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SOWETAN 13-05-92

Death threat for Swazi Minister

MBABANE - A Swazi Cabinet Minister, who was this week reported to have been pestered by men who wanted to steal his bath towel, yesterday said he had received death threats.

Transport and Communications Minister Mr Albert Shabangu caused controversy soon after his appointment early this year when he raised the fine for

Sowetan Africa News Service

abuse of government vehicles from R60 to R4 000.

Sources at his Mbabane home said at the weekend that two men had made repeated attempts to obtain his bath towel, first by saying they had been sent by him to collect it and then by trying to buy it.

Shabangu's maid said the two offered her R2 000

if she would give them the towel, but she refused.

There was wide speculation in Swaziland that the men wanted to harm Shabangu and had been advised by a sangoma to get his towel so that "muti" could be used on it.

Police

The incident was reported to the police and yesterday Shabangu said he had received calls about the

towel incident, together with death threats. He said the caller told him his maid had saved his life by refusing to hand over the towel.

Teacher

Shabangu is a former teacher and was a forceful leader of the teachers' trade union before he became a Cabinet Minister.

Police said yesterday they are investigating the matter.

Ten held over taxi killings

BOPHUTHATSWANA police have arrested 10 men in connection with the death of two taxi drivers who were shot and killed in Eersterus on Friday night.

The victims were apparently forced out of their vehicles, ordered to lie face-down and shot in the head.

The two, Mr Charles Nkuna and his friend known only as Mr Nhlane, were allegedly killed by a "hit squad" hired by a member of a rival taxi association in Hammanskraal, according to Mr Sipho Mahlobo, president of the South African Taxi Association Peace Committee.

Nhlane and Nkuna were towing a minibus on the outskirts of Eersterus when they were stopped by unknown men.

The killings are believed to be linked to the conflict between the Soshanguve Long Distance Taxi Association, of which the two men were members, and the Letlhabile Taxi Association.

The dispute between the two organisations is over the route between Marabastad in Pretoria and Pietersburg.

Mahlobo said the peace committee had been involved in discussions with both taxi

By **MONK NKOMO**

associations to resolve their dispute.

"We have established that this hit squad was promised R10 000 if they killed the owner of the taxis operated by both men, and R5 000 if they eliminated his drivers," he said.

Bophuthatswana police spokesman Colonel David George confirmed the killings, but said he did not know more about the case or if any arrests had been made.

"We found eight spent cartridges on the scene," Mahlobo said.

Mahlobo said they conducted investigations immediately after the bodies were discovered on Saturday morning and found footprints on the scene belonging to a Mamelodi man who is an alleged member of the "hit squad".

He said they reported their findings to the Bophuthatswana police in Temba, Hammanskraal, who later arrested 10 men near a local fast-food outlet.

According to Mahlobo, police also confiscated three unlicensed firearms found in the suspects' possession.



DALI MPOFU

ANC sacks Dali Mpofu

Mr Dali Mpofu, Mrs Winnie Mandela's former deputy in the ANC's social welfare department, was dismissed from his position "some time last week."

ANC spokesman Ms Gill Marcus yesterday confirmed the dismissal.

She said he had been dismissed for internal departmental matters.

Mpofu was romantically linked to Mrs Mandela in media reports when her husband Nelson announced their separation on April 13. But he has denied any intimate relationship with Mrs Mandela.

Mrs Mandela resigned as head of the social welfare department two days later. - Sapa.

'I was offered R260 for every person I killed.'

RING OF DEATH

SPECIAL REPORT
By MATHATHA
TSEDU
Investigations
Editor

The ring of death

● From page 1

the townships.

According to our investigations, Hillbrow police arrested five people but are not investigating the involvement of the group in the violence in Alexandra.

The men were released on warning and are to appear in the Hillbrow Magistrate's Court on May 19 on charges of assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm.

Bhengu says he knows all the men who attacked

him. He says they wanted him to join them in a killing spree they were conducting in Alexandra at the time.

A police spokesman, Warrant Officer A Pieke, said Bhengu had "been arrested previously for assaulting people. This could just be a revenge attack".

April 4, the date on which Bhengu was attacked, saw the most intense fighting in Alexandra.

He said in discussions with the squad, he had understood that they had been

involved in the killings in Alexandra for "at least three weeks", almost bringing it to the time when serious outbreak of violence started on March 7.

According to Bhengu, an organisation finances the operations.

The Alexandra fighting was largely seen as township residents fighting hostel dwellers. Bhengu's information, however, indicates that the instigation may have been done by a flying killer squad.

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FORMER Natal flyweight and welter-weight champion Mr Peter Nkosentle Bhengu (53) says he was offered R260 for every person he killed in Alexandra when violence hit the area last month.

Bhengu, formerly of Chatham Court in Joubert Park, Johannesburg, refused the offer made to him by his flatmates, who worked as security guards. They boasted they had found a way of making money.

Later he was attacked with pangas and knives because he now knew "too much", and left for dead.

Bhengu miraculously survived the vicious attack, which left him with impaired speech, hearing and sight. He was in a coma for about 17 days at the Hillbrow Hospital. He was later discharged but had to be admitted to Baragwanath Hospital the same day, after he had collapsed.

He reported the matter to the police. The police arrested the men. When Bhengu later went to the flat to collect his clothing, he found his attackers had been released. He ran away.

His revelations suggest that Johannesburg's flatland may also be one of the many bases used by mobile killer squads sowing death and destruction in

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LOWETAN 13-05-92

Sanderton Chronicle

13/5/92

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MAYBE more Sandtonians should learn to speak an African language.

For if you understood Xhosa this is what you would have heard chairman of the Alexandra Civic Organisation Moses Mayekiso say, at the end of the May Day rally held in the Alexandra Stadium:

"Gatsha (Buthelezi) is a criminal and should be removed. Why doesn't he come here and talk to the hostel people? Doesn't he know he is guilty?"

"You must fight Inkatha and get them out of Alex. You mustn't accept people being killed. We want unity of the people, but not unity with the violent, the criminals.

"The people in the hostel aren't happy now and it's because they know they're going to have to move.

"De Klerk and Gatsha

are criminals because they didn't want to take Inkatha out so they didn't come and discuss all this with the people because they know they are guilty.

"The violence is all a class war, capitalist class wants to destabilise workers. Down with capitalism, on to socialism! We want an OAU international monitoring group.

"The community in Alex must fight for power. Defence units must be supported by the people. People who are well trained MUST USE GUNS and chase out Inkatha. People must fight, roll up their trousers and get Inkatha out of Alex.

"Trained people must train others. They must not just say 'I'm well trained so I'll just help my family'.

"If all this can happen, the next step will be everyone will live in peace." - (Taken from a verbatim transcript of the speech.)

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Sandton Chronicle

13/5/92

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Alex leader incites violence

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VOS I F P

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Consensus in one Codesa group
points way to transition period

Joint control of security

By Esther Waugh
Political Reporter

The first practical benefits of the Codesa process emerged yesterday with a series of far-reaching agreements secured in the working group dealing with the creation of a climate for free political activity.

There is apparent across-the-board agreement on a range of key specific issues regarding the transition period.

These include control of the security forces to be placed in the hands of interim governmental structures, and independent control of telecommunications, including the SAB.

Although implementation of these breakthrough decisions will depend on similar progress in other working groups, the stage has been reached whereby the proposals will be put to Codesa 2, starting on Friday.

In the Codesa hot seat
Page 15

The agreements therefore represent the most advanced phase yet in the negotiations process. If they proceed through the endorsement stage without further incident, South Africans will for the first time be given a picture of how the country will be run in the period leading up to elections for an interim government.

The core significance of the decisions rests in the fact that the Government would be acceding to genuine power-sharing with extra-parliamentary groups and the people of the country.

forces — one of the most controversial aspects of the current system — the working group said it was "satisfied that all security forces should be placed under the control of interim/transitional governmental structures".

In this regard, the working group took note of proposals tabled in working group 3 (dealing with transitional arrangements) to set up councils, with one or more specifically intended to deal with the security forces.

It also agreed that mechanisms should be implemented to ensure the public accountability of the security forces and that a code of conduct should be agreed to and implemented.

The group further agreed that a "programme of orientation, designed with a view to improving security force-community relations, specifically with regard to respect for human rights, non-racialism and democracy", should be implemented.

The working group had not yet reached agreement on the composition of the security forces or on operations which might limit free political activity.

Concerning telecommunications and the SAB, the group said it had not yet finalised whether the independent board of control should be called the South African Independent Telecommunications Authority or the South African Independent Telecommunications Commission.

It was, however, agreed that the independent body should ensure that a wide range of telecommunications services was available throughout South Africa.

Govt's corruption a block to peace: Hani

GOVERNMENT corruption and its involvement in the murder and assassination of political activists were the major obstacles to peace and a negotiated settlement, South African Communist Party secretary-general Mr Chris Hani said yesterday.

In a statement to Sapa Mr Hani said: "Therefore, it is quite clear that the major decision to be taken at Codesa Two is the demand for the immediate and unconditional resignation of this illegitimate, corrupt, neo-fascist and decadent regime making way for an interim

government of national unity which would pave the way for elections to a constituent assembly.

"These latest scandals, we believe, are only the tip of the iceberg. They clearly reveal a pattern of massive financial corruption that affects the entire fabric of government.

"The victims are the poorest of the poor who are currently facing serious crises in housing, employment, health services and education," Mr Hani said.

The DP spokesman on Development Aid, Mr Peter Soal, said the fact that six civil ser-

vants could be the fall guys for billions of rands fraudulently misappropriated from the Department of Development Aid would not satisfy public anger.

He said in a statement that the government had to move swiftly to assure the public that it was committed to clean and open administration.

While the officials were pursued through the courts the politicians responsible for this gross mismanagement had to accept responsibility for their ineptitude and resign. — Sapa.

Groundswell 'no' for an interim govt

By Fred de Lange

MOST Whites, Indians and Coloureds are not in favour of an interim government without a further test of the electorate's opinion while roughly half of Blacks feel the same way.

In a survey result issued by the HSRC in Pretoria yesterday, 2 000 respondents indicated that the overwhelming endorsement of negotiation and reform in the referendum was substantially due to fears of what would happen if Mr De Klerk lost and negotiation ceased.

Project leader Prof Lawrence Schlemmer said his analysis of the result of the survey proved the referendum result was not due to any particular enthusiasm for the results of negotiation.

Only about 25 percent of Asians and Coloureds, 14 percent of Whites and 50 percent of Blacks favoured an interim government.

It appeared as if most party political supporters wanted some kind of elec-

tion to test support before such a government was formed.

Most respondents also felt that an interim government should contain as many parties as possible and few wanted to see such a government dominated by the ANC and the National Party.

Few respondents, including only 40 percent of the Black respondents, wanted such an interim government to take control of the security forces.

Professor Schlemmer said the main reason for the hesitation and lack of conviction among the respondents was as a result of perceptions of what life would be like in the new South Africa with only Black respondents being more positive than negative about the future.

He said much of this pessimism was unwarranted if one considered the views and sentiments of all South Africans concerning democratic checks and balances with most respondents supporting such measures.

In general there was a great deal of tolerance

among the rank and file supporters of the different political parties and also a high degree of acceptance of direct ethnic representation in government.

A surprising element of the survey was the fact that there was division among Black on the abolishment of homelands.

Future Black voters also showed no consistent evidence of adhering to a strong socialist ideology although most wanted some kind of affirmative action.

Professor Schlemmer said it appeared as if the high degree of violence and extreme political views in South Africa were centred on a small group of highly politicised activists with ordinary people being much more amenable to find an equitable resolution of differences.

"The sooner all parties mobilise the real masses, bringing in ordinary people, the sooner South Africans will realise that the future holds more promise than threat," he said.

Mandela rejects Turkish award

AFRICAN National Congress president Mr Nelson Mandela has rejected the Ataturk Award which the Turkish Government said it would present to him on May 19.

