… there is an emerging orthodoxy made up of a combination of moderate, reformist, communitarian, humanitarian and bottom-up approaches to development. A large number of policy documents, guidelines, handbooks and other practical resources used by the major NGOs, government agencies and multilateral development institutions express this new (socio-political) orthodoxy. These claim to approach development policy making from a people-centred, rights-based and more local point of view. Yet alongside this new soft and fluffy orthodoxy, the hard, unfluffy economic neo-liberal orthodoxy appears alive and well.

A good example of this contradiction is South Africa's ongoing negotiations with the EU on a "Trade and Development Agreement". While an agreement has yet to be reached, it is clear that the deal, while ostensibly developmentalist and regionally sensitive (only after protests from the region of course), is based on a market initiative principle which may have "soft and fluffy" rhetoric but which will reward those who can most adequately function within the market. At the same time, it will adversely affect market entrants, and future market entrants, who will find it difficult to compete with the poorer EU states. These entrants are and will be groups who have been discriminated against during various phases of colonialism and apartheid, both within South Africa and beyond (in South Africa a lot is said about "previously disadvantaged groups", but words are, of course, a *cheap* alternative, in both senses of the word, to the real thing).

The contradiction between the rhetoric and reality is also evident in the evolution of the security debate within the regional organisation SADC, especially since South Africa joined in 1994. The debate has been based on exchanges between the heads of state who make up the SADC Summit, but also on an interchange between research institutions (especially in South Africa) and the South African Department of Foreign Affairs (Vale, 1996).[13] It is interesting in that it also ties up directly with the connections between development and security discourses.

In southern Africa academic analyses of the region have drawn heavily on the Cold War discourses, which revolved around the caricatured "superpower rivalry". Constructing regional understandings of security inevitably gravitated towards some form of analysis of the Frontline States (FLS), a loose grouping of

peace'" (Booth, 1991; 341). Arguably this is a more salient manner of focusing on societal security in developing countries, because, as Bryant (1988:9) has put it (in the context of southern Africa), " ... one cannot uncouple security policies from those of development.[12]

Gendered critical approaches have questioned the extent to which "democracy, openness, and/or legitimate authority apply to different groups inside the state, and draws attention to the fact that outside can also be inside (the state), and that self and other may have multiple meanings within and between states, and between groups sharing various allegiances. However, many gendered critical approaches insist on talking about "humanity as such", especially in terms of emancipation from oppression and discrimination, political and economic. The ways in which discrimination is entrenched, theoretically and practically, through dominant discourses on politics and economics are a key area of critical analysis.

In the southern African context, the dominant discourses on security and development maintain the metanarratives which underpin dominant discourses within the international knowledge structure. Development narratives, while ostensibly "indigenous", are written in a language which appropriates both the language of macro-economics (music to the international world of finance) as well as the language of politically correct development-speak (the language of development experts). The shift, by the South African government, from the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) to the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) macro-economic framework is a case in point. Whatever the "social" content of either policy (they can only be seen as policy window-dressing), the appropriation of the language of development experts in GEAR indicates the government's collective realisation that there is only one far-reaching rule: do not openly buck the system by attempting any form of social engineering.

The security realist "moment" continues, and in the South African context this is reinforced by security studies analysts whose funding often depends on research on "hard" or "real" security issues (obtained from guess who, or better put, which states). While broader (horizontal) aspects are included as add-on variables, the presumptions of realism portray a state-centric view of political/military security. This predominates as the most important referent by which governments should measure their legitimacy as states, and their status as states in the region. It must be added that even while this metanarrative is largely

illustrated is security studies. Buzan's (1983) attempt to expand notions of security horizontally to include aspects other than simply the political and military security of states has triggered a wave of critical theory analysis which has attempted to extend this conceptualisation vertically to embrace communitarian (or societal) aspects as well. At the horizontal level, attempts have also been made to conceptualise security regionally, especially in the "developing" world context. To this extent, depending on the analyst, previously hidden insecurities (i.e. that of marginalised groups within and between states) have emerged more clearly. The benefits of expanded notions of security is thus a more multi-level approach to analysis as well as, depending once again on the analyst, a more nuanced and gendered examination of local and regional narratives.

In spite of these analytical advances there has been very little change to the classic notion of security as military security. The fact that military security issues have so easily eclipsed the Southern African Development Community (SADC) development agenda is more than adequate testimony. SADC has, since the establishment of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) as an institution in 1996, become influenced by military security issues at an operational level. While it has been argued that this is because the Organ is not functioning as it should, it remains a valid point that the inclusion of such a military dimension into an organisation aiming at regional development was bound to create tension between old and new priorities, especially among state leaders. Debates on the connection between security and development are long and, in many senses, not intrinsic to the angle of my argument, since it is quite self-evident that "new security thinking" incorporates a developmental impetus even while this is vaguely (arguably also poorly) articulated. The connection between the two is also not new to SADC, which, when it was still the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC),[5] had already embraced the notion of, for example, food security as part of the development process (Thompson, 1996).

If the dialectic between metanarratives and narratives on the one hand and discourses on the other is to be more adequately understood, it is important to note the range and focus of critical theoretical approaches which are, to state the obvious, vast at both the level of theoretical assumptions and the analytical and methodological level. Generally speaking, critical approaches espouse an emancipatory dimension, although there is some rivalry between those who ascribe to

on military and political state power. This has been no different since the end of the Cold War. The global metanarrative of security remains realist and state-centric, as does the regional discourse, and is distinct from the development discourse. It should be clear that, viewed from a gendered critical perspective, the priorities of SADC, especially institutionally with the establishment of the Organ, are structured along lines which reflect a prioritisation of a masculinised military security ethic which excludes broader security and development concerns. It is also evident that, in spite of rhetoric on gender equality (including SADC's Declaration on Gender endorsed in 1997), notions of regional security and development have not been much altered at the policy practice level by critical academic analyses.

As promised, a brief mention will be made of why alternative metanarratives appear to have an effect on language yet not on policy. There appear to be at least four problem areas, or weak spots, to critical analyses:

- They are too general.

- They emphasise bottom-up approaches and drawing on local narratives, but never actually do so.

- They do not face the awful reality that states can control political legitimacy and therefore are not interested in establishing local narrative input to discourses which may lead to challenges to their authority.

- They sheer away from the knowledge that NGOs and others may appropriate their language and use it to repackage old priorities.

It would be rather less tiring to end here, since resolving the problem areas in their entirety is not possible on the page. It seems to me that the task of critical analysts is to reappropriate their language by showing how it has been appropriated, by specifically interrogating the security and development discourses to show where language is just language and action does not follow. It is necessary to be on the lookout for fluffy NGO documents and to interrogate how these are translated into action. It is necessary to be non-partisan and not to accept that state leaders and their minions are necessarily going to put those nice-sounding words into action. In other words, it is necessary to get out of the ivory tower and do some real work, together with some clear thinking. The complacency of the last ten years has to give way to a knowledge that *naïveté* is a form of reverse

Diagram 1: Relational power of social forces in the "developing" state

Labels in diagram:

WORLD/REGION

INTERESTS

STRUCTURAL POWER (where applicable)

SOCIAL FORCES

International governmental organisations

Business

Organised labour

Formal producers

Local NGOs

Unorganised labour

Semi-subsistence

Informal producers

STATE CORE

MIL.

EC.

POL.

SERV

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SOUTHERN AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES

No. 78

Understanding the development and security discourses in southern Africa: Constructive or destructive dialectic?

LISA THOMPSON

CENTRE for SOUTHERN AFRICAN STUDIES

SCHOOL of GOVERNMENT

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Development and security discourses in international relations

The concepts "discourse", "metanarrative" and "narrative" have recently become popular in theorising on international relations (and in International Relations – the upper case denoting the discipline), especially where international relations analysis intersects with discussions on regional security and development. This article examines the uses (and usefulness) of these concepts in relation to debates on regional security and development in southern Africa. Almost ten years after the end of the Cold War and the popularisation of alternative approaches to security, regional dynamics look disturbingly the same. Why is this so? Is there something inherently problematic about the alternatives? Or is there perhaps something wrong with how we understand the dynamics of discourses? I argue that there is reason to question the understanding of alternatives *as discourses*, since the alternatives rarely reach policy implementation level (substantively that is; of course, politically correct policy rhetoric remains an obligatory aspect of politics). There is perhaps a corresponding vagueness to the use of the concept "discourse", which interferes with our understanding of how dominant discourses become self-perpetuating (in a similar way to how bureaucratic norms and values perpetuate themselves, no matter who takes office).

Gramsci (1971), Cox (1987), Strange (1988), Crush (1995), Fraser and Nicholson (1991), Bordo (1991) and others have pointed out in various different ways, and using various different conceptual terms, such as hegemonic knowledge (Gramsci, Cox); dominant discourses (Crush, Watts); legitimating

the context of the geography of the state system, even when these have regional implications, and even when policies are made collectively. For this reason, dominant security and development discourses remain stubbornly resistant to change. Thus while some might argue that, for example, regional security understandings have broadened and deepened, it is not the discourse which has changed (as yet), but simply that alternative metanarratives have been developed which have had little or no policy impact. Can the discourses be changed? I am tempted to take the scholar's weasel route and state that the question falls beyond the scope of this paper, but since the question can neither be ignored, nor substantively addressed here, some thoughts on what alternative metanarratives have and have not done in terms of their professed "emancipatory" edge will be offered in lieu of yet more bold prescriptions at the "meta" level.

