

VKAKKfE0 2xgjf;%;.v2;/LF k 0

80X X130

Refugees, Returnees and Displaced Persons
in Southern Africa

'SoHdarhy and Rehabnhauon"

QC???)

Distr.

GENERAL

SARRED/88/2

25 May 1988

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

VICTIMS OF APARTHEID:

Refugees, Returnees and Displaced
Persons in Southern Africa

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON

THE FLIGHT OF REFUGEES. RETURNEES AND
DISPLACED PERSONS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

OSLO

22 - 24 AUGUST. 1988

Conference Secretariat 0 Room 5-3031 0 United Nations - New York. NY10017

VICTIMS OF APARTHEID

Refugees. Returnees and

Displaced Persons in Southern Africa

Information Paper prepared for 0810 conference on

The Plight of Refugees, Returnees & Displaced Persons
in Southern Africa

August 1988

BY

PHYLLIS JOHNSON and DAVID MARTIN

1510t

I Introduction:

A Regional Crisis of Vast Proportions

II A Deliberate Policy:

Displacement in the Context of South Africa's 'Total Strategy'

III A Holocaust:

The Case of Mozambique and Angola

IV The Buffer Zone:

No Safe Refuge from Apartheid

V Conclusion:

Toward Solutions to the Crisis of Displacement in Southern Africa

INTRODUCTION

A Regional Crisis of Vast Proportions

South Africa, while at war with its own people, is waging an undeclared war against its neighbours and the suffering caused by apartheid stretches far beyond the borders of the republic.¹ This war is part of a 'total strategy' involving the mobilization of all forces -- political, economic, diplomatic and military -- in defence of apartheid. The regional objective is to create and maintain a dependence that will be economically lucrative and politically submissive, and act as a bulwark against the imposition of international sanctions. The combination of tactics used against each state depends on political, economic and military vulnerabilities, and military action masks economic and political goals. Central to this 'destabilization' is sabotage of the transportation network to ensure that regional trade flows through South Africa. Pretoria's destructive strategy has disrupted economic development and caused human suffering on an incomprehensible scale. Over 2.5 million people are displaced in countries bordering on South Africa. Two thirds of these are displaced within their own national boundaries, having fled from their land in fear of their lives, losing relatives and belongings. Most of the rest, numbering almost a million, have fled across international boundaries, stretching support systems for food and clothing, health and education. A further 100,000 are South Africans and Namibians who sought refuge in neighbouring states.² Outside the scope of this paper, and not yet wholly quantified, are the vast numbers uprooted within South Africa, 'resettled', sent to 'homelands' or otherwise displaced from their normal residential areas. The majority of displaced people in the region lack sufficient food and clothing, adequate health care and education, and are physically or psychologically brutalized. In the worst cases, they turn up at camps 'in poor health, severely malnourished, without belongings and often naked'.³ Some clothe themselves in bark or sacking, some have only leaves to eat. Many are subjected to forced labour, physical abuse or mutilation by rebels or bandits, and many have lost young children, who have ended up dead or missing.

These people are not fleeing from their governments or from drought, and are not refugees in the usual sense. They are people 'displaced' from fertile lands, who have been terrorized and traumatized, who have often witnessed the death of relatives or friends and who are afraid to plough. Their governments support them and are trying in various ways to ease their situation and improve it.

This paper intends to present the problem of displacement in the context of South Africa's 'total strategy'; to give the examples of Mozambique and Angola, where their populations are in need of emergency assistance within or outside the country; to show the precarious position of refugees from South Africa and Namibia and the threat to their safety; and to conclude with some suggestions for moving toward a solution to the causes of what has been described by a senior official of the US State Department as 'one of the most brutal holocausts against ordinary human beings since World War II'.⁴

II

A DELIBERATE POLICY:

Displacement in the context of South Africa's 'Total Strategy' South Africa's regional policy until the mid-1970s concerned itself with attempts to thwart activities by liberation movements which were increasingly growing in strength. As has always been its policy, South Africa saw this growth in strength as wholly externally based, in neighbouring countries as well as at home. South Africa was shielded in this period by a ring of 'buffer' states that included the Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola; the British rebel colony of Southern Rhodesia, and by its own occupation of Namibia. Regional policy was directed toward reinforcing this barrier of states through various economic, political and military alliances.

After the Portuguese coup d'état in 1974, the political face of southern Africa changed dramatically, with the independence of Mozambique and Angola the following year, and then, in 1980, of Zimbabwe. This was not achieved without considerable bloodshed, and many of the defeated colonizers retreated into apartheid's laager.

The defeat of Portuguese colonialism gave rise to a hasty reformulation of South Africa's regional strategy. B.J. Vorster launched his diplomatic detente initiative, vaguely defined as a 'constellation' of independent states presenting a united front against common enemies. This was coupled with military expansion and the removal of some forms of 'petty' apartheid. The detente initiative crumbled with the invasion of Angola in 1975 and the eventual expulsion of South African forces by Angolan and Cuban troops in early 1976. Any impetus to maintain dialogue was dashed with the brutal repression of the Soweto uprising a few months later.