In a statement in Johannesburg yesterday, the ANC said it was aware of the Turkish

Government's announcement that it would make the award.

"(But) the ANC wishes to state quite categorically that Mr Mandela has not accepted the Ataturk Award, and has no plans to visit Turkey."

The ANC's attitude

did not reflect any negative view of Kemal Ataturk, the reformer and founder of modern Turkey, the statement added.

ANC publicity official Gill Marcus said Mr Mandela's non-acceptance of the award effectively meant he had "rejected or declined" it.

Disgraced bishop had used church funds

DUBLIN. — A disgraced Irish Catholic bishop has admitted the "grievous sin" of fathering a child but his American son, now a teenager, told of his pride at finally being acknowledged.

Dr Eamonn Casey also confessed that he once used church funds to make a payment to the boy's mother, although this sum had now been repaid.

American divorcee Annie Murphy (44), stunned Ireland last Friday when

she said on radio that her 17-year-old son Peter was born after a "magical" 1970s love affair with Dr Casey.

Celibacy

The scandal has rocked Catholic Ireland, sparking a debate about priestly celibacy and the use of church funds.

Dr Casey (65), resigned last week as Bishop of Galway, citing personal reasons, and left for the United States saying he planned to devote the rest of his life to missionary work.

"I have sinned grievously against God and His church, and the clergy and all the people of the dioceses of Galway and Kerry," he said.

But 17-year-old high school student Peter Eamonn Murphy said from his Connecticut home this was a great moment.

"This is incredible. I could not have asked for anything more. I am dumbfounded, and I am very proud," he said. "It shows he is willing to admit his mistakes. I'm very happy."

Annie Murphy, of Ridgefield, Connecticut, was also delighted. Initial reaction in Ireland was that the statement was a necessary clarification and there were hopes now in the church that the statement would close the scandal.

The controversy surrounding Dr Casey, a bishop since 1969, has also caused fears the church's moral authority could be diminished at a time when Ireland is agonising about whether to relax a constitutional ban on abortion.

Dr Casey is regarded in the church as a liberal and caused a stir in 1981 by urging Ireland to sever ties with the United States over its policy on El Salvador. He refused to meet then president Ronald Reagan when he visited Ireland.

Divorce

Ms Murphy said she met Dr Casey in Ireland in 1973 when he was Bishop of Kerry, shortly after her own "bad divorce" in the United States.

She said the baby was born in Dublin, where she lived for a time in a home for unmarried mothers.

Dr Casey at first offered "belligerently and grudgingly" to make child support payments of 100 dollars (R290) a month then raised the sum to 175 after Ms Murphy threatened to take the child to Rome and have him declared a ward of the church, she said.

Dr Casey said he needed prayer and guidance "before reaching a final decision about how I can set about helping the hurt I have caused to Annie and Peter". — Sapa-Reuter.

Tukkies Right-wingers claim SAP 'spy' move

By Fred de Lange

RIGHT-wing students at the University of Pretoria yesterday claimed that the security police had launched a covert operation to infiltrate the various Right-wing organisations at the campus and had offered state funds to further the cause of such organisations.

Dexter, mouthpiece of the "Vrye Afrikaners op Tuks", yesterday claimed that at least three security policemen approached the various Right-wing organisations on campus and attempted to infiltrate them.

The three, Warrant Officer Johann Hattingh, Tommie Kruger (rank not known), and a woman known only as Jenny, allegedly tried to sow division among Right-wing groups and promised to make money available from State funds for information on other organisations.

The editor of Dexter, Mr Ernst Rex, yesterday said the first contact from the security police came a week before Christmas in 1990 when he was approached by Tommy Kruger — who introduced himself as Hannes — and was told that the security police had infiltrated the Conservative Party branch on the campus.

Early in January, Mr Rex visited the South African Police and complained to senior officers about the way in which "Hannes" was trying to sow division. The police denied that Hannes was a policeman but said they knew who he was and would stop his activities.

During May 1991, a man who introduced himself as Tommy Kruger and who identified himself as a journalist working at a news agency claimed that he knew of a number of security policemen who had infiltrated Right-wing organisations.

Mr Kruger later admitted that he was a security policeman and later that month he introduced Jenny to the Right-wing organisation and offered to make money available to them.

During the next year the three allegedly claimed that there were a number of security policemen supporting the Right-wing and that this group would assist to make sure that the Right-wing organisations at Tuks would not be infiltrated.

They allegedly offered bugs to be used to spy on suspicious people and urged Right-wingers to investigate Left-wing organisations on the campus.

Mr Rex said yesterday that it appeared as if the policemen were trying to keep the government of the day in power and to make political profit out of the Right-wing.

He felt that should this be true, the police were exceeding their duties and aims and were a danger to democracy in South Africa.

In its reaction yesterday, police headquarters in Pretoria said it had taken note of the allegations and normally did comment on such allegations.

The police wished to

point out, however, that the use of collaborators was a wide-spread practice in security services throughout the world and that such actions fell within the terms of Article 5 of the Police Act.

"It would therefore be unfair to create a perception that the South African Police are involved in political activities."

"It must also be accepted that the police do not spy on legal organisations or political parties but that attention is given to individuals involved in illegal activities, notwithstanding their political connections," the South African Police said.

Corruption 'shocks' Communist Party

Daily News Reporter

THE South African Communist Party says the recent scandals involving Government officials will hamper the way forward for a peaceful negotiated settlement.

In a statement, the SACP said "the shocking disclosures of Government corruption and involvement in the murder and assassination of political activists" had confirmed their view that "the De Klerk regime was a major obstacle to peace and a negotiated settlement".

Joining the joint call by the African National Congress Members of Parliament and the Conservative Party, the Communist Party called for the Government's "immediate and unconditional resignation".

The SACP said the latest scandals were "the tip of the iceberg" and "clearly revealed

a pattern of massive financial corruption that affects the entire fabric of government.

"The victims are the poor who are currently facing serious crisis in housing, employment, health services as well as education.

"The Trust Feed verdict and the written proof of State instructions for the murder of Matthew Goniwe were no exceptions, but part of a cynical plan to eliminate the ANC, SACP and other community leaders on a systematic basis."

Attacking the recent release of KwaZulu policeman Khethani Shange, whom a judge called "a monster in a policeman's clothes", the SACP claimed countless people remained incarcerated as political prisoners "contrary to agreements between the Government and the ANC."

Eight alleged ANC members in court over killing of woman

Pietermaritzburg Bureau

EIGHT alleged members of the African National Congress at Enhlalakahle, Greytown, appeared in the Pietermaritzburg Supreme Court yesterday in connection with the killing of a woman who was suspected of supporting the Inkatha Freedom Party.

It was revealed in court that the victim was a member of the ANC.

The accused, whose ages ranged between 15 and 22, were apparently part of a group that in September last year allegedly assaulted and repeatedly stabbed Miss Thembisile Victoria Mthembu (20) after seeing her close to the HL&H compound near Greytown — which is frequented by Inkatha Freedom Party supporters.

Thereafter Miss Mthembu was seen in Zig Zag Road, Enhlalakahle, and was accosted and assaulted before being taken to a house in the township.

At the house it was established that Miss Mthembu was on the list of people suspected of supporting Inkatha and it was allegedly decided to kill her.

The charge is that the eight accused and others formed two groups and waited for her to leave the house. She tried to flee from the groups, but she was caught and they took turns stabbing her.

She died on the scene from multiple injuries.

The eight, appearing before Mr Justice McLaren, all pleaded not guilty to the charge.

Proceeding

ANC WOMEN TO APPEAR IN COURT

TWENTY-TWO members of the African National Congress women's league who were arrested outside the Durban offices of the British Consulate and the United States Consulate-General yesterday were due to appear in the Durban Magistrate's Court today.

The women, from Imbali township, Pietermaritzburg, face charges of trespassing.

The women attempted to stage a sit-in at the consulates and wanted to hand over memoranda asking the British and US governments to put pressure on the South African Government to withdraw the Defence Force's 32 Battalion, the South African Police's Riot Unit and the KwaZulu Police from Imbali township.

The women were refused entry into the diplomatic offices and later arrested.—Crime Reporter

Break-in: dog tackles man

AN ALLEGED burglar was tackled by a police patrol dog after breaking into a panelbeating workshop in Sydney Road, Durban, last night.

Lieutenant-Colonel Dickie Pieterse, regional co-ordinator of Dog Units in Natal, said today that the alarm at Durban Panel Beaters went off and a security company investigated.

Warrant Officer Dennis Crew, of the Dog Unit, arrived at the scene and released his dog, Rex, who tackled a man.—Crime Reporter

Shange's release: the secrecy persists

KHETHANI Richard Shange's fame as a released prisoner dates back to early 1990 when he twice led attacks on the Gumede home in KwaMashu, situated 500 metres from the local police station.

Five people were murdered.

Shange was both a member of the Inkatha Freedom Party and the KwaZulu Police.

At the time KwaMashu was deeply divided, and plagued by political violence.

While African National Congress supporters danced with joy at the release of Nelson Mandela, IFP supporters looked on with displeasure and fear.

On May 29, 1991, Mr Acting Justice Gordon convicted Shange of murder and three cases of attempted murder, sending him to jail for 27 years.

Why was a convicted murderer released nine months after he started a 27-year jail term?

Mr Justice Gordon described Shange as a cold-blooded murderer, and as "an aggressive person who attacks his enemy first, enjoys being popular as a killer, and that people fear him".

Shange was a "beast in a policeman's clothes who was one of the main players in the reign of terror in KwaMashu", Mr Justice Gordon said.

At the time, the South African Government was involved in intricate dealings with the ANC on the release of political prisoners.

President de Klerk was anxious to complete the release because it was the last remaining pre-condition Washington had imposed before President George Bush would lift sanctions.

MARTIN CHALLENGOR, Political Correspondent of The Daily News, reports.

Included in the agreement between the ANC and the Government on the release of prisoners was a paragraph that said: "Whereas a large number of prisoners do not qualify for release according to the categories and the guidelines, cognisance is taken of the fact that the Government is making proposals for special and substantial remission of sentence which may include parole in certain case."

The Government used this provision to release 41 security force members in jail, 13 ANC members, 10 IFP members and two old-age prisoners.

Mr Kobie Coetsee, then Minister of Correctional Services, signed the papers on July 4 to release Shange and the other security force mem-

bers but, in keeping with the Government's golden rule of saying nothing and hoping nobody found out, made no attempt to explain the fairness aspect.

Murder is murder. But if ANC murderers go free in the name of seeking a new South Africa, then the doctrine of fairness implies that people on the Government's side who killed deserved equal treatment.

It was only last week, when the Democratic Party MPs started asking questions about Shange, that the release of the 66 prisoners this way became known.

Still the secrecy persists. Shange should have been released on May 29, but a computer error let him out on February 14.

He had a job arranged before he was released, according to his parole conditions. There is thus a suspicion and fear that he is back in policeman's clothes.

Masses show moderation about future

Extrême caution rules South Africans, dictating their views towards negotiations, an interim government, constitutional principles and an eventual open democracy.

A recent survey by the HSRC shows that South Africans are not "wildly excited" about the new South Africa; that they generally hold similar views and are not as polarised as the leadership of the political organisations and parties they may support.

Professor Lawrence Schlemmer, a managing director at the HSRC, said the recent referendum results in no way indicated any particular enthusiasm for negotiations.

The HSRC survey (which excluded the TBVC states) showed that about 25 percent of Indians and coloureds, roughly 50 percent of blacks and about 15 percent of whites want an interim government as soon as possible.

He added that most party political supporters, black and white, would like to see some further test of opinion before the interim government is established.

Other survey findings:

- Very few people said they would like to see a big party "cartel" between the ANC;

- Very few people would like to see the interim government taking control of the security

WHILE the politicians squabble in Codesa, ordinary South Africans are remarkably agreed on the major issues facing the new South Africa. A recent survey shows that South Africans are leaning to the centre of the political spectrum and their hopes and fears are so common that they could force hardline political parties into reconsidering their positions.