Crush draws our attention to the way in which development requires a socio-spatial dimension and it is clear that security functions in much the same way. Geography acts as "both stage and actor", defining the boundaries of nation-states as well as posing states as core actors. Viewed this way, the discourse on development and security in South Africa and southern Africa shows the reinvention of a new language of crisis, of which a key aspect is the geographical dynamic of globalisation. As Watts (1995) points out, one of the key ways in which the development discourse perpetuates itself is through notions of crisis at both the level of theory and policy practice (in the latter case both state and non-state). The new language of development is characterised by references to the "inexorable force of globalisation" and the simultaneous need for "sustainable development", "empowerment of marginalised groups", "enhanced productivity", and the need for "regional development integration".

If, for reasons of (perhaps over)simplification, one conceptualises dominant theories and/or ideologies of politics and economics as metanarratives, it is also obvious that while in many ways these have shifted, and alternatives have indeed been advanced, as we approach the 21st century, most metanarratives of the state and international relations remain caught in the state-centric framing metanarrative which dates back to 1648. While there has been a general academic acceptance of broader notions of security and development and how this relates to societies, geographic boundaries (arbitrary or otherwise) still constrain both academic and policy debates. Southern African academic and policy debates are a very good example of the conceptual and practical problems at hand. On

the urban/political centres via government and also largely regional research and academic institutions.

At the analytical level, the concern of security studies institutions close to governments in the region (and especially in South Africa) is perforce focused on those issues that government prioritises, which are generally to do with maintaining (and in some cases fudging) legitimacy and maintaining state power. The conceptual stumbling block revolves around the traditional conception of "high" and "low" politics, which has been enforced by academics and state leaders, especially in the developing world. It allows them to separate political from economic security, and "inside" (the state) from "outside". These elements of both dominant metanarratives and discourses of security and development have remained unchanged since the end of the Cold War.

How has the discourse on security and development affected national and regional policies since the end of apartheid? SADC leaders have reshaped the security arrangements of the region, but while ostensibly "broadening" the security

FLOW OF DOMINANT DISCOURSE

Technology, development and security

Influence of international financial institutions (IFIs), international governmental organisations (IGOs), international non-governmental organisations (INGOs)

Core (mostly the major urban and political centre)

Diagram 2: Flows of power beyond and between states in the SADC region

narrative, they have in fact absorbed the military security aspect into SADC's structure in ways which have undermined regional solidarity even further. At present the strength and coherency of SADC is being seriously threatened by the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo, formerly Zaire.

The prioritisation of a political/military horizontally-focused approach by the South African state, even in its supposedly "transformed" context, is transparent. The Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) and more militarily-oriented institutions such as the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) were promoted by South Africa to provide an outlet for the aspirations of South African (combined new and old) political/military leadership. The Organ, according to South Africa's proposal, was to be steered by the heads of Foreign Affairs in the region. In other words, it was to have a base at the Council of Ministers level within SADC and was to defer to state leaders where necessary. As it has turned out a second Council of Ministers was against SADC's Treaty rules, and so it fell to the heads of state to constitute its leadership. Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe became president of the Organ in 1996 at about the time Nelson Mandela became President of SADC as a whole. SADC now has two heads, two summits, and, ostensibly, two main goals – political and economic/developmental, with the political/military aspect threatening to undermine the previous developmental focus, weak as it was.

The Organ which has ostensibly been suspended since 1997, has effectively undermined the one strong point of the SADC organisation since its inception – the ability to behave cohesively if only at the level of regional platforms like SADC. An example of this is the way that Mugabe endorsed the intervention of Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola in the Democratic Republic of Congo as a SADC intervention, despite South Africa's (Mandela's) disfavour of such a solution.

Reappropriating alternative metanarratives

The undeniably state-oriented, military character of the Organ illustrates that state leaders in the region are far from broader notions of security at the level of actual policy processes. Dominant discourses of security overlay and reinforce their focus. The state in southern Africa is characterised by an overwhelming adherence to a logocentrically constructed conception of security, which centres

universalistic notions of epistemology (derived from Habermasian Critical Theory – note the upper case) and those who embrace diversity (critical theory – lower case). The latter group embraces, in a variety of ways and to greater and lesser extents, tenets of postmodernism, especially in its critique of the logocentric foundations of modernism. Jean-Francois Lyotard has gone as far as to say that to be truly postmodern, we should do away with the search for universal explanatory metanarratives and concentrate instead on localised narratives, since this is the only way to allow voices from the margins, with their varied interpretations of social reality, to emerge (Lyotard, 1993). Feminists who have begun to explore the potential of postmodern approaches have pointed out the drawbacks of dealing solely with localised narratives, the call for which is a kind of metanarrative all on its own, as well as the lack of cognisance, by Lyotard and others, of (inter)national structural influences on the content of regional and national discourses (Fraser and Nicholson, 1991; Benhabib, 1991).

A very crucial aspect of this debate is precisely, however, the distinction between metanarratives, narratives and discourses. The extent to which local narratives actually form any kind of alternative discourse is the conceptual problem. Because of the structural strength of dominant knowledge and more localised discourses, the lack of any clearly articulated local (in the sense of indigenously produced) narrative is the issue, especially in the "developing" world, which by the very term is conditioned and disciplined by dominant knowledge to a standard set by the "developed". The lack of local narratives and therefore alternative discourses means that much of the attractively packaged "new metanarratives" have an emancipatory effect only in terms of providing a new more inclusive language to policy makers in which to repackage the same (old) priorities. This is not the same as saying local narratives have a standard of truth (lower case) not yet discovered; that would be a form of cultural relativism which simply enforces the logocentrism of western thought (more specifically the self/other dichotomy: the developed world have their thoughts, the developing world have ours).[6]

The only way past this is sharing intersubjective meaning, to borrow a term from Habermas, i.e. to attempt to collectively aim at debunking both biased representations of (western) Truth, as well as to work towards eradicating the distance between subjects and objects (and the distance subjects keep from themselves) so as to recapture local narratives. At issue, however, is the ability of civil

fairy-tale, the *Emperor's New Clothes*. As the story goes two tailors persuade the Emperor that their new cloth is only invisible to those unfit for their office or otherwise "unforgivably stupid". As a result of fear no-one, including the Emperor, can bring themselves to admit that the Emperor eventually parades with nothing on at all. A small boy in the crowd is the first who is brave enough to say he has no clothes on. Hintjens (1998:11) states that:

> Development experts are like the tailors in Andersen's story when they give advice; and they can "sell" that advice only to the extent that they say more or less what the power brokers, decision-makers and "doers" want to hear. On the other hand, before the buffet-ing forces of world capitalism, and even armed with all their academic and professional knowledge and procedures, they are as na-ked as the Emperor.

Alternative metanarratives to security and development in southern Africa

As mentioned earlier, initial attempts at expanding notions of security and development have taken place horizontally, at the level of the state. Critical approaches have further emphasised that understanding security in a regional context necessitates a broadening of the meaning of security to encompass those dimensions of security which extend beyond the boundaries of the nation-state. Many aspects of security, for example environmental protection, food security, and water security, to name but three, have an interregional/international, "between boundaries" nature (Booth and Vale, 1995; Spike Peterson, 1992; Zalewski and Enloe, 1995). Development critiques contain a similar dynamic, the regional "between borders" development rationale being one of the initial justifications for the formation of SADCC and which is still an explicit founda-tion of SADC.

Booth brings in the communitarian aspect clearly, " ... the referent object of 'security' should no longer be almost exclusively the state ... but should also encompass the individual human being at the lowest level and world society at the highest. Thus the traditional strategic studies notion of security should be-come broader and synonymous with the peace research concept of 'positive

internationally derived and structurally enforced by the vestiges of colonialism, socio-spatially as well as socio-economically, the discourse is fortified by overlapping forms of state and societal discrimination at the socio-economic level. The current Democratic Republic of Congo crisis is a clear indication, as is the continuing war in Angola.

The discourses on security and development in southern Africa are examined briefly below to show how critical perspectives, gendered or otherwise, have had very little effect on dominant metanarratives on security and development and consequently on the ways in which dominant development and security discourses perpetuate themselves. The only real difference lies in the language which has been appropriated from critiques. SADC has incorporated a "realist" stance into the organisation's priorities and institutions, and, at the same time, it has gradually shifted its regional economic approach more in line with neoliberal economics. Thus, while there are changes of narrative style (the language of development and security), dominant discourses (the manifestation of dominant knowledge in actual policy processes) remain remarkably the same.

(In)securities in southern Africa

How do the national and regional discourses on security and development absorb and neutralise emancipatory critiques? The mainstream and critical discourses operate dialectically at the level of metanarratives, but in terms of policy narratives the language is appropriated. "Sustainable development", including "marginalised groups" and the need for "gender equity and women's empowerment", is rhetoric that falls from the lips of policy makers and features ad nauseum in development agency reports. Part of the reason for this has already been examined, but to restate the central dynamics in relation to development and security respectively will help to clarify the central elements of regional discourses.

With regard to development, the intersection between what Hintjens calls "new" and "old" orthodoxies gives rise to an ostensibly more inclusive discourse, which is in actual fact simply the Emperor in his new clothes. Resting on the basic foundation of neoliberal economics, that "development interventions that do not contribute to greater market efficiency within the existing system are seen as worse than nothing", Hintjens (1998:4) notes that:

one level, leaders of states in the region have ostensibly tried to be responsive to "new thinking", which has permeated, mostly from centres of knowledge production outside the region through to regional academic and policy development institutions where the knowledge is often adapted and/or reapplied to the regional context. On another level, most leaders and their executive support (where such a legitimated luxury exists) continue to view their decision-making options with exactly the same national-based, self-preserving logic as before.