By the end of 1976, South Africa's regional policy was discredited and the regime faced a growing internal crisis. Top military strategists, including the then defence minister, P.W. Botha, began to flesh out the 'total strategy' which they had proposed as early as 1973. This was laid out in the 1977 Defence White Paper which identified the need to 'maintain a solid military balance relative to neighbouring states', while advocating economic and other 'action in relation to transport services, distribution and telecommunications' with the purpose of promoting 'political and economic collaboration' in the region. After P.W. Botha became prime minister in 1978 he adopted 'total strategy' as the official policy.⁵ He reorganized the

security structures, reflecting a desire for long term planning to replace the kind of ad hoc decision-making that had caused the embarrassing withdrawal of Angola in 1976, and a reaction to the power wielded by individuals in the Vorster administration. Botha also resurrected the proposal for a 'constellation of southern African states' held together by joint projects between member states and formal security agreements, and in which the bantustans would have full membership. Pretoria would dominate this grouping militarily, economically and technologically, but Rhodesia, commanding access to the hinterland, was seen as a vital component if a malleable government could be put in power when it became Zimbabwe.

Pretoria's hopes for immediate implementation of this plan were shattered by two related events in early 1980. First was the result of the Zimbabwe independence election announced on 4 March. The victor, with an outright majority, was Robert Mugabe's party which opposes apartheid and supports international sanctions against South Africa. Less than a month later, the Frontline states - Zambia, Botswana, Tanzania, Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe - formed the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) with the stated aim of reducing the region's dependence on the apartheid regime. SADCC incorporated three other countries in the region - Malawi, Swaziland and Lesotho - and was initiated with the support of Pretoria's traditional allies in Western Europe. The formation of SADCC clearly challenged South Africa's regional predominance, and it was this new option for the contiguous states that Pretoria set out to destroy, while proceeding with its own blueprint for regional relations.

Of the railway links running east through Mozambique, west through Angola, and south, it is more than coincidence that the only one not sabotaged in the past eight years is the route through Zimbabwe to the South African ports of Durban, Port Elizabeth, East London and Cape Town. This route provides Pretoria with considerable foreign currency earnings, carrying the bulk of the trade of Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe, and almost half of Zaire's mineral exports. SADCC's intention of reducing dependence on South Africa by upgrading regional transportation routes had serious economic implications for Pretoria. A reduction in traffic threatened to reduce South Africa's trade surplus with the region at a time when its own economy was stretched.

To prevent this, and to bludgeon its way to regional acceptance, South Africa began in 1981 to implement its 'total strategy' policy, using military, economic and political weapons to try to force the region into formal security agreements and joint economic projects thereby creating a mutual dependence for the protection of white supremacy in South Africa.

Of great importance in the context of the current situation in the region is that, during the colonial wars, the Portuguese and the Rhodesian administrations created or co-opted groups to use as surrogates against the nationalist parties. After the fall of the Portuguese colonial empire and then Rhodesia, these groups were inherited by South Africa. The historical evidence of this is confirmed by those who created, armed and directed these groups which are today South Africa's tools in destabilizing the region, and the support they receive from Pretoria is now a matter of public record.⁶

Destabilization of Mozambique is carried out in the name of the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR or Renamo), which was created by Rhodesia's Central Intelligence Organization in 1976 as a clandestine intelligence-gathering group.⁷ A senior officer involved in early training said 'the MNR gave a cover for Rhodesian operations and, from initial intelligence-gathering, moved on to getting recruits and then on to the offensive, disrupting road and rail links.' In March 1980, just before Zimbabwe's independence but after the election results were known, MNR personnel and equipment were moved out of Rhodesia to the South African department of Military Intelligence.⁸

In the Rhodesian era, the activities of these 'bandidos armados' (armed bandits) were confined to the central provinces of Mozambique which shared a common border with Rhodesia. From 1981, under South African tutelage, with fresh armaments and trained personnel, the war escalated dramatically. The disruption began of the main rail routes to the sea for the land-locked hinterland. New fronts were opened in the southern provinces bordering on South Africa. More than 100,000 people died from starvation and drought-related diseases in that area in 1983-84 because ambushes and attacks on emergency relief supplies hampered the distribution of food and medicine.

On the other side of the continent, where the region's transportation routes run to the west coast through Angola, there were three collaborationist groups of which one remains relevant today. That is the so-called National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Unita) led by Jonas Savimbi. Letters and documents which have been published elsewhere reveal that when Unita was supposedly fighting against Portuguese colonialism, it was in reality an adjunct of the Portuguese armed forces fighting against the MPLA.⁹

Portuguese army commanders who were in Angola from 1971-74, none of whom could be described as radicals seeking to belittle Unita, have confirmed that the documents are authentic. They say that there was a 'gentleman's agreement' to provide ammunition, medical and other assistance to Unita, a movement which purported to be anti-Portuguese when presenting itself to international

forums.¹⁰ Unita was given its own area of operations by the Portuguese military and one of its main tactics, which continues to this day, was the disruption of the Benguela railway, a main artery not only for the Angolan interior but for trade from Zambia and Zaire.

Unita's acceptance of South African military support is now public knowledge, confirmed by all sides, as are Savimbi's utterances and appearances in support of South Africa, including his presence at the swearing in of PW Botha as President, where he took his place alongside South Africa's bantustan leaders. The destruction, brutality and loss of life caused by Unita's collaboration with South Africa is mirrored in the suffering of the displaced people within and outside of Angola's borders. The origins of the MNR and Unita have been stressed because they were both inherited by South Africa and are now used as proxies in the 'destabilization' of the region. There are examples in other parts of the region of smaller groups co-opted and armed by South Africa to cause destruction and terror in Lesotho, Zambia and Zimbabwe, but the main means of ensuring this regional dependence has been the disruption of the coastal states of Mozambique and Angola.