VASANTHA ANGAMUTHU and SUSAN MILLER report.

forces;

- Black people were only moderately positive in their expectations of the new South Africa;

- Whites were generally pessimistic about the future;

- There is strong support among all South Africans for a devolution of power to lower tiers of government, closer to the people;

- Political rights and liberties are well endorsed;

- There is a high degree of acceptance of direct ethnic representation in Government;

- There is no overwhelming view among blacks that homelands should be abolished;

- There is no consistent evidence of strong "socialist" ideology among future black voters;

- Strong sentiments favouring affirmative action — both by ANC and NP supporters — exists.

Professor Schlemmer said that extreme political views, the current violence and political aggression were being perpetrated by highly politicised activists, both black and white.

"The real grassroots, the rank and file, are much more amenable to

finding an equitable resolution of differences."

Professor Schlemmer said that the sooner all parties mobilised "the real masses", bringing in ordinary people, the sooner South Africans will realise that the future holds more promise than threat.

The findings of support for political parties put the ANC and the National Party at the top end of the poll.

The survey results significantly marginalised the Democratic Party, the Conservative Party, other right-wing organisations, the Pan Africanist Congress and the Azanian Peoples' Organisation as having very little, if any support among the wider South African population.

Professor Johann Mouton, a general manager at the HSRC, said that South Africans will vote the ANC into power if a general election was held today.

However support for the National Party among Indians and coloureds particularly has almost doubled in the past three years.

Despite this, the NP would only get about 25 percent of the votes as



AMONG the crowds, the results of the referendum was not a mandate for change. A survey by the HSRC shows that most people have little

enthusiasm for negotiations and are not wild about an interim government at this stage, preferring to see a further test of opinion.

opposed to the ANC at between 40 to 45 percent.

The Inkatha Freedom Party would come in third at around 10 percent.

Professor Mouton said that support for organisations to the far left was confined to the better educated Sotho speakers and metropolitan Xhosa, Swazi and Ndebele speakers.

Overall the ANC would poll two-thirds of the black support in the country, the IFP 12 to 15 percent and the NP between three and five percent.

Between 15 and 18 per-

cent of those polled were uncertain about which way they would vote as compared to the 30 to 40 percent in the beginning of 1991 — possibly because black respondents were more willing to voice their opinions about political matters or because they had made up their minds to side with the ANC.

Professor Schlemmer said that the support for organisations and parties had more or less peaked.

The ANC, as an example, enjoyed close to 70 percent support in a survey conducted soon after its unbanning.

Professor Schlemmer said this could be attributed to the "newness factor", and that most people had more or less decided which way to go when voting.

Some organisations have dismissed the findings of the survey, especially those whose support appears to be far below their expectations.

National spokesman for the Azanian People's Organisation, Strini Moodley, said the survey was "highly suspect" and that Azapo would not take it seriously.

"Schlemmer has always been guilty of using

the academic trick of research to support his own theories. It is remarkable that people who conduct them, more often than not, reflect their own views."

Mr Moodley was sceptical of the survey findings that the NP support among blacks had grown.

"The vast majority of people in this country have clear evidence of NP involvement in violence, from the Trust Feed findings and the release of policemen who have killed, the Development Aid scandal, the fact that they have

messed up the Budget, and the high rate of unemployment.

"I cannot for the life of me understand how people are going to want to support a party that is responsible for all of this," Mr Moodley said.

Kim Hodgeson, a spokesman for the Inkatha Institute, said they viewed surveys like the HSRC one with scepticism because the results could be "slanted" by who was doing the interviewing.

"On the Reef, for instance, people would be too scared to say they supported the IFP and

no survey so far has gone into the hostels on the Reef where almost all the hostel-dwellers are IFP supporters," he said.

Mr Hodgeson said he accepted the survey might indicate trends in politics and that the IFP was "gearing itself up to mobilise in the Indian, coloured and white areas" and stated that it had attracted some support amongst Sotho and Xhosa-speakers.

Mr Frank Le Roux of the Conservative Party said the CP was involved in a profound study of political developments after March 17.

Strong partnership possible after frosty Nairobi-Pretoria relations

Opportunities for Africa from advanced economy

THE once-frosty relations between Kenya and South Africa are undergoing a transformation that some Kenyans believe could result in the creation of a formidable trade alliance.

The new relationship has come at a fortunate time for the Government of President Daniel arap Moi. With inflation running at about 22 percent, with the budget hugely in deficit and with the manufacturing, agricultural and tourist sectors all depressed, Kenya was on the look-out for new markets and trading partners.

The air links that were resumed in December 1990 after a break of 28 years opened some avenues for entrepreneurs of both countries. There has been a continuing exchange of visits and some business agreements, including the multi-million-dollar joint venture between Johannesburg-based M-Net and Kenya's only privately-owned television station, RTN Channel 62.

M-Net is reported to have taken a 50 percent stake in RTN in a R11-million deal that is described here as the biggest joint venture between Kenya and South Africa so far. As a result, Kenyans are expecting to receive entertainment programmes from South Africa from September this year.

The deal was followed by the signing of a trade agreement in January between the South African Foreign Trade Organisation and the Kenya Association of Manufacturers, aimed at facilitating relationships in the industrial sector and paving the way for joint ventures.

Immediately afterwards, two separate visits were made to South Africa by officials of the Kenya National Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and the Government-supported Investment Promotion Centre.

The chamber chairman, Francis Ma-

charia, says Kenya and South Africa are on "the way to greater heights" while John Mwangeka of the centre says Kenya is destined to be South Africa's trade gateway to East and Central Africa.

"South Africa has the most advanced economy on the continent and, therefore, presents many opportunities to the rest of Africa," Mr Mwangeka says.

It should be noted, however, that despite official Kenyan Government embargoes, some underground trade between the two countries has been going on for years.

Available figures show that in 1989, Kenya exported to South Africa goods worth more than R1.7 million, while it imported products worth more than R1 million from South Africa. Most of Kenya's exports were sodium carbonate, a by-product of soda ash which reportedly accounted for 40 percent of the total figure.

From South Africa, Kenya bought coal for its cement factories and steel products.

Nicholas Gor, chairman of the Kenya External Trade Authority, the Government's international business watchdog, says most of the South African businessmen who have visited Kenya since air links were established have expressed interest mainly in the fields of hardware, food processing and tourism.

South African-manufactured interior and exterior wall coatings are already gracing the Hilton Hotel, Jomo Kenyatta Airport and the new Meridien Hotel; Cape wines are toasting weddings and corporate func-

tions and travel packages to South Africa are being advertised in the news media almost daily.

Mr Gor said, however, that there was a need for market surveys to determine the whole range of available trading possibilities.

"Both Kenyan and South African businessmen need a clearer picture of existing possibilities and this can only be achieved through comprehensive market surveys," he said.

Despite the optimism, growing fears are being expressed in Kenyan business and Government circles that the opening of trade could tip the balance in favour of Pretoria. These fears were fuelled by a speech here by the Secretary of the Preferential Trade Area, Dr Ngingu wa Muthariku, who advised businessmen in the trade region to be cautious of South African moves to woo them with large business opportunities.

He said a lot of African businessmen had not analysed the South African market or their own potential and had, therefore, become targets of what he called "that country's business psychology".

Dr Muthariku, a Malawian, said: "South Africa has developed a strategy of the romance of the unknown and a lot of our business people have been attracted by this without realising the consequences."

Most businessmen here believe that much of what will come out of the Kenya-South African alliance will depend on the political stability in both countries.

They say that while there has been a tremendous interest in Kenya from South African businessmen, very few tangible commitments have been made and deals sealed. South African investors are believed to be awaiting the outcome of the multi-party elections that are due to be held in Kenya within the next 12 months.

Lifting of arms sanctions will make 'little difference'

Political Staff

CAPE TOWN — The lifting of arms sanctions would make little difference to SA, SA Defence Force chief-of-staff finance Vice-Admiral Paul Murray said yesterday.

However, he did not believe arms boycotts would be lifted soon and pointed out that arms sanctions were still being enforced against Namibia. Even if they were lifted, many of the best type of weapons for SA conditions were produced in the country, he said at a news briefing.

Murray also disclosed that more soldiers currently were deployed in townships than had been used at any time during the border war in Namibia and Angola.

He said about R100m of the secret R4383m special defence account was spent on line-function intelligence and counter-intelligence.

The remainder of the account, all of which was fully audited both internally and by the Auditor-General, was spent on equipment.

Although he would not give details on how the SADF's capital budget during the current financial year was allocated, he said a new tank cost in the region of R15m and a new fighter aircraft between R125m and R150m.

However, Murray said 54% of the defence budget of R9 705m during the 1992/93 financial year was for operating costs such as clothing, rations, computer services, fuel and spares, and 46% for capital costs such as aircraft, tanks, ships, ammunition, spares, maintenance and the special defence account.

He said the army would receive R3 219m, or 33,2% of the budget, the air

force R4 112m (42,4%), the navy R827m, (8,5%) and others R1 547m (15,9%).

If defence spending had been maintained in terms of the five-year plan drawn up in 1988, when it had been anticipated that the Cuban army would be in Namibia, the budget this year would have been about R17bn and about R14bn if the 1990 estimates had been maintained.

It was, however, R9,705bn, a decline in real terms of 7,7%, and it accounted for 9,7% of the total Budget and 2,8% of the gross domestic product (GDP).

In 1989, defence absorbed 15,7% of the Budget and 4,3% of GDP, and operating costs were 66,8% of the defence budget during the current financial year, compared with 56,8% in 1988.

Murray said it was a misconception that the special defence account had plenty of slush funds to spend on secret projects.

A Cabinet committee had been examining state income and expenditure over the next five years and had appointed 12 groups. The defence group had drawn up a five-year plan with various spending and strategic options.

Every cent of the defence budget was fully audited by the Auditor-General but the disclosure of the special defence account had to be agreed by the Auditor-General and President.

He said the Cabinet had laid down strategic guidelines for the SADF 18 years ago, including an internal political settlement by 1994.

Genghis Khan with helicopters or for that matter Ivan the Terrible with a functioning Internal Revenue Service. To add to this armoury of power control over the economy — that is, control of the livelihood of all or even the great majority of the population — is to bring about a quantum leap in power.

Such power is difficult if not impossible to reconcile with democracy. Socialism can only be established by a titanic act of expropriation. But, given the condition of human life in society, property will inevitably spring up again.

The socialist expropriation therefore, cannot be a one-time only event. It must be reiterated over and over again.

Socialism requires eternal vigilance. Such permanent expropriation, however, cannot be democratically administered. Those who are to be expropriated will organise and resist. Dictatorship is the only political solution to this problem.

If one understands these basic structural facts about a modern society, the talk of a "third way" between capitalism and socialism makes no sense at all. There is no "third way". There are, to be sure, modifications of the first and the second "ways". There are variants of capitalism, as there have been variants of socialism.

If one prefers to speak of a "mixed economy", every empirically existent economy is "mixed" in the sense that there is some combination of market forces and State interventions.

Capitalism has shown an enduring capacity to produce historically unprecedented wealth and to allow huge masses of people to benefit from this. Socialism has shown itself to be an unmitigated economic and political disaster. As democracy requires a capitalist foundation this foundation appears secure for the foreseeable future. Democratic capitalism thus appears to be the only way to go.

The last few years have indeed been a triumph for democratic capitalism, and its prospects today are much brighter than they have been for a long time. Given my understanding of the economic features of modernity, I regard it as unlikely that "new kinds of economic systems" will emerge in the foreseeable future. Either capitalism will survive, or socialism will return in one form or another.

If the latter eventuality occurs, the prospects for democracy are gloomy indeed.

If capitalism will, after all, become the prevailing system in most if not all the world, then the prospects for democracy are quite bright. □

TWO STAR 12-9 5-22

Quantum jump into Codesa's hot seat



Pravin Gordhan... seen as the official "voice of Codesa".

