

Zim/032/0031/01

RETURN OF THE PRODIGAL SON

PROSPECTS FOR A REVIVAL OF THE PAN AFRICANIST CONGRESS

Paper presented at the Political Science Association  
of South Africa Research Colloquium

Alpha Training Centre, Broederstroom. 6/7 October 1988

GARY VAN STADEN  
SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS



## 1. INTRODUCTION

If the prominence and influence of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) in helping to shape South African history over the past 30 years was plotted on a graph, the resulting line would bear a strong resemblance to a roller-coaster track. From a series of peaks and valleys in the late 1950s and early 1960s the PAC entered a period of protracted decline which was to last for some two decades.

Events and developments since the first few months of 1985, however, suggest that the roller-coaster ride is not yet over for the PAC and that the organisation's influence may once again be on the rise.

The PAC is one of the three main South African liberation movements operating in exile, the others being the African National Congress (ANC) and the Black Consciousness Movement of Azania (BCM).

Only the PAC and the ANC are recognised as "official" South African liberation movements by, among others, the United Nations (UN) and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU).

For most of the period in exile - almost 30 years - the PAC has failed to emerge from the shadow of its "father", the ANC.

But evidence to hand suggests that the PAC is showing some signs of revival - both internally and internationally - and the thrust of this paper will be to suggest that under certain conditions the PAC could well re-emerge as a major actor in the South African political drama.

For the sake of context a brief outline of the movement's early history and problems is presented.

## 2. EARLY HISTORY OF THE PAC

This section will briefly look at the formation and early policies of the PAC; the concept of Africanism and the ANC Youth League; and finally the decline of the organisation.

### 2:1. FORMATION AND POLICIES

The PAC was officially launched at a conference in Soweto on 5/6 April 1959, some four months after years of tension in the ANC had finally led to an Africanist breakaway.

The new organisation adopted the philosophy of Africanism and elected Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe as its first president.

Sobukwe set about removing the labels of racism and exclusivity the opponents of Africanism had attached to the philosophy and his intellectual input helped establish the philosophy in the mainstream of political thought in South



Africa.

Africanist opposition to the role of white and communist members in the ANC was at the core of the tensions present in that organisation from the early 1940s but it would be a gross oversimplification to suggest that it was the only cause of dissatisfaction.

Some scholars of the South African liberation movements argue that the major criticism of the ANC by the Africanist "dissidents" centred not on the question of race but on the ANC's political programme - or more precisely the lack thereof.(1)

Central to the Africanist rejection of white participation in the ANC's liberation struggle was the former's distinctions between co-operation and collaboration.

The Africanists departed from the premise that co-operation was possible only if such co-operation took place on equal terms from an equal base. As such equality was not present in South Africa then neither was true co-operation, only collaboration.(2)

Sobukwe argued that Africanism was a non-racial concept and he repeatedly rejected claims that the philosophy was exclusivist.

According to Sobukwe there was no reason why white South Africans could not be regarded as Africans in a post liberation society.

But whatever the validity or otherwise of Sobukwe's intellectual observations the debate was swiftly swept away by a wide perception that Africanism - and its proponents in the PAC - was anti-white.

This perception was by no means limited to Africanism's opponents and was shared by a significant number of its supporters. There was evidence to suggest that much of the PAC's early appeal was due to its anti-white image.(3)

The literature available on the Africanist split from the ANC and the subsequent formation of the PAC is extensive and need not be repeated here. See, for example, the detailed analysis of these events provided by Tom Lodge.(4)

For the purpose of this paper it would be sufficient to point out that implicit in the PAC objections to the strategies of the ANC were several key elements of Africanist philosophy, including:

1. That the liberation struggle in South Africa was an African affair (5) and could only take place under African leadership in African organisations. The role of sympathetic whites had to be limited to organising their own communities to prepare for liberation. They could play no part in the struggle itself.(6) Such a position, firmly excluded the multiracial approach of the Freedom Charter which the ANC had adopted in 1955. (Now called simply "Charterism".)

2. That the liberation struggle was essentially a race conflict, not a class conflict. The contradiction in South African society was that of white oppressor and African oppressed on the basis of colour. The creation of a race oligarchy in South Africa had placed severe limitations on a



Marxist interpretation of the society. The PAC regarded Marxism as a "foreign import" and alien to Africa. (7)

3. That the principle form of liberation was the armed struggle with mass participation by the people themselves. It was to be a revolution of the people, by the people, for the people, with the emphasis on mass action.

Negotiation, bargaining and persuasion were regarded as useless. The Africanists argued that there was no historical evidence to suggest that despots, dictators or oligarchies who held political and economic power could be persuaded to bargain it away. This could only be achieved by force. (8)

4. That the "new order" in South Africa would be an Africanist socialist democracy based on the principle of equality and non-racialism (as opposed to multiracialism). The concepts "equality" and "non-racial" implied an absence of groups or racial divisions with the obvious consequence that no minority "groups" could expect guarantees nor even recognition. (9)

The above guidelines are not intended to be comprehensive.

## 2:2. AFRICANISM AND THE CONGRESS YOUTH LEAGUE (10)

Africanism or "African nationalism" were not the products of the apartheid era nor even of the colonial-era and existed long before the first European settlers arrived. (11)

During the 20th century renewed growth in Africanist philosophy resulted in a series of congresses designed to promote its influence (12) and led to the development of a strong movement in post-independence Africa for unity.

Among the leading proponents of the unity drive - and the creation of a United States of Africa - was Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and his philosophy had a profound effect on the Africanists in South Africa.

Nkrumah led Ghana to independence in 1957, two years before the Africanist breakaway from the ANC, and subsequently became one of the organisation's strongest supporters.

Nkrumah's belief that fundamental change in Africa had been brought about by the sufferings and sacrifices of the African people themselves (13) was taken to heart by the Africanists at the foot of the continent.

Africanism countered the traditional colonial notion that Western culture and civilization were somehow superior. It strived to convince Africans that African reality could not be related or understood in terms of Western systems and that the continent possessed a characteristic wisdom of its own. (14).

But above all else Africanism strived to shake off the inferiority complex colonialism had instilled in the people of the continent. (15)



By the mid-1940s the philosophy of Africanism began to play an important role in South Africa's political development, following the formation of the ANC Youth League in 1944.(16) Prominent members included Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu and Oliver Tambo.

According to Lodge the Africanist philosophy drew heavily on 19th century Romanticism and Social Darwinism. It lacked clear political theory but this shortcoming was more than compensated for in imaginative strategies used to maximise the effect of spontaneous popular uprisings.(17)

Central to these strategies was an emphasis on confrontation and non-negotiation.(18)

By the end of the 1940s the Youth League had consolidated its position and counted six members on the executive of the ANC. In addition the Programme of Action adopted in 1949 reflected Africanist philosophy and strategies to a significant degree.(19)

But a scant two years later the Youth League reflected the broad ideological divisions within the ANC and the election of non-Africanists to the positions of president and national secretary in 1951 put the Africanists on the retreat.(20)

By then the men who would play key roles in the development of the ANC - Mandela, Sisulu, and Tambo - were counted among the Charterists.

The flag of Africanism was kept flying mainly by Youth Leaguers in Orlando and this group included Potlake Leballo, Zephania Mothopeng and Peter Raboroko.(21)

Increasing confrontation between the Africanist faction and the Charterists led to a series of suspensions and infighting in the ANC which came to a head at a Transvaal provincial congress in February 1958.