To understand the "how" before the "why", a brief revisit to the "new" metanarratives on security and development sheds some light on what changes alternative perspectives have put forward. Extremely problematic dynamics which have emanated from the alternative viewpoints will be discussed. The second part of the paper takes a brief glimpse at the state of regional development and security discourses in southern Africa before some points are made concerning the power of dominant discourses and their resistance to change.

Alternative metanarratives

t has become a worn and somewhat self-perpetuating obvious statement that International Relations (IR) and International Political Economy (IPE) academic debates have been characterised by notions of theoretical insufficiency and crisis since the development of the discipline qua discipline after WW 1. This has been due to the inability of IR theories (or metanarratives) to bring about anything other than a fragmented and contradictory body of knowledge on global politics and economics which, at its most homogenous point of analytical departure, tively defensive on both aspects. Indeed, the extent to which realism is a theory realism and neorealism, is quite crude and transparently normative while reflec- is arguable, since it is based so closely on Hobbes's political philosophy, which is intended only to serve as a justification for the social contract and not as a theoretical legitimation of an international state-centred conception of the war of all against all (Hobbes, 1968; Walker, 1990, 1995). Surveys of IR literature and analyses of the discipline's inadequacies are numerous and repetitive, showing many symptoms of a dialogue of the deaf.[4] The end of the Cold War initially appeared to signal a watershed, but it is unclear whether this has really done much to change the nature of dominant metanarratives of international relations. One area commonly associated with IR where these points are well

metanarratives (Lyotard, 1993); or philosophical metanarratives (Fraser and Nicholson, Bordo), that dominant metanarratives (or dominant knowledge) have a conditioning relationship on narratives (explanations of historical events).[1] Their unifying contention is that the way that events are explained will always contain a normative dimension. More centrally, the way that events are explained and predicted may have more to do with whose knowledge is said to count (legitimate/legitimised knowledge) than with the explanatory superiority of one form of theory or metanarrative over another.[2]

How does the concept "discourse" relate to metanarratives or dominant knowledge, and narratives? This paper draws on the distinction which Crush (1995:3–5) makes between discourses and narratives. Crush uses this distinction to probe the ways in which debates on development (and crises of development) renew and reinvent themselves while at the same time reproducing the same binary and pejorative underpinnings: developed versus undeveloped, backward versus modern and so on. The discourse is understood to mean " ... the forms in which it makes its arguments and establishes its authority, the manner in which it constructs the world (which) are usually seen as self-evident and unworthy of attention". In this sense discourse refers to the ways in which discursive aspects of dominant knowledge manifest themselves in policy practices, in other words, the manifestation of knowledge at a practical or observable level.[3] Narratives refer to " ... the language of development (which) constantly visualises landscape, territory, area, location, distance, boundary and situation ... one of the primary elements in the development narrative is the setting of the geographical stage ... (Crush, 1995:14). Metanarratives refer to universalised and legitimised narratives writ large and buttressed by international structural power. In this sense there is an analytical distinction between metanarratives and discourses insofar as the latter refers to both language and policy practices. The distinction is, in terms of the subsequent analysis, an important one, because it also allows for (more or less obvious) dialectic relationships between metanarratives and policy practices.

It is fairly self-evident that the language of development and security share resonances: they both draw on the realist, neorealist international relations metanarrative (some ambitiously call realism a theory) which is grounded, in socio-spatial terms, on the nation-state system. The implications of this for dominant narratives are unnervingly simple: narratives are always visualised within

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Understanding the development and security discourses in southern Africa: Constructive or destructive dialectic?

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Murphy and Tooze et al (1991), Linklater (1992), Booth (1994) and Walker (1989).

8   Of course this has also occurred in the social sciences as a whole, with, for example, Sociology, Psychology, Anthropology and Political Science also splitting off to form separate areas of enquiry, all of which aim to analyse the nature of different aspects of social life within and between societies.

9   For an elaboration of this discussion, see Yeatman (1990), Spike Peterson (1992) and Walker (1990). Spike Peterson and Walker examine the political and economic implications of the "splitting off", i.e. how the academic understanding of "discrete areas of enquiry" came to influence western understandings of the nature of social reality.

10   Development research has been undertaken by both "economists" and "political scientists", each with their own vocabulary and (undeclared) normative biases (Cowen and Shenton, 1995; Crush, 1995).

11   This technicist approach removes the political content from economic development. This point will be returned to in the discussion of the relation between security and development. Suffice it to say at this point that while the technicist approach separates politics from economics, a critical examination of any development programme clearly illustrates the interconnection between the political and the economic. Ferguson (1990) provides a particularly salient account of the interconnection.

12   This is, arguably, the case in other developing regions too.

13   The Department of Foreign Affairs, since 1994, has tried (at least on the surface) to draw academics and researchers into helping the newly democratic state make "newly democratic" foreign policy. However, because both the "old guard" and the new have been captured by the old dream of South Africa as the "benevolent hegemon" in the region, issues of security have tended to resemble a "made-over" US in the regional context. This is the criticism most often mentioned by state leaders in the region as well.

14   The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) before 1992, reconstituted as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) after adopting the SADC Treaty in 1992. South Africa joined the organisation in 1994.

15   The term relational power is drawn from Susan Strange (1988; 1991), whose now classic distinction between structural and relational power in the interna-

southern African states who, in the 1980s, rallied political support against South Africa. These states concerned themselves with supporting the liberation movements set on freeing the South African state from apartheid. At the same time, economic security (mostly understood under the heading of "development") was to be addressed by SADC.[14]

Notions of security were thus conceptually distinct: military security versus economic security (or development). How deep were these split notions of security at (regional) state level? As many analysts of SADC have pointed out, regional development strategies were scuppered by the failure of the state to secure the interests of especially the large peasant populations, but, in most cases, of the nascent business class as well. Usually, as in the case of Zimbabwe, Zambia, Mozambique, Angola and Tanzania, considerable time, material and human resources were wasted on costly state-led economic policies (usually "marketed" as some form of communism or socialism) which were oriented more at shoring up political power than ensuring the well-being of their respective populations. The aspiration towards theoretical ideals also came at a price: it should not be forgotten that the Cold War was conditioned by a polarised political and economic metanarrative (communism versus neoliberal capitalism) which underpinned a patriarchal and militarily-oriented role for states. These roles were enforced by South Africa's attempt to sell off destabilisation to the West in terms of the war against communism, thus leading to the region becoming a site of superpower rivalry. As a result, the region was heavily influenced by notions of political and economic security as being coterminous with the geographic delineation of the state.

While military security has occupied the minds of state leaders and many academics, the insecurity of societies in the region has been precarious, and not only because of apartheid. While no-one can deny the ravages of South African destabilisation, the term also became a useful catch-all phrase for states in the region to deflect blame for socio-economic insecurity which was also the result of state negligence, especially in relation to economic policies. The consequence of this is that those economic policies which have been effected usually advantage those who form part of formal markets, i.e. employable, skilled and educated populations in urban areas and large-scale farmers (predominantly white men, but also an emerging black business and farming class). In this context it is evident that policy makers believe(d) that society is there to shore up the state

economic logic (or as close to it as possible – the state may intervene if it is logical to the functioning of the national market, but ideally speaking, not the other way around). The power aspect, like the Cheshire Cat's smile, pops up on the political level, where, realism explains, crudely, that this is a dog eat dog world. While this fiction is substantiated by existing disciplinary boundaries, allowing for dominant discourses rather than a discourse to operate at the structural level, it is patently obvious that in international policy-making terms the two spheres are intimately connected. Justificatory and legitimating strategies of the dominant international actors are nonetheless heavily based on this separation, hence development is seen to be tangentially related to international relations and power struggles (the socio-spatial content of development is, after all, the nation-state).

Critical, feminist and postmodernist analysts such as Tickner (1991), Meena (1992) and Spike Peterson (1992) have also pointed out that in terms of the traditional agendas of international relations and development theory, "neutral" assessments of socio-economic dynamics within and between societies conceal a gendered normative bias. Relatedly, *national development policies* (narratives which translate into discourse – the degree to which these are national is, of course, the issue) are conceptualised in ways which implicitly and/or explicitly sideline gender considerations except at the level of rhetoric. The "problem" of incorporating women into mainstream development is tackled as an issue area, and not as a major socio-economic problem which has its roots in how we have been taught to perceive politics and economics (Okin, 1992; Bergman, 1987; Hartsock, 1987; Meena, 1992). Societal security is increasingly the preserve of international and national non-governmental organisations (NGOs) who conceptualise and operationalise their activities in terms of development categories such as "women in rural areas" or the "marginalised poor". These agencies (such as Oxfam, Unicef, Unifem, the World Bank) are also very effective in capturing the language of critical discourses and making it serve their own agendas, primarily to motivate their need to continue to exist (Parpart, 1995; Thompson, 1997).

In this way development is kept separate from political security. This serves the interests of both "developing" states, who need not assume responsibility, and agencies, who are thereby guaranteed of their existence. Hintjens (1998) has created an amusing if, at core, depressing analogy to Hans Christian Andersen's

society in the developing world (the latter term is used in terms of its genealogical meaning) to put forward their understandings of reality in any way that really influences policy substantively. This is at the heart of both the security and development debate and is examined in various ways below.