PRAVIN Gordhan's name was well known in activist circles a long time ago, but now the whole country hangs on his words as the "voice of Codesa".

Mr Gordhan — known as "PG" to his friends — succeeded Democratic Party leader Dr Zach de Beer as management committee chairman on January 20. Since then he has summarised and interpreted for the nation all the goings-on in working groups — and sounded positive notes when deadlocks seemed inevitable.

It is a task which seems to the liking of the man whose friendly face and softly spoken style belie a background of steely political commitment.

Mr Gordhan, a longstanding executive member of the Natal Indian Congress, was a natural choice on the management committee and the Codesa working group thrashing out transitional arrangements.

Besides the NIC, however, his name was connected with "Operation Vula" — the operation which the Government portrayed as an insurrectionary plot by the South African Communist Party. Mr Gordhan spent close to four months in detention in 1990 in connection with Operation Vula.

Codesa has a knack of catapulting political figures into the national limelight — the latest is Pravin Gordhan, chairman of the management committee. On the eve of Codesa 2, Political Reporter ESTHER WAUGH profiles the man.

But there is more to "PG" than the Vula connection. The 43-year-old is a founder member of the Durban Housing Action Committee, and in 1976 was involved in organising Indian communities, which led to civic organisations being formed in the area.

He is also part of a campaign for a democratic Durban and is involved in the Cato Manor de-

velopment for the development of nonracial housing.

Mr Gordhan was also a member of the first People's Education Committee and is now on the ANC's education committee.

He was a member of the Release Mandela Committee and assisted in launching the United Democratic Front in Natal.

He is also a member of the ANC and is a chairman of a

local SACP branch.

And yes, he has been a member of the ANC underground for more than 10 years, doing "political work".

At University of Durban Westville in the 1970s — where he studied as a pharmacist — Mr Gordhan says he developed a "democratic consciousness" and "Congress orientation".

Mr Gordhan worked as

pharmacist at Durban's King Edward Hospital until November 1981 when he was held in solitary confinement for 161 days in terms of section 6 of the Terrorism Act.

After the first month in detention, Mr Gordhan was told he had been fired from his job as a result of "alleged incompetence".

On his release almost six months later, he was banned and placed under house arrest for 13 months.

Mr Gordhan was detained again for a month in 1985 in

connection with the Inanda unrest and again in 1990 in connection with Operation Vula.

During his last spell in detention, Mr Gordhan said he repeatedly wrote to Adriaan Vlok, then Minister of Law and Order, telling him that negotiations had begun.

Negotiations had always been possible and viable, depending on the extent the Government was prepared to relinquish monopoly of power, he said.

He describes his quantum leap from the ANC underground to being the second chairman of South Africa's first real negotiating forum as not a "totally disconcerting experience but certainly a new experience". □

DOES political democracy depend upon a market economy? The evidence suggests three simple, but far-reaching propositions.

First, there has been no case of political democracy that has not been a market economy — in other words, there has been no case of democratic socialism. Second, there have been numerous non-democratic market economies. Third, when market economies are successful over a period of time, democratising pressures are generated.

One must be clear about terms. Someone will propose Sweden as a case of democratic socialism, but it is not. Capitalism and socialism must be understood as two alternative modern systems of production — as the Marxists have always done — the one based on market forces and private ownership of at least the “commanding heights” of the economy, the other based on political control mechanisms and on public ownership of the “commanding heights”. There is no “third way”; there are only different versions and modifications of the two models.

Does political democracy require private property? If so, how much of it? Answer to the first question: Almost certainly yes. Answer to the second: No one knows for sure.

We do know the extremes. Socialism, the maximal role of the state in the economy, makes democracy impossible and ruins the economy. At the other pole, at least under modern conditions, a minimalist, *laissez-faire* state is empirically impossible. Some will certainly mention Hong Kong. It is no such thing, but rather a very efficient, if thoroughly undemocratic, conspiracy of Chinese businessmen and British civil servants.

In between there seems to be a good deal of leeway — say, between the US, a relatively modest case of state intervention, and much more statist cases like Japan or even France — all market economies, all democracies. The libertarian view that each step in the direction of public ownership is a step towards

despotism is not borne out by the evidence.

Probably, it is important to ask about not so much the degree of state intervention as the nature of the intervention. Does state intervention move with market forces or against them? Arguably, the Japanese state intervenes in the economy without undermining market dynamics; by contrast, some argue that the evolving EC bureaucracy will damage the market economy.

Capitalism is a necessary but not sufficient precondition for democracy. But democracy is not a precondition for capitalism. The East Asian economic success stories show a vigorous capitalist dynamic. The “four little dragons” of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore unfolded under non-democratic regimes. Indeed, one might ask how many Western societies could be called democracies in our sense at the time they took off into modern capitalism.

In view of this, an intelligent argument has even been made that democracy is not suitable for the period when capitalism is first established, though it is likely to emerge after a time of successful capitalist development. These considerations are uncomfortable and uncertain;

how they are eventually concluded has far-reaching policy implications.

More certainly, however, there is no great mystery as to why capitalism is necessary for democracy. It provides the social space within which individuals, groups and entire institutional complexes can develop independent of state control. Conversely, the correlation between socialism and dictatorship can be explained, precisely, by the absence of such space in a socialist system.

If one understands these basic structural facts about a modern society, the talk of a “third way” between capitalism and socialism makes no sense at all. If one prefers to speak of a “mixed economy”, every economy is “mixed” in the sense that there is some combination of market forces and state interventions. If one keeps in mind the notion of the “commanding heights”, it is not difficult to decide whether one is looking at a modification of the capitalist or the socialist “way”.

In current political parlance, “third way” rhetoric is typically the language of redistributionist populism. And, typically, it occurs in

countries that can ill afford a lot of redistribution because the rich are few and don’t have all that much to take away from, so that redistribution means the destruction of the very middle class upon which economic growth depends.

Socialism’s enormous intellectual and political defeat has fuelled a mood of triumphalism among those who believe in democracy and capitalism. But a squirt of cold water on this happy mood might be in order.

In terms of an empirically oriented, rational mind the conclusions are compelling. Democratic capitalism appears to be the only way to go. But this argument hinges on one highly questionable presupposition — that the course of history is determined by rational minds.

It is not hard to imagine scenarios that would make democratic capitalism very vulnerable. This is most clearly the case in the societies that once comprised the Soviet empire now engaged in the transition from socialism to capitalism.

Not only will this transition involve massive dislocation and suffering at least in the short run, but we do not yet fully understand all the components of this transition and there is no sure policy prescription for managing it. It would be foolhar-

Why capitalism is a precondition for democracy

PETER BERGER

dy to bet on democracy’s survival.

It is also far from certain that the transition will occur in all these societies, no matter whether under democratic or non-democratic auspices. Capitalism may quickly come to be associated with soaring inflation and unemployment, severe material hardships, collapse of public order and political chaos. Arguments about the prospects of capitalism in the longer run will be of little comfort and some form of “emergency socialism” could be reimposed.

Similar scenarios are equally possible in many less developed countries now moving toward a market economy. The costs of economic take-off cannot be avoided. In such situations, rational arguments do not have much weight and few people are going to be interested in pondering the “lessons of history”.

Further, while socialism is highly irrational in terms of society’s well-being, it can be very rational in terms of an elite in charge of society. To use quasi-Marxist language, a command economy immiserates the masses but it can very efficiently enrich the commanders.

Finally it would even be premature to lay pessimism to rest in the advanced capitalist societies of Europe and North America. There continues to exist a bureaucracy seeking to stifle enterprise.

New utopias are springing up. Thus there is a feminist path to socialism, and an environmentalist one. Both would create a maze of entitlements and regulations that would mean state control over the dynamics of the market and finally the latter’s stagnation.

We do not know at what point state intervention in a market economy tilts the latter into a spiral of decline; we do know there must be such a point; the moment when we discover it may well be the moment when it is too late to do anything about it.

□ Berger is director of the Institute for the Study of Economic Culture at Boston University. These are edited excerpts from a public lecture delivered last night under the auspices of the Urban Foundation.

COMMENT

Shoddy

BY DOING nothing this week, President de Klerk ensured that the new South Africa will be just like the old: robbed blind by its own officials. By saying nothing, the message he sends is that officials must be expected to divert public millions for private gain; there is thus little point in pursuing those who do it or dismissing Ministers who fail to stop it.

It is a shoddy legacy, unexpected from a man whose presidency has been one of decency, integrity and principle. The Development Aid scandal is probably the largest in the corruption-ridden decades of NP rule; how it was handled would say much about the present government's view of the past and would inevitably set a norm for the government of the future. President de Klerk has fallen back on the examples of his predecessors: brazen it out, do as little as you have to, and hope it will go away.

Are no examples to be made after officials squandered and stole millions, and possibly billions, of taxpayers' money? Are no efforts to be made to recover any of this money from them or the private contractors with whom they conspired? Are most of those involved in this loss of public money, whether through dishonesty or incompetence, to keep their jobs? Officials have been suspended (on full pay?) and transferred; if other scandals are anything to go by, some will be retired early with lucrative benefits. How many have been fired?

The prosecutions so far have been singularly unsuccessful; charges against 17 officials withdrawn, six

acquitted, none convicted and six or so cases still outstanding. This out of a department a judge found to be so rotten it had to be disbanded and provided a string of examples where action was warranted.

The judge also found that from 1984 onwards the department's top management knew of the problems. He found no indication that effective or successful steps were taken to reverse the situation. From 1984 to 1989, Gerrit Viljoen was the Minister responsible for this department in which dishonesty and abuse were rife; he may have tried to stop it, but the judge's verdict on his efforts is damning. If Viljoen resisted a suggestion for a commission of inquiry in 1988, how many more millions were pilfered between then and 1990, when a parliamentary committee insisted on an investigation? How can Viljoen keep his Cabinet post?

Where are the promises to open this matter "to the bone" and to prosecute every last person involved? Where is the demand for exemplary sentences of officials who betrayed a public trust? Where is the principled statement that an honest Cabinet colleague must pay the political price for the dishonesty that flourished under him?

Development Aid is not a sad aberration or an apartheid folly, as President de Klerk allows his Ministers to pretend. It is the inevitable result of inadequate control of public funds. A silent President has done nothing to ensure that those controls are any better, now or in the future.

BUSINESS DAY 13.05.92

No incentive for quick buck

Dear Sir,
I AM delighted to see that you have allowed Mr Joe Slovo to contribute a monthly column to your newspaper (Business Day, May 8). We need to know our antagonist if we are to defeat him.

Mr Slovo makes some valid points in his article and then spoils them with his analysis. He states, for example: "Capital, if it is true to itself, gives as little to the social fund as it can get away with. This is its legal and 'moral' right in current ethics. But if making a quick buck is the beginning and end of morality and social obligation, you'll pardon us for trying to find another way in search of social justice."

The capitalist, or more correctly liberal, view is that society is best advanced by each individual being free to pursue his own ends within a framework of laws. He does not advance the lot of his fellows by trying to do good for them in his business activities. This however, is not to say that he should not, as many reviled capitalists do, contribute financially out of his own pocket and of his own time to many deserving causes.

The real error in Mr Slovo's comment is the reference to a "quick" buck. Good and successful businesses, including those of the Oppenheimers and Ruperts to whom he refers, will only survive and prosper over the long term by acting within the law and ethically towards their employees, customers, suppliers and the community in general. The quick buck is therefore not their style. Even if they were ethically comfortable with it, and Mr Slovo advances no evidence in support of this view, it would be contrary to their own best interests.

Contrast this with Business Day's comment on the Department of Development Aid scandal the same day. There is a supreme example of socialism at work, and of the opportunities it provides to venal officials to feather their own nests. Similar practices have been rife throughout the socialist world, not because so-

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cialists are worse people than capitalists, but because the structure of socialist society affords much greater opportunities for corruption. I would back the "self-interest" of a Rembrandt or Anglo American group any day to advance the welfare of the people of this country against the well-intentioned activities of a bunch of bureaucrats.