The congress was supposed to put an end to the squabbles and dissent which had followed the previous congress in October 1957 but it served merely to accentuate the process of division.(22) The situation deteriorated rapidly reaching a low point at the November 1958 provincial congress where the Africanist supporters had their credentials rejected and were prevented from entering the venue.(23)

The split was complete and the Africanists withdrew from the ANC. Four months later they formed the PAC.

### 2:3. DIVISION AND DECLINE

The PAC made no dramatic inroads into ANC support during the first 11 or so months of its existence and remained more or less confined to historical Youth League support bases in Soweto, Alexandra, the Vaal Triangle and Pretoria.

Any gains made by the PAC between April 1959 and early March 1960 were largely confined to the Western Cape.

But 21 March 1960 was to change everything. The events in Sharpeville on that day catapulted the PAC into national and international prominence. As the popular uprisings, sparked by the pass protests, spread across the country the PAC could well



have believed that its emphasis on undirected mass action had been vindicated. The ANC was quick to respond and organised pass protests of its own (24) but the PAC remained the focus of attention.

A survey conducted among middle-class African men in the PWV area by the SA Institute of Race Relations eight months after the Sharpeville tragedy showed significantly more support for the PAC than for the ANC. (25) The survey included university students in its sample. (26)

According to the survey 57% of respondents favoured the PAC while 39% registered support for the ANC. (27) The PAC president, Sobukwe, emerged from the poll with a considerably higher profile than even Chief Albert Luthuli, then head of the ANC. (28)

The survey findings indicated that the ANC seemed to be more popular among the older respondents than among students and that a positive correlation existed between support for the PAC and a willingness to accept violent strategies. (29)

Although the survey sample was relatively small - 150 - and its application was limited to the PWV area, there were no structural or methodological weaknesses in the survey design.

There was thus no real reason to reject the findings, only to exercise caution in their application. The findings themselves, however, remain significant.

But if the Sharpeville tragedy and the resultant insurrections had boosted the PAC's popularity and influence in African politics it, ironically, also signalled the beginning of its decline.

The pass protests had perhaps been too successful and the PAC was ill-prepared for the State response which followed and for the loss of Sobukwe (who had walked into jail as part of the protests on 21 March).

The scale and intensity of the State-inspired restrictions and repression and the imprisonment of its leadership threw the PAC into total confusion and disarray.

The most important consequence of this was the series of leadership crises and crises of policy which were to dog the PAC for the next two decades.

These developments are well documented and do not need repeating here. (30) It will be sufficient to say that the quality of leadership and the frequent, often violent, disputes which erupted around it were sufficient to render the PAC all but useless.

### 3. PROSPECTS FOR A REVIVAL OF THE PAC

The PAC can claim an uninterrupted existence of almost 30 years and it could well be argued - with some validity - that to discuss its "revival" is illogical.

The problem is overcome by defining the concept "revival" so that it is taken to mean renewed growth of influence (and thus



support) and not merely the reactivation of organisational structures which had fallen into disuse.

The evaluation of a re-emergence of influence depends on three key elements. The first is historical/descriptive in nature and examines developments in the PAC since 1979.

The second element comprises an analysis of the "ideal conditions" under which the PAC could expect to extend its influence.

The third component involves an assessment of the extent to which prevailing conditions match this ideal and includes an evaluation of the options open to the PAC to maximise its influence.

### 3.1. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PAC (1979 - 1988 )

In June 1979 Leballo's turbulent 17-year reign as chairman of the PAC's Central Committee (31) was brought to an end by a palace coup led by his friend and righthand man David Sibeko, and Vusi Make.

Make, who subsequently became the new chairman, provided some insight into the bitter divisions which had plagued the PAC for the last two decades when he told the OAU's Liberation Committee that the PAC was divided into at least two well-armed factions ready to make all-out war on each other. (32)

It was a new low point and represented the culmination of a series of setbacks suffered by the PAC since almost its entire underground leadership in South Africa was arrested and imprisoned in 1977.

Make held the PAC chairmanship for two years and his successor - John Nyatni Pokela - was to begin the long process of rebuilding the organisation. Pokela, like most of the PAC's early leadership, came from an educational background and had been an active member of the ANC Youth League from its formation in 1944.

He was strongly influenced by Africanism (33) and was among those who had fled to Lesotho (Basutoland) in 1963 in the wake of the State crackdown which followed the Poqo uprisings in the Western Cape.

Pokela's chairmanship of the PAC (1981 - 1985) saw much of the bitter in-fighting within the organisation come to an end. He has subsequently been widely credited with re-uniting and rebuilding the PAC and he remained untarnished by the allegations of corruption which clung to other PAC leaders. (34)

Pokela inherited the chairmanship in difficult circumstances which soon deteriorated further when the PAC's then director of foreign affairs, Henry Isaacs, resigned in a blaze of publicity. Isaacs released dozens of documents to the media which contained detailed allegations of corruption and inefficiency in the PAC. (35)

Whatever the truth or otherwise of the allegations Pokela set about tackling precisely those two problems. At the time of his death in June 1985 he had done enough to rebuild and unify the



PAC to spare his successor the diversive power struggles which had accompanied previous changes of leadership.

The successor was Johnson Mlambo, who had been Secretary for Foreign Affairs under Pokela. That Mlambo had emerged as a natural successor and the ease of the transfer of leadership, which was achieved in a matter of a few weeks, were clear evidence of the new political maturity Pokela had brought to the PAC.

Like his predecessors Mlambo had been part of the PAC from the very beginning, although unlike them he had not been very well known at the time.

Mlambo had the advantage of recent experience inside South Africa, having fled the country just over a year before his appointment as chairman. The process of rebuilding the PAC, which Pokela had begun, continued under Mlambo's leadership with even more concrete results.

### 3.1.1. INSURGENCY

By the first few months of 1986 Mlambo was able to claim that the PAC was gaining a "strong foothold" inside South Africa, including the labour movement and said that PAC insurgents were beginning to operate against targets in the security forces, "collaborators" and "puppets". (36) In a report which appeared in Zimbabwe at almost the same time, Mlambo - speaking in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the PAC's military wing, the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA) - said that the 1984 uprising in South Africa had its base in the Vaal Triangle and that this area was now clearly an Africanist and "Azanianist" stronghold. (37)

The predominance of activists linked to the rival United Democratic Front (UDF), who were subsequently charged for activities directly related to the uprising, would seem to cast some doubt on that statement. (38) But clear evidence of increased APLA activity soon emerged.