South Africa has often threatened retaliatory sanctions against the independent states of the region in the event that international sanctions are imposed against apartheid. But it is now clear that Pretoria is already imposing sanctions against other states in southern Africa.¹

Sanctions are defined as 'economic or military action to coerce a state to conform'. The objective of sanctions is to restrict or prevent access and increase costs. There is ample evidence that South Africa has already adopted both economic and military means to coerce its neighbours, restricting their access to trade routes and vastly increasing their transportation costs. To achieve this, Pretoria has relied largely on the use of its surrogate forces. Captured documents, prisoners and ballistic tests in at least three countries have identified South Africa as the source of training, weapons and strategy for the destruction of economic targets.

South Africa's regional wars since 1981 have cost one million lives. These were caused directly by war or occurred as a result of the destruction of rural medical clinics and emergency food supplies, dislocation of communities and loss of food production.¹²

Examples of direct economic pressure used by South Africa against its neighbours are many and can be seen in the deliberately created congestion, amounting to blockades, on the borders of Lesotho, Botswana and, to a lesser extent, Zimbabwe; the withdrawal of railway wagons to Zimbabwe; the repatriation of migrant mine-workers, particularly to Mozambique; reduction in traffic through Maputo port; withholding of monies due to partners in the Southern African Customs Union - Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland - and so on.

The financial cost to the region is difficult to quantify and must take into account destruction of infrastructure, lost production and revenue, higher transportations costs, displacement of people, the spread of malnutrition and disease, etc. SADCC members now estimate this figure to be over \$30 billion. Defence costs against South African-backed insurgents are put as high as \$17 billion for Angola and \$5.5 billion for Mozambique.¹³

The late president of Botswana, Sir Seretse Khama, who was a moving force behind the creation of SADCC, warned at its formative meeting in Lusaka that, 'The struggle for economic liberation will be as bitterly contested as has been the struggle for political liberation.'

The cases of Mozambique and Angola serve to illustrate the point that the suffering caused by apartheid is not contained only within the borders of the republic; that economic devastation, sabotage of transport and other infrastructure are part of South Africa's sanctions against the region; and that hunger is one of the weapons in the arsenal of apartheid.

III

A HOLOCAUST:

The case of Mozambique and Angola

Mozambique is gripped by a vicious war in which the level of brutality is almost impossible to grasp. Half of its population is threatened with hunger because rural farmers are afraid to till their land or have had to abandon it in fear of their lives, becoming 'displaced' within their own country or just outside its borders.

Despite the difficulties caused by inheriting an incredibly underdeveloped colonial economy, Mozambique had made considerable progress by 1981, six years after independence. Agricultural and mineral exports had increased and the economy was expanding. The medical system, oriented to primary health care, was hailed as a Third World model and school enrolment had tripled.

Then South Africa unleashed the surrogate force inherited from Rhodesia which systematically disrupted or destroyed railways and roads, farms and agro-industrial complexes, foreign aid projects, schools, health clinics and rural shops. Even the people who live and farm in rural areas became an economic target. Their massive displacement is part of the disruption of rural infrastructure which has destroyed 'the basis of self-sufficiency' in the countryside. 4 Mozambique's transportation routes hold the key to reduced regional dependence on South Africa, so it was these routes that Pretoria set out to destroy. And in the process it has destroyed the young nation's economic base, its social system and well over half a million lives.¹⁵

Three railway systems serving the hinterland traverse Mozambique but the only lines now operational are those which also run through South Africa or which are defended at massive military cost. This reduction in transit traffic caused direct and indirect losses to Mozambique's ports and railways of well over 1 billion dollars from 1980 - 1986.¹⁶

In the south, the port of Maputo is the natural egress to the sea for the northern Transvaal province of South Africa, for Swaziland, and for Zimbabwe's bulk exports such as sugar and steel. The railway from South Africa to Maputo is operating, but the direct route from Zimbabwe along the Limpopo river, out of use since it was sabotaged in 1984, is under repair and expected to re-open this year. Until then Zimbabwe's traffic to Maputo must transit South Africa.

In central Mozambique, the port of Beira is a natural outlet for much of the trade of Zimbabwe and Malawi. Zambia, Zaire and Botswana can also use this route. The rail link to Malawi is not operational but the route to Zimbabwe is open, guarded by Zimbabwean soldiers and, with international development assistance, slowly increasing traffic. Zimbabwe's oil pipeline from Beira runs along this route. Protection of the Beira corridor is costly, but as Zimbabwe's shortest link to the sea it is regarded as a lifeline.

Further north, the Nacala railway is Malawi's shortest route to the sea and also services Zambia, but that too has not been fully operational for almost four years due to sabotage. Repair work is nearing completion and Malawian soldiers have been deployed to protect the repair crews.

Well over 1,000 Mozambican railway workers have died or been wounded in the battle to keep the trains rolling. One of those who lived to tell his story is Julio Ernesto Tivane, 32 years old, married with four children. He was wounded in an ambush when he went out to push a crippled train off the line to South Africa. Today he walks with a limp, his left side hideously scarred by shrapnel. That was the eighth time in three years that his train had been rocketed, mined or ambushed. He admits he is afraid but he is still driving. Tivane's resolve typifies the resolve of the people of Mozambique. They have suffered the indignities of colonialism, rejoiced at their independence, recall the promise of achievement, and live in the horrendous reality of today.