There has been a strong effort from the socialist camp to ridicule Adam Smith's "invisible hand" and to disparage the work of writers such as Frederick Hayek. However, not only have Smith and Hayek been proven to be correct, by the failure of socialism and success of liberal societies, but in their writing they dis-

play much greater consideration for the real rights of individuals than do the socialists with their references to a social justice which is generally neither social nor just.

P C HOWARD
Oaklands

□ □ □ □

Dear Sir,
ABOUT 2 300 years ago the philosopher Diogenes was seen walking through the streets of Athens — then in its declining years as the seat of philosophical eminence, political wisdom, economic probity and social concern — carrying a lantern in broad daylight. On being asked what he was looking for he replied: "I am seeking an honest man." It is not recorded if he found one.

Reflecting on the continuing revelations of chicanery, corruption and criminal collusion in government ranks, one wonders whether Dioge-

nes — if he had conducted his search in recent days in the precincts, once venerable, of Parliament and the Union Buildings — would have had much success.

JACK CURTIS
Norwood

□ □ □ □

Dear Sir,
PERHAPS Simon Willson, author of articles in praise of Barend du Plessis (Business Day, April 27 and May 6), could consider the other side of the Minister's legacy: after more than two years of recession, company and personal taxation remain at unacceptably high levels; burdensome VAT legislation; taxpayer funding of 100 000 redundant but employed bureaucrats; and a discredited fiscus.

It would seem that this Minister's demise is the result of running out of rope rather than wealth.

D FORBES
Randburg

□ While pseudonyms are sometimes acceptable, correspondents should sign letters and give their names, a street address and a daytime contact number. The Editor reserves the right to shorten letters.

SPOT DESK

BUSINESS DAY 13-05-92

Lifting of arms sanctions will make 'little difference'

CAPE TOWN — The lifting of arms sanctions would make little difference to SA, SA Defence Force chief-of-staff finance Vice-Admiral Paul Murray said yesterday.

However, he did not believe arms boycotts would be lifted soon and pointed out that arms sanctions were still being enforced against Namibia. Even if they were lifted, many of the best type of weapons for SA conditions were produced in the country, he said at a news briefing.

Murray also disclosed that more soldiers currently were deployed in townships than had been used at any time during the border war in Namibia and Angola.

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However, Murray said 54% of the defence budget of R9 705m during the 1992/93 financial year was for operating costs such as clothing, rations, computer services, fuel and spares, and 46% for capital costs such as aircraft, tanks, ships, ammunition, spares, maintenance and the special defence account.

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Political Staff

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In 1989, defence absorbed 15,7% of the Budget and 4,3% of GDP, and operating costs were 66,8% of the defence budget during the current financial year, compared with 56,8% in 1988.

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Every cent of the defence budget was fully audited by the Auditor-General but the disclosure of the special defence account had to be agreed by the Auditor-General and President.

He said the Cabinet had laid down strategic guidelines for the SADF 18 years ago, including an internal political settlement by 1994.

13 MAY 1992

THE CITIZEN COMMENT

Scandals

WE are not surprised that the special debate on corruption in the now defunct Department of Development Aid ended like a damp squib.

The Opposition wants the government to dismiss Ministers or resign itself, but it is not the kind of things that happens here, even if such scandals might topple governments overseas. Besides, Dr Gerrit Viljoen, who was shifted from Development Aid to Constitutional Development, has given up Constitutional Development for State Affairs and no longer has a department to control.

The stresses and strains of running Constitutional Development and at the same time leading the government's team at Codesa have left him exhausted and he has a month's sick leave.

Government speakers in the debate came to his defence, saying that he had taken the legal and disciplinary steps where evidence justified it.

However, judging by the disclosures in the Pickard Commission's report, neither Dr Viljoen, nor Dr Stoffel van der Merwe, his successor at Development Aid, nor the final Minister in charge of that badly managed department, Mr Jacob de Villiers, can escape their shares of blame for what happened.

Mr De Villiers, now Minister of Regional and Land Affairs, admits that the report has revealed a sad story of dishonesty, corruption, theft, negligence and unauthorised conduct. Yet he pleads that unravelling irregularities is a complicated process.

This is no excuse for allowing the situation to continue over so many years without three Ministers being able to put a stop to it.

Sad to say, of the 32 police dockets opened against former employees of the department, only six criminal cases are outstanding — and there have been no convictions in the cases heard so far (six cases went to trial and the accused were acquitted; the Attorney-General withdrew 17 cases).

We think it quite amazing that a scandal that cost taxpayers many millions, perhaps billions, of rands can end without any major — and successful — prosecution so far.

The government is riding out the storm.

It cannot be successfully challenged in Parliament nor is there any other way in which the Opposition can force the issue.

However, taken in conjunction with the allegations that instructions were given via the State Security Council that three Eastern Cape activists be "permanently removed from society as a matter of urgency" — and they and another activist were shortly afterwards murdered — the government is facing a credibility crisis.

This is happening virtually on the eve of Codesa II.

It is not only the Opposition that has been exploiting the government's discomfiture — the ANC, too, is making capital out of it.

Mr De Klerk, who in less than three years has had to pick up scandals that might have shaken any other leader, is in the invidious position of having to answer for scandals that originated even before he took office.

Nevertheless, he has always been willing to have matters probed in the interests of clean administration.

In the case of the assassination of Mr Matthew Goniwe and three others, he has instructed that the Goniwe inquest be reopened by Eastern Cape Judge-President, Mr Justice N Z Zietsman.

In the case of the Department of Development Aid, he acted swiftly after the Pickard Commission reported last year by abolishing the department.

But corruption in that defunct department still reeks and needs some kind of special political aerosol to clear the stink away.

Mr De Klerk must again demonstrate not only that he is a man of integrity — which goes without saying — but that he will not tolerate bad administration, corruption or incompetence either in government or in the public service.

He has achieved the moral ascendancy; here and abroad, over the ANC and he must restore it as speedily as possible.

THE DAILY NEWS 13-05-92

The silent majority

THE overwhelming message of the latest survey by the Human Sciences Research Council is that most South Africans want moderate solutions to the country's problems. They would rather have multi-party government than rule by a single political party or a cartel of the two major parties. Interim government is not a high priority. They would rather the security forces remained under the control of the State President than be put under an interim government.

Abolition of the homeland governments is not a high priority. And there is a strong predisposition toward a devolution of power to provinces and regions. These attitudes are true in varying degree across every racial, ethnic and political grouping.

The survey suggests that certain political firebrands are sadly out of touch with the real needs and desires of the people. It also suggests a political opening for any party which set out to meet those needs.

It confirms what had been long suspected — the African National Congress is the largest grouping but not a majority. No party is strong enough to rule alone.

BUSINESS DAY 13-05-92

Blacks 'want unions to wield political clout'

CAPE TOWN — Political parties would have to cater to and woo trade unions if they desired significant showings in elections under a new constitution, political analyst Lawrence Schlemmer said yesterday.

Speaking at the release of the results of the Human Sciences Research Council's latest survey, he said there was overwhelming enough support among blacks for trade unions to have a strong influence on government.

Results in the latest edition of Information Update also demonstrated that among blacks there was a very strong demand for positive regulated affirmative action.

The surprising result was that SACP and ANC-supporting respondents in the house-to-house direct interview survey rejected nationalisation. Only 38% of ANC supporters said it was good while all the SACP supporters rejected it.

However, 91% of SACP supporters said they wanted trade unions to have control of companies.

The results showed that across the board, including Inkatha supporters (43%), there was overwhelming support for trade

BILLY PADDOCK

unions to influence governments.

Schlemmer, who analysed the survey, concluded that most whites, Asians and coloureds viewed an interim government with trepidation. Whites, especially, viewed the future negatively and believed that things would become worse in a new SA, while blacks were most optimistic.

However, Schlemmer points out that expectations among blacks have been largely tempered over the past year and "the rose garden mentality" has all but disappeared from all groups.

There was strong support for devolution of power to towns, cities and regions.

He said "supporters of what might be the largest future party, the ANC, are most inclined to favour exclusive government by a majority party, but even they would see the need for curbs on power and protection of minority interests".

He said the tolerance reflected among the rank and file extended to surprising sentiments where there was a high degree of acceptance of direct ethnic representation in government by traditional leaders.

BUSINESS DAY 13 - 05 - 92

African Development Bank pins hopes on SA

DAKAR — The African Development Bank opened its three-day annual meeting yesterday in the Senegalese capital buoyed by hopes that a post-apartheid SA would strengthen the continent's economy, but worried it could take a decade to reverse falls in living standards since 1980.

The bank is expected to savour a modest improvement in fortunes in 1991, when economic growth for the continent, excluding SA, edged up to 2,5% from 2,1% in 1990.

But with a population of 600-million people growing faster than anywhere in the world at 3,1% annually, individual incomes fell again.

The bank, in a briefing paper, estimated it would take seven to 10 years

of sustained, real economic growth at 4% annually to recover per capita income losses suffered in the '80s.

The bank's Babacar Ndiaye told a pre-conference seminar SA had a key role to play as an engine of economic recovery, but Pretoria would not immediately start channelling investments to African nations. Once SA revived its economy, it had a role to play.

He would welcome SA membership of the bank. According to bank statutes, however, SA must first become part of the OAU.

SA officials, who took part informally in last year's meeting of the bank, will attend officially this week for the first time as observers. The

ANC will also take part.

Philippe Lietard, director of African investment for the World Bank's International Finance Corporation, which funds private sector ventures, said the size and range of SA's economy, which accounted for 40% of sub-Saharan Africa's economy, would be attractive to foreign financiers. Its creditworthiness could help it win funding from international lenders such as the African Development Bank and World Bank.

Derek Auret, deputy director-general in SA's Foreign Ministry, said regional integration of economies was vital as regional blocs were being formed in North America, Europe and the Far East. — Sapa-Reuter.

BUSINESS DAY 13-05-92

DP town councillor to administer Alex

A DP town councillor from Randburg has been appointed by the Transvaal Provincial Administration (TPA) to run Alexandra township, a special provincial gazette has announced.

Andre Jacobs, 34, who was Randburg's management committee chairman until he resigned in March, said yesterday of his appointment as administrator: "Now I will have to wear two hats and be objective about both of them."

It is believed Jacobs is the first DP leader to be appointed by the TPA to such a post.

He will retain his post as chairman of the party's Randburg council caucus.

As a prime mover behind the anticipated merger or joint administration between Randburg, Sandton, Marlboro Gardens and Alexandra, Jacobs said his appointment would be "helpful" in forthcoming negotiations.

He said his intimate knowledge of Alexandra's financial and administrative situation would make possible a more informed decision regarding the possible formation of a joint administration.

"My uppermost priorities are the

ADRIAN HADLAND

provision of a normal and improved local administration, the resolution of the financial situation in Alexandra, the upgrading of facilities and services and participation in negotiating forums which will decide how best to fit Alexandra into new developments," he said.

Jacobs succeeds the previous administrator John Griffiths — who was formerly chairman of the Central Witwatersrand Regional Services Council.

Administration in the violence-ravaged township has virtually come to a standstill.

"There are some councillors, though without a quorum the council does not function," Jacobs said.

"We have got to get back to the basics and will be employing a turn-around strategy rather than any fancy new ideas."

Jacobs will consult the township's interim crisis committee as well as councillors and community organisations in his bid to turn around the fortunes of Alexandra.

The resolution of violence in Alexandra would also be an important objective of his tenure, he said.

The Star

Established 1887

South Africa's largest daily newspaper

Crossing the race divide

THE DECISION by the Democratic Party to give priority to the recruitment of black members is a sign of the times. No political party, however impressive its past achievement and however noble its ideals, can survive today without black support.

Blacks will comprise the biggest racial component of an electorate of 20 million or more in the new South Africa. Political parties without black members will wither away and die. The DP, threatened with absorption by the ANC on the left and the NP on the right, is particularly vulnerable.

