

MEMORANDUM FOR DISCUSSION WITH  
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MR WERNER HUNDT CHIEF EXECUTIVE  
E DRESDNER BANK

AND

WITH MR. BRUCE RICKERSON KEY SENATE  
STAFFER FROM THE UNITED STATES,

BY MANGOSUTHU BUTHELEZI,

CHIEF MINISTER OF KWAZULU

AND PRESIDENT OF INKATHA

ULUNDI. 19TH MARCH 1990

Mr. Hundt, Mr. Rickerson, it is not very often that I have the pleasure of joining two meetings into one and to have a German and an American input into the discussion. I have just returned from a trip to Zambia and the only way I could avoid cancelling one of Hick -

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four appointments, was to see you together. I am very grateful

that this is possible.

The South African situation is one which will become increasingly difficult to understand as different parties involved in

mãnoeuvering themselves into more favourable positions to negotiate  
Qith greater weight, represent South Africa to the outside world so  
that their own positions seem more politically logical and more  
ãffective.

The ANC in fast-moving steps drew up a negotiation document in July  
last year, fed it into the Harare OAU Foreign Ministers' Conference  
and had it endorsed as an OAU document which was subsequently fed  
into the United Nations.

In these moves, the Harare Declaration - as it has become known - solicits African and international support for the negotiating S

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position which the ANC wishes to evolve. I now see that they are

making further moves to ensure that the OAU emerges as sSpokesmen fÃ©r the whole of Africa when it comes to dealing with Pretoria. The ANC is pouring a lot of its negotiating substance into this one political mould made out of the endorsements of the OAU, th Non-

Aligned Countries and the United Nations.

I want to express the concern that this kind of fast-manoeuvring without consensus-taking and consultation here at home will stultify debate.

My view is that the politics of negotiation must inevitably take on the form of a process and we must avoid demands in winner-takes-all ;political manoeuvring at all possible costs. Basic to the Harare Declaration is the notion that the South African Government must lay down its right to govern and hand over power to a Namibia-type

interim government which will play midwife to a new constitution.

This approach can only scuttle all prospects of serious negotiation

if it is pushed too far. White South Africa is not in the same

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position as the then Rhodesia was when Mr. Ian Smith went to the  
Lancaster-House - Conference. The South African Government is not  
suing for peace and there is no victor and there is no vanquished.  
A Lancaster House formula were sought for the handing over of power

to Mr. Robert Mugabe and Mr. Joshua Nkomo. Mr. F.W. de Klerk is

not seeking ways and means of handing over power to the ANC.

The South African situation is so very different to the situations

in Angola and Mozambique or Zimbabwe. The Government here is by  
no manner of means facing military defeat. There are no liberated  
areas in the country. There is in fact really not an armed  
struggle taking place. There is only the hit and run of planted

bombs and the setting of Black against Black to escalate levels of

violence hoping for a final state of ungovernability. We have not

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HÃ©d a classical armed struggle with guerillas fighting against the  
a;my and the police force.

ï¬\201bite Socuth Africans are not ex-patriates. They are going to live  
Ã©f die here and they will die rather than live under what they  
QÃ©lieve will be Black tyranny. Winner-takes-all politics can only  
Ã©amage real prospects that there are now of negotiations taking  
off.



I' am also always very aware of the extent to which White South Africans could develop the kind of resistance to a new majority government which would make the Renamo and UNITA resistance look like real child's play. White South Africans are equipped and trained for warfare. They occupy strategic positions in mining, commerce, banking and industry and in the Civil Service which Renamo and UNITA would only dream of for their members. Whites have mobility and could take advantage of every modern form of communication and transport to destroy all prospects of any

government ruling successfully, if that government was not brought into being by substantial White inputs.

The politics of negotiation as I see it must be multi-racial now while we are setting negotiations up. They must be multi-racial negotiations and they must give rise to non-racial social, economic and political orders.

Unless we work together as Black and White to make the form and

content of negotiation acceptable to all race groups, negotiations will not get off the ground. Winner-takes-all politics will just

it\201ot make this joint effort possible.

And perhaps even more so, I am particularly concerned about the need to get Black and White together while we are talking about it\201alks SO it\201hat when negotiations do succeed, we can ensure that they succeed without South Africa paying economic prices which would be

totally prohibitive of good government afterwards.

innerâ\200\224takesâ\200\224all politics giving rise to the dictation of a Black  
majority and the enforced re-distribution of wealth through  
nationalisation and like action can only spell total disaster. The  
world â\200\230has now pronounced on controlled economies. As far as I am

concerned it is only a liberated free enterprise system being

ProPerly controlled by a strong central government in the way in

which Christian Democrats or Social Democrats do it in Europe and

elsewhere, which will be able to give governments of the future the

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means to govern without resorting to guns and barbed wire.

i,â\200\230am intensely aware of how democracy flees before real mass  
;preading poverty in Africa. If we destroy South Africa's economic  
'potential in a drive to do whatever has to be done in winnerâ\200\224-takes-  
;11 politics, the millions of Blacks now totally job dependent in  
South :AfriÃ@a's urban environment will become disillusioned and

disgruntled and finally will become the happy hunting ground for  
counter-revolutionary recrulters.

