a large proportion of the population would be met. The price, however, would be the continued domination of monopoly interests in the sector who would determine to a very large extent, the how and what of agricultural production, including the terms of exploitation of labour.

b) Alternatively, large and medium sized enterprises can be expropriated. This too would release land and it would break the back of the big agricultural bourgeoisie, without bringing small white farmers into the conflict. The problem is how would this affect food production? For how long would production be disrupted and could the state ensure that food would be produced in quantities and at a cost that would satisfy urban and industrial demand.

c) If the state can expropriate all enterprises. In addition to the opposition this would unleash from all sections of the agricultural establishment as well as international capital, the same question about production that has been raised in the point above would have to be answered.

Those who remain and wish to be part of a democratic South African state.

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As an option it would offer the greatest possibilities to redress the national inequalities on the land as well as to reorganise the way the land is used.

There are some additional points which have to be considered, no matter the option the post-apartheid state chooses.

1) How is the land to be redivided? When we say that the land shall be shared amongst those who work it, does this literally mean breaking up the land into small peasant holdings or could it not also include forms of cooperative and social (state) ownership. What should the balance be between 'peasant' and production demands? What combination of forms of production should be encouraged to make sure that as many demands are met as adequately as possible?

ii) Nationalisation raises the question of compensation?. Should landowners and owners of agricultural enterprises be compensated? What reaction can be expected both at home and abroad if no compensation is paid? If the new government decides in favour of compensation, what price is it going to pay and where is the money to come from?

Although the approach which the government of a democratic South Africa adopts to agrarian transformation will be determined by its social composition and the interests it will have to serve, it is possible and necessary for us to have a strategy on the question. In formulating it, we should be guided by the often contradictory and therefore not easily reconcilable needs that have to be met, namely:

- land hunger, the most urgent grievance of people in the bantustans and on white owned- farms;
  - the need to feed the people as a whole at a price they can afford;
  - the demands placed on the sector by both manufacturing and finance for high and efficient output;
  - ensuring there is work, security and comfort for all who live off the land.
- These are the challenges before us.

T. Marcus

22.2.1988

REPORT OF THE NATIONAL YOUTH SECRETARIAT  
TO THE END NATIONAL YOUTH COMEEREEEEEMEETING  
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HELD 1671q FEBRUARY 1 88

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This report covers the period Aug.1987-Feb.1988. It is an attempt to detail the activities that the ull-IIII Youth Secretariat has done since wonference. In the recent past period, the Secretariat has endeavoured to implement as best as it could, the decisions of Conference. Frnm the report itself, it will be clear that some of the desks have not started functioning because a number of comrades .elected by Conference have not been released by their former depar- tments" We sincerely hope all these issues will be sorted out as soon as possible so that our Section can be fully functional.

Below is a summarized version of the report of the NYS to the NYC. The internal drive of the Youth Section is carried out and co-ordi- nated through the SubuCommittee for Internal Mobilisation, composed of four presens and these members of the NYC deployed within the PMC SubmStructures in the forward areas and internally. The first meeting ef the SubuCommittee was held in Octobar, 1987 to orient . members and explain the guiding principles in co-ordinating within the PMC Umbrella.

For a starts reports were submitted for discussion by the nys; covering develOpments in the Youth Front of the past year, as well as the problematic area-n In this way, the youth leadership has been able ts mike its contribution ln developments at home and in general. We have been able to hold Official discussions with both the leadership of the South African Youth and Students Organisations- onse These meetings gave the Youth Secretabiet a better understa- nding of youth thinking at home; problehs they face and possible solutions that could be employed ts resolve problems and shortcoa .mingsu

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The NYS, through its Sub-Committee, is currently addressing the Education Crisis especially its effect on the High School Students Movement. The State-Of-Emergency has taken a heavy toll within this Section resulting in poor co-ordination and weakening of structures. At a recently held National Students Co-ordinating Committee Extended Conference, a new Interim body composed of two representatives from each region has been set up. It is expected to launch this organisation - nationally. On the other hand, the Progressive Teacher's Movement; in co-ordination with other Structures are holding Consultative meetings aimed at creating a single Progressive Teacher's Union. We shall continue to make our contributions for the realisation of the above objectives.