It is no coincidence that the DP drive for black members, launched at the weekend, comes barely a week after the new Transvaal leader of the Nationalists, Pik Botha, set the same priority for the NP. Blacks, once ignored by white political parties, will be wooed as never before in months ahead.

These developments are welcome. The more that party-political affiliations cut across race and language, the better South Africa's chances will be of avoiding the destructive forces of racial bigotry in the testing times ahead. By the same token, the ANC's commitment to improve its standing in the white, coloured and Indian communities is to be welcomed.

A tough road lies ahead for DP and NP proselytisers. The DP, by its own admission, barely has enough resources to woo white voters. The NP, however sincere its rejection of apartheid, is burdened by its past policy of white supremacy.

Experience so far has not been auspicious: last year DP members were driven out of school in Mashishing, near Lydenburg, by ANC zealots; only last week an NP meeting at Huhudi, near Vryburg, was broken up by ANC militants.

The search for black members will bring the DP and NP face to face with the culture of intolerance which festered during the heyday of apartheid. These parties' presence in townships should give the ANC an opportunity to preach tolerance to its youthful enthusiasts.

'The only way to go'

DOES political democracy require or depend upon a market economy? Here is possibly one question where caution is not called for.

The answer is "yes". The evidence overwhelmingly suggests it. That evidence makes possible three simple but far-reaching propositions.

One: There has been no case of political democracy that has not been a market economy. Or, if one prefers a sharper formulation, there has been no case of democratic socialism.

Two: There have been numerous cases of non-democratic market economies.

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It seems to me that one most usefully discusses capitalism and socialism if one understands them quite narrowly as two alternative modern systems of production (as, indeed, the Marxists have always done) — the one based on market forces and private ownership of at least the "commanding heights" of the economy; the other based on political control mechanisms and on public ownership of the "commanding heights".

By these definitions, Sweden (even in the heyday of Social Democratic governance) cannot be called socialist. The confusion here is between production and distribution.

Sweden, like most of the other northern European democracies, developed generous welfare states — that is, very elaborate systems of distribution and redistribution.

But the welfare state, even in its Scandinavian apotheosis, continued to rest on a capitalist system of production and, indeed, only the affluence created by the latter made this welfare state possible.

Sweden was not, as its proponents kept saying, a "third way"; rather, it was a particular version of the "first way". Actually, under modern conditions, there is no "third way"; there are only different versions and modifications of the two alternative models.

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The question here is whether there could be a market economy without private property; the question of whether political democracy requires a market economy having already been answered positively.

Put differently, the question is whether there could be such a thing as "market socialism" — the important enterprises remaining in public ownership but competing with each other under market forces. Theoretically, such a system can be imagined. Two societies that

ran experiments with "market socialism" for 30 years were Yugoslavia and Hungary. Both failed. Can one explain the failure? Probably.

The entrepreneurial risk-taking and the financial controls over these risks (say, the businessman who starts an enterprise and the banker who loans him the start-up capital) depend on the motives of private owners — not so much because of the joys of ownership as such, but because of the control that ownership bestows when it is legally secure.

Improbable

The manager of a socialist enterprise who is told by the economic command centres — which own his firm and which in a real sense own him (since, outside the command structure, there are no worthwhile jobs) — to go out and act as an entrepreneur is in fact told to do the impossible or at least the highly improbable: to stimulate capitalist entrepreneurship.

In practice, it seems, this simply doesn't work. What does work, up to a point, is releasing sectors of a socialist economy to private enterprise.

This occurred in both Yugoslavia and Hungary, and it has been happening quite successfully in China. What also happens in such cases, though, is that the capitalist sector develops a dynamism that will increasingly threaten the much less productive socialist sector — the development that keeps the Beijing gerontocracy awake at night.

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must be a threshold somewhere which, if crossed, threatens democracy. But it seems to me that present knowledge does not permit us to mark the spot.

Comparison between existing capitalist democracies (say, between countries like Austria and Switzerland, with quite different levels of public ownership) suggests that there is a good deal of leeway.

The libertarian view that each step in the direction of public ownership is a step towards despotism is not borne out by the evidence.

On the other hand, given the empirical linkage between democracy and capitalism, policymakers would be well-advised to be cautious if moved to expand public ownership.

This leads logically to the more general question, about the limitations on the State and its role in the economy required by democracy.

On a basic level, the notion of democracy depends on a limitation of State power. The commonsensical definition of democracy defines democracy in terms of two institutions — regular (and real) elections, and a body of (real) civil rights and liberties. Both institutions serve to limit State power.

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
Someone will certainly mention Hong Kong. It is no such thing, but rather an efficient, if thoroughly undemocratic conspiracy of Chinese businessmen and British civil servants.

In between, once more, there seems to be a good deal of leeway — say, between the United States, a relatively modest case of State intervention, and much more statist cases like Japan or

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Page I

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even France — all market economies, all democracies.

Probably it is important to ask about, not so much the degree of State intervention, as the nature of it. More specifically: does State intervention in the economy move with market forces or against them?

Thus, arguably, the Japanese State intervenes in the economy without undermining the dynamics of the market; by contrast, the argument has been made that the evolving bureaucracy of the European Community (the "Brussels syndrome") will damage the workings of the market economy. One way to describe the relation between democracy and capitalism is to say that is asymmetrical.

Put simply: capitalism is a

precondition for democracy (put more precisely, a necessary but not sufficient condition); but democracy is not a precondition for capitalism. This, it seems, is what the empirical evidence indicates.

I regret this; I would much prefer a symmetrical relation, where the two institutional arrangements could be seen as the two sides of the same coin of liberty. Alas, they are not.

The major contemporary falsification of the symmetrical view (the classical libertarian one) is constituted by the east Asian economic success stories.

Here we have a vigorous capitalist dynamic, still far from its apex, in some ways more successful than the Western case. Every one of the post-

World-War 2 success stories — notably South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore — unfolded under non-democratic regimes.

As to Japan, it has been a democracy since World War 2, but the period when it first established a successful capitalism, the Meiji period, was anything but democratic in its political system. One might ask how many of the Western societies could be called democracies in our sense at the time they took off into modern capitalism — hardly England in the 18th century, the country where it all started. The United States, in this as in many other matters, may be exceptional.

In view of this evidence, an intelligent argument has even

been made to the effect that democracy is not the regime best suited for the period when capitalism is first established, though it is the regime most likely to emerge after a time of successful capitalist development. There is no great mystery as to why capitalism is necessary for democracy.

It provides the social space within which individuals, groups and entire institutional complexes can develop independently of State control.

Conversely, the empirical correlation between socialism and dictatorship can be explained, precisely, by the absence of such social space in a socialist system. The anti-democratic effect of socialism is structural in origin, and not just the result of some variety of totalitarian ideology (such as Marxism-Leninism).

Inspire

To be sure, totalitarian ideas, such as that of society as an all-embracing fraternity or of the party as the infallible embodiment of the force of history, have served to legitimate socialist dictatorships and to inspire their cadres. But socialism would make democracy highly unlikely even in the absence of such ideas.

The explanation for this is simple: While there have been socialist Utopias envisaging the control of the economy by independent association of producers (such was the syndicalist vision), these have remained just that — Utopias, empirically unrealisable, except perhaps in small communities (such as the kibbutz or the "intentional communities" of American sectarianism) or over short periods of time (as in the Soviets right after the Bolshevik revolution).

Under modern conditions, given the complexity of a modern or even a modernising economy, socialism invariably means control of the economy by the State. In other words, the State is the only "available" control mechanism other than the market.

But because of technology, the State is already a fearsome agglomeration of power. Even the most restrained, democratic State today has more power at its disposal than the most efficient despotisms of pre-modern times.

Imagine Caligula with an empire-wide computer network, or

Genghis Khan with helicopters or for that matter Ivan the Terrible with a functioning Internal Revenue Service. To add to this armoury of power control over the economy — that is, control of the livelihood of all or even the great majority of the population — is to bring about a quantum leap in power.

Such power is difficult if not impossible to reconcile with democracy. Socialism can only be established by a titanic act of expropriation. But, given the condition of human life in society, property will inevitably spring up again.

The socialist expropriation, therefore, cannot be a one-time-only event. It must be reiterated over and over again.

Socialism requires eternal vigilance. Such permanent expropriation, however, cannot be democratically administered. Those who are to be expropriated will organise and resist. Dictatorship is the only political solution to this problem.

If one understands these basic structural facts about a modern society, the talk of a "third way" between capitalism and socialism makes no sense at all. There is no "third way". There are, to be sure, modifications of the first and the second "ways". There are variants of capitalism, as there have been variants of socialism.

If one prefers to speak of a "mixed economy", every empirically existent economy is "mixed" in the sense that there is some combination of market forces and State interventions.

Capitalism has shown an enduring capacity to produce historically unprecedented wealth and to allow huge masses of people to benefit from this. Socialism has shown itself to be an unmitigated economic and political disaster. As democracy requires a capitalist foundation, this foundation appears secure for the foreseeable future. Democratic capitalism thus appears to be the only way to go.

The last few years have indeed been a triumph for democratic capitalism, and its prospects today are much brighter than they have been for a long time. Given my understanding of the economic features of modernity, I regard it as unlikely that "new kinds of economic systems" will emerge in the foreseeable future. Either capitalism will survive, or socialism will return in one form or another.

If the latter eventuality occurs, the prospects for democracy are gloomy indeed.

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
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Black leaders must move firmly to crush this destructive force, writes Mike Siluma

Ethnicity used to fan violence

NOT a moment too soon, the National Peace Committee (NPC) is to act against political leaders who make inflammatory statements in contravention of the National Peace Accord.

That matters have come to a stage where the NPC found it necessary to take such a step is a timely reminder of the crucial role that black leaders — whose followers are, after all, the ones being maimed and murdered in political violence — have to play in efforts to stem the carnage.

In particular, black political leaders need to address a phenomenon that is assuming a greater importance in the fighting — the manipulation for political gain of ethnicity to fan violence among blacks.

Recent events suggest that, despite urbanisation and heightened political consciousness among blacks, ethnicity remains a potent force and a useful tool in the hands of those seeking to delay

the advent of democracy, or to build a political base among blacks ahead of elections for the first non-racial government.

Consider the following:

- A mob rampages through a part of Soweto, killing 10 people and injuring an unknown number. Residents blame the bloody mayhem on Xhosa-speaking men from a nearby squatter camp. The attackers, according to press reports, sought out Zulu speakers for attack.

- A public claim, later proved by the Goldstone Commission to be unfounded, by senior Inkatha Freedom Party leadership of arms being stockpiled in their "tens of thousands" for attacks on Zulu-speakers and hostel inmates in the PWV area.

- An IFP ultimatum to Pretoria to, among other things, halt "the killing of Zulus" on trains on the Reef.

- A recent investigation by the Independent Board of Inquiry into Informal Repression which found

that eyewitnesses and survivors of train violence had consistently described the attackers as Zulu-speaking.

- An elderly preacher is killed after being thrown from a moving train, apparently for no other reason than that he conducted a sermon in Xhosa.

But what do these incidents tell us? That (as some Right-leaning commentators argue) on the eve of transition to democracy Zulu-speaking South Africans have suddenly discovered that they have unique and separate political and cultural interests which can only be advanced through the annihilation of their non-Zulu-speaking black compatriots?

Or that the reading of the funeral rites for apartheid has rekindled in Xhosa speakers some atavistic, anti-Zulu sentiment which drives them to crave for Zulu blood?

Far from it. If either were the case, South Africa's townships, especially in the metropolitan

areas, would long ago have been turned into wastelands.

What the incidents do tell us, though, is that ethnicity is emerging as a factor in the violence, sowing suspicion and hostility.

It is this which recently drove Zulu-speaking journalist Mondli Makhanya to write in the Weekly Mail: "As a non-ethnic-minded Zulu I am often perturbed by (the IFP's) abuse of Zuluness to further its narrow political goals."

