



# **FUEL FOR APARTHEID**

**OIL SUPPLIES TO SOUTH AFRICA**



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**SHIPPING RESEARCH BUREAU**

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GmB 034/0229/5

# **FUEL FOR APARTHEID**

## **OIL SUPPLIES TO SOUTH AFRICA**

**Shipping Research Bureau  
Amsterdam**

**September 1990**

The Shipping Research Bureau is a non-profit research  
organisation established in 1980 by  
the Holland Committee on Southern Africa and  
the Working Group Kairos

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The Shipping Research Bureau continues to welcome all relevant information concerning oil deliveries or suspected oil deliveries to South Africa, whether this is provided openly or on a confidential basis.

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## Summary

### 1987-1988

1. The Shipping Research Bureau identified **193 tankers** each capable of carrying a cargo of over 50,000 tons of crude oil, which called at South African ports during 1987 and 1988.

**66** of these tankers apparently **delivered oil** to South Africa.

The total cargo capacity of the 66 tankers is about **15.8 million tons**, equivalent to nearly 60 per cent of South Africa's estimated crude oil import needs over the two-year period.

2. The *oil-trading companies* most deeply involved in the secret oil trade with South Africa during 1987-1988 appear to be:

<b>MARC RICH</b>	(Switzerland)
<b>AFRICAN MIDDLE EAST</b>	
<b>PETROLEUM COMPANY</b>	(Monaco/Switzerland)

Featuring prominently among the *shipping companies* are:

<b>WORLD-WIDE SHIPPING</b>	(Hong Kong)	27 deliveries
<b>C.M. LEMOS</b>	(Greece/U.K.)	8 deliveries
<b>BERGESEN</b>	(Norway)	6 deliveries
<b>LIVANOS/CARRAS GROUP</b>	(Greece/U.K.)	6 deliveries
<b>HADJIPATERAS GROUP</b>	(Greece/U.K.)	4 deliveries
<b>SEAAARLAND SHIPPING</b>		
<b>MANAGEMENT</b>	(Austria)	4 deliveries

3. **Norwegian shipping companies** have ceased transporting crude oil to South Africa since 20 July 1987 when the Norwegian law prohibiting crude oil transports to South Africa came into effect.

Shipping companies based in **Greece**, the **United Kingdom** and, in particular, the **Hong Kong-based World-Wide Shipping Group** have filled the gap left by the Norwegian tankers.

Among the other nations whose companies and flags are extensively involved in oil deliveries to South Africa are **Liberia**, **Switzerland**, **Monaco** and **Cyprus**.

4. In **63** of the 66 cases, a tanker sailed to South Africa from the **Middle East**. Of these deliveries, 55 were from the *Persian Gulf*, namely:

- 30 from the **United Arab Emirates**
- 9 from **Qatar**
- 8 from **Oman**
- 7 from **Iran**
- 6 from **Saudi Arabia**

Eight tankers sailed from the *Red Sea*:

- 8 from **Egypt**
- 1 from **Saudi Arabia**

(Figures include multi-porting in different countries.)

The other three tankers sailed to South Africa from *France*, *Malaysia* and the *U.S.S.R.*

### 1989-1990

5. Preliminary research revealed 28 crude oil deliveries to South Africa in 1989 and early 1990. The cargo capacity of the tankers, **6.3 million tons**, represents some 36 per cent of South Africa's estimated import needs during the period.

6. The *oil-trading companies* included:

<b>AFRICAN MIDDLE EAST</b>	
<b>PETROLEUM COMPANY</b>	(Monaco/Switzerland)
<b>MARIMPEX</b>	(F.R. Germany)

Among the *shipping companies*, the **Hong Kong-based World-Wide Shipping Group** (12 deliveries) and a number of shipping groups in **Greece/U.K.** (10 deliveries) and **Austria** (4 deliveries) continued their involvement.

7. All 28 tankers sailed to South Africa from the **Middle East**, namely:

- 12 from the **United Arab Emirates**
- 7 from **Egypt**
- 3 from **Oman**

(Figures include multi-porting in different countries.)

### Refined Petroleum Products to South Africa

8. Since mid-1989, a relatively large number of vessels have been identified as suppliers of **refined oil products** to South Africa. Fires at the South African SASOL oil-from-coal plants, which considerably reduced the indigenous production of synthetic fuel, may partly explain the increase in imports.

9. The trans-shipment port of **Amsterdam, The Netherlands**, has emerged as a major channel for petroleum product deliveries to South Africa. The shipments are mainly by combined carriers of 70,000 tons deadweight and over. *Nine* vessels have sailed to South Africa from Amsterdam since May 1989.



10. The main supplier of petroleum products to South Africa is the oil-trading company **Marc Rich** (Switzerland).

**Leif Høegh & Co.** and other Norwegian shipping companies play a major role in this recent surge in shipments of refined products. The Norwegian ban of July 1987 does not cover the transport of refined products.

### Secrecy, False Destinations and Forged Documents

11. Oil and shipping companies are prepared to go to great lengths to conceal oil deliveries to South Africa. Deliveries are obscured by *confidential charter-parties, false destinations* and *forged documents*.

Since 1987, virtually all calls of vessels delivering oil to South Africa have been kept secret. In the few remaining cases there were only vague reports indicating that a call had been made. *None* of the tankers reported their actual destination on departure from the oil-exporting countries.

In a number of cases, the Shipping Research Bureau has evidence of **forged documents** being used to conceal an oil delivery.

### Costs of the Oil Embargo

12. The present voluntary oil embargo has had severe financial effects on South Africa. The 'pariah cost' which the country has to pay for its crude oil imports is considerable. Between January 1979 and January 1990, over and above its crude oil bill of about US \$ 29,000 million, South Africa has had to spend **at least US \$ 25,000 million** to overcome the direct and indirect effects of the oil embargo.

### Recent Trends in Oil Supplies to South Africa

13. Since Norwegian companies ended their involvement in crude oil transports to South Africa in 1987, *shipping companies* based in **Greece**, the **United Kingdom**, **Austria**, and, in particular, **Hong Kong** have taken over these transports.

**Norwegian** shipping companies are increasingly active in deliveries of refined petroleum products to South Africa.

14. The *oil-trading companies* **Marc Rich** and **Marimpex** have continued their involvement in oil supplies to South Africa. Since 1988, the company **African Middle East** emerged as the

last-known owner of at least 15 oil cargoes delivered to South Africa from Egypt.

15. The number of *oil-exporting countries* from which tankers sailed to South Africa remained fairly stable. No ships have been identified as sailing to South Africa from *Brunei* since late 1986. On the other hand, a considerable number of tankers were identified as sailing to South Africa from **Egypt** since 1988.

Increasing numbers of tankers were found to be sailing from the **United Arab Emirates**, which now tops the list with 90 shipments identified since January 1979. With 79 deliveries, **Saudi Arabia** now ranks second after the United Arab Emirates. The number of tankers sailing to South Africa from **Oman**, **Iran**, and **Qatar** remained fairly high.

All the above mentioned countries have repeatedly endorsed the oil embargo against South Africa. However, the massive violations of their embargo policies suggest serious deficiencies in their procedures for monitoring possible oil deliveries to South Africa.

### Making the Oil Embargo More Effective

16. *A further tightening of the oil embargo is feasible.* The crude oil shipped to South Africa originates in a limited number of countries. If **oil-exporting countries** like the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Iran, Qatar and Egypt were to observe and enforce their embargo policies, and penalise companies which violate them, the flow of oil to South Africa could be significantly curtailed.

**Oil embargo legislation by shipping nations** like Hong Kong, Greece, the United Kingdom, Austria and Liberia, could considerably limit the transport capacity available for crude oil deliveries to South Africa.

The Norwegian transport ban should be extended to apply to refined products.

Embargo legislation by countries in which **oil traders** are based, like Switzerland, the Federal Republic of Germany and Monaco, could disrupt the oil procurement systems which the South African government has set up with a number of these traders. The **monitoring** of oil deliveries to South Africa has proved feasible despite the secrecy surrounding such deliveries.

17. In various reports, the *United Nations Intergovernmental Group to Monitor the Supply and Shipping of Oil and Petroleum Products to South Africa* has made a number of important suggestions to improve the embargo.



## Introduction

Since early 1990, there have been some unprecedented developments towards dismantling the apartheid system and the creation of democratic institutions in South Africa.

Mr F.W. de Klerk's statement on 2 February 1990 and the long-awaited release of Mr Nelson Mandela have removed some abiding impediments to negotiations between the minority government and the majority of South Africans.

The combined pressure from within and outside South Africa has been an important stimulus to these developments.

*Sanctions* applied by the international community continue to play an important role. The effect of economic sanctions has been to increase the cost of maintaining apartheid. The financial burden placed upon the South African economy by the *oil embargo* alone is estimated at some US \$ 2,300 million on average annually.

*"To lift sanctions now would be to run the risk of aborting the process towards the complete eradication of apartheid", as was pointed out by Mr Mandela in his first public speech since his release from prison.*<sup>1</sup>

In the same vein, the Chairman of the United Nations Intergovernmental Group to Monitor the Supply and Shipping of Oil and Petroleum Products to South Africa, H.E. Mr Anthony Nyakyi, has called the oil embargo *"one of the factors which have propelled Mr. de Klerk to the negotiating table. Therefore, if the international community can maintain the same level of effective pressure on Pretoria, there is a good chance of keeping him there until a democratic and just settlement is achieved"*.<sup>2</sup>

At the moment of writing this sixth main report of the Shipping Research Bureau on violations of the oil embargo, apartheid is still a reality. Until definitive steps have been taken to safeguard an irreversible change in South Africa, a strictly enforced and properly monitored international oil embargo will continue to have a function.

## Research Findings 1987-1988

### 193 calls at South African ports identified

The Shipping Research Bureau has identified a total of 193 ships, each capable of carrying an oil cargo of 50,000 tons or more, which called at South African ports<sup>1</sup> in 1987 and 1988.<sup>2</sup> All ships are listed in Appendix I, Table F.

### 66 apparent oil deliveries

Based on the evidence at the Bureau's disposal, 66 of the ships apparently delivered oil to South Africa (for full details, see Appendix I, Table A). With regard to the remaining 127 ships, the Shipping Research Bureau either has positive evidence that they did *not* deliver oil to South Africa, or has insufficient evidence to warrant an allegation. This chapter focusses on further analysis of the 66 ships which apparently delivered oil to South Africa. For details regarding the Bureau's research methodology, see Appendix II.

### Further details regarding some of the 66 tankers

Several tankers appear to have been engaged in a 'shuttle' trade to South Africa during the period under consideration. The prime example is the tanker *World Progress*, accounting for *seven* of the deliveries identified. In fact, 27 deliveries were made by just *six* different tankers:

WORLD PROGRESS	(World-Wide – Hong Kong)	7 deliveries
WORLD RENOWN	(World-Wide – Hong Kong)	4 deliveries
ETHNIC	(C.M. Lemos – Greece/U.K.)	4 deliveries
PATRIOTIC	(C.M. Lemos – Greece/U.K.)	4 deliveries
ALKI	(Seaarland – Austria)	4 deliveries
LOUISIANA	(Hadjipateras – Greece/U.K.)	4 deliveries

### 15.8 million tons of oil

The total capacity of the 66 tankers which apparently delivered crude oil to South Africa was about *15.8 million tons*.

The cargo capacity of the 36 tankers which delivered oil in 1987 was about *9.0 million tons*. The cargo capacity of the 30 tankers which delivered oil in 1988 was about *6.9 million tons*.

South Africa has to import an estimated 14 million tons of crude oil per year. On the basis of this estimate, the volume identified would constitute some 56 per cent of the country's crude oil imports in 1987-1988.<sup>3</sup>

### The oil companies involved

In almost all cases (65 out of 66), oil companies used tankers chartered from independent tanker owners. They usually demanded that a confidentiality-clause be included in the

Table 1 The oil companies apparently owning the oil cargoes on board the 66 tankers

oil company	principal country or countries in which the oil company is based	number of deliveries	volume of cargo (million tons)
AFRICAN MIDDLE EAST	Monaco/Switzerland	8	1.9
MARC RICH	Switzerland	7	1.6
MARIMPEX	Fed. Rep. Germany	2	0.6
INTERCONTINENTAL TRANSPORTATION CORP.	Cayman Islands	2	0.5
TRANSWORLD OIL	Netherlands/Bermuda	1	0.3
EURAVIA	Switzerland	1*	0.2
MARK WOLMAN	United Kingdom	1*	0.2
KUO INTERNATIONAL	Hong Kong	1	0.1
unknown companies		45	10.9
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>66</b>	<b>15.8</b>

\* These companies were involved in a chain of owners together with Marc Rich.

1. This number does not include ships which were only serviced off coast by launch or helicopter while passing South Africa.  
2. Two calls at South Africa in November/December 1986, which have recently been identified, have been included.  
3. Estimates of South Africa's crude import needs tend to range between 10 and 15 million tons per year. Depending on the assumed level of imports, the volume identified could either constitute a considerably

higher percentage (nearly 80% at a level of 10m tons per year), or a somewhat lower proportion (about 53% at an import level of 15m tons). In all calculations, we assume that the *stockpile of oil* is kept at a constant level. In fact, of course, South Africa's oil imports may vary considerably from year to year, depending on the use of the strategic stockpile (cf. Shipping Research Bureau, *Oil to South Africa. Apartheid's Friends and Partners*, Amsterdam 1988, pp. 1 and 4).



charter-party to protect their identity. In 21 cases, the Shipping Research Bureau has been able to identify the *owner (or owners) of the oil cargo* delivered to South Africa. The oil companies are listed in Table 1 (for details, see Appendix I, Table B).

**The identity of the shipping companies**

Table 2 lists the shipping companies which were the apparent beneficial owners of the 66 tankers which delivered oil to South Africa (for a complete overview, see Appendix I, Table C).

**The nationalities of the oil and shipping companies**

Table D, Appendix I, gives a detailed overview of all countries in which oil and shipping companies involved in the 66 oil deliveries are based, as well as the countries whose flags the 66 tankers flew when calling at South African ports.

In the beginning of the two-year period 1987-1988, tankers owned and managed by **Norwegian** shipping companies, which for many years topped the list of oil transporters to South Africa, still accounted for a major part of South Africa's crude oil imports. Eight deliveries made by Norwegian tankers between March and June 1987 may have covered as much as *44 per cent*

of these imports during that period. This massive involvement came to an end in July 1987 when the Norwegian ban on transports of crude oil to South Africa came into effect.<sup>4</sup>

Shipping companies based in the **United Kingdom** and **Greece**, and especially one company in **Hong Kong**, appear to have filled the gap created by the discontinuation of crude oil transports to South Africa by Norwegian tankers. These companies are thus profiting from the legal bans on such transports imposed by shipping nations whose companies used to be heavily involved in oil transports to South Africa.<sup>5</sup>

Countries whose companies and/or flags were linked with a considerable number of deliveries are:<sup>6</sup>

LIBERIA	33 cases
HONG KONG	30 cases
UNITED KINGDOM	24 cases
GREECE	20 cases
SWITZERLAND	14 cases
NORWAY	11 cases
MONACO	8 cases

Table 2 The shipping companies which were the apparent beneficial owners of the 66 tankers

shipping company	principal country/countries in which the company is based	number of cases
WORLD-WIDE SHIPPING GROUP	Hong Kong	27
C.M. LEMOS	Greece/United Kingdom	8
BERGESEN D.Y. A/S & GENERAL ORE INTERNATIONAL CORP.	Norway/Liechtenstein	6
G.P. LIVANOS/CARRAS GROUP	Greece/United Kingdom	6
HADJIPATERAS GROUP	Greece/United Kingdom	4
SEAARLAND SHIPPING MANAGEMENT	Austria	4
CANADIAN PACIFIC	Canada	2
KULUKUNDIS GROUP	Greece/United Kingdom	2
COMPAGNIE GENERALE MARITIME ET FINANCIERE	France	1
JOHN FREDRIKSEN GROUP	Norway/Cyprus	1
SIGURD HERLOFSON & B.& H. SHIPPING ASSOCIATES	Norway/Bahamas/U.S.A.	1
MARIMPEX	Fed. Rep. Germany	1
MOSVOLD SHIPPING CO.	Norway	1
A/S OCEAN	Norway	1
ANDREAS UGLAND	Norway	1
TOTAL		66

4. The Norwegian ban does not cover the transport of *refined petroleum products* to South Africa. Several Norwegian companies make ample use of this loophole (see pp. 11ff).

5. In 1986, *Danish* tankers were banned from carrying crude oil and refined products to South Africa. See Shipping Research Bureau, *South*

*Africa's Lifeline. Violations of the Oil Embargo*, Amsterdam 1986, p. 42.

6. The cases in which only the *registered owner* of a tanker was based in a particular country are not included here. The total of the cases shown is greater than 66 because for a given tanker the country of the owner, of the manager and of the flag may all be different.



## BERGE ENTERPRISE: Misleading information and documentation to cover up a secret oil delivery<sup>7</sup>

In April 1987, the *Berge Enterprise* – a Norwegian-flagged 'ultra large crude carrier' of 360,700 tons deadweight – collected part cargoes of crude oil in Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. The vessel, owned and managed by the Norwegian shipping company Bergesen, sailed from the Persian Gulf with as purported destination 'Singapore'. In fact, however, the German oil trading company Marimpex which owned the cargo, ordered the vessel to sail straight to South Africa.

When in 1988 the Government of Saudi Arabia set out to investigate where their oil had gone, it was first presented with information apparently confirming that the cargo of Arabian Medium Crude had indeed been delivered to Singapore. There were no independent reports corroborating the alleged call of the *Berge Enterprise* at Singapore. The Government of Saudi Arabia was later provided with a return copy of the 'Oil Export Declaration' issued by its own Customs Department, from which it appeared that the cargo had not been discharged at Singapore, but at *Ain Sukhna* (Egypt – Red Sea) from where it was transferred to the Mediterranean via the *Arab Petroleum Pipeline*. According to the document, the cargo had been reloaded on the Japanese tanker *Elbe Maru* on 30 April 1987, and had been discharged at *Fos-sur-Mer* (France). Stamps and signatures, apparently in use by the Arab Petroleum

Pipeline and the French Customs, were used to authenticate the document.

It was a rather clever cover-up at first sight. The Japanese oil tanker *Elbe Maru* had indeed discharged an oil cargo of approximately the same volume as the *Berge Enterprise* cargo at Fos, on 3 May 1987. However, not only was the exact quantity of the cargo different from the original cargo, it also contained a mixture of *Iranian and Arabian heavy crude* rather than Arabian Medium Crude.

Another factor helped to expose this attempted cover-up. According to the document, the *Elbe Maru* collected the cargo allegedly discharged by the *Berge Enterprise* at the Arab Petroleum Pipeline, on April 30th. However, even at full speed, the *Elbe Maru* could never have covered the distance between the Mediterranean outlet of the pipeline at Sidi Kerir (Egypt) to Fos (France) in the time indicated.

A final touch of implausibility was added when the Government of *Qatar* was presented with a certificate of discharge 'proving' that the *Berge Enterprise* had discharged her part cargo of Qatar crude in *Singapore* – on exactly the same days when the ship was purportedly in the Red Sea delivering her cargo of Saudi crude...

Saudi Arabia  
Finance & National  
Economy  
Customs Department  
Zoo Tamara  
Customs of

Oil Export Declaration  
Order No. 25128-60

No. 1258 Date 13 April 87 Exp. Manifest No. 1423 Date 8 TH APRIL 87  
Vessel's Name: *BERGE ENTERPRISE* Type: *WOMENIAN* Arrival date: 6TH APRIL 87  
Owner's Name: *BERGSEN* Agent's Name: *KAROO* Captain: *O S LANGELET*  
Discharge Port: *SINGAPORE* Date of Sailing: 8TH APRIL 87  
Shipper: *ARABCO* Import Country: *SINGAPORE*  
Buyer: *ARABCO ON BEHALF OF ARABIAN NATIONAL OIL CO.*  
CONSIGNEE: *TO ORDER OF SINGAPORE PETROLEUM CO. PTE LTD.*  
Quantity Exported in Tons

WEIGHT		QUANTITY		TYPE OF SHIPMENT	VALUE	STATISTICAL NUMBER
GROSS	NET	PER TON	NO OF BARRELS			
196728	125883	114892.35	656798	AR. MEDIUM		27090000
				VESSEL DISCHARGED BY ATN		
				CARGO RELOADED ON VESSEL		
				FOR DISCHARGE IN LAYENA		

We certify that the above mentioned information are correct and identical to the Exp. Manifest.  
Vessel's Agent: *Handwritten Signature* Head of Oil Div. Customs Manager: *Handwritten Signature*  
We certify that the above mentioned quantity of oil was discharged at the Port of *LAYENA* on *8 TH APRIL 1987*  
Official's Name and signature at Port or Customs: *Handwritten Signature*

بيان تصدير الزيت  
رقم الطلب: 25128-60  
رقم البيان: 125883 تاريخ: 13/4/87 رقم مقيت الصادر: 1423 تاريخ: 8/4/87  
اسم الباطة: *BERGE ENTERPRISE* نوعها: *WOMENIAN* تاريخ الوصول: 6/4/87  
اسم مالك الباطة: *BERGSEN* اسم وكيلها: *كارو* تاريخ سفرها: 8/4/87  
محل التفريغ: *سينغابور* تاريخ السفر إلى: *سينغابور*  
الشحن: *بتريكة ارايكو* شركة المصير: *للزيت الوطنية*  
البيان الصادر بالطن: 125883 / 125883 تاريخ: 8/4/87

البيان الاحادي	البيان الاحادي	نوع الباطة	البيان		البيان الاحادي
			عدد الباطة	البيان	
125883	125883	زيت خام متوسط	656798	114892.35	27090000

نحن نشهد بأن كمية الزيت الموضحة أعلاه وصلت كاملة  
وتم تفريغها بسلامة  
توقيع المسئول بالبيان أو المصير: *Handwritten Signature*

7. For more details on this delivery, see Shipping Research Bureau, *Oil to South Africa*, op.cit., pp. 10-11.



The countries from which the tankers sailed to South Africa

Table 3 lists the countries and regions from which the 66 tankers sailed to South Africa. The calls at individual countries in the various regions do not always add up to the total number of tankers which sailed from each region; most tankers called at two or more countries prior to sailing to South Africa. This practice of *multi-porting* is one of the factors making it difficult to assess how much of the crude oil originated in each country. A second factor is the continual incorrect and non-reporting of movements by tankers and by shipping companies.

No less than 55 of the 66 tankers sailed to South Africa from the **Persian Gulf**, with most of them returning immediately. More than half of the vessels called at the **United Arab Emirates** before sailing to South Africa. All countries in this area have an embargo on oil shipments to South Africa. Oil and shipping companies go to great lengths to conceal violations of the embargo policies of the oil-exporting countries. None of the 55 tankers reported their actual destination on departure from the Persian Gulf area.

The total cargo capacity of the 55 tankers which sailed to South Africa from the Persian Gulf was about 13.7 million tons, or *almost 87 per cent* of the total volume identified of 15.8 million tons.

Eight tankers sailed to South Africa from the **Red Sea area**. Seven of these tankers sailed straight to South Africa from **Egypt**; one tanker collected part cargoes in both Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The cargo capacity of these eight tankers was about 1.9 million tons, or *almost 12 per cent* of the total volume identified of 15.8 million tons.

Table 3 The countries/regions from which the 66 tankers sailed to South Africa

country/region	number of cases
<b>Persian Gulf</b>	55
<i>of which from:</i>	
United Arab Emirates	30 *
Qatar	9 *
Oman	8 *
Iran	7 *
Saudi Arabia	6 *
unknown countries	6
<b>Red Sea area</b>	8
<i>of which from:</i>	
Egypt	8 *
Saudi Arabia	1 *
<b>Other countries</b>	3
<i>of which from:</i>	
France	1
Malaysia	1
U.S.S.R.	1
<b>TOTAL</b>	66

\* Including multi-porting.

The combined cargo capacity of the 63 tankers which sailed to South Africa from the **Middle East** (Persian Gulf and Red Sea area) was about 15.6 million tons. This represents *almost 99 per cent* of the total volume of 15.8 million tons. The remaining one per cent was covered by three tankers sailing from France, Malaysia and the U.S.S.R.

## LICORNE OCEANE: Idle attempts to conceal a breach of the oil embargo

The French supertanker *Licorne Océane*, 290,767 tons dwt, Liberian flag, had laid immobile in the Far East for nearly three years, when she finally re-entered the voyage market.

However, the ship's first job after her departure on 16 January 1987 from Singapore, where she had anchored for one month, was one which her owners deemed advisable that it should be carefully kept from the outside world. It was reported that the *Licorne Océane* sailed from Singapore 'for Japan'; then the ship disappeared, to surface again only after more than seven weeks, at the anchorage of Fujairah (U.A.E.) previous port: 'not reported'.

In fact, from Singapore the *Licorne Océane* had sailed directly to the Persian Gulf, because a confidential contract concluded between the ship's managers and a charterer whose identity was deliberately kept concealed, provided for a delivery of Iranian crude oil to be made to South Africa. On 30 January 1987, two weeks after her departure from Singapore, the *Licorne Océane* loaded a cargo of Iranian oil at Hormuz Terminal. That is, a cargo of oil was transferred into the *Licorne Océane* from a giant British tanker, the *Burmah Endeavour*, currently in use by the National Iranian Oil Co. as a floating storage depot outside the dangerous Persian Gulf war zone.

The vessel's owners, French state-controlled *Compagnie Générale Maritime et Financière*, has placed commercial management of the vessel in the hands of a company called *Seatramp (U.K.) Ltd.* which, although situated in London, is half-owned by another French shipping company, the *Société Française de Transports Maritimes* (a subsidiary of the —private— Worms Group). *Seatramp* arranged for the oil to be shipped to South Africa, nevertheless seeing to it that on paper 'Singapore' was mentioned as the port of discharge.

However, before the cargo could indeed be unloaded at the South African port of Durban, some additional precautions were taken. Detailed directions were transmitted to the *Licorne Océane* while she steamed off East Africa on her way to her final destination:

*"It is most important that the vessel's name is not displayed at the dis[charge] port. (...) If it is possible the vessel's name must be covered with canvas securely fitted in place on the bow, the stern and the bridge. The owners' identification on the funnel should also be removed. On leaving the dis[charge] port there should be nothing on board the vessel which would indicate where the vessel has actually been. This must include the disposal of all newspapers or magazines or calendars from the dis[charge] port. If any stores are taken then any packages or documents relating to them which would show where they were purchased must also be disposed of."*

A last measure was introduced as the ship approached her destination: her own name disappeared from all external communications. As is usual with tankers employed in breaches of the oil embargo against South Africa, she had been awarded a code name to be used instead, in order to diminish the chance of being detected. Mid-February 1987, about two weeks after the departure of the *Licorne Océane* from the Persian Gulf, tanker 'M 49' arrived at Durban to discharge her valuable cargo into the offshore oil buoy.

Assuming that the crew of a ship not normally engaged in trading surrounded with the same secretiveness would be a little taken aback by the outlined procedure, *Seatramp* had reassuringly added to their instructions:

*"We understand that the above requests may seem unusual but rest assured it is in the best interests of the vessel and her owners."*

From: Shipping Research Bureau, *Oil to South Africa. Apartheid's Friends and Partners*, Amsterdam 1988, p. 9.



## Preliminary Findings on Oil Deliveries to South Africa in 1989-1990

A preliminary investigation of the periods 1989 and early 1990 has enabled the Shipping Research Bureau to identify 28 tankers of over 50,000 tons deadweight which have apparently delivered crude oil to South Africa.

Besides, ten tankers were found to have delivered *refined petroleum products* in the same period. Seven of those tankers have a deadweight tonnage of more than 50,000 (see pp. 9ff).

Table 4 **28 tankers which apparently delivered crude oil to South Africa in 1989-1990**

ship's name	dwt tonnage	month in South Africa
Alki	232,600	May 89
Alki	232,600	Jly 89
Alki	232,600	Aug 89
Alki	232,600	Sep 89
Anax	259,449	Apr 89
Batis	155,089	Apr 89
Batis	155,089	Jly 89
Batis	155,089	Dec 89
Batis	155,089	Mar 90
Brittany	233,348	Dec 89
Cali	236,425	May 89
Cali	236,425	Jne/Jly 89
Eastern Courage	267,807	May 89
Eastern Promise	268,038	Apr 89
Ethnic	274,629	Mar 89
Pacificos	268,467	Jan 89
Pacificos	268,467	Apr 89
Pacificos	268,467	Jne 89
Pacificos	268,467	Mar 90
Rafio	290,271	Apr 89
Rafio	290,271	Dec 89/ Jan 90
World Champion	273,117	May 89
World Hitachi Zosen	268,904	Feb 89
World Hitachi Zosen	268,904	Mar 89
World Renown	262,267	Jly 89
World Renown	262,267	Nov/Dec 89
World Summit	260,064	Mar 89
World Xanadu	264,170	May 89
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>6,840,980</b>	

### 28 crude oil deliveries – 6.3 million tons of oil<sup>1</sup>

The total cargo capacity of the 28 tankers which have to date been found delivering crude oil to South Africa in 1989-1990 amounts to about 6.3 million tons of crude oil. These 6.3 million tons represent some 36 per cent of South Africa's estimated crude oil import needs during the period. The 28 tankers are listed in Table 4.

Several of the tankers appear to have been engaged in a 'shuttle' trade to South Africa: *twelve* deliveries were made by just three vessels, *Alki*, *Batis* and *Pacificos*.<sup>2</sup>

### The identity of the shipping companies and the countries in which these companies are based

In 1987-1988 a trend was observed that shipping companies based in **Hong Kong**, **Greece** and the **United Kingdom** filled the gap created by the discontinuation of crude oil transports by Norwegian tankers. This trend seems to be continuing in 1989-1990 as well. The Hong Kong-based *World-Wide Shipping Group* again tops the list, with 12 deliveries identified. Greek shipping companies, their commercial operations often based in the United Kingdom, were involved in 10 of the 28 deliveries. The **Austrian** shipping company *Seaarland Shipping Management GmbH* which came to the fore as an oil transporter to South Africa in 1988, continued its involvement in 1989 (more details in Appendix I, Table G):

#### *Hong Kong*

– World-Wide Shipping Group: 12 cases

#### *Greece/United Kingdom*

– Embiricos Shipping/Buenamar: 4 cases  
 – Kulukundis Group/Saipan Steamship: 4 cases  
 – C.M. Lemos/Nereus Shipping: 1 case  
 – Pegasus Ocean Services/Pleiades: 1 case

#### *Austria*

– Seaarland Shipping Management: 4 cases

#### *F.R. Germany*

– Marimpex: 2 cases

### The oil companies involved

In nine of the 28 cases the Shipping Research Bureau has been able to identify the owner of the cargo (more details in Appendix I, Table G).

The oil company *African Middle East* which came to the fore rather prominently in 1988 as the last-known owner of eight cargoes delivered to South Africa from Egypt, has continued its

1. These findings are provisional and not comprehensive.

2. Earlier deliveries by the *Alki* (four) and the *Pacificos* (two) have already been identified since July 1988; see Appendix I, Table A.

Table 5 The region/countries from which the 28 tankers sailed to South Africa in 1989-1990

country	number of cases	dwt tonnage
United Arab Emirates	12 *	2,919,519
Egypt	7	1,616,281
Oman	3 *	763,334
unknown countries in the Persian Gulf/Middle East	9	2,305,180
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>6,840,980</b>

\* Including multi-porting.

trade in 1989-1990 (seven cargoes identified – 1.5 million tons). As in 1988, all cargoes of which the company was the last-known owner have been collected in Egypt.

The countries from which the 28 tankers sailed to South Africa

All 28 tankers sailed to South Africa from the **Middle East** (Persian Gulf and Red Sea area). The trend that the **United Arab Emirates** account for the vast majority of the cases identified by the Shipping Research Bureau, seems to continue in 1989. Twelve tankers sailed to South Africa after having called at one or more oil terminals in the United Arab Emirates. The countries are listed in Table 5.



## Refined Petroleum Products to South Africa

Most crude oil transports to South Africa are made by large tankers and combined carriers in sizes ranging up to 200,000-300,000 tons and over. But a considerable number of smaller product tankers and chemical tankers under 50,000 deadweight tons also call regularly at South African ports.<sup>1</sup>

The calls of these vessels are sometimes made for loading bunker fuel, collecting spare parts or crew changes. Sometimes cargoes ranging from edible oils, molasses or chemical products to dry bulk goods (in the case of ore/bulk/oil carriers) are discharged or loaded. However, in some cases, these vessels are engaged in transports of *petroleum derivatives* to or from South Africa.

The United Nations Intergovernmental Group estimates that about 80 per cent of South Africa's imported oil is delivered in crude form on large tankers. According to the Group's 1989 report, the remaining 20 per cent comes to South Africa either as crude oil on medium size tankers or combination carriers, or in the form of refined petroleum products on ships of considerably smaller tonnage.<sup>2</sup>

An effective oil embargo against South Africa should cover all products derived from crude petroleum.<sup>3</sup> These range from 'dirty' products such as heavy fuel oil to 'clean' jet fuel and specialised petrochemical products. With its domestic refining capacity and synthetic-fuel installations, South Africa is able to produce many petroleum products itself. Nevertheless, it appears to be economical or even necessary for South Africa to import certain types and quantities of these products from abroad.

The volume and value of refined petroleum products reaching South Africa are partly reflected in the export statistics of several countries (as opposed to the import statistics of South Africa itself which omit all figures related to oil). The reason for this is that a number of countries which have made *crude oil* exports to South Africa illegal, have failed to do so with regard to exports of oil products.

However, probably more and more refined product transports remain hidden as is illustrated by the developments which have taken place since 1989.

### ***Shipowner refuses oil product shipments to South Africa***

Mid-1989, Almare, the owner of a number of bulk/oil carriers, was requested by the Norwegian time-charterers of three of its vessels, if the clause in the charter-party reading "*Vessel not to be employed in illegal trading such as oil to South Africa*" could be amended to apply to crude oil transports only. The Italian owner refused both this request and that of a number of brokers asking them to accept charters on three other vessels for oil product shipments to South Africa from the Netherlands.

[Letter from Almare di Navigazione S.p.A., Italy, to the Shipping Research Bureau of 7 September 1989. The Norwegian company was Arcade Shipping Co., Oslo.]

### **Refined product imports increasing**

Refined petroleum products are occasionally transported by large tankers. As early as 1985 as well as later, vessels of 50,000 tons deadweight and over were found by the Shipping Research Bureau to deliver cargoes of petroleum products (mainly fuel oil and diesel) to South Africa.<sup>4</sup> However, since 1989 a striking number of larger vessels have been identified as suppliers of refined products to South Africa.

In the first half of 1989, word got round in the chartering market that vessels in the range of 60-110,000 tons deadweight were sought for petroleum product transports from various places to South Africa. A possible explanation for the surge in refined product shipments identified since mid-1989 may be found in the problems encountered by South Africa in its domestic production of certain petroleum products. Fires at the oil-from-coal factories SASOL Three and Two in January and May 1989 respectively, have reduced the production of synthetic fuel.<sup>5</sup>

1. In its interim report of 12 June 1990, the United Nations Intergovernmental Group (see below) mentions a number of 474 tankers and combined carriers of all sizes of which calls at South African ports have been reported between early 1986 and early 1989.
2. United Nations, *Report of the Intergovernmental Group to Monitor the Supply and Shipping of Oil and Petroleum Products to South Africa*, October 1989, p. 3.
3. The resolutions on the Oil Embargo against South Africa adopted annually by the United Nations General Assembly urge the Security Council "*to take action without further delay to impose a mandatory embargo on the supply and shipping of oil and petroleum products to South Africa*". All measures proposed to strengthen the oil embargo

refer to refined products as well as to crude oil. See p. 38.

4. In 1985-1986, seven shipments of refined petroleum products (fuel oil from Saudi Arabia and South Yemen, diesel from Bahrain) to South Africa, made by oil tankers and combined carriers in the range of 55,000-104,000 tons dwt were identified. These deliveries have been described in: Shipping Research Bureau, *Oil to South Africa*, op.cit., Appendix I, Table A, cases 8, 10, 22, 34, 56, 57 and 61. On the cases of the *Beatrice*, the *Biscaya*, the *Gentle Breeze* and the *Singa Star*, see also this report, p. 40. A few cases in 1987-1988 are included in Table 6.
5. SASOL's Managing Director said that output had dropped by some 10-15 per cent after the two fires, the first of which killed 12 persons. *SRB Newsletter* No. 17, October 1989, p. 2; No. 19, 1st quarter 1990, p. 2.



The shortfall must have been considerable, bearing in mind that recent import increases are found mainly for *gasoline*, a product which due to the production characteristics of the indigenous synfuel industry and the structure of domestic demand is normally in relative oversupply in South Africa.<sup>6</sup>

Some shipments of refined petroleum products to South Africa identified by the Shipping Research Bureau since 1987 are listed in Table 6.<sup>7</sup>

*Countries of origin* of recent shipments were located in the Mediterranean, Eastern Europe, Southwest Europe, East Africa and especially **Northwest Europe**. The Dutch trans-shipment port of *Amsterdam* has emerged as a major source for oil products for South Africa, mainly transported by combined carriers of 70,000 tons dwt and over.

In none of the cases, the vessels in question reported their real destination on departure from Amsterdam (most reported 'Gibraltar for orders' instead). Consequently, none of the

Table 6 **Some refined petroleum shipments to South Africa since 1987**

ship's name	dwt tonnage	month in South Africa	product loaded	country of sailing
UGLAND OBO-ONE	54,500	Apr 87	gasoline	France
TENACITY	46,693	Jne 87	carbon black	U.S.A.
LUCERNA	39,865	Jan/Feb 88	gasoline	Greece
WHITE EXCELSIOR	38,598	Feb 88	gasoline	Netherlands
DAGLI	57,372	Oct 88	fuel oil	U.S.S.R.
BRALI	48,581	Feb 89	fuel oil	Kenya
QUEBEC	39,728	Jne 89	gasoline	Netherlands
GRIPARION	70,247	Jne/Jly 89	gasoline	Netherlands
OBO VEGA	97,947	Jly 89	gasoline	Netherlands
PROBO GULL	48,263	Aug 89	gasoline	Romania
JARAMA	77,673	Aug/Sep 89	gasoline gasoil jet fuel	Netherlands Netherlands Portugal
FAITH I	37,797	Sep/Oct 89	gasoline	Netherlands
HØEGH FOUNTAIN	78,488	Sep/Oct 89	gasoil gasoline	Sweden Netherlands
HØEGH FOAM	78,571	Oct 89	oil products	Romania
AMBIA FAIR	78,434	Oct 89	oil products	Greece
HØEGH FOAM	78,571	Nov/Dec 89	gasoline	Netherlands
GRIPARION	70,247	Jan 90	gasoline	Netherlands
HØEGH FALCON	81,158	Apr 90	gasoline	Netherlands

6. "Of all the fractions of the crude oil barrel, diesel fuel is in many ways the most strategically important to South Africa. (...) The commercial, industrial and transport sectors of the economy rely heavily on diesel fuel (...)." The side-effects of South Africa's strategy of reducing its reliance on imported crude oil by building coal-based synfuel plants have included "the production of far larger quantities of petrol than diesel fuel, leading to the problem of matching the petrol and diesel fuel demand within the country." In the past, the imbalance "reached such proportions that it became necessary to export surplus petrol to

ensure that sufficient crude oil was processed to meet diesel fuel requirements." K.F. Bennett, 'Matching petrol and diesel fuel demand in South Africa', in *Energy Policy*, South Africa, April 1990 [emphasis added -SRB].

