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process of analysis and consolidation begun in Vancouver.

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Mangopeâ\200\231s Fate Hovered in Balance/Passive Army Watched the Coup - SAâ\200\231s State Security Council debated whether to rescue Mangope from the February 10 coup, while the Bophutatswana Army looked on passively Bophutatswana.

Poll on Coal Sanctions - poll commissioned by Deutsche-Afrika Stiftung indicates 70% of black coal miners oppose sanctions.

SAâ\200\231s Right Wing Advances

Two new prospects opened on the South African political horizon on March 3: the Conservative Party became a serious contender for political power, and the ruling National Party may be forced by the rise of the white

right-wing into seeking electoral support from left-of-NP parties, like the Progressive Federal Party and the Independents. This is the message of the two parliamentary by-elections in the Transvaal on March 3 in which the CP retained Standerton and Schweizer Reneke with increased majorities.

The CP claims there has been a 5% electoral shift in its favour since the May 6, 1987 general elections, and that a further 10% shift will take it into government. Another calculation (Front File 2 and Vol.2, No.1) is based on the following figures: the CP won 22 seats in 1987. With the votes of its right-wing rival, the HNP (now being obliterated), it would have won 30 seats. In a further 32 seats, the CP won 40-50% of the votes and these seats are winnable. This gives the CP a realistic target of 62 seats. It needs 84 of the 166 elected seats in the House of Assembly to obtain power, but after the March 3 by-elections, the number of winnable seats must be revised upwards. Power for the CP is no longer an illusion.

In the 1987 elections, the NP (according to most analysts) polled about 50% of the Afrikaner vote and the CP about 43% (the rest went to left-of-NP parties). Now analysts think that in the Transvaal, where all the CP gains have

taken place, the Afrikaner vote is shared equally between the CP and NP. In the 1987 elections, too, the NP attracted 57% of the English-speaking vote. The CP is within reach, therefore, of legitimising itself as the party of Afrikaner traditionalists. The NP, by contrast, contains a wider cross-section of white South Africans than any other political party in the country and this restructuring rules out future reconciliation with the right-wing, which is almost exclusively Afrikaner. But it prepares the NP for electoral agreements on its political left.

The NP lost ground in the two by-elections in spite of putting in a huge effort. It was well-organised and brought in its big guns, including President Botha. All it had to offer though was a failed reform policy (not that the reforms have been insignificant, but they have failed to conciliate blacks) and a blurred vision of the future. The CP, by contrast, re-created the swart gevaar (black danger) politics of the 1950s, concentrating on black penetration of white residential areas and beaches and on Botha's promises of power sharing with blacks and economic reforms.

The NP vote held constant in both constituencies, but the CP was able to increase its vote by drawing in former HNP supporters, Afrikaners who abstained in the 1987 elections and, significantly, young Afrikaners voting for the first time.

A. Treurnicht is the brother of Dr. A.P. Treurnicht, leader of the CP.

The present state of parties in the whites-only House of Assembly is: NP 123, CP 22, PFP 19, NRP 1, Ind.1.

Stanley Uys

Election Results (Results of May 6, 1987 elections in brackets)

Standerton Schweizer Reneke

J.R. de Ville: CP 9,078 7,096) Dr. P. Mulder: CP 6,400 (5,622)

H. Erasmus: NP 6224 (6,144) W. Lemmer: NP 5,606 (5431)
A. Treurnicht: HNP 261 (834) Jaap Marais: HNP 414 (544)
CP majority 2854 (834) CP majority 79 (191)

Dr. Mulder is the son of Dr C.P. Mulder, central figure in the 1979
Information scandal who, after leaving the NP, won Randfontein for
the CP in 1987. His recent death forces a by-election on March 29
which the CP expects to win.

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Communists vs 1980s Ultra-Left Socialists

The underground South African Communist Party has intervened publicly in the 1980s populist vs 1980s workerist dispute in the black trade union movement. The intervention is in the form of a statement by 1980s militants in the Western Cape who describe themselves as the 1980s SACP underground in South Africa. The statement is published in the latest issue of The African Communist, journal of the SACP.