Notwithstanding the ferocity of the onslaught mounted since 1981 by South Africa and its surrogates, Mozambican forces gradually regained the upper hand in the southern provinces. South Africa then extended the war in the centre-north to Mozambique's 'bread basket' provinces which produce over half of its export earnings.

Ports and railways, fuel depots and pipelines, bridges and roads were the main targets. Captured documents reveal that the MNR was ordered by South African military intelligence as early as October 1980 to close the transportation routes to Zimbabwe, and that other targets included those 'of an economic nature such as the ones belonging to SADCC'.¹⁷ By various means, South Africa deliberately and systematically set out from late 1980 to sabotage the Mozambican economy and its communications systems.

As the war escalated, Mozambique was forced to negotiate. On 16 March 1984, the late President Samora Machel met P.W. Botha on their common border to sign an agreement of 'non-aggression and good neighbourliness' under which both sides agreed not to provide from their territory assistance to opponents of the other, military bases, training, armaments, command, communications, propaganda etc. and to refuse transit or recruitment to individuals planning acts of violence against the other.

Although Mozambique scrupulously implemented the agreement, South Africa did not. Sabotage continued and escalated against economic targets that included foreign aid workers as well as Cahora Bassa power lines and agro-industrial complexes. Piles of incriminating documents, including diaries, found at the main MNR base at Gorongosa in central Mozambique when it was overrun in August 1985, reveal massive violations of the agreement by South Africa.

Before the signing at Nkomati, South Africa's military had moved into Mozambique enough armaments and other supplies to cover MNR needs for six months. Their communications continued despite the agreement, using new radio frequencies, as did supply drops and training. Although South Africa denies that it is currently supporting the MNR, it now admits its involvement prior to 1984, which was also denied at the time.

"There was of course a time when we helped to train Renamo and assisted it," Foreign Minister Pik Botha told parliament in 1985. "Renamo requests for aid were acceded to. I wish to confirm today that in similar circumstances in southern Africa, we should do it again." He claimed that violations of the Nkomati agreement, including construction of a clandestine airstrip in Mozambique, were technical."¹⁸

A few months later, after the publication of diaries found at Gorongosa, Pik Botha told parliament the documents were genuine. "One can go through all those entries in the diary...the information tallies with the flights undertaken by the airforce. That is true. The time of our meetings (with MNR) are correct. The times that they indicated that I had been present are correct."¹⁹

More information about South Africa's involvement is becoming available from people who have escaped from MNR captivity or have surrendered under the government's amnesty programme. As well as captured documents and prisoners, new details have also recently come to light through the release from prison in South Africa of some members of a group who were collecting information on assistance to the MNR. 0 Another source of inside information was a former senior official of the

MNR in Portugal who returned to Maputo earlier this year. Paulo Oliveira, who was an MNR representative in Western Europe, has spoken publicly of South Africa's involvement and of the MNR training camps he visited in Mozambique and South Africa. Visiting the bases, he said 'enabled me to see the degree of control that the South Africans had over the MNR'.²¹

Oliveira confirmed that South Africa was still giving material support to the MNR at the time he left the organization in late 1987. He gave the names of officers whom he dealt with, and said he was told by one of them that the objective was 'to create massive confusion and difficulty for the Mozambican government'.

October 1986 was a turning point, in terms of regional resolve as well as international awareness. The centre-north provinces of Tete and Zambezia had been attacked by the MNR in September. Prior to this act of banditry Pretoria seemed content with a level of destabilization that disrupted the transportation system, maintaining regional dependence on southern routes with considerable benefit to the apartheid economy. The attack of late 1986 signalled an escalation.

Then, some three weeks later, President Machel and other senior government officials died in a still unexplained plane crash just inside South African territory.²² The new President, Joaquim Chissano, began to implement an economic and military recovery programme mapped out in part under his predecessor. Some of what had been lost was regained, with military assistance from neighbouring Tanzania and Zimbabwe, and increased training of Mozambican army units with international support. But the agricultural and industrial base of the economy was devastated and vast sectors of the rural population displaced. Production in virtually every agricultural sector is less than one quarter of its 1981 level, and a serious consequence of the present situation is the disruption of normal commercial trade patterns between the rural and urban areas.

Mozambique's fertile land is traversed by many rivers, and its mineral wealth is virtually untapped, so there is great potential for economic growth. But the destruction of marketing and transport systems has hampered the internal distribution of goods and prevented the movement of exports to the coast. Tea worth almost 14 million dollars deteriorated at Gurue in Zambezia province, and production halted at the Moatize mine in Tete due to a stockpile of coal worth 25 million dollars. The railway wagons that moved the coal and the trucks that hauled cement to build the giant Cahora Bassa dam now give shelter to families displaced by the war.

The destruction of one economic target has ripple effects through the entire economy. Cement is one example. A quarry which supplied the cement factory at Dondo, near Beira, was forced to close because of the security situation. This led to the closure of the cement plant itself, then of an asbestos roofing factory, and finally an asbestos mine. Mozambique, which became a significant post-independence cement exporter, has been forced to import clinker from South Africa, spending precious foreign currency to produce any cement at all. Meanwhile, South African companies have taken over Mozambique's cement export markets, and more Mozambicans are without jobs or means of livelihood.