7. Among the vessels investigated were also a few of less than 50,000 tons dwt. *N.B.*: Refined product shipments have not been researched comprehensively; the Bureau's main focus is still on the monitoring of crude oil shipments to South Africa. Details on the shipments listed can be found in Appendix I, Table H.



shipments are reflected in Dutch foreign trade and transit statistics.

*Oil-trading companies* involved in the product shipments, as far as known, are *Marc Rich* (Switzerland) with at least four to six<sup>8</sup> shipments, and *Inter-Mediterranean* (United Kingdom) with one shipment.


A recent investigation shows that, in spite of a section in the United States Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 which says "No crude oil or refined petroleum product (...) may be exported to South Africa", companies in the **United States** were able to ship almost 19 million gallons (about 72,000 m<sup>3</sup>) of petroleum-based products to South Africa since 1986, worth perhaps as much as US \$ 760 million. While Congressional sponsors of the law say they intended a broad ban on such exports, the Commerce Department has determined that the sanctions law applies to just 49 of the hundreds of variations of petroleum products. The products shipped are largely vital lubricant additives. The prime U.S. exporter of these petroleum-based products is *Lubrizol*, followed by *Caltex*. Another big exporter, *Mobil Corp.*, said it had stopped because of the passage of the law in 1986.<sup>9</sup>

### Once again major role Norway

A striking feature of the recent shipments of refined products is the major role played by *Norwegian shipping companies*. It appears that several Norwegian companies are taking advantage of a loophole in the Norwegian boycott law. The law bans transports of crude oil but is currently being undermined by an increasing number of vessels carrying refined oil products instead.

Norwegian companies involved in refined product shipments to South Africa include:

- A/S Ocean/JPP Shipping and Iver Bugge, as owners and operators respectively of the *Dagli* which delivered fuel oil from the Soviet Union to South Africa in 1988;<sup>10</sup>
- the Bulkhandling pool and its partners L. Gill-Johannessen and Havtor Management, with two shipments in 1989 (*Brali* and *Probo Gull*);
- VShips Norway as the technical manager of the *Brali*;
- Andreas Ugland/Ugland Management with one gasoline cargo in 1987;
- Anders Jahre as the owner of the *Jarama*, one of the vessels operated by;
- Leif Høegh & Co., the company which ranks first and foremost with at least six shipments since August 1989, mostly from Amsterdam.<sup>11</sup>



Amsterdam, 8 November 1989: The *Høegh Foam* (r.) loading gasoline for South Africa at the Amerikahaven jetty – Photo: SRB

### Preventing further oil product transports

Some of the shipments of petroleum products described in this report have led to developments on a political level after having been disclosed in the media, especially in Norway.

In February 1989, questions were asked in the *Norwegian Parliament* as a result from the disclosure of the involvement of the tanker *Dagrun*. On 22 January 1989, this tanker of 39,728 tons dwt sailed for the Far East after a secret call at Durban, South Africa, where she had collected a cargo of about 30,000 tons of diesel oil.<sup>12</sup> At the time, the Norwegian Government said this did not necessitate an extension of the legal ban on crude oil transports to and from South Africa to refined products as well.<sup>13</sup>

When in April 1989 a well-documented Norwegian television programme revealed the extensive means by which the operator and the charterer of the *Dagli* willingly met South Africa's wishes to keep a delivery of fuel oil from the Soviet Union to Cape Town a secret, the Norwegian Minister of Trade and Shipping called the delivery "painful for Norwegian shipping", and said that Norway ought to consider extending the legal ban if the United Nations would issue such a call. The national anti-apartheid coalition *Norwegian Council for Southern Africa* repeated its call for such an extension. Already during the debate on the boycott law in 1986, the Council claimed that the law could not possibly be effective if refined oil product transports were not covered as well.

The *United Nations Intergovernmental Group* reported the case of the *Dagli* back to the Soviet authorities, and conveyed therewith that it expected them to punish those found to have violated the Soviet embargo regulations.<sup>14</sup>

8. On the connection between Marc Rich (four cases listed) and a group of companies involved in two additional cases, see p. 17.

9. *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, United States, 13 May 1990.

10. A/S Ocean and JPP Shipping A/S were also involved in an oil products shipment from South Africa to the Far East in February 1989 by the tanker *Dagrun*, which led to parliamentary questions on the loopholes in the Norwegian law (see below). For the case of the *Dagli*, see pp. 12 and 17.

11. See pp. 22-23 of this report.

12. The Norwegian-flagged oil tanker *Dagrun* (ex-*Lucerna*) is owned by A/S Ocean, and operated by JPP Shipping A/S, both on the same address in Oslo. The ship sailed under time-charter to a Liberian company, Salcom, represented by its London agent Silver Line. *Klassekampen*, Norway, 9 and 10 February 1989.

13. Parliamentary Reports, Norwegian Parliament, 22 February 1989.

14. NRK TV, Norway, 22, 23 and 24 April 1989; see also *SRB Newsletter*



## DAGLI: Soviet oil diverted to South Africa

On 21 September 1988, the Norwegian-flagged tanker *Dagli* sailed from the Black Sea port of Odessa, U.S.S.R. The vessel was loaded with nearly 50,000 tons of fuel oil owned by the oil trader *Marc Rich*. The 57,372 deadweight-tons oil tanker belonging to the Oslo shipping company *A/S Ocean*, at the time represented by *JPP Shipping*, was operated by another Norwegian shipping company, *Iver Bugge* of Larvik.

On the Bill of Lading, the destination of the cargo was specified as 'Italy'. South Africa was explicitly excluded as a destination in the oil sale contract. After the *Dagli* had left Odessa, the first buyer of the oil, a Greek company, informed the Soviet authorities of the request of its client to change the destination into 'East Coast U.S.'. In fact, the ship was never intended to go to the United States. Still in the Mediterranean, the ship's captain received orders not to go to Italy, but to change course to *Cape Town*.

After a short stop at Gibraltar in order to collect some spare parts on 29 September 1988 the ship headed South. An extensive camouflage operation was set up by the charterer's South African agent. On 5 October 1988, the ship's captain was requested to contact the agent via Cape Town radio solely using the South African assigned secret code 'MF1', instead of the ship's name or her official call sign LAIF2.

Two days later, a message was received from the charterer and passed on to captain Arvid Hansen requesting that "*vessel proceed relevant terminal at Cape Town (...) identifying at all times exclusively by call sign MF1. Any communications are to refer only to bunkering operation with no reference whatsoever to cargo discharge, vessel's name or loading port. (...) Vessel at all times only use call sign MF1 and under no circumstances*

*should vessel use usual call sign.*" Moreover, the master was asked to paint over his ship's name, but he refused replying on 12 October that "*under no circumstances will the name be painted over under my command stop but I will cover the name with canvas if the weather permits. Regards MF1.*" The next day, Iver Bugge cabled that the company agreed, though adding: "*But also remember not to show the flag of nationality.*"

On 15 October 1988, the *Dagli*, her name covered by tarpaulins, discharged her cargo of fuel oil from the Soviet Union in Cape Town. After two days, she proceeded to the Persian Gulf for orders. On arrival, the authorities were told that the tanker's last port of call had been 'Gibraltar'...

The delivery constitutes a clear infringement of the Soviet oil embargo. Although the Norwegian ban in force since mid-1987 prohibiting crude oil transports to South Africa by Norwegian tankers does not cover refined oil products such as fuel oil, the Norwegian Minister of Trade and Shipping Jan Balstad told Norwegian TV that the *Dagli* case was "*painful for Norwegian shipping*". According to the Norwegian Maritime Directorate, hiding a ship's identity and nationality is clearly against the law, and the Inspector for Shipping in Oslo was asked to investigate the matter.

Mr Jan A. Bugge, chairman of Iver Bugge, the operator of the *Dagli*, admitted that his company had 'sailed close to the wind' by meeting the South African agent's request to hide the ship's identity. He said his company had no regular trade with South Africa and had followed local instructions over what was an isolated cargo. He regretted that the oil had ended up in South Africa, since it originated from a country which has a total trade embargo. However, "*it is not up to us to be concerned with the Russian policies in this respect*".

In October 1989, the Congress of the *Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions* adopted a resolution calling for the extension of the Norwegian law to oil products as well. The Federation has urged the Foreign Minister to introduce a change in the law. The Federation's campaign was given added impetus when in November 1989 four recent shipments by vessels operated by Leif Høegh & Co. were disclosed on Norwegian television.<sup>15</sup>

The disclosure caused a commotion in Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands as well.<sup>16</sup>

In the Netherlands, two anti-apartheid organisations, the *Holland Committee on Southern Africa* and *Kairos*, have asked the City Council of Amsterdam, a self-declared 'anti-apartheid city', for an investigation into and action against oil product shipments to South Africa via the port of Amsterdam.<sup>17</sup>

No. 15/16, July 1989, pp. 4-5; *Report of the Intergovernmental Group...*, October 1989, op. cit., p. 41. The *Dagli* case is described in detail on pp. 12 and 17.

In its report of October 1989, the U.N. Intergovernmental Group considered "*that a global approach to its task requires that it also pay attention to the*

*question of petroleum products*" (op. cit., p. 2).

15. NRK TV, Norway, 11 November 1989. See *SRB Newsletter* No. 18, 1st quarter 1990, pp. 1-2.

16. See the story on the *Høegh Fountain* on p. 13.

17. *SRB Newsletter* No. 20, 3rd quarter 1990, pp. 1-2.



## HØEGH FOUNTAIN: 'Wholly Within the Framework of the Law'

After having delivered a cargo of coal from the U.S.A. to Rotterdam in August 1989, the Norwegian vessel *Høegh Fountain* was ordered to interrupt her normal routine of voyages across the Atlantic, taking oil one way and returning to Europe with dry cargoes. Her owners had found a new lucrative opportunity for their fleet of bulk/oil carriers: transporting refined petroleum products to South Africa, and taking South African coal to Europe. Before the carriage to South Africa of crude oil by Norwegian-owned and managed vessels was banned by law in 1987, vessels of Leif Høegh & Co. in Oslo – among them the *Høegh Fountain* in May 1982 – had shipped several cargoes of oil to South Africa. This time, a mix of refined petroleum products from different origins was to be shipped to Durban in South Africa.

First, the vessel was directed to Sweden. On 3 September 1989 she arrived at the Swedish/Norwegian-owned *Scanraff* refinery in Lysekil/Brofjorden and sailed the next day after having collected 25,000 m<sup>3</sup> or 19,197 metric tons of gasoil. The oil had been refined for the Danish state-owned oil company *Dansk Olieforsyning A/S* (DOFAS), which purchases crude oil from the Danish sector of the North Sea. The refining was done under an agreement of the Danish company with the owners of the Swedish refinery for the processing of DOFAS-supplied crude.

DOFAS had sold the cargo loaded on the *Høegh Fountain* to the Swiss company *Astra Oil Trading* (AOT) for delivery to the Canary Islands. AOT afterwards claimed to have sold it on to a company called *Inter-Mediterranean Petroleum Co. (U.K.) Ltd.*, which according to some reports is closely linked to AOT itself. Inter-Mediterranean realises about three-quarters of its turnover and profits from the oil trade with South Africa.

On her way South, the partially loaded vessel made a second call, at the Dutch port of Amsterdam. Early in the morning of September 6th she arrived at the Usselincx-haven oil jetty. However, the gasoline cargo she was to load was not yet available, so the loading operation started on the 7th at 7.15 a.m. The *Høegh Fountain* sailed from Amsterdam two days later at 5.55 a.m., purportedly 'for Gibraltar for orders'.

She, in fact, sailed directly to South Africa, without stops at the Canary Islands or Gibraltar, and discharged her

cargoes of gasoil and gasoline there. Afterwards, the vessel was cleaned up and directed to the coal-exporting port Richards Bay, where she stayed from 9 to 11 October 1989 collecting a cargo of South African coal for Spain.

Apparently, no official embargo regulations were broken by loading gasoline for South Africa in the Netherlands, as there is only a limited Dutch embargo on exports of crude oil. However, none of the parties involved was willing to disclose the actual country of origin of the cargo loaded in Amsterdam. Amsterdam is simply a storage and trans-shipment port without refining capacity. The main sources of gasoline trans-shipped via Amsterdam are the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, the first of which embargoes all supplies to South Africa. Both Sweden and Denmark have a full embargo on exports to South Africa.

The Swedish Board of Customs have started an investigation into the matter in November 1989 and their Danish colleagues have been requested to follow their example. At the very time the delivery was revealed by the Norwegian state television, the Foreign Affairs Committee of Swedish Parliament met to evaluate the Swedish boycott law. The Swedish anti-apartheid movement has urged the Committee, in view of the *Høegh Fountain* case, to propose a sharpening of the law to Parliament.

In Amsterdam, anti-apartheid organisations have asked the City Council to investigate the use of the local port in shipping oil products to South Africa, citing the delivery by the *Høegh Fountain* as an example.

The Swiss buyer AOT has failed to produce a *discharge certificate* as required by the Danish supplier of the gasoil cargo. When the irregularities became apparent after an initial investigation by the Shipping Research Bureau, DOFAS told a Swedish radio reporter that the company would preclude the Swiss company from any further deliveries and that it had decided to include clauses demanding discharge certificates in all future contracts. The Swedish refiner of the *Høegh Fountain* cargo, OK Petroleum, has decided to take similar precautions, incorporating clauses prohibiting the resale of cargoes to countries embargoed by the United Nations or the Swedish Government into all its sale contracts and its General Conditions of Sale.



## Changing Patterns in Oil Supplies to South Africa

### Oil-exporting countries

A review of the Shipping Research Bureau's research findings from the last few years indicates that the number of oil-exporting countries from which tankers sailed to South Africa to deliver crude oil has remained fairly stable.

On the one hand, no tankers have been identified as sailing to South Africa from *Brunei* since late 1986. On the other hand, a considerable number of tankers were identified as sailing to South Africa from **Egypt** (15 deliveries) since 1988.

Increasing numbers of tankers were found to be sailing from the **United Arab Emirates**, which now tops the list with 90 shipments identified since January 1979.

The **map** provides a summary of oil deliveries by tankers of 50,000 tons deadweight upwards identified by the Shipping Research Bureau for the period 1979-1990.<sup>1</sup> Appendix III provides further information on the 441 deliveries.

Since 1987, only a few tanker sailings from **Saudi Arabia** have been identified. With 79 deliveries, the country now ranks second after the United Arab Emirates. The number of sailings to South Africa from other countries in the Persian Gulf area, **Oman** (60 tankers), **Iran** (38 cargoes) and **Qatar** (21 tankers) remained fairly high.

### Refined products from Europe

Since 1989, a striking number of tankers over 50,000 tons deadweight have been identified as carrying *refined petroleum products* to South Africa.

In particular, the trans-shipment port of Amsterdam, **The Netherlands**, has emerged as a major source of refined product supplies to South Africa.


### Companies involved

Changes can be observed in the nationalities of the *shipping companies* transporting oil to South Africa. Since Norwegian shipping companies ended their involvement in crude oil transports in 1987, shipping companies based in **Greece**, the **United Kingdom**, **Austria** and, in particular, the **Hong Kong**-based company *World-Wide Shipping*, have taken over these transports.

**Norwegian** shipping companies have been prominently involved in supplying refined products since 1988.

The *oil-trading* companies *Marimpex* and, in particular, *Marc Rich* have continued their involvement in oil supplies to South Africa. Since 1988, the company *African Middle East* emerged as the last-known owner of at least 15 oil cargoes delivered to South Africa from Egypt.

1. 1989 and early 1990: preliminary findings.



Regions from which the 441 tankers sailed to South Africa, January 1979-April 1990



## The Main Oil and Shipping Companies Involved

### Marc Rich

The international commodities trader Marc Rich is responsible for ten of the deliveries to South Africa identified in this report – and most likely for a far greater number now hidden under the heading 'oil company unknown' or under the names of other companies.

Marc Rich is a Belgian-born former U.S. and now Spanish citizen, wanted on legal charges in the U.S.A. and therefore unable to enter that country or any other country where tax evasion is an extraditable offence.<sup>1</sup> He is now living and working in Zug, one of the choice Swiss locations of companies active in world-wide trading including supplies to South Africa. To hide his involvement from the outside world, Marc Rich uses a whole series of, often short-lived, companies based in different countries for his South African business. The first names to be disclosed were those of *Minoil Inc.* (Switzerland) and *Liquin*

When the *Dagli* sailed from Odessa in the Black Sea on 21 September 1988, the oil aboard the tanker was supposedly destined for Italy. As a matter of standard procedure, delivery or resale to South Africa was explicitly excluded in the sale contract. However, the Greek company purchasing the Soviet oil had sold it on to a Swiss company called *Manpétrole*, which company had resold it to a British firm called *Falcrest Commodities*. The British firm resold the oil once more to another Swiss-registered company, *Baltic Chartering*. Only after the ship had left port, the authorities in the Soviet Union were asked permission for the oil to be redirected to the U.S.A. In fact, the whole masquerade had been set up by the real buyer, *Marc Rich*, who made use of a company which soon after ceased operating (*Manpétrole*) and to which therefore no official questions could be asked, and another company belonging to his empire (*Baltic Chartering*) of which no traces are left at all.

During the decade from 1979 to 1988, the Shipping Research Bureau was able to identify 64 shipments of crude oil to South Africa which were apparently owned by Marc Rich or one of the company's subsidiaries. Of these 64 shipments, involving over 8 million tons of crude oil, at least 61 do not coincide with any of the 17 cargoes of the *Minoil* contract revealed in a confidential South African report of 1984 (see note 2). Thus, the total number of crude oil deliveries to South Africa by Marc Rich since 1979 is **at least 78**. The volume of crude oil involved in these shipments is 11-11.5 million tons. This means that between early 1979 and late 1988, Marc Rich delivered *at least some 8 per cent* of South Africa's crude oil import needs. If all identified deliveries in which companies in the **Eastco/Hollywell** group were involved were made in connection with Marc Rich sales, the number of crude oil deliveries would still be higher: at least 82. Marc Rich not only supplies crude oil but also refined petroleum products to South Africa. Of a number of, mostly recent, deliveries of gasoline and other products identified by the Bureau, at least *five* were made by Marc Rich, and another *three* by companies associated with Eastco/Hollywell.

*Resources Corp.* (Panama).<sup>2</sup> The case of the tanker *Dagli*<sup>3</sup> provides a recent illustration. This case involved a group of companies centered around the British firms *Eastco* and *Hollywell*. Although these firms may not all be formally owned by Marc Rich or work exclusively for him, they are working closely together with Rich in oil supplies to South Africa. The companies include the *East Coast Group Ltd.* (U.K.), *Hollywell Shipping Ltd.* (U.K.), *Rainbow Line Ltd.* (Hong Kong), *Intercontinental Transportation Corporation Ltd.* (Grand Cayman).<sup>4</sup>

1. As from 1981, the company Marc Rich became the subject of large-scale investigations by the U.S. authorities into "the largest tax evasion scheme ever prosecuted" (U.S. District Attorney Mr Rudolph Giuliani) and other charges including "racketeering, fraud, (...) and trading with the enemy". While the charges against the company were settled at huge cost when it pleaded guilty on a number of counts in 1984, those against Mr Rich personally have not been withdrawn. See Shipping Research Bureau, *Oil to South Africa*, Amsterdam 1988, p. 16; A. Craig Copetas, *Metal Men: Marc Rich and the 10-Billion-Dollar Scam*, Putnam & Sons, New York/London 1985; *Financial Times*, U.K., 1 September 1988.

2. A contract between Rich and the state oil procurement agency SFF to supply 6,500,000 tons of crude oil annually to South Africa through his companies *Minoil* and *Liquin Resources* was disclosed by a confidential report of the South African Advocate-General, presented to the South African Parliament in June 1984 on behalf of President P.W. Botha in an attempt to counter allegations that SFF had spent excessive amounts of state money on Rich and other traders. Advocate-General, *Report in terms of section 5(1) of the Advocate-General Act, 1979 (Act 118 of 1979)*, No. 7, 27 June 1984, pp. 33-35.

3. Appendix I, Table A, case 13; see also p. 12.

4. Oil deliveries identified by the Shipping Research Bureau in which one



Oil and oil products are only one branch of trade in which Marc Rich is active. He is also big in the trading of metal as well as a range of other commodities. When his former employer Phibro stopped trading with South Africa in 1985 under pressure from the anti-apartheid movement in the U.S.A., Rich stepped in,

*"Marc never once reflected on the moral implications of a deal. Doing business with corrupt societies was exactly the same as doing business with anyone else. I don't know if that's right or wrong. What I am sure of is that it's business".<sup>7</sup>*

Time and again, Marc Rich is the subject of controversy when commodity deals are discussed in parliaments and elsewhere, all around the world. In 1989, a storm blew up in *Jamaica* regarding a government alumina contract with Rich. The new Manley Government was severely criticised for not breaking its ties with the notorious oil-sanctions breaker. In *Mexico*, Rich was named as one of the chief collaborators with an official of a Mexican state-owned company in his efforts to control copper output from the country's biggest mine in 1989. Late 1989, protests were raised when *Algeria*, itself represented in the United Nations oil embargo monitoring group,

replacing Phibro as the exclusive sales agent for a giant South African lead mine.<sup>5</sup> Recently, Rich has become increasingly active in selling South African coal to countries such as Chile and the Peoples Republic of China as well, in spite of the latter country's nominal embargo on South African imports.<sup>6</sup>

planned an alumina processing deal with Rich. Early 1987, another oil-exporting country, *Brunei*, strengthened the application of its oil embargo regulations after revelations in the press and in a Shipping Research Bureau report of a large series of oil deliveries to South Africa from Brunei by Marc Rich. Even Rich's cultural and social sponsoring activities are inevitably viewed in the light of his supposed interest in "cleaning up his tarnished image" as was speculated when Rich donated *The Marc Rich Collection* of photographs to the Zurich Kunsthau (Switzerland). When his company contributed 100 million Swiss Francs to the building of the International Red Cross Museum, the beneficiaries were asked if they did not have scruples accepting a donation from a man supplying oil to South Africa, a country refusing the International Red Cross permission to visit most of its political detainees?<sup>8</sup>

## Marimpex

Late 1988, the West German weekly *Der Spiegel* was the first to publish a photograph of a man who had always eschewed publicity: *Gert Lutter*, the head of the Hamburg-based company Marimpex. Having become an independent oil trader in 1974, "Lutter's big break came towards the end of the 1970s when the Shah of Iran fell. Until then, the Iranians had supplied oil to South Africa which was boycotted by all major oil-exporting countries. However, the Mullahs cut the links with this fishy client. Like several other oil traders, Lutter now rendered his services to the South Africans".<sup>9</sup>

To facilitate this, a number of South Africans rendered their services to Marimpex. Until 1988, the main Swiss branch office *Marimpex Mineralöl-Handels AG* in Rapperswil was led by a South African, Mr Jürgen Hasse. A former top official of the South African oil company *SASOL* was employed in the London

branch, *Marimpex International Ltd*. The London employee, Mr John Bredenkamp, has an extensive record of 'sanctions busting' activities dating back to the 1970s when there was still a mandatory United Nations embargo against Rhodesia.<sup>10</sup>

Mr Lutter, based in the head office in Hamburg, is the pivot around which the whole Marimpex Group of companies revolves. Some of his companies maintain some measure of public profile, including the German head office and the British and Swiss main branch offices. From time to time, less visible firms are set up in countries like Bermuda and Panama, and especially in Switzerland where the companies *Corylus Trading GmbH* and *Ecos AG* (Zug) have been repeatedly used for the financial settlement of oil deliveries to South Africa.<sup>11</sup> In January 1989, Mr Hasse has moved to a newly set-up company, *Mexxoil AG* in Pfäffikon near Rapperswil.

or more of these companies were involved include those by the *Thorsholm* in February 1984, *Almare Settima* in December 1985/January 1986, *Almare Terza* in April 1986, *Fidius* in March and July 1987, *Freedomship L.* in November 1987, *Dagli* in October 1988, *Brali* in February 1989 and *Probo Gull* in August 1989.

5. *Fortune*, U.S.A., 1 August 1988.

6. *Coal Monitor* Nos. 2 and 3, in *SRB Newsletter* Nos. 18 and 19, 1990.

7. A senior executive of one of the companies of Marc Rich, quoted in: A. Craig Copetas, op.cit., p. 120.

8. *SRB Newsletter* No. 14, January 1989, p. 14; No. 17, October 1989, p. 11; *Financial Times*, U.K., 6 September 1989; *ARTnews*, U.S.A., September 1989; *L'Hebdo*, Switzerland, 28 July 1988.

9. *Der Spiegel*, F.R.G., 14 November 1988.

10. It has been suggested that Mr Bredenkamp has since worked for Marimpex in South Africa itself.

11. It has been confirmed by an executive of Marimpex that *Corylus Trading* (now wound up) was a subsidiary of his company. See Shipping Research Bureau, *Oil to South Africa*, op. cit., p. 17 note 16.



At the end of 1988, Marimpex was in severe financial troubles caused by a series of faulty speculations. Mr Lutter narrowly escaped bankruptcy when in December 1988, its main creditor Crédit Lyonnais and two German banks succeeded in securing the creditors' interests by finding a buyer for Marimpex in *Sucden Kerry International*, a company in which the giant French commodity house *Compagnie Financière Sucres et Denrées* has a controlling interest.<sup>12</sup> Sucden initially took a 17.5 per cent stake in Marimpex, and has subsequently expanded its share to 66.66 per cent.<sup>13</sup>

For its oil transports to South Africa, Marimpex has always employed both ships chartered from other owners and tankers owned by the company itself.<sup>14</sup> A prime example is the tanker *Rafio* (formerly *Mirafiori*). Nine trips to South Africa made by this tanker have been identified since late 1984 – a 'shuttle' service showing many unexplained gaps which together may account for some 20 additional deliveries during the period. Technical

On 25 July 1984, the *Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation* informed Marimpex that the company did not qualify to purchase crude oil from Nigeria. The Corporation has blacklisted all vessels owned or chartered by Marimpex and any company associated with or subsidiary to it. All agents of Marimpex or its subsidiary companies are also forbidden from discharging or loading crude oil from Nigeria.

[Letter of the Embassy of Nigeria to the Netherlands to the Shipping Research Bureau, 14 February 1989.]

During the period between late 1980 (when the first Marimpex shipment was discovered) and the beginning of 1990, research by the Shipping Research Bureau shows that Marimpex has supplied South Africa with *at least 33 oil cargoes*.

Even leaving aside unidentified Marimpex shipments by tankers chartered from other shipowners, periods of faulty reporting with regard to the movements of tankers owned by the company itself may account for more than a *tripling* of the number of oil deliveries by Marimpex during the period 1983-early 1990. The total volume of oil delivered may be as much as *9.5-10.5 million tons*, which means that at least 10-11 per cent of South Africa's estimated crude oil import needs during that period may have been covered by supplies made by this single company.

management of a number of Marimpex-owned tankers was placed with the Norwegian shipping company *Fearnley & Eger A/S* until this arrangement had to be terminated when Norwegian law prohibited the further involvement of that company in oil transports to South Africa.<sup>15</sup>

An oil-exporting country which is one of the most outspoken proponents of a strict oil embargo against South Africa, *Nigeria*, boycotted Marimpex in 1984. Another oil-exporting country, which has close links with Marimpex, *Iran*, has to date failed to take the same step.<sup>16</sup>

## African Middle East Petroleum Company

For the period from early 1988 to early 1990, the Shipping Research Bureau has identified 15 oil deliveries to South Africa from *Egypt*. The company African Middle East Petroleum Company Ltd. Inc. was the last-known owner of the shipments. These 15 oil deliveries amounted to some 3.4 million tons of oil, equivalent to *11 per cent* of South Africa's need for imported crude oil.

African Middle East is a private and limited company, incorporated in Panama in 1987. The company is owned by two Egyptian nationals, living in Cairo, Mr Fakhry Abdelnour and his brother Mr Mounir Abdelnour. Mr Fakhry Abdelnour is apparently the company's senior principal and major shareholder. The registration of the company in Panama is a formality. Day-to-day business is conducted from the

12. A minority interest of 30 per cent of Sucden is held by the Kuok Group (Hong Kong).

13. *Lloyd's List*, U.K., 7 November 1989.

14. See also: *Marimpex - A German Oil Supplier to South Africa*, Shipping Research Bureau survey, updated edition, Amsterdam 1989 (the 1985 edition has been translated into German as: *Marimpex liefert Öl*, epd-Entwicklungspolitik: Materialien IV/86, Frankfurt/M, FRG, 1986), pp. 15ff; Shipping Research Bureau, *South Africa's Lifeline*, Amsterdam 1986, p. 76.

15. 'As a result of Norwegian legislation prohibiting relationship with vessels/companies trading to South Africa after 20th July 1987, our

consultancy agreements were terminated, and we have not been involved with these vessels [Rafio, Dorian] since.' Letter from Fearnley & Eger A/S to Shipping Research Bureau, 31 January 1990. During 1987-1989, the movements of the Marimpex-owned tankers *Dorian* and *Azuro* showed a similar pattern as that of the *Rafio* mentioned above.

16. When Marimpex in 1989, under the aegis of Sucden and Crédit Lyonnais, concluded the largest ever contract to lift Iranian oil (300,000 barrels a day over a period of 18 months, representing one-seventh of Iran's total crude sales), it was rumoured in the international oil market that part of the oil was destined for South Africa. *The Independent*, U.K., 8 December 1989.



company's offices in Monaco and Geneva (Switzerland).

African Middle East specialises in marketing surplus Egyptian oil and oil from Qatar on the spot market. The marketing of surplus Egyptian oil is based on a contract the company seems to have with the Egyptian national oil company EGPC. Various sources within the international oil industry have described the role of African Middle East as the major channel through which the

Egyptian national oil company discreetly sells its surplus production of crude oil at market prices. Indeed, African Middle East has been described as 'a sort of marketing arm for the Egyptian Government, but on an arm's-length basis'. Apparently, quite a few of these spot cargoes of surplus Egyptian crude oil have found their way to South Africa, despite the official Egyptian embargo on oil deliveries to South Africa.

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## Bergesen d.y. A/S

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*"An essential aspect of our South Africa trade was that we could keep our ships employed. Thus we could avoid waiting longer periods for new cargoes. Income to the company in this connection probably amounted to some 100 million Crowns over a four-year period".<sup>17</sup>*

As from 20 July 1987 Norwegian law prohibits crude oil transports to South Africa by Norwegian tankers. Deliveries by tankers of the Norwegian shipping company Bergesen – once the main oil transporter to South Africa<sup>18</sup> – had already been decreasing for some time. However, during the last four months before the ban was introduced, Bergesen tankers showed a

sudden upsurge in activity in this respect: six deliveries supplied South Africa with *more than a third* of its need for imported oil. Since the Norwegian ban on crude oil transports to South Africa came into effect, no crude oil deliveries by Bergesen tankers have been identified by the Shipping Research Bureau. Bergesen combined carriers continue to call at South Africa in connection with dry bulk trade.

Between January 1979 and July 1987, Bergesen vessels made at least 37 oil deliveries to South Africa. The total cargo capacity of the 37 tankers was about 7.7 million tons.

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## World-Wide Shipping Group – The major oil transporter to South Africa

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*"Decidedly the greatest weakness of the Norwegian International Ships Register is the prohibition against sailing to South Africa. Today foreigners – not in the least Chinese – have taken over that part of the trade in which we used to be involved".<sup>19</sup>*

In the above statement, the chairman of Bergesen, the main oil transporter to South Africa over a prolonged period, points out that *Hong Kong* tankers have filled the gap created by the discontinuation of oil transport by Norwegian tankers. The World-Wide Shipping Group is paramount among those companies profiting from the bans imposed by law by shipping nations whose companies used to be heavily involved in oil transports to South Africa.

Based on the number of oil deliveries identified and the volume of oil transported to South Africa, the World-Wide Shipping

Group has now become *the major oil transporter to South Africa*. Between April 1979 and December 1989, *at least 46* deliveries were made by World-Wide tankers. If all tankers delivered a full cargo of oil, they have delivered some *10.7 million tons* of oil to South Africa.

While only a few, occasional, deliveries were identified until mid-1986, the involvement of World-Wide tankers shows a sudden increase from October 1986 onwards. At that time, it became clear that in future South Africa could no longer rely on Norwegian tankers for the country's crude oil imports.

Of the 46 deliveries identified, 41 have been made since October 1986. These 41 deliveries involved approximately *9.9 million tons* of oil. This volume represents about *22 per cent* of South Africa's estimated need for imported crude oil between October 1986 and December 1989.<sup>20</sup>

17. Petter C.G. Sundt, Chairman of the Board of Bergesen d.y. A/S, in: *Dagens Næringsliv*, Norway, 2 November 1987 (100m Norwegian Crowns: appr. US \$ 15.5m).

18. Shipping Research Bureau, *Oil shipments to South Africa by tankers owned and managed by Sig. Bergesen d.y. & Co. of Norway (Jan. 1979-Jan. 1985)*, survey, Amsterdam July 1985; *Oil to South Africa*, op. cit., p. 18.

19. Petter C.G. Sundt in *Skip & Sjø*, Norway, February 1988.

20. Various World-Wide tankers show a number of voyages that are either wrongly reported or not reported at all for which a final destination in South Africa cannot be positively ruled out. These voyages may very well push up secret oil deliveries to South Africa by the World-Wide Shipping group to a volume representing almost a *quarter* of the country's import needs during the period.



Reaction by the company

*“Oil deliveries by World-Wide tankers to South Africa are nothing secret and form part of the company’s international business. (...) Any ship that is fixed to charter can take goods to anywhere in the world. There is nothing underhand about us shipping oil to South Africa”.*<sup>21</sup>

In the past world-Wide Shipping used to respond to the

preliminary research findings and queries submitted to them by the Shipping Research Bureau prior to the publication of reports. Since it has become clear that the company has involved itself heavily in transporting embargoed oil to South Africa after October 1986, no reponses have been received. On the occasion of the release of the Shipping Research Bureau’s survey on the company in April 1989,<sup>22</sup> executives in Hong Kong and the U.S.A. acknowledged their company’s involvement in oil transports to South Africa to the press.<sup>23</sup>

London-based Greek shipping companies

During the period from 1979 to early 1990, Greek companies were involved in no less than 77 oil shipments to South Africa identified by the Shipping Research Bureau.<sup>24</sup>

Until the mid-1980s, a relatively large number of Greek shipping companies were involved, most of them accounting for a single cargo. In contrast, in 1986 these transports became almost entirely concentrated in the hands of a few Greek shipping groups, all of which conduct much of their commercial business from offices in London in the United Kingdom. As is shown in Table 7, five companies account for 38 of the 40 deliveries so far identified for the period 1986-1990. Three of these companies had already delivered at least nine cargoes before 1986, two others have become active only since 1987 and 1989, respectively.

Since the London-based Greek shipping groups came to the fore prominently in 1986 and 1987 – the years in which laws banning crude oil transports on Danish and Norwegian tankers came into force – the role of Greek tankers in oil deliveries to South Africa has increased considerably. While 32 Greek ships delivered some 3.9 million tons of crude oil during the seven-year period 1979-1985, 40 Greek ships delivered some 9.6 million tons during the four years since 1986. After the World-Wide Shipping Group of Hong Kong, these London-based Greek shipping companies are now the major oil transporters to South Africa.

G.P. Livanos/Carras Group

The G.P. Livanos/Carras Group were the owners and operators of the tankers *Captain John G.P. Livanos*, *Faroship L.*, *Fellowship L.*, *Flagship L.*, *Fortuneship L.*, *Freedomship L.* and

Table 7: Crude oil deliveries to South Africa by Greek shipping companies identified since 1979

company	total	1979-1985	volume (mln t)	1986ff	volume (mln t)
Livanos/Carras	16	4	0.5	12	3.0
C.M. Lemos	14	2	0.2	12	3.0
Hadjipateras	7	3	0.4	4	1.2
Kulukundis	6	-	-	6	1.5
Embiricos	4	-	-	4	0.6
subtotal	47	9	1.1	38	9.3
15 other Greek shipping companies	25	23	2.9	2	0.3
TOTAL	72	32	3.9	40	9.6

*Friendship L.* which together made at least twelve oil deliveries to South Africa between May 1986 and January 1988. The quantity of oil involved was about 3 million tons. Before that period, the vessels *Captain John G.P. Livanos* and *Filikon L.* had made four deliveries. This brings the total number of identified crude oil deliveries by Livanos/Carras vessels since 1979 to 16.<sup>25</sup>

The three main companies around which the Livanos/Carras conglomerate is built are: Unisea Ltd. in London, and Carras (Hellas) Ltd. and Ceres Hellenic Shipping Enterprises Ltd., both

21. Mr R.J. Allen of World-Wide Shipping in *South China Morning Post*, Hong Kong, 2 April 1989.  
22. *World-Wide Shipping Group. A Hong Kong Oil Shipper Comes to South Africa’s Rescue*, Shipping Research Bureau survey, Amsterdam April 1989.  
23. For Hong Kong: *South China Morning Post*, Hong Kong, 2 and 5 April 1989. In *Platt’s Week*, U.S.A., No. 16, 24 April 1989, Mr T. Liu of World-Wide’s U.S. office acknowledged that “some of his company’s tankers deliver to South Africa, but [he said] this is a matter for the charterers”.  
24. In all but a few cases, tankers owned and/or managed by Greek shipping companies (two-thirds of them also sailing under the Greek flag) transported a cargo of crude oil to South Africa. In one case, a

*Greek oil company* was the owner of an oil cargo delivered to South Africa; two vessels sailed to South Africa carrying petroleum products refined by a Greek refining company (Appendix I, Table H cases 3 and 15). In two recent cases, a Greek-owned tanker delivered gasoline to South Africa (Table H, cases 8 and 17).  
The published reports on the movements of many Greek tankers are markedly deficient. A South African destination could not be positively ruled out for at least 60 other voyages by Greek tankers which were investigated by the Shipping Research Bureau since 1982 but which are not listed in the Bureau’s reports.  
25. Furthermore, the Livanos/Carras Group accounts for about 25 of the 60 possible additional crude oil deliveries by Greek tankers referred to in note 24.



based in Piraeus. *Ceres Hellenic Shipping Enterprises Ltd.* is the managing company of the tankers delivering crude oil to South Africa.

### C.M. Lemos

*C.M. Lemos Ltd.* and its Piraeus-based operating company *Nereus Shipping S.A.* own and manage the tankers *Ethnic* and *Patriotic*. These tankers made 8 and 4 oil deliveries, respectively, to South Africa between May/June 1986 and March 1989, amounting to some 3 million tons of oil.<sup>26</sup>

### Hadjipateras Group

Mr John Hadjipateras of the Hadjipateras Group is the Chairman of the London-based Greek Shipping Co-operation Committee, in which Greek shipowners operating from London meet to discuss their mutual concerns. The Hadjipateras Group operates from the offices of its agent in the United Kingdom, *Peninsular Maritime Ltd.* In Piraeus, the Group's main operating company is *Dorian (Hellas) S.A.*

The total number of oil deliveries to South Africa since mid-1981 by tankers of the Group is *at least seven*, involving some 1.6 million tons of oil.<sup>27</sup>

### Kulukundis Group

The Kulukundis Group is a conglomerate of companies consisting of Rethymnis & Kulukundis Ltd., London & Overseas Freighters Ltd. and Off Shore Oil Services (U.K.) Ltd., all based in London, and a number of companies based in Piraeus, Kassos Maritime Enterprises Ltd., Saipan Steamship Corp. and Pegasus Maritime Enterprises Ltd.

