

I agree with Chris' comments.

There are a number of points which need to emerge with greater emphasis in connection with the AMC e.g.

a) INC has emerged as unchallenged leader of the people (all blacks and democratic whites) and this is what the enemy is most frantic about. Its ^A«^hole international and regional diplomatic gone is geared to our destruction} it is item one on the agenda of all proposed negotiations with neighbouring states.

b) We must get across why the fear is so much} the growing sophistication of MK actions, the massive political advances in the sense of increased mass organisation and resistance etc. But also because we stand for real liberation and not
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c) We must somehow allude to the multi-dimensional offensive against the Frontline States with greater emphasis and hint (diplomatically) at the dangers of any retreat by the Frontline States on the question of the ANC. Perhaps this could be done in a paragraph _^iÂ°h draws attention to the short-term and long-term objectives of the regime in its pre-occupation with the ANC:

Short-term - of course to destroy the vanguard of our peoples liberation struggle.

Long-term - To destroy the gains of the freedom revolutions in our region, knowing that the destruction of revolutionary opposition inside South Africa is the shortest route to the complete neo-colonial domination by the racist state of the whole sub-continent. (By the way, para. 58 (pÂ» 13): Do we want to single out Swaziland in this way?)

I believe we must spell out more directly a clear line of tactics on the 3-tier parliament; should we not call for a boycott by the Indian and Coloured people of the forthcoming "elections"? And to combine this with an all-round offensive against the Bantustans?

Necessary to refer to the fact that events of the past year have reinforced even further our conviction that proper power can only be achieved by a combination of mass political action and

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Also we should briefly refer to the new emphasis we are injecting into the armed struggle, that is, the unfolding of peoples war;

The people enthusiastically support and applaud our armed blows, they must increasingly become active participants.

5. « The last sentence of paragraph 48 (p. 10) suggests a complete and final break with Buthelezi - putting him in the same category as Sebe. Do we want to go this far?

6. Paragraph 68 (p. 15)

I don't like the oversimplified way in which we deal with the crime statistics. It either needs more detailed treatment or should be left out altogether.

7. The statement should not end up merely (p. 15) with a reference to the mobilisation of women; it should reiterate the need for the mass united and broader assault on the racist regime and its policies by the workers, youth, those on the land, in the Bantustans, in the ghettos etc.

8. Also the most recent statistics on the growth of the UDF (I have not got them but JM mentioned them to me) should be included.

9. In connection with point 4 about: We must somewhere answer those who are beginning to hint that we should perhaps change our strategy (e.g. Vel's line). Obviously we should not identify the "deviationists" but we should make the point

that the enormous political strides which have been achieved have organic connection with the continued pressure on the front of revolutionary violence. Indeed it is this more than anything else which explains the enemy's frenetic pre-occupation with the ANC. Stop violence and you hand South Africa to the racists on a silver plate!! - for ever.

COMMENTS

I agree with Chris' comments.

There are a number of points which need to emerge with greater emphasis in connection with the ANC e.g.

a) ANC has emerged as unchallenged leader of the people (all blacks and democratic whites) and this is what the enemy is most frantic about. Its whole international and regional diplomatic goÂ»Â» is geared to our destruction} it is item one on the agenda of all proposed negotiations with neighbouring states.

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COMMENTS

1/1/84 by Chris

1. First page, paragraph 3 starting* "Indeed, the relentless march^and ending^that South Africa's future belongs to the democratic majority". I have my doubts whether the ruling class has come to realise that the future belongs to the democratic majority". The sentence is a bit of an overstatement and there are no facts to substantiate the assertion.

£1 On page 2, paragraph one, should we not rather say that 'our revolutionary struggle rests on five pillars by including the struggle of the workers as distinct from the United mass action of the peoples'. After all, 19^3 has seen the unprecedented growth of Trade Unions and a determined search for unity.

3 Page 2, paragraph 8, I do not like the over-optimistic ^

statement that the regime realises that "apartheid is doomed".

^ In paragraph 19 page 4* we make a fleeting reference to the Bantustans, yet it is an area where the enemy has partially succeeded. There is in existence 4 so-called independent Bantustans. Should we not concretely expose^ the grisly horrors of the Bantustans, the persecution and murders there and call on the people, on the police and the army there not to be surrogates of Pretoria by collaborating with the implementation of measures that keep them in chains.

5" On page 5j paragraph 24, we should extend what we say about the Ciskei to the other Bantustans as well. Mphahlele is just as vicious as Sebe, Matanzima is persecuting patriots and democrats and some of them are in prisons.

(p Page 6. The reference to the UDP is very scanty. While commending

the masses for their creative efforts to forge the UDF, we should not sow the seeds of complacency - the UDP needs to expand to pull into its ranks more workers and peasants - it must find vehicles for mobilising the countryside where our people face some of the worst excesses of apartheid tyranny. There is a need to defend and safeguard this United Front by being very

vigilant, try fighting all forms of sectarianism and also to emphasise the need for United Mass action.

Page 7. Paragraph 35 - let us just say we have build a mass movement and drop the epithet'strong'.

Page 7 paragraph 36 - In the past year, the Churches have been active i
n
the struggle and more religious leaders have participated e.g. Tutu
Boesak, Chikane, Mkhathswa, Mcebisi Xundu, Dennis Hurley - surely w
e
need to recognise this increasing role that a section of the Church is
playing and we should (?) a message for them.