In March 1986 two APLA insurgents - believed to be part of a party numbering between six and 10 - were arrested shortly after infiltrating South Africa from Botswana. (39) At the same time South African intelligence sources were quoted as saying that 150 PAC insurgents had been trained in Libya since 1982. The PAC subsequently confirmed the claim but denied that the insurgents would be infiltrated into South Africa with instructions to assassinate political leaders. (40)

The PAC did not confine itself to insurgency and set about organising and training cell structures inside South Africa with a view to increasing the role of the local black populace in the armed struggle. (41)

In September 1986 six members of the PAC were sentenced to death for the murder of a township official and a further five were imprisoned for furthering the aims of the PAC. (42)

This followed the arrest of five APLA insurgents in



Bophuthatswana (43) and the arrest of APLA's second-in-command in South Africa, Enoch Zulu, who had evaded capture since first appearing on the "wanted list" in 1962. (44)

The PAC also claimed responsibility for the assassination of Brigadier Andrew Molope in June 1986 but independent confirmation of the claim has not been forthcoming. (45)

By late 1986 the then Minister of Law and Order, Louis le Grange, was moved to note in Parliament that there appeared to be a dramatic increase in PAC activity. Le Grange told Parliament that the security forces had detected a strong element of Maoism in the PAC's rural subversion campaign and its inclusion of the "ordinary masses" in "terrorist attacks". (46)

This revival of the armed struggle - the PAC's principle strategy for liberation - continued in 1987. In February of that year the organisation claimed responsibility for a series of attacks on policemen and "system collaborators" in Soweto and Alexandra townships. (47) The use of Scorpion automatic weapons in the operations led the media to dub the attackers the "Scorpion Gang".

A few days later the South African police announced that a further five APLA insurgents had been taken into custody shortly after crossing the border from Botswana. (48)

Shortly afterwards the PAC claimed responsibility for a handgrenade attack on municipal police in Soweto. One policeman died and 64 were injured in the attack - to date the largest number of security force casualties (deaths and injuries) in a single incident of insurgency.

The PAC statement said that the attack was part of its planned intensification of the armed struggle. (49)

In August 1987 three APLA insurgents were killed in a shootout with South African security forces. No further details were released in the police statement which came 10 months after the incident occurred. Security police sources were quoted as saying that the PAC was in the midst of its first serious revival in over a decade. (50)

In the same report security sources said that APLA insurgents were currently undergoing training in Libya, Iran, Lebanon and Syria. (51)

It was also during 1987 that a trial of five alleged members of the PAC and two alleged members of Qibla (52) began in Pretoria.

Thus far in 1988 the PAC has achieved some consistency in maintaining its new insurgency campaign. But on the debit side its success rate remains low.

The PAC has now decided in principle to undertake most of its insurgency training operations within South Africa's borders, sending only those in need of specialist training to foreign bases. (53) Such a step would reduce the risks involved in infiltrating foreign-based cadres into South Africa but substantially increase the possibility of infiltration by security force operatives.

At the time of writing the most recent attempts to infiltrate PAC insurgents into South Africa ended in a shootout at a



roadblock in the Northern Transvaal. Four suspected PAC insurgents died in the clash and another two were subsequently captured. A total of 12 policemen were injured in the incident. (54)

By April of this year there were approximately 18 people known to be facing charges under the Internal Security Act and other Acts relating to their activities as alleged members of the PAC. (55)

The trials involving the 18 are taking place in Pretoria, Johannesburg, Springs and Umtata.

These figures could be higher because, firstly, not all trials are reported and, secondly, specific organisations are not always mentioned on chargesheets or reports of the cases. Chargesheets often contain simply the specific charge in terms of a particular Act - such as treason, terrorism, unlawful possession of weapons, public violence, sedition and subversion or a combination thereof.

At this point it would be appropriate to inject a note of caution. While the events described above as well as those which follow indicate that the PAC is indeed in the process of its most significant revival since the early 1960s, both the scale and intensity of the revival remain relatively low.

The novelty value of renewed PAC activity has tended to portray the revival of the organisation as far more spectacular than it actually is.

While the number of APLA insurgents and "sympathisers" killed or captured during 1986 was - at 38 - significantly higher than previous years it is given some perspective by the comparative figures - 660 - for the ANC's Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK). (56)

In 1987 85 APLA insurgents or "sympathisers" were killed or captured by security forces as against a corresponding figure of 446 MK insurgents or supporters killed or arrested. (57)

So while the number of APLA insurgents "neutralised" by the security forces during 1987 accounted for just under 16% of the total for the year two factors detracted from the overall significance of the increase.

The first was that APLA insurgency continued to function at a relatively low rate of success and the second was that an overall decline in ANC (MK) activity during 1987 served to inflate the percentage. (58)

It thus becomes important to take note of the significance of renewed PAC activity within South Africa while at the same time keeping it in perspective.

### 3.1.2. DIPLOMATIC DEVELOPMENTS

The significance of the revival in PAC insurgency activity over the past three years was matched, if not exceeded, by developments on the diplomatic front.

While the PAC remained committed to the armed struggle as the principle strategy for liberation in South Africa (59) its



leadership under Mlambo had apparently recognised the value of diplomatic pressure - especially if that pressure came from South Africa's major Western allies.

It was in this sphere particularly that the PAC had for years lived in the shadow of the ANC who, via its twin-pronged strategy of armed struggle on the one hand and political organisation and diplomatic pressure on the other, had emerged in the eyes of many foreign governments as the only "alternative" in South Africa.

The PAC enjoyed few of the benefits bestowed on its ideological rival. While it shared recognition as an official liberation movement by organisations such as the OAU, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the UN, it received few material benefits from these relationships.

The PAC received diplomatic and logistical support from a number of nations prior to 1985 but most, if not all, were either third-world nations or aligned to the Eastern Bloc. Communist China was the PAC's main backer during its early years in exile.

A noticeable change came in 1986 after the appointment of Ahmed Gora Ebrahim as Secretary for Foreign Affairs on the PAC's Central Committee and the appointment of Sam Makhanda as PAC representative to the UN.

As early as January 1986 Mlambo had complained of Western media bias against the PAC (60) - a situation which probably accurately reflected the attitude of most Western governments.

The PAC apparently believed that the root of the problem lay in Western government perceptions of the organisation as extremely radical and anti-white - a view still widely held even within South Africa. In response the PAC leadership began what were the first in-depth explanations of its attitude towards whites in South Africa since Sobukwe dealt with the problem over 20 years earlier.

Mlambo said in a general comment on PAC policy that whites were part of the future in Africa and that any white South African who accepted the establishment of an Africanist, socialist, democratic society would be "welcome in a free Azania". (61)

Ebrahim expanded on that policy by stating that the PAC would accept whites as individuals in the organisation but remained firm on the issue of joint action with white groups to bring about an end to white rule. (62)

As far as the PAC was concerned the role of whites in the liberation struggle remained confined to their own communities. That did not imply, however, that they would be unwelcome in a post-apartheid Africanist society.

The precise role of the PAC's "information campaign" as regarded the organisation's policies on white South Africans in the developments which followed is not yet clear. What is clear is that from about mid-1986 the PAC made unprecedented progress in bringing its case to the attention of the international community.

With Ebrahim, Mlambo and Makhanda working furiously behind the scenes the PAC established official diplomatic contact with the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Yugoslavia,



Pakistan, the Caribbean Island nations, the Soviet Union and a series of African countries who had been previously committed only to the ANC. This in the space of less than 14 months.

In November 1986 Ebrahim addressed the UN General Assembly. (63) The address was followed by the first official contacts with senior officials in the United States State Department a few days later. (64) A second meeting followed 12 months later. (65)

The development was significant because the United States for the first time formalised its relationship with the PAC. The ANC had enjoyed a similar status for almost 10 years.