The Group's supertanker *Pacificos* is involved in a 'shuttle' to South Africa, delivering crude oil from the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea area. After one oil delivery to South Africa in 1987, the vessel delivered *at least four more oil cargoes* to South Africa in the relatively short period between November 1988 and July

In October 1989, the *Pacificos* suddenly acquired a gaping hole, 22 metres long and 11 metres wide, while sailing off South Africa. Ostensibly, she was on a voyage from Saudi Arabia to Brazil. Some 8,000 tons of crude oil leaked into the sea. The owners took elaborate precautions not to call at any South African port for transfer of the cargo. Eventually, the cargo was lightered into the tanker *Henrique Dias* in the Mozambique Channel. The *Henrique Dias* then delivered the cargo to Brazil. After provisional repairs in Durban (South Africa), the *Pacificos* headed for Dubai (U.A.E.) for drydocking. After completion of the repair work, she resumed her oil transports to South Africa. In March 1990, the *Pacificos* secretly discharged another cargo of oil into the Single Point Mooring Buoy about five kilometres off Durban.<sup>29</sup>

1989.<sup>28</sup> After an interruption forced by problems which the ship encountered off the South African coast in October 1989, the *Pacificos* resumed her South African shuttle in March 1990. The six deliveries by the *Pacificos* identified so far amount to about 1.5 million tons of oil.

### Embiricos Shipping

In 1989-1990 the shipping company *Embiricos Shipping* (London) / *Buenamar Compania Naviera* (Piraeus) came to the fore with *four* oil deliveries to South Africa by the combined carrier *Batis*. After delivering each oil cargo, the ship collected a cargo of South African iron ore for the Far East.

Combined carriers belonging to the company had also occasionally called at South African ports in earlier years.

## Leif Høegh & Co. A/S

Once again, Norwegian shipping companies figure prominently in the Shipping Research Bureau's lists of companies breaking the oil embargo against South Africa. First among these is the company of *Leif Høegh & Co.* from Oslo.

In November 1989, a surge in shipments of refined products by vessels owned and operated by Leif Høegh was disclosed on Norwegian state television. For the very first time, a TV crew had been able to catch a vessel in the act of loading oil for South Africa. The bulk/oil carrier *Høegh Foam* was filmed early November in the Dutch port of Amsterdam while loading 65,000

tonnes of gasoline, to be delivered in South Africa.

One day after the departure of the *Høegh Foam*, the chief executive officer of Leif Høegh, Mr Ragnar Belck-Olsen, confirmed on TV that a number of his ships had been in South Africa in the past few months. "*Transporting refined products to South Africa is not against the Norwegian law. We live up to the Norwegian regulations. If the authorities are going to require a different position from Norwegian shipowners, we will as a matter of course also comply with that*".<sup>30</sup>

Even if no Norwegian law was broken by these transports, this

26. In the same period, the two tankers made *seven* additional voyages for which a South African destination could not be positively ruled out (cf. note 24).

27. During 1986-1988, the Shipping Research Bureau found *ten* additional voyages by Hadjipateras tankers for which a South African destination could not be positively ruled out (cf. note 24).

28. In fact, the total number of deliveries in 1987-1989 may be as high as 12 (cf. note 24).

29. *Lloyd's List*, U.K., 6, 7, 9 and 30 October 1990; *South African Shipping News and Fishing Industry Review*, South Africa, October and December 1989.

30. NRK TV News, Norway, 11 November 1989.



was not necessarily true for the embargo regulations of other countries. Høegh vessels have shipped cargoes of petroleum products to South Africa from Scandinavian and other countries which do have a full embargo on trade with South Africa.<sup>31</sup> Vessels owned or managed by Leif Høegh may have shipped refined petroleum products totalling at least some 440,000 tons to South Africa over a period of just 7 months since August 1989. The products delivered include gasoline, gasoil and jet fuel. On the return trips these combined carriers were always used to transport South African coal from Richards Bay to various European destinations.

Høegh vessels were identified as transporters of crude oil to South Africa several times in the early 1980s. After a rather lengthy period during which the company had apparently withdrawn from the South African trade, its involvement sharply expanded in the second half of 1989. The Høegh fleet of ore/bulk/ore carriers is primarily involved in the carriage of petroleum products from the Mediterranean to the U.S. Gulf, and of coal or grain to Europe on the return voyage. But they had already resumed calling at South African ports in 1988, mostly in order to collect cargoes of coal and iron ore. *“However,”* the company’s director wrote to the Shipping Research Bureau, *“we can confirm that some of the vessels operated by our company have been in South Africa during 1988 and 1989, delivering petroleum products”*.<sup>32</sup> The Shipping Research Bureau has identified oil shipments to Durban by Høegh-controlled vessels from August 1989 onwards.

After having gone through a difficult period, Leif Høegh was relieved to report buoyant results over 1989. Reviewing the fourth quarter, Høegh announced that vessel operations had produced a higher profit than expected. *“The positive trend for its Panamax OBO vessels (...) continued”*.<sup>33</sup>

Table 8 Leif Høegh vessels in South Africa 1979-1990

Crude oil deliveries:		
HØEGH ROVER	Apr/May 80	Brunei
KONKAR DINOS *	Dec 80/Jan 81	The Netherlands
HØEGH HILL	Sep 81	The Netherlands
HØEGH FOUNTAIN	May 82	Brunei
MOBIL WESER *	Dec 82	The Netherlands
HØEGH FOAM	Jne/Jly 1983	Brunei
HØEGH FORTUNA	Nov/Dec 83	Brunei
Calls by combined carriers at South African ports mainly for dry bulk trade (listed since Jan 84):		
HØEGH HILL	Feb 84	
HØEGH FULMAR	Apr 84	
HØEGH FULMAR	Aug 84	
HØEGH FORUM	Apr 88	
HØEGH FOUNTAIN	Apr 88	
HØEGH FAVOUR	Oct 88	
HØEGH FORUM	Mar 89	
Some recent petroleum products deliveries:		
JARAMA *	Aug/Sep 89	The Netherlands and Portugal
HØEGH FOUNTAIN	Oct 89	Denmark/Sweden and the Netherlands
HØEGH FOAM	Oct 89	Romania
AMBIA FAIR	Oct 89	Greece
HØEGH FOAM	Nov 89	The Netherlands
HØEGH FALCON	Apr 90	The Netherlands

\* Timecharter to Leif Høegh.

31. See p. 11-12.

32. Letter Leif Høegh & Co. A/S to Shipping Research Bureau, 7 February

1990.

33. *Lloyd’s List*, U.K., 9 January 1990.





## Effects of the Oil Embargo on South Africa

Oil is without doubt South Africa's *Achilles' heel* from the point of view of its dependence on the international community. Oil is the only strategic raw material not found in exploitable quantities, yet it is vital for the South African economy and for its military and police forces.

South Africa has to import at least 75 per cent of its needs for liquid fuel – on average about 14 million tons of crude oil yearly – from overseas by means of large oil tankers. The greater part of the oil is discharged at the Single Point Mooring Buoy about five kilometres off Durban on the east coast. Oil is also discharged at Cape Town and Saldanha Bay on the southwest coast of South Africa.

The remaining 20-25 percent of the country's fuel needs is

covered by the synthetic fuel production of the SASOL plants, in which indigenous coal is converted by a costly process into liquid fuels. In 1992, the first fuel is expected to flow from the Mossel Bay fuel-from-gas project, which is presently under construction. It will reduce South Africa's requirement for imported oil by ten per cent at the most. The country has spent large sums of money on oil exploration, mainly offshore, without making any economically exploitable oil finds.

The South African government has also tried to reduce its dependence on crude oil imports by reorganising its total energy consumption. Where possible, oil has been replaced by coal and nuclear energy. The use of oil has been confined to those areas where it cannot be replaced by any other fuel.

### South Africa's strategy to counter the oil embargo


#### South Africa's quest for oil

South Africa has searched extensively for oil, onshore as well as offshore, through its state-controlled exploration company *Southern Oil Exploration Corporation (SOEKOR)*. Since SOEKOR was founded in 1965, it has drilled at more than 150 sites. Although these searches have had little success, the company has always remained extremely optimistic about its oil search activities, reportedly moving from one 'promising' drilling site to the next. However, only a few of the sites have yielded any oil at all and none, so far, in economically exploitable quantities. SOEKOR has spent at least R 900 million on these activities.

SOEKOR's latest 'promising' sites are three offshore oil wells in the Bredasdorp Basin, southeast of Cape Town, 120 kilometres off the coast of Mossel Bay. The South African mining house *Gencor* has a twenty per cent interest in this project. The combined flow of oil from these wells could be some 22,000 barrels per day, equivalent to seven to eight per cent of South Africa's total oil imports. However, a major exploitation problem for SOEKOR is that the wells are not economically viable on their own. To obtain the oil from the wells, which are separated from one another by some ten kilometres, SOEKOR would have to use a floating production platform or deploy small tankers. As always, the company is extremely confident that the results are "the most promising (...) achieved so far" and optimistic reports continue to appear.<sup>1</sup>

In 1989, it took from early July to September for a tanker

chartered by SOEKOR to pump up a mere 40,000 tons of oil from one of the wells, before the first authentic South African oil could be brought ashore to be processed by one of the refineries at Durban or Cape Town.<sup>2</sup> On a visit in September 1989 to the rig *Omega*, which drilled the wells together with the rig *Actinia*, the then Minister of Mining and Energy Affairs Mr Danie Steyn stated that hopes to strike a viable oil source were increasing.<sup>3</sup> Similar optimistic notes were struck by Mr Steyn's successor, Mr Dawie de Villiers, who in March 1990 announced that SOEKOR had drilled at three more sites in the Bredasdorp Basin which showed "good signs" of oil and gas. In all, twelve boreholes have been drilled by SOEKOR in the area. According to Minister De Villiers three of them could be "classified as potentially



1. *Lloyd's List*, U.K., 7 November 1988.

2. *Cape Times*, South Africa, 7 July 1989; *Sunday Times*, South Africa,

27 August 1989; *The Citizen*, South Africa, 15 September 1989.

3. *The Citizen*, South Africa, 15 September 1989.



### Wells drilled by the SOEKOR-owned rigs *Actinia* and *Omega* in the Bredasdorp Basin

1.	Well E-AA1	discovered March 1987	3,000-5,000 b/d drilled by <i>Actinia</i>
2.	Well E-AD1	discovered March 1988	6,000-7,000 b/d drilled by <i>Actinia</i>
3.	Well E-AR1	discovered November 1988	10,000 b/d drilled by <i>Omega</i>
4.	} location not yet made public	discovered 1989/1990	reserves
5.			not yet
6.			made public
TOTAL			19,000-22,000 b/d

commercial oil strikes, while good signs of oil and gas were to be found in three other boreholes". He furthermore announced that SOEKOR is aiming at discovering more oil wells, with the intention to produce oil by 1992.<sup>4</sup>

SOEKOR is the ultimate owner of the rigs *Actinia* and *Omega*, drilling in the Bredasdorp Basin, and the *Nymphaea* which drilled off the South African coast until 1988 (see diagram on page 27).

### Mossel Bay fuel-from-gas project

Another project aiming to reduce the country's crude oil imports is the Mossel Bay fuel-from-gas project. It is the country's largest industrial project and has been under construction since 1987, when the government approved of the project after years of deliberation and evaluation. The approval was not based on economic grounds but on strategic considerations only, its purpose being to make the country less dependent on the import of oil. The cost of the project, initially calculated at R 5,500 million, has already soared to at least R 8,500 million. It would not be surprising if the total cost will reach R 10,000 million by the time the project is completed.

It was clear from the start that expertise and technology provided by foreign firms would be indispensable for this first giant offshore operation. Quite a number of European companies, mainly from the United Kingdom and West Germany, have been involved in the project. These companies participate in joint ventures with South African firms or have been subcontracted by them. Apparently, all contracts awarded to foreign suppliers include clauses which require these companies to seek countertrade opportunities with South Africa as a means of

repayment. The countertrade scheme is being orchestrated by MARCOSA, an independent body set up by Moss gas and Gencor.

The offshore part of the project consists of the platform which will extract the gas from the wells. Two pipelines of 85 kilometres will carry gas and condensate from the platform to the onshore refinery. Here the gas will be converted into liquid fuel. The Fischer-Tropsch process, which is also used at the SASOL synthetic fuel plants, will be used for the conversion. This process was originally developed in the 1930s in Nazi Germany by the chemical firm IG Farben.

The expected 25,000 barrels per day will be produced at a ratio of 53 per cent petrol and 47 per cent diesel. The planned capacity of the refinery is 50,000 barrels a day.

### The Namibian Kudu gasfield

Until Namibia's independence, South Africa had hopes that it would be able to reduce its dependence on crude oil imports by obtaining fuel from the *Kudu gasfield*. The reserves of this field, which is situated about 120 kilometres off the Namibian coast, have been estimated to be between three and eight times the gas reserves of Mossel Bay. Since the end of 1987 the SOEKOR-controlled Namibian exploration company SWAKOR conducted drilling activities in the offshore field.<sup>5</sup>

### SASOL


To date, only one project has succeeded in reducing the country's dependence on oil imports to a certain extent: the production of synthetic fuel at the SASOL plants near Johannesburg. *SASOL One*, *Two* and *Three* were built to

4. *The Star*, South Africa, 20 March 1990.

5. Shipping Research Bureau, *Oil to South Africa*, 1988, pp. 23ff; idem, *Kudu: South African development of Namibia's gas deposits to*

*circumvent the oil embargo?*, paper, 1988. Since its independence Namibia is investigating further exploitation possibilities.





The companies *Glance Bay Shipping Corporation* and *Woolf Rock Shipping Corporation* are financing organisations which were set up specifically to acquire the oil rigs *Nymphea* and *Actinia* on behalf of SOEKOR at the beginning of the 1980s. Apparently the loans provided at the time by Barclays and Nedbank, were replaced by loans provided by SOEKOR. SOEKOR has indemnified the banks

and their subsidiaries against any potential loss. The oil rig *Omega* was purchased by SOEKOR (*Actinia Corp.*) in 1987. The *Nymphea* and the *Actinia* were built by Hitachi Zosen, Ariaki Works in Japan in 1982. The *Omega* was bought from the Norwegian firm Dyvi Offshore Ltd. in 1987. The construction of the rig was by C.N.I.M. in France in 1983.



convert coal to liquid fuel by the Fischer-Tropsch process. The production of synthetic fuel is presently performed by SASOL Two and Three. SASOL One, constructed in 1955, started running down its output of synthetic fuel at the end of 1988 and ceased production of it in April 1990.

No official data are available on SASOL's output capacity, as all South African energy figures are considered a state secret under the Petroleum Products Act. Estimates range from 55,000 to 78,000 barrels per day. An operational estimate of some 70,000

barrels per day seems justified. This amount could reduce the country's imports by at most 20-25 per cent. The cessation of synfuel production by SASOL One does not seem to have affected SASOL's total output. SASOL's oldest plant has hardly produced any synthetic fuel in recent years. Instead, production has been focussed on other chemical products. However, the total synfuel output was affected by two fires which occurred at SASOL Three and Two in January and May 1989 respectively. The fires caused severe personal and material damage. Both plants were out of action for several months. By mid-1990 their production was still below capacity.

*Foreign firms involved in the Mossel Bay project:*

Davy Corporation *U.K.*  
 Crawford & Russell / John Brown Group *U.K.*  
 Brown & Root *U.K.* / Halliburton Co. *U.S.A.*  
 Northern Engineering Industries (NEI) *U.K.*  
 Howden Group *U.K.*  
 ICI *U.K.*  
 Humphries & Glasgow *U.K.* / Enserch Corporation *U.S.A.*  
 Kleinwort Benson *U.K.*  
 Lurgi / Metallgesellschaft *F.R.G.*  
 Hoechst *F.R.G.*  
 Linde *F.R.G.*  
 Howaldtswerke Deutsche Werft *F.R.G.*  
 Offshore Supply Association (OSA) *U.K.* / Preussag *F.R.G.*  
 VTG / Preussag *F.R.G.*  
 Entreprise Travaux Pétroliers Maritimes *France*  
 Allseas Engineering *The Netherlands*  
 Philips *The Netherlands*  
 Van Leeuwen Buizen *The Netherlands*  
 Smit-Lloyd *The Netherlands*  
 Kahn Scheepvaart *The Netherlands*  
 Jumbo Shipping Co. *Switzerland*  
 Dietsmann International *Belgium*

*Oil rigs controlled by the following companies have been involved in the search for oil off the South African coast for SOEKOR (and, in the past, in gas drilling off the Namibian coast for South African-controlled SWAKOR):*

Foramer / Forasol *France* – jointly owned by:  
 Soletanche *France*  
 Ackermans & Van Haaren *Belgium*  
 Industriele Handels Combinatie (IHC) *The Netherlands* (sold its share to its partners in 1989)

The process applied at the SASOL plants to convert coal into liquid fuel is a very costly one. The price at which SASOL produces liquid fuel is estimated at US \$ 75 per barrel of oil equivalent, which is far above current world market prices. Furthermore, high investments would be necessary to maintain the production capacity which has been declining considerably over the years owing to falling thermal efficiency of the plants. Therefore it is not likely that SASOL could reduce South Africa's need for imported liquid fuel any further. Plans to build another SASOL plant have been shelved.

### **Other synthetic fuel projects**

For a time, Moss gas and SASOL seemed to remain the only government-backed synthetic fuel projects. In November 1989 the government announced that it had dropped two other projects that had been waiting for approval since 1987. One was based on producing *methanol from coal*, the other on the recovery of oil from *torbanite*. The government's reason for dropping the projects was scarcity of capital and low oil prices.<sup>6</sup>

However, this did not herald a change in South Africa's policy on synthetic fuel. On the eve of South Africa's parliamentary elections in September 1989, the government approved in principle a third project. This project aims at the production of *ethanol from sugar*. Since, at mid-1990, no further progress has been made towards the realisation of the project it would not be surprising if it ended up on the same shelf as the two other synfuel projects.

### **The strategic stockpile of oil**

To counter the devastating effects of a possible total oil cut-off, the South African government has built up a stockpile of oil which could cover the country's total fuel consumption for several months. The exact size of the stockpile is not known but it is now assumed that it could meet a loss of imports of about 6 months. At a maximum, South Africa's reserve could be somewhere between fifty and sixty million barrels, or 7 to 8 million tonnes.

The stockpile of oil is stored in huge underground bunkers,

6. The methanol project, the larger of the two, was a joint venture between AECI, South Africa's largest diversified chemical group, and the Anglo American Coal Corporation (AMCOAL). The methanol was

to have been converted for use in vehicle engines using special additives developed by AECI. The torbanite project was backed by the Gencor Mining Group.



SOUTH AFRICAN OIL/FUEL INFRASTRUCTURE



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UPDATED SHIPPING RESEARCH BUREAU APRIL 1990

mostly converted mines. The bulk of the oil can be found in the industrial and demographical heartland of the country, in Transvaal and Natal. In addition, oil is stored in large steel tanks near South Africa's major towns and refineries (see Table 9).

There seems to be no significant storage of diesel oil. The SASOL plants produce more petrol than diesel. However, it is precisely diesel that South African transport, agriculture, industry, and the military and police forces need more.<sup>7</sup>

**Mossel Bay fuel-from-gas project – Facts and figures**

- ◆ Location: F-A gasfield, 85 kilometres off Mossel Bay on the south coast of South Africa (about 100 kms from Bredasdorp Basin)
- ◆ First gas deposits discovered by SOEKOR in 1980
- ◆ Government approval of the project February 1987
- ◆ Project planned to be completed by end 1991/beginning 1992
- ◆ Reserves: 28,000-34,000 million m<sup>3</sup> gas
- ◆ Production: 25,000 b/d (53 per cent petrol, 47 per cent diesel) during 30 years
- ◆ Costs: R 8,500-10,000 million
  
- ◆ **Owner and developer Mossgas (Pty) Ltd.:**
  - Central Energy Fund (government-controlled): 50 per cent
  - Gencor (private enterprise): 30 per cent
  - Industrial Development Corporation: 20 per cent
  
- ◆ **Financers of the project:**
  - Mossgas (Pty) Ltd.: 40 per cent
  - Central Energy Fund: 40 percent (soft loans)
  - exports credits: 20 per cent
  
- ◆ **General project manager:** Engen (Gencor)
  
- ◆ **Offshore part (Mossgas) – Project managers:**
  - Engineering Management Services Offshore (EMSO), a consortium of the South African company Murray & Roberts (60 per cent) and the British company Crawford & Russell, an offshoot of the John Brown Group (part of Trafalgar House): 40 per cent
  
- ◆ **Detailed design for Mossgas supplied by:**
  - Offshore Design Services (ODS), a joint venture of the South African companies Edward L. Bateman and LBD Engineering and the British firm Brown & Root, a subsidiary of the U.S. engineering firm Halliburton Company
  
- ◆ **Onshore part (Mossref) – Project management:**
  - Edward L. Bateman (South Africa)
  - Dave McKee S.A., part of the British Davy Corporation

**South Africa’s counterstrategy under attack**

South Africa’s energy policy – particularly the *Mossgas project* – has to endure a lot of internal criticism from the press, from the parliamentary opposition and from synthetic fuel industry experts.

As early as March 1987, the business weekly *Financial Mail* called the **Mossgas project** a “bubble of euphoria”.<sup>8</sup> In May 1988 the same weekly said “The overall conclusion is simple: it is not too late to put the Mossgas project on ice”.<sup>9</sup> A year later the project was even more vehemently criticised, when press reports quoted energy experts according to whom it was a giant economic disaster and “a rip-off” from beginning to end. The South African newspaper *The Star* reported “The whole project

Table 9 Oil storage locations in South Africa

locations	estimated amount
<i>Transvaal:</i>	
Kendal/Ogies (3-5 converted coal mines)	18 million barrels (2-2.5 mln tons) of crude oil and products
Ferrobank (one converted coal mine)	10-12 million barrels (1-1.5 mln tons) of oil products (presumably petrol)
<i>Orange Free State:</i>	
near Vrede (probably a blasted-out underground chamber)	10-12 million barrels (appr. 1.5 mln tons) of oil products
<i>Cape Province:</i>	
near Saldanha Bay (underground storage)	4 million barrels (0.5 mln tons) of crude oil
<i>All provinces:</i>	
steel tank farms near towns and refineries	12.5 million barrels (1.5-2 mln tons)
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>54.5-58.5 million barrels (7-8 mln tons)</b>

Source: Dr Paul Conlon. See also *SRB Newsletter* Nos. 10, January 1988, and 19, 2nd quarter 1990.

7. See note 6 on page 10.

8. *Financial Mail*, South Africa, 5 March 1987.

9. *Financial Mail*, South Africa, 13 May 1988.



looks economically speaking sick, producing an estimated 25,000 barrels of fuel a day for R 5,500 million, when overseas they can construct one that produces 100,000 barrels a day for less than R 100 million".<sup>10</sup>

In March 1990, the former head of Research and Development of SASOL, Mr Jan Hoogendoorn, suggested that the Moss gas project, which he called "shooting a midge with a cannon", should be scrapped. This would save the country R 3,500 million.<sup>11</sup> Another former SASOL employee, presently a senior lecturer at the Witwatersrand University, described the project as "a disgraceful and deplorable disaster" which would never show a profit. He said that the savings in foreign exchange, which he estimated to be some R 14,000 million, would barely outweigh the rands spent on the project. Officially, foreign exchange savings due to Moss gas have been calculated at R 120,000 million.<sup>12</sup>

In Parliament, the opposition Democratic Party called the project the "biggest economic liability left over from the P.W. Botha era." According to the party's spokesperson for energy affairs, Mr Roger Hulley, Moss gas was a great expense at a time when the country could least afford it. On an earlier occasion, Mr Hulley had said that the project made sense "only as a siege decision. If we were a normal society we wouldn't be taking these steps".<sup>13</sup>

**SASOL** is also criticised. In March 1990, the South African *Weekly Mail* said that if the oil embargo against South Africa was lifted, the country would be left with two enormous white elephants: SASOL and Moss gas. SASOL could never have succeeded without government protection.<sup>14</sup>

"Might the elimination of apartheid not have opened up world oil supplies at a far lower price, allowing the country to develop more viable resources? It is no accident that the huge SASOL plants haven't been matched in other countries. They had no need to tie up huge sums of development capital in such projects when cheaper fuel sources were available. Mossel Bay's degree of viability is related to the country's isolation".

[*The Star*, South Africa, 20 February 1987.]

The millions of rands "squandered on building up the country's strategic reserves of oil"<sup>15</sup> have also aroused questions. Oil worth hundreds of millions of dollars is tied up in the **stockpile**, the only purpose of which is to counter a possible oil cut-off.<sup>16</sup>

A recurring topic in South Africa's energy discussion is the amount of **money spent on the country's oil purchases**. In 1989, Mr Malcomess of the Progressive Federal Party (now part of the Democratic Party) stated in Parliament "When the full story of South Africa's oil purchases is known, we will find that enormous fortunes have been made".<sup>17</sup>

The continual **increases in petrol prices** have also been under fire. In Parliament the Democratic Party claimed that the South Africans were paying a political price for the high cost of petrol and that the petrol price would continue to rise as long as there was no majority government.<sup>18</sup> The government has also been pressed to reveal petrol price investigations.<sup>19</sup>

## Official secrecy and draconian legislation

The oil industry is well protected in South Africa by numerous laws. They make it illegal for anyone to disclose information on oil-related matters. People infringing these laws face heavy fines and possible jail-terms. Oil companies are strictly regulated. South African law prescribes the manner in which they may produce, transport, distribute and price their products. Regulations govern everything, from the number of service stations a company is permitted to open, to whether a company must maintain its own security forces to protect it from sabotage.

Companies face heavy penalties if they reveal whether the South African government has compelled them to sell their products to controversial buyers such as the police or the army. The companies are also forced to contribute to the strategic stockpile of oil.

The main laws regulating South Africa's procurement apparatus, the strategic stockpile, security, secrecy, and its system of financing oil purchases are briefly discussed below.

10. *The Star*, South Africa, 15 April 1989.

11. *The Star*, South Africa, 7 March 1990.

12. Mr Mike Smith in *The Star*, South Africa, 7 March 1990.

13. *The Star*, South Africa, 24 August 1989; *The Sunday Times*, South Africa, 11 February 1990.

14. *Weekly Mail*, South Africa, 2 March 1990.

15. South Africa's Finance Minister Barend du Plessis, *Natal Mercury*, South Africa, 12 November 1987.

16. The South African weekly *Finance Week* (1 March 1990) calculated that the stockpile could be worth somewhere between US \$ 4,000 and

6,000 million. Although this amount seems to be exaggerated, as it is based on a stockpile that could cover some two-and-a-half to three years of oil consumption, the real amount based on a reserve of some six months is still considerable.

17. Debates of the South African House of Assembly, Hansard, 14 February 1989.

18. *The Star*, South Africa, 15 July 1989.

19. House of Assembly Debates, Hansard, 13 February 1990; *The Citizen*, South Africa, 9 May 1990.



<p><i>"The Minister may ... regulate in such manner as he may deem fit, or prohibit, the publication, releasing, announcement, disclosure or conveyance to any person of information or the making of comment regarding (a) the source, manufacture, transportation, destination, storage, consumption, quantity or stock level of any petroleum product [incl. crude oil] acquired or manufactured or being acquired or manufactured for or in the Republic; (b) the taking place and particulars of negotiations in respect of the acquisition of petroleum products for the Republic and the transportation or consumption thereof, or of any other</i></p>	<p><i>business transaction in connection with any such petroleum product.</i></p> <p><i>Any person [contravening such prohibition or regulation] shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding seven thousand rand or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding seven years or to both such fine and such imprisonment."</i></p> <p>[From South African Petroleum Products Act 1977 as amended in 1979 and 1985]</p>
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**Defence Act:**

Under the Defence Act (1957<sup>20</sup>), petroleum products are defined as 'classified'. Any statement by an oil company relating to the supply or even non-supply of one of the products to the military is a punishable offence under this Act.

**National Supplies Procurement Act:**

Under the National Supplies Procurement Act (1970<sup>21</sup>) foreign-owned companies can be forced to produce strategic oil products for the country. They are required to set aside a certain portion of their refined oil for government purchase.

**National Key Points Act:**

This Act, dating from 1980, allows the government to take over company facilities and to place military personnel on the premises during emergencies. The act empowers the Minister of Defence to declare any place or area which is of strategic importance to the functioning of the South African state a National Key Point. Refineries and some of their main depots have been declared National Key Points in terms of the act.

**Petroleum Products Act:**

This Act (1977; further tightened in 1979 and 1985) specifically regulates all aspects of the oil industry. It prohibits the disclosure of information on oil matters (see sections of the law above).

**State Oil Fund Act:**

This Act (1977) allowed the creation of funds through which the South African government can control the domestic oil market. Three funds have been established: the Central Energy Fund (CEF); the Strategic Fuel Fund (SFF); and the Equalisation Fund. The funds are financed by various levies on the petrol price.

The **Central Energy Fund** (1985; formerly the State Oil Fund, 1977) covers the costs of research, development and construction of all energy projects in South Africa, including all expenses for the oil exploration corporation SOEKOR. The CEF is one of the three partners in the Mossel Bay gas-from-fuel project and provides more than a half of its finance. The Central Energy Fund also controls crude oil purchases and all connected transactions.

The **Strategic Fuel Fund** (1977) was originally founded to purchase oil for strategic purposes. Since 1979 the state has used the SFF to control practically all South African oil purchases from abroad.

The **Equalisation Fund** (1977) was established to compensate the subsidiaries of Western oil companies refining oil in South Africa for the abnormal cost of their crude oil purchases.

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**Costs of the oil embargo**

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South Africa's efforts to circumvent the oil embargo and to reduce its dependence on crude oil imports have cost the government dearly. A very heavy burden is placed on the South African economy. On top of its annual oil bill which varied between US \$ 1,300 and US \$ 3,800 million per year over the past eleven years, the country has had to pay a 'pariah cost' in order to overcome the direct and indirect effects of the oil embargo. This additional cost has varied between US \$ 2,000 and US \$ 2,460 million at a conservative estimate (see Table 10).

*Regular increases in fuel prices at the pump* can be partly explained as an effect of the oil embargo. Between September 1988 and mid-1990, crude oil prices have on the whole been falling, while fuel prices have risen by some forty per cent. At the same time, increases in fuel consumption make it hard for the country to attain its desired level of self-sufficiency. Growing oil import needs, together with a deteriorating rand/US dollar exchange rate, place a heavy burden on the national budget. *"This country's petrol consumption is growing by about 8 per*

20. And later amendments. Most South African laws involved are amended regularly.

21. And later amendments.




Table 10 Costs of the oil embargo

year	estimated cost of crude oil (US \$ mln)	estimated additional cost of embargo * (US \$ mln)
1979	3,800	2,360
1980	3,800	2,360
1981	3,000	2,000
1982	3,000	2,000
1983	3,000	2,300
1984	3,000	2,300
1985	3,000	2,300
1986	1,300	2,200
1987	1,730	2,460
1988	1,400	2,410
1989	1,600	2,410
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>28,630</b>	<b>25,100</b>

\* Estimated expenditure for: the search for crude oil and gas sources onshore and offshore; premiums paid to middlemen and traders on imported oil; the development and construction of the SASOL plants, and subsidies on their output and on the subsequent under-utilisation of the crude-oil refineries; the Mossel Bay project; facilities and opportunity cost for the strategic oil stockpile. For a detailed account, listing additional costs not included here, see Shipping Research Bureau, *South Africa's Lifeline. Violations of the Oil Embargo*, 1986, pp. 37-40.

cent in terms of volume each year. People have to realise we are in a country that is under boycotts and we have balance of payment problems".<sup>22</sup> Rising Equalisation Fund levies on petrol and diesel are another factor in increasing pump prices which is directly linked to the oil embargo. Compensation payments to oil companies at the current levels of the levies caused the Fund to run at a loss.<sup>23</sup>



PWV Area: SA's industrial heartland; Landed Cost: fictitious landed costs of imported petrol, based on weighted average prices at three refineries in Singapore and one in Bahrain, plus shipping costs to SA etc.; MVA: motor vehicle accident fund; Equalisation Fund: see p. 32

From: *SA Leadership*, South Africa, November 1989.

## Oil companies in South Africa

### The withdrawal of Mobil

On 28 April 1989 it was announced that the U.S. oil company *Mobil Corporation* had agreed to sell its business operations in Southern Africa to *General Mining Union Corporation Ltd.* (Gencor). The price agreed for Mobil's assets, believed to be worth at least US \$ 400 million, was US \$ 150 million. The assets included the Wentworth refinery near Durban, pipelines, a distribution network and twelve subsidiaries. The company employed nearly 3,000 workers in South Africa and operated over 1,100 petrol stations. Mobil was the biggest U.S. investor; it had been in the country for 92 years.

The withdrawal of Mobil Oil was widely regarded as rendering the position of the remaining foreign oil companies, *Shell*, *British Petroleum*, *Caltex* and *Total*, more vulnerable.<sup>24</sup>

Mobil said its decision to disinvest had been brought about by the legislation enacted and proposed in the U.S.A. which made it more and more difficult for the company to be fully competitive in South Africa. The Rangel amendment of January 1988 eliminated write-offs by U.S. companies of taxes paid in South Africa. This raised the effective tax rate for Mobil from 57.5 to 72

per cent, costing the company US \$ 5 million – or one third of its South African profits. Mobil also referred to the Dellums Bill which proposed a total ban on economic links between the U.S.A. and South Africa. If the Bill was adopted Mobil would be forced by law to withdraw, making its South African assets virtually worthless. Furthermore, the company had been under continual pressure from anti-apartheid organisations to withdraw from South Africa.

From the start, the South African *Chemical Workers Industrial Union* (CWIU) was highly critical of the withdrawal: although Mobil's disinvestment was "a victory for all anti-apartheid forces", it was nonetheless "Corporate Camouflage". "We demand that Mobil negotiate the terms of its withdrawal with us and disclose to us the details of the deal it has made with Gencor".<sup>25</sup> CWIU and Mobil Oil reached an agreement partially meeting the union's demands and safeguarding workers' rights only after strikes and weeks of negotiations.

Mobil is the second U.S. oil company to withdraw from South Africa. In 1986, the American oil company *Exxon* sold its South

22. South Africa's Minister of Finance Barend du Plessis, quoted in *The Star*, South Africa, 7 December 1988.


23. See *SRB Newsletter* No. 17, October 1989, pp. 3-4.

24. Shortly before the withdrawal, the chairman of Mobil Corp., Alan

Murray, said "if Shell or BP went, we'd all have to go" (*SA Leadership*, South Africa, 1988/5).

25. Statement CWIU National Executive Committee, 30 April 1989.





Source: *Sunday Times*, South Africa, 25 February 1990.

African subsidiaries to a trust which had been especially established to continue its operations. Since then its 160 petrol stations and bulk distribution have operated under the name *Zenex*.

### Gencor forms energy giant

In February 1990 Gencor announced the formation of a new energy group, *Engen*, in which Mobil's former assets were integrated. Mobil Oil's former chairman Mr Bob Angel became the company's first managing director. The new group consists of three divisions: marketing (Mobil, Trek Petroleum, Sonap, together 1500 petrol stations); production (Genref, the former Mobil Wentworth refinery, and Moss gas); and exploration (Soekor).

Engen is now South Africa's largest petrol group.

### Remaining companies

*Shell South Africa (Pty) Ltd.*

The Royal Dutch/Shell Group (the Netherlands/United Kingdom) is the largest foreign investor in South Africa. Together with British Petroleum, Shell S.A. owns and operates the *SAPREF* refinery (1963) near Durban. The refinery is South Africa's largest, with a capacity of 200,000 b/d. Shell S.A. also has about 850 petrol stations.

Shell S.A. has a 50 per cent share in the South African Rietspruit coal mine and a 12.5 per cent share in the Richards Bay coal terminal. Among its numerous other interests are the lubricants producers Cera Oil and Veetech Oil, Spectracare (a lubricants research laboratory), CADAC, Easigas, Pering Zinc Mine, Reef Chemicals and Price's Candles. Together with BP Southern Africa, Shell is part owner and operator of the Single Point Mooring Buoy off Durban, where most of South Africa's imported oil is discharged.

In November 1989, Shell announced that it had sold its shares in the South African companies Chemico and Trek, to Trek and Gencor respectively. Shell had frequently been criticised for its share in Chemico, as this company openly advertised its supplies to the South African police force. At its annual shareholders' meetings Shell always categorically denied supplying the South


Table 11 **South Africa's refining capacity**

SAPREF (1963) Durban <i>Shell/BP</i>	200,000 b/d
Caltex Oil (early 1960s) Milnerton, Cape Town <i>Caltex</i>	90,000 b/d
NATREF (1970) Sasolburg <i>Total/SASOL/NIOC?</i>	78,500 b/d
Wentworth/GENREF (1953) Durban <i>Engen</i>	65,000 - 100,000 b/d *
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>433,500 - 468,500 b/d</b>

\* In April 1990 Gencor announced that between 1990-1995 GENREF will be expanded by 75 per cent.

Sources: PennWell *Worldwide Refining & Gas Processing Directory 1990*, Tulsa OK, September 1989; Drewry Shipping Consultants, *Refined Petroleum Products*, London, December 1989, p. 63.





Source: *The SA Defence Force Yearbook*, 1989.

African defence force through Chemico. However, Chemico's open advertisements were becoming increasingly embarrassing. In the same deal SAPREF, fully-owned by Shell and BP, obtained Trek's fifty per cent share in SAMCO (South Africa Lubricants Manufacturing Company).

*BP Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd.*

BP Southern Africa is a fully-owned subsidiary of the British company British Petroleum. Besides its 50 per cent share in SAPREF, the company has some 900 petrol stations. Like Shell, BP has sold its shares in Trek and Chemico. In November 1989, BP sold its South African mining division. The

company is now concentrating on refining and marketing oil products.

*Caltex Oil (S.A.) (Pty) Ltd.*

Caltex is jointly-owned by Texaco and Socal (Chevron). Since Mobil withdrew from South Africa, Caltex is the only subsidiary of a U.S. company to remain. The company owns the only refinery in the Cape Province. The refinery at Milnerton near Cape Town has a capacity of 90,000 b/d. Caltex S.A. has some 950 petrol stations.

*Total South Africa (Pty) Ltd.*

Total S.A. is 57.6 per cent owned by the French company Total CFP (Compagnie Française des Pétroles). The remaining shares are held by South African investors: Rembrandt Group (34.4 per cent) and Old Mutual (8 per cent). Total S.A. co-owns (30 per cent) and operates the *NATREF* refinery at Sasolburg, Transvaal. SASOL owns 52.5 per cent of the shares in NATREF. The last known owner of the remaining 17.5 per cent was the National Iranian Oil Company; in 1989 Iran announced that it had been able to dissolve all its South African assets. No information was given as to who took over NIOC's share in NATREF. Total has some 700 petrol stations in South Africa.