Export earnings in 1987 were just 86 million dollars, marginally up over the previous two years but largely from two products - prawns and cashew nuts. Donations, mainly food aid, totalled 358 million dollars. The 1987 import bill for fuel, raw materials and spare parts was 642 million dollars. Although an increase in exports is projected for 1988, the rise in cost of imports is expected to exceed this.²³

Two principal sources of foreign exchange income - rail and port fees, and remittances from migrant workers - declined in 1987 due to South Africa's decision to cut back on the use of Maputo port and to speed up the repatriation of Mozambicans working in South African mines. South Africa reduced its traffic through Maputo in 1987 to one third of the 1986 figure, one of the many sanctions Pretoria imposed against its neighbour. The cost of direct and indirect losses to Mozambique is now approaching \$10 billion,²⁴ and this figure excludes military hardware and buildings.

The population of Mozambique is estimated at 14 million, of whom almost one million are displaced outside the country. Of the 5.9 million people in need of emergency relief within Mozambique, at least 1.1 million are displaced from their homes. A further 2.2 million have had their livelihood disrupted by destabilization and are unable to produce enough to feed themselves. The remaining 2.6 million who require food aid are urban dwellers for whom the countryside is no longer producing a surplus.²⁵

The number of Mozambicans arriving in southern Malawi was running as high as 1,000 a day earlier this year, according to an independent report commissioned for the US State Department, which also revealed in some detail the level of MNR brutality against civilians. The report, by Robert Gersony, said that many thousands of people are detained against their will by such

methods as food deprivation. The findings confirmed a high level of MNR violence including rape and other physical abuse, murder and mutilation, abductions, forced labour in fields and as porters, systematic burning of villages and looting of possessions. 'That the accounts are so strikingly similar by refugees who have fled from northern, central and southern Mozambique suggests that the violence is systematic and coordinated and not a series of spontaneous, isolated incidents by undisciplined combatants.'

On 8 July last year, a Maputo newspaper, Noticias, reported that passengers on a coastal ship, Chiloane II, had seen an 'unidentified' submarine inside Mozambique's territorial waters. There were reports from Inhambane province of several hundred newly trained men landed by sea. Military supply parachutes were found in a lake in the area. A detailed story in a British newspaper about Pretoria's role traced the parachutes to a supply drop two months earlier. The 29-metre parachutes can carry almost 2,500 kg of supplies and the only airforce in the region which uses them is that of South Africa.

On 18 July there was massive attack on the lush agricultural centre of Homoine in Inhambane in which 424 people were slaughtered, including 44 children and some patients in the local hospital where pregnant women were bayoneted in the stomach. The attackers wore new uniforms and were well equipped. A U.S. Mennonite agronomist, Mark von Koevering, who survived the massacre, said, 'This is not a war to win land or support. It's a war of terror. The bandits have absolutely no support from any person or group I have met.' Four days later, a British newspaper carried a detailed report about Pretoria's support for the MNR, including a description of a South African supply plane which had landed at Chitpe, in Inhambane, on a resupply mission on 8 May.²⁶

Homine was the bloodiest massacre, but not the last. The nearby town of Manjacaze was attacked a few days later and almost 100 people lost their lives. Ambushes increased on commercial convoys in Maputo province, near the capital. In one such attack 96 trucks were destroyed; in another, a busload of people were burned to death.

One of the most frightening aspects of this surrogate war is the use of child combatants, most in their early teen but some as young as 10 years old. Two 11-year-olds and a youth of 23 have related their experiences operating as bandits in Inhambane province, and of their kidnapping and integration into bandit units. One said the attack on Homoine was carried out by an MNR group operating from a nearby base at Inhamungue. They said some supplies and equipment came by helicopter.²⁷ Another 11-year-old, Alfredo Carlos Mbulo, said he saw his family hacked

to death with machetes, and less than two weeks later he was in training with the killers. He said he was afraid of guns, but those who refused were beaten. Another boy was made to watch while his grandfather was beheaded and the head paraded on a pole. The child was told that if he cried they would do the same to him.

UNICEF in Maputo has begun collecting these stories of brutalized children. One particularly awful one describes how some kidnapped boys are conditioned to kill: 'First they kill a pig or a goat as a group. Then they kill as an individual. Finally, they graduate to a human prisoner'.²⁸

A captured MNR recruit told journalists that there were more than 500 children serving at one base in the southern Gaza province. The MNR prefers using children, he said, because the army 'won't shoot children' and because 'children do what we want them to do. Adults defect'.²⁹

When several MNR bases were overrun in Zambezia province in 1987, dozens of these children were found. They, and many others found since then, have been given special care. One such centre in Maputo contains 35 children at any one time, under the care of social workers, doctors and psychologists. When they are able to leave, to be absorbed into extended family networks or orphanages, others take their place. They tell tragic tales of brutality, murder, mutilation, and use of drugs such as mandrax. The Director of Social Welfare in Maputo said, 'You can tell the ones who have killed. When you speak they don't listen. They're always vacant.' It is important to 'note their condition and behavior when they come in,' she said. 'Some always have to have a stick in hand as a weapon. Tantrums and fist-fights diminish over time, but depression is the long term problem. All of them are very tired and depressed.'

Some 200 000 children have lost or been separated from one or both parents. Mikas, about 12 years old, is one of thousands of orphans. He lives at a school near Maputo, since the train he was travelling on with his parents was ambushed three years ago and they were killed. His forefinger is all that remains of his left hand, and he lost his right leg below the knee. His dream is to have shoes and play soccer.

It is not only the children who have suffered. A youth with a bandage over his left eye steps into the street at a traffic light in Maputo. As he passes, the realization that he has no ears, lips or nose is devastating. A young woman sitting on a bench at the airport has no ears.