International structures, discourses and (meta)narratives

The concept of a dominant international *"knowledge structure"* is derived in part from Gramsci (1978). While Gramsci's conceptualisation of hegemonic knowledge, or what are here called dominant metanarratives (the discursive legitimation of policy processes), was specifically oriented within the nation-state, Cox (1987), Gill (1991), Gill and Law (1988; 1989) and Strange (1988; 1991) have extended the idea of hegemonic knowledge to the international sphere. Gramsci's original argument was that traditional intellectuals (i.e. those with a high degree of formal education in the natural and social sciences) acted as "functionaries" of the superstructure of the state, and exercised "subaltern functions of social hegemony and political government" (Gramsci, 1978). Hegemonic knowledge in this sense, is part of the political superstructure which tends to conceal the true nature of economic and political domination within a state. Cox, and Gill and Law broaden this conceptualisation by pointing to the internationalisation of knowledge. This internationalisation is a fundamental part of power relations and is linked to the spread of communications, the advance of technology and the central control of these and other resources especially finance, in geographically distinct areas (i.e. North America, Japan, Western Europe). The knowledge structure is intimately connected to dominant discourses on security, development, international order and the global political economy (including production and trade). It could be said that this structure both reflects and perpetuates discourses which are favourable to dominant political and economic powers, especially those who are able to spread their ideas as True Knowledge throughout the international system.

The extent to which dominant discourses reflect dominant metanarratives is more tricky. For example, the international trading order is now held in place by the World Trade Organisation, and the dominant discourse is supposed to reflect economic liberalism, which it partially does. However, it more accurately reflects the interests of the dominant political and economic leaders in the international

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Understanding the Development and Security Discourses in Southern Africa: Constructive or Destructive Dialectic?

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SOUTHERN AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES:
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community, specifically the United States, the European Union (EU) and Japan. Their interests carry the day when decisions are negotiated (for example, the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS), the Trade-Related Investment Measures Agreement (TRIMS), as well as the proposed Multilateral Investment Agreement (MIA)). The discourse is merely underpinned by a fairly arbitrary interpretation of the metanarrative of economic liberalism (arbitrary in the sense of being determined by any process of logic)

Dominant knowledge, abstracted from a historical context and narrowly representing social reality, is one of the central areas of critique on the part of critical theorists, feminists, postmodernists and feminist postmodernists. These perspectives are clearly not homogeneous in terms of their ontological and epistemological foundations. Nonetheless, a uniting contention is that because of the dominance of discourses (discussed above) within the knowledge structure, as well as in relation to this structure's interconnection (meshing) with other structures, namely security, production (of which trade and consequently development form a part) and finance, "views from the margins" tend to be excluded. A broader understanding of aspects of social life in both the developed and developing world becomes problematic unless full cognisance is taken of how hegemonic knowledge functions to legitimate certain interpretations of social reality and to exclude others.

At this point it is necessary to be a little more rigorous on how dominant discourses arise and manifest themselves in relation to the focus on security and development. How is it that certain metanarratives are judged as the best way to explain reality and to interface with policy as to how decisions can best be determined? Part of this *how*, of course, is *who* decides.

The linkage between metanarratives and discourses

The study of international relations and development is not, as many students of international relations imagine, a new phenomenon, and the philosophical roots of current approaches are centuries old. The scope and content of the study of politics and economics in the international sphere, however, have been defined in terms of the evolution of separate research areas, particularly in the US and Britain.[7] Of significance to understandings of security and development is that the study of Economics is a separate (and for many, a scientifically

sacrosanct) area of enquiry,[8] while development studies and security studies have long been understood to refer to other "knowledge territories" (with defined boundaries). Disciplinary divisions are, of course, to a fundamental degree a result of the desire of social scientists to emulate methods in the natural sciences. The underlying logic is similar: once a foundation of agreed upon propositions, assumptions and rules for their testing can be established, each discipline (qua discipline) carries on with its "bit of business". The intention was to create discrete, specific areas of enquiry, for which there would be dominant ideas, theories and paradigms of a logical, coherent and predictive design to order and understand different aspects of social life.[9] In this context, the distinctions between International Relations and Development[10] as fields of study (as well as the research agendas within them) are also largely the result of the dominance of a specific set of ideas concerning the relationship between politics and economics both domestically and internationally.

The divisions between the study of politics and economics, as well as the tendency to analyse development as a process which occurs essentially *within* the nation-state, and similarly (military) security as an issue addressed *among* them (i.e. as states), obscure the international context within which national development and broader security dynamics take place. The divisions create an under-emphasis on the security aspect of development and vice versa. The separation of politics and economics has also lent a distinctly technicist approach to the development debate (Ferguson, 1990).[11] "National" security and economic development are, within this context, assumed to be two separate concepts located within distinct explanatory approaches and research areas. Notions of development are thus depoliticised and rendered conceptually distant from societies and communities. The increasingly neoliberal dimension to development reinvents the language of development in terms of markets, modernity, factors of production, productivity, market niches, market access and so on (Cowen and Shenton, 1995; Watts, 1995; Parpart, 1995). Social development, and socioeconomic security become invisible in the context of this language of modern economics.

The point of re-emphasising the separation is simply to highlight the obvious (which, as a result, many do not see). It allows for the state power aspect to vanish, as it were, from the economic realm, as Economics has aimed at scientifically examining markets as if it were possible for them to function with a solely

and not the other way around, and thus responsibility building a strong civil society has been virtually non-existent. In most cases, with the obvious exception of political power rivalries, states in southern Africa have been more accountable to external donors and agencies than to the societies they are supposed to represent (Swatuk and Black, 1997). Society in the region remains, as a result, largely uncivil (in the political sense of the word).

The priorities and interests of states in the southern Africa region, as well as the relational power exercised by social forces on these states, can be represented diagrammatically as a socio-spatial arrangement which has national, regional and international dimensions. The two figures (diagrams 1 and 2) presented here are intended to indicate the regional loci of power, as well as where and why socio-economic relations in the region are gender discriminatory.[15]

The "wheel" diagram (diagram 1) shows, by the concentric circles, the relational power exercised by what Cox (1987) describes as "social forces". The conceptualisation of social forces is evidently not a homogeneous category, as Cox points out, but I would argue that the discrepancies are even more evident in the developing world. The state core, represented here very basically as the centre, the lower the level of its "power to influence". This power is derived, to a large extent, from the degree to which the group is linked to other loci of power, internationally and regionally. The same applies to the power of states in the region to exercise structural power, both regionally (over each other) and internationally. It should be noted that structural power is minimal internationally, even on the part of South Africa.

The second diagram, which is supposed to represent the region,[16] shows how the states in the region are joined in a pattern of connected centres (often located in one large urban centre where the most influential social forces, as well as arms of the state are to be found) (see diagram 2). The gendered socio-spatial ramifications of this should be evident, but the diagrams also emphasise the relative socio-spatial discrepancies and relational power differentials between dominant and marginal social forces nationally and regionally. Note that the flows of dominant knowledge from outside the region manifest themselves in

cynicism and vice versa – both are inherently static and simplistic. To reclaim our words implies having to give them the weight they originally lacked.

Notes

1. These understandings of dominant knowledge and metanarratives differ somewhat depending on the academic context. The basic conceptualisation remains the same: the dominant knowledge coupled to a legitimating account as to its universal veracity.

2. This can be the case even where there is no explicit metanarrative (for example, in newspaper articles, where, say, neoliberal economic assumptions are the prism through which international and national economic events are interpreted).

3. Of course knowledge may have an influence without being observable in the strictly positivistic sense, but as a result it remains tiresomely resistant to theorising.

4. I have discussed these debates at length in my Ph.D. Thesis, *Strictures or structures: southern African development, an international perspective* (1996).

5. The organisation took this loose, sector-based functional form between 1980 and 1992, whereafter it moved to a more formal, treaty-based approach which incorporates formal integration objectives as well as a developmental approach (SADC, 1992)

6. Van Niekerk (1998:60–1) notes of cultural relativism in anthropology (and this is something that professed postmodernists should have at least some sleepless nights thinking through): " … once the subjugation of indigenous cultures was completed, it seemed necessary to promote cultural closure of the indigenous people …. the anthropology of the day represented indigenous cultures as well-behaved, integrated cultures that had to remain as uncontaminated by western influences as possible". The justification for apartheid drew on precisely this notion of "separate but distinct cultures", a justification for the establishment of independent homeland states which, despite heavy propaganda, was swallowed by no-one – except many white South Africans with their naïve optimism about their own innate superiority.

7. This is not a point of dispute amongst International Relations scholars. Critical examinations of the effects of this dominance can be found in Cox (1987), Smith (1987), Hoffman (1987), Lapid (1989), Ashley and Walker (1990),

tional context is widely used. The notion of structural power serves to represent international power derived from material and other resources in the areas of finance, knowledge, security and production. Relational power refers to the power of a socio-economic group to exercise influence over another.

16   The SADC region consists of the following 14 states: Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, South Africa, Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Seychelles, Mauritius, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania, Zambia and Malawi.

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internationally derived and structurally enforced by the vestiges of colonialism, socio-spatially as well as socio-economically, the discourse is fortified by overlapping forms of state and societal discrimination at the socio-economic level. The current Democratic Republic of Congo crisis is a clear indication, as is the continuing war in Angola.