## Closing the Loopholes

Many governments and intergovernmental organisations have adopted oil embargo policies. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of the existing embargo is seriously hampered by deficiencies in the

measures taken. Efforts to enhance the effectiveness of the oil embargo should therefore also entail the closing of loopholes in the existing measures.

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### Recent developments: Countries

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#### \* Norway: Successful crude oil ban undermined

The transport capacity available for oil destined for South Africa was considerably curtailed when a ban on *crude oil* transports by Norwegian tankers and companies came into force on 20 July 1987. Until mid-1987 Norwegian tankers had been the main transporters of crude oil to South Africa, but investigations by the Shipping Research Bureau have identified no further shipments since that date.

There are certain conditions under which deliveries of crude oil are not punishable<sup>1</sup> but no advantage has been taken of these loopholes, as far as we know.

However, the effectiveness of the law is currently undermined by Norwegian tankers delivering *refined oil products* instead. A campaign is under way in Norway to close this loophole in the boycott law.<sup>2</sup>

#### \* Singapore adopts oil ban

In September 1989 the Government of Singapore adopted an administrative ban on the export and transport of oil and petroleum products to South Africa by Singapore tankers and companies. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced in a press release: "In compliance with U.N. General Assembly resolutions calling for the complete cessation of the supply of petroleum and petroleum products to South Africa, and with the Commonwealth Accord on Southern Africa calling for an oil embargo against South Africa, the Singapore Government is banning the carriage of oil to South Africa by Singapore-flagged ships with effect from 15 September 1989. Shipping companies owned by the Singapore Government will include 'end-user' clauses and other conditions in their charter agreements to ensure compliance with the embargo. Singapore-registered ships violating this ban are liable to have their registrations cancelled. An administrative ban on the export of oil and petroleum products to South Africa will also come into effect on 15 September 1989".<sup>3</sup>

This announcement followed only a few weeks after a

Singapore-registered tanker, the *Probo Gull*, had delivered a cargo of gasoline to South Africa.<sup>4</sup>

A loophole in the ban is that it does not prohibit Singapore-based companies from using *foreign-flagged* ships for oil transports to South Africa. Nor does it apply to Singapore companies trading oil from third countries. The embargo would certainly be more comprehensive if provisions were included to close these loopholes.

#### \* U.S. Congress: New Bill discussed

In the United States of America the *Anti-Apartheid Sanctions Bill* proposes a total cut of all economic ties with South Africa. Under this Bill foreign companies with investments in South Africa would have to withdraw from the country.

The Bill was introduced by the Democratic Congressman Ronald Dellums of California and adopted in the House of Representatives in 1988,<sup>5</sup> but failed to get through the Senate before Congress dissolved in October 1988. After the presidential elections, the Bill was reintroduced in the new House of Representatives in January 1989. In March 1989 the identical Anti-Apartheid Sanctions Bill was introduced before the Senate by the Democratic Senator Paul Simon from Illinois. The Bill includes clauses penalising oil and mining subsidiaries of international companies with investments in South Africa.

Three amendments to the existing *Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act* of 1986 would affect the oil industry. No United States company would be allowed to hold any investment in South Africa. This would force the last U.S. oil company with investments in South Africa, *Caltex*, to withdraw. Secondly, foreign-owned oil companies with investments in South Africa would not be able to obtain any new oil, coal and gas leases in the U.S.A. In the third place no U.S. person would be allowed to provide transportation of crude oil or refined petroleum products to South Africa, directly or through an affiliate.

1. See Shipping Research Bureau, *Oil to South Africa. Apartheid's Friends and Partners*, 1988, p. 27.

2. See pp. 11-12.

3. Press statement Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Singapore's policy on oil

trade with South Africa, 15 September 1989.

4. Appendix I, Table H, case 10.

5. See Shipping Research Bureau, *Oil to South Africa*, op. cit., pp. 27ff.



## Recent developments: International organisations

### \* The United Nations

The General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a resolution on the oil embargo against South Africa by the largest majority ever on 22 November 1989. There were 139 votes for the resolution, two against and 14 abstentions. Among those abstaining were **Belgium, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Israel, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Portugal**. The **United Kingdom** and the **United States of America** persevered in their negative votes. (See annex on page 44.)

#### *Intergovernmental Group to Monitor the Supply and Shipping of Oil and Petroleum Products to South Africa*

The United Nations Intergovernmental Group was established by the General Assembly in 1986. The Group, in which both oil-shipping and oil-exporting nations are represented, issued its first report in 1987.<sup>6</sup>

In its second report in November **1988**, the Group dealt with a great number of individual cases of violations of the oil embargo. It emphasised the need for a strict implementation of the oil embargo. Despite universally declared policies that no oil or petroleum products should reach South Africa, implementation of these policies fell short, the report concluded.

The third report (November **1989**) stated that it was now more important than ever that the international community continued to put pressure on South Africa and that existing measures should be strengthened. According to the Group, South Africa was facing increasing difficulties in evading the oil embargo. The report emphasised the role of the transnational oil companies in assisting South Africa in its attempts to satisfy its energy requirements.

The Group announced that it was planning to formulate a *model law*, on the basis of existing laws, regulations and comparable measures already taken by Member States. This model law will be presented to governments for their consideration.

In April **1989**, the Intergovernmental Group and the United Nations Special Committee against Apartheid organised *Hearings on the Oil Embargo*. The Shipping Research Bureau was one of the thirteen witnesses heard by a Panel. In its final conclusions the Panel emphasised the importance of a comprehensive approach to the embargo which should comprise the supply, shipping and handling of oil destined for South Africa, and the financing of and investment in the petroleum industry. The role of transnational companies in the continuing supply of oil to South Africa was underscored.

In May 1990, Ambassador Anthony B. Nyakyi of Tanzania succeeded the former Norwegian Ambassador Mr Tom Erik Vraalsen as Chairman of the Group. At his appointment the Ambassador emphasised that there was an obvious link between the work of the Group and the present political developments in South Africa, which he described as the “*first tentative steps on a long and arduous road*”. He said:

*“Even the Pretoria authorities admit that the heavy toll of economic sanctions, including the oil embargo, could not have been borne in the long run. There is no doubt this is one of the factors which have propelled Mr. de Klerk to the negotiating table. Therefore, if the international community can maintain the same level of effective pressure on Pretoria, there is a good chance of keeping him there until a democratic and just settlement is achieved. Thus the Intergovernmental Group has an important role to play in support of such a just settlement”.*<sup>7</sup>

Referring to the direct effects of the embargo for South Africa, the Chairman explained that the country has to buy its oil half-way around the world instead of in the nearest market. “*A rough, though by no means unrealistic, calculation suggests that for every thousand dollars spent by the international community in enforcing the oil embargo, Pretoria must spend one million dollars to readapt its logistics to offset the effect.*” He said that the Group was going to focus more on shipping states that register the tankers transporting oil and petroleum products to South Africa. The oil exporting countries should also use *certificates of discharge* more effectively.<sup>8</sup>

In June **1990** the Intergovernmental Group released an interim report which deals with 415 unclarified port calls made by potential petroleum carriers to South Africa over the period 1986-early 1989. According to the Group these ships called at South African ports so often that there was probably a serious loophole in the embargo. The cooperation of flag states would be vital in closing such a loophole because ships are bound at all times by the laws of the flag state. Unfortunately, the majority of the states contacted did not provide the Group with any explanations for the port calls.

### \* The Commonwealth

The Commonwealth Heads of Governments called for a tightening up of the existing sanctions against South Africa, at their biennial meeting in Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia) in October 1989. They concluded that it was not the time “*to consider any relaxation of existing sanctions and pressure. That would have to await evidence of clear and irreversible change*”.<sup>9</sup>

6. Ibid., p. 29. The eleven members of the Group are Algeria, Cuba, the German Democratic Republic, Indonesia, Kuwait (vice-chairman), New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Tanzania (chairman as of May 1990), and the Ukrainian S.S.R.

7. Statement of H.E. Mr A.B. Nyakyi, upon his election as Chairman of

the Intergovernmental Group, United Nations, New York 7 May 1990.

8. Ibidem.

9. *Southern Africa. The Way Ahead*, Final statement, Kuala Lumpur, October 1989. The United Kingdom dissented, repeating its opposition to further sanctions.



The Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa made a call at their meeting in Abuja (Nigeria) in May 1990 not to lift any of the existing sanctions.

The Commonwealth first adopted sanctions against South Africa, including an embargo on oil, at its Heads of Governments meeting in Nassau (Bahamas) in 1985. South Africa has been on the agenda of Commonwealth meetings for the last thirty years.

**\* The European Community**

At the summit of the European Community held in Dublin on 25-26 June 1990, it was decided that all sanctions against South Africa, including the oil embargo, would remain in force. In 1985 the E.C. Member States adopted a limited oil embargo which restricted exports only of crude oil produced or brought into free circulation in E.C. countries. Exports of petroleum products and deliveries of oil held in bonded storage are not included in this ban.

**The importance of discharge control**

*"The oil-exporting States have adopted measures and procedures to enforce the oil embargo such as the certificate-of-discharge practice which have not been as effective as we would have liked, but which do represent a basis for further co-ordination efforts. (...) The Intergovernmental Group will press for more rigorous standards and procedures in the matter of discharge certification in order to increase the impact of this method of preventing oil shipments to South Africa".<sup>10</sup>*

With these words Ambassador Nyakyi of Tanzania, the new Chairman of the United Nations Intergovernmental Group to Monitor the Supply and Shipping of Oil and Petroleum Products to South Africa, pinpointed one of the main issues to be addressed by the Group in 1990.

*'Certificates of discharge', 'end-user certificates'* and similar

documents enable the authorities of oil-exporting countries to control the destination of their oil, and in particular, to verify that none of their oil reaches destinations which are subject to an embargo, such as South Africa. Each cargo sold is accompanied by a document which the purchasers of oil have to return to the oil-exporting country after having been duly certified by the competent Customs or Port Authorities in the country where the cargo in question has been delivered. Alternatively, the purchasers are requested to produce any other document certified by the competent authorities in the receiving country proving the discharge in that particular country.

An efficient system of discharge certificates is indispensable for attaining a strictly enforced oil embargo against South Africa. However, there are a number of problems. Not every oil-exporting country has instituted a strict system of destination

ATTESTATION  
-----  
certificate of discharge

JE SOUSSEIGNE RECEVEUR DES DOUANES DE : VERDON  
I undersigned Head of Customs at

CERTIFIE QUE LA CARGAISON TOTALE DU NAVIRE PETROLIER  
certify that the entire cargo of the tanker CAST PUFFIN

ARRIVE LE 21 sep '80 A VERDON EN PROVENANCE DE SEAL SANDS  
arrived on the at coming from

AVEC / 81.695,936 LONGTONS D'HUILE MINERALE BRUTE, A ETE DECHARGE  
with longtons of crude oil, was discharged

DANS CE PORT 23 SEP 1980  
at this port

FAIT A VERDON LE 24 SEP 1980  
issued at on the

PR. LE RECEVEUR DES DOUANES  
for and on behalf of head of Customs

PORT AUTONOME DE BORDEAUX

TELEPHONE (05 75 11) 10000-10001 FAX DE LA MOINE - PLACE BARBE 1001 BORDEAUX MERE

LE DIRECTEUR P.O. BOX 1898 1001 OM AMSTERDAM

13/01/1984

27 MARS 1984

Escalé au VERDON de 2 tonnes anglaises

Monsieur,

En réponse à votre lettre de référence, j'ai l'honneur de vous informer que les deux pétroliers anglais "CAST PUFFIN" et "SPET BRIDGE" n'ont jamais fait escale au VERDON.

Je vous prie, Monsieur, de croire à ma considération distinguée.

M. LANS

DIRECTION REGIONALE DES DOUANES  
et des DROITS INDIRECTS

Division de Bordeaux - Communauté Urbaine  
1, Quai de la Douane - BORDEAUX

TEL. : 46 70 48 46 70 10

Le Directeur Adjoint des Douanes  
Chef Division de Bordeaux

D. N°

Monsieur-Jacques Tronchet  
Monsieur Shipping Research Bureau PO Box 11058  
1001 OM AMSTERDAM - 1001 OM AMSTERDAM

Objet: Escalé au Verdon de deux pétroliers anglais.

Référence: Vos lettres des 30 mars et 8 mai 1984  
lettre du Port autonome de Bordeaux (SD p. tel 180) du 27 Mars 1984.

Monsieur,

Par lettre citée en référence adressée à M. le Directeur des Douanes au Verdon, et agissant pour le compte du Ministère Français de l'Énergie, vous avez demandé des renseignements concernant le développement dans le Port du Verdon, de deux pétroliers "Hullie" et "Hullie" transportés par les autres pétroliers Cast Puffin et Spet Bridge.

Je vous précise que les recherches effectuées dans les archives du Bureau de douane confirment la réponse du Directeur du Port Autonome de Bordeaux qui vous a été transmise le 27 Mars 1984. Les pétroliers n'ont pas touché le Port du Verdon aux dates indiquées dans vos correspondances.

En ce qui concerne l'empreinte des rebuts de douane qui auraient été apposés sur les attestations jointes au dossier, je vous informe qu'une enquête administrative est en cours.

Je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur, mes salutations distinguées.

M. LANS

False French customs documents were submitted to the Norwegian Ministry of Oil and Energy in order to make it appear that the embargo on North Sea oil to South Africa had been duly observed. French port and customs authorities have confirmed that the tankers in question have not called at the port indicated by the falsified certificates of discharge. An official investigation is in progress. (See also: John Deuss/Transworld Oil, SRB survey, January 1985.)

From: Shipping Research Bureau, South Africa's Lifeline. Violations of the Oil Embargo, 1986, p. 13.

10. Statement H.E. A. Nyakyi, op. cit.



control. Often a system exists but no penalties are applied when discharge documents are not received. And when documents are submitted, they are not always thoroughly scrutinised. During the United Nations Hearings on the Oil Embargo against South Africa in April 1989, *"testimony indicated a general feeling that the monitoring and verification of such destination control instruments was lax"*.<sup>11</sup> All 'discharge certificates' with regard to cargoes which in fact have been secretly delivered to South Africa are forged, showing fake destinations in countries not subject to an embargo.

Monitoring institutions attach much weight to an efficient system of discharge certificates. The United Nations Intergovernmental Group, submitting cases of suspected oil deliveries to South Africa to Governments concerned, *"believes that only a certificate of discharge or comparable proof could be accepted as conclusive evidence that the oil shipment in question did not take place."* The Group has always *"emphasized the need to receive [from Governments] documentation on the destination of the oil shipments in question, including certificates of discharge of the oil cargoes. (...) It is hoped that, by requesting such documentation and subjecting it to thorough scrutiny, the Governments concerned will be more conscientious in ensuring that oil and shipping companies do not falsify the documents"*.<sup>12</sup>

A striking example of a forged discharge document, used to conceal a secret delivery to South Africa of crude oil from Saudi Arabia by the tanker *Berge Enterprise* in April 1987, is reproduced in this report on page 3. Below, we will show a few other clear examples of the way in which discharge certificates are forged in order to mislead oil-exporting countries. The deliveries in question have been identified some time ago and have been described in earlier Shipping Research Bureau reports.<sup>13</sup> The falsified 'certificates', used to conceal deliveries to South Africa of crude oil, fuel oil and gasoil from different countries in the Middle East and Far East, have only recently come to the Bureau's attention.

**Crude oil from Brunei to South Africa**

On 17 February 1984, the tanker *Ohio* sailed from Brunei loaded with two types of crude oil. Destination on departure 'U.S. West Coast', the destination usually reported to the seller in Brunei in those cases when the trader at the end of the chain, Marc Rich, had in fact destined the oil for South Africa. After 42 days, during which the cargo was discharged in South Africa, the *Ohio* surfaced at one of the anchorage ports in the Persian Gulf area.

Afterwards, the Brunei company selling the crude was presented with the 'certificate' reproduced herewith, showing the purported discharge at *Genoa, Italy*, shortly before the date the *Ohio* arrived at Fujairah Anchorage on 30 April 1984.

DOGANA DI GENOVA - Ufficio Manifesti -

Visti l'Art.375 regolamento Doganale su istanza dello

spedizionario P. TOMANELLI per conto della Spett.le

CICHERO, giusta autorizzazione della Diraz. Sup. 7011.

esaminati gli atti d'ufficio si certifica che nel

M.M.A. no. 200200 del 21/3/84 della Nave OHIO

risalzano iscritte per la destinazione di

Genova le sottoelencate partite di merce imbarcate a

SERIA, BRUNEI -----

Rinfusa - SERIA LIGHT CRUDE OIL KG 80,140,000 (ottanta

milioncentoquarantamila)

e CHAMPION CRUDE OIL KG 21,713,000 (ventunomilioni

settecentotredicimila) si rilascia

il presente certificato per gli usi consentiti dalla

legge con l'avvertenza che il presente sarà nullo e

privo di ogni effetto se prodotto in giudizio ai danni

dell'AMministrazione Finanziaria e ai suoi

funzionari, né vale per documentare richieste di

cessazione di valuta, non scorta merce.

GENOVA 17

IL COMPILATORE

IL CAPO UFFICIO

CAPO DELLA CIRCOSCRIZIONE

23-3-1984

DOGANA DI GENOVA - SET. GENERALE

A voyage to Genoa in the period indicated would have been possible, via the Suez Canal. Needless to say that no passages through the Canal had been reported, and besides, no voyage Genoa-Persian Gulf could have been made within the short time interval of between the dates mentioned in the document and the date of arrival in the Persian Gulf. A voyage to Genoa and back round the Cape which would have explained why no passages through the Suez Canal were reported is absolutely impossible within the space of 42 days.

**Gasoil from Bahrain to South Africa**

The 'certificates' reproduced here were presented to the Bahrain National Oil Company by *Total International* (France), the purchaser of a number of gasoil cargoes which ended up in South Africa. The 'certificates' offer some additional examples which show that often even a cursory investigation of such documents inevitably leads to the conclusion that they are a fake.

The *Gentle Breeze*, a bulk/oil carrier and not a 'motor tanker' as she is called in the document, loaded part cargoes in Bahrain and Kuwait purportedly for delivery in Rotterdam, the Netherlands. She discharged

11. Report of the Intergovernmental Group., 1989, pp. 8-9.  
12. Report of the Intergovernmental Group., 1988, pp. 10 and 42.  
13. Shipping Research Bureau, South Africa's Lifeline. Violations of the Oil

Embargo, 1986, Appendix I, Table A, case 61 (*Ohio*); idem, Oil to South Africa, op.cit., Appendix I, Table A, cases 10 (*Beatrice*), 22 (*Biscaya*), 34 (*Gentle Breeze*) and 61 (*Singa Star*).



Trieste, 17 Marzo 1986

**CERTIFICATE OF DISCHARGE**

Port of Loading details :

Name of original vessel : m/t " GENTLE BREEZE "  
 Loading port : Sitra  
 Date of loading : 18th February 1986  
 Cargo in (gross)/Metric Tons : 29.993,640  
 Grade of cargo loaded : Gasoil

Port of discharge details :


Name of port : Trieste  
 Name of vessel : m/t " GENTLE BREEZE "  
 Date of discharge : 15th March 1986  
 Cargo in (gross) / Metric Tons : 29.993,640  
 Name of consignee : S.I.O.T. / TAL - TRIESTE

Dogana di Trieste / Sezione San Sabba

Si attesta che dalla petroliera Gentle Breeze sono state scaricate in questo porto una partita di gasolio di Kg. 29.993,640 proveniente da Sitra come da MMA n. Ro 6 Serie A del 15.3.86

AUTORIZZAZIONE DELLA DIREZIONE CIRCOSCRIZIONALE DELLA DOGANA DI TRIESTE,

Trieste,



during the period in question no movements were reported at all. As was to be expected, no call at Trieste was reported, neither were passages through the Suez Canal.

According to the next document, the *Biscaya* – again a bulk/oil carrier – would have discharged her cargo not in South Africa but, again, in Trieste and again on a date, 27 May 1986, which would not have allowed the ship to arrive at the Persian Gulf on 6 June 1986, even if she had sailed at maximum speed. Of course, no passages through the Suez Canal were reported.<sup>14</sup>

The document shown for the *Singa Star* is peculiar indeed. This vessel sailed from Bahrain (a place the 'certificate' situates in *Saudi Arabia*) and Kuwait mid-September 1986, again purportedly 'for Rotterdam'. On 20 October 1986, after having discreetly discharged her cargo in South Africa, she surfaced again in the Persian Gulf. However, according to the

her cargo in South Africa instead and subsequently collected a cargo of South African coal in Richards Bay for delivery in the Far East. The document submitted to Bahrain would make believe that the *Gentle Breeze* discharged her cargo in *Trieste, Italy*, on a date which is incompatible with a voyage Trieste-Richards Bay-Far East. In fact,

Trieste, 27 Maggio 1986

**CERTIFICATE OF DISCHARGE**

Port of Loading details :

Name of original vessel : m/t " BISCAYA "  
 Loading port : Sitra  
 Date of loading : 4th May 1986  
 Cargo in (gross)/Metric Tons : 37.982,850  
 Grade of cargo loaded : Gasoil

Port of discharge details :


Name of port : Trieste  
 Name of vessel : " BISCAYA "  
 Date of discharge : 27th May 1986  
 Cargo in (gross) / Metric Tons : 37.982,850  
 Name of consignee : S.I.O.T. / TAL - TRIESTE

Dogana di Trieste / Sezione San Sabba

Si attesta che dalla petroliera Biscaya sono state scaricate in questo porto una partita di gasolio di Kg. 37.982,850 proveniente da Sitra come da MMA n. Ro 7 Serie A del 27.5.86

AUTORIZZAZIONE DELLA DIREZIONE CIRCOSCRIZIONALE DELLA DOGANA DI TRIESTE,

Trieste,



Trieste, 13 October 1986

**CERTIFICATE OF DISCHARGE**

Port of Loading details :

Name of original vessel : m/t " SINGA STAR "  
 Loading port : Bahrain (Saudi Arabia)  
 Date of loading : 13th September 1986  
 Cargo in (gross)/Metric Tons : 51.795,99  
 Grade of cargo loaded : Diesel/gasoil  
 Transhipment vessel : m/t " ARCHONTISSA KATINGO "  
 Date of transhipment : 20th September 1986

Port of discharge details :


Name of port : Trieste  
 Name of vessel : m/t " ARCHONTISSA KATINGO "  
 Date of discharge : 11th October 1986  
 Cargo in (gross) / Metric Tons : 51.795,99  
 Name of consignee : S.I.O.T. / TAL - TRIESTE

Dogana di Trieste / Sezione San Sabba

Si attesta che dalla petroliera Singa Star sono state scaricate in questo porto una partita di olio di petrolio diesel di Kg. 51.795,99 proveniente da Bahrain come da MMA n. Ro 7 Serie A del 11.10.86

AUTORIZZAZIONE DELLA DIREZIONE CIRCOSCRIZIONALE DELLA DOGANA DI TRIESTE,

Trieste,



document submitted to Bahrain, the cargo had been transferred on 20 September, at a non-specified place, into the *Archontissa Katingo*. This 'motor tanker' was supposed to have discharged the oil in *Trieste* on 11 October 1986. At the purported date of trans-shipment, no vessel existed bearing the name *Archontissa Katingo*. A bulk/oil carrier bearing that name had been renamed *Archontissa* and reflagged in August 1986 at the latest, that is, quite some time before the date mentioned in the document. Even so, the *Archontissa* was nowhere near the Persian Gulf or Italy on 20 September 1986, but in *Sakai, Japan*. From there, she could never have reached Italy by the date indicated on the document.


#### Fuel oil from Aden to South Africa

A document regarding the tanker *Beatrice* presents another interesting

14. On departure from the Persian Gulf, as well as on returning there, the *Biscaya* maintained that she would go, respectively, had sailed to Rotterdam... Again a voyage which she could never have made within

the 33 days between her departure from and her return to the Persian Gulf.





case. This vessel sailed from Aden in Yemen on 16 May 1986, loaded with fuel oil for the *National Iranian Oil Company* (NIOC). The oil had been refined at the Aden Refinery Company, which was informed that the cargo was destined for Genoa, Italy. On 20 June 1986, after having delivered her cargo in South Africa, the *Beatrice* arrived at Jeddah in the Red Sea, reporting 'Singapore' as her last port of call. No calls have been reported at Genoa or Singapore, and no passages through the Suez Canal. Genoa was chosen as the purported discharge port in the document which the Government of Iran received and consequently submitted to the Shipping Research Bureau. However, while adapting the document to this particular case, the producers of the forged document which is in all aspects similar to the three Trieste 'certificates' reproduced above, forgot that *Section San Sabba* is the oil terminal area in the port of *Trieste*, and has nothing to do with Genoa.

The wording of the 'Italian' documents also gives rise to considerable doubts concerning their producers' mastery of the Italian language. E.g., the *Beatrice* document 'testifies' something to the effect that "*in this port a cargo are discharged tanker Beatrice*".

The Italian Government has informed the Shipping Research Bureau that none of the ships mentioned have discharged any oil in Genoa or Trieste in 1986, which "*could indeed substantiate the conclusion that the documents in question were falsified*".<sup>15</sup>

Campaigns against the presence of oil companies in South Africa

During recent years the Western oil companies with subsidiaries in South Africa have been under pressure to disinvest from the country.

In particular, the Dutch/British **Royal Dutch/Shell Group** has been under fire world-wide from anti-apartheid organisations, solidarity groups, churches, municipalities, trade unions etc. for its activities in South Africa. Besides international organisations such as the World Council of Churches and the World Health Organisation (WHO), organisations in at least fifteen countries have joined in the boycott.<sup>16</sup>

Within South Africa, the company prides itself on its outspoken anti-apartheid stance. However, Shell has never violated any apartheid law. The Chemical Workers' Industrial Union, which regards Shell S.A. as "*the worst employer in the petrol industry*", expressed its views on the company and its 'anti-apartheid' advertisements as follows:

*"Shell's presence in South Africa is not primarily to provide employment, uplift the economy, support freedom of the press or, even less, to ensure democratic participation of all South Africans in the political life of the country.*

*Shell's objectives are to secure a good return on its investments in South Africa on the basis of exploiting South African workers and assisting the upholding of the status quo, and consequently the apartheid regime*".<sup>17</sup>

In reaction to Mobil's decision to withdraw, Shell's managing director John Kilroe said that the withdrawal had "*not in any way affected Shell's determination to continue in its fight to maintain its South African operations*".<sup>18</sup>

**Mobil Oil** has been under sustained pressure from organisations in the United States to withdraw from South Africa. These activities definitely contributed to the company's decision to sell its South African assets in April 1989.

Since the withdrawal of Mobil, attention in the U.S.A. has focussed on the only U.S. oil company to remain in South Africa, **Caltex**. According to the former chairman of Mobil S.A. and present managing director of Engen, Bob Angel, Caltex's position is vulnerable: "*They are caught by double taxation and they cannot bring in new technology or investment*".<sup>19</sup> At the time, reacting to Mobil's withdrawal, the managing director of

15. Letter to the Shipping Research Bureau from the Permanent Mission of Italy to the United Nations, 28 August 1989. See also *SRB Newsletter* No. 18, 1st quarter 1990, p. 7.  
16. Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Japan, Malaysia, the Netherlands, New Zealand,

Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the U.S.A.  
17. CWIU petrol coordinator Martin Jansen, quoted in *New Nation*, South Africa, 10 October 1989.  
18. *The Citizen*, South Africa, 9 May 1989.  
19. *Cape Times*, South Africa, 6 April 1990.



Caltex itself, Mr Jock McKenzie said that his company had "no intention of leaving SA unless legislation forces us to", a position which the company has maintained since.<sup>20</sup>

When the news of Mobil's planned disinvestment leaked out, the chief executive of **Total S.A.**, Mr Bernhard Lafitte, said he was "extremely disconcerted" by the prospect: "If one pulls out,

there will be increasing pressure on the rest of us to do the same".<sup>21</sup>

In 1986, the anti-apartheid movement, trade unions and others in France started a campaign against the continued South African activities of French parent company Total, of which the French Government is the principal shareholder.

### Publicity and Action Are Effective

Publicity breaks secrecy. Oil deliveries to South Africa cannot bear the light of day. Secrecy, misinformation, fraud and deception are basic ingredients of the trade. Publicising information and public and political debate on the involvement of companies in oil supplies to South Africa have a deterring effect in themselves; publicity, action and legislation appear to be effective in tightening the oil embargo:

- ◆ In the early 1980s, major oil companies such as BP, Mobil and, especially, Shell were still defying the oil embargo and kept sending their own tankers to South Africa. In shareholders' meetings and elsewhere, the companies came under persistent fire for their activities. Under pressure of adverse publicity these companies were **forced to bring their direct and visible involvement in transports to South Africa to an end** in early 1981. This has forced South Africa to turn to oil traders such as Marc Rich, John Deuss (Transworld Oil), Marimpex and other middlemen. These have asked a price for their willingness to go on supplying South Africa, thus aggravating the financial strains on the country.
- ◆ In 1987, South Africa's **main supplier of oil** for many years, Transworld Oil, felt compelled to issue a **statement to the effect that the company had stopped selling oil to South Africa**. A major reason for this step was the **sharpening of Commonwealth sanctions policies**.
- ◆ Nation-wide actions by anti-apartheid organisations, trade-unions, church bodies and other organisations have in 1986 and 1987 respectively, led the Parliaments of Denmark and Norway to adopt **legislation prohibiting further involvement of companies** in oil transports to South Africa. South Africa was **effectively cut off from a major section of the world's tanker fleet** which it had relied upon for many years.
- ◆ In late 1986 details were revealed of a large series of secret oil transports to South Africa from Brunei. The ensuing **publicity** induced the Brunei Government to keep a **closer watch on the application of its embargo regulations**. No oil transported by tankers sailing from Brunei has reached South Africa anymore since then. Thus, another source of oil for South Africa has dried up.
- ◆ In 1988 the Italian state-owned shipping company Almare **decided to stop oil transports to South Africa** and to include in all contracts a clause excluding landings in South Africa. The decision followed investigations by the United Nations and the Shipping Research Bureau on an illegal delivery of British North Sea oil to South Africa by an Almare tanker. In 1989, when South Africa increasingly needed supplies of *refined petroleum products*, the company decided to apply this clause to transports of such refined products as well.
- ◆ United States **anti-apartheid legislation, increasing the tax burden on companies with South African activities**, attained a major success when in April 1989, the biggest U.S. investor in South Africa, Mobil Oil, announced its **withdrawal from South Africa**.
- ◆ In the period 1979-1989, at least 27 tankers linked in some way to Singapore have delivered oil cargoes to South Africa, the last one being the *Probo Gull* in August 1989. One of the successes attained by increasing **pressure on governments** of oil-exporting and shipping nations from the United Nations, through its Intergovernmental Group to Monitor the Supply and Shipping of Oil and Petroleum Products to South Africa, was the issuing by Singapore of a **ban on exports and transports of oil by its tankers** as from 15 September 1989.

20. *Financial Mail*, South Africa, 24 February 1989; *Business Day*, South Africa, 29 September 1989; *Argus*, South Africa, 5 April 1990.

21. *The Citizen*, South Africa, 26 April 1989.

**ANNEX: U.N. oil embargo resolutions 1979-1989**

Not indicated are those States which by their absence in some cases accounted for small variations in the numbers of recorded votes.

date of adoption and number of resolution	in favour	against	abstained	date of adoption and number of resolution	in favour	against	abstained
1979 (24 January) 33/183 E	105	6	16	1983 (5 December) 38/39 J	130	6	14
	<i>against:</i> Belgium, France, FRG, Luxembourg, UK, USA <i>abst.:</i> Australia, Austria, Bolivia, Botswana, Canada, El Salvador, Greece, Guatemala, Italy, Japan, Lesotho, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Portugal, Spain, Swaziland				<i>against:</i> Belgium, France, FRG, Luxembourg, UK, USA <i>abst.:</i> Australia, Austria, Botswana, Canada, Greece, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Lesotho, Malawi, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Swaziland		
1979 (12 December) 34/93 F	124	7	13	In 1984 and 1985, the General Assembly did not adopt any separate oil embargo resolutions.			
	<i>against:</i> Belgium, Canada, France, FRG, Luxembourg, UK, USA <i>abst.:</i> Australia, Austria, Botswana, Greece, Italy, Japan, Lesotho, Malawi, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Swaziland			1986 (10 November) 41/35 F	136	5	15
					<i>against:</i> France, FRG, Israel, UK, USA <i>abst.:</i> Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Greece, Ivory Coast, Italy, Japan, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Liberia, Malawi, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Swaziland		
1980 (16 December) 35/206D	123	7	13	1987 (20 November) 42/23 F	138	4	12
	<i>against:</i> Belgium, Canada, France, FRG, Luxembourg, UK, USA <i>abst.:</i> Australia, Austria, Botswana, Greece, Italy, Japan, Lesotho, Malawi, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Swaziland, Zimbabwe				<i>against:</i> France, FRG, UK, USA <i>abst.:</i> Belgium, Canada, Greece, Israel, Ivory Coast, Japan, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Malawi, Netherlands, Portugal, Swaziland		
1981 (17 December) 36/172 G	126	7	12	1988 (5 December) 43/50 J	138	2	14
	<i>against:</i> Belgium, Canada, France, FRG, Luxembourg, UK, USA <i>abst.:</i> Australia, Austria, Botswana, Chile, Greece, Guatemala, Italy, Japan, Lesotho, New Zealand, Portugal, Swaziland				<i>against:</i> UK, USA <i>abst.:</i> Belgium, Botswana, Canada, France, FRG, Greece, Israel, Japan, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Malawi, Netherlands, Portugal, Swaziland		
1982 (9 December) 37/69 J	125	6	13	1989 (22 november) 44/27 H	139	2	14
	<i>against:</i> Belgium, France, FRG, Luxembourg, UK, USA <i>abst.:</i> Australia, Austria, Botswana, Canada, Greece, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Lesotho, Malawi, New Zealand, Portugal, Swaziland				<i>against:</i> UK, USA <i>abst.:</i> Belgium, Botswana, Canada, France, FRG, Greece, Israel, Japan, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Malawi, Netherlands, Portugal, Swaziland		



## Appendix I

### The Principal Working Tables

#### An explanation of technical terms

A number of technical terms are used in the text of this report and in the following tables. Their meanings are as follows:

**Crude oil:** principally (a) mineral oil that has not yet been refined, or a mixture of such unrefined mineral oils. Incidentally (b) a mixture of unrefined mineral oil with heavy and lighter oil products that has to be refined; these mixtures may be made for tax reasons or to disguise the origin of the refined oil, but they may also serve to upgrade the unrefined oil or to dispose of a relatively low-priced by-product. In some cases (c) dirty oil products, in as far as they are not distinguished from unrefined oil by the shipping industry.

**Petroleum products:** gasoline (or petrol), gasoil, lubricating oil, fuel oil, carbon black and all other products obtained from crude oil.

**Ship's name:** self-explanatory. **Subsequent name (\*)**: if a ship was renamed some time after the date she called at South Africa, the new name is mentioned.

**Date the ship was scrapped (+)**: the month the ship was reported as being delivered to a scrapyard for breaking up.

**Deadweight (dwt)**: the weight (in metric tons) that the ship can carry. 90-95 per cent of this is the actual cargo capacity. The remaining 5-15 per cent is accounted for by bunker fuel, stores, water, etc.

**Tons, tonnes:** metric tons.

**Oil tanker:** a ship designed to carry only oil cargoes.

**Combined carrier:** a ship capable of carrying two types of cargo (though not both at the same time): (a) oil cargoes, (b) bulk solid cargoes (dry cargoes) such as coal and iron ore.

**OBO:** ore/bulk/oil carrier.

**P.c.:** part cargo.

**Flag:** a ship flies the flag of the country in which the ship herself is registered, which is often not the country in which the managing or owning companies are based. Many ships (particularly tankers) which are owned and managed by companies based in Western countries are registered in countries which have an 'open registry'. These ships are then said to fly 'flags of convenience'. There is no genuine link between these vessels and the flag of registry. A well-known open-registry fleet is that of Liberia.

Some Western countries have instituted open registers of their own, known as 'offshore' or 'international' registers, in addition to their normal shipping registers. In the tables, no distinction is made between vessels registered in such 'international' registers and those sailing under the normal flags of the same country.

**Changed flag (\*)**: if a ship has been reflagged since the delivery, though without being renamed, this is indicated in the table.

**Manager:** the company that truly manages the ship, technically and/or commercially. The manager may be different from the owner, although certain owners do manage their own ships. In some cases, a time-charterer who is responsible for the trading of a ship (or for reletting her to other companies) is given here as the manager.

**Registered owner:** the company which is at least the nominal owner of the ship. The problem here is that a ship often has a registered owner whose total assets consist only of the ship in question. The company may well be owned by another company which also owns a number of other 'single-ship companies'. That company may in turn be owned by yet another company. It is easy enough to obtain the name and address of the company which is the registered owner of the ship. It is often much more difficult to obtain details on the 'beneficial owner', i.e. the company which is at the end of a chain of owners. Such hidden ownership is particularly prevalent with ships using 'flags of convenience'.

**Apparent beneficial owner:** the company which, to the best of the Shipping Research Bureau's knowledge, is the genuine and ultimate owner of the ship.

**Charterer:** a company that reaches an agreement with the manager or owner/manager of a ship for the use of that ship. Contracts (or charter-parties) can be concluded for five main types of charter: time-charter, voyage charter, consecutive voyage charter, bare-boat charter, and contract of affreightment. The meanings of these are as follows:

- a *time-charter* is an arrangement whereby the ship's manager makes the ship available to the charterer for a specified period of time. This leaves the charterer free to specify the cargo and destination or to relet the ship to another company, subject to any constraints applied in the charter-party. The manager provides the crew;
- under a *voyage charter*, the ship's manager agrees to transport a cargo from a specified port to one or more other specified ports;
- under a *consecutive voyage charter*, the ship is chartered to make a number of consecutive voyages over the same route;
- a *bare-boat charter* is an arrangement under which the 'bare' ship is made available to the charterer for a specified period of time. Unlike a time-charter, the charterer has to provide his own crew;
- in a *contract of affreightment* the shipowner agrees to make available a specific tonnage capacity over a specified period to transport a fixed quantity of cargo from a specified port or ports to one or more other specified ports. However, continued employment of a specified vessel is not necessarily part of the agreement; it is up to the shipowner to schedule suitable vessels to meet the loading commitments.

If a ship sails to South Africa and makes a delivery of oil, the companies primarily responsible are the *charterer* and *manager*. The manager

provides the officers and crew, and passes the charterer's instructions to the captain. When there is no charterer, the manager is fully responsible for the instructions. If there is a chartering company, then it is the latter that decides that the ship will go to South Africa, but those instructions will in many cases be relayed to the captain via the managing company which is then a party to the decision. The owner, however, may in certain cases be unaware of where his ship went.

If the owner of a tanker is an *oil company*, then normally the ship will only carry oil owned by the oil company in question. If the company owning the tanker is a shipping company, and the tanker carries an oil cargo, it is because the ship has been chartered by an oil company to carry such a cargo. Occasionally, a tanker is chartered on a time-charter or bare-boat basis by a *shipping* company, and is then sub-chartered to an oil company to carry that company's oil.

Sometimes, a shipping company which owns or manages a tanker that has been chartered by an oil company to carry oil, claims that it is not able to prevent the charterer from using the ship to take oil to South Africa. This is not a valid argument. There is nothing to prevent the

owner or manager of a ship from specifying in the charter-party that the ship shall not be used for taking oil to South Africa. Such contractual restrictions are indeed often made.