Squeezed between the two meetings with the United States government was the first official contact between the organisation and the British government in March 1987. (66)

At about the same time the PAC was instrumental in securing additional Australian government support for the Southern Africa Development Co-ordinating Conference (SADCC). (67)

It could well be argued that the sudden international interest in the PAC was the result of developments inside South Africa at the time (widespread unrest and a state of emergency), rather than a reflection of any improvement in the PAC's international standing.

The argument has two flaws, however. Firstly, the perception of "ungovernability" in South Africa was at a peak in late 1984 and early 1985. By 1986, and certainly by 1987, there was little doubt that the South African government was well in control.

Secondly, the ANC was widely perceived - incorrectly - to be in control of events in South Africa's black townships between September 1984 and the start of the second state of emergency in June 1986. The PAC received barely a mention.

Towards the end of the 1970s the PAC's international contacts were largely confined to Africa, a few Middle Eastern countries and some international organisations.

By the first months of 1988, however, the situation had undergone a remarkable transformation and the PAC boasted official diplomatic contact on a regular basis with the following: the United States; the United Kingdom; France; the Soviet Union; mainland China \*; Australia; Yugoslavia; Zimbabwe; Zambia \*; Botswana\*; Lesotho \*; Egypt\*; Nigeria \*; Cuba; Iran \*; Libya; Pakistan; Czechoslovakia; Argentina; Algeria \*; Syria \*; the Caribbean nations; Lebanon \*; Tanzania \*; Ethiopia \*; Burkina Faso; Ghana \*; and Guinea Bissau. (\* denotes official contact prior to 1980.)

The list is not comprehensive and includes only those countries with whom the PAC seems to have had regular contact during the past 30 months.

The list now includes all five permanent members of the UN Security Council (as opposed to only one prior to 1980) and its international contacts have taken on a global appearance.

The PAC maintains its full observer status at the UN, the OAU, the NAM and SADCC, as well as various other regional and international organisations.

Its status in all of the above is quite secure, as opposed to



the situation in the late 1960s and early 1970s when its position was in some jeopardy.

European countries such as the Netherlands, as well as the Scandinavian countries, would seem the next logical targets for PAC diplomatic penetration. The relatively low success of PAC efforts in these countries to date could be ascribed to the long history of support these nations have of the rival ANC.

The PAC's main backers as far as logistical - training bases - and financial support are concerned are (in no specific order): Libya; Yugoslavia; Czechoslovakia; mainland China \*; Syria \*; Lebanon \*; Iran; the OAU's Liberation Committee \*; the World Council of Churches \*; and Tanzania \*. (\* denotes support predating 1980.)

Despite the considerable advances of recent years the PAC - as was the case with its revived insurgency campaign - remains very much in the diplomatic shadow of the ANC and, more importantly, trails behind the latter as far as financial support is concerned. The significance of the PAC effort as detailed above is twofold. Firstly, it is a reflection of the quality of leadership currently present in the organisation and, secondly, it may herald the first real attempt by the PAC to integrate at least some political action into its programme which until now has relied exclusively on the armed struggle.

The ability of the PAC leadership to maintain the stability and unity of the organisation over the next few years will be crucial if the organisation wishes to obtain a greater share of the resources the international community makes available to the liberation struggle in South Africa.

### 3.1.3. INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS

Elements of Africanist philosophy have existed in various black political organisations since it first found a new prominence in the South African political environment in the 1940s.

But from the early 1960s until the beginning of the 1980s, Africanism in South Africa became the near-exclusive domain of the PAC.

The black consciousness ideology which began to develop in South Africa in the late 1960s was quite distinct from Africanism.

Africanism and black consciousness do share a deep distrust of white liberalism and hold similar positions on a number of issues. They differ quite considerably on other aspects. Most notable among these are ideological differences and the question of tactics.

Practical considerations have also played a role in the past. For example, while their own ideology is significantly closer to Africanism than to the multiracial Charterism of the ANC, there is evidence to suggest that the majority of black consciousness adherents who fled South Africa during the 1976/1977 uprisings joined the ANC in exile. (68) The black consciousness exiles were



most likely drawn to the ANC because it was the larger and better organised of the two exiled liberation movements. This despite the fact that they had previously shunned its political stance. (69)

But while the black consciousness exiles may have taken the only practical course open to them in 1976/1977, the theory of black consciousness remains much closer to the PAC than to the ANC. (70)

It is not merely coincidental that both the PAC and black consciousness groups (71) drew extensively for their respective leaderships on the South African Students' Organisation (SASO).

SASO was created in 1968 in direct response to black opposition to white liberal leadership.

In addition black consciousness rejected the historical role of white liberals using almost identical arguments to those put forward by the PAC in the 1958/1959 breakaway. (72)

Africanism and black consciousness share similar views on suffrage and both differ from the ANC in this regard. (73) Other similar positions included a mutual stand against negotiation with the South African government (74) and a shared view that any guarantees of "minority rights" implied an unacceptable race bias in a society where all who lived in a post-apartheid South Africa would be equal. (75)

The Azanian Manifesto, adopted in 1983 by most of the black consciousness organisations, reflected the major principles of Africanism. (76)

The similarities in Africanism and black consciousness thought would thus seem to place them in the same camp and in opposition to the ANC and its allies.

Bantu Steven Biko, probably the most influential black consciousness leader in the history of the movement, implicitly praised the Africanists who challenged the Freedom Charter and broke away from the ANC. (77)

While it remains important to view black consciousness and the Africanism of the PAC as essentially different philosophies or ideologies, it is equally important to keep sight of the fact that they are united in one key respect - they both oppose the multiracial Charterism of the ANC from similar platforms.

Black consciousness was able to provide the only outlet for those Africanists who became disillusioned with the PAC's performance in the late 1960s and 1970s.

In the 1980s, however, Africanism began a period of renewed growth which began with the formation of the National Forum in 1983. The National Forum was formed to oppose the new constitution, which had created the tricameral system of parliament, and to mobilise support for a boycott of the 1984 elections in the coloured and Indian communities.

The National Forum contained elements of both black consciousness and Africanism and played a significant role in bringing the two movements closer together under one umbrella.

But Africanism began to expand its influence outside of the black consciousness groupings - expansion which occurred independently of the PAC.



It was not long before this growth manifested itself in the creation of new organisations which were essentially supportive of the PAC but which had no links with the exiled movement.

The most important of these organisations was the Azanian National Youth Unity (AZANYU) which was formed in 1983 to promote the unity - under an Africanist banner - of those forces opposing white rule.

Less than a year later AZANYU claimed a membership of 16 000.(78) While the claim was greeted with some scepticism little doubt remained by January 1988 that AZANYU was among the fastest growing township movements in South Africa. During that month an AZANYU national congress in Soweto attracted 2 000 delegates from branches all over the country.(79)

Equally important was the fact that officials from five Western embassies attended the proceedings as did a delegation from Zimbabwe.(80)

Another purely Africanist movement to emerge from the revival was the All African Student Action Committee (AASAC) which was launched in early 1988. The AASAC was supposed to co-ordinate "Sobukwe Year" celebrations but the organisation was restricted and its leaders detained just weeks after it came into being.(81)

Africanism also began to gain a strong foothold in the labour movement with the revival of the South African Black Municipal Workers Union. It received a further boost in 1986 with the formation of the National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU) - a federation of black consciousness/Africanist trade unions.