The NYS has initiated discussions with youth and women's Organisations and influential personalities on the subject of the creation of a National Pioneer Organisation. According to recent reports, this work has begun taking shape at home. '

The NYS took part in the process which culminated in the Gaborone launch of the Union of Southern African Students (USAS). It is an anti-imperialist Student Movement aimed at promoting a regional solidarity and support to the liberation struggle in Namibia and South Africa.

Late in 1987, the NYS organised and took part in a working visit together with representatives of youth from home to our units in DAKAWA and Mazimbu with a view of giving comrades a briefing on the situation and the state of organisation of youth inside the country.

It is obvious that due to the nature of work involved, the report cannot go further than it has.

DESK OF ORGANISATION, EDUCATION AND CULTURE

The main task of this desk is connected with the all-round activities of the youth in our Movement. The desk has to see that the youth, through their structures, uplift the political, cultural and educational levels of our Movement.

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For this take place, the desk has to ensure that the youth is organised and its political maturity remains high. It has to ensure that the masses of our youth in the Movement are in constant contact with the youth leadership and are kept abreast with all developments in our Movement and our struggle in general. To pursue its tasks effectively, the desk must have links not only with the youth structures but must also have close ties with the Movement's Departments of Education and Arts and Culture; and, since the desk is concerned with personnel, it must of necessity establish links with the other related departments of our Movement like the DMD and Health, which would help solve practical problems from time to time.

It was the broadness of the tasks of this desk that brought the first NYC Meeting after the 2nd National Youth Conference to conclude that this desk needed a lot of mobility. Unfortunately, the basis for the mobility of the desk has not been created as its Secretary has not been relieved of his tasks in the Movement to do full time youth work. This has hampered the advance of this desk. In the 4 months since the Conference, activities of this desk cannot be said to have been impressive, to say the least. Besides the issuing of 66 Conference Documents to regions, there has been an insignificant contact with youth in general. The desk Secretary has had physical contacts with only one region, Angola. Thanks to the few visits by: other NYS members to some of our areas, our comrades in those regions have had the opportunity to be linked with our activities as the NYS.

Links have been made with the Education Department and one comrade has been found to deal with this aspect of our work. We are presently acquainting ourselves with the problems faced in the educational sphere. Work with the Cultural Department is not yet well organised. Save for a few exchanges on technical matters on cultural matters with the desk, we have not gone down to our own youth level to deal with this matter. We are still looking for a suitable candidate to help in this aspect of our work and this move will complete the personnel needs of the desk. '

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It would be difficult to give a general picture of the state of organisation of the youth in the various regions since the last reports were those sent to Conference. We may here account for a few:- Zambia is stagnant; Zimbabwe has a functioning core and faces problems of mass participation; Angola is re-structuring after the Conference; USSR is functioning and Bulgaria is functioning.

#### DESK FOR PROJECTS, FINANCE AND MATERIAL ASSISTANCE

The Sub-Committee consists of two persons although it is proposed that it should consist of at least three. Part of the limitation in increasing the number has been lack of enough Office Space. The period between August 1987 and January 1988, has in the main been used for planning the work of the Sub-Committee. A proposal of how the Sub-Committee will function was drawn up and discussed in an NYS Meeting. The planning process has been made more difficult because of the non-existence of the desk for Projects before Conference.

Meetings and consultations have been held with the Treasurer-General, the Secretary for Administration in the TGO; the Projects Office and the Women's Section (Sub-Committee for Projects) to find out as to how we will co-ordinate our work. In meetings with the TG, he stressed the fact that the youth must be involved in a series of fund-raising Campaigns for which the TGO could provide tickets. This is being followed-up.

#### MEETINGS WITH DELEGATES WITH WHOM FINANCE AND MATERIAL AID WAS DISCUSSED:

KMO-U.S.S.R.

In their visit to Lusaka, KMO informed the ANC Youth Delegation that they had raised some material for the ANC and wanted to know where it is to be sent. KMO also wanted a list of our needs for further work.

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B; MEETING WITH I.F.L.R.Y.

The need for a sponsor for the \$65 000 needed to purchase a building for new Youth Offices and Centre was raised. They were taken to the building at took photos. Upon return to their base they sent us a telex to the effect that they would raise the amount by December 1989. They needed a further Project Description which was Sent.

C. MEETING WITH OCLAE

. The delegation was met during the Arusha Conference. When the issue of Fund-Raising was presented they requested for a list of needs or a project around-which the fund-raising could be done.