**Multi-porting:** see page 4.

**Month the ship called at South Africa:** self-explanatory.

**Secret call:** the standard shipping industry publications, which report nearly all ports of call by the world's commercial shipping fleet, do not mention the ship's call at South Africa in the course of a particular voyage.

**Reported call:** the standard shipping industry publications mention the ship's call at South Africa in the course of a particular voyage. N.B.: only the *call* is reported, not that the ship delivered oil. In most cases, calls at South African ports turn up (sometimes rather vaguely, e.g., 'Cape f[or] o[r]ders'), without a specified date) and are thus classified as 'reported calls' here only because the ship reported a port in South Africa as her previous port of call on arrival elsewhere.



Table A

The ships which called at South Africa in 1987-1988,  
and which apparently delivered oil cargoes during their visits to South Africa

ship's name * subsequent name + date the ship was scrapped	dwt tonnage  <i>type of ship</i>	flag  *changed flag	SHIPPING COMPANIES INVOLVED			OIL COMPANIES INVOLVED  apparent owner of the ship's oil cargo
			managing company	country in which registered owner is based	apparent beneficial owner of ship	
1 <b>ACTOR</b>  * Jarabella	274,938  <i>oil tanker</i>	Liberia	Mosvold Shipping Co.A/S <sup>1</sup>  (Norway)	Liberia	Mosvold Shipping Co. A/S <sup>1</sup>  (Norway)	unknown
2 <b>ALKI</b>	232,600  <i>oil tanker</i>	Cyprus	Seaarland Shipping Management GmbH <sup>2</sup>  (Austria)	Cyprus	Seaarland Shipping Management GmbH <sup>3</sup>  (Austria)	unknown
3 <b>ALKI</b>	232,600  <i>oil tanker</i>	Cyprus	Seaarland Shipping Management GmbH <sup>2</sup>  (Austria)	Cyprus	Seaarland Shipping Management GmbH <sup>3</sup>  (Austria)	unknown
4 <b>ALKI</b>	232,600  <i>oil tanker</i>	Cyprus	Seaarland Shipping Management GmbH <sup>2</sup>  (Austria)	Cyprus	Seaarland Shipping Management GmbH <sup>3</sup>  (Austria)	African Middle East Petroleum Co. <sup>4</sup> (Monaco/ Switzerland)
5 <b>ALKI</b>	232,600  <i>oil tanker</i>	Cyprus	Seaarland Shipping Management GmbH <sup>2</sup>  (Austria)	Cyprus	Seaarland Shipping Management GmbH <sup>3</sup>  (Austria)	unknown
6 <b>BERGE CHIEF</b>	289,981  <i>oil tanker</i>	Norway	Bergesen d.y. A/S <sup>5</sup>  (Norway)	Norway	Bergesen d.y. A/S <sup>5</sup>  (Norway)	Transworld Oil <sup>2</sup>  (Netherlands/ Bermuda)
7 <b>BERGE ENTERPRISE</b>	360,700  <i>oil tanker</i>	Norway	Bergesen d.y. A/S <sup>5</sup>  (Norway)	Norway	Bergesen d.y. A/S <sup>5</sup>  (Norway)	Marimpex <sup>6</sup>  (F.R. Germany)
8 <b>BERGE ENTERPRISE</b>	360,700  <i>oil tanker</i>	Norway	Bergesen d.y. A/S <sup>5</sup>  (Norway)	Norway	Bergesen d.y. A/S <sup>5</sup>  (Norway)	unknown
9 <b>BERGE PRINCE</b>	284,522  <i>oil tanker</i>	Liberia	Bergesen d.y. A/S <sup>5</sup>  (Norway)	Liechtenstein	General Ore International Corp. <sup>7</sup> (Liechtenstein) & Bergesen d.y. A/S <sup>5</sup> (Norway)	unknown



region or country from which the ship sailed to South Africa	month the ship called at South Africa  type of call	region to which the ship sailed from South Africa	c o m m e n t s :
Persian Gulf [Iran]	May/Jne 87  secret call	Persian Gulf	Sailed from an oil-exporting area without disclosing her destination. The ship 'disappeared' for several weeks, under circumstances strongly suggesting that she may have called at South Africa to deliver an oil cargo. She then immediately returned to the same oil-exporting area. See also: <i>Verdens Gang</i> , Norway, 17 August 1987.
Persian Gulf [U.A.E.]	Jly 88  secret call	Persian Gulf	Sailed from an oil-exporting area. On departure, the purported destination was 'Singapore'. A call there has not been reported. Instead, the vessel 'disappeared' for a prolonged period, under circumstances strongly suggesting that she may have called at South Africa to deliver an oil cargo. She then returned to the same oil-exporting area.
Persian Gulf [U.A.E.]	Sep 88  secret call	Persian Gulf	Sailed from an oil-exporting area. On departure, the purported destination was 'Singapore'. A call there has not been reported. Instead, the vessel 'disappeared' for a prolonged period, under circumstances strongly suggesting that she may have called at South Africa to deliver an oil cargo. She then returned to the same oil-exporting area.
Red Sea [Egypt]	Nov 88  secret call	Persian Gulf	Sailed from an oil-exporting area without disclosing her destination. The vessel 'disappeared' for a prolonged period, under circumstances strongly suggesting that she may have called at South Africa to deliver an oil cargo. She then sailed on to another oil-exporting area.
Persian Gulf [U.A.E.]	Dec 88/Jan 89  secret call	Persian Gulf	Sailed to South Africa from an oil-exporting area; then immediately returned to the same oil-exporting area.
Persian Gulf [Oman]	Apr 87  secret call	Persian Gulf	Sailed to South Africa from an oil-exporting area; then immediately returned to the same oil-exporting area. See also: <i>Verdens Gang</i> , Norway, 17 August 1987.
Persian Gulf [Saudi Arabia Qatar; U.A.E.]	Apr 87  secret call	Persian Gulf	Sailed to South Africa from an oil-exporting area; then immediately returned to the same oil-exporting area. On this delivery, see also page 3. See also: <i>Verdens Gang</i> , Norway, 17 August 1987.
Persian Gulf [U.A.E.; Oman]	Jne 87  secret call	Persian Gulf	Sailed to South Africa from an oil-exporting area; then immediately returned to the same oil-exporting area. See also: <i>Verdens Gang</i> , Norway, 17 August 1987.
Persian Gulf [Iran]	Apr 87  secret call	Persian Gulf	Sailed to South Africa from an oil-exporting area; then immediately returned to the same oil-exporting area. NB: The Government of the oil-exporting country was informed that the ship's cargo had been discharged at the port of Wilhelmshaven (F.R.G.).

ship's name * subsequent name + date the ship was scrapped	dwt tonnage <i>type of ship</i>	flag *changed flag	SHIPPING COMPANIES INVOLVED			OIL COMPANIES INVOLVED  apparent owner of the ship's oil cargo
			managing company	country in which registered owner is based	apparent beneficial owner of ship	
10 <b>BERGE PRINCE</b>  <i>oil tanker</i>	284,522	Liberia	Bergesen d.y. A/S <sup>5</sup> (Norway)	Liechtenstein	General Ore International Corp. <sup>7</sup> (Liechtenstein) & Bergesen d.y. A/S <sup>5</sup> (Norway)	unknown
11 <b>BERGE PRINCESS</b>  * Lux Princess * Oslo Princess	284,507 <i>oil tanker</i>	Liberia	Bergesen d.y. A/S <sup>5</sup> (Norway)	Liechtenstein	General Ore International Corp. <sup>7</sup> (Liechtenstein) & Bergesen d.y. A/S <sup>5</sup> (Norway)	unknown company  (reported voyage charter)
12 <b>CAPTAIN JOHN G.P. LIVANOS</b>  * Choyo Maru	259,657 <i>oil tanker</i>	Greece	Ceres Hellenic Shipping Enterprises <sup>2</sup> (Greece)	Liberia	G.P. Livanos/Carras Group (Greece/U.K.) c/o Unisea Ltd. <sup>2</sup> (United Kingdom)	African Middle East Petroleum Co. <sup>4</sup> (Monaco/ Switzerland)  unknown
13 <b>DAGLI</b>  * Iver Lundina	57,372 <i>oil tanker</i>	Norway	Iver Bugge <sup>8</sup> (Norway) (time-charter)	Liberia	A/S Ocean <sup>2</sup> (Norway)	Marc Rich <sup>9</sup> (Switzerland)
14 <b>EASTERN PROMISE</b>	268,038 <i>oil tanker</i>	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Agency Ltd. <sup>10</sup> (Hong Kong)	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Group <sup>10</sup> (Hong Kong)	Euravia A.G. <sup>2</sup> (Switzerland)  Marc Rich <sup>2</sup> (Switzerland)
15 <b>EASTERN STRENGTH</b>	267,577 <i>oil tanker</i>	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Agency Ltd. <sup>10</sup> (Hong Kong)	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Group <sup>10</sup> (Hong Kong)	unknown
16 <b>EASTERN STRENGTH</b>	267,577 <i>oil tanker</i>	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Agency Ltd. <sup>10</sup> (Hong Kong)	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Group <sup>10</sup> (Hong Kong)	unknown
17 <b>ETHNIC</b>  <i>oil tanker</i>	274,629	Greece	Nereus Shipping S.A. <sup>2</sup> (Greece)	Panama	C.M. Lemos <sup>2</sup> (Greece/United Kingdom)	unknown
18 <b>ETHNIC</b>  <i>oil tanker</i>	274,629	Greece	Nereus Shipping S.A. <sup>2</sup> (Greece)	Panama	C.M. Lemos <sup>2</sup> (Greece/United Kingdom)	unknown company  (reported voyage charter)



region or country from which the ship sailed to South Africa	month the ship called at South Africa <i>type of call</i>	region to which the ship sailed from South Africa	c o m m e n t s :
Persian Gulf [Saudi Arabia; Persian Gulf]	Jne 87 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed to South Africa from an oil-exporting area; then immediately returned to the same oil-exporting area.
Persian Gulf [Iran]	Mar 87 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed to South Africa from an oil-exporting area; then immediately returned to the same oil-exporting area. Press reports confirm this oil delivery: <i>Fædrelandsvennen</i> , Norway, 10 April 1987.
Red Sea [Egypt; Saudi Arabia]	Jan 88 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed from an oil-exporting area without disclosing her destination after loading crude oil in two different countries. The vessel 'disappeared' for a prolonged period, under circumstances strongly suggesting that she may have called at South Africa to deliver her oil cargo there. She then immediately sailed on to another oil-exporting area.
Black Sea [U.S.S.R.]	Oct 88 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed to South Africa to deliver a cargo of fuel oil. On this delivery, see also pages 12 and 17.
Persian Gulf [U.A.E.]	Dec 88/ Jan 89 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed from an oil-exporting area without disclosing her destination. The vessel 'disappeared' for several weeks, under circumstances strongly suggesting that she may have called at South Africa to deliver an oil cargo. She then returned to the same oil-exporting area.
Persian Gulf [U.A.E.]	Aug/Sep 88 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed to South Africa from an oil-exporting area; then immediately returned to the same oil-exporting area.
Persian Gulf [U.A.E.]	Oct 88 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed from an oil-exporting area. On departure, the purported destination was 'France'. A call there has not been reported. Instead, the ship 'disappeared' for several weeks, under circumstances strongly suggesting that she may have called at South Africa to deliver an oil cargo. She then returned to the same oil-exporting area.
Persian Gulf [Oman]	Mar 88 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed from an oil-exporting area. On departure, the purported destination was 'Rotterdam'. A call there has not been reported. Instead, the vessel 'disappeared' for several weeks, under circumstances strongly suggesting that she may have called at South Africa to deliver an oil cargo. She then immediately returned to the same oil-exporting area.
Persian Gulf [U.A.E.]	Aug 88 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed from an oil-exporting area. On departure, the purported destination was 'Singapore'. A call there has not been reported. Instead, the vessel 'disappeared' for several weeks, under circumstances strongly suggesting that she may have called at South Africa to deliver an oil cargo. She then immediately returned to the same oil-exporting area.

ship's name * subsequent name + date the ship was scrapped	dwt tonnage  type of ship	flag  * changed flag	SHIPPING COMPANIES INVOLVED			OIL COMPANIES INVOLVED  apparent owner of the ship's oil cargo
			managing company	country in which registered owner is based	apparent beneficial owner of ship	
19 <b>ETHNIC</b>	274,629 <i>oil tanker</i>	Greece	Nereus Shipping S.A. <sup>2</sup> (Greece)	Panama	C.M. Lemos <sup>2</sup> (Greece/United Kingdom)	unknown
20 <b>ETHNIC</b>	274,629 <i>oil tanker</i>	Greece	Nereus Shipping S.A. <sup>2</sup> (Greece)	Panama	C.M. Lemos <sup>2</sup> (Greece/United Kingdom)	Marc Rich <sup>2</sup> (Switzerland)
21 <b>FELLOWSHIP L.</b>	268,255 <i>oil tanker</i>	Liberia	Ceres Hellenic Shipping Enterprises <sup>2</sup> (Greece)	Liberia	G.P. Livanos/Carras Group (Greece/U.K.) c/o Unisea Ltd. <sup>2</sup> (United Kingdom)	unknown
22 <b>FIDIUS</b> * Happy Master * Nor Master	254,691 <i>oil tanker</i>	United Kingdom	Barber Ship Management Ltd. <sup>11</sup> (Hong Kong)	United Kingdom	Canadian Pacific Ltd. <sup>2</sup> (Canada)	Intercontinental Transportation Corp. <sup>12</sup> (Cayman Islands)
23 <b>FIDIUS</b> * Happy Master * Nor Master	254,691 <i>oil tanker</i>	United Kingdom	Barber Ship Management Ltd. <sup>11</sup> (Hong Kong)	United Kingdom	Canadian Pacific Ltd. <sup>2</sup> (Canada)	Intercontinental Transportation Corp. <sup>12</sup> (Cayman Islands)
24 <b>FORTUNESHIP L.</b>	268,081 <i>oil tanker</i>	Greece	Ceres Hellenic Shipping Enterprises <sup>2</sup> (Greece)	Liberia	G.P. Livanos/Carras Group (Greece/U.K.) c/o Unisea Ltd. <sup>2</sup> (United Kingdom)	unknown
25 <b>FORTUNESHIP L.</b>	268,081 <i>oil tanker</i>	Greece	Ceres Hellenic Shipping Enterprises <sup>2</sup> (Greece)	Liberia	G.P. Livanos/Carras Group (Greece/U.K.) c/o Unisea Ltd. <sup>2</sup> (United Kingdom)	unknown
26 <b>FREEDOMSHIP L.</b>	283,271 <i>oil tanker</i>	Greece	Ceres Hellenic Shipping Enterprises <sup>2</sup> (Greece)	Liberia	G.P. Livanos/Carras Group (Greece/U.K.) c/o Unisea Ltd. <sup>2</sup> (United Kingdom)	Marc Rich <sup>9</sup> (Switzerland)
27 <b>FRIENDSHIP L.</b>	267,590 <i>oil tanker</i>	Greece	Ceres Hellenic Shipping Enterprises <sup>2</sup> (Greece)	Liberia	G.P. Livanos/Carras Group (Greece/U.K.) c/o Unisea Ltd. <sup>2</sup> (United Kingdom)	unknown
28 <b>LICORNE OCEANE</b> * Illinois * Lake Progress	290,767 <i>oil tanker</i>	Liberia	Seatramp (U.K.) Ltd. <sup>13</sup> (United Kingdom)	Liberia	Compagnie Générale Maritime et Financière <sup>14</sup> (France)	unknown



region or country from which the ship sailed to South Africa	month the ship called at South Africa  <i>type of call</i>	region to which the ship sailed from South Africa	c o m m e n t s :
Persian Gulf [U.A.E.]	Sep 88 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed from an oil-exporting area without disclosing her destination. The vessel 'disappeared' for several weeks, under circumstances strongly suggesting that she may have called at South Africa to deliver an oil cargo. She then immediately returned to the same oil-exporting area.
Persian Gulf [U.A.E.; Qatar]	Oct 88 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed from an oil-exporting area without disclosing her destination. The vessel 'disappeared' for several weeks, under circumstances strongly suggesting that she may have called at South Africa to deliver an oil cargo. She then returned to the same oil-exporting area.
Persian Gulf [U.A.E.]	Sep 87 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed from an oil-exporting area. On departure, the purported destination was 'Singapore'. A call there has not been reported. Instead, the vessel 'disappeared' for a prolonged period, under circumstances strongly suggesting that she may have called at South Africa to deliver an oil cargo. She then returned to the same oil-exporting area.
Persian Gulf [Persian Gulf]	Mar 87 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed to South Africa from an oil-exporting area; then immediately returned to the same oil-exporting area.
Persian Gulf [Iran]	Jly 87 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed to South Africa from an oil-exporting area; then immediately returned to the same oil-exporting area. NB: The Government of the oil-exporting country was informed that the ship's cargo had been discharged at the port of Rotterdam (Netherlands) on 16 August 1987.
Persian Gulf [Qatar]	Apr 87 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed from an oil-exporting area without disclosing her destination. The vessel 'disappeared' for several weeks, under circumstances strongly suggesting that she may have called at South Africa to deliver an oil cargo. She then returned to the same oil-exporting area.
Persian Gulf [Qatar]	Jne/Jly 87 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed from an oil-exporting area without disclosing her destination. The vessel 'disappeared' for several weeks, under circumstances strongly suggesting that she may have called at South Africa to deliver an oil cargo. She then returned to the same oil-exporting area.
Persian Gulf [Persian Gulf]	Nov 87 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed from an oil-exporting area without disclosing her destination. The vessel 'disappeared' for several weeks, under circumstances strongly suggesting that she may have called at South Africa to deliver an oil cargo. She then returned to the same oil-exporting area.
Persian Gulf [Persian Gulf; Oman]	Jan/Feb 87 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed from an oil-exporting area. On departure, the purported destination was 'Singapore'. A call there has not been reported. Instead, the vessel 'disappeared' for several weeks, under circumstances strongly suggesting that she may have called at South Africa to deliver an oil cargo. She then immediately returned to the same oil-exporting area.
Persian Gulf [Iran]	Feb 87 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed to South Africa from an oil-exporting area; then immediately returned to the same oil-exporting area. On this delivery, see also page 5. NB: The Government of the oil-exporting country was informed that the ship's cargo had been discharged at the port of Singapore.



ship's name * subsequent name + date the ship was scrapped	dwt tonnage <i>type of ship</i>	flag * changed flag	SHIPPING COMPANIES INVOLVED			OIL COMPANIES INVOLVED  apparent owner of the ship's oil cargo
			managing company	country in which registered owner is based	apparent beneficial owner of ship	
29 <b>LOUISIANA</b> * Berge Boss	315,713 <i>oil tanker</i>	Bahamas	Dorian (Hellas) S.A. <sup>2</sup> (Greece)	Panama	Hadjipateras Group (Greece) c/o Peninsular Maritime Ltd. <sup>15</sup> (United Kingdom)	unknown
30 <b>LOUISIANA</b> * Berge Boss	315,713 <i>oil tanker</i>	Bahamas	Dorian (Hellas) S.A. <sup>2</sup> (Greece)	Panama	Hadjipateras Group (Greece) c/o Peninsular Maritime Ltd. <sup>16</sup> (United Kingdom)	unknown
31 <b>LOUISIANA</b> * Berge Boss	315,713 <i>oil tanker</i>	Bahamas	Dorian (Hellas) S.A. <sup>2</sup> (Greece)	Panama	Hadjipateras Group (Greece) c/o Peninsular Maritime Ltd. <sup>16</sup> (United Kingdom)	unknown
32 <b>LOUISIANA</b> * Berge Boss	315,713 <i>oil tanker</i>	Bahamas	Dorian (Hellas) S.A. <sup>2</sup> (Greece)	Panama	Hadjipateras Group (Greece) c/o Peninsular Maritime Ltd. <sup>15</sup> (United Kingdom)	unknown
33 <b>OBO BARON</b> * Theotokos	103,320 <i>combined carrier</i>	Bahamas	Sigurd Herlofson & Co A/S <sup>2</sup> (Norway)	U.S.A.	Sigurd Herlofson <sup>2</sup> (Norway/Bahamas) & B. & H. Shipping Associates <sup>2</sup> (U.S.A.)	unknown company (reported voyage charter)
34 <b>OCEAN CARRIER</b>	123,999 <i>combined carrier</i>	Cyprus	Seatankers Management Co. Ltd. <sup>2</sup> (Cyprus)	Cyprus	John Fredriksen Group <sup>2</sup> (Norway/Cyprus) c/o Seatankers Management Co. Ltd. (Cyprus)	KUO International Oil Ltd. <sup>2</sup> (Hong Kong)
35 <b>PACIFICOS</b>	268,467 <i>oil tanker</i>	Liberia * Cyprus	Saipan Steamship Corp. c/o Kassos Maritime Enterprises Ltd. <sup>18</sup> (Greece)	Cyprus	Kulukundis Group (Greece/U.K.) c/o Off Shore Cil Services (U.K.) Ltd. <sup>19</sup> (United Kingdom)	unknown
36 <b>PACIFICOS</b>	268,467 <i>oil tanker</i>	Cyprus	Saipan Steamship Corp. c/o Kassos Maritime Enterprises Ltd. <sup>18</sup> (Greece)	Cyprus	Kulukundis Group (Greece/U.K.) c/o Off Shore Oil Services (U.K.) Ltd. <sup>19</sup> (United Kingdom)	African Middle East Petroleum Co. <sup>4</sup> (Monaco/ Switzerland)
37 <b>PATRIOTIC</b>	269,500 <i>oil tanker</i>	Greece	Nereus Shipping S.A. <sup>2</sup> (Greece)	Panama	C.M. Lemos <sup>2</sup> (Greece/United Kingdom)	unknown company (reported voyage charter)



region or country from which the ship sailed to South Africa	month the ship called at South Africa <i>type of call</i>	region to which the ship sailed from South Africa	co m m e n t s :
Persian Gulf [U.A.E.]	Nov/Dec 86 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed from an oil-exporting area. On departure, the purported destination was 'Ain Sukhna' (Egypt). A call there has not been reported. Instead, the vessel 'disappeared' for several weeks, under circumstances strongly suggesting that she may have called at South Africa to deliver an oil cargo. She then returned to the same oil-exporting area.
Persian Gulf [Saudi Arabia]	Feb/Mar 87 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed from an oil-exporting area without disclosing her destination. The vessel 'disappeared' for several weeks, under circumstances strongly suggesting that she may have called at South Africa to deliver an oil cargo. She then immediately returned to the same oil-exporting area.
Persian Gulf [U.A.E.]	Jly 87 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed to South Africa from an oil-exporting area; then returned to the same oil-exporting area.
Persian Gulf [U.A.E.]	Aug 87 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed to South Africa from an oil-exporting area; then immediately returned to the same oil-exporting area.
Persian Gulf [Qatar; Saudi Arabia; Persian Gulf]	Mar/Apr 87 <i>reported call</i>	North West Europe	Sailed from an oil-exporting area to South Africa, apparently to deliver an oil cargo. Then collected a cargo of South African coal for North West Europe. NB: The Government of Saudi Arabia informed the United Nations that the ship carried oil on 7 March 1987 and that no certificate of discharge was available. <sup>17</sup>
Far East [Malaysia]	Dec 88/Jan 89 <i>reported call</i>	Medi- terranean	Sailed from an oil-exporting area to South Africa, apparently to deliver an oil cargo. Then collected a cargo of South African iron ore for the Mediterranean.
Persian Gulf [Qatar; U.A.E.]	Jly/Aug 87 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed from an oil-exporting area. On departure, the purported destination was 'Singapore'. A call there has not been reported. Instead, the vessel 'disappeared' for a prolonged period, under circumstances strongly suggesting that she may have called at South Africa to deliver an oil cargo.
Red Sea [Egypt]	Nov 88 <i>secret call</i>	Middle East	Sailed from an oil-exporting area without disclosing her destination. The vessel 'disappeared' for several weeks, under circumstances strongly suggesting that she may have called at South Africa to deliver an oil cargo.
Persian Gulf [U.A.E.; Qatar]	Jan 87 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed from an oil-exporting area without disclosing her destination, while on voyage charter to an unknown company. The ship 'disappeared' for several weeks, under circumstances strongly suggesting that she may have called at South Africa to deliver an oil cargo. She then immediately returned to the same oil-exporting area.

ship's name * subsequent name + date the ship was scrapped	dwt tonnage <i>type of ship</i>	flag *changed flag	SHIPPING COMPANIES INVOLVED			OIL COMPANIES INVOLVED apparent owner of the ship's oil cargo
			managing company	country in which registered owner is based	apparent beneficial owner of ship	
38 <b>PATRIOTIC</b>	269,500 <i>oil tanker</i>	Greece	Nereus Shipping S.A. <sup>2</sup> (Greece)	Panama	C.M. Lemos <sup>2</sup> (Greece/United Kingdom)	unknown
39 <b>PATRIOTIC</b>	269,500 <i>oil tanker</i>	Greece	Nereus Shipping S.A. <sup>2</sup> (Greece)	Panama	C.M. Lemos <sup>2</sup> (Greece/United Kingdom)	Marc Rich <sup>2</sup> (Switzerland)
40 <b>PATRIOTIC</b>	269,500 <i>oil tanker</i>	Greece	Nereus Shipping S.A. <sup>2</sup> (Greece)	Panama	C.M. Lemos <sup>2</sup> (Greece/United Kingdom)	unknown
41 <b>RAFIO</b>	290,271 <i>oil tanker</i>	Liberia	Marimpex <sup>21</sup> (F.R. Germany)	Liberia	Marimpex <sup>21</sup> (F.R. Germany)	Marimpex <sup>21</sup> (F.R. Germany)
42 <b>UGLAND OBO-ONE</b> * Nor-Obo 1 * Obo Buzzard * Obo Victory	54,500 <i>combined carrier</i>	Panama	Ugland Management Co. A/S <sup>22</sup> (Norway)	Panama	Andreas Ugland <sup>22</sup> (Norway)	unknown
43 <b>WORLD AMBASSADOR</b>	237,474 <i>oil tanker</i>	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Agency Ltd. <sup>10</sup> (Hong Kong)	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Group <sup>10</sup> (Hong Kong)	African Middle East Petroleum Co. <sup>4</sup> (Monaco/ Switzerland)
44 <b>WORLD BERMUDA</b>	271,580 <i>oil tanker</i>	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Agency Ltd. <sup>10</sup> (Hong Kong)	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Group <sup>10</sup> (Hong Kong)	unknown company (reported voyage charter)
45 <b>WORLD BRASILIA</b>	283,761 <i>oil tanker</i>	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Agency Ltd. <sup>23</sup> (Hong Kong)	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Group <sup>23</sup> (Hong Kong)	unknown
46 <b>WORLD EMINENCE</b>	261,729 <i>oil tanker</i>	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Agency Ltd. <sup>10</sup> (Hong Kong)	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Group <sup>10</sup> (Hong Kong)	unknown



region or country from which the ship sailed to South Africa	month the ship called at South Africa  <i>type of call</i>	region to which the ship sailed from South Africa	c o m m e n t s :
Persian Gulf [Persian Gulf]	Mar 87  <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed from an oil-exporting area without disclosing her destination. The ship 'disappeared' for several weeks, under circumstances strongly suggesting that she may have called at South Africa to deliver an oil cargo. She then immediately returned to the same oil-exporting area. On returning, 'Singapore' was reported as the vessel's previous port of call. However, no call there has been recorded during the period under consideration.
Persian Gulf [U.A.E.]	Apr/May 87  <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed from an oil-exporting area without disclosing her destination. The ship 'disappeared' for several weeks, under circumstances strongly suggesting that she may have called at South Africa to deliver an oil cargo. She then immediately returned to the same oil-exporting area. Press reports confirm this call: <i>Africa Analysis</i> , U.K., 21 August 1987. NB: The Government of Greece informed the United Nations that the cargo had been discharged at Singapore on 11 May 1987, which "is proved by the ship documents which were certified by the competent port authorities of Singapore". <sup>20</sup> However, there are no records of a call of the vessel at the port of Singapore during the whole of 1987. According to a spokesman of BP, an oil cargo originally belonging to them was loaded in the U.A.E. "We sold the oil to a trader and it was then their responsibility. (...) This particular cargo was not to be sold in South Africa" ( <i>Africa Analysis</i> , 21 August 1987).
Persian Gulf [U.A.E.; Qatar]	Aug 88  <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed from an oil-exporting area without disclosing her destination. The ship 'disappeared' for several weeks, under circumstances strongly suggesting that she may have called at South Africa to deliver an oil cargo. She then immediately returned to the same oil-exporting area.
Persian Gulf [Persian Gulf]	Nov/Dec 88  <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed from an oil-exporting area without disclosing her destination. The ship 'disappeared' for several weeks, under circumstances strongly suggesting that she may have called at South Africa to deliver an oil cargo. She then returned to the same oil-exporting area.
North West Europe [France]	Apr 87  <i>reported call</i>	Black Sea	Sailed to South Africa to deliver a cargo of gasoline.
Red Sea [Egypt]	Mar 88  <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed from an oil-exporting area. On departure, the purported destination was 'U.S.A.'. A call there has not been reported. Instead, after a short call at Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, the ship 'disappeared' for several weeks, under circumstances strongly suggesting that she may have called at South Africa to deliver her oil cargo there. She then immediately sailed on to another oil-exporting area.
Persian Gulf [Persian Gulf]	Apr/May 88  <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed from an oil-exporting area while on voyage charter to an unknown company and 'disappeared' for several weeks, under circumstances suggesting that she may have called at South Africa to deliver an oil cargo. She then returned to the same oil-exporting area.
Persian Gulf [Saudi Arabia]	Jan 87  <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed to South Africa from an oil-exporting area; then immediately returned to the same oil-exporting area.
Persian Gulf [U.A.E.]	Dec 87  <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed to South Africa from an oil-exporting area; then immediately returned to the same oil-exporting area.



	ship's name	dwt	flag	SHIPPING COMPANIES INVOLVED			OIL COMPANIES INVOLVED
	* subsequent name + date the ship was scrapped	tonnage  type of ship	* changed flag	managing company	country in which registered owner is based	apparent beneficial owner of ship	apparent owner of the ship's oil cargo
47	<b>WORLD EMINENCE</b>	261,729 <i>oil tanker</i>	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Agency Ltd. <sup>10</sup> (Hong Kong)	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Group <sup>10</sup> (Hong Kong)	unknown
48	<b>WORLD HARMONY</b>	259,596 <i>oil tanker</i>	Panama	World-Wide Shipping Agency Ltd. <sup>10</sup> (Hong Kong)	Panama	World-Wide Shipping Group <sup>10</sup> (Hong Kong)	unknown
49	<b>WORLD HARMONY</b>	259,596 <i>oil tanker</i>	Panama	World-Wide Shipping Agency Ltd. <sup>10</sup> (Hong Kong)	Panama	World-Wide Shipping Group <sup>10</sup> (Hong Kong)	unknown
50	<b>WORLD HITACHI ZOSEN</b>	268,904 <i>oil tanker</i>	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Agency Ltd. <sup>10</sup> (Hong Kong)	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Group <sup>10</sup> (Hong Kong)	African Middle East Petroleum Co. <sup>4</sup> (Monaco/ Switzerland)
51	<b>WORLD PROGRESS</b>	237,285 <i>oil tanker</i>	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Agency Ltd. <sup>10</sup> (Hong Kong)	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Group <sup>10</sup> (Hong Kong)	unknown
52	<b>WORLD PROGRESS</b>	237,285 <i>oil tanker</i>	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Agency Ltd. <sup>10</sup> (Hong Kong)	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Group <sup>10</sup> (Hong Kong)	unknown
53	<b>WORLD PROGRESS</b>	237,285 <i>oil tanker</i>	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Agency Ltd. <sup>10</sup> (Hong Kong)	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Group <sup>10</sup> (Hong Kong)	unknown
54	<b>WORLD PROGRESS</b>	237,285 <i>oil tanker</i>	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Agency Ltd. <sup>10</sup> (Hong Kong)	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Group <sup>10</sup> (Hong Kong)	unknown
55	<b>WORLD PROGRESS</b>	237,285 <i>oil tanker</i>	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Agency Ltd. <sup>10</sup> (Hong Kong)	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Group <sup>10</sup> (Hong Kong)	African Middle East Petroleum Co. <sup>4</sup> (Monaco/ Switzerland)
56	<b>WORLD PROGRESS</b>	237,285 <i>oil tanker</i>	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Agency Ltd. <sup>10</sup> (Hong Kong)	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Group <sup>10</sup> (Hong Kong)	African Middle East Petroleum Co. <sup>4</sup> (Monaco/ Switzerland)



region or country from which the ship sailed to South Africa	month the ship called at South Africa <i>type of call</i>	region to which the ship sailed from South Africa	c o m m e n t s :
Persian Gulf [Qatar; Oman]	Apr 88 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed from an oil-exporting area. On departure, the purported destination was 'Port de Bouc' (France). A call there has not been reported. Instead, the ship 'disappeared' for several weeks, under circumstances strongly suggesting that she may have called at South Africa to deliver an oil cargo.
Persian Gulf [Oman]	May 88 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed from an oil-exporting area. On departure, the purported destination was 'Port de Bouc' (France). A call there has not been reported. Instead, the ship 'disappeared' for several weeks, under circumstances strongly suggesting that she may have called at South Africa to deliver an oil cargo. She then immediately returned to the same oil-exporting area.
Persian Gulf [Oman]	Sep 88 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed from an oil-exporting area. On departure, the purported destination was 'Singapore'. A call there has not been reported. Instead, the vessel 'disappeared' for several weeks, under circumstances strongly suggesting that she may have called at South Africa to deliver an oil cargo. She then immediately returned to the same oil-exporting area.
Red Sea [Egypt]	Jly 88 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed from an oil-exporting area without disclosing her destination. The ship 'disappeared' for several weeks, under circumstances strongly suggesting that she may have called at South Africa to deliver an oil cargo. She then immediately sailed on to another oil-exporting area.
Persian Gulf [U.A.E.]	Dec 86 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed to South Africa from an oil-exporting area; then immediately returned to the same oil-exporting area.
Persian Gulf [U.A.E.]	Jan 87 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed to South Africa from an oil-exporting area; then immediately returned to the same oil-exporting area.
Persian Gulf [U.A.E.]	Jly 87 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed to South Africa from an oil-exporting area; then immediately returned to the same oil-exporting area.
Persian Gulf [U.A.E.]	Dec 87 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed to South Africa from an oil-exporting area; then immediately returned to the same oil-exporting area.
Red Sea [Egypt]	Jne 88 <i>secret call</i>	Red Sea	Sailed to South Africa from an oil-exporting area; then returned to the same oil-exporting area.
Red Sea [Egypt]	Aug 88 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed from an oil-exporting area without disclosing her destination. The vessel 'disappeared' for a prolonged period, under circumstances strongly suggesting that she may have called at South Africa to deliver her oil cargo. She then immediately sailed on to another oil-exporting area.

ship's name * subsequent name + date the ship was scrapped	dwt tonnage <i>type of ship</i>	flag *changed flag	SHIPPING COMPANIES INVOLVED			OIL COMPANIES INVOLVED  apparent owner of the ship's oil cargo
			managing company	country in which registered owner is based	apparent beneficial owner of ship	
57 <b>WORLD PROGRESS</b>	237,285 <i>oil tanker</i>	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Agency Ltd. <sup>10</sup> (Hong Kong)	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Group <sup>10</sup> (Hong Kong)	unknown
58 <b>WORLD RENOWN</b>	262,267 <i>oil tanker</i>	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Agency Ltd. <sup>23</sup> (Hong Kong)	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Group <sup>23</sup> (Hong Kong)	unknown company (reported voyage charter)
59 <b>WORLD RENOWN</b>	262,267 <i>oil tanker</i>	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Agency Ltd. <sup>23</sup> (Hong Kong)	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Group <sup>23</sup> (Hong Kong)	unknown company (reported voyage charter)
60 <b>WORLD RENOWN</b>	262,267 <i>oil tanker</i>	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Agency Ltd. <sup>10</sup> (Hong Kong)	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Group <sup>10</sup> (Hong Kong)	unknown
61 <b>WORLD RENOWN</b>	262,267 <i>oil tanker</i>	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Agency Ltd. <sup>10</sup> (Hong Kong)	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Group <sup>10</sup> (Hong Kong)	African Middle East Petroleum Co. <sup>4</sup> (Monaco/ Switzerland)
62 <b>WORLD SUMMIT</b>	260,064 <i>oil tanker</i>	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Agency Ltd. <sup>10</sup> (Hong Kong)	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Group <sup>10</sup> (Hong Kong)	unknown
63 <b>WORLD SYMPHONY</b>	356,324 <i>oil tanker</i>	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Agency Ltd. <sup>23</sup> (Hong Kong)	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Group <sup>23</sup> (Hong Kong)	Marc Rich <sup>2</sup> (Switzerland)
64 <b>WORLD TRUTH</b> * Trade Fortitude	249,223 <i>combined carrier</i>	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Agency Ltd. <sup>10</sup> (Hong Kong)	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Group <sup>10</sup> (Hong Kong)	unknown



region or country from which the ship sailed to South Africa	month the ship called at South Africa <i>type of call</i>	region to which the ship sailed from South Africa	c o m m e n t s :
Persian Gulf [U.A.E.]	Dec 88 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed from an oil-exporting area. On departure, the purported destination was 'Singapore'. A call there has not been reported. Instead, the vessel 'disappeared' for several weeks, under circumstances strongly suggesting that she may have called at South Africa to deliver an oil cargo. She then immediately returned to the same oil-exporting area.
Persian Gulf [Saudi Arabia]	Apr 87 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed from an oil-exporting area without disclosing her destination, while on voyage charter to an unknown company. The ship then 'disappeared' for several weeks, under circumstances strongly suggesting that she may have called at South Africa to deliver an oil cargo. She then immediately returned to the same oil-exporting area.
Persian Gulf [Persian Gulf]	May/Jne 87 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed from an oil-exporting area without disclosing her destination, while on voyage charter to an unknown company. The ship then 'disappeared' for several weeks, under circumstances strongly suggesting that she may have called at South Africa to deliver an oil cargo. She then returned to the same oil-exporting area.
Persian Gulf [U.A.E.; Oman]	Feb/Mar 88 <i>secret call</i>	East Africa	Sailed from an oil-exporting area. On departure, the purported destination was 'Singapore'. A call there has not been confirmed. Instead, the ship 'disappeared' for several weeks, under circumstances strongly suggesting that she may have called at South Africa to deliver an oil cargo.
Red Sea [Egypt]	May 88 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed from an oil-exporting area without disclosing her destination. The vessel 'disappeared' for several weeks, under circumstances strongly suggesting that she may have called at South Africa to deliver her oil cargo. She then sailed on to another oil-exporting area.
Persian Gulf [Iran]	Oct 88 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed from an oil-exporting area without disclosing her destination. The vessel 'disappeared' for several weeks, under circumstances strongly suggesting that she may have called at South Africa to deliver her oil cargo. She then immediately returned to the same oil-exporting area.
Persian Gulf [Iran; U.A.E.]	Mar 87 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed from an oil-exporting area, reportedly on voyage charter to Marc Rich, a well-known oil supplier to South Africa. The vessel's destination was 'Options'. The ship 'disappeared' for several weeks, under circumstances strongly suggesting that she may have called at South Africa to deliver her oil cargo. She then returned to the same oil-exporting area. NB: The Government of Iran was informed that the cargo had been discharged at Rotterdam (Netherlands).
Persian Gulf [U.A.E.]	Jly 87 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed to South Africa from an oil-exporting area; then immediately returned to the same oil-exporting area.



ship's name * subsequent name + date the ship was scrapped	dwt tonnage <i>type of ship</i>	flag *changed flag	SHIPPING COMPANIES INVOLVED			OIL COMPANIES INVOLVED  apparent owner of the ship's oil cargo
			managing company	country in which registered owner is based	apparent beneficial owner of ship	
65 <b>WORLD XANADU</b>	264,170 <i>oil tanker</i>	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Agency Ltd. <sup>10</sup> (Hong Kong)	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Group <sup>10</sup> (Hong Kong)	Marc Rich <sup>2</sup> (Switzerland)  Mark Wolman <sup>24</sup> (United Kingdom)
66 <b>WORLD XANADU</b>	264,170 <i>oil tanker</i>	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Agency Ltd. <sup>10</sup> (Hong Kong)	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Group <sup>10</sup> (Hong Kong)	unknown

- Referring to the private and confidential nature of all its charter-contracts, this company declined to confirm whether or not the tanker discharged oil at a South African port. With reference to preliminary findings regarding a series of possible oil deliveries to South Africa by the *Actor* (formerly sailing under the name *Moscliff*), the company stated that the Bureau's "information is not correct, as f. inst. every time the above mentioned vessel has discharged crude oil at Ain Sukhna [Red Sea, Egypt – SRB], you have believed that the vessel's destinations have been South African ports". However, during the period under consideration, it was never reported that the vessel was destined for, or called at Ain Sukhna. Only in *one* of the other cases submitted (SRB, *Oil to South Africa*, 1988, pp. 34-35, case No. 3; month in South Africa: April 1986), it was reported to the shipping press that the vessel sailed for, respectively returned from *Ain Sukhna*. However, the shipowner publicly admitted afterwards that his ship in April 1986 in fact discharged a cargo of oil at a South African port (ibidem, p. 50, note 3).
- This company has not replied to a request sent by registered mail or telefax, nor to one or more telex or telefax messages, in which it was asked to comment on the findings of the Shipping Research Bureau.
- This company has not replied to a request sent by registered mail or telefax, nor to one or more telex or telefax messages, in which it was asked to comment on the findings of the Shipping Research Bureau. The Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the Shipping Research Bureau that, according to a spokesman of the company, its "involvement in the shipping business only concerns administrative matters such as maintenance, repairs and personnel. (...) The spokesman (...) also maintained that the nature and the destination of the freights can only be determined by the owner or the charterer of the ship whereas his company has no influence thereupon. Furthermore, he declared that the owner of the oil tanker 'Alki' told him that the allegations of oil transports to South Africa are not true" (letter from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vienna, to the Shipping Research Bureau of 7 May 1990). In various shipping industry publications, the vessel in question is listed as belonging to the Seaarland fleet exclusively. No reply was received as to the identity of the 'owner of the oil tanker Alki' mentioned above.
- This company denies "categorically (...) any involvement by our company, or any associated company, in such alleged supplies [to South Africa]. We furthermore confirm that we have no knowledge of any of the vessels mentioned (...) nor, in consequence, have we had any involvement with same". However, information obtained by the Shipping Research Bureau confirms that this company, or one belonging to this Group, was in fact involved in the sale of the cargo of Egyptian crude oil on board this vessel.