In Maputo's Central Hospital, a young mother with a mutilated face wept as she told of an attack on her village in the northern province of Mampula. Her husband escaped with their

three children and she tried to run but was caught. Everything was stolen, including the clothes she wore. she wants to see her children, to go back to her village, but she thinks she cannot live there again. Another young woman, not out of her teens, walked from house to house in a Maputo suburb begging milk for the baby strapped to her back. She had been in a convoy ambushed 60 km north of the capital a few days earlier, and had come to Maputo to search for her parents.

An Australian doctor, at a village in southern Inhambane province, asked if there were any problems she might help with. 'Yes,' replied an elderly woman. How could they get the bodies out of the well where the 'bandidos armados' had thrown them, and get clean water again?

The problem of resettlement and reintegration into society is a particularly thorny one for Mozambique, covering a broad spectrum of physical and psychological problems. In many parts of the countryside the rural infrastructure has been destroyed, and traditional patterns of life disrupted. The social sector has been devastated and most aspects of the economic sector have been affected, including distribution of consumer goods through rural shops, transport and small scale industry. There are also economic refugees to resettle, migrant workers repatriated from the South African mines at a time when most Mozambican mines are closed and the economy is not expanding to create more jobs. The main prerequisite for resettlement is the safety to till the land. Where security can be provided, there are normal requirements of seeds and implements, food, water, health and education facilities. Secure resettlement for as many as possible as soon as possible has the advantage of allowing people to become quickly self-sufficient again so they do not become dependent on food aid. These physical problems of resettlement can be overcome with assistance from the international community and from existing national structures. The psychological effects will be more difficult to handle.

These displaced people are traumatized, having been uprooted from their homes and traditions. Most fled their villages after an act of brutality against a close relative or after belongings were plundered and dwellings burned. Many have been victims of, or witnessed, some atrocity. There are mothers and daughters who have been raped or have been forced to hurt their children in some way; families which have been scattered and separated from each other, often in circumstances of fear or brutality; men and young boys who have been forcibly recruited and made to kill,

often hooked on drugs; people who have been mutilated and maimed; others accustomed to violence and theft. Those who have been forcibly recruited or detained against their will need reintegration into society, as will those who have been their captors, and almost two million people who are displaced within and outside the country.

The population of Angola, like that of Mozambique, has been massively disrupted by South Africa's war, with over half a million people displaced internally, almost 100,000 in Zambia and possibly as many as 300,000 in Zaire.³⁰ Those displaced internally are totally dependent upon humanitarian assistance, and a further one million people (half the urban population) are experiencing severe shortages of staple foods. Their suffering is not limited to displacement and hunger, many thousands of people have been maimed. Angola has a large artificial limb factory and hospital to cater for more than 20,000 people who have lost limbs, often from landmines planted on paths to their fields.

In Angola, as in Mozambique, the farmers and rural infrastructure are an economic target of war, along with railways and other transportation routes, bridges, rural clinics and schools, teachers and health workers, foreign aid personnel and vehicles transporting relief supplies. The distribution of essential commodities is often hampered by the destruction of vehicles in landmine explosions. As well as the future implications of the loss of formal education and literacy programmes to a large sector of the rural population, malnutrition is rife and their well-being is affected by the destruction of health posts. The delivery and use of health services is declining, and immunization coverage is very low. At least 100,000 people perished in Angola from 1980-85 through war-related famine and its effects; and, in the same period, 150,000 infants and children under five died who, but for the war, would have lived. Deaths among the same group were calculated 55,000 for 1986 and that would have been the minimum for 1987, without the war-related escalation in mortality rates which certainly occurred.³¹

Like Mozambique, Angola's colonial legacy involved almost 90 percent illiteracy and an economy which had been developed to serve the metropolis. The majority of settlers left with the colonial flag, destroying the transportation system and disrupting the rural distribution network. However, unlike Mozambique, Angola has a mineral extraction sector that includes oil, diamonds and iron. Agricultural cash crops include coffee,

cotton, timber, sisal, maize, tobacco and sugar. Today oil and gas constitute most of Angola's export earnings, in joint ventures with several western transnational companies. Prior to the collapse in world oil prices, the government imported food in times of shortage but the recent reduction in oil income has cut in half the country's ability to feed its people, also reducing imports of food and clothing, and cutting back on raw materials for factories. And Angola has remained the main external target for South Africa's 'total strategy'.

Unlike the clandestine nature of its military pressure on Mozambique, South Africa has waged its war against Angola more or less openly for 13 years, directly and through material assistance to Unita. The SADF has made more than a dozen major incursions into Angola since they first entered the country in the second week of August 1975, occupying a strip of territory 50 km deep allegedly to protect the Calueque hydro-electric project near the Namibian border. A few months later, in October, their armoured columns began moving in a two-pronged pincer movement across the country toward Luanda in a bid to prevent the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) proclaiming independence from the departing Portuguese administration.

The first Cuban military personnel arrived in Angola in October 1975: 480 instructors to train the large numbers of new recruits joining the MPLA. Cuban combat troops first entered Angola in November after MPLA President Agostinho Neto called for their assistance against the powerful South African military force armed with sophisticated equipment and moving rapidly up the country toward the capital on the eve of independence. 2 Confronted by Cuban and Angolan forces only 100 km from Luanda, the South Africans withdrew, destroying bridges, plundering machinery, vehicles and cattle. The Angolan government estimated the quantifiable war damage in that period as \$6.7 billion. In April 1976, only weeks after the departure of the South African forces, Angola and Cuba agreed on a programmed reduction of Cuban forces which were reduced by more than one third in less than a year. Renewed South African aggression stopped the withdrawal, and a further decision in 1979 to reduce the number of Cubans was again followed by an escalation of SADF military operations in southern Angola.