The discourses on security and development in southern Africa are examined briefly below to show how critical perspectives, gendered or otherwise, have had very little effect on dominant metanarratives on security and development and consequently on the ways in which dominant development and security discourses perpetuate themselves. The only real difference lies in the language which has been appropriated from critiques. SADC has incorporated a "realist" stance into the organisation's priorities and institutions, and, at the same time, it has gradually shifted its regional economic approach more in line with neoliberal economics. Thus, while there are changes of narrative style (the language of development and security), dominant discourses (the manifestation of dominant knowledge in actual policy processes) remain remarkably the same.

(In)securities in southern Africa

How do the national and regional discourses on security and development absorb and neutralise emancipatory critiques? The mainstream and critical discourses operate dialectically at the level of metanarratives, but in terms of policy narratives the language is appropriated. "Sustainable development", in- cluding "marginalised groups" and the need for "gender equity and women's empowerment", is rhetoric that falls from the lips of policy makers and features ad nauseum in development agency reports. Part of the reason for this has al- ready been examined, but to restate the central dynamics in relation to develop- ment and security respectively will help to clarify the central elements of regional discourses.

With regard to development, the intersection between what Hintjens calls "new" and "old" orthodoxies gives rise to an ostensibly more inclusive discourse, which is in actual fact simply the Emperor in his new clothes. Resting on the basic foundation of neoliberal economics, that " development interventions that do not contribute to greater market efficiency within the existing system are seen as worse than nothing", Hintjens (1998:4) notes that:

Development and security discourses in international relations

The concepts "discourse", "metanarrative" and "narrative" have recently become popular in theorising on international relations (and in International Relations – the upper case denoting the discipline), especially where international relations analysis intersects with discussions on regional security and development. This article examines the uses (and usefulness) of these concepts in relation to debates on regional security and development in southern Africa. Almost ten years after the end of the Cold War and the popularisation of alternative approaches to security, regional dynamics look disturbingly the same. Why is this so? Is there something inherently problematic about the alternatives? Or is there perhaps something wrong with how we understand the dynamics of discourses? I argue that there is reason to question the understanding of alternatives *as discourses*, since the alternatives rarely reach policy implementation level (substantively that is; of course, politically correct policy rhetoric remains an obligatory aspect of politics). There is perhaps a corresponding vagueness to the use of the concept "discourse", which interferes with our understanding of how dominant discourses become self-perpetuating (in a similar way to how bureaucratic norms and values perpetuate themselves, no matter who takes office).

Gramsci (1971), Cox (1987), Strange (1988), Crush (1995), Fraser and Nicholson (1991), Bordo (1991) and others have pointed out in various different ways, and using various different conceptual terms, such as hegemonic knowledge (Gramsci, Cox); dominant discourses (Crush, Watts); legitimating

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the context of the geography of the state system, even when these have regional implications, and even when policies are made collectively. For this reason, dominant security and development discourses remain stubbornly resistant to change. Thus while some might argue that, for example, regional security understandings have broadened and deepened, it is not the discourse which has changed (as yet), but simply that alternative metanarratives have been developed which have had little or no policy impact. Can the discourses be changed? I am tempted to take the scholar's weasel route and state that the question falls beyond the scope of this paper, but since the question can neither be ignored, nor substantively addressed here, some thoughts on what alternative metanarratives have and have not done in terms of their professed "emancipatory" edge will be offered in lieu of yet more bold prescriptions at the "meta" level.

Crush draws our attention to the way in which development requires a socio-spatial dimension and it is clear that security functions in much the same way. Geography acts as "both stage and actor", defining the boundaries of nation-states as well as posing states as core actors. Viewed this way, the discourse on development and security in South Africa and southern Africa shows the reinvention of a new language of crisis, of which a key aspect is the geographical dynamic of globalisation. As Watts (1995) points out, one of the key ways in which the development discourse perpetuates itself is through notions of crisis at both the level of theory and policy practice (in the latter case both state and non-state). The new language of development is characterised by references to the "inexorable force of globalisation" and the simultaneous need for "sustainable development", "empowerment of marginalised groups", "enhanced productivity", and the need for "regional development integration".

If, for reasons of (perhaps over)simplification, one conceptualises dominant theories and/or ideologies of politics and economics as metanarratives, it is also obvious that while in many ways these have shifted, and alternatives have indeed been advanced, as we approach the 21st century, most metanarratives of the state and international relations remain caught in the state-centric framing metanarrative which dates back to 1648. While there has been a general academic acceptance of broader notions of security and development and how this relates to societies, geographic boundaries (arbitrary or otherwise) still constrain both academic and policy debates. Southern African academic and policy debates are a very good example of the conceptual and practical problems at hand. On

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governmental
organisations

Semi-
subsistence

Business

Formal
producers

Unorganised
labour

Informal
producers

SOCIAL
FORCES

Organised
labour

Local
NGOs

Diagram 1: Relational power of social forces in the "developing" state

on military and political state power. This has been no different since the end of the Cold War. The global metanarrative of security remains realist and state-centric, as does the regional discourse, and is distinct from the development discourse. It should be clear that, viewed from a gendered critical perspective, the priorities of SADC, especially institutionally with the establishment of the Organ, are structured along lines which reflect a prioritisation of a masculinised military security ethic which excludes broader security and development concerns. It is also evident that, in spite of rhetoric on gender equality (including SADC's Declaration on Gender endorsed in 1997), notions of regional security and development have not been much altered at the policy practice level by critical academic analyses.

As promised, a brief mention will be made of why alternative metanarratives appear to have an effect on language yet not on policy. There appear to be at least four problem areas, or weak spots, to critical analyses:

- They are too general.

- They emphasise bottom-up approaches and drawing on local narratives, but never actually do so.

- They do not face the awful reality that states can control political legitimacy and therefore are not interested in establishing local narrative input to discourses which may lead to challenges to their authority.

- They sheer away from the knowledge that NGOs and others may appropriate their language and use it to repackage old priorities.

It would be rather less tiring to end here, since resolving the problem areas in their entirety is not possible on the page. It seems to me that the task of critical analysts is to reappropriate their language by showing how it has been appropriated, by specifically interrogating the security and development discourses to show where language is just language and action does not follow. It is necessary to be on the lookout for fluffy NGO documents and to interrogate how these are translated into action. It is necessary to be non-partisan and not to accept that state leaders and their minions are necessarily going to put those nice-sounding words into action. In other words, it is necessary to get out of the ivory tower and do some real work, together with some clear thinking. The complacency of the last ten years has to give way to a knowledge that *naïveté* is a form of reverse

> ... there is an emerging orthodoxy made up of a combination of moderate, reformist, communitarian, humanitarian and bottom-up approaches to development. A large number of policy documents, guidelines, handbooks and other practical resources used by the major NGOs, government agencies and multilateral development institutions express this new (socio-political) orthodoxy. These claim to approach development policy making from a people-centred, rights-based and more local point of view. Yet alongside this new soft and fluffy orthodoxy, the hard, unfluffy economic neo-liberal orthodoxy appears alive and well.

A good example of this contradiction is South Africa's ongoing negotiations with the EU on a "Trade and Development Agreement". While an agreement has yet to be reached, it is clear that the deal, while ostensibly developmentalist and regionally sensitive (only after protests from the region of course), is based on a market initiative principle which may have "soft and fluffy" rhetoric but which will reward those who can most adequately function within the market. At the same time, it will adversely affect market entrants, and future market entrants, who will find it difficult to compete with the poorer EU states. These entrants are and will be groups who have been discriminated against during various phases of colonialism and apartheid, both within South Africa and beyond (in South Africa a lot is said about "previously disadvantaged groups", but words are, of course, a *cheap* alternative, in both senses of the word, to the real thing).

The contradiction between the rhetoric and reality is also evident in the evolution of the security debate within the regional organisation SADC, especially since South Africa joined in 1994. The debate has been based on exchanges between the heads of state who make up the SADC Summit, but also on an interchange between research institutions (especially in South Africa) and the South African Department of Foreign Affairs (Vale, 1996).[13] It is interesting in that it also ties up directly with the connections between development and security discourses.

In southern Africa academic analyses of the region have drawn heavily on the Cold War discourses, which revolved around the caricatured "superpower rivalry". Constructing regional understandings of security inevitably gravitated towards some form of analysis of the Frontline States (FLS), a loose grouping of

illustrated is security studies. Buzan's (1983) attempt to expand notions of security horizontally to include aspects other than simply the political and military security of states has triggered a wave of critical theory analysis which has attempted to extend this conceptualisation vertically to embrace communitarian (or societal) aspects as well. At the horizontal level, attempts have also been made to conceptualise security regionally, especially in the "developing" world context. To this extent, depending on the analyst, previously hidden insecurities (i.e. that of marginalised groups within and between states) have emerged more clearly. The benefits of expanded notions of security is thus a more multi-level approach to analysis as well as, depending once again on the analyst, a more nuanced and gendered examination of local and regional narratives.

In spite of these analytical advances there has been very little change to the classic notion of security as military security. The fact that military security issues have so easily eclipsed the Southern African Development Community (SADC) development agenda is more than adequate testimony. SADC has, since the establishment of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) as an institution in 1996, become influenced by military security issues at an operational level. While it has been argued that this is because the Organ is not functioning as it should, it remains a valid point that the inclusion of such a military dimension into an organisation aiming at regional development was bound to create tension between old and new priorities, especially among state leaders. Debates on the connection between security and development are long and, in many senses, not intrinsic to the angle of my argument, since it is quite self-evident that "new security thinking" incorporates a developmental impetus even while this is vaguely (arguably also poorly) articulated. The connection between the two is also not new to SADC, which, when it was still the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC),[5] had already embraced the notion of, for example, food security as part of the development process (Thompson, 1996).