D. MEETING WITH TECHNICA (USA)

It is group of mainly Technical Workers. In light of some problems in placing our graduates, the following proposals were made:

- that they send books and other reading material for a library that would cater for this Section of our Youth. A list of the fields of study will later be sent after consultations with the DMD.

- . - attaching our youth to Professionals for Information on and guidance in research work. This will initially be done through the NYS.

- study possibilities of having a youth Training and Service Centre e.g. expansion of the Electronics Workshop.

E. MEETING WITH E.Dahlin (SIDAZ\_FOREIGN MINISTRY)

The Fund-Raising Tour to the Nordic Countries was raised with her. Also raised was:

- needs for the Pioneer Camp and
- Accommodation for Amandla Group.

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F. MEETING WITH TEMBA VILAKAZIz- FFAFSA (USA)

FFAFSA - Fund for Free South Africa.

1. The question of fund-raising tour in the USA was discussed and the comrade made the following proposals for the tour:

- that it be linked with or co-ordinated with the American Committee On Africa (ACOA) speaking tour.

- that better results will be achieved if the delegation was: an eloquent speaker

- : female and

- z with some personal experience.

- that if in some way the link between our work and that of the youth inside Sbnth Africa could be explained, it would be better.

2. The question of other needs for the Pioneers and the Youth was raised and we were asked to write them out with some information ourselves. This was done.

3. A list of Magazines, Journals or Newspapers that we need should be sent so that we may receive them.

G. LYBIA (Gu9plach)

The NYS received some goods from Lybia which passed through Angola mostly stationary.r '

H. SSM (CSSR)

In a meeting during their Congress, our problems of transport was raised. They promised two cars in January 1988.

I. RYC - USSR.

The Regional Youth Committee requested for a list of needs and were allocated the project of furnishing the Youth Office and Centre.

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J. CUSO

It is presently sponsoring the following projects for the NYS.

- Driving 5 people. t
- . - French Language 3 people.
- Also inciided is Typing

All the lessons have already started and would continue to also include other members of different departments of our Movement.,  
DESK FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

At present, the Sub-Committee consists of only two members i.e. the Assistant Secretary and one extra member. The long-term plan is to increase this number to three (3) because we intend to specialise on the six (6) continents of the world with each member concentrating on two (2). As for now, the second member of the Sub-Committee serves the Sub-Committee as somekind of an Administrative Secretary and also attending to problems of visas for people travelling outside.

We have worked out a weekly . - - rogramme which includes days for Sub-Committee meetings; days for drafting or discussing draft speeches for outgoing delegations; days for the briefing of delegations etc. We also worked out a Draft Programme Of Action for this year.

#### ACTIVITIES:

'Not much has happened at the International Relations Level during this period. However, the following few activities about-which written reports have been made, have taken place.

A delegation consisting of two members of the NYC/NYS and a student from SOMAFCO attended the 2nd Nordic-SADCC Youth Meeting in Koge-Denmark in September which was preceeded by a tour of the four (4) Nordic countries. This Conference was assessed by the delegation as very succesful not-with-standing several problems that were encountered during the deliberations.

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- During the month of November another NYC delegation attended the 15th Congress of the International Union of Students (IUS) held in Havana. This Occassion which was attended by over 400 delegates from all over the world, served as yet another opportunity to consult with other delegates on bilateral issues and questions in addition to allowing us to influence the general course of events.

- We also sent another delegation of the NYS to Mozambique to attend the Commemorative activities marking the 10th Anniversary of the founding of the OJM. During their stay, the delegates also had a formal meeting with OJM leadership on bilateral issues. In line with the resolutions of the first (1) NYC Meeting, we sent a three men delegation to the People's Republic of Angola on an official visit to the J-MPLA. The discussions held centred mainly on our last Youth Conference and on matters of bilateral relations. The delegation was also taken on a tour of the Southern Area of the country to familiarise it with the effects of the undeclared war unleashed by racist South Africa.

- The Secretary for Youth was invited to join a WFDY delegation to a Seminar between the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) and the Nordic Centre Youth (NCY) held in Finland this February. During this visit he also held meetings with a number of Finnish Youth and Students delegations on various questions of support for our struggle during the coming period.

- We also took part in the Arusha Conference where we were represented by one delegate with four (4) other members of the NYC participating in Various other capacities.