NACTU claimed (and still does) to hold a strictly neutral position in the broad ANC/PAC debate. Members of NACTU met officials of both exiled movements (82) for discussions on the South African situation, but the raising of the PAC flag at NACTU's launch has left a lasting impression.(83)

The NACTU federation claimed a membership of 23 unions looking after the interests of 240 000 workers.(84)

While sceptics pointed out that not all the 23 unions in the NACTU federation were active there were unions - such as the South African Chemical Workers Union and the Media Workers Association of South Africa - which had long histories of effective action.

Recent developments within NACTU suggest that a power struggle within the federation between the adherents of black consciousness and the Africanists has shifted decisively in favour of the latter.(85)

That has very important implications for the growth of Africanism in the labour movement, even if most of that growth is initially at the expense of black consciousness.

### 3.2. NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR FURTHER GROWTH OF THE PAC

While the level of PAC-inspired insurgency outlined in the preceding section hardly qualifies as spectacular its significance lies in the fact that it represents the most



concerted PAC effort to date.

The Poqo uprisings in the early 1960s do not qualify as externally motivated insurgency. While some link to the PAC, certainly existed there was enough evidence to suggest that the role of the exiled movement's leadership was limited. (86)

Prior to 1985, and apart from isolated incidents during the 1970s, (specifically the half-hearted attempt to infiltrate mainland China-trained insurgents in 1978), the last known serious attempt by the PAC to infiltrate insurgents into South Africa occurred in 1968 and even that effort ended in dismal failure before the group reached the South African border. (87)

The 1980s, especially since 1985, however, has seen the PAC extend its diplomatic influence and increase its support base inside South Africa.

The PAC is thus clearly in the midst of a revival.

What needs to be assessed now is the potential of that revival and the following would seem to be essential in this regard:

1. High quality leadership.
2. The growth of Africanism in South Africa.
3. Increased international support.
4. An increase in insurgency and insurrection.
5. A reasonably high level of state repression.
6. Increased radicalisation of (especially) the black youth.
7. A perception that the ANC cannot end white minority rule.
8. Increased radicalisation in white reactionary politics.
9. The failure or perception of failure of negotiation politics.

The list is a formidable one but a close examination would reveal that all nine conditions already exist to a greater or lesser degree.

High quality leadership is necessary to inspire confidence in the organisation and to give clear direction to the strategies of the PAC. It would also suggest to the international community that the PAC should be taken seriously.

Organisational skills of a high standard would be necessary in order to: plan and execute insurgent campaigns; organise fund raising programmes; secure additional logistical support; and to mobilize and direct internal programmes. The days of "spontaneous mass action" ended with Poqo.

The growth of Africanism within South Africa and an increase in (mainly) financial support from the international community would be required before the PAC could realistically expect to maintain, let alone increase, its current rate of growth.

One of the key conditions the PAC must meet involves demonstrating - as visibly as possible - both the willingness and the ability to oppose the South African government.

The PAC would have to improve not only the quantity but the quality of its insurgency. It would also need to demonstrate the ability to organise and maintain acts of local insurrection with a far greater level of control than was evident in the case of Poqo.

The Poqo insurrections were not, as is often portrayed, merely



acts of mindless violence (88) but the lack of direction resulted in many missed opportunities. The PAC cannot afford to repeat the error.

The organisation has elevated the strategy of armed struggle to a principle position in its overall plan and its ability to maintain it effectively would have a direct bearing on the support it is able to attract.

A condition which lies largely beyond the control of the PAC is that related to the level of repression present in the country. The higher the level of repression, the more radical the townships (especially the youth) are likely to become and the PAC has always held a special appeal for the more radical elements. (89)

There is little doubt that the cycles of repression and radicalisation feed off each other and the faster the wheels turn the greater the PAC is likely to benefit - especially if the ANC proved unwilling or unable to absorb the new levels of radicalisation.

Directly related to this aspect is the success - or lack thereof - of ANC efforts to bring white minority rule closer to an end.

The ANC holds the political high ground in black politics in South Africa today - ground that the PAC has to erode from under the former's feet. And one of the most important means to achieve this end would be to exploit the apparent failure of the ANC to consolidate its position or make any significant impact on the South African government during the widespread insurrections of 1984 to 1986.

Another key element in the growth potential of the PAC calls for a continuing shift in white politics to the Right of the political spectrum. Based on South African government reactions to similar shifts in the past, this would bring both a slowdown in the government's "reform" measures and increased repression. Both reactions would further radicalise black opinion.

In addition a continuing shift to the Right of white opinion would first shrink and then isolate what remained of white liberalism. Such a development would erode the basis of the ANC's multiracial Charterist approach and underscore the Africanist/black consciousness contention that white liberalism was an unreliable ally.

The final necessary condition for further growth of the PAC is the failure - or perceived failure - of the politics of negotiation.

The PAC (and the black consciousness groupings) have historically rejected negotiation with the South African government while the ANC, despite propaganda to the contrary, continues to place considerable emphasis on the strategy. However, if the strategy continues to fail to produce concrete results then black opinion will inevitably harden against it in favour of armed resistance.

There would seem to be no point in attempting to talk when no-one was willing to listen.

The conditions outlined and discussed above are, in fact, all



interlinked and were separated merely to facilitate an explanation. The division of the conditions should be seen as artificial.

### 3.3. THE CURRENT SITUATION

The above list of necessary conditions for the continuing growth and development of the PAC comes with two assumptions of its own.

The first is that the broad ideological divisions in black South African politics will remain roughly where they are for some time to come and that no alternative "third force" will emerge.

Secondly it is assumed that the major exiled organisations will remain intact. While a split in either the PAC or ANC (or both) is always possible the likelihood of such a split(s) in the short to medium term appears remote.

Following on this is the assumption that a loss of support for the multiracial Charterist approach will benefit the Africanist/black consciousness bloc.

Present conditions in the black townships and black areas, the high level of repression, the lack of constitutional development towards a more equitable deal for the black population, and a general slow-down of the limited South African government reform measures make it unlikely at present that the exiled movements will lose support to the black political middle-ground.

It now remains to assess the extent to which the current situation meets the necessary conditions for further PAC growth.

The PAC's insurgency campaign, the extent of its domestic and international support, and the quality of its leadership have been dealt with in preceeding sections and need not be repeated here.

These aspects can be summarised as follows:

1. That the PAC has made significant strides in all four areas but that the organisation still trails behind the ANC.
2. That a potential for PAC expansion exists.
3. That the quality of its leadership has improved considerably and will be a decisive factor in its growth potential.

#### 3.3.1. PERCEPTIONS OF ANC FAILURE

There is no evidence to suggest that the ANC played any major role in sparking the insurrection of the Vaal Triangle in the spring of 1984. As the insurrection spread, however, the ANC's role increased.

The spate of treason, terrorism, and related Internal Security



Act trials during 1985 and 1986 provides sufficient evidence of this increasing role.

From January 1986 to February 1987 104 people were charged in terms of Section 29 (1) of the Internal Security Act which includes offences such as treason, terrorism, subversion, sedition, terrorist activities, as well as murder and arson. (90)

A further 399 people faced charges under the Internal Security Act but relating to less serious offences such as public violence, intimidation, further the aims of banned organisations, and possession of banned literature. (91)

The ANC was specifically mentioned during evidence in many of these trials. (92)

But even more important than the facts of the ANC's role in the widespread insurrections of September 1984 to mid 1986 was the perception, both internally and internationally, that the ANC was leading the revolt.