If the dialectic between metanarratives and narratives on the one hand and discourses on the other is to be more adequately understood, it is important to note the range and focus of critical theoretical approaches which are, to state the obvious, vast at both the level of theoretical assumptions and the analytical and methodological level. Generally speaking, critical approaches espouse an emancipatory dimension, although there is some rivalry between those who ascribe to

peace'" (Booth, 1991; 341). Arguably this is a more salient manner of focusing on societal security in developing countries, because, as Bryant (1988:9) has put it (in the context of southern Africa), " ... one cannot uncouple security policies from those of development.[12]

Gendered critical approaches have questioned the extent to which "democracy, openness, and/or legitimate authority apply to different groups inside the state, and draws attention to the fact that outside can also be inside (the state), and that self and other may have multiple meanings within and between states, and between groups sharing various allegiances. However, many gendered critical approaches insist on talking about "humanity as such", especially in terms of emancipation from oppression and discrimination, political and economic. The ways in which discrimination is entrenched, theoretically and practically, through dominant discourses on politics and economics are a key area of critical analysis.

In the southern African context, the dominant discourses on security and development maintain the metanarratives which underpin dominant discourses within the international knowledge structure. Development narratives, while ostensibly "indigenous", are written in a language which appropriates both the language of macro-economics (music to the international world of finance) as well as the language of politically correct development-speak (the language of development experts). The shift, by the South African government, from the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) to the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) macro-economic framework is a case in point. Whatever the "social" content of either policy (they can only be seen as policy window-dressing), the appropriation of the language of development experts in GEAR indicates the government's collective realisation that there is only one far-reaching rule: do not openly buck the system by attempting any form of social engineering.

The security realist "moment" continues, and in the South African context this is reinforced by security studies analysts whose funding often depends on research on "hard" or "real" security issues (obtained from guess who, or better put, which states). While broader (horizontal) aspects are included as add-on variables, the presumptions of realism portray a state-centric view of political/military security. This predominates as the most important referent by which governments should measure their legitimacy as states, and their status as states in the region. It must be added that even while this metanarrative is largely

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CENTRE *for* SOUTHERN AFRICAN STUDIES

SCHOOL *of* GOVERNMENT
UNIVERSITY *of the* WESTERN CAPE

The Centre for Southern African Studies (CSAS) was established at the University of the Western Cape in 1990 to promote an exploration of problems faced by southern African countries. It is a constituent unit of the School of Government, and its aims and functions are:

- To research and disseminate findings on southern Africa, particularly issues of a social, economic and political nature;
- To educate South Africans in regional relations through appropriate academic and adult education courses; and
- To raise public awareness of southern African questions through conferences, symposia and workshops.

RESPICE PROSPICE

one level, leaders of states in the region have ostensibly tried to be responsive to "new thinking", which has permeated, mostly from centres of knowledge production outside the region through to regional academic and policy development institutions where the knowledge is often adapted and/or reapplied to the regional context. On another level, most leaders and their executive support (where such a legitimated luxury exists) continue to view their decision-making options with exactly the same national-based, self-preserving logic as before.

To understand the "how" before the "why", a brief revisit to the "new" metanarratives on security and development sheds some light on what changes alternative perspectives have put forward. Extremely problematic dynamics which have emanated from the alternative viewpoints will be discussed. The second part of the paper takes a brief glimpse at the state of regional development and security discourses in southern Africa before some points are made concerning the power of dominant discourses and their resistance to change.

Alternative metanarratives

It has become a worn and somewhat self-perpetuating obvious statement that International Relations (IR) and International Political Economy (IPE) academic debates have been characterised by notions of theoretical insufficiency and crisis since the development of the discipline qua discipline after WW 1. This has been due to the inability of IR theories (or metanarratives) to bring about anything other than a fragmented and contradictory body of knowledge on global politics and economics which, at its most homogenous point of analytical departure, realism and neorealism, is quite crude and transparently normative while reflectively defensive on both aspects. Indeed, the extent to which realism is a theory is arguable, since it is based so closely on Hobbes's political philosophy, which is intended only to serve as a justification for the social contract and not as a theoretical legitimation of an international state-centred conception of the war of all against all (Hobbes, 1968; Walker, 1990, 1995). Surveys of IR literature and analyses of the discipline's inadequacies are numerous and repetitive, showing many symptoms of a dialogue of the deaf.[4] The end of the Cold War initially appeared to signal a watershed, but it is unclear whether this has really done much to change the nature of dominant metanarratives of international relations. One area commonly associated with IR where these points are well

metanarratives (Lyotard, 1993); or philosophical metanarratives (Fraser and Nicholson, Bordo), that dominant metanarratives (or dominant knowledge) have a conditioning relationship on narratives (explanations of historical events).[1] Their unifying contention is that the way that events are explained will always contain a normative dimension. More centrally, the way that events are explained and predicted may have more to do with whose knowledge is said to count (legitimate/legitimised knowledge) than with the explanatory superiority of one form of theory or metanarrative over another.[2]

How does the concept "discourse" relate to metanarratives or dominant knowledge, and narratives? This paper draws on the distinction which Crush (1995:3–5) makes between discourses and narratives. Crush uses this distinction to probe the ways in which debates on development (and crises of development) renew and reinvent themselves while at the same time reproducing the same binary and pejorative underpinnings: developed versus undeveloped, backward versus modern and so on. The discourse is understood to mean " ... the forms in which it makes its arguments and establishes its authority, the manner in which it constructs the world (which) are usually seen as self-evident and unworthy of attention". In this sense discourse refers to the ways in which discursive aspects of dominant knowledge manifest themselves in policy practices, in other words, the manifestation of knowledge at a practical or observable level.[3] Narratives refer to " ... the language of development (which) constantly visualises landscape, territory, area, location, distance, boundary and situation ... one of the primary elements in the development narrative is the setting of the geographical stage ... (Crush, 1995:14). Metanarratives refer to universalised and legitimised narratives writ large and buttressed by international structural power. In this sense there is an analytical distinction between metanarratives and discourses insofar as the latter refers to both language and policy practices. The distinction is, in terms of the subsequent analysis, an important one, because it also allows for (more or less obvious) dialectic relationships between metanarratives and policy practices.

It is fairly self-evident that the language of development and security share resonances: they both draw on the realist, neorealist international relations metanarrative (some ambitiously call realism a theory) which is grounded, in socio-spatial terms, on the nation-state system. The implications of this for dominant narratives are unnervingly simple: narratives are always visualised within

fairy-tale, the *Emperor's New Clothes*. As the story goes two tailors persuade the Emperor that their new cloth is only invisible to those unfit for their office or otherwise "unforgivably stupid". As a result of fear no-one, including the Emperor, can bring themselves to admit that the Emperor eventually parades with nothing on at all. A small boy in the crowd is the first who is brave enough to say he has no clothes on. Hintjens (1998:11) states that:

> Development experts are like the tailors in Andersen's story when they give advice; and they can "sell" that advice only to the extent that they say more or less what the power brokers, decision-makers and "doers" want to hear. On the other hand, before the buffeting forces of world capitalism, and even armed with all their academic and professional knowledge and procedures, they are as naked as the Emperor.

Alternative metanarratives to security and development in southern Africa

As mentioned earlier, initial attempts at expanding notions of security and development have taken place horizontally, at the level of the state. Critical approaches have further emphasised that understanding security in a regional context necessitates a broadening of the meaning of security to encompass those dimensions of security which extend beyond the boundaries of the nation-state. Many aspects of security, for example environmental protection, food security, and water security, to name but three, have an interregional/international, "between boundaries" nature (Booth and Vale, 1995; Spike Peterson, 1992; Zalewski and Enloe, 1995). Development critiques contain a similar dynamic, the regional "between borders" development rationale being one of the initial justifications for the formation of SADCC and which is still an explicit foundation of SADC.

Booth brings in the communitarian aspect clearly, " ... the referent object of 'security' should no longer be almost exclusively the state ... but should also encompass the individual human being at the lowest level and world society at the highest. Thus the traditional strategic studies notion of security should become broader and synonymous with the peace research concept of 'positive

universalistic notions of epistemology (derived from Habermasian Critical Theory – note the upper case) and those who embrace diversity (critical theory – lower case). The latter group embraces, in a variety of ways and to greater and lesser extents, tenets of postmodernism, especially in its critique of the logocentric foundations of modernism. Jean-Francois Lyotard has gone as far as to say that to be truly postmodern, we should do away with the search for universal explanatory metanarratives and concentrate instead on localised narratives, since this is the only way to allow voices from the margins, with their varied interpretations of social reality, to emerge (Lyotard, 1993). Feminists who have begun to explore the potential of postmodern approaches have pointed out the drawbacks of dealing solely with localised narratives, the call for which is a kind of metanarrative all on its own, as well as the lack of cognisance, by Lyotard and others, of (inter)national structural influences on the content of regional and national discourses (Fraser and Nicholson, 1991; Benhabib, 1991).