"Terrified Reef township residents often shout 'the Zulus are coming' as they flee from marauding Inkatha imps. Civic and political activists often refer to hostel dwellers as 'the Zulus', regardless of the fact that a large proportion of their constituency belongs to this tribe."

Mr Makhanya's desperate plea for a more sober analysis of the conflict, and for the de-tribalisation of what is essentially a political feud, will have been received with much sympathy by many with a finger on the townships' po-

litical pulse.

One of them is Institute for Multiparty Democracy executive chairman Oscar Dlomo, who points out that for many years political violence in Natal has been mainly between Zulu-speaking people divided by political allegiances.

"Casting the conflict in ethnic or tribal terms is dangerous in that it can actually contribute to the violence. The police are sometimes guilty of this. Also, there is the unfortunate situation where some politicians are casting the violence in ethnic terms. This is poisoning the attitudes of people," said Dr Dlomo.

The director of the Project for the Study of Violence at the University of the Witwatersrand, Lloyd Vogelmann, thinks that ethnicity is "a major factor, often central to the violence".

"What is happening is that as people become fearful of the violence they withdraw into ethnic nationalism, which is not unique

to the South African situation. Also, in the run-up to elections there is likely to be a greater emphasis on ethnicity, by some groups such as, for instance, the IFP," Mr Vogelmann argued.

It is Dr Vogelmann's latter point which the NPC, together with all black leaders, should give serious consideration. Granted, many black leaders do not like to be seen to be tribalist for fear of appearing to be doing apartheid's dirty work. But this is no reason for not tackling an issue which cannot be wished away, which will increasingly add fuel to the fire of political violence, especially once electioneering for a new government begins in earnest.

It is only the black leaders who can effectively make a stand against a creed which, handled recklessly, can give rise to tribal chauvinism and a greater polarisation of South Africa's black population — something which will, in the long run, benefit no one. □

Hit squads: how much more proof does FW need?

THE case for joint control of the security forces is now incontrovertible.

For months, President de Klerk and his Ministers have been dismissing evidence of police involvement in the violence with the argument that these were aberrations, that every police force in the world has its "few rotten apples", but the SAP as a whole is strictly impartial and firmly committed to a peace-keeping role.

Now we have documentary evidence in the Matthew Goniwe case of an established procedure for authorising political assassinations involving the very highest councils of government.

It is not clear whether the signal message sent to the State Security Council proposing that Goniwe and his friends be "permanently removed from society" was ever discussed by that body, which was headed by President Botha, and included Pik Botha, General Magnus Malan and Kobie Coetsee of the present Cabinet.

President de Klerk insists it was not, and this is probably correct given the need-not-to-know

principle with which political leaders usually insulate themselves from such matters. The decision to authorise the assassinations was most likely taken somewhere in the Secretariat of more than 100 securocrats.

But the members of the State Security Council must have known that political assassinations were taking place and tacitly condoned them.

Nor is this surprising. In 1985, when Goniwe, Fort Calata, Sparrow Mkonto and Sicela Mhlauli were killed, mutilated and burned, the State Security Council was operating according to its "total strategy".

This was based largely on the writings of an American military strategist, John J. McCuen, who specified in his book, "The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War", that the first step in counter-insurgency operations was to smash the "revolutionary" organisation by, among other things, identifying and eliminating key leaders.

It would appear, therefore, that the assassinations carried out in 1985 were not done by "rotten



Allister Sparks

apples" but by trained hit squads acting on orders from above, in accordance with approved policy.

This must now be placed in context with the large accumulation of evidence indicating that such hit squad activity is continuing — the latest being the Weekly Mail's disclosure of a secret police base in Sebokeng linked to the planning of assassinations in the Vaal area.

It must be linked, too, to the ridiculously premature release of some policemen sentenced to long prison terms for political murders, which points implicitly to a sense of obligation to these men on the part of their superiors.

There is, in fact, what Judge Rudolph Erasmus of the Info Inquiry would have called "a golden thread" running through all the incidents — from such dirty tricks as the smashing of Alan Paton's car windscreen and the sending of

a toxic T-shirt to Donald Woods's small daughter, to the more systematic and ideological operations of the '80s when the CCB hung a baboon foetus outside Bishop Desmond Tutu's home, poisoned the Rev Frank Chikane's clothing, switched lawyer Dullah Omar's heart pills to give him a coronary attack, and went in for selective assassinations.

There was the blowing up of Albie Sachs, the assassination of Ruth First, Jeanette Schoon and her daughter, Griffiths and Victoria Mxenge, Fabian Ribeiro, Goniwe and his colleagues, David Webster, and many more.

There was support for Renamo to destabilise Mozambique as an ANC base, the bombs in Zimbabwe, death squad raids into Swaziland, a clandestine campaign to destabilise Swapo in the Namibian elections, Inkathagate, the Trust Feeds massacre and its evidence of support for Inkatha in destabilising the legalised ANC inside South Africa. And now the Weekly Mail revelations.

It's a long, long thread of official venality and violence. Yet the repeated exposures yield nothing.

The evidence disappears into some cosmic black hole in Pretoria and there is no response other than bland assurances.

Even at the height of the latest appalling revelations, the lack of concern continued. The Minister of Law and Order appointed Willem Krugel, the surviving assessor in the discredited Delmas case, declared a mistrial by the Appeal Court, to investigate the allegations of a police cover-up in the Trust Feeds case — a choice about as sensitive to public perceptions as choosing a juror in the Rodney King case to investigate the Los Angeles riots.

To cap it all, right after the Trust Feeds verdict the notorious 32 Battalion, fresh from allegations of wanton violence in Phola Park, was sent into the Maritzburg area where Trust Feeds is located, provoking mass protests that culminated in a state of emergency being declared there by the end of last week.

We can't go on like this. We can't have peace this way — and we can't build a new nation without peace.

What to do about it? We need a

cleansing, but we can't have a Nuremberg trial because any thought of that would send those now in power scrambling away from the negotiating table.

Perhaps, as in post-Pinochet Chile, we could have a Commission on Human Rights Abuses that would publish its findings but impose no punishments. Yet even that has its perils, as Ariel Dorfman warns in his explosive play, "Death and the Maiden", which has just won the top Olivier Award in Britain.

Dorfman, himself a Chilean who was persecuted under Pinochet and had friends tortured and assassinated, believes it is essential that a nation be able to face and articulate the dark side of its experiences.

At the very least, the Government must stop pretending there is no problem. The evidence is too overwhelming. Mr de Klerk must acknowledge it and with his Codesa partners begin structuring an agreed form of joint control of the police, the military — and, not least, the entire intelligence gathering apparatus. □

DUMISANI MAKHAYE looks at the role of Umkhonto we Sizwe

THE NATAL MERCURY

13-05-92

No disbanding under apartheid

THERE are growing rumblings about the existence of private armies in South Africa. These reverberate from the Union Buildings to the Parliamentary building in Cape Town and are echoed in Ulundi and in some sectors of the established media.

The common theme is that the ANC must disband Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) in order to level the political ground. When the ANC refuses, it is portrayed as having bad faith. This is politics and politics is science. We need to go deeper than what is shown on the surface with regard to the question of private armies.

From its very inception Umkhonto we Sizwe was perceived as a national liberation army of the National Liberation Movement headed by the ANC. It drew its cadres at all levels from democrats from all different racial groups not simply for logistical reasons but as a matter of principle.

It is important to emphasise at this point that the struggle of the oppressed majority in South Africa is not a struggle for civil rights, nor a struggle against only racism like say the struggle of the Hispanic people or African-Americans in the USA.

It is basically a national liberation struggle and for national self-determination even though the struggle for civil rights and against racism forms part of it.

It is a struggle against colonialism within the South African context where the coloniser and the colonised share the common borders. What happened in 1910 was not a process of decolonisation but a change of one coloniser to the other.

The conditions of the black majority remained basically the same. Such a situation also happened in countries like Tanganyika where colonialism changed hands from Germany to Britain.

The difference with the South African situation might be the

question of form but not the essence.

It has been necessary to dig this background because the historical place of Umkhonto we Sizwe is located within that historical context.

Umkhonto we Sizwe was formed after all avenues for a peaceful change had been closed with the banning of the ANC and the marshalling of the security forces by the state to crush by gun all forms of resistance. Its historical mission was the defence of not only ANC members or supporters but all the oppressed people regardless of their political affiliation.

This might sound ridiculous for those who have never experienced the political culture from within. To illustrate the point, let us take a classical hypothetical situation.

Suppose at the height of the State of Emergency the Inkatha Freedom Party organised a mass demonstration against that State of Emergency. Suppose there was a well-equipped MK unit in that vicinity and the police attacked the IFP demonstrators.

It would have been within the brief of that MK unit to react in defence of those demonstrators irrespective of their political affiliation.

Unfortunately, organisations like Inkatha have been funded by the Department of Military Intelligence. Its cadres have been trained by the SADF in the Caprivi Strip, Matigulu and elsewhere. Its mass meetings have been organised and funded by the SADF with an aim of countering the growth and influence of the ANC and other organisations. All this is well documented in the Inkathagate Scandal.

The revelations in the recent Trust Feed trial and the findings of the Goldstone Commission in Mooi River are testimony to the collusion between the IFP and South Afri-

can security forces. In a way the organisational independence of the IFP is questionable. Therefore it cannot expect protection by MK. This is not of the making of the ANC. Anyway, it does not need protection from anyone for it hob-nobs with the security forces of apartheid.

It is clear that the De Klerk and KwaZulu governments want to achieve by other means what they failed to achieve in the last 30 years — the destruction of MK. They expect the ANC to assist them in that plan.

The problem with the De Klerk government is that it regards the SADF as a national army. The voteless majority of South Africans disputes this.

The SADF and SAP's *raison d'être* is to uphold and defend the South African constitution and laws emanating from the white-only Parliament. The black majority are statutorily excluded from any meaningful participation in the government of their lives. They are operating outside the constitution. Therefore the SADF and the SAP are a white tribal army. The few black officers are there simply for logistical reasons and window-dressing. They implement orders from their white senior officers.

More than this, the coming into office of the National Party saw some radical changes in the officers corps of the Defence Force. The majority of capable officers who had distinguished themselves in World War 11 were unceremoniously removed or retired. Their places were taken by those who were ardent supporters of the policy of apartheid and the National Party. Therefore the SADF is not only a white tribal army, but also a private army of the National Party.

Similarly, for all practical purposes the KwaZulu Police are a tribal private army of the Inkatha Freedom Party. Whoever doubts this must go to the

people of Umlazi, KwaMashu and elsewhere and learn from their practical experiences with regard to the KwaZulu Police. Why are they guarding houses of only the IFP leaders and not those of any other political organisation? Yet they are paid through the tax of all the people regardless of their political affiliation.

The ANC upholds the letter and spirit of the Groote Schuur, Pretoria and more especially, the DF Malan Minutes. It is therefore puzzling that the De Klerk government should at this hour be raising questions about MK as if there have never been any discussion on that question.

It is clear that De Klerk is already electioneering on this question. But one feels that it is being irresponsible of him to use such a sensitive national issue just for electioneering.

It is clear that there are many armed formations in South Africa. The position of the ANC on this question is known. The ANC cannot disband MK while the apartheid regime is still in power.

The reality is that the integration of these armed formations cannot take place under the National Party government which has its own private army — the SADF. This integration can only take place under the auspices of an Interim Government of National Unity. In fact, it is those who delay the formation of an Interim Government who are the cause of the continuing existence of private armies in South Africa. The new army of a democratic South Africa will not pay allegiance to any political party but to the people as a whole. Its main task will be to defend the democratic constitution and the sovereignty of the people as a whole.

Dumisani Makhaye is head of the ANC's Department of Information and Publicity in Southern Natal.

13/5/92

Mixed feelings

TWO FINDINGS stand out among the many from the Human Sciences Research Council's latest opinion survey. One is that the ANC remains the strongest political organisation, and the other is that pessimism about the future remains high among whites, but to a surprising degree also among other races.