In a second letter the Shipping Research Bureau asked the company if it could provide the Bureau with the name(s) of the company (ies) to which they had possibly resold the cargo. It restated that "... since we were not involved in any way with the shipments you have mentioned, we have no possibility to assist you in discovering the identity (ies) of the eventual owner(s) of such cargoes".

- This company confirmed that the vessel has "traded as stated" by the Shipping Research Bureau.
- This company states that it has never chartered this vessel for journeys to South African ports. However, standard international shipping publications list this vessel as chartered by Marimpex for this voyage.
- This company states that the vessel was "bare-boat chartered to a Norwegian shipping firm and (...) [the ship] did in fact call at ports in South Africa in connection with oil trade. Such calls were pursuant to authority contained in the bare-boat charter agreement permitting them to engage in 'lawful trade'".
- This company wrote to the Shipping Research Bureau: "We can assure you that during the period we had above mentioned ship on time charter the vessel traded only with lawful merchandise according both to Charter Party and Norwegian Law". On Norwegian state television, Mr Jan A. Bugge, chairman of the company, confirmed that his ship had delivered fuel oil from the Soviet Union to South Africa during this voyage (NRK TV, Norway, 22 April 1989; cf. page 12 of this report).
- This company, nor the company Hollywell Shipping Ltd. (United Kingdom) that acted on behalf of Marc Rich in this case, have replied to requests sent by registered mail or telefax, nor to one or more telex or telefax messages, in which they were asked to comment on the findings of the Shipping Research Bureau.
- This company has not replied to a request sent by registered mail or telefax, nor to one or more telex or telefax messages, in which it was asked to comment on the findings of the Shipping Research Bureau. Mr R.J. Allen of World-Wide has informed the press that oil deliveries by World-Wide tankers to South Africa are nothing secret and form part of the company's international business (*South China Morning Post*, Hong Kong, 2 April 1989; see also page 21 of this report).
- This company states that "the vessel was on charter and we are not aware of orders given by the charterers".
- This company has not replied to several requests sent by registered mail, in which it was asked to comment on the findings of the Shipping Research Bureau. In a letter to the Shipping Research Bureau, the managing director of the East Coast Group Ltd. (Eastco; United Kingdom), Mr D.H. Cavendish-



region or country from which the ship sailed to South Africa	month the ship called at South Africa <i>type of call</i>	region to which the ship sailed from South Africa	comments:
Persian Gulf [U.A.E.]	Dec 87/Jan 88 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed from an oil-exporting area. On departure, the purported destination was 'Ain Sukhna' (Egypt). A call there has not been confirmed. Instead, the vessel 'disappeared' for a prolonged period, under circumstances strongly suggesting that she may have called at South Africa to deliver an oil cargo. She then returned to the same oil-exporting area.
Persian Gulf [U.A.E.]	Nov 88 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed from an oil-exporting area. On departure, the purported destination was 'Singapore'. A call there has not been reported. Instead, the vessel 'disappeared' for a prolonged period, under circumstances strongly suggesting that she may have called at South Africa to deliver an oil cargo. She then returned to the same oil-exporting area.

Pell, confirmed that Eastco had chartered this vessel on behalf of Intercontinental Transportation Corporation. He stated that "we have no reason to suspect that the vessel (...) discharged in South Africa." Initially, Eastco mentioned an address on Grand Cayman, British West Indies, as the office address of Intercontinental Transportation Corporation. However, when a registered letter from the Shipping Research Bureau was 'returned to sender', Eastco gave an alternative address in Nassau, Bahamas. No reply was received to a letter sent to that address either.

The Government of the Cayman Islands confirmed to the Bureau that "the company is registered here. We have no means, however, of verifying the ownership of the cargo or taking any action in Cayman law against the company, or exerting pressure on it even if it [owned the cargo,] even while sympathizing with your general aims" (letter to the Shipping Research Bureau, 21 June 1988).

On the companies Intercontinental Transportation Corporation and Eastco, see also page 17 of this report.

13. This company declined to confirm whether or not the ship delivered crude oil to South Africa.

In a letter to the Shipping Research Bureau, the company wrote that it "is a totally non-political, purely commercial operation and reserves the right to trade with respectable principals, as owners or charterers in any trade that is consistent with International Maritime Law. (...) Seatramp (UK) Ltd are merely managing agents for a number of owners and companies and are not invariably involved in all the chartering activities of their principals, and we would suggest that some of the data you accredit to Seatramp may be inaccurate. Finally, in a competitive world and the historically depressed market, the company must preserve the confidentiality of a high proportion of its business, and so as to a matter of principle is not willing to disclose information to disinterested third parties."

14. This company states that the information gathered by the Shipping Research Bureau "is erroneous: on the dates mentioned, the Licorne Océane has to our knowledge made a voyage to the Far East". However, sources within the shipping industry confirm that a secret oil delivery to South Africa was made; a Far Eastern destination (Singapore) was used to conceal the true destination of the cargo (see also page 5). The company further states that "the commercial management of the vessel is conducted by Seatramp (UK) Limited (...), London", and therefore refers to that company "for a more detailed reply". (See also note 13.)

15. An answer on behalf of the owners was received from Peninsular Maritime Ltd., "As Agents Only". The company does not reveal

who owns the vessel; it states, however, that it has no knowledge of a company or entity entitled the Hadjipateras Group. With regard to voyages to South Africa of two vessels, possibly involved in oil deliveries to the country, the company states: "The contracts in question contain confidentiality clauses which preclude the release of any information pertaining to the Charter Parties." Nevertheless, the company has "been authorised to confirm to you that neither vessel has ever discharged oil and or its products at or off South Africa". However, sources within the shipping industry confirm that the tanker sailed to South Africa to discharge oil. See also note 16.

16. An answer on behalf of the owners was received from Peninsular Maritime Ltd., "As Agents Only". The company does not reveal who owns the vessel; it states, however, that it has no knowledge of a company or entity entitled the Hadjipateras Group. With regard to voyages to South Africa of two vessels, possibly involved in oil deliveries to the country, the company states: "The contracts in question contain confidentiality clauses which preclude the release of any information pertaining to the Charter Parties." Nevertheless, the company has "been authorised to confirm to you that neither vessel has ever discharged oil and or its products at or off South Africa". In a second letter, the company states that it has checked the trading record of a number of vessels among which the *Louisiana* and "can confirm that none of them has delivered oil to South Africa". However, sources within the shipping industry confirm that the tanker sailed to South Africa to discharge oil.

17. *Report of the Intergovernmental Group to Monitor the Supply and Shipping of Oil and Petroleum Products to South Africa*, United Nations, October 1988, p. 54.

18. The company Kassos Maritime Enterprises Ltd. denies any involvement with the vessel *Pacificos* and with the Kulukundis Group. The company informed the Shipping Research Bureau that another company, Saipan Steamship Corporation, had "from time to time undertaken technical advice and supervision" and was "the responsible party for maintenance and repairs".

The company Saipan Steamship Corporation is located at the same address as Kassos Maritime Enterprises Ltd. A registered letter from the Shipping Research Bureau was, however, returned marked 'unknown'. In numerous articles in the international shipping press and in various shipping industry publications, the company Kassos Maritime Enterprises Ltd. is referred to as owner or manager of the vessel *Pacificos* and as belonging to the Kulukundis Group. See also note 19.

19. The company Off Shore Oil Services (U.K.) Ltd. stated that the Kulukundis Group neither are or have ever been the vessel's apparent



beneficial owners. In a second telex message, Off Shore Oil Services repeated that "our principals have no association with the (...) vessel". However, various shipping industry publications list the vessel as belonging to the Kulukundis fleet at the time of delivery. The company refrained from commenting on the Bureau's queries about the apparent oil deliveries to South Africa. See also note 18.

20. *Report of the Intergovernmental Group...*, United Nations, November 1987/January 1988, pp. 54-55.
21. This company states that it has never chartered this vessel for calls at South African ports. However, this statement is rather irrelevant as the company was the vessel's apparent beneficial owner during the period concerned.
22. In a letter to the Shipping Research Bureau, the Ugland Group has confirmed the findings of the Bureau.
23. This company has not replied to a request sent by telefax, nor to two reminding messages by registered mail and fax, in which it was asked to comment on the findings of the Shipping Research Bureau. See also note 10.  
The company's London agents, Marine Navigation Co. Ltd., which requested a copy of the Bureau's letter to World-Wide Shipping, has not

responded to that letter, nor to an additional letter and telex message.

24. In a letter to the Shipping Research Bureau from one of his companies, Tiger Petroleum Corporation N.V. (Netherlands Antilles), Mr Mark Wolman (London, U.K.) states: "In respect to your enquiry about the (...) World Xanadu we must inform you that we have not been involved in any purchase or movement on [this] vessel(.) whatsoever. We suspect that we are being connected to these reports as this company used to trade on occasions with Marc Rich & Co. until it was involved in a dispute involving shipping with them in 1987. Because of their alleged involvement with business in South Africa, our name has been tangled with theirs and consequently speculation has led to a belief that we are some type of 'co-conspirator'." However, various sources within the oil and shipping industry confirm that Mr Wolman/Tiger Petroleum acted as an intermediary in the supply of this oil cargo by Marc Rich to South Africa. The same sources state that the dispute between Marc Rich and Mark Wolman/Tiger Petroleum to which Mr Wolman refers involves a conflict between both parties about the financial settlement of one or more oil deliveries to South Africa (see also below, Table H, pp. 90-91, case No. 3; on Mark Wolman, see also SRB, *Oil to South Africa*, 1988, pp. 34-35, case No. 9).



**Table B: The oil companies apparently owning the presumed oil cargoes aboard the 66 ships – 1987-1988**

The information in this table is extracted from Table A, which also provides details regarding responses by companies named. A summary version of this table is provided in Table 1.

oil company	principal country or countries in which the company is based	ships' names	case No. in Table A
AFRICAN MIDDLE EAST PETROLEUM CO. LTD. INC.	Monaco/Switzerland	Alki	4
		Capt. John G.P. Livanos	12
		Pacificos	36
<i>total: 8 cases</i>		World Ambassador	43
		World Hitachi Zosen	50
		World Progress	55
		World Progress	56
		World Renown	61
EURAVIA A.G.	Switzerland	Eastern Promise	14
<i>total: 1 case</i>			
INTERCONTINENTAL TRANSPORTATION CORP.	Cayman Islands	Fidius	22
		Fidius	23
<i>total: 2 cases</i>			
KUO INTERNATIONAL OIL LTD.	Hong Kong	Ocean Carrier	34
<i>total: 1 case</i>			
MARIMPEX	F.R. Germany	Berge Enterprise	7
		Rafio	41
<i>total: 2 cases</i>			
MARC RICH	Switzerland	Dagli	13
		Eastern Promise	14
<i>total: 7 cases</i>		Ethnic	20
		Freedomship L.	26
		Patriotic	39
		World Symphony	63
		World Xanadu	65
TRANSWORLD OIL	Netherlands/Bermuda	Berge Chief	6
<i>total: 1 case</i>			
MARK WOLMAN	United Kingdom	World Xanadu	65
<i>total: 1 case</i>			
unknown companies		45 ships	

**Table C: The shipping companies which were the managers and apparent beneficial owners of the 66 ships – 1987-1988**

The information in this table is extracted from Table A, which also provides details regarding responses by companies named. A summary version of this table is provided in Table 2.

shipping company	principal country or countries in which company is based	ship's names	case No. in Table A	during the voyage to South Africa, the company was involved as:	
				managing company	apparent beneficial owner
B. & H. SHIPPING ASSOCIATES	U.S.A.	Obo Baron	33	-	x
BARBER SHIP MANAGEMENT LTD.	Hong Kong	Fidius	22	x	-
		Fidius	23	x	-
<i>total: 2 cases</i>					
BERGESEN D.Y. A/S	Norway	Berge Chief	6	x	x
		Berge Enterprise	7	x	x
<i>total: 6 cases</i>					
		Berge Enterprise	8	x	x
		Berge Prince	9	x	x
		Berge Prince	10	x	x
		Berge Princess	11	x	x
IVER BUGGE	Norway	Dagli	13	x	-
CANADIAN PACIFIC LTD.	Canada	Fidius	22	-	x
		Fidius	23	-	x
<i>total: 2 cases</i>					
CERES HELLENIC SHIPPING ENTERPRISES	Greece	Captain John			
<i>total: 6 cases</i>					
		G.P. Livanos	12	x	-
		Fellowship L.	21	x	-
		Fortuneship L.	24	x	-
		Fortuneship L.	25	x	-
		Freedomship L.	26	x	-
		Friendship L.	27	x	-
COMPAGNIE GENERALE MARITIME ET FINANCIERE	France	Licorne Océane	28	-	x
DORIAN (HELLAS) S.A.	Greece	Louisiana	29	x	-
<i>total: 4 cases</i>					
		Louisiana	30	x	-
		Louisiana	31	x	-
		Louisiana	32	x	-
JOHN FREDRIKSEN GROUP	Norway / Cyprus	Ocean Carrier	34	-	x
<i>c/o Seatankers Management Co. Ltd. (Cyprus)</i>					
GENERAL ORE INTERNATIONAL CORP.	Liechtenstein	Berge Prince	9	-	x
<i>total: 3 cases</i>					
		Berge Prince	10	-	x
		Berge Princess	11	-	x



shipping company	principal country or countries in which company is based	ship's names	case No. in Table A	during the voyage to South Africa, the company was involved as:	
				managing company	apparent beneficial owner
HADJIPATERAS GROUP	Greece / United Kingdom	Louisiana	29	-	x
c/o Peninsular Maritime Ltd. (U.K.)		Louisiana	30	-	x
		Louisiana	31	-	x
		Louisiana	32	-	x
total: 4 cases					
SIGURD HERLOFSON	Norway / Bahamas	Obo Baron	33	x	x
c/o S. Herlofson & Co. A/S (Norway)					
KASSOS MARITIME ENTERPRISES LTD. — see Saipan Steamship Corp.					
KULUKUNDIS GROUP	Greece / United Kingdom	Pacificos	35	-	x
c/o Off Shore Oil Services (U.K.) Ltd.		Pacificos	36	-	x
	total: 2 cases				
C.M. LEMOS	Greece / United Kingdom	Ethnic	17	-	x
c/o C.M. Lemos Ltd. (U.K.)		Ethnic	18	-	x
		Ethnic	19	-	x
		Ethnic	20	-	x
		Patriotic	37	-	x
		Patriotic	38	-	x
		Patriotic	39	-	x
		Patriotic	40	-	x
total: 8 cases					
G.P. LIVANOS/CARRAS GROUP	Greece / United Kingdom	Captain John			
c/o Unisea Ltd. (U.K.)		G.P. Livanos	12	-	x
		Fellowship L.	21	-	x
		Fortuneship L.	24	-	x
		Fortuneship L.	25	-	x
		Freedomship L.	26	-	x
		Friendship L.	27	-	x
total: 6 cases					
MARIMPEX	F.R. Germany	Rafio	41	x	x
MOSVOLD SHIPPING CO. A/S	Norway	Actor	1	x	x
NEREUS SHIPPING S.A.	Greece	Ethnic	17	x	-
total: 8 cases		Ethnic	18	x	-
		Ethnic	19	x	-
		Ethnic	20	x	-
		Patriotic	37	x	-
		Patriotic	38	x	-
		Patriotic	39	x	-
		Patriotic	40	x	-
A/S OCEAN	Norway	Dagli	13	-	x
OFF SHORE OIL SERVICES (U.K.) LTD. — see Kulukundis Group					

shipping company	principal country or countries in which company is based	ship's names	case No. in Table A	during the voyage to South Africa, the company was involved as:	
				managing company	apparent beneficial owner
PENINSULAR MARITIME LTD. — see Hadjipateras Group					
SAIPAN STEAMSHIP CORPORATION	Greece	Pacificos	35	x	-
		Pacificos	36	x	-
c/o Kassos Maritime Enterprises (Greece)					
<i>total: 2 cases</i>					
SEARLAND SHIPPING MANAGEMENT GMBH	Austria	Alki	2	x	x
		Alki	3	x	x
<i>total: 4 cases</i>					
		Alki	4	x	x
		Alki	5	x	x
SEATANKERS MANAGEMENT CO. LTD.	Cyprus	Ocean Carrier	34	x	-
SEATRAMP (U.K.) LTD.	United Kingdom	Licorne Océane	28	x	-
ANDREAS UGLAND	Norway	Ugland Obo-One	42	-	x
UGLAND MANAGEMENT CO. A/S	Norway	Ugland Obo-One	42	x	-
UNISEA LTD. — see G.P. Livanos/Carras Group					
WORLD-WIDE SHIPPING AGENCY LTD.	Hong Kong	Eastern Promise	14	x	-
		Eastern Strength	15	x	-
<i>total: 27 cases</i>					
		Eastern Strength	16	x	-
		World Ambassador	43	x	-
		World Bermuda	44	x	-
		World Brasilia	45	x	-
		World Eminence	46	x	-
		World Eminence	47	x	-
		World Harmony	48	x	-
		World Harmony	49	x	-
		World Hitachi Zosen	50	x	-
		World Progress	51	x	-
		World Progress	52	x	-
		World Progress	53	x	-
		World Progress	54	x	-
		World Progress	55	x	-
		World Progress	56	x	-
		World Progress	57	x	-
		World Renown	58	x	-
		World Renown	59	x	-
		World Renown	60	x	-
		World Renown	61	x	-
		World Summit	62	x	-
		World Symphony	63	x	-
		World Truth	64	x	-
		World Xanadu	65	x	-
		World Xanadu	66	x	-



shipping company	principal country or countries in which company is based	ship's names	case No. in Table A	during the voyage to South Africa, the company was involved as:	
				managing company	apparent beneficial owner
WORLD-WIDE SHIPPING GROUP	Hong Kong	Eastern Promise	14	-	x
		Eastern Strength	15	-	x
total: 27 cases		Eastern Strength	16	-	x
		World Ambassador	43	-	x
		World Bermuda	44	-	x
		World Brasilia	45	-	x
		World Eminence	46	-	x
		World Eminence	47	-	x
		World Harmony	48	-	x
		World Harmony	49	-	x
		World Hitachi Zosen	50	-	x
		World Progress	51	-	x
		World Progress	52	-	x
		World Progress	53	-	x
		World Progress	54	-	x
		World Progress	55	-	x
		World Progress	56	-	x
		World Progress	57	-	x
		World Renown	58	-	x
		World Renown	59	-	x
		World Renown	60	-	x
		World Renown	61	-	x
		World Summit	62	-	x
		World Symphony	63	-	x
		World Truth	64	-	x
		World Xanadu	65	-	x
		World Xanadu	66	-	x

**Table D: The countries in which the companies are based, and the countries whose flags were used by the 66 ships – 1987-1988**

The information in this table is extracted from Table A, which also provides details regarding responses by companies named.

COUNTRY	ships' names	case No. in Table A	OIL COMPANY based in this country, which was apparently the owner of ship's cargo	SHIPPING COMPANY based in this country, which was involved as the ship's managing company	apparent beneficial owner	registered owner of ship	ship used flag of this country
AUSTRIA	Alki	2	-	Seaarland	Seaarland	-	-
	Alki	3	-	Seaarland	Seaarland	-	-
<i>total: 4 cases</i>	Alki	4	-	Seaarland	Seaarland	-	-
	Alki	5	-	Seaarland	Seaarland	-	-
BAHAMAS	Louisiana	29	-	-	-	-	x
	Louisiana	30	-	-	-	-	x
<i>total: 5 cases</i>	Louisiana	31	-	-	-	-	x
	Louisiana	32	-	-	-	-	x
	Obo Baron	33	-	-	Herlofson/B. & H.	-	x
BERMUDA	Berge Chief	6	Transworld Oil	-	-	-	-
CANADA	Fidius	22	-	-	Canadian Pacific	-	-
	Fidius	23	-	-	Canadian Pacific	-	-
<i>total: 2 cases</i>							
CAYMAN ISLANDS	Fidius	22	Intercont. Tr. C.	-	Canadian Pacific	-	-
	Fidius	23	Intercont. Tr. C.	-	Canadian Pacific	-	-
<i>total: 2 cases</i>							
CYPRUS	Alki	2	-	-	-	x	x
	Alki	3	-	-	-	x	x
<i>total: 7 cases</i>	Alki	4	-	-	-	x	x
	Alki	5	-	-	-	x	x
	Ocean Carrier	34	-	Seatankers Man.	Fredriksen Group	x	x
	Pacificos	35	-	-	-	x	-
	Pacificos	36	-	-	-	x	x
FRANCE	Licorne Océane	28	-	-	Cie Gén. M. et F.	-	-
F.R. GERMANY	Berge Enterprise	7	Marimpex	-	-	-	-
	Rafio	41	Marimpex	Marimpex	Marimpex	-	-
<i>total: 2 cases</i>							
GREECE	Captain John						
	G.P. Livanos	12	-	Ceres Hellenic	Livanos/Carras	-	x
<i>total: 20 cases</i>	Ethnic	17	-	Nereus Shipping	C.M. Lemos	-	x
	Ethnic	18	-	Nereus Shipping	C.M. Lemos	-	x
	Ethnic	19	-	Nereus Shipping	C.M. Lemos	-	x
	Ethnic	20	-	Nereus Shipping	C.M. Lemos	-	x
	Fellowship L.	21	-	Ceres Hellenic	Livanos/Carras	-	-
	Fortuneship L.	24	-	Ceres Hellenic	Livanos/Carras	-	x
	Fortuneship L.	25	-	Ceres Hellenic	Livanos/Carras	-	x
	Freedomship L.	26	-	Ceres Hellenic	Livanos/Carras	-	x
	Friendship L.	27	-	Ceres Hellenic	Livanos/Carras	-	x
	Louisiana	29	-	Dorian (Hellas)	Hadjipateras Gr.	-	-
	Louisiana	30	-	Dorian (Hellas)	Hadjipateras Gr.	-	-
	Louisiana	31	-	Dorian (Hellas)	Hadjipateras Gr.	-	-
<i>./.</i>	Louisiana	32	-	Dorian (Hellas)	Hadjipateras Gr.	-	-



COUNTRY	ships' names	case No. in Table A	OIL COMPANY based in this country, which was apparently the owner of ship's cargo	SHIPPING COMPANY based in this country, which was involved as the ship's managing company      apparent beneficial owner		registered owner of ship	ship used flag of this country
GREECE	Pacificos	35	-	Saipan S.S.	Kulukundis Group	-	-
	Pacificos	36	-	Saipan S.S.	Kulukundis Group	-	-
<i>continued</i>	Patriotic	37	-	Nereus Shipping	C.M. Lemos	-	x
	Patriotic	38	-	Nereus Shipping	C.M. Lemos	-	x
	Patriotic	39	-	Nereus Shipping	C.M. Lemos	-	x
	Patriotic	40	-	Nereus Shipping	C.M. Lemos	-	x
HONG KONG	Eastern Promise	14	-	World-Wide Sh.Ag.	World-Wide Sh.Gr.	-	-
	Eastern Strength	15	-	World-Wide Sh.Ag.	World-Wide Sh.Gr.	-	-
<i>total: 30 cases</i>	Eastern Strength	16	-	World-Wide Sh.Ag.	World-Wide Sh.Gr.	-	-
	Fidius	22	-	Barber Ship M.	-	-	-
	Fidius	23	-	Barber Ship M.	-	-	-
	Ocean Carrier	34	Kuo International	-	-	-	-
	World Ambassador	43	-	World-Wide Sh.Ag.	World-Wide Sh.Gr.	-	-
	World Bermuda	44	-	World-Wide Sh.Ag.	World-Wide Sh.Gr.	-	-
	World Brasilia	45	-	World-Wide Sh.Ag.	World-Wide Sh.Gr.	-	-
	World Eminence	46	-	World-Wide Sh.Ag.	World-Wide Sh.Gr.	-	-
	World Eminence	47	-	World-Wide Sh.Ag.	World-Wide Sh.Gr.	-	-
	World Harmony	48	-	World-Wide Sh.Ag.	World-Wide Sh.Gr.	-	-
	World Harmony	49	-	World-Wide Sh.Ag.	World-Wide Sh.Gr.	-	-
	World Hitachi Zosen	50	-	World-Wide Sh.Ag.	World-Wide Sh.Gr.	-	-
	World Progress	51	-	World-Wide Sh.Ag.	World-Wide Sh.Gr.	-	-
	World Progress	52	-	World-Wide Sh.Ag.	World-Wide Sh.Gr.	-	-
	World Progress	53	-	World-Wide Sh.Ag.	World-Wide Sh.Gr.	-	-
	World Progress	54	-	World-Wide Sh.Ag.	World-Wide Sh.Gr.	-	-
	World Progress	55	-	World-Wide Sh.Ag.	World-Wide Sh.Gr.	-	-
	World Progress	56	-	World-Wide Sh.Ag.	World-Wide Sh.Gr.	-	-
	World Progress	57	-	World-Wide Sh.Ag.	World-Wide Sh.Gr.	-	-
	World Renown	58	-	World-Wide Sh.Ag.	World-Wide Sh.Gr.	-	-
	World Renown	59	-	World-Wide Sh.Ag.	World-Wide Sh.Gr.	-	-
	World Renown	60	-	World-Wide Sh.Ag.	World-Wide Sh.Gr.	-	-
	World Renown	61	-	World-Wide Sh.Ag.	World-Wide Sh.Gr.	-	-
	World Summit	62	-	World-Wide Sh.Ag.	World-Wide Sh.Gr.	-	-
	World Symphony	63	-	World-Wide Sh.Ag.	World-Wide Sh.Gr.	-	-
	World Truth	64	-	World-Wide Sh.Ag.	World-Wide Sh.Gr.	-	-
	World Xanadu	65	-	World-Wide Sh.Ag.	World-Wide Sh.Gr.	-	-
	World Xanadu	66	-	World-Wide Sh.Ag.	World-Wide Sh.Gr.	-	-
LIBERIA	Actor	1	-	-	-	x	x
	Berge Prince	9	-	-	-	-	x
<i>total: 39 cases</i>	Berge Prince	10	-	-	-	-	x
	Berge Princess	11	-	-	-	-	x
	Captain John G.P. Livanos	12	-	-	-	x	-
	Dagli	13	-	-	-	x	-
	Eastern Promise	14	-	-	-	x	x
	Eastern Promise	15	-	-	-	x	x
	Eastern Strength	16	-	-	-	x	x
	Fellowship L.	21	-	-	-	x	x
	Fortuneship L.	24	-	-	-	x	-
	Fortuneship L.	25	-	-	-	x	-
<i>./.</i>	Freedomship L.	26	-	-	-	x	-

COUNTRY	ships' names	case No. in Table A	OIL COMPANY based in this country, which was apparently the owner of ship's cargo	SHIPPING COMPANY based in this country, which was involved as the ship's managing company      apparent beneficial owner		registered owner of ship	ship used flag of this country
LIBERIA	Friendship L.	27	-	-	-	x	-
	Licorne Océane	28	-	-	-	x	x
<i>continued</i>	Pacificos	35	-	-	-	-	x
	Rafio	41	-	-	-	x	x
	World Ambassador	43	-	-	-	x	x
	World Bermuda	44	-	-	-	x	x
	World Brasilia	45	-	-	-	x	x
	World Eminence	46	-	-	-	x	x
	World Eminence	47	-	-	-	x	x
	World Hitachi Zosen	50	-	-	-	x	x
	World Progress	51	-	-	-	x	x
	World Progress	52	-	-	-	x	x
	World Progress	53	-	-	-	x	x
	World Progress	54	-	-	-	x	x
	World Progress	55	-	-	-	x	x
	World Progress	56	-	-	-	x	x
	World Progress	57	-	-	-	x	x
	World Renown	58	-	-	-	x	x
	World Renown	59	-	-	-	x	x
	World Renown	60	-	-	-	x	x
	World Renown	61	-	-	-	x	x
	World Summit	62	-	-	-	x	x
	World Symphony	63	-	-	-	x	x
	World Truth	64	-	-	-	x	x
	World Xanadu	65	-	-	-	x	x
	World Xanadu	66	-	-	-	x	x
LIECHTENSTEIN	Berge Prince	9	-	-	Gen. Ore/Bergesen	x	-
	Berge Prince	10	-	-	Gen. Ore/Bergesen	x	-
<i>total: 3 cases</i>	Berge Princess	11	-	-	Gen. Ore/Bergesen	x	-
MONACO	Alki	4	African Middle East	-	-	-	-
	Captain John						
<i>total: 8 cases</i>	G.P. Livanos	12	African Middle East	-	-	-	-
	Pacificos	36	African Middle East	-	-	-	-
	World Ambassador	43	African Middle East	-	-	-	-
	World Hitachi Zosen	50	African Middle East	-	-	-	-
	World Progress	55	African Middle East	-	-	-	-
	World Progress	56	African Middle East	-	-	-	-
	World Renown	61	African Middle East	-	-	-	-
THE NETHERLANDS	Berge Chief	6	Transworld Oil	-	-	-	-
NORWAY	Actor	1	-	Mosvold Shipping	Mosvold Shipping	-	-
	Berge Chief	6	-	Bergesen	Bergesen	x	x
<i>total: 11 cases</i>	Berge Enterprise	7	-	Bergesen	Bergesen	x	x
	Berge Enterprise	8	-	Bergesen	Bergesen	x	x
	Berge Prince	9	-	Bergesen	Bergesen/Gen. Ore	-	-
	Berge Prince	10	-	Bergesen	Bergesen/Gen. Ore	-	-
	Berge Princess	11	-	Bergesen	Bergesen/Gen. Ore	-	-
	Dagli	13	-	Iver Bugge	A/S Ocean	-	x
<i>./.</i>	Obo Baron	33	-	S. Herlofson	Herlofson/B. & H.	-	-



COUNTRY	ships' names	case No. in Table A	OIL COMPANY based in this country, which was apparently the owner of ship's cargo	SHIPPING COMPANY based in this country, which was involved as the ship's managing company	registered owner of ship	ship used flag of this country
NORWAY	Ocean Carrier	34	-	-	Fredriksen Group	-
	Ugland Obo-One	42	-	Ugland Man.	Andreas Ugland	-
<i>continued</i>						
PANAMA	Ethnic	17	-	-	-	x
	Ethnic	18	-	-	-	x
<i>total: 15 cases</i>	Ethnic	19	-	-	-	x
	Ethnic	20	-	-	-	x
	Louisiana	29	-	-	-	x
	Louisiana	30	-	-	-	x
	Louisiana	31	-	-	-	x
	Louisiana	32	-	-	-	x
	Patriotic	37	-	-	-	x
	Patriotic	38	-	-	-	x
	Patriotic	39	-	-	-	x
	Patriotic	40	-	-	-	x
	Ugland Obo-One	42	-	-	-	x
	World Harmony	48	-	-	-	x
	World Harmony	49	-	-	-	x
SWITZERLAND	Alki	4	African Middle East	-	-	-
	Captain John					
<i>total: 14 cases</i>	G.P. Livanos	12	African Middle East	-	-	-
	Dagli	13	Marc Rich	-	-	-
	Eastern Promise	14	Euravia/Marc Rich	-	-	-
	Ethnic	20	Marc Rich	-	-	-
	Freedomship L.	26	Marc Rich	-	-	-
	Pacificos	36	African Middle East	-	-	-
	World Ambassador	43	African Middle East	-	-	-
	World Hitachi Zosen	50	African Middle East	-	-	-
	World Progress	55	African Middle East	-	-	-
	World Progress	56	African Middle East	-	-	-
	World Renown	60	African Middle East	-	-	-
	World Symphony	63	Marc Rich	-	-	-
	World Xanadu	65	M. Rich/M. Wolman	-	-	-
UNITED KINGDOM	Captain John					
	G.P. Livanos	12	-	-	Livanos/Carras	-
	Ethnic	17	-	-	C.M. Lemos	-
<i>total: 24 cases</i>	Ethnic	18	-	-	C.M. Lemos	-
	Ethnic	19	-	-	C.M. Lemos	-
	Ethnic	20	-	-	C.M. Lemos	-
	Fellowship L.	21	-	-	Livanos/Carras	-
	Fidius	22	-	-	-	x
	Fidius	23	-	-	-	x
	Fortuneship L.	24	-	-	Livanos/Carras	-
	Fortuneship L.	25	-	-	Livanos/Carras	-
	Freedomship L.	26	-	-	Livanos/Carras	-
	Friendship L.	27	-	-	Livanos/Carras	-
	Licorne Océane	28	-	Seatramp	-	-
	Louisiana	29	-	-	Hadjipateras Gr.	-
./.	Louisiana	30	-	-	Hadjipateras Gr.	-

COUNTRY	ships' names	case No. in Table A	OIL COMPANY based in this country, which was apparently the owner of ship's cargo	SHIPPING COMPANY based in this country, which was involved as the ship's managing company	apparent beneficial owner	registered owner of ship	ship used flag of this country
UNITED	Louisiana	31	-	-	Hadjipateras Gr.	-	-
KINGDOM	Louisiana	32	-	-	Hadjipateras Gr.	-	-
	Pacificos	35	-	-	Kulukundis Group	-	-
<i>continued</i>	Pacificos	36	-	-	Kulukundis Group	-	-
	Patriotic	37	-	-	C.M. Lemos	-	-
	Patriotic	38	-	-	C.M. Lemos	-	-
	Patriotic	39	-	-	C.M. Lemos	-	-
	Patriotic	40	-	-	C.M. Lemos	-	-
	World Xanadu	66	M. Wolman/M. Rich	-	-	-	-
U.S.A.	Obo Baron	33	-	-	B. & H./Herlofson	x	-



**Table E: The countries from which the 66 ships sailed to South Africa – 1987-1988**

The information in this table is extracted from Table A. A summary version of this table is provided in Table 3.