Members of the US congress, angered by revelations of covert operations in Angola and a CIA cover-up, banned military aid to anti-government forces in Angola without congressional approval. The Clark amendment of 9 February 1976 was in force until its repeal in mid-1985.

During this period, the five Western members of the UN Security Council - Britain, Canada, France, West Germany and the United States - set themselves up as a 'contact group' to negotiate a settlement in Namibia. An independence plan was approved by all parties and its implementation demanded in Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978. Pretoria, while stating publicly that it agreed to the plan 'in principle', did not implement it and continued to escalate the war. Despite the various pretexts used by Pretoria in this period for not implementing Resolution 435, the presence of Cuban troops in Angola was not among them.

Estimated human losses in Angola from the 'end' of the war in early 1976 until the end of 1980 were almost 1900 dead and 2 500 wounded, with an unknown number of people kidnapped and missing. Material damage in that period was assessed at \$530 million.³² Unquantifiable are those losses resulting from the forced exodus of people from war areas, interruption of schooling and disruption of social services, unemployment caused by the destruction of economic targets and unfinished development projects, nutritional and material shortages, and the psychological damage caused, especially to children. Since their expulsion in early 1976, the SADF have been in Angola more than they have been out, occupying parts of the border area continuously since 1981.

Since 1981, the independence of Namibia has been 'linked' to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. Yet there is no parallel between the illegal presence of South African troops in Namibia and the Cuban military presence to which Angola is fully entitled under Article 51 of the UN Charter which recognizes 'the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence' of a country under armed attack. And no Cuban or Angolan soldier has crossed into or threatened any country in the region.

In December 1983, the SADF launched its biggest military operation of this period, surpassed only by the offensive against Cuito Cuanavale four years later and also aimed at consolidating bargaining positions. Cloaked in the usual verbal disguise of 'hot pursuit against Swapo terrorists', the so-called Operation Askari was designed to expand the area occupied by Unita. It failed to do so, and the South African generals were forced to concede that they had not expected such fierce resistance, making it the costliest SADF operation in Angola in terms of their own losses since 1975-76. South Africa's air superiority, which had proved decisive in previous operations, was still a factor but, to their surprise and dismay, the Angolan army was better equipped, preventing the invaders from sending ground troops too far ahead or attacking by air.

Despite the Lusaka 'understanding' in February 1984 and the

much-publicized and-photographed 'withdrawals of men and equipment' in April 1985, the SADF maintained a powerful force on both sides of the Angola-Namibia border. By the end of 1985, the South Africans had openly rescued their surrogates and were again occupying parts of southern Angola. The transition from destabilization to diplomacy and back again was so sudden that one South African magazine likened it to a Transvaal thunderstorm. At the same time, South Africa had announced the installation of an 'internal' government in Namibia making it clear that it had no intention of ending its illegal occupation. It was also in this period that the Clark Amendment, banning open US military aid to anti-government forces in Angola, was repealed; and Angola was one of five areas of regional conflict chosen by the US administration for discussion at the Reagan-Gorbachev summit in November 1985. Two months later it was announced that the United States had decided to provide military assistance to Unita, and reports indicated an initial \$15 million in covert aid, including shoulder-fired surface-to-air Stinger missiles.

A single event served to expose the facts of the campaign against Angola. On 21 May 1985, a Fapla patrol foiled an attempt by a South African commando unit to sabotage the Cabinda Gulf Oil complex, and captured the commander, Captain du Toit, a member of the SADF special forces. He said his unit came from an Israeli-built South African destroyer which lay off the coast while they landed from inflatable boats. Du Toit said that Unita often claimed responsibility for South Africa's covert operations in Angola. South Africa initially denied that its forces were in Cabinda then adjusted this to say they were engaged in gathering intelligence on Swapo and the ANC (who are not based in Cabinda). Du Toit was released two years later in an exchange of prisoners.

President Eduardo Dos Santos told party leaders last year that the war had cost \$12 billion since 1975, and estimates including war damage and economic losses in that period range up to \$17 billion. With a fraction of that sum to spend on development, and peace instead of war, Angola's population of 8 million could be living in relative prosperity rather than the squalor of displacement. Instead, the costs of war are increasing.

In June 1987, South Africa budgeted a massive 54% increase to air force operations and later in the year openly declared its presence in southern Angola with a massive offensive against the tiny town of Cuito Cuanavale. Despite heavy bombardments by long-range artillery and hopeful claims by Unita, they were not able to take the heavily fortified town. Cuito Cuanavale became

the battleground for a military test of wills between apartheid and its neighbours, a showdown of regional power over South Africa's aspiration to be recognized as the 'superpower' of southern Africa. The strategic importance of the town at the confluence of two rivers is its airstrip and its position as a forward air defence base for southern Angola but beyond that it became a regional symbol of resistance to South Africa's military might and its designs for the region.

The SADF had up to 9 000 troops in southern Angola, and sent its most sophisticated military hardware into the offensive, including long-range artillery, tanks, armoured cars and a massive air force commitment. The contest between South Africa's aggression and Angola's ability to defend itself resulted in heavy casualties and loss of equipment. The SADF, which does not announce black or foreign casualties, began sending home enough bodies of young white conscripts to set white public opinion on edge. And, despite a visit by PW Botha and several cabinet ministers to Unita's base near the Namibian border, the SADF faced mutinies in its ranks, especially from black Namibian soldiers.