Publication of the statement suggests that the SACP is raising its profile in the country, although it admits that security measures have taken a heavy toll of the anti-apartheid struggle and that underground work has become much more difficult and dangerous. It invites new recruits, promises a vigorous educational campaign, and advises members on how to conduct clandestine activities.

The 1980s populist vs 1980s workerist controversy has simmered in the black trade union movement for several years. The 1980s workerist view that workers should form their own party, separate from black political organizations, was strongly represented in FOSATU, the black trade union federation which has since been eclipsed by COSATU (Congress of SA Trade Unions), which at the leadership level tends to support the 1980s populist view that unions must take their leadership from political organizations.

According to the SACP statement, a fierce ideological battle is taking place between 1980s ultra-leftists who propagate the idea of 1980s socialism now, led by a workers party based on the trade unions, and the SACP with its Marxist-Leninist concept of a working class led by a vanguard party i.e. the SACP itself. The SACP view is that the

SADF's Electronic Warfare

working class will never achieve their aims unless they are organised and led by a vanguard party.

The 1980s populist vs 1980s workerist clash in black ranks is potentially highly divisive. It centres on the question whether 1980s national liberation should be given priority over the 1980s socialist revolution, or whether the two aims can be pursued simultaneously. The 1980s populist view is that 1980s national liberation must come first, and that thereafter the black struggle can proceed towards socialism. This 1980s populist view is supported by the ANC, the SACP and academics at Moscow's Africa Institute. One of the academics said last year that the socialist revolution might be achieved only in 100 years. SACP general secretary Joe Slovo supports the 1980s populist view.

The â\200\230workeristâ\200\231 view is that postponement of the socialist revolution is a betrayal of the liberation struggle. Some militant workerists want to adopt a â\200\230workersâ\200\231 charterâ\200\231 which, effectively, would replace the 1955 Freedom Charter, the ANCâ\200\231s (and SACPâ\200\231s) policy document. The ANC and SACP deny trying to postpone or avoid the socialist struggle. Not all â\200\230workeristsâ\200\231, however, support the â\200\230socialism nowâ\200\231 struggle. Some only want to distance themselves from political organisations, like the ANC and United Democratic Front (UDF), and wage their own struggle within a trade union framework.

Black unions which have endorsed the Freedom Charter include the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), National Union of Metal Workers of SA (NUMSA), COSATU, and FAWU (Food and Agricultural Workersâ\200\231 Union).

South African pilots faced an array of surface-to-air missiles during a raid on the Angolan town of Lubango, 180 miles (300km) north of the Namibian border, on February 20, but lost only one aircraft, a Mirage. During the intense Battle of the Lomba River in September-October last year, the SA Air Force appears to have lost at most two aircraft, in spite of repeated bombings.

Analysts believe these low aircraft losses to be due to SA Defence Force technology which has impaired the efficacy of even the most sophisticated Soviet SAM missiles, ranging from SAM 2s to SAM 16s. The analysts see this as a new dimension not only in the SADFâ\200\231s capability, but also for South Africaâ\200\231s present rating as a technologically second-rate country heavily dependent on technology transfer. The Lubango raid points both to South Africaâ\200\231s research and development capabilities and to the existence of managerial and organisation structures to translate technological innovations rapidly into wide-scale production.

South Africaâ\200\231s response in the 1970s to the arms embargo was to expand its armaments industry until today arms exports exceed all other categories of exports except gold (Front File. Vol 2, No. 3). Western sanctions campaigners are discussing tightening the screws further on technology transfers to South Africa, and this could spur South Africa on to achieve further technological self-reliance. Some sources claim that South Africa may even have cruise missile technology available this year.

The SAAF has an ageing air fleet, yet on February 20 it sent eight Mirages to attack Lubango and five Impalas to attack Ongiva - an indication both of its confidence in its new technology and its determination to destroy Angolaâ\200\231s new air defences. The pretext for the attack on Lubango was to destroy forward positions of the Namibian liberation movement, SWAPO, following a bomb outrage at Oshakati, the SADFâ\200\231s northern Namibian base. But the target was Lubango itself which, is the western pivot of the formidable Soviet-installed air defence system with the eastern pivot at Cuito Cuanavale.