Thus when the insurrections failed, the ANC was left to accept most of the blame.

The ANC's strategy during 1984 to 1986 failed mainly because it underestimated the strength of Pretoria's security force network. (93) In addition the ANC did not have internal organisational mechanisms of sufficient strength or skill to guide effectively the insurrections. (94)

These shortcomings did not go unnoticed, especially after the State crackdown which followed the June 1986 state of emergency effectively ended the revolt.

It brought those who had believed the government was about to fold back to reality with a jolt and left them nursing bruised expectations.

In such a climate it was perhaps inevitable that the ANC would be blamed - at least in part - for the failure.

There is no evidence to suggest that the ANC's "failure to deliver" has as yet resulted in widespread disillusionment with the organisation, but the seed had been sown and there is no guarantee that it will not bloom at some future date.

While the ANC maintains its dominant position in black politics in South Africa, the failure of the insurrections may have made that support more brittle. (95)

The ANC has experienced similar problems in its 76 year history but the events of the past four years have shown unprecedented levels of frustration, anger, and radicalisation among a vast section of the black population.

The ANC thus cannot afford to "fail" indefinitely without losing at least some of its support and the organisation may soon find the fact that it can boast a 76 year history becomes a problem rather than a rallying point.

### 3.3.2. REPRESSION AND RADICALISATION

Even a cursory glance at the history of black politics in South Africa since the banning of the ANC and PAC in 1960 will reveal a



close historical relationship between repression and radicalisation.

The one always follows the other, even if it takes some time, with the ultimate result that both the radicalisation of black opinion and actions and the level of state repression continue to reach new heights.

The relationship between the two concepts has continued to follow the pattern throughout the current crisis which, for the sake of a cut-off, point will be deemed to have begun on 3 September 1984.

A breakdown of insurgency activity shows that there were 44 reported incidents of insurgency during 1984. (96)

Following the insurrections of 1984 and 1985 and the first state of emergency which was proclaimed in the latter year, incidents of insurgency increased by over 100% to stand at 96 for the 12 month period ending December 1985. (97)

The continuing insurrections and the new peak in insurgency levels resulted in further repressive measures contained in the 12 June 1986 proclamation of a new state of emergency.

By the end of that year the state of emergency provisions and a massive state crackdown had all but ended the insurrections but the level of insurgency doubled again to a total of 203 incidents recorded by the end of 1986. (98)

There was a slight decline during 1987 but 1988 saw the emergence of a far more radical insurgency campaign with a dramatic increase in attacks on so-called "soft" or civilian targets. (99)

The current year has also seen a significant rise in the level of State repression with a spate of restrictions on black extra-parliamentary political organisations and trade unions and the detention or silencing of the organisations' leaderships.

By September 1988 detention monitoring groups were reporting an increase in the number of political detainees and added that over 1 000 activists and trade union leaders were known to be in detention. (100)

The last few months have also witnessed an increase in insurrectionary activity (although its extent is unknown due to restrictions on the reporting of such activity by the media).

There is no doubting the dramatic increase in insurgency activity, however, and incidents are now being reported on an almost daily basis. For the first 26 days of September a total of 21 incidents were reported, the highest figure for a single month since the ANC and PAC were banned in 1960. (101)

The contention that the increased levels of insurgency, insurrection and repression are more closely related to the October 1988 municipal elections than to each other is of academic importance only.

Firstly, the increased level of insurgency will bring greater repression and thus feed the cycle anyway, and secondly, the elections themselves are widely regarded as perpetuating a repressive system.

But whatever the underlying reasons the ultimate result will be the same - to push the repression/radicalisation cycle another



notch up the scale. .

And the higher up the scale the cycle moves, the greater the likely benefit to the PAC. There already exists some evidence to support the contention that the post-1984 levels of black radicalisation are causing tensions in the ANC.

Unless the ANC is able to absorb the new levels of radicalisation - and the new phase in its insurgency campaign is evidence of its attempt to do so - it faces the very real danger of losing touch with its constituency and creating a gap the PAC may be able to fill.

As early as 1986 the first signs of strain in the ANC began to show as the organisation attempted to absorb the new influx of increasingly radical recruits. (102)

Brutalised by events in South Africa's townships the young radicals began to demand increased military action against their white oppressors on an ever widening front.

And as the black political environment becomes more radicalised so those demands will increase.

To date the ANC has succeeded in not only absorbing but largely containing the radicalisation but at some cost to its political programme. The ANC has, however, provided no indication of deviating from its policy of subordinating the armed struggle to its political programme. (103)

It is equally evident, however, that containing the young radicals is placing the organisation under increasing strain and may have resulted in at least some of its insurgents ignoring ANC policy directives.

If Umkhonto we Sizwe operatives continue to ignore policy for any length of time beyond the October elections (until then the ANC leadership seems unlikely to take a firm stand) then the military wing's leadership, including its Chief-of-Staff and rising young star, Chris Hani, may be called to account.

Disciplinary action against Umkhonto we Sizwe insurgents who ignore policy cannot be ruled out. The ANC will not allow the tail to wag the dog indefinitely before it bites it off.

The recent public reprimand of Umkhonto we Sizwe (104) indicated that the ANC has no intention of sacrificing political influence to satisfy the demands of the young radicals for increased (and indiscriminate) acts of insurgency against whites in general.

While this root cause of strain (and tension) within the ANC is likely to increase in the short to medium term it is improbable that it will result in any dramatic alterations in the organisation's policies. In addition the quality of the ANC leadership (including Mandela); the proven loyalty of the National Executive Committee (NEC) members - including Hani and his major NEC ally Steve Tshwete; as well as its long history mitigate against a serious split in the ANC. That leaves only one possible result.

It is not beyond the bounds of possibility that the ANC will choose to occupy the middle-ground in black politics - there are many who would say it already does - and in so doing sacrifice the support of the more radical elements, even at the



cost this might entail.

By leaving the PAC to absorb this radical element the ANC would be running the risk of altering the balance of power between the two liberation movements, but it seems to be a risk the organisation is willing to take.

Provided the PAC proved equal to the task the development will strengthen the organisation. The only real imponderable is to what degree?

### 3.3.3. NEGOTIATION AND WHITE POLITICS

The current swing in white politics to the Right of the political spectrum and the decreasing likelihood of direct negotiations between the South African government and the ANC are two further elements which add momentum to the growth of the PAC.

The form of the relationship is an indirect one and derives from the premise that a shift to the Right by whites and the failure of negotiation politics will promote the further radicalisation of black opinion.

There is substantial evidence to support the proposition that white opinion has shifted to the Right since the start of the latest insurrection in 1984.

In the 1987 General Election, for example, the ruling National Party's share of the vote declined by 3.5% while the Rightwing share increased from 15% in 1981 to over 30% in 1987. (105)

The detractors who claim that the size of the increase was distorted by the fact that the Conservative Party (CP) came into existence only in 1982 are misguided. Comparing the support attracted by the Herstigte Nasionale Party in 1981 to that of the CP in 1987 is not comparing an orange with an apple. It is comparing a green apple to one which was just beginning to ripen.