\*: 'multi-porting'

COUNTRY/REGION	ship's names	case No. in Table A	deadweight
<b>ALL COUNTRIES</b>			
<i>grand total: 66 cases – 17,102,603 tons dwt</i>			
<b>PERSIAN GULF</b>			
<i>grand total: 55 cases – 14,862,793 tons dwt</i>			
IRAN	Actor	1	274,938
	Berge Prince	9	284,522
<i>6 cases – 1,649,489 tons dwt</i>	Berge Princess	11	284,507
<i>plus</i>	Fidius	23	254,691
<i>1 case multi-porting – 356,324 tons dwt</i>	Licorne Océane	28	290,767
	World Summit	62	260,064
	World Symphony*	63	356,324*
OMAN	Berge Chief	6	289,981
	Berge Enterprise*	8	360,700*
<i>4 cases – 1,083,802 tons dwt</i>	Ethnic	17	274,629
<i>plus</i>	Friendship L.*	27	267,590*
<i>4 cases multi-porting – 1,152,286 tons dwt</i>	World Eminence*	47	261,729*
	World Harmony	48	259,596
	World Harmony	49	259,596
	World Renown*	60	262,267*
QATAR	Berge Enterprise*	7	360,700*
	Ethnic*	20	274,629*
<i>2 cases – 536,162 tons dwt</i>	Fortuneship L.	24	268,081
<i>plus</i>	Fortuneship L.	25	268,081
<i>7 cases multi-porting – 1,807,755 tons dwt</i>	Obo Baron*	33	103,230*
	Pacificos*	35	268,467*
	Patriotic*	37	269,500*
	Patriotic*	40	269,500*
	World Eminence*	47	261,729*
SAUDI ARABIA	Berge Enterprise*	7	360,700*
[incl. Red Sea ports]	Berge Prince*	10	284,522*
	Captain John G.P. Livanos*	12	259,657*
<i>3 cases – 861,741 tons dwt</i>	Louisiana	30	315,713
<i>plus</i>	Obo Baron*	33	103,230*
<i>4 cases multi-porting – 1,008,109 tons dwt</i>	World Brasilia	45	283,761
	World Renown	58	262,267

COUNTRY/REGION	ship's names	case No. in Table A	deadweight
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	Alki	2	232,600
	Alki	3	232,600
22 cases – 5,760,861 tons dwt	Alki	5	232,600
plus	Berge Enterprise*	7	360,700*
8 cases multi-porting – 2,422,087 tons dwt	Berge Enterprise*	8	360,700*
	Eastern Promise	14	268,038
	Eastern Strength	15	267,577
	Eastern Strength	16	267,577
	Ethnic	18	274,629
	Ethnic	19	274,629
	Ethnic*	20	274,629*
	Fellowship L.	21	268,255
	Louisiana	29	315,713
	Louisiana	31	315,713
	Louisiana	32	315,713
	Pacificos*	35	268,467*
	Patriotic*	37	269,500*
	Patriotic	39	269,500
	Patriotic*	40	269,500*
	World Eminence	46	261,729
	World Progress	50	237,285
	World Progress	52	237,285
	World Progress	53	237,285
	World Progress	54	237,285
	World Progress	57	237,285
	World Renown*	60	262,267*
	World Symphony*	63	356,324*
	World Truth	64	249,223
	World Xanadu	65	264,170
	World Xanadu	66	264,170
PERSIAN GULF:	Fidius	22	254,691
unknown countries	Freedomship L.	26	283,271
	Patriotic	38	269,500
6 cases – 1,631,580 tons dwt	Rafio	41	290,271
	World Bermuda	44	271,580
	World Renown	59	262,267
RED SEA			
<i>grand total: 8 cases – 2,003,939 tons dwt</i>			
EGYPT	Alki	4	232,600
	Captain John G.P. Livanos*	12	259,657*
7 cases – 1,744,282 tons dwt	Pacificos	36	268,467
plus	World Ambassador	43	237,474
1 case multi-porting – 259,657 tons dwt	World Hitachi Zosen	50	268,904
	World Progress	55	237,285
	World Progress	56	237,285
	World Renown	61	262,267



COUNTRY/REGION	ship's names	case No. in Table A	deadweight
SAUDI ARABIA			
1 case multi-porting Saudi Arabian Red Sea port – see above			
EUROPE			
grand total: 2 cases – 111,872 tons dwt			
FRANCE	Ugland Obo-One	42	54,500
1 case – 54,500 tons dwt			
U.S.S.R.	Dagli	13	57,372
1 case – 57,372 tons dwt			
FAR EAST			
MALAYSIA	Ocean Carrier	34	123,999
1 case – 123,999 tons dwt			

**Table F: The 193 ships of 50,000 tons dwt and over analysed by the Shipping Research Bureaus which called at South Africa 1987-1988**

The 66 ships which –based on the evidence at the Bureau's disposal – apparently delivered oil cargoes during their visits to South Africa, are shown in CAPITAL LETTERS.

ship's name	dwt tonnage	type of ship	month in South Africa	ship's name	dwt tonnage	type of ship	month in South Africa
Abant	103,887	combined carrier	Jly/Aug 88	FELLOWSHIP L.	268,255	oil tanker	Sep 87
Abant	103,887	combined carrier	Sep/Oct 88	Fernteam	123,043	combined carrier	Oct 87
Abant	103,887	combined carrier	Nov/Dec 88	Fernteam	123,043	combined carrier	Feb 88
ACTOR	274,938	oil tanker	May/Jne 87	FIDIUS	254,691	oil tanker	Mar 87
Aegean Sea	114,036	combined carrier	Feb 88	FIDIUS	254,691	oil tanker	Jly 87
Aegean Sea	114,036	combined carrier	Mar/Apr 88	FORTUNESHIP L.	268,081	oil tanker	Apr 87
ALKI	232,600	oil tanker	Jly 88	FORTUNESHIP L.	268,081	oil tanker	Jne/Jly 87
ALKI	232,600	oil tanker	Sep 88	FREEDOMSHIP L.	283,271	oil tanker	Nov 87
ALKI	232,600	oil tanker	Nov 88	FRIENDSHIP L.	267,590	oil tanker	Jan/Feb 87
ALKI	232,600	oil tanker	Dec 88/Jan 89	Goldstar	145,057	combined carrier	Apr 87
Alster Ore	305,863	combined carrier	Jne/Jly 88	Goldstar	145,057	combined carrier	Jly/Aug 87
Alster Star	217,257	combined carrier	Aug 88	Grand Phoenix	290,793	combined carrier	Jan 87
Amber	164,811	combined carrier	Dec 88	Høegh Favour	82,460	combined carrier	Oct 88
Andros Aries	233,805	combined carrier	Mar/Apr 87	Høegh Forum	78,585	combined carrier	Apr 88
Andros Atlas	224,074	combined carrier	Jan 88	Høegh Fountain	78,488	combined carrier	Apr 88
Arapaho	123,170	combined carrier	May 87	Hudson Bay 1	152,396	combined carrier	Sep/Oct 87
Arapaho	123,170	combined carrier	Sep/Oct 87	Hudson Bay 1	152,396	combined carrier	Mar 88
Arapaho	123,170	combined carrier	Feb 88	Hudson Bay 1	152,396	combined carrier	Aug 88
Arapaho	123,170	combined carrier	Nov 88	Hydrus	160,787	combined carrier	Feb 87
Astranor	85,150	combined carrier	May 87	Hydrus	160,787	combined carrier	Dec 87/Jan 88
Banak	123,999	combined carrier	Jly/Aug 87	Inci S.	161,798	combined carrier	Jly 88
Benyon One	103,231	combined carrier	Sep 87	Irenes Destiny	145,092	combined carrier	Sep/Oct 88
Benyon One	103,231	combined carrier	Feb 88	Jahre Pearl	78,075	combined carrier	Mar 88
Benyon Three	103,332	combined carrier	Apr 88	Jahre Rose	127,050	combined carrier	Oct 88
BERGE CHIEF	289,981	oil tanker	Apr 87	Kildare	155,450	combined carrier	Jly 87
BERGE ENTERPRISE	360,700	oil tanker	Apr 87	Kildare	155,450	combined carrier	May 88
BERGE ENTERPRISE	360,700	oil tanker	Jne 87	Kimizuru	172,165	combined carrier	Jly 88
Berge Odel	155,048	combined carrier	Feb 87	Kition	158,909	oil tanker	Oct 88/Feb 89
Berge Odel	155,048	combined carrier	Apr 87	Konkar Theodoros	225,162	combined carrier	Jne 87
Berge Odel	155,048	combined carrier	Sep 87	Lady Sky	154,900	combined carrier	Jan 88
Berge Odel	155,048	combined carrier	Sep 88	LICORNE OCEANE	290,767	oil tanker	Feb 87
BERGE PRINCE	284,522	oil tanker	Apr 87	Long Star	183,526	combined carrier	Jne 88
BERGE PRINCE	284,522	oil tanker	Jne 87	LOUISIANA	315,713	oil tanker	Nov/Dec 86
BERGE PRINCESS	284,507	oil tanker	Mar 87	LOUISIANA	315,713	oil tanker	Feb/Mar 87
Bergebonde	155,048	combined carrier	Sep 87	LOUISIANA	315,713	oil tanker	Jly 87
Bergebonde	155,048	combined carrier	May 88	LOUISIANA	315,713	oil tanker	Aug 87
Capo Emma	89,284	oil tanker	Jly 87	Lyra	152,305	combined carrier	Jne 87
CAPTAIN JOHN G.P.				Mandan	123,043	combined carrier	Oct 88
LIVANOS	259,657	oil tanker	Jan 88	Marika P.	78,010	combined carrier	Oct 87
Chamois	73,253	combined carrier	Jly 88	Marikit	117,893	combined carrier	Jly 87
Champion	112,109	combined carrier	Mar 88	Marikit	117,893	combined carrier	Jan 88
Choctaw	152,259	combined carrier	May/Jne 88	Musashi Spirit	258,268	combined carrier	Dec 87
DAGLI	57,372	oil tanker	Oct 88	New Phase	155,450	combined carrier	Dec 88
East Star	169,317	combined carrier	May 88	Norman Hunter	145,015	combined carrier	Sep 88
Eastern Plum	70,743	combined carrier	Aug 88	OBO BARON	103,230	combined carrier	Mar/Apr 87
EASTERN PROMISE	268,038	oil tanker	Dec 88/Jan 89	Obo Prince	127,050	combined carrier	May/Jne 88
EASTERN STRENGTH	267,577	oil tanker	Aug/Sep 88	Obo Vega	97,947	combined carrier	Dec 87/Jan 88
EASTERN STRENGTH	267,577	oil tanker	Oct 88	Ocean Carrier	123,999	combined carrier	Mar 88
Elbe Maru	158,570	combined carrier	Sep/Oct 88	Ocean Carrier	123,999	combined carrier	Oct/Nov 88
Elbe Ore	160,565	combined carrier	Aug/Sep 88	OCEAN CARRIER	123,999	combined carrier	Dec 88/Jan 89
Eldora	59,847	combined carrier	May 87	Ocean Commander	122,050	combined carrier	Nov 88
Eleni P.	164,545	combined carrier	Jne 87	Ocean Regent	114,058	combined carrier	May 88
ETHNIC	274,629	oil tanker	Mar 88	Ocean Regent	114,058	combined carrier	Oct/Nov 88
ETHNIC	274,629	oil tanker	Aug 88	Ocean Trader	104,850	combined carrier	Apr 88
ETHNIC	274,629	oil tanker	Sep 88	Ocean Voyager	123,767	combined carrier	Oct 88
ETHNIC	274,629	oil tanker	Oct 88	Oder Maru	172,278	combined carrier	Oct 87



ship's name	dwt tonnage	type of ship	month in South Africa
Oder Maru	172,278	combined carrier	Dec 87
Oslo	123,768	combined carrier	Mar 87
Oslo	123,768	combined carrier	Jne 87
Oslo	123,768	combined carrier	Aug/Sep 87
Oslo	123,768	combined carrier	Nov 87
Oslo	123,768	combined carrier	Jly/Aug 88
Oslo	123,768	combined carrier	Oct 88
PACIFICOS	268,467	oil tanker	Jly/Aug 87
PACIFICOS	268,467	oil tanker	Nov 88
Panthir	85,414	combined carrier	Oct 88
Pasithea	155,407	combined carrier	Jan 88
Pasithea	155,407	combined carrier	Mar/Apr 88
PATRIOTIC	269,500	oil tanker	Jan 87
PATRIOTIC	269,500	oil tanker	Mar 87
PATRIOTIC	269,500	oil tanker	Apr/May 87
PATRIOTIC	269,500	oil tanker	Aug 88
Pawnee	122,272	combined carrier	Oct/Nov 87
Pawnee	122,272	combined carrier	Feb 88
Pawnee	122,272	combined carrier	Aug 88
Penteli	114,014	combined carrier	Jne 88
RAFIO	290,271	oil tanker	Nov/Dec 88
Rhine Ore	264,999	combined carrier	Jly 87
Rhine Ore	264,999	combined carrier	Mar 88
Ruhr Ore	305,863	combined carrier	Aug 87
Ruhr Ore	305,863	combined carrier	Sep 88
St. John	156,109	combined carrier	Oct 88
Sauda	123,767	combined carrier	Mar/Apr 87
Sauda	123,767	combined carrier	Aug 87
Sauda	123,767	combined carrier	Nov 87
Sauda	123,767	combined carrier	Jan 88
Sauda	123,767	combined carrier	Apr 88
Sauda	123,767	combined carrier	Jne 88
Sea Victory	85,989	combined carrier	Mar 88
Sea Victory	85,989	combined carrier	Nov 88
Seiko Maru	247,867	combined carrier	Sep 88
Shawnee	122,171	combined carrier	Oct 87
Shawnee	122,171	combined carrier	Jly 88
Sioux	66,234	combined carrier	Aug 88
Sioux	66,234	combined carrier	Sep 88
Skaubo	132,409	combined carrier	Sep 88
South Star	77,988	combined carrier	Nov/Dec 88

ship's name	dwt tonnage	type of ship	month in South Africa
Tassia	120,250	oil tanker	Sep/Oct 87
Tavistock	163,035	oil tanker	Jan 88
Theogennitor	116,978	combined carrier	May/Jne 88
Theotokos	103,230	combined carrier	Jne 88
UGLAND OBO-ONE	54,500	combined carrier	Apr 87
Waasland	147,327	combined carrier	Nov 87
Waasland	147,327	combined carrier	Jne/Jly 88
WORLD AMBASSADOR	237,474	oil tanker	Mar 88
WORLD BERMUDA	271,580	oil tanker	Apr/May 88
WORLD BRASILIA	283,761	oil tanker	Jan 87
World Duality	114,144	combined carrier	Mar/Apr 87
World Duality	114,144	combined carrier	Jan 88
World Duality	114,144	combined carrier	May 88
World Duality	114,144	combined carrier	Jly/Aug 88
World Duality	114,144	combined carrier	Nov/Dec 88
World Duet	114,092	combined carrier	Apr 87
World Duet	114,092	combined carrier	Jan 88
World Duet	114,092	combined carrier	May 88
World Duet	114,092	combined carrier	Nov 88
World Duet	114,092	combined carrier	Dec 88
WORLD EMINENCE	261,729	oil tanker	Dec 87
WORLD EMINENCE	261,729	oil tanker	Apr 88
WORLD HARMONY	259,596	oil tanker	May 88
WORLD HARMONY	259,596	oil tanker	Sep 88
WORLD HITACHI ZOSEN	268,904	oil tanker	Jly 88
WORLD PROGRESS	237,285	oil tanker	Dec 86
WORLD PROGRESS	237,285	oil tanker	Jan 87
WORLD PROGRESS	237,285	oil tanker	Jly 87
WORLD PROGRESS	237,285	oil tanker	Dec 87
WORLD PROGRESS	237,285	oil tanker	Jne 88
WORLD PROGRESS	237,285	oil tanker	Aug 88
WORLD PROGRESS	237,285	oil tanker	Dec 88
WORLD RENOWN	262,267	oil tanker	Apr 87
WORLD RENOWN	262,267	oil tanker	May/Jne 87
WORLD RENOWN	262,267	oil tanker	Feb/Mar 88
WORLD RENOWN	262,267	oil tanker	May 88
WORLD SUMMIT	260,064	oil tanker	Oct 88
WORLD SYMPHONY	356,324	oil tanker	Mar 87
WORLD TRUTH	249,223	combined carrier	Jly 87
WORLD XANADU	264,170	oil tanker	Dec 87/Jan 88
WORLD XANADU	264,170	oil tanker	Nov 88





Table G

Some preliminary findings on apparent  
crude oil deliveries to South Africa in 1989 and early 1990

ship's name	dwt tonnage <i>type of ship</i>	flag  * changed flag	SHIPPING COMPANIES INVOLVED			OIL COMPANIES INVOLVED  apparent owner of the ship's crude oil cargo
			managing company	country in which registered owner is based	apparent beneficial owner of ship	
1 <b>ALKI</b>	232,600 <i>oil tanker</i>	Cyprus	Seaarland Shipping Management GmbH <sup>1</sup> (Austria)	Cyprus	Seaarland Shipping Management GmbH <sup>2</sup> (Austria)	unknown
2 <b>ALKI</b>	232,600 <i>oil tanker</i>	Cyprus	Seaarland Shipping Management GmbH <sup>1</sup> (Austria)	Cyprus	Seaarland Shipping Management GmbH <sup>2</sup> (Austria)	unknown
3 <b>ALKI</b>	232,600 <i>oil tanker</i>	Cyprus	Seaarland Shipping Management GmbH <sup>1</sup> (Austria)	Cyprus	Seaarland Shipping Management GmbH <sup>2</sup> (Austria)	unknown
4 <b>ALKI</b>	232,600 <i>oil tanker</i>	Cyprus	Seaarland Shipping Management GmbH <sup>1</sup> (Austria)	Cyprus	Seaarland Shipping Management GmbH <sup>2</sup> (Austria)	unknown
5 <b>ANAX</b>	259,449 <i>oil tanker</i>	Cyprus  * Liberia	Pegasus Ocean Services Ltd. <sup>1</sup> (United Kingdom)	Cyprus	unknown company c/o Pleiades Shipping Agents Ltd. <sup>1</sup> (Greece)	unknown
6 <b>BATIS</b>	155,089 <i>combined carrier</i>	Greece	Buenamar Compania Naviera S.A. <sup>1</sup> (Greece)	Liberia	Embiricos Shipping <sup>1</sup> (Greece/United Kingdom)	African Middle East Petroleum Co. <sup>3</sup> (Monaco/ Switzerland)
7 <b>BATIS</b>	155,089 <i>combined carrier</i>	Greece	Buenamar Compania Naviera S.A. <sup>1</sup> (Greece)	Liberia	Embiricos Shipping <sup>1</sup> (Greece/United Kingdom)	unknown
8 <b>BATIS</b>	155,089 <i>combined carrier</i>	Greece	Buenamar Compania Naviera S.A. <sup>1</sup> (Greece)	Liberia	Embiricos Shipping <sup>1</sup> (Greece/United Kingdom)	unknown
9 <b>BATIS</b>	155,089 <i>combined carrier</i>	Greece	Buenamar Compania Naviera S.A. <sup>1</sup> (Greece)	Liberia	Embiricos Shipping <sup>1</sup> (Greece/United Kingdom)	African Middle East Petroleum Co. <sup>3</sup> (Monaco/ Switzerland)
10 <b>BRITTANY</b>	233,348 <i>oil tanker</i>	Panama	World-Wide Shipping Agency Ltd. <sup>4</sup> (Hong Kong)	Panama	World-Wide Shipping Group <sup>4</sup> (Hong Kong)	African Middle East Petroleum Co. <sup>3</sup> (Monaco/ Switzerland)



region or country from which the ship sailed to South Africa	month the ship called at South Africa  <i>type of call</i>	region to which the ship sailed from South Africa	c o m m e n t s :
Persian Gulf [U.A.E.]	May 89 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed to South Africa from an oil-exporting area; then returned to the same oil-exporting area.
Persian Gulf [Persian Gulf]	Jly 89 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed to South Africa from an oil-exporting area; then immediately returned to the same oil-exporting area.
Persian Gulf [U.A.E.]	Aug 89 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed to South Africa from an oil-exporting area; then immediately returned to the same oil-exporting area.
Persian Gulf [U.A.E.; Oman]	Sep 89 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed to South Africa from an oil-exporting area; then returned to the same oil-exporting area.
Persian Gulf [U.A.E.]	Apr 89 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed from an oil-exporting area. On departure, the purported destination was 'Ain Sukhna' (Egypt). However, a call there was never reported. The vessel 'disappeared' for several weeks, under circumstances strongly suggesting that she may have called at South Africa to deliver an oil cargo. She then immediately returned to the same oil-exporting area.
Red Sea [Egypt]	Apr 89 <i>secret call</i>	Far East	Sailed to South Africa from an oil-exporting area, apparently to deliver an oil cargo. Then collected a cargo of South African iron ore for the Far East.
Persian Gulf [Persian Gulf]	Jly 89 <i>secret call</i>	Far East	Sailed to South Africa from an oil-exporting area, apparently to deliver an oil cargo. Then collected a cargo of South African iron ore for the Far East.
Persian Gulf [U.A.E.]	Dec 89 <i>reported call</i>	Far East	Sailed to South Africa from an oil-exporting area, apparently to deliver an oil cargo. Then collected a cargo of South African iron ore for the Far East.
Red Sea [Egypt]	Mar 90 <i>secret call</i>	Far East	Sailed from Egypt loaded with crude oil, purportedly destined for 'Singapore'. After a short call of less than one day at Djibouti, the ship sailed on, again reporting 'Singapore' as her destination. Instead, she sailed to South Africa, apparently to deliver her oil cargo. She then collected a cargo of South African iron ore for the Far East.
Red Sea [Egypt]	Dec 89 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed from an oil-exporting area. On departure, the purported destination was 'Far East'. However, no calls there were reported. The vessel 'disappeared' for several weeks, under circumstances strongly suggesting that she may have called at South Africa to deliver an oil cargo. She then immediately sailed on to another oil-exporting area.

ship's name	dwt tonnage  <i>type of ship</i>	flag	SHIPPING COMPANIES INVOLVED			OIL COMPANIES INVOLVED  apparent owner of the ship's crude oil cargo
			managing company	country in which registered owner is based	apparent beneficial owner of ship	
11 <b>CALI</b>	236,425 <i>oil tanker</i>	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Agency Ltd. <sup>4</sup> (Hong Kong)	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Group <sup>4</sup> (Hong Kong)	unknown
12 <b>CALI</b>	236,425 <i>oil tanker</i>	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Agency Ltd. <sup>4</sup> (Hong Kong)	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Group <sup>4</sup> (Hong Kong)	unknown
13 <b>EASTERN COURAGE</b>	267,807 <i>oil tanker</i>	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Agency Ltd. <sup>4</sup> (Hong Kong)	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Group <sup>4</sup> (Hong Kong)	unknown
14 <b>EASTERN PROMISE</b>	268,038 <i>oil tanker</i>	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Agency Ltd. <sup>4</sup> (Hong Kong)	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Group <sup>4</sup> (Hong Kong)	unknown
15 <b>ETHNIC</b>	274,629 <i>oil tanker</i>	Greece	Nereus Shipping S.A. <sup>1</sup> (Greece)	Panama	C.M. Lemos <sup>1</sup> (Greece/United Kingdom)	unknown
16 <b>PACIFICOS</b>	268,467 <i>oil tanker</i>	Cyprus	Saipan Steamship Corp. c/o Kassos Maritime Enterprises Ltd. <sup>5</sup> (Greece)	Cyprus	Kulukundis Group (Greece/U.K.) c/o Off Shore Oil Services (U.K.) Ltd. <sup>6</sup> (United Kingdom)	unknown
17 <b>PACIFICOS</b>	268,467 <i>oil tanker</i>	Cyprus	Saipan Steamship Corp. c/o Kassos Maritime Enterprises Ltd. <sup>5</sup> (Greece)	Cyprus	Kulukundis Group (Greece/U.K.) c/o Off Shore Oil Services (U.K.) Ltd. <sup>6</sup> (United Kingdom)	unknown
18 <b>PACIFICOS</b>	268,467 <i>oil tanker</i>	Cyprus	Saipan Steamship Corp. c/o Kassos Maritime Enterprises Ltd. <sup>5</sup> (Greece)	Cyprus	Kulukundis Group (Greece/U.K.) c/o Off Shore Oil Services (U.K.) Ltd. <sup>6</sup> (United Kingdom)	African Middle East Petroleum Co. <sup>7</sup> (Monaco/Switzerland)
19 <b>PACIFICOS</b>	268,467 <i>oil tanker</i>	Cyprus	Saipan Steamship Corp. c/o Kassos Maritime Enterprises Ltd. <sup>5</sup> (Greece)	Cyprus	Kulukundis Group (Greece/U.K.) c/o Off Shore Oil Services (U.K.) Ltd. <sup>6</sup> (United Kingdom)	unknown



region or country from which the ship sailed to South Africa	month the ship called at South Africa <i>type of call</i>	region to which the ship sailed from South Africa	c o m m e n t s :
Persian Gulf [U.A.E.]	May 89 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed from an oil-exporting area. On departure, the purported destination was 'Singapore'. However, a call there was never reported. The vessel 'disappeared' for several weeks, under circumstances strongly suggesting that she may have called at South Africa to deliver an oil cargo.
Persian Gulf [U.A.E.]	Jne/Jly 89 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	After sailing from an oil-exporting area, the vessel 'disappeared' for several weeks, under circumstances strongly suggesting that she may have called at South Africa to deliver an oil cargo. She then immediately returned to the same oil-exporting area.
Persian Gulf [Persian Gulf]	May 89 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed from an oil-exporting area without disclosing her destination. The vessel 'disappeared' for several weeks, under circumstances strongly suggesting that she may have called at South Africa to deliver an oil cargo. She then immediately returned to the same oil-exporting area.
Persian Gulf [Persian Gulf]	Apr 89 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	After sailing from an oil-exporting area, the vessel 'disappeared' for several weeks, under circumstances strongly suggesting that she may have called at South Africa to deliver an oil cargo. She then immediately returned to the same oil-exporting area.
Persian Gulf [U.A.E.]	Mar 89 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed from an oil-exporting area. On departure, the purported destination was 'Singapore'. However, a call there was never reported. The vessel 'disappeared' for several weeks, under circumstances strongly suggesting that she may have called at South Africa to deliver an oil cargo. She then returned to the same oil-exporting area.
Middle East [Middle East]	Jan 89 <i>secret call</i>	unknown	Sailed from an oil-exporting area without disclosing her destination. The vessel 'disappeared' for several weeks, under circumstances strongly suggesting that she may have called at South Africa to deliver an oil cargo.
Middle East [Middle East]	Apr 89 <i>secret call</i>	Middle East	Sailed from an oil-exporting area without disclosing her destination. The vessel 'disappeared' for several weeks under circumstances strongly suggesting that she may have called at South Africa to deliver an oil cargo. She then returned to the same oil-exporting area.
Red Sea [Egypt]	Jne 89 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed from an oil-exporting area without disclosing her destination. The vessel 'disappeared' for several weeks under circumstances strongly suggesting that she may have called at South Africa to deliver an oil cargo. She then sailed on to another oil-exporting area.
Persian Gulf [U.A.E.; Oman]	Mar 90 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed from an oil-exporting area. On departure, the purported destination was 'Singapore'. However, a call there was never reported. The vessel 'disappeared' for a prolonged period, under circumstances strongly suggesting that she may have called at South Africa to deliver an oil cargo.

ship's name	dwt tonnage <i>type of ship</i>	flag	SHIPPING COMPANIES INVOLVED			OIL COMPANIES INVOLVED
			managing company	country in which registered owner is based	apparent beneficial owner of ship	apparent owner of the ship's crude oil cargo
20 <b>RAFIO</b>	290,271 <i>oil tanker</i>	Liberia	Marimpex <sup>1</sup> (F.R. Germany)	Liberia	Marimpex <sup>1</sup> (F.R. Germany)	Marimpex <sup>1</sup> (F.R. Germany)
21 <b>RAFIO</b>	290,271 <i>oil tanker</i>	Liberia	Marimpex <sup>8</sup> (F.R. Germany)	Liberia	Marimpex <sup>8</sup> (F.R. Germany)	Marimpex <sup>8</sup> (F.R. Germany)
22 <b>WORLD CHAMPION</b>	273,117 <i>oil tanker</i>	Panama	World-Wide Shipping Agency Ltd. <sup>4</sup> (Hong Kong)	Panama	World-Wide Shipping Group <sup>4</sup> (Hong Kong)	African Middle East Petroleum Co. <sup>7</sup> (Monaco/ Switzerland)
23 <b>WORLD HITACHI ZOSEN</b>	268,904 <i>oil tanker</i>	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Agency Ltd. <sup>4</sup> (Hong Kong)	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Group <sup>4</sup> (Hong Kong)	African Middle East Petroleum Co. <sup>7</sup> (Monaco/ Switzerland)
24 <b>WORLD HITACHI ZOSEN</b>	268,904 <i>oil tanker</i>	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Agency Ltd. <sup>4</sup> (Hong Kong)	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Group <sup>4</sup> (Hong Kong)	unknown
25 <b>WORLD RENOWN</b>	262,267 <i>oil tanker</i>	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Agency Ltd. <sup>4</sup> (Hong Kong)	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Group <sup>4</sup> (Hong Kong)	unknown
26 <b>WORLD RENOWN</b>	262,267 <i>oil tanker</i>	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Agency Ltd. <sup>4</sup> (Hong Kong)	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Group <sup>4</sup> (Hong Kong)	African Middle East Petroleum Co. <sup>7</sup> (Monaco/ Switzerland)
27 <b>WORLD SUMMIT</b>	260,064 <i>oil tanker</i>	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Agency Ltd. <sup>4</sup> (Hong Kong)	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Group <sup>4</sup> (Hong Kong)	unknown
28 <b>WORLD XANADU</b>	264,170 <i>oil tanker</i>	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Agency Ltd. <sup>4</sup> (Hong Kong)	Liberia	World-Wide Shipping Group <sup>4</sup> (Hong Kong)	unknown



region or country from which the ship sailed to South Africa	month the ship called at South Africa <i>type of call</i>	region to which the ship sailed from South Africa	c o m m e n t s :
Persian Gulf [Persian Gulf]	Apr 89 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed from an oil-exporting area without disclosing her destination. The vessel 'disappeared' for a prolonged period, under circumstances strongly suggesting that she may have called at South Africa to deliver an oil cargo.
Persian Gulf [Persian Gulf]	Dec 89/ Jan 90 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed from an oil-exporting area without disclosing her destination. The vessel 'disappeared' for a prolonged period, under circumstances strongly suggesting that she may have called at South Africa to deliver an oil cargo. She then returned to the same oil-exporting area.
Red Sea [Egypt]	May 89 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed from an oil-exporting area. On departure, the purported destination was 'Singapore'. Instead, the vessel sailed to South Africa to deliver her oil cargo. She happened to be at the buoy off Durban at the same time as another World-Wide tanker, the <i>World Xanadu</i> (case No. 28).
Red Sea [Egypt]	Feb 89 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed from an oil-exporting area without disclosing her destination. The vessel 'disappeared' for several weeks, under circumstances strongly suggesting that she may have called at South Africa to deliver an oil cargo. She then immediately sailed on to another oil-exporting area.
Persian Gulf [U.A.E.]	Mar 89 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed from an oil-exporting area. On departure, the purported destination was 'Singapore'. However, a call there was never reported. The vessel 'disappeared' for several weeks, under circumstances strongly suggesting that she may have called at South Africa to deliver an oil cargo. She then immediately returned to the same oil-exporting area.
Persian Gulf [U.A.E.; Oman]	Jly 89 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed from an oil-exporting area. On departure, the purported destination was 'Singapore'. However, a call there was never reported. The vessel 'disappeared' for several weeks, under circumstances strongly suggesting that she may have called at South Africa to deliver an oil cargo. She then immediately returned to the same oil-exporting area.
Red Sea [Egypt]	Nov/Dec 89 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed from an oil-exporting area. The vessel 'disappeared' for a prolonged period, under circumstances strongly suggesting that she may have called at South Africa to deliver an oil cargo. She then sailed on to another oil-exporting area.
Persian Gulf [U.A.E.]	Mar 89 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed from an oil-exporting area. On departure, the purported destination was 'Singapore'. However, a call there was never reported. The vessel 'disappeared' for a prolonged period, under circumstances strongly suggesting that she may have called at South Africa to deliver an oil cargo.
Persian Gulf [Persian Gulf]	May 89 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed to South Africa from an oil-exporting area. As ' <i>B51</i> ' the vessel discharged her oil cargo at the buoy off Durban, where she happened to be at the same time as another World-Wide tanker, the <i>World Champion</i> (case No. 22).



1. This company has not replied to a request sent by registered mail or telefax, nor to one or more telex or telefax messages, in which it was asked to comment on the findings of the Shipping Research Bureau.
2. This company has not replied to a request sent by registered mail or telefax, nor to one or more telex or telefax messages, in which it was asked to comment on the findings of the Shipping Research Bureau. The Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the Shipping Research Bureau that, according to a spokesman of the company, its "involvement in the shipping business only concerns administrative matters such as maintenance, repairs and personnel. (...) The spokesman (...) also maintained that the nature and the destination of the freights can only be determined by the owner or the charterer of the ship whereas his company has no influence thereupon. Furthermore, he declared that the owner of the oil tanker 'Alki' told him that the allegations of oil transports to South Africa are not true" (letter from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vienna, to the Shipping Research Bureau of 7 May 1990). In various shipping industry publications, the vessel in question is listed as belonging to the Seaarland fleet exclusively. No reply was received as to the identity of the 'owner of the oil tanker Alki' mentioned above.
3. This company has not replied to a request sent by registered mail or telefax, in which it was asked to comment on the findings of the Shipping Research Bureau. Cf. note 7.
4. This company has not replied to a request sent by registered mail or telefax, nor to one or more telex or telefax messages, in which it was asked to comment on the findings of the Shipping Research Bureau. Mr R.J. Allen of World-Wide has informed the press that oil deliveries by World-Wide tankers to South Africa are nothing secret and form part of the company's international business (*South China Morning Post*, Hong Kong, 2 April 1989; see also page 21 of this report).
5. The company Kassos Maritime Enterprises Ltd. denies any involvement with the vessel *Pacificos* and with the Kulukundis Group. The company informed the Shipping Research Bureau that another company, Saipan Steamship Corporation, had "from time to time undertaken technical advice and supervision" and was "the responsible party for maintenance and repairs". The company Saipan Steamship Corporation is located at the same address as Kassos Maritime Enterprises Ltd. A registered letter from the Shipping Research Bureau was, however, returned marked 'unknown'. In numerous articles in the international shipping press and in various shipping industry publications, the company Kassos Maritime Enterprises Ltd. is referred to as owner or manager of the vessel *Pacificos* and as belonging to the Kulukundis Group. See also note 6.
6. The company Off Shore Oil Services (U.K.) Ltd. stated that the Kulukundis Group neither are or have ever been the vessel's apparent beneficial owners. In a second telex message, Off Shore Oil Services repeated that "our principals have no association with the (...) vessel". However, various shipping industry publications list the vessel as belonging to the Kulukundis fleet at the time of delivery. The company refrained from commenting on the Bureau's queries about the apparent oil deliveries to South Africa. See also note 5.
7. This company denies "categorically (...) any involvement by our company, or any associated company, in such alleged supplies [to South Africa]. We furthermore confirm that we have no knowledge of any of the vessels mentioned (...) nor, in consequence, have we had any involvement with same". However, information obtained by the Shipping Research Bureau confirms that this company, or one belonging to this Group, was in fact involved in the sale of the cargo of Egyptian crude oil on board this vessel. In a second letter the Shipping Research Bureau asked the company if it could provide the Bureau with the name(s) of the company (ies) to which they had possibly resold the cargo. The company restated that "... since we were not involved in any way with the shipments you have mentioned, we have no possibility to assist you in discovering the identity (ies) of the eventual owner(s) of such cargoes".
8. This company has only recently been contacted by the Shipping Research Bureau concerning this particular voyage. To date, no reply has been received.