The findings are not unexpected. The survey was done in February, and even with Codesa approaching its second plenary session, uncertainty remains the order of the day. It is understandable, for moving from white minority rule to a non-racial democracy in a society as predominantly black and with a history like ours is a giant leap by any standards.

It is clear from the breakdown of support for the various parties that the racial prejudice on which apartheid thrived — and which it inspired — is still at work, although it is beginning to work in somewhat different ways. Thus, while the ANC can hope for about 45% of the over-all vote with the help of two-thirds of the black electorate, it is different for the Nationalists. Their 25% of the over-all vote comes more from the coloured people (66%) and Asians (57%) than from whites (53%).

The survey was done before the referendum, but research analyst Professor Lawrence Schlemmer believes the big 'Yes' vote was more from fear of what might happen if President de Klerk lost than from actual enthusiasm for reform.

The survey was concentrated mainly in the urban and peri-urban areas, which is to the disadvantage of both the Conservative Party and the Inkatha Freedom Party, whose strongest support is in the rural areas. However, while the IFP is given only 10% of the over-all vote, in the rural Zulu community it remains a substantial factor.

As the transition process moves to interim rule, it would be well for the negotiators to keep these divisions — and fears — in mind. It makes it all the more important that as many parties as possible are made part of the process, serving reconciliation rather than aggravating division.

Open hand

IT IS seven years since ANC activist Matthew Goniwe and his companions died, and although suspicions were aroused at the time of his death, it is only now that Transkei leader Major-General Bantu Holomisa has released a document purporting to implicate the State Security Council in an assassination plan that the matter is being taken further.

The potentially damning document was released at a critical time for negotiations, and through a homeland leader linked to the ANC, suggesting political stage management. The fact that General Holomisa is still withholding what he says is a "thick file" of further evidence of SA state involvement in plans to assassinate Transkei nationals adds to that impression.

If Mr Goniwe was assassinated, and the SA Government did plot to assassinate other activists, these are matters that should be exposed without further delay.

The alleged killings took place in circumstances of low-level warfare between ANC guerillas and SA security forces. Today, as negotiations for a new order make progress, the country does not need an overhang of past war crimes to be released in dribs and drabs for political convenience. It needs to clear the air so all can face the future with a new resolve to leave an ugly past behind.

MICHAEL HARTNACK reports from Harare

THE NATAL Mercury B-05-96

Ruling by consent — or coercion

THE recent outbursts of violent unrest in both Malawi and Zimbabwe offer some useful reflections for the whole of Africa on the fundamental problem of violence and coercion in all its subtle forms. There is also something worth noting for the liberal, humanitarian, anti-authoritarian "tradition" which runs through all our societies, although it has nowhere achieved such stature as in South Africa.

In Blantyre, Lilongwe and Limbe, at least 38 people were killed in three days of rioting which was unprecedented in the 30-year heavy-handed rule of life-president Hastings Kamuzu Banda.

In Harare and Bulawayo, President Robert Mugabe's para-military riot squads fought running battles with university students. Although the Zanu(PF) government is now, obviously, adrift without any ideological or moral direction, the students are in a similar quandary. While their woes about being unable to make ends meet are real enough, they prevaricate between the Marxist-Leninist clichés they learned at school and western anti-communist jargon, when trying to piece their discontent into a coherent philosophical whole.

Zanu(PF) has no theory left to justify its right to coerce, but no opponent has much of a credible one with which to challenge it. This could prove either a blessing or a curse depending on whether all ten million of us want or need to be coerced in future.

President Banda, conservatively estimated to be within 87 and 93 years old, has been a curious phenomenon in African politics, an exception proving the rule. He was the only national messiah whose moral batteries did not need constant recharging by white sycophants during his years in power. The loss of international righteousness involved in his establishment of diplomatic ties with Pretoria was, in his eyes, well worth South Africa's multi-million rands aid.

Because of his extraordinary background as a London general practitioner (his was no bogus honorary doctorate), because he had assimilated European culture so much he had forgotten his mother tongue, Dr Banda enjoyed the sort of towering sense of moral and intellectual superiority over his subjects that the archetypical colonial administrators did.

The first moral is that politicians need a dynamic ideological base to persist in the business of coercion, whether in government or opposition.

The second moral lies in the nature of the society, in how much coercion it requires or will tolerate.

President Banda had the good fortune to rule over a state which is, by African standards, remarkably homogenous in tribal terms (although there have been some regional tensions).

Now, warns a western diplomat, the perennially placid Malawians for the first time since 1962 "have the fire in their eyes." This sudden abandon-

ment of the "don't rock the boat" attitude could be terrifyingly destructive or excitingly constructive, depending how Malawians play things.

Africa has no shortage of politicians with "fire in their eyes" and their capacity for mischief is endless.

A classic example is Zimbabwe's Dr Herbert Ushewokunze, President Mugabe's seemingly indestructible lieutenant who has caused havoc, successively, at the ministries of health, home affairs (where he controlled the police), transport, and latterly energy and water resources.

President Mugabe deserves sympathy if he feels what Dr Ushewokunze has cost the national economy is cheap compared with the damage he might do if denied office. Clearly, if that is how all ten million of us aspire to behave, any government is going to have to employ a great degree of coercion to maintain order, and it will have to acquire or evolve a belief system to justify this use of force.

Africa's problems have frequently been blamed on Marxist-Leninism or "African socialism." The contrasting experiences of Zimbabwe and Malawi — ideologically so different yet so similar in end result — reveal this to be an illusion created by propaganda. The real problem is endemic violence, the need for coercion, the costly manner of coercion.

Our "liberal traditions" should have been able to expose the truth and mitigate the situa-

tion. Sadly, they made a series of grave tactical blunders.

First, they idealised the rising forces of opposition (such as Dr Banda, in Rhodesian federal days), condoning their violence until a nation-wide pattern of terror had been institutionalised by women's leagues, party thugs, and "intelligence cadres."

Second, many representatives of the "liberal tradition" prematurely threw in their lot with one or other African nationalist faction. Sometimes they acted from the noble ideal of promoting inter-racial unity or attempting to moderate extremist forces.

Sometimes they acted to satisfy their long-frustrated ambitions for "real" political power after decades of seemingly futile opposition.

But when their chosen faction could no longer escape the challenges of violence and coercion, these representatives of the liberal tradition found themselves unwitting associates to some ugly incidents. They were seen to have blood on their hands, and lost their moral authority to continue protesting.

The liberal tradition can survive without aspiring to power, concentrating on cultivating its humanitarian, anti-authoritarian ideals throughout the national life, so power rests less on coercion and more on intelligent consent. If we can reform the violent tendencies in societies, government will be easier to reform, and economic improvement should follow.

PATRICK LEEMAN reports on a nationwide HSRC survey

'Don't rush into interim government'

ONLY 14% OF WHITES appear to want an interim government as soon as possible. Only 25% of Asians and coloured people fall into this category and even black views are divided on the issue.

This point is made by Prof Lawrence Schlemmer, a general manager of the Human Sciences Research Council, in the latest edition of its quarterly report, *Information Update*.

Prof Schlemmer says most party political supporters, black and white, would like to see some further test of opinion before the interim government is fully and formally established.

The academic analysed the results of 2 000 replies after personal interviews were conducted around the country and came to the conclusion that most whites, Asians and coloured people view an interim government with some trepidation at present.

He says the overwhelming endorsement of negotiation and reform in the March referendum was due very substantially to fears of what would happen if State President FW de Klerk lost and negotiation ceased. It was not due to any particular enthusiasm for the results of negotiation.

Prof Schlemmer maintains that popular

views on the composition of an interim government, once established, is that it should contain as many parties as possible, even including the Conservative Party.

Generally, very few people would like to see a big party "cartel" between the African National Congress and the National Party.

He says very few people, among them only 40% of blacks, would like to see the interim government taking control of the security forces.

Prof Schlemmer says black people are more positive than negative about life in the "new South Africa" but only moderately so.

He says whites are generally very pessimistic about political, social and economic conditions in the future while Asians and coloured people are varied in their expectations.

The researcher says there appears to be majority support in all constituencies for what he terms "democratic checks and balances."

There is also strong support among all South Africans for devolution of power to lower tiers of government closer to the people.

Prof Schlemmer says supporters of what might be the largest future party, the ANC, are most inclined to favour exclusive government by a majority party, but even they would see the need for curbs on power and protection of minority interests.

He says that, suprisingly, black people are divided about the future of the homelands and there is no overwhelming majority view that they should be abolished.

Prof Schlemmer finds that there is no consistent evidence of strong "socialist" ideology among future black voters.

Strong sentiments in favour of affirmative action exist, but such sentiments are not more consistently held by ANC, SACP or PAC supporters than by government supporters.

"Why then does it seem that so many political factions, by their actions and the current violence, display extreme views, intolerance and political aggression?" he asks.

"The answer lies in the fact that these people are highly politicised activists, black and white.

"The real 'grassroots', the rank and file, are much more amenable to finding an equitable resolution of differences."

Prof Schlemmer concludes that the

sooner all parties mobilise the real masses, bringing in ordinary people, the sooner South Africans will realise that the future holds more promise than threat.

Using the results of the same survey, Dr Johann Mouton, another general manager of the HSRC, says that the Conservative Party would probably poll in the region of 30% of the white vote in a general election.

He says the support for the Democratic Party reached a new low of 3% in February compared to the average of 6% obtained throughout 1991.

The only substantial DP support — 10% — is found among English-speaking whites in the metropolitan areas, according to Dr Mouton.

As far as support for black leaders is concerned, the academic says Mr Nelson Mandela polled 65% of the black vote, Dr Mangosutho Buthelezi 11%, other black leaders 6% and Mr de Klerk 5%.

Mandela's support is highest among Xhosa-speaking blacks — 80% — and Dr Buthelezi's biggest constituency is among the rural Zulu population — 43%.

Dr Mouton says support for the KwaZulu Chief Minister remains at only 8% among metropolitan Zulu-speakers.

FORUM

'Opportunist' Pik

SIR — So ... the "Honourable" R F Botha has now been the RSA's Minister of Foreign Affairs for 15 years.

Pik Botha has always been a leftist and shameless panderer to blacks. Recently, however, on the flight back from Abuja he excelled himself when he demonstrated to the world where his devotion and sympathies lie by disporting himself to the press in a dash-iki!

Although this behaviour makes one feel sick, it is not surprising if his political background is taken into consideration.

Mr Botha has always been an opponent of so-called apartheid. Being a shrewd political opportunist, however, he managed to become NP member of Parliament for Wonderboom on the grounds of his professed support for that selfsame apartheid, both big and small — Immorality Act, Mixed Marriages Act, Group Areas Act, Separate Amenities Act, Population Registration Act, the lot.

Thus was introduced into the NP the technique of the "political big lie" as an exact science. It is worthwhile remembering that it was he who, when confronted with the fact that he had lied about the funding of the IFP, said it was irrelevant. To Pik Botha, then, the truth is irrelevant!

After becoming an MP he rapidly made a name for himself by the way in which he exerted himself to sell out the whites and destroy everything that, rightly or wrongly, was intended to protect them.

The so-called "successes" he achieved in the field of foreign affairs, were the fruits of his efficiency as a master of the sell-out. Rhodesia to Mugabe, South-West Africa to Swapo, the RSA to the communist-controlled ANC. At one stage he even tried to sell out the Mozambican resistance movement, Renamo, to the hardened communistic Frelimo régime.

Over all the years, he has not offered anything to replace the apartheid that he hates so much, other than black majority rule. Saddest of all, is the fact that he has never raised a finger to establish anything that could benefit the nation that he belongs to. He is indeed a tragic Afrikaner politician who has descended like a bird of ill omen on the Afrikaner in his hour of crisis.

Ostensibly unaware of his own roots, he has always shown more understanding for the aspirations of his people's enemies than for their fears, ideals and endeavours!

To Pik Botha, therefore, F W de Klerk is a godsend!
Umhlanga

JL BUYS

MICHAEL HARTNACK reports from Harare

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