Those who claim that the swing to the white Right has been exaggerated have yet to offer a satisfactory explanation for how a "liberal" Official Opposition came to be replaced by an ultra-conservative one.

The election results are not the only evidence to support the proposition that the white electorate is drifting to the Right.

A series of surveys conducted by the South African Institute of International Affairs over six years at two-year intervals show the shift quite clearly. (The survey was confined to whites.)

Consider the answers to the question: "Blacks should serve with whites, coloureds and Indians in the same Parliament".

In 1982 (the first year of the survey) 61% replied in the affirmative; in 1984 74% concurred; in 1986 68% and by 1988 it was down to 60%. (106)

The trend to the Right was evident on issues such as the Group Areas Act where in 1988 some 60% wanted the Act retained. (107)

A recent survey conducted for the Afrikaans Sunday newspaper Rapport (August 1988) showed a similar shift away from the white political centre to the Rightwing parties. (108)



It was thus hardly suprising that the SALLA surveys found a steadily declining level of support for direct South African government negotiations with the ANC - down from 41% in 1986 to 36% two years later. (109)

The South African government - its domestic power base under threat as never before in its 40-year history - seems unlikely to ignore the danger signals from its white constituency and proceed with substantial reform measures and even less likely to take a bolder approach on the issue of negotiating with the ANC.

The ultimate result will be the further radicalisation of black opinion (and consequently its actions too) and lend increasing weight to the Africanist/black consciousness contention that the vested interests of whites prevented them playing any meaningful role in the liberation struggle.

And the longer the shift to the Right continues the closer South Africa will move to a situation of almost total polarisation.

The George Orwell slogan from his book "Animal Farm" which proclaimed: "Four legs good, two legs bad" could soon find a local counterpart "Black good, white bad" with no attempt to distinguish any further.

Under such conditions the PAC will hold considerably more appeal to the radicalised youth than the ANC could provide.

#### 3.4. WHERE TO FROM HERE FOR THE PAC ?

The preceeding sections have hopefully provided some insight into:

1. the ideal conditions under which the PAC would increase its influence and support both inside South Africa and externally, and
2. the extent to which prevailing conditions in the broad domestic political environment approximate to the ideal.

The leadership of the PAC is the core around which all else will rotate. Only an effective and united leadership would be able to take advantage of the opportunities which will present themselves in the near future.

If events in South Africa continue along approximately the same path for the next few years as they have followed the previous four, then the ever increasing levels of black radicalisation could well result in a situation where the ANC is regarded as too moderate by many in its present constituency.

It would then be up to the PAC to take maximum advantage of the situation and improve its own position - and once again the question of leadership becomes crucial.

While the quality of the organisation's leadership has certainly improved in recent years, some problems continue to exist.



The 1987 upheaval in the PAC's Central Committee which resulted in the dismissal of CC members Ike Mafole (Secretary for Education) and Mike Muendane (Secretary for Labour) and prompted the resignation of UK Representative Vusi Nomodolo, raised the old spectre of division and infighting. (110)

While the PAC seemed able - for the first time since the early 1960s - to deal with a disagreement at CC level without falling apart, it was precisely the kind of incident the organisation cannot afford to repeat too often. Memories of the bitter divisions of the 1970s are still too fresh in too many minds.

The leadership question is crucial because despite the fact that the PAC may be moving into the most favourable period of its history since the early 1960s, it still faces many obstacles.

And heading the list of obstacles is its old rival, the ANC. The ANC has gained an impressive head start and even under the most favourable conditions the PAC will be hard-pressed to close the gap enough to become a serious threat to the ANC's position.

The established structures and organisational mechanisms of the ANC, its long history and the sheer size of its support base place substantial restraints on the PAC's growth potential.

While the PAC could gather a significant number of radicals under its wing, and even assuming it can mobilise this support to maximum effect, it may not have enough time to develop to the point where it could mount a serious challenge to the ANC.

While conditions are currently shifting in its favour and are likely to remain so for the next two to three years, the period beyond that is an imponderable.

The favourable circumstances the PAC finds itself in at the moment are based to a significant degree on two variables. Firstly, that the black political environment is becoming increasingly radical, and secondly, that the failure of the ANC to take full advantage of the favourable conditions - especially between 1984 and 1986 - is causing increasing impatience among elements of its constituency.

Both those variables could alter virtually overnight and pull the rug from under the PAC's feet. While such developments are unlikely they cannot be ruled out.

Thus the PAC would be advised to concentrate its efforts on short term objectives. While the PAC may be tempted by the favourable prevailing conditions to make a serious bid to replace the ANC as the major liberation movement, it would seem to be an ill advised gamble which may demand more resources than the PAC could muster.

A less ambitious but more attainable objective would be for the PAC to concentrate its efforts and resources on improving its bargaining position and then push for unity with the ANC while the latter organisation was at its weakest and the PAC at its strongest.

In this way the PAC may be able to force some concessions from the ANC. Such a strategy would also take advantage of the pressure - notably from Nigeria and Zimbabwe - which currently exists within the OAU for the unification of the two liberation movements. (111)



The OAU could resort to arm-twisting if it was forced to do so and in the not too distant future the ANC - faced with a steady increase in PAC growth and African pressure for unity - may be forced to accept.

Admittedly unity between the two major liberation movements - if it occurs at all - is likely to involve a far more complex procedure than that briefly outlined above.

But it never-the-less seems to represent the most viable option open to the PAC at present. Although all indications are that Africanism in South Africa will emerge after the next few years with more influence and support than at any time in its history, it may not be enough to swing the balance of power between the liberation movements to the point where it favours the PAC.

There would seem to be little point in the PAC attempting an exhausting climb to the peak of a mountain only to find on reaching the summit that ANC has been sitting there for 25 years.

The logical course would be to attempt to force the ANC to meet them halfway.



- a Study of the Social, Racial and Political Attitudes of Some Middle-class Africans, SA Institute of Race Relations: Johannesburg. 1963. pp. 58 - 61.
26. ibid., p. 5.
  27. ibid., pp. 58 - 61.
  28. ibid., pp. 61 - 62.
  29. ibid., pp. 61 - 63.
  30. See Lodge, Black Politics, Chapter 12 for a detailed account.
  31. Potlake Leballo was chairman of the PAC's Central Committee and its Acting-President from 1962 until 1979.
  32. Davies, et al. The Struggle for South Africa. pp. 300 - 301.
  33. Karis, T. and Carter, G. H. (eds), From Protest to Challenge - Vol 4 (Political Profiles), Hoover Institution Press: Stanford. 1977. p. 129.
  34. Africa Research Bulletin Vol 22. (15.8.1985).
  35. Weekly Mail. 16.5.1986.
  36. The Sowetan. 7.1.1986.
  37. The Zimbabwe Herald. 6.1.1986. (Hereafter called The Herald).
  38. At the time of writing 19 men accused of treason and other charges in the so-called "Delmas Treason Trial" are awaiting judgment. Three of the accused, "Terror" Lekota, Popo Molefe and Moss Chikane, were senior UDF officials at the time of the Vaal uprisings in September 1984 to which the charges relate.
  39. The Citizen. 12.4.1986.
  40. The Star. 12.4.1986.
  41. The Botswana Gazette. 20.1.1986.
  42. Africa News Summary Vol 27. No. 6. (September 1986).
  43. Race Relations Survey - Part 1 1986. SAIRR/Blackshaws: Cape Town. 1987. p. 167.
  44. Race Relations Survey - Part 2 1986. SAIRR/Blackshaws: Cape Town. 1987. p. 530.
  45. Molepe was the officer commanding a Bophuthatswana riot unit which opened fire on a crowd of demonstrators at Winterveld on 26 March 1986 killing 26 people.
  46. The Herald. 16.9.1986.
  47. The Star. 28.2.1987.
  48. The Star. 28.2.1987.
  49. Business Day. 22.4.1987.
  50. The Citizen. 1.6.1988.
  51. The Citizen. 1.6.1988.
  52. Qibla is an Islamic fundamentalist organisation which began to operate in South Africa during the early 1960s. Originally active in some Western Cape townships Qibla has all but disappeared in recent years. While the links between Qibla and the PAC predate the post-colonial rise of Islamic fundamentalism in North Africa and the Middle East, both organisations now count Libya, Iran and Syria as common backers.
  53. The Sowetan. 9.2.1988.
  54. The Star. 25.7.1988.
  55. Human Rights Update. Centre for Applied Legal Studies, University of the Witwatersrand. April 1988. pp. 30 - 34.
  56. Figures released in Parliament by the Minister of Law and