The whole line-up of OAU support, United Nation's support, Non-  
'Aligned Countries' support and Commonwealth support for winner-  
takes-all politics and the back-up steps of increasing sanctions  
and increasing the diplomatic isolation of South Africa, all add up  
to be totally unacceptable as far as I am concerned.

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We must reconcile now while we are formulating approaches to the  
politics of negotiation. We must produce radical change in South  
Africa by a joint Black/White endeavour. The National Party lis

most certainly not the sole driver of the vehicle of change and the

ANC will never ever become the sole driver either. There must be strong elements of co-operation in the politics of negotiation in

which real compromises can be made and are made.

My message to the outside world is that winner-takes-all politics

risking everything in order to control everything is just not necessary. It is just untrue that there are any prospects that the

South African Government will not continue to be committed to

change away from apartheid.

The ruling National Party is totally dependent on an

institutionalised South Africa which has now institutionalised the

politics of change. It is there in our educational systems; it is

there in institutionalised mining, commerce, banking and industry.

It is there in our institutionalised religious life. There is no  
institutionalised force of resistance to fundamental change which

amounts to anything important.



Institutionalised South Africa has been preparing for the kind of  
gouth Africa . which Mr. F.W. de Klerk has now committed himself to.  
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Lrbduce. Mr. de Klerk would not have ousted Mr. P.W. Botha as  
-Ngational Party leader and subsequently as State President if this  
was not true. The National Party Caucus turned away from Mr. Botha  
because he could not ensure continued support for LEs

Institutionalised South Africa was producing ultimatums of adapt or  
die.

I have now met Mr. de Klerk on four separate occasions since he

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took over the leadership of the National Party, and three of these

occasions were after he became State President. I add my voice to

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the important spokesmen like Dr. Kaunda who also believes that Mr. de Klerk is very sincere in his commitments to bring about an end

to apartheid. I also see him as a very competent leader. I think

he has both the will and the ability to get negotiations off the

ground and to see them through wherever they take him.

It is so tragic that there is so little discussion between black political forces which are going to be involved in the politics of negotiation when it does get off the ground. I have had preliminary talks about talks with Mr. de Klerk and I have declared

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my willingness to begin negotiations now. I did so without what I would have regarded as very welcome discussions with my black political peers. I was saddened by the fact that this was just not possible.

That is part of the problem of winner-takes-all politics. Every move made in it is a move to dominate and every strategy is one of co-optation or annihilation. DE Nelson Mandela has had

consultations with his own people in the ANC/UDF/COSATU front and

he will now be leading a group to have discussions with the State

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President with none of us knowing what he is going to say and none of us being really convinced that what he will be saying will be in

the best interests of South Africa.

I really do fight for a multi-Party democracy. I fight for the right of the people to reject me if that is what they want to do.

In winner-takes-all politics one fights to make it impossible for the people to reject one. Winner-takes-all politics takes all not only from political foes but from electorates and would-be electorates as well.

All of us are concerned about violence being used for political

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poses in South Africa and the spilling over of such violence into ever-wider and ever-increasingly non-political contexts. We are concerned about it for humanitarian reasons but I am also concerned about it for political reasons. The levels of violence now evident in South Africa - and even in this region of South Africa - absolutely prohibit any real negotiations getting off the ground. For me there can only be negotiations with black leaders who can go

to black constituencies to seek mandates and then to return to them to check the acceptability of that which was negotiated. This too-yhg and fro-ing from black grass root society just cannot take

place with the present levels of violence in existence.

I fully agree that we cannot negotiate effectively while the national state of emergency is in place. If we lift that, however, and we are left with violence which is prohibitive anyway, we will

still not be able to negotiate. There really must be a very

fundamental commitment to non-violence by all the negotiating parties concerned and I believe the ANC must stop its war-talk and its politics of confrontation so that we can normalise the South

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African situation as fast as possible to make consultation between political Parties and the people possible.

As far as I am concerned, the international community should do everything in its power to back whatever is being done by whoever does it, that furthers the politics of negotiation. Mr. de Klerk



does need backing for what he has already done. The ANC will also need backing if it too does something internationally praiseworthy such as stopping talk of the armed struggle and stopping spoiling for the kind of confrontations in which it will need economic sanctions against South Africa and in which it will need the diplomatic isolation of Mr. F.W. de Klerk.

I must speak thus because it is the fate of my country which is at stake. I am not rejecting the ANC as an organisation. All I have

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been doing in this document is talking about the circumstances in which the politics of negotiation can now get off the ground and go on: to succeed. I am simply saying to the ANC that I hold out a hand of friendship to it and that we should now begin talking to each other about talks, and that we now command the political strength to lead the white man down the road to which Mr. F.W. de Klerk has pointed.