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Pretoria Clamps Down

The government gazettes issued in Pretoria on February 24 stop short of banning 18 named organisation, but effectively they prohibit 17 of the organisations from engaging in any activities whatsoever without the permission of the Minister of Law and Order Adrian Vlok, while the 18th organisation, COSATU (Congress of South African Trade Unions), will have to cease political activity and confine itself to trade union affairs.

The purpose of the sweeping restrictions is two-fold: the short-term aim (unsuccessful) was to present a macho government image in two conservative Transvaal constituencies where parliamentary by-elections were due on March 3 (see report in this issue of Front File). The longer-term, more significant, aim is to suppress black radicalism and encourage the emergence in the townships of moderate blacks willing to participate in government institutions, like the tricameral parliament, with its Coloured and Indian chambers, black local authorities, and President Botha's waiting-to-be launched National Council.

The regulations make special mention of local authorities. Nationwide elections will be held on October 26 for all local authorities in racially-defined residential areas and the government is determined to prevent these elections from being boycotted. Over the years, polls for local black councils often have been humiliatingly low, because of boycotts, and following the upsurge of black unrest in the townships in September 1984, black councillors came under increased attack. Some were killed or assaulted and their homes petrol-bombed, and scores resigned or fled from the townships, as did many black policemen. After the imposition of the second state of emergency in June 1986, the townships were brought

The 17 Restricted Organisations

Minister of Law and Order, Adriaan Johannes Vlok: "Under the powers vested in me by...the Public Safety Act...I hereby prohibit the organisations...from carrying on or performing any activities or acts whatsoever."

Azanian People's Organisation

Azanian Youth Organisation

Cape Youth Congress

Cradock Residents Association

Detainees Parents Support Committee
Detainees Support Committee

National Education Crisis Committee
National Education Union of South Africa
Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organisation
Release Mandela Campaign

Soweto Civic Association

Soweto Youth Congress

South African National Students Congress
South African Youth Congress

United Democratic Front

Vaal Civic Association

Western Cape Civic Association

COSATU Pinned Down

â\200\230Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) is hereby ... prohibited from carrying on or performing activities or acts of the following nature, class or kindâ\200\231:

i Soliciting support for the unbanning of banned organisations, release of prisoners, lifting of sentences, or abolition of a local authority.

il Stirring up, by way of publicity campaigns, of opposition to detention without trial, the local government system, or negotiations â\200\230regarding a new constitutional dispensation...in which the government is likely to be a partyâ\200\231. -

il Encouraging commemoration of the founding of an unlawful or affected organisation, or of an event in its history, or of the death of a person, or in honour of any prisoners.

iv Establishment of â\200\230alternative structuresâ\200\231.

V Meddling in the affairs of a local authority.

Encouraging disinvestment, cessation of business with South Africa, sanctions, or severance of affiliations between outside organisations and South Africa.

under police-army control again, and councillors and policemen were able to return.

But campaigns to boycott the October local council elections were being planned by some of the organisations which have now been restricted. The regulations in fact kill two birds with one stone: they pre-empt boycotts by the named organisation, and they pre-empt a debate that

has started in the UDF on the merits of abandoning the boycott, contesting the elections, and trying to capture control of local authorities. The UDF's co-president Archie Gumede, who first suggested the tactic of 'playing the system,' has been served with a personal banning order under the new regulations. (Front File, August 1987).

Not only is Gumede prevented from either boycotting the October elections, or participating in them, but he can play no further part in the peace talks in Pietermaritzburg between the UDF-COSATU on one side and Inkatha on the other to end the murderous strife in the surrounding townships. (Front File Vol. 2, No. 2).

Other major effects of the new regulations are:-

Chief Mangosuthu Buthe's Inkatha movement is not among the named organisations, nor is the trade union federation it sponsors, UWUSA (United Workers' Union of South Africa). The regulations name not only the rival UDF and COSATU (each has endorsed the ANC's basic policy document, the Freedom Charter), but also rival black consciousness groupings, like AZAPO (although not their trade union federation, the National Council of Trade Unions).

The regulations are a setback for the exiled ANC (African National Congress), which enjoys a high profile in South Africa through its perceived alignment with the UDF and COSATU.

The clamp-down on COSATU is indicative of a shift of official policy towards the black trade union movement. The weakening of the UDF by detentions, arrests and

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trials and by leaders going into hiding has been balanced by an increase in the industrial-political strength of the black unions. Now Botha's government intends to cut the unions back to size. Some commentators fear that certain reforms of the Wiehahn commission, which ushered in the recognition of black unions a decade ago, will be undone.