Order on 2 September 1987 and reported in The Citizen of 3.9.1987.

57. Figures quoted in Parliament by the Minister of Law and Order and reported in The Citizen of 1.6.1988.

58. See "Select Indicators of Political Violence" in Indicator S.A. Vol. 5. No. 2. pp. 20 - 21.

59. City Press. 25.10.1987.

60. The Herald. 6.1.1986.

61. The Botswana Gazette. 20.1.1986.

62. The Sowetan. 29.7.1986.

63. The Sowetan. 14.11.1986.

64. The Sowetan. 14.11.1986.

65. The Sowetan. 12.11.1987.

66. The Sowetan. 9.3.1987.

67. The Herald. 20.2.1987.

68. See Attwell, H. South Africa: Background to the Crisis, Sidgwick and Jackson: London. 1986. pp. 134 - 135.

69. ibid., p. 135.

70. Motlhabi, Black Resistance, p. 115.

71. The use of the terminology "black consciousness groups" is designed to avoid the confusion which may arise if the terminology "black consciousness movement" was used instead. The Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) is a specific organisation and operates from exile in Harare, Zimbabwe.

72. Motlhabi, Black Resistance, pp. 139 - 140.

73. ibid., p. 116.

74. ibid., p. 137.

75. ibid., p. 120.

76. For example The Azanian Manifesto lists as principles: non-racialism; non-collaboration; opposition to alliances with the ruling class (whites). Africanism adopted precisely the same principles some 24 years earlier. The Azanian Manifesto was banned by proclamation in the Government Gazette of 9 October 1987. Most of the major black consciousness organisations - ie the Azanian Peoples' Organisation (AZAPO), the Azanian Students' Movement (AZASM), had adopted The Azanian Manifesto prior to its banning.

77. The Star. 12.9.1987.

78. The Sowetan. 9.10.1986.

79. The Sowetan. 21.1.1988.

80. The Sowetan. 21.1.1988.

81. The Sowetan. 24.3.1988.

82. NACTU met the PAC in September 1987 (see The Sowetan 4.9.1987) and the ANC in May 1988 (see The Herald 5.5.1988).

83. See Africa Confidential Vol. 28. No. 5. (4.3.1987).

84. ibid.

85. The New Nation. 1.9.1988.

86. Lodge, Black Politics, pp. 244 - 245.

87. The Star. 28.2.1987.

88. See the paper by Lodge titled The Paarl Insurrection presented at an African Studies Seminar, University of the Witwatersrand 1979, especially pp. 17 - 18.

89. See Brett, African Attitudes, pp. 61 - 62, and Davies, et



- al, The Struggle for South Africa, pp. 299 - 300, also Molthabi, Black Resistance, p. 153 for further details of this aspect.
90. Race Relations Survey 1986 Part 2 p. 878.
91. ibid., pp. 880 - 883.
92. ibid., pp. 878 - 883.
93. Africa Confidential Vol. 29. No. 5. (4.3.1988).
94. Africa Confidential Vol. 27. No. 25. (10.12.1986).
95. ibid.
96. See Indicator SA Vol. 5 No. 2 (Summer 1988) p. 21
97. ibid., p. 21
98. ibid., p. 21
99. The Sunday Star 21.8.88
100. The Star 24.9.88
101. The Star 26.9.88
102. Africa Confidential Vol 27. No. 25. (10.12.86).
103. The Sunday Star 21.8.88
104. The Star 17.8.88
105. See the article titled: Considering the swing to the Right - some thoughts on the 1987 election result by Kotze, H. and Lourens, E. in Van Vuuren, D.J. et al. (eds) South African Election 1987, Owen Burgess Publishers: Pinetown. 1987. p. 366.
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107. ibid., p. 34
108. Market and Opinion Surveys Survey No. 1/88. Commissioned by Rapport. Presented August 1988. pp. 2 - 4.
109. Du Pisani, What do we Think? p. 31.
110. Work in Progress No. 47. April 1987.
111. The Cape Times 23.5.88. (Nigeria and Zimbabwe are particularly significant. The former is the major financial contributor to the OAU Liberation Committee from which both the PAC and ANC draw considerable support and the latter currently holds the chairmanship of the OAU.



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The Sowetan.  
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Beeld.  
The Star.



## APPENDIX

The PAC's Central Committee and Foreign Representatives. (CC denotes Central Committee member).

✓ Zephania Mothopeng	PRESIDENT (CC*)
✓ Johnson Mlambo	CHAIRMAN (CC) COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF APLA
✓ Ahmed Gora Ebrahim	SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (CC)
✓ Leswane Samuel Makhandu	CHIEF REPRESENTATIVE - UN (CC)
✓ Joe Mkhwanazi	ADMINISTRATIVE SECRETARY (CC)
✓ Keke Nkula	DEPUTY ADMINISTRATIVE SECRETARY (CC)
✓ Edwin Makoti	SECRETARY FOR INFORMATION AND PUBLICITY (CC)
Joe Moabi	SECRETARY FOR FINANCE (CC)
✓ Mfanasekhaya Gqobose	SECRETARY FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS (CC)
✓ Nomvo Boyi	SECRETARY FOR SOCIAL WELFARE (CC)
✓ Sabelo Victor Phama	SECRETARY FOR DEFENCE (CC)
Waters Thobotho	CHIEF REPRESENTATIVE - ZIMBABWE (CC)
Maxwell Nemadznhanani	CHIEF REPRESENTATIVE - SOUTH PACIFIC
✓ Thobile Gola	CHIEF REPRESENTATIVE - TANZANIA (CC)
Hamilton Keke	CHIEF REPRESENTATIVE - MIDDLE EAST (CC)
Boyi Jordaan	CHIEF REPRESENTATIVE - NIGERIA
Ray Johnson	CHIEF REPRESENTATIVE - GHANA
✓ Lawrence Mgweba	MEMBER CC
Morgan Mgidini	MEMBER CC

PAC HEADQUARTERS: TANZANIA.

\*Zeph Mothopeng is currently serving a term of life imprisonment in South Africa after he was convicted of treason in 1977.