**Table H**  
**Some refined petroleum shipments**  
**to South Africa 1987-1990 (listed in chronological order)**

ship's name * subsequent name	dwt tonnage  type of ship	flag	SHIPPING COMPANIES INVOLVED			OIL COMPANIES INVOLVED  apparent owner of the ship's oil cargo
			managing company	country in which registered owner is based	apparent beneficial owner of ship	
1 <b>UGLAND OBO-ONE</b>  * Nor-Obo 1 * Obo Buzzard * Obo Victory	54,500  <i>combined carrier</i>	Panama	Ugland Management Co. A.S. <sup>1</sup>  (Norway)	Panama	Andreas Ugland <sup>1</sup>  (Norway)	unknown
2 <b>TENACITY</b>	46,693  <i>oil tanker</i>	Singapore	Wallem Ship- management Ltd. <sup>2</sup> (Hong Kong)  Canadian Pacific Ltd. <sup>3</sup> (Canada) (time-charter)	Singapore	Transpetrol Services N.V. <sup>4</sup>  (Belgium)	unknown
3 <b>LUCERNA</b>  * Dakila * Dagrun * Quebec	39,865  <i>oil tanker</i>	Liberia	Cunard Shipping Services Ltd. <sup>2</sup>  (United Kingdom)	United Kingdom	The Cunard Steam- Ship Co. P.L.C. <sup>5</sup>  (United Kingdom)	Marc Rich <sup>6</sup> (Switzerland)  Mark Wolman <sup>6</sup> (United Kingdom)
4 <b>WHITE EXCELSIOR</b>  * Iver Expert	38,598  <i>oil tanker</i>	Liberia	Beta Maritime Services Ltd. <sup>7</sup>  (United Kingdom)	Liberia	Yasuda Shintaku Ginko K.K. <sup>2</sup>  (Japan)	unknown
5 <b>DAGLI</b>  * Iver Lundina	57,372  <i>oil tanker</i>	Norway	Iver Bugge <sup>8</sup>  (Norway) (time-charter)	Liberia	A/S Ocean <sup>2</sup>  (Norway)	Marc Rich <sup>9</sup> (Switzerland)
6 <b>BRALI</b>	48,581  <i>oil tanker</i>	Norway	A/S Bulkhandling <sup>10</sup> (Norway)  V. Ships Norway AS <sup>11</sup> (Norway)	Norway	L. Gill-Johannesen A/S <sup>12</sup>  (Norway)	Rainbow Line Ltd. <sup>13</sup>  (Hong Kong)
7 <b>QUEBEC</b>	39,728  <i>oil tanker</i>	Bahamas	V. Ships <sup>2</sup>  (Monaco)	Gibraltar	Vlasov Group c/o V. Ships <sup>2</sup> (Monaco)	unknown
8 <b>GRIPARION</b>	70,247  <i>combined carrier</i>	Cyprus	Thalassic Steamship Agency Inc. <sup>2</sup>  (Greece)	Cyprus	Thalassic Steamship Agency Inc. <sup>2</sup>  (Greece)	Marc Rich <sup>2</sup> (Switzerland)
9 <b>OBO VEGA</b>	97,947  <i>combined carrier</i>	Turkey	Marti Shipping and Trading Co. Inc. <sup>14</sup>  (Turkey)	Turkey	Marti Shipping and Trading Co. Inc. <sup>14</sup>  (Turkey)	unknown



country from which the ship sailed to South Africa	month the ship called at South Africa <i>type of call</i>	region to which the ship sailed from South Africa	c o m m e n t s :
France	Apr 87 <i>reported call</i>	Black Sea	Sailed to South Africa to deliver a cargo of over 32,000 tons of <b>gasoline</b> from Port Jerome, France.
U.S.A.	Jne 87 <i>secret call</i>	South America	Sailed to South Africa from New Orleans, U.S.A., to deliver a combined cargo of petroleum and chemical products, viz. <b>carbon black</b> and caustic.
Greece	Jan/ Feb 88 <i>secret call</i>	Middle East	Sailed to South Africa to deliver a cargo of 30,000 tons of <b>gasoline</b> from Agioi Theodoroi, Greece.
The Netherlands	Feb 88 <i>secret call</i>	West Africa	Sailed from Amsterdam, the Netherlands, loaded with <b>gasoline</b> . On departure, the purported destination was 'Gibraltar'. After apparently having delivered her petroleum product cargo in South Africa, the ship arrived in Ghana, reporting Maputo (Mozambique) as her previous port of call. No calls at Gibraltar or Mozambique have been confirmed.
U.S.S.R.	Oct 88 <i>secret call</i>	Persian Gulf	Sailed to South Africa to deliver a cargo of nearly 50,000 tons of <b>heavy fuel oil</b> from Odessa, U.S.S.R. On this delivery, see also pp. 12 and 17.
Kenya	Feb 89 <i>secret call</i>	Far East	Sailed to Cape Town, South Africa, to deliver a cargo of over 40,000 tons of <b>fuel oil</b> loaded at the Kenya Petroleum Refineries and sold by the Kenyan oil company Kobil. Next, the ship sailed on to the South African port of Durban, reportedly to pick up another load for Indonesia. Press reports confirm this delivery: <i>The Guardian</i> , U.K., 27 November 1989; <i>Dagbladet</i> , Norway, 28 November 1989; <i>Africa Analysis</i> , U.K., 8 December 1989; <i>Seatrade Week</i> , U.S.A., 8-14 December 1989.
The Netherlands	Jne 89 <i>secret call</i>	Far East	Sailed to South Africa to deliver a cargo of <b>gasoline</b> collected in Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
The Netherlands	Jne/ Jly 89 <i>secret call</i>	Far East	Sailed to South Africa to deliver a cargo of <b>gasoline</b> collected in Amsterdam, the Netherlands; next collected a cargo of South African coal for Hong Kong.
The Netherlands	Jly 89 <i>reported call</i>	Medi- terranean	Sailed to South Africa to deliver a cargo of <b>gasoline</b> collected in Amsterdam, the Netherlands; next collected a cargo of South African iron ore for Turkey. The ship's secret call at South Africa was only brought to light after she had sailed laden from the South African port of Saldanha Bay, because an explosion took place in one of her tanks off Namibia, which took the lives of two crew members.

ship's name * subsequent name	dwt tonnage <i>type of ship</i>	flag * changed flag	SHIPPING COMPANIES INVOLVED			OIL COMPANIES INVOLVED apparent owner of the ship's oil cargo
			managing company	country in which registered owner is based	apparent beneficial owner of ship	
10 PROBO GULL	48,263 <i>combined carrier</i>	Singapore	A/S Bulkhandling <sup>10</sup> (Norway)	Singapore	A/S Havtor Management <sup>15</sup> (Norway)	Rainbow Line Ltd. <sup>13</sup> (Hong Kong)
11 JARAMA	77,673 <i>combined carrier</i>	Norway	Leif Høegh & Co. A/S <sup>16</sup> (Norway) (time-charter)	Liberia	Anders Jahre A/S <sup>2</sup> (Norway)	unknown
12 FAITH I	37,797 <i>oil tanker</i>	Panama * Bahamas	Wallem Ship- management Ltd. <sup>2</sup> (Hong Kong)	U.S.A.	PLM Investment Management Inc. <sup>2</sup> (U.S.A.)	unknown
13 HØEGH FOUNTAIN	78,488 <i>combined carrier</i>	Bahamas	Leif Høegh & Co. A/S <sup>16</sup> (Norway)	Norway	Leif Høegh & Co. A/S <sup>16</sup> (Norway)	Inter- Mediterranean Petroleum Co. (U.K.) Ltd. <sup>17</sup> (United Kingdom)
14 HØEGH FOAM	78,571 <i>combined carrier</i>	Bahamas	Leif Høegh & Co. A/S <sup>16</sup> (Norway)	Norway	Leif Høegh & Co. A/S <sup>16</sup> (Norway)	unknown
15 AMBIA FAIR	78,434 <i>combined carrier</i>	Bahamas	Leif Høegh (U.K.) Ltd. <sup>18</sup> (United Kingdom)	Bahamas	Leif Høegh & Co. A/S <sup>16</sup> (Norway)	unknown
16 HØEGH FOAM	78,571 <i>combined carrier</i>	Bahamas	Leif Høegh & Co. A/S <sup>16</sup> (Norway)	Norway	Leif Høegh & Co. A/S <sup>16</sup> (Norway)	Marc Rich <sup>2</sup> (Switzerland)
17 GRIPARION	70,247 <i>combined carrier</i>	Cyprus	Thalassic Steamship Agency Inc. <sup>2</sup> (Greece)	Cyprus	Thalassic Steamship Agency Inc. <sup>2</sup> (Greece)	Marc Rich <sup>2</sup> (Switzerland)
18 HØEGH FALCON	81,158 <i>combined carrier</i>	Bahamas	Leif Høegh & Co. A/S <sup>16</sup> (Norway)	Norway	Leif Høegh & Co. A/S <sup>16</sup> (Norway)	unknown



country from which the ship sailed to South Africa	month the ship called at South Africa <i>type of call</i>	region to which the ship sailed from South Africa	c o m m e n t s :
Romania	Aug 89 <i>reported call</i>	Caribbean	Sailed to South Africa to deliver a cargo of <b>gasoline</b> from Constantza, Romania. Press reports confirm this delivery: <i>The Guardian</i> , U.K., 27 November 1989; <i>Dagbladet</i> , Norway, 28 November 1989; <i>Africa Analysis</i> , U.K., 8 December 1989; <i>Seatrade Week</i> , U.S.A., 8-14 December 1989.
The Netherlands; Portugal	Aug/Sep 89 <i>reported call</i>	North West Europe	Sailed to South Africa after loading cargoes of <b>gasoil</b> (nearly 27,000 tons) and <b>gasoline</b> (nearly 26,000 tons) in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, and <b>jet fuel</b> (over 8,000 tons) in Sines, Portugal. After delivering her cargo of petroleum products to South Africa, the ship collected a cargo of South African coal for France.
The Netherlands	Sep/Oct 89 <i>secret call</i>	South Africa	Sailed from Amsterdam, the Netherlands, loaded with <b>gasoline</b> . On departure, the purported destination was 'Gibraltar'. After apparently having delivered her petroleum product cargo in South Africa, the ship arrived in Argentina, reporting a Mozambican port as her previous port of call. No calls at Gibraltar or Mozambique have been confirmed.
Sweden; The Netherlands	Sep/Oct 89 <i>reported call</i>	Mediterranean	Sailed to South Africa after loading a cargo of over 19,000 tons of <b>gasoil</b> which had been refined for the Danish state-owned oil company DOFAS by the Scanraff refinery in Lysekil, Sweden, and a cargo of <b>gasoline</b> in Amsterdam, the Netherlands. The Danish/Swedish cargo had been sold by DOFAS to the Swiss oil-trading company AOT Ltd. which had sold it on to Inter-Mediterranean Petroleum Co. After delivering her cargo of petroleum products to South Africa, the ship collected a cargo of South African coal for the Netherlands. After a series of radio programs in which details regarding this delivery were disclosed, DOFAS has precluded AOT from further deliveries and has decided to include clauses demanding discharge certificates into all future spot contracts. OK Petroleum, the Swedish owner of the Scanraff refinery, has taken similar precautions by incorporating in each contract and in their General Conditions of Sale clauses prohibiting the resale of cargoes to countries embargoed by the U.N. or Sweden <sup>19</sup> . See also p. 13.
Romania	Oct 89 <i>reported call</i>	North West Europe	Sailed to South Africa to deliver a cargo of petroleum products from Constantza, Romania; next collected a cargo of South African coal for Belgium.
Greece	Oct 89 <i>reported call</i>	North West Europe	Sailed to South Africa to deliver a cargo of petroleum products from Agioi Theodoroi, Greece; next collected a cargo of South African coal for the Netherlands.
The Netherlands	Nov/Dec 89 <i>reported call</i>	North West Europe	After delivering petroleum products from Romania to South Africa and carrying South African coal to Belgium (see case No. 14 above), the ship sailed to Amsterdam to collect another cargo of 60-65,000 tons of <b>gasoline</b> for delivery to South Africa. The ship next collected a cargo of South African coal for France. See picture on p. 11.
The Netherlands	Jan 90 <i>reported call</i>	Far East	Sailed to South Africa to deliver a cargo of 40-50,000 tons of <b>gasoline</b> collected in Amsterdam, the Netherlands; next collected a cargo of South African coal for Hong Kong.
The Netherlands	Apr 90 <i>reported call</i>	North West Europe	Sailed to South Africa to deliver a cargo of <b>gasoline</b> collected in Amsterdam, the Netherlands; next collected a cargo of South African coal for Belgium.



1. In a letter to the Shipping Research Bureau, the Ugland Group has confirmed the findings of the Bureau.
2. This company has not replied to a request sent by registered mail or telefax, nor to one or more telex or telefax messages, in which it was asked to comment on the findings of the Shipping Research Bureau.
3. This company has not replied to a request sent by registered mail or telefax, nor to one or more telex or telefax messages, in which it was asked to comment on the findings of the Shipping Research Bureau. The Government of Canada informed the Bureau that the ship was "possibly chartered by a Bermuda-based company. (...) Canadian Pacific possessed equity interest in the above Bermuda-based affiliate which in turn managed CP oil charter business until June, 1989. (...) The tanker 'Tenacity' may in fact have been subchartered to yet another firm when the alleged 'secret call at South Africa' took place" (letter to the Shipping Research Bureau from the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations of 1 May 1990).
4. This company confirmed that the vessel called at South Africa to deliver her cargo there while on time-charter to Canadian Pacific. According to the company, the vessel carried cargoes of Caustic and Carbon Black which had been loaded in the U.S. Gulf. The company added that it "would feel that neither of these cargoes would come under the oil embargo restrictions."
5. On behalf of this company, the company Cunard Ellerman Ltd. wrote to the Bureau that "it is not our practice to discuss with others the business undertaken by our vessels when they are chartered to third parties. This clearly has to be a matter for the charterer. The vessel has since been sold by our company."
6. This company has only recently been contacted by the Shipping Research Bureau concerning this particular voyage. To date, no reply has been received.  
Contracts related to the cargo of 30,000 tons motor gasoline carried by the *Lucerna* were concluded late December 1987 between companies owned by Marc Rich and companies owned by Mark Wolman. Problems with regard to the financial settlement of these contracts were apparently among the causes for the dispute between Marc Rich and Mark Wolman referred to in a letter of Mr Wolman to the Shipping Research Bureau quoted in note 24 on p. 64. See also Table A, pp. 62-63, Case No. 65.
7. This company has probably changed address or was dissolved.
8. This company wrote to the Shipping Research Bureau: "We can assure you that during the period we had above mentioned ship on time charter the vessel traded only with lawful merchandise according both to Charter Party and Norwegian Law".  
On Norwegian state television, Mr Jan A. Bugge, chairman of the company, confirmed that his ship had delivered fuel oil from the Soviet Union to South Africa during this voyage (NRK TV, Norway, 22 April 1989; cf. page 12 of this report). Mr Bugge said to the press that his company knew about the cargo and had done nothing illegal, because the cargo was not included in the boycott rules, which applied to crude oil (*Lloyd's List*, U.K., 25 April 1989).
9. Neither this company, nor the company Hollywell Shipping Ltd. (United Kingdom) that acted on behalf of Marc Rich, have replied to requests sent by registered mail or telefax, nor to one or more telex or telefax messages, in which they were asked to comment on the findings of the Shipping Research Bureau.
10. This company has not replied to a request sent by registered mail or telefax, nor to one or more telex or telefax messages, in which it was asked to comment on the findings of the Shipping Research Bureau. Mr Gunnar Forsberg, managing director of Bulkhandling, has said to the press that his ship was on charter to international charterers and that he could not give details, although he added: "I know that we have had these links with South Africa". He stressed that his company did not break any law by carrying refined oil products to South Africa. If it were to be made illegal, his company "would comply" (*Observer News Service*, U.K., 28 November 1989; *Dagbladet*, Norway, 28 November 1989; *Seatrade Week*, U.S.A., 8-14 December 1989).
11. V.Ships Norway AS act as technical ship managers for L. Gill-Johannessen A/S. See the reply received from the latter in note 12.
12. This company confirmed that it is the disponent owner of the vessel, the commercial manager of which is A/S Bulkhandling and the technical manager V.Ships Norway AS. The company confirmed that the vessel delivered fuel oil to South Africa.
13. The Shipping Research Bureau has not been able to contact this company because no address could be found.  
According to sources within the oil and shipping industry, the company which always acts on behalf of Rainbow Line is the East Coast Group Ltd. (United Kingdom). The latter company has only recently been contacted by the Shipping Research Bureau concerning this particular voyage; to date, no reply has been received.  
On the East Coast Group and Rainbow Line Ltd., see p. 17.
14. This company declines to confirm whether or not the ship delivered oil to South Africa. It adds that "for many occasions related charter parties order us not to release information about the business." In a letter of 4 May 1990 to the Turkish Ministry of Transportation, the company only confirmed that the ship called at the South African port of Saldanha Bay from 18-22 June 1989 to load iron ore.
15. This company confirmed that the vessel discharged a petroleum product cargo in South Africa during this voyage. It added that the vessel was on timecharter to A/S Bulkhandling and that inquiries would, accordingly, be best answered by them.
16. This company states that for contractual reasons, it cannot specifically respond to queries about calls at and deliveries to South Africa by this vessel. It adds: "However, we can confirm that some of the vessels operated by our company have been in South Africa during [the relevant period] delivering petroleum products. We underline that this has always been done within the framework of existing Norwegian laws and regulations."
17. This company has not replied to a request sent by registered mail or telefax, nor to one or more telex or telefax messages, in which it was asked to comment on the findings of the Shipping Research Bureau. The company has said to a Swedish radio reporter that it could not make any comment on its involvement in the delivery of gasoil from Sweden to South Africa because all its business was of a confidential nature (*Radio Väst*, Sweden, 15 November 1989).
18. This company has not been contacted by the Shipping Research Bureau concerning this voyage.
19. Press release of the parent company of DOFAS, Dansk Olie & Naturgas A/S, of 14 November 1989; letter OK Petroleum AB to the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 9 April 1990; *Radio Väst*, Sweden, 14 and 15 November 1989.



# Appendix II

## Methodology

### Stages in the Preparation of this Report

#### 1. The initial gathering of data

This report is the sixth major report published by the Shipping Research Bureau. It covers the period between January 1987 and December 1988. Some preliminary findings relating to 1989-1990 are included.

There are no publicly available statistical sources on the supply of crude oil to South Africa. The principal research method used by the Shipping Research Bureau has been an extensive analysis of the movements of the world's tanker fleet.

The Bureau's main sources of data regarding these ships have been specialised shipping industry publications and computerised data bases. These sources record the identities of the companies that own, operate and charter individual ships, including the movements of these ships in and out most of the world's ports as reported by agents in those ports and by the companies operating the ships. (The Shipping Research Bureau cannot be held liable for the reproduction of any errors which these publications may contain.) The Bureau has extensively checked and supplemented this information by a variety of means.

The initial gathering of data was completed in January 1990. By then, the Shipping Research Bureau had identified over 200 vessels capable of carrying crude oil which had called at South African ports. A few smaller product tankers were added to the list of vessels under investigation; basically, the procedure outlined below has also been followed for these vessels.

#### 2. Findings submitted to companies for corrections

After preliminary selection of the cases, registered letters were sent to some 80 companies which had been identified as the owner and/or manager of the vessels, and/or the last known owner of the oil cargo.

Each company was provided with the Bureau's preliminary research findings on the vessels linked with that company, and was asked to correct or amplify the data. The Bureau explicitly asked the company to confirm or deny that the vessels in question had delivered crude oil or petroleum products to South Africa during their calls there. Companies which had not responded within one month were sent a reminder by telex or fax. Replies were received from, or on behalf of, some two-thirds of the companies. The replies were all taken into consideration in the preparation of this report.

#### 3. Findings submitted to governments for investigation

In March 1990, the Shipping Research Bureau contacted the governments of some 35 countries in which the above mentioned oil and shipping companies were based, where the vessels were registered or from where the vessels had sailed to South Africa. These governments received detailed data about the vessels suspected of delivering crude oil or petroleum products to South Africa, and about vessels for which the companies had given the Bureau at best an inconclusive reply. The governments were requested to investigate the cases and – if possible – to inform the Shipping Research Bureau of any inaccuracies in the data. Again, the replies received were all taken into consideration.

#### 4. The final analysis and decisions about the findings

Further analyses were conducted until the finalisation of this report towards the end of July 1990.

The data to which the Shipping Research Bureau has access normally does not specify why a vessel called at a particular port. Such a call might be to load cargo, to discharge cargo, or to carry out other tasks such as bunkering (loading fuel for the vessel herself), taking in food and water supplies, or changing crew.

In several cases, sufficient information was obtained to decide that the vessel under consideration had not made a crude oil delivery when she called at a South African port.

Analysis of the trade pattern of the other ships investigated made it clear that some of them were much more likely than others to have delivered oil to South Africa. Reasons for suspecting that a particular vessel probably delivered oil when she called at a South African port include the following:

- the company owning, managing or chartering the vessel has informed the Shipping Research Bureau that the vessel's call at South Africa involved a delivery of oil;
- the vessel sailed from an oil-exporting country or area straight to South Africa, and then immediately returned to the same oil-exporting area;
- the vessel's reported movements show a gap between calls at oil-exporting areas, under circumstances which suggest that a secret oil delivery to South Africa was made, especially when misleading or incorrect reports on destinations and/or actual routes were issued, and/or methods were used to shun publicity regarding the voyage;
- press or other published reports, for instance based on the testimony of crew members, confirm that when the vessel called at a South African port, she delivered oil.

In a few instances, investigations have borne out that the cargo delivered to South Africa by a tanker, capable of carrying a crude oil load of 50,000 tons or more, may have consisted of refined petroleum products. These cases are indicated in Appendix I, Table A. However, for the sake of convenience, throughout this report these cases are subsumed under the aggregate figures for deliveries of crude oil. Special attention is given to deliveries of refined products to South Africa on pages 9ff and in Appendix I, Table H.

The main part of this report includes only those cases in which the Shipping Research Bureau has concluded, after careful research and correspondence, that the vessels clearly delivered crude oil to South Africa. The principal reasons for inclusion of each case are summarised in the comment section of the tables in Appendix I.

Investigations continue regarding several of the ships listed in Appendix I, Table F.

The Shipping Research Bureau continues to welcome all relevant information concerning oil deliveries or suspected oil deliveries to South Africa, whether this is provided openly or on a confidential basis.



## Appendix III

### Countries from which Tankers Sailed to South Africa, 1979-1990

The table in this Appendix lists a complete overview of the research findings of the Shipping Research Bureau over the period 1979-1990.<sup>1</sup> Of each country or area, the number of tankers which sailed from there to South Africa and their total deadweight tonnage are presented.

#### 441 oil deliveries – 86 million tons of oil

Over the period January 1979-April 1990, the Shipping Research Bureau identified 441 oil deliveries. The total cargo capacity of the 441 tankers was about 86 million tons. During the period of a little more than eleven years covered by the table, South Africa's estimated crude oil import needs amounted to about 160 million tons. If each of the 441 tankers delivered a full cargo of crude oil to South Africa, the volume delivered covered about 53 per cent, or more than half of South Africa's crude oil import needs.<sup>2</sup>

#### 309 tankers sailed from the Middle East

Over the whole period 1979-1990, 309 of the 441 tankers identified sailed to South Africa from the *Middle East*. Of these, at least 287 sailed from the Persian Gulf. The cargo capacity of the 309 tankers was about 68 million tons, or, 79 per cent of the total volume identified. If each of the 309 tankers delivered a full cargo of crude oil, the volume delivered would amount to about 42 per cent of South Africa's crude oil import needs during the period under consideration.

The 309 tankers often called at more than one country in the Middle East prior to sailing to South Africa. Therefore, the calls at the different countries in this area add up to more than 309. Both this practice of 'multi-porting' and the number of cases in which a tanker sailed to South Africa from an *unidentified* country in the Middle East, make it impossible to give an accurate assessment of how much of the oil delivered to South Africa originated in each individual oil-exporting country in this area.

Nevertheless, it is obvious that oil originating in the **United Arab Emirates** (at least 90 tankers sailed to South Africa from the United Arab Emirates), in **Saudi Arabia** (79 tankers), in **Oman** (60 tankers), in **Iran** (38 cargoes), in **Qatar** (21 tankers) and in **Egypt** (17 tankers), has reached

South Africa in rather large quantities during the period under investigation.

All the above mentioned countries have repeatedly endorsed the oil embargo against South Africa. However, the massive violations of these countries' embargo policies suggest serious deficiencies in their monitoring procedures regarding possible oil deliveries to South Africa. The governments of these countries have always been duly informed of preliminary research findings of the Shipping Research Bureau, and have been asked, prior to publication of reports by the Bureau, to investigate these possible cases. The governments concerned, therefore, have been aware that trading with specific oil and shipping companies could mean that at least part of the oil involved could end up in South Africa. Apparently, the governments did not prevent companies from delivering their oil to South Africa.

#### Recent trends in oil supplies to South Africa<sup>3</sup>

Over the years, the number of oil-exporting countries from where tankers sailed to South Africa remained fairly stable. Since late 1986, no shipments from Brunei have been found anymore. On the other hand, a considerable number of tankers sailing from *Egypt* have been identified since 1988. During recent years, more and more tankers were found sailing from the *United Arab Emirates* which now top the list with 90 shipments identified.

Since 1989, a striking number of tankers of over 50,000 tons deadweight have been identified as suppliers to South Africa of *refined petroleum products* from Europe. In particular, the trans-shipment port of Amsterdam, **The Netherlands**, has emerged as a major source of oil product supplies to South Africa with seven shipments since mid-1989. These shipments do not come under the limited Dutch embargo on crude oil exports. However, the products trans-shipped in Amsterdam may well originate in countries which have a more comprehensive embargo including one on refined products.

1. 1989 and early 1990: preliminary findings.
2. In a few cases, investigations have borne out that the cargo delivered to South Africa by a tanker, capable of carrying a crude oil cargo of 50,000 tons or more, may have consisted of petroleum products. For the sake of convenience, these cases are subsumed under the

aggregate figures. A number of known refined product deliveries are indicated by notes 5, 8 and 11 of the table.

3. For a more detailed account of changing patterns in oil supplies to South Africa during the period 1979-1988, see Shipping Research Bureau, *Oil to South Africa*, Amsterdam 1988, pp. 12ff.

Notes to Table on next page:

1. Including one smaller tanker which delivered crude oil from Indonesia.
2. Including cases 29 and 51 in Table A, Appendix I of this report.
3. Including one tanker which had loaded crude oil in Egypt and a Saudi Arabian Red Sea port.
4. Including trans-shipment of Iranian crude oil through the Netherlands (1) and Egypt (1).
5. Refined petroleum product shipment(s).
6. Subsumed under the figure for Saudi Arabia under the heading 'Persian Gulf'.
7. At least 12 tankers delivered Norwegian crude oil to South Africa during the period 1979-1981. Cargoes had been loaded and/or trans-shipped, a.o., in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. Not all these tankers have been identified by the Shipping Research Bureau.
8. All oil cargoes identified until 1985 consisted of crude oil originating in other countries, that had been stored in Rotterdam. All cargoes identified as from 1989 consisted of refined petroleum products shipped to South Africa from storage in Amsterdam.
9. Including trans-shipment of British North Sea oil through the Netherlands (1) and Spain (1).
10. Ship-to-ship transfer of crude oil originating in Western Europe and the Mediterranean.
11. One vessel delivered a part cargo of a petroleum product derived from Danish crude oil refined in Sweden.
12. All oil cargoes delivered to South Africa consisted of crude oil originating in other countries, that had been stored in the Netherlands Antilles.



**The countries from which tankers of 50,000 tons dwt and over<sup>1</sup> sailed to South Africa, apparently to deliver oil cargoes – January 1979-April 1990**

region/country	total number of cases	dwt tonnage	1979-1986 number of cases	dwt tonnage	1987-1988 number of cases	dwt tonnage	1989-1990 number of cases	dwt tonnage
<b>PERSIAN GULF</b>	287	69,156,989	215 <sup>2</sup>	50,159,429	53	14,309,795	19	4,687,765
<i>of which from:</i>								
United Arab Emirates	90*	23,322,205*	50*	12,772,736*	28*	7,629,950*	12*	2,919,519*
Saudi Arabia	79* <sup>3</sup>	19,097,322* <sup>3</sup>	72*	17,227,472*	7* <sup>3</sup>	1,869,850* <sup>3</sup>	-	-
Oman	60*	14,969,649*	49*	11,970,227*	8*	2,236,088*	3*	763,334*
Iran	38* <sup>4</sup>	9,918,109* <sup>4</sup>	31* <sup>4</sup>	7,912,296* <sup>4</sup>	7*	2,005,813*	-	-
Qatar	21*	5,228,532*	12*	2,884,615*	9*	2,343,917*	-	-
Bahrain	9*	1,978,320*	9*	1,978,320*	-	-	-	-
Kuwait	5*	935,344*	5*	935,344*	-	-	-	-
unknown countries in the Persian Gulf	51	12,426,934	38	9,027,108	6	1,631,580	7	1,768,246
<b>RED SEA</b>	20 <sup>4</sup>	4,207,148 <sup>4</sup>	5 <sup>4</sup>	586,928 <sup>4</sup>	8	2,003,939 <sup>3</sup>	7	1,616,281
<i>of which from:</i>								
Egypt	17* <sup>4</sup>	4,043,522* <sup>4</sup>	2 <sup>4</sup>	423,302 <sup>4</sup>	8*	2,003,939*	7	1,616,281
South Yemen	3	163,626	3 <sup>5</sup>	163,626	-	-	-	-
Saudi Arabia	1* <sup>6</sup>	-	-	-	1* <sup>6</sup>	-	-	-
<b>MIDDLE EAST</b>								
unknown countries	2	536,934	-	-	-	-	2	536,934
<b>FAR EAST</b>	73	8,860,073	72	8,736,074	1	123,999	-	-
<i>of which from:</i>								
Brunei	68	8,222,263	68	8,222,263	-	-	-	-
Malaysia	2	199,496	1	75,470	1	123,999	-	-
Indonesia	1	44,066	1	44,066	-	-	-	-
unknown countries in the Far East	2	394,275	2	394,275	-	-	-	-
<b>WESTERN EUROPE</b>	41 <sup>4,7</sup>	7,316,610 <sup>4</sup>	32 <sup>4,7</sup>	6,550,774 <sup>4</sup>	1 <sup>5</sup>	54,500	8 <sup>5</sup>	711,336
<i>of which from:</i>								
The Netherlands	34* <sup>4</sup>	6,223,522* <sup>4</sup>	27* <sup>4,8</sup>	5,669,191* <sup>4</sup>	-	-	7* <sup>8</sup>	554,331*
United Kingdom	6* <sup>9</sup>	991,844* <sup>9</sup>	6* <sup>9</sup>	991,844* <sup>9</sup>	-	-	-	-
Spain	1	254,735	1 <sup>10</sup>	254,735	-	-	-	-
Sweden	1*	78,488*	-	-	-	-	1* <sup>11</sup>	78,488*
Greece	1	78,434	-	-	-	-	1 <sup>5</sup>	78,434
Portugal	1*	77,673*	-	-	-	-	1* <sup>5</sup>	77,673*
France	2	316,229	1	261,729	1 <sup>5</sup>	54,500	-	-
<b>EASTERN EUROPE</b>	2	135,943	-	-	1 <sup>5</sup>	57,372	1 <sup>5</sup>	78,571
<i>of which from:</i>								
Romania	1	78,571	-	-	-	-	1 <sup>5</sup>	78,571
U.S.S.R.	1	57,372	-	-	1 <sup>5</sup>	57,372	-	-
<b>LATIN AMERICA/CARIBBEAN</b>	11	2,545,599	11	2,545,599	-	-	-	-
<i>of which from:</i>								
Netherlands Antilles	10	2,390,388	10 <sup>12</sup>	2,390,388	-	-	-	-
Ecuador	1	155,211	1	155,211	-	-	-	-
<b>NORTH AMERICA</b>	3	170,267	3	170,267	-	-	-	-
<i>of which from:</i>								
Canada	2	119,300	2	119,300	-	-	-	-
U.S.A.	1	50,967	1	50,967	-	-	-	-
<b>AFRICA</b>	1	215,205	1	215,205	-	-	-	-
<i>of which from:</i>								
Gabon	1	215,205	1	215,205	-	-	-	-
<b>UNKNOWN COUNTRIES</b>	1	274,938	1	274,938	-	-	-	-
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>441</b>	<b>93,419,709</b>	<b>340</b>	<b>69,239,214</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>16,549,605</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>7,630,887</b>

\* Including multi-porting.



## Appendix IV

### Background Information Regarding the Shipping Research Bureau and its Founding Organisations

In the past, several calls have been made at an international level for the establishment of an effective monitoring mechanism for the oil embargo against South Africa. In July 1979, the Council of Ministers of the Organisation of African Unity (O.A.U.) passed a resolution that welcomed "*proposals for methods of monitoring and cutting down the shipments of oil to South Africa*". The final declaration of the International Seminar on the Oil Embargo against South Africa in March 1980, sponsored by the United Nations Special Committee against Apartheid and two Dutch anti-apartheid organisations, stated that "*an essential component of an effective oil embargo against South Africa is the creation of a machinery to monitor all shipments of oil to South Africa*".

Similar calls for such a monitoring mechanism were made by the O.A.U. Sanctions Committee (Arusha, March 1981), by the Nairobi summit of Heads of State of the O.A.U. (June 1981), and in the May 1981 Paris Declaration on Sanctions against South Africa (which was endorsed by 124 governments).

The Shipping Research Bureau was established in March 1980 by two Netherlands-based non-governmental organisations which co-sponsored the March 1980 conference on oil sanctions: the *Working Group Kairos (Christians against Apartheid)* and the *Holland Committee on Southern Africa*, both of which have a long history of action in support of the struggle for freedom in Southern Africa. The Bureau was established after a process of consultation with the United Nations Special Committee against Apartheid, the Southern African liberation movements and other concerned public bodies.

The *Holland Committee on Southern Africa* was founded in 1961 as the Angola Committee. It has disseminated information on and has mobilised support for the liberation struggles in Southern Africa. The Committee's activities focussed on the Portuguese African colonies until their independence. Since then, the Committee has concentrated on the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe and Namibia (prior to their independence) and South Africa.

The national stature of the Holland Committee on Southern Africa is illustrated by the fact that it raises several million US dollars every year, most of it from members of the public. Most of the funds are raised for direct humanitarian assistance to the liberation movement in South Africa. The Committee also plays a prominent role in distributing Dutch Government and E.C. funds to development projects in the region as a whole.

The three main objectives of the Holland Committee are to promote economic and other sanctions against South Africa, to disseminate information about the situation in Southern Africa and to mobilise support for the liberation movement and the Front Line States.

Since 1970, the *Working Group Kairos (Christians against Apartheid)* has been working to increase Dutch public awareness of the apartheid system and the resulting violations of human rights in South Africa. Kairos primarily operates within the churches and the Christian community in the Netherlands. It was founded in support of the now prohibited Christian Institute in South Africa, headed by Dr C.F. Beyers Naudé. But Kairos also directs its activities towards Christian and non-

Christian organisations such as political parties, trade unions etc. 'Kairos' means 'now is the time of truth – the time for change'.

In 1973, Kairos started a debate with Shell about the company's policy in Southern Africa. This resulted in Kairos asking Shell to end its ties with the white minority governments in Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa. Prior to Zimbabwe's independence, Kairos urged the Government of the Netherlands to adopt effective legislation regarding the mandatory oil embargo against Rhodesia.

Presently, Kairos is engaged in a campaign for a boycott of imports of South African coal, especially in the Netherlands and the European Community. Pension funds, churches, trade unions and other organisations are asked to sell their shares in companies which have business interests in South Africa. A campaign under the title 'Does your money support apartheid?' focussed the attention of church congregations on their church's investments in companies with South African subsidiaries. The violation of human rights in South Africa is invariably a theme of Kairos' programme of activities.

In 1977, the Holland Committee on Southern Africa and the Working Group Kairos joined forces in opposing the oil link between the Netherlands and South Africa. Since March 1979, the two organisations have been engaged in a nation-wide campaign for the Netherlands to join the oil embargo and for the termination of all links between the Dutch/British oil major *Shell* with South Africa. This campaign has also been waged on an international scale since early 1986. Organisations in at least fifteen countries have pledged their support to the international campaign against Shell.

The Board of the Shipping Research Bureau consists of representatives of both founding organisations. The chairperson of the Bureau, Mr Cor Groenendijk, is also chairperson of the Working Group Kairos.

The Shipping Research Bureau's main activities in the area of the oil embargo are researching and reporting circumventions of the embargo. Other activities are research on legislative and other means of enforcing the embargo more effectively, and maintaining contact with government, intergovernmental and non-governmental bodies which could make use of the research results. Since March 1989, the Bureau has also been monitoring coal exports from South Africa.

The actual research and writing takes place in Amsterdam. The staff of the Shipping Research Bureau is assisted by a number of volunteer associates in various countries.

#### Addresses:

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## Appendix V

### List of Main Publications of the Shipping Research Bureau

**Oil Tankers to South Africa 1980-1981** [2nd SRB main report], Amsterdam, June 1982; ISBN 90 70331 05 5 [currently out of print]

**Secret Oil Deliveries to South Africa 1981-1982** [3rd SRB main report], Amsterdam, June 1984; ISBN 90 70331 15 2

**South Africa's Lifeline. Violations of the Oil Embargo** [4th SRB main report, covering the period January 1983 – first months of 1985; special section on shipments from Rotterdam 1979-1985], Amsterdam, September 1986; ISBN 90 70331 13 6

**Oil to South Africa. Apartheid's Friends and Partners** [5th SRB main report, covering the period January 1985 – first half of 1987; special section on the countries from which tankers sailed to South Africa 1979-1987; maps, illustrations], Amsterdam, September 1988; ISBN 90 70331 19 5

**Fuel for Apartheid. Oil Supplies to South Africa** [6th SRB main report, covering the period January 1987 – early 1990; special section on shipments of refined petroleum products; maps, illustrations], Amsterdam, September 1990; ISBN 90 70331 24 1

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**Oil and Tanker Interests that Facilitate the Exploitation of Namibia's Natural Resources** [survey], Amsterdam, April/August 1984

**The Oil Embargo against South Africa: West European involvement and possible actions**, United Nations Centre against Apartheid, Information Note No. 57/84, New York, November 1984 [paper, prepared for the founding conference of the Association of West European Parliamentarians for Action against Apartheid (AWEPPA), Copenhagen, 2-3 November 1984]

**Oil Shipments to South Africa by the Tankers Thorsaga, Thorshavet and Thorsholm** [survey on the role of the Norwegian shipping company A/S Thor Dahl, 1981-1984], Amsterdam/Oslo, December 1984

**John Deuss – Transworld Oil. Zuid-Afrika's belangrijkste olieleverancier** [John Deuss – *TWO. South Africa's main oil supplier*; survey in Dutch with an English summary], Amsterdam, January 1985

**Oil Shipments to South Africa on Maersk Tankers: The Role of A.P. Møller of Denmark** [survey, based on research conducted jointly with the Danish Seamen's Union, Copenhagen], Amsterdam, June 1985

**Oil Shipments to South Africa by Tankers Owned and Managed by Sig. Bergesen d.y. and Co. of Norway (1979-1985)** [survey], Amsterdam/Oslo, August 1985

**West European Companies Breaking the Oil Embargo against South Africa. Possibilities for a West European Response** [paper for International Conference 'Apartheid and Southern Africa: the West European Response', 12-14 September 1985 at Amsterdam; French version available], Amsterdam, September 1985 [currently out of print]

**Companies Breaking the Oil Embargo against South Africa** [paper, prepared for the International Conference on Oil Supplies to South Africa by seafarers' and dockers' unions in London, 30-31 October 1985, sponsored by the United Nations Special Committee against Apartheid], Amsterdam/London, October 1985

**Shell, Marubeni, Rich. Crude Oil Deliveries to South Africa from Brunei (Jan. 1979 – Oct. 1986)** [survey], Amsterdam, January 1987

**Oil Embargo against South Africa. How to close the loopholes in current West European measures** [paper, prepared for the European Seminar on Support to SADC and Action against Apartheid, organised by the Association of West European Parliamentarians for Action against Apartheid (AWEPPA) at Strasbourg, 13-15 May 1987], Amsterdam/Strasbourg, May 1987

**The Commonwealth and the Oil Embargo against South Africa** [paper], Amsterdam, September 1987

**The Oil Embargo against South Africa: Effects and Loopholes** [paper, prepared for the conference 'Sanctions and South Africa', organised by the African Studies & Research Program of the Graduate School of Howard University, Washington, DC, 30-31 October 1987], Amsterdam/Washington, October 1987 (also incorporated in: Robert E. Edgar (ed.), *Sanctioning Apartheid*, Africa World Press, Trenton NJ, 1990, pp. 165-180; ISBN 0-86543-162-0 & 0-86543-163-9)

**The European Community and the Oil Embargo against South Africa** [paper], Amsterdam, November 1987; 2nd revised and updated edition [prepared for the Consultative Meeting of Anti Apartheid movements from the E.C. Countries, Bonn, 13-14 February 1988], Amsterdam/Bonn, February 1988

**Closing the Loopholes in the Oil Embargo against South Africa** [paper, prepared for the International Conference 'The World United Against Apartheid for a Democratic South Africa', organised by the African National Congress of South Africa in Arusha, 1-4 December 1987], Amsterdam/Arusha, December 1987

**Kudu: South African Development of Namibia's Gas Deposits to Circumvent the Oil Embargo?** [paper, prepared for the Seminar on the International Responsibility for Namibia's Independence, organised by the United Nations Council for Namibia, Istanbul, 21-25 March 1988], Amsterdam/Istanbul, March 1988



**Legislation, Monitoring, Enforcement: Tightening the Oil Embargo against South Africa** [paper, prepared for AWEPA Twin Conference on 'Southern Africa's Future – Europe's Role', organised by the Association of West European Parliamentarians for Action against Apartheid in Lusaka/Harare, 23-30 March 1988], Amsterdam/Lusaka, March 1988

**Oil: South Africa's Lifeline** [paper, prepared for the International Conference on Anti-Apartheid, organised by the Nigerian National Committee against Apartheid (NACAP), Lagos, Nigeria, 7-9 November 1988, and the International Conference of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO), New Delhi, India, 24-28 November 1988], Amsterdam/Lagos resp. New Delhi, November 1988

**Marimpex. A German Oil Supplier to South Africa** [survey], updated ed., Amsterdam, February 1989 (1st ed. translated into German as 'Marimpex liefert Öl. Umgehung des Ölembargos gegen Südafrika', *epd-Entwicklungspolitik* Materialien IV/86; ISSN 0177-5510; P.O. Box 170361, Frankfurt/Main, FRG)

**World-Wide Shipping Group. A Hong Kong Oil Supplier Comes to South Africa's Rescue** [survey], Amsterdam, April 1989

'Some successes of the oil embargo' and 'Technology transfer to circumvent the oil embargo', in: Joseph Hanlon (ed.), *South Africa. The Sanctions Report. Documents and Statistics. A report from the Independent Expert Study Group on the Evaluation of the Application and Impact of Sanctions Against South Africa prepared for the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa*, The Commonwealth Secretariat/James Currey, London/Heinemann, Portsmouth NH, 1990, pp. 175-179 and 222-225; ISBN 0-85255-338-2 & 0-435-08049-0

## **Shipping Research Bureau Newsletter**

In addition to its main reports on the oil embargo against South Africa, company surveys and other occasional topical reports, and reports on the export of coal from South Africa, the Shipping Research Bureau publishes a quarterly Newsletter. The *SRB Newsletter* includes the *Newsletter on the Oil Embargo against South Africa* and the *Coal Monitor*.

Since 1985, the *SRB Newsletter* has been providing a regular flow of information on the oil embargo and the boycott of South African coal. It contains recent findings of the Shipping Research Bureau, and information obtained from other sources on South Africa's oil and coal situation. It reports actions by governments and international bodies and campaigns by anti-apartheid organisations throughout the world.

The *SRB Newsletter* is distributed quarterly free of charge to some 2,200 subscribers all over the world. Another 800 copies are distributed through anti-apartheid organisations and other interested organisations. It is the Bureau's experience that the *SRB Newsletter* is closely read by the media, by representatives of companies and governments, and by non-governmental groups concerned with economic sanctions against South Africa.

For subscriptions and back issues: The Circulation Manager, P.O. Box 11898, NL –1001 GW Amsterdam, The Netherlands.

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