- A one man delegation represented us in the International Youth Conference held in India in October last year. The theme of this Conference was " Youth of the World for a Nuclear Free Asia and the Pacific".

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\_ The Secretary for Information; and Publicity represented us in the International Seminar of Journalists meant to mark the 70th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution held in Moscow late last year.

- We also sent a delegation to participate in the Coffee Harvest Brigade in Nicaragua. At the time of writing, the delegation had not returned as yet and are therefore unable to formulate proper impressions on this.

- We have so far received only one delegation from outside ( A Canadian Youth Delegation from various anti-apartheid groups. The purpose of its visit was to acquaint itself more with the ANC; its projects and the general situation in Southern Africa. An appropriate programme of their stay was therefore arranged which included lectures, video shows and visits to some of our projects and a discussion with the NYS.

During this time we also received invitations from various other friends that we could not honour due to the fact that these could not transport our delegations. We however, sent messages of greetings to most of these events.

REPORT OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE FOR INFORMATION AND PUBLICITY;

The Sub-Committee has not had an easy period since the 2nd National Youth Conference. The problem of manpower has continued to bedevil the Sub-Committee. Instead of the problem being alleviated it has worsened. For instance, the desk for Information and Publicity does not have effectively the Assistant Secretary. This means that in the Secretariat Meetings it is never effectively represented.

Since Conference, the Sub-Committee has managed to issue out only one issue of Forward. Presently, we are working on the first issue for the year and we may finish with it by the end of this month. Radio work has been going on. We have managed up to now to broadcast regularly.

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After Conference the Sub-Committee set itself tasks. Some of these were to work out working methods of the sub-committee. However, due to certain problems most of these have not been put into effect. We are hoping that soon we will be able to work according to these working methods a copy of which was submitted to the Secretariat. Another task that was given to the sub-committee was the compiling of Conference documents into a booklet. This has not been accomplished yet but work on it is going on.

There are areas of publicity that the subcommittee would like the Secretariat to consider. Firstly, it is an undeniable fact that propaganda for any organisation is very important. For us in the Youth Secretariat the regularity of can see the worth of our contribution. It is therefore imperative for the Secretariat to pay more attention to the improvement of this desk. The question of manning the desk with qualified personnel both in terms of having certificates and having people with the correct political direction is of the essence. Furthermore the urgency of the matter can never be over emphasised.

Attention does not only mean that We should get the desk properly staffed but the members of the Secretariat should be readily available to contribute to the radio and 'Forward' through articles. In this regard we would like to commend the desk for Pioneers which has always been ready to write articles when asked.

Secondly, the question of the Assistant Secretary for the desk needs urgent attention. It is only through him that the sub-Sommittse has any link not when we talk in the corridors. Once again it would be correct to mention that propaganda is one of the most important areas of our work and this should never be forgotten in our daily work. In this regard priority must be given to the desk.

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#### PARTICIPATION OF MASUPATSELA IN THE REGIONS

It is difficult for the desk of Pioneer Organisation to list a detailed information on the situation of Pioneer work in the regions. This has been caused by the regions not submitting their reports. V

There are only three (3) regions that have been active though out of them only one has submitted a report. i.e. Maputo region. The major problems in these regions are as follows:

(1) Transport. has made their meeting difficult. Attempts have been made with the other departments but this has been very difficult. The other problems that contribute into this is the inactiveness of the RYC's in the regions.

(2) Venue: this problems existed even when the young Pioneers were under the WOmEn's Section. In all the regions there are no specific venues for Pioneer meetings (work) e.g. Pioneer Houses. This problem has contributed a lot in delaying the implementation of the programme of young pioneers. This reflects when pioneers are supposed to take up tasks particularly at international level.

93) Personnel: This is major problem to our work. Eversince the Pioneers became the responsibility of the Youth' Section, we have trained 16 comrades and out of this only one comrades is working fulltime though she has done only a crash-course, of 24 hrs in Pioneer work in the USSR. The problem is the selection of comrades. Without the personnel trained in the technical knowhow there will be no smooth running of work of pioneers in all the regions. The Youth must be firm and political in choosing comrades who will attend such courses.

(4) Participation of Pioneers in International Summer Camps is becoming very poor. This reflects the poor organisation in the regions. This must be improved by the Youth. '

#### ACHIEVEMENTS

##### INTERNAL:

- We have trained Pioneer Leaders since the responsibility was given to the youth though we are still having problems in assisting

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