A very crucial aspect of this debate is precisely, however, the distinction between metanarratives, narratives and discourses. The extent to which local narratives actually form any kind of alternative discourse is the conceptual problem. Because of the structural strength of dominant knowledge and more localised discourses, the lack of any clearly articulated local (in the sense of indigenously produced) narrative is the issue, especially in the "developing" world, which by the very term is conditioned and disciplined by dominant knowledge to a standard set by the "developed". The lack of local narratives and therefore alternative discourses means that much of the attractively packaged "new metanarratives" have an emancipatory effect only in terms of providing a new more inclusive language to policy makers in which to repackage the same (old) priorities. This is not the same as saying local narratives have a standard of truth (lower case) not yet discovered; that would be a form of cultural relativism which simply enforces the logocentrism of western thought (more specifically the self/ other dichotomy: the developed world have their thoughts, the developing world have ours).[6]

The only way past this is sharing intersubjective meaning, to borrow a term from Habermas, i.e. to attempt to collectively aim at debunking both biased representations of (western) Truth, as well as to work towards eradicating the distance between subjects and objects (and the distance subjects keep from themselves) so as to recapture local narratives. At issue, however, is the ability of civil

narrative, they have in fact absorbed the military security aspect into SADC's structure in ways which have undermined regional solidarity even further. At present the strength and coherency of SADC is being seriously threatened by the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo, formerly Zaire.

The prioritisation of a political/military horizontally-focused approach by the South African state, even in its supposedly "transformed" context, is transparent. The Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) and more militarily-oriented institutions such as the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) were promoted by South Africa to provide an outlet for the aspirations of South African (combined new and old) political/military leadership. The Organ, · according to South Africa's proposal, was to be steered by the heads of Foreign Affairs in the region. In other words, it was to have a base at the Council of Ministers level within SADC and was to defer to state leaders where necessary. As it has turned out a second Council of Ministers was against SADC's Treaty rules, and so it fell to the heads of state to constitute its leadership. Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe became president of the Organ in 1996 at about the time Nelson Mandela became President of SADC as a whole. SADC now has two heads, two summits, and, ostensibly, two main goals – political and economic/developmental, with the political/military aspect threatening to undermine the previous developmental focus, weak as it was.

The Organ which has ostensibly been suspended since 1997, has effectively undermined the one strong point of the SADC organisation since its inception – the ability to behave cohesively if only at the level of regional platforms like SADC. An example of this is the way that Mugabe endorsed the intervention of Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola in the Democratic Republic of Congo as a SADC intervention, despite South Africa's (Mandela's) disfavour of such a solution.

Reappropriating alternative metanarratives

The undeniably state-oriented, military character of the Organ illustrates that state leaders in the region are far from broader notions of security at the level of actual policy processes. Dominant discourses of security overlay and reinforce their focus. The state in southern Africa is characterised by an overwhelming adherence to a logocentrically constructed conception of security, which centres

the urban/political centres via government and also largely regional research and academic institutions.

At the analytical level, the concern of security studies institutions close to governments in the region (and especially in South Africa) is perforce focused on those issues that government prioritises, which are generally to do with maintaining (and in some cases fudging) legitimacy and maintaining state power. The conceptual stumbling block revolves around the traditional conception of "high" and "low" politics, which has been enforced by academics and state leaders, especially in the developing world. It allows them to separate political from economic security, and "inside" (the state) from "outside". These elements of both dominant metanarratives and discourses of security and development have remained unchanged since the end of the Cold War.

How has the discourse on security and development affected national and regional policies since the end of apartheid? SADC leaders have reshaped the security arrangements of the region, but while ostensibly "broadening" the security


Diagram 2: Flows of power beyond and between states in the SADC region

society in the developing world (the latter term is used in terms of its genealogical meaning) to put forward their understandings of reality in any way that really influences policy substantively. This is at the heart of both the security and development debate and is examined in various ways below.

International structures, discourses and (meta)narratives

The concept of a dominant international *"knowledge structure"* is derived in part from Gramsci (1978). While Gramsci's conceptualisation of hegemonic knowledge, or what are here called dominant metanarratives (the discursive legitimation of policy processes), was specifically oriented within the nation-state, Cox (1987), Gill (1991), Gill and Law (1988; 1989) and Strange (1988; 1991) have extended the idea of hegemonic knowledge to the international sphere. Gramsci's original argument was that traditional intellectuals (i.e. those with a high degree of formal education in the natural and social sciences) acted as "functionaries" of the superstructure of the state, and exercised "subaltern functions of social hegemony and political government" (Gramsci, 1978). Hegemonic knowledge in this sense, is part of the political superstructure which tends to conceal the true nature of economic and political domination within a state. Cox, and Gill and Law broaden this conceptualisation by pointing to the internationalisation of knowledge. This internationalisation is a fundamental part of power relations and is linked to the spread of communications, the advance of technology and the central control of these and other resources especially finance, in geographically distinct areas (i.e. North America, Japan, Western Europe). The knowledge structure is intimately connected to dominant discourses on security, development, international order and the global political economy (including production and trade). It could be said that this structure both reflects and perpetuates discourses which are favourable to dominant political and economic powers, especially those who are able to spread their ideas as True Knowledge throughout the international system.

The extent to which dominant discourses reflect dominant metanarratives is more tricky. For example, the international trading order is now held in place by the World Trade Organisation, and the dominant discourse is supposed to reflect economic liberalism, which it partially does. However, it more accurately reflects the interests of the dominant political and economic leaders in the international

economic logic (or as close to it as possible – the state may intervene if it is logical to the functioning of the national market, but ideally speaking, not the other way around). The power aspect, like the Cheshire Cat's smile, pops up on the political level, where, realism explains, crudely, that this is a dog eat dog world. While this fiction is substantiated by existing disciplinary boundaries, allowing for dominant discourses rather than a discourse to operate at the structural level, it is patently obvious that in international policy-making terms the two spheres are intimately connected. Justificatory and legitimating strategies of the dominant international actors are nonetheless heavily based on this separation, hence development is seen to be tangentially related to international relations and power struggles (the socio-spatial content of development is, after all, the nation-state!).

Critical, feminist and postmodernist analysts such as Tickner (1991), Meena (1992) and Spike Peterson (1992) have also pointed out that in terms of the traditional agendas of international relations and development theory, "neutral" assessments of socio-economic dynamics within and between societies conceal a gendered normative bias. Relatedly, *national* development policies (narratives which translate into discourse – the degree to which these are national is, of course, the issue) are conceptualised in ways which implicitly and/or explicitly sideline gender considerations except at the level of rhetoric. The "problem" of incorporating women into mainstream development is tackled as an issue area, and not as a major socio-economic problem which has its roots in how we have been taught to perceive politics and economics (Okin, 1992; Bergman, 1987; Hartsock, 1987; Meena, 1992). Societal security is increasingly the preserve of international and national non-governmental organisations (NGOs) who conceptualise and operationalise their activities in terms of development categories such as "women in rural areas" or the "marginalised poor". These agencies (such as Oxfam, Unicef, Unifem, the World Bank) are also very effective in capturing the language of critical discourses and making it serve their own agendas, primarily to motivate their need to continue to exist (Parpart, 1995; Thompson, 1997).

In this way development is kept separate from political security. This serves the interests of both "developing" states, who need not assume responsibility, and agencies, who are thereby guaranteed of their existence. Hintjens (1998) has created an amusing if, at core, depressing analogy to Hans Christian Andersen's

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Der Derian, J. and Shapiro, M. (eds.). 1989. *International/intertextual relations: postmodern readings of world politics.* Massachusetts: Lexington Books.

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southern African states who, in the 1980s, rallied political support against South Africa. These states concerned themselves with supporting the liberation movements set on freeing the South African state from apartheid. At the same time, economic security (mostly understood under the heading of "development") was to be addressed by SADC.[14]

Notions of security were thus conceptually distinct: military security versus economic security (or development). How deep were these split notions of security at (regional) state level? As many analysts of SADC have pointed out, regional development strategies were scuppered by the failure of the state to secure the interests of especially the large peasant populations, but, in most cases, of the nascent business class as well. Usually, as in the case of Zimbabwe, Zambia, Mozambique, Angola and Tanzania, considerable time, material and human resources were wasted on costly state-led economic policies (usually "marketed" as some form of communism or socialism) which were oriented more at shoring up political power than ensuring the well-being of their respective populations. The aspiration towards theoretical ideals also came at a price: it should not be forgotten that the Cold War was conditioned by a polarised political and economic metanarrative (communism versus neoliberal capitalism) which underpinned a patriarchal and militarily-oriented role for states. These roles were enforced by South Africa's attempt to sell off destabilisation to the West in terms of the war against communism, thus leading to the region becoming a site of superpower rivalry. As a result, the region was heavily influenced by notions of political and economic security as being coterminous with the geographic delineation of the state.

While military security has occupied the minds of state leaders and many academics, the insecurity of societies in the region has been precarious, and not only because of apartheid. While no-one can deny the ravages of South African destabilisation, the term also became a useful catch-all phrase for states in the region to deflect blame for socio-economic insecurity which was also the result of state negligence, especially in relation to economic policies. The consequence of this is that those economic policies which have been effected usually advantage those who form part of formal markets, i.e. employable, skilled and educated populations in urban areas and large-scale farmers (predominantly white men, but also an emerging black business and farming class). In this context it is evident that policy makers believe(d) that society is there to shore up the state

      Murphy and Tooze et al (1991), Linklater (1992), Booth (1994) and Walker (1989).