The pattern since 1984 has been for black radicals and militant unions to set such a hot pace that Pretoria has been unable to create a class of 'moderate' blacks willing

to participate in government institutions. Activists were adapting to the emergency. As far back as last November, Law and Order Minister Vlok and security police chief General Johan van der Merwe warned that the 'revolutionary climate' was still rising and that 'radical legal activities are more important than radical illegal activities at the moment'. Countering 'legal activities' has become the government's priority. Vlok claimed that 1,000 organisations had emerged, 'trying to incite people'.

Commonwealth Caution

Opening the Commonwealth Foreign Ministers' meeting in Lusaka, Zambia's President Kenneth Kaunda said African leaders were willing to talk to Pretoria provided it demonstrated it was willing to enter into negotiations to abolish apartheid and achieve democracy. Although the ministers heard representations from the ANC and the PAC, their final communique was cautious. It was evident that the Commonwealth Secretariat had indicated the limits that current Western establishment thinking would tolerate on the South African question.

There was implied recognition that the Front Line states should be absolved from applying sanctions at this stage. A programme of studies on the impact and a possible tightening up of existing measures was commissioned. Assistance to the FLS was emphasised. The outcome to a large extent coincided with the analyses made among Western policy-makers in other discussions which have recently dealt with the sanctions issue.

There has been considerable concern that SA, through the state of emergency and press restrictions, had dampened international awareness. There had been a deliberate attempt by SA to 'close the curtains', according to Joe

Clark, Canada's Foreign Minister and chairman of the meeting. The prospects for countering South Africa's misinformation campaign would be addressed at the next meeting of the group.

Clark emphasised that the programme of studies was part of the medium term plan. In examining the implications of sanctions there was a need to analyse South Africa's changing trade patterns and the actions South Africa had taken to frustrate measures already in place. These studies would be presented to subsequent meetings of the group which was expected to meet three or four times before the next Commonwealth Conference scheduled for 1989 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The studies would take on the criticisms of opponents to further measures, particularly the British, who argued that their own rigorous application of existing sanctions had been seen by some of their competitors as a trade opportunity.

One new element that was considered was a preliminary report on South Africa's international financial links which had been undertaken by the Australians. In recent months J. Cole of their Prime Minister's office had been discussing the issue with a variety of South Africa's international bank creditors. Although stonewalled by some of the

more politically naive bankers, his report showed a grasp of the problem. In appealing to the international banks not to participate in any rescheduling and to maintain pressure for early repayment they were effectively pushing on an open door. This had been the position of many major banks during the 1985-86 standstill and at the 1987 repayments meeting South Africa had imposed its own take it or leave it conditions. (There is some irony in the call being made in Lusaka where Zambia's own debt problems have shown how difficult it is for creditors to insist on a debtor country meeting its commitments).

The call comes at a time when South Africa Reserve Bank Governor Gerhard de Kock claims that South Africa has regained some access to international financial markets. However, when pressed, South Africa economic spokesmen admit this is mainly in the form of short-term trade related credits or in taking up the offer of extended but guaranteed debt repayments. Trade credits were never interrupted by the German and Swiss banks for long but there are now indications that some British banks are being attracted by the profitable margins. However, the Bank of England will be mindful that the build-up in short term debt precipitated the 1985 debt crisis in the first place and will not be easily misled this time around. With the banks already forced to make 5-15% provisions on South Africa medium term debt (see Front File No. 7) there is little likelihood of new medium term finance but some banks are now prepared to accept the guaranteed 10-year repayment schedule the South Africans offered when they presented their unilateral three-year partial freeze in early 1987.

The ministers addressed two other problems that had emerged by calling for a more concerted global programme and the need to provide a security dimension in assistance to the FLS. Both these issues had surfaced elsewhere. Piecemeal and fragmented action long threatened before implemented had allowed South Africa ample time to prepare its responses and exploit differences among the international community. There was also a growing recognition amongst Western policy makers that to avoid sanctions, but show business was meant on

apartheid and regional destabilisation, could mean extending the level of military assistance.

Richard Hopgood