Page 11, paragraph 51> we should say something to the black or
African soldiers who are joining the army in increasing numbers.

On page 15, we should also extend our greetings to our leaders in
prisons, all the political prisoners as well as the banned and
banished.

Para. 1

oooo In keeping with Established practice, we ask you to share with us today some thoughts on the tasks that confront us during 198[^]. Allow me to begin by extending to you all the wishes of the National Executive Committee and the general ^

leadership of the AIMC for great successes in the new year.

Para. 2

(Remove quotation marks and put "had" in place of "has" ^
thatis If... Had reached" and "had plunged").

Line 5. ".o0 Ltie went on to state that within the confines ..0.." ^

Para. 3

Line 6..... Indeed the relentless forward march of history must soon enough force upon ... majority.

Para 5: Latet Line: isolate the apartheid regime and win world-wide moral, political and material support for the struggle. v

Para 7: The Bantustan scheme, the militarisation of wo -coualzcy, the offensive against the ANC, the new apartheid constitution and other recent pieces of legislation, notably those covering industrial relations, the so-called community councils, the press and the economy - all are_elements in this programme of crisis management. Coupled with thewar against the Namibian and Angolan people and increased aggression against the rest of Southern Africa, these measures point to the desperation of the regime as it battles for its survival.

Para, 8: 'refer PD page 2&3Â«)

Para 9: We recall how, at the height of the Soweto Uprising, T.B Vorster made bold to declare: " There is no crisis." - no crisis for minority rule. But a few years later, P.W.Botha called on the ^ whites to adapt to reality or perish with apartheid.

J1

Para 10: Thars-was~a-pukl4.o . admission that--there is a crisis,

the apartheid system. It is an imperative task of the revolutionary and democratic forces of our country to compound and further deepen this crisis by ever intensifying the struggle for national and social emancipation.

Paras 11 and 12 Refer PD page 3- 5 These two paras combine into

Para 11: change numbering of subsequent paras.)

Para 13: changes already made in original).

Para 14: Line 3: ... in preparation for the next stage. our forward

march to victory^ The answer to these questions relate^W what we have referred to as the illegality of the apartheid state.

Para 15: We must begin to use our accumulated strength to destroy the organs of government of the apartheid regime. We have, to undermine and weaken its control over us, exactly by frustrating its attempts to control us. We should direct our collective might to rendering

2.

the enemy's instruments of authority ^unworkable. To march forward must mean that we advance against the regime's organs of state power^ creating conditions in which the country becomes increasingly ungovernable.

Paras 16 & 17: These should be combined into one paragraph to read/:

You are aware ... local affairs committees. It is these institutions r- n of apartheid power that we must attack and demolish wi-th-fetee pa+ t QcUL
frolc Q-fcivo-O'f putting)6f6 an end to racist minority rule in our country. Needless to say, as strategists, we must select for attack ... weakest.

Para 18: The goal we are setting ourselves today ... its accomplishment. Thus, through our efforts^the so-called Coloured Persons Representative

Council ceased to exist; as a result of extensive mobilisation, the puppet South African Indian Council was brought in by a laughably insignificant minority: the entire Bantustan system faces overwhelming rejection and continuous resistance; and similarly, towards the end ^ of 1983^ we united in a massive rejection of the local management committees and community councils.

Para 19: This has become part of Para 18 - change numbering.

Para 20: Line 2: change comma into a dash after "government".

Para 20: Line 4: ... their own administration and people's coufcts.

It took the full weight of the regime's armed forces to quell the revolt. Likewise in 1976 we caused the collapse of the Urban Bantu Councils. In the recent past,^n^nlwly installed community *

council in SobantU Village, Pi Ptormayi f gnf P01qQH q -orw<

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Para 21: Our determined resistance at Crossroads and at KTC in the Western Cape has made it impossible for Koornhof to carry out his,6eiiÂ £w4>.

pX-aa-s. He has been unable to govern at will. In Mdantsane our heroic struggle has shaken the puppet Sebe Administration to its core. Commenting on this situation, one South African political observer stated: " The stakes are high because the issues have moved beyond those of a (bus) fare increase. The boycott has become a conflict of will between the Ciskei (puppet administration) and its many opponents in Mdantsane, the second largest black township in South Africa."

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KwaZulu bantustan, we have gone further to ... Pretoria regime. v

Para 23: Line 4: ... Where Administration Boards take over their functions, then these must be destroyed too.

Para 24: (refer PD page 4) "Should we here refer to conditions in bantustans)

Para 25: Line 4: leave out the word "junior". (Should we here call on soldiers not to serve or defend bantustan administrations.)

Para 26: Line 4: " struggling for a new order in our country..."

Para 27: (There is too much use of the phrase "we must" in this statement.)

It is essential that we continue to shift our posture from the defensive to the offensive. The enemy has failed to destroy us and never will. But invincibility is not enough. It is in the attack that we shall find victory. Nor should we wait for the enemy to take the initiative and then react to its plans and schemes. We have a purpose, a goal, an objective, a historic mission^ to accomplish for our country and for humanity. Our historic duty is to pursue it with relentless determination and persistence, whatever the enemy does or omits to do.

Para 28: We must apply ourselves with more vigour in our efforts to organise . . . organisations, and lacreaso-our -capacity--to engage the racist enemy in united action on all fronts. It is absolutely necessary ... our revolution today.

Para 29: (Omit).

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