8   Of course this has also occurred in the social sciences as a whole, with, for example, Sociology, Psychology, Anthropology and Political Science also splitting off to form separate areas of enquiry, all of which aim to analyse the nature of different aspects of social life within and between societies.

9   For an elaboration of this discussion, see Yeatman (1990), Spike Peterson (1992) and Walker (1990). Spike Peterson and Walker examine the political and economic implications of the "splitting off", i.e. how the academic understanding of "discrete areas of enquiry" came to influence western understandings of the nature of social reality.

10   Development research has been undertaken by both "economists" and "political scientists", each with their own vocabulary and (undeclared) normative biases (Cowen and Shenton, 1995; Crush, 1995).

11   This technicist approach removes the political content from economic development. This point will be returned to in the discussion of the relation between security and development. Suffice it to say at this point that while the technicist approach separates politics from economics, a critical examination of any development programme clearly illustrates the interconnection between the political and the economic. Ferguson (1990) provides a particularly salient account of the interconnection.

12   This is, arguably, the case in other developing regions too.

13   The Department of Foreign Affairs, since 1994, has tried (at least on the surface) to draw academics and researchers into helping the newly democratic state make "newly democratic" foreign policy. However, because both the "old guard" and the new have been captured by the old dream of South Africa as the "benevolent hegemon" in the region, issues of security have tended to resemble a "made-over" US in the regional context. This is the criticism most often mentioned by state leaders in the region as well.

14   The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) before 1992; reconstituted as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) after adopting the SADC Treaty in 1992. South Africa joined the organisation in 1994.

15   The term relational power is drawn from Susan Strange (1988; 1991), whose now classic distinction between structural and relational power in the interna-

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Understanding the Development and Security Discourses in Southern Africa: Constructive or Destructive Dialectic?

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cynicism and vice versa – both are inherently static and simplistic. To reclaim our words implies having to give them the weight they originally lacked.

Notes

1   These understandings of dominant knowledge and metanarratives differ somewhat depending on the academic context. The basic conceptualisation remains the same: the dominant knowledge coupled to a legitimating account as to its universal veracity.

2   This can be the case even where there is no explicit metanarrative (for example, in newspaper articles, where, say, neoliberal economic assumptions are the prism through which international and national economic events are interpreted).

3   Of course knowledge may have an influence without being observable in the strictly positivistic sense, but as a result it remains tiresomely resistant to theorising.

4   I have discussed these debates at length in my Ph.D. Thesis, *Strictures or structures: southern African development, an international perspective* (1996).

5   The organisation took this loose, sector-based functional form between 1980 and 1992, whereafter it moved to a more formal, treaty-based approach which incorporates formal integration objectives as well as a developmental approach (SADC, 1992)

6   Van Niekerk (1998:60–1) notes of cultural relativism in anthropology (and this is something that professed postmodernists should have at least some sleepless nights thinking through): " ... once the subjugation of indigenous cultures was completed, it seemed necessary to promote cultural closure of the indigenous people .... the anthropology of the day represented indigenous cultures as well-behaved, integrated cultures that had to remain as uncontaminated by western influences as possible". The justification for apartheid drew on precisely this notion of "separate but distinct cultures", a justification for the establishment of independent homeland states which, despite heavy propaganda, was swallowed by no-one – except many white South Africans with their naïve optimism about their own innate superiority.

7   This is not a point of dispute amongst International Relations scholars. Critical examinations of the effects of this dominance can be found in Cox (1987), Smith (1987), Hoffman (1987), Lapid (1989), Ashley and Walker (1990),

and not the other way around, and thus responsibility towards building a strong civil society has been virtually non-existent. In most cases, with the obvious exception of political power rivalries, states in southern Africa have been more accountable to external donors and agencies than to the societies they are supposed to represent (Swatuk and Black, 1997). Society in the region remains, as a result, largely uncivil (in the political sense of the word).

The priorities and interests of states in the southern Africa region, as well as the relational power exercised by social forces on these states, can be represented diagrammatically as a socio-spatial arrangement which has national, regional and international dimensions. The two figures (diagrams 1 and 2) presented here are intended to indicate the regional loci of power, as well as where and why socio-economic relations in the region are gender discriminatory.[15]

The "wheel" diagram (diagram 1) shows, by the concentric circles, the relational power exercised by what Cox (1987) describes as "social forces". The conceptualisation of social forces is evidently not a homogeneous category, as Cox points out, but I would argue that the discrepancies are even more evident in the developing world. The state core, represented here very basically as the political, economic, military and services dimensions of government, remains influenced by those groups closest to it (i.e. international governmental organisations, business and so on). The further the group in question is located from the centre, the lower the level of its "power to influence". This power is derived, to a large extent, from the degree to which the group is linked to other loci of power, internationally and regionally. The same applies to the power of states in the region to exercise structural power, both regionally (over each other) and internationally. It should be noted that structural power is minimal internationally, even on the part of South Africa.

The second diagram, which is supposed to represent the region,[16] shows how the states in the region are joined in a pattern of connected centres (often located in one large urban centre where the most influential social forces, as well as arms of the state are to be found) (see diagram 2). The gendered socio-spatial ramifications of this should be evident, but the diagrams also emphasise the relative socio-spatial discrepancies and relational power differentials between dominant and marginal social forces nationally and regionally. Note that the flows of dominant knowledge from outside the region manifest themselves in

tional context is widely used. The notion of structural power serves to repre-
sent international power derived from material and other resources in the areas
of finance, knowledge, security and production. Relational power refers to the
power of a socio-economic group to exercise influence over another.

16   The SADC region consists of the following 14 states: Botswana, Lesotho,
Swaziland, South Africa, Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe,
Seychelles, Mauritius, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania, Zambia
and Malawi.

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sacrosanct) area of enquiry,[8] while development studies and security studies have long been understood to refer to other "knowledge territories" (with defined boundaries). Disciplinary divisions are, of course, to a fundamental degree a result of the desire of social scientists to emulate methods in the natural sciences. The underlying logic is similar: once a foundation of agreed upon propositions, assumptions and rules for their testing can be established, each discipline (qua discipline) carries on with its "bit of business". The intention was to create discrete, specific areas of enquiry, for which there would be dominant ideas, theories and paradigms of a logical, coherent and predictive design to order and understand different aspects of social life.[9] In this context, the distinctions between International Relations and Development[10] as fields of study (as well as the research agendas within them) are also largely the result of the dominance of a specific set of ideas concerning the relationship between politics and economics both domestically and internationally.

The divisions between the study of politics and economics, as well as the tendency to analyse development as a process which occurs essentially *within* the nation-state, and similarly (military) security as an issue addressed *among* them (i.e. as states), obscure the international context within which national development and broader security dynamics take place. The divisions create an under-emphasis on the security aspect of development and vice versa. The separation of politics and economics has also lent a distinctly technicist approach to the development debate (Ferguson, 1990).[11] "National" security and economic development are, within this context, assumed to be two separate concepts located within distinct explanatory approaches and research areas. Notions of development are thus depoliticised and rendered conceptually distant from societies and communities. The increasingly neoliberal dimension to development reinvents the language of development in terms of markets, modernity, factors of production, productivity, market niches, market access and so on (Cowen and Shenton, 1995; Watts, 1995; Parpart, 1995). Social development, and socio-economic security become invisible in the context of this language of modern economics.

The point of re-emphasising the separation is simply to highlight the obvious (which, as a result, many do not see). It allows for the state power aspect to vanish, as it were, from the economic realm, as Economics has aimed at scientifically examining markets as if it were possible for them to function with a solely

community, specifically the United States, the European Union (EU) and Japan. Their interests carry the day when decisions are negotiated (for example, the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS), the Trade-Related Investment Measures Agreement (TRIMS), as well as the proposed Multilateral Investment Agreement (MIA)). The discourse is merely underpinned by a fairly arbitrary interpretation of the metanarrative of economic liberalism (arbitrary in the sense of being determined by any process of logic)

Dominant knowledge, abstracted from a historical context and narrowly representing social reality, is one of the central areas of critique on the part of critical theorists, feminists, postmodernists and feminist postmodernists. These perspectives are clearly not homogeneous in terms of their ontological and epistemological foundations. Nonetheless, a uniting contention is that because of the dominance of discourses (discussed above) within the knowledge structure, as well as in relation to this structure's interconnection (meshing) with other structures, namely security, production (of which trade and consequently development form a part) and finance, "views from the margins" tend to be excluded. A broader understanding of aspects of social life in both the developed and developing world becomes problematic unless full cognisance is taken of how hegemonic knowledge functions to legitimate certain interpretations of social reality and to exclude others.

At this point it is necessary to be a little more rigorous on how dominant discourses arise and manifest themselves in relation to the focus on security and development. How is it that certain metanarratives are judged as the best way to explain reality and to interface with policy as to how decisions can best be determined? Part of this *how*, of course, is *who* decides.

The linkage between metanarratives and discourses

The study of international relations and development is not, as many students of international relations imagine, a new phenomenon, and the philosophical roots of current approaches are centuries old. The scope and content of the study of politics and economics in the international sphere, however, have been defined in terms of the evolution of separate research areas, particularly in the US and Britain.[7] Of significance to understandings of security and development is that the study of Economics is a separate (and for many, a scientifically

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UNDERSTANDING THE DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY DISCOURSES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: CONSTRUCTIVE OR DESTRUCTIVE DIALECTIC?

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