Unita's presence in the southern offensive was hardly visible, and many of their forces have been moved north, where there is extensive infiltration across the border from Zaire, and some into the enclave of Cabinda. The latest South African offensive allowed Unita to concentrate its attention elsewhere, in Moxico and on towns along the strategic Benguela railway. Journalists taken in early March to Cuemba were shown equipment captured from Unita which included South African-made vehicles. This catalogue of events over the past 13 years in Angola underlines the warning contained in the UNICEF report that 'it is unrealistic to approach the challenge of protecting the children and people of southern Africa as a short-term matter, or as a problem readily amenable to the techniques applied to natural disasters such as droughts, which are self-terminating. 'Above all the children of southern Africa need peace.'³³

IV

THE BUFFER ZONE:

No Safe Refuge from Apartheid

As the protective colonial larger on South Africa's borders was collapsing from 1974 through 1980, a new set of Afrikaaner administrators with military experience were taking power in Pretoria in what is often referred to as a 'constitutional coup d'etat'. They believed themselves to be victims of the same colonial domination as the rest of the subcontinent, having 'liberated' their government from English-speaking control only 40 years ago. Through the powerful State Security Council they are constructing a militarist management system right down to local committees of regional Joint Management Centres, and they believe that threats to the apartheid system come from outside the country. They believe that these threats can be confronted militarily and they are using their military capacity to impose a new buffer zone based, like the old colonial one, on regional economic linkages, mutual security and a resistance to pressure from outsiders.

They have sought to divert attention from the root cause of the growing conflagration of apartheid by presenting it as a 'total onslaught' organized by the Soviet Union, and by presenting their system as the last line of defence in protecting Western interests in the region. This argument, used previously by Rhodesia and Portugal in defence of the indefensible, has been used to justify violation of neighbouring territories as 'hot pursuit' against 'terrorists' of the South West Africa Peoples Organization (SWAPO) or the African National Congress (ANC).

Pretoria would wish to destroy any belief in socialism as a development strategy and so much the better if, when it buries socialism, it can also persuade the population of South Africa that chaos is the result of majority rule. Another goal is to limit the influence of outside powers, including the West and the United Nations, infrastructure for long term military and economic control in the entire region. South Africa dramatically escalated its undeclared war against the Frontline states in 1987 and the patterns that emerged continued into 1988, with serious consequences for the region.

The current negotiations between South Africa and Angola must be seen in a historical context as well as within the context of South Africa's overall strategy toward the region. The offensive against Angola, which escalated into fullscale

invasion in the middle of last year, coincided with surrogate offensives elsewhere in the region in which the role of South Africa was more covert. An examination of the pattern of regional destruction since May/June of last year indicates coordination from a central point.

In Mozambique, South African-backed forces began perpetrating bloody massacres in a new wave of terror after further infiltrations in the south and, as 1987 drew to a close, vicious attacks on the main access routes around Maputo made them unsafe for commercial traffic, even in escorted convoys. For Zimbabwe, the most serious new development was in the eastern border area where MNR groups began hit-and-run attacks on 15 June 1987. Before that date there were virtually no such incidents but in the six months that followed at least 180 Zimbabweans were murdered and 235 abducted, many of them known to be or presumed dead. These incidents involve abductions, murders, mutilations, rapes, robbing stores, burning huts, and destroying property. A former MNR representative in Western Europe, Paulo Oliveira, has said that the order to begin these cross-border attacks was given by a South African brigadier.

There have been many incursions into Zambia from the Caprivi Strip area of Namibia and across the western border from Angola, and President Kaunda accused South Africa last October of infiltrating trained men to overthrow his government. Zambia has been subject to attacks across its eastern border in recent months, similar to those in Zimbabwe.

At the end of May last year, when they began this escalation of military activity throughout the region, the SADF held a massive exercise called 'Iron Eagle' near the Botswana border, in which 14 transport aircrafts dropped 500 men and 50 tonnes of equipment. It was the largest South African airborne exercise to date, according to the British publication 'Jane's Defence Weekly', and demonstrated an ability to strike deep into the heart of neighbouring states. 'Iron Eagle' contained the hint of short or long term plans to occupy neighbouring countries if necessary, coinciding as it did with the infiltration of large groups of armed men into southern Mozambique, the offensive in southern Angola, infiltrations across Zimbabwe's eastern border and, to a lesser extent, Zambia's.

Opening a new air force base last October in the northern Transvaal near the Zimbabwean border, the South African Defence Minister, General Malan, again threatened neighbouring countries, accusing them of supporting the ANC. For South Africa, he said, whoever provides good neighbourliness 'which promotes and serves our interests' is acceptable.

Attempts are being made to neutralize Namibia by a different method, through the establishment of structures for future control and, if necessary, destabilization. This involves all

sectors. Much of the economic control already exists, and much of the internal military and police structure has been established. The internal 'government', in which most of the power still rests with the Administrator-General, and current moves toward constitutional adjustment, are meant to take care of the political aspect while reinforcing future control through the civil service structure. And all of this presupposes that Walvis Bay, Namibia's only viable port and a strategic South African military base, remains part of South Africa.

This 'total strategy' also encompasses the internal situation in South Africa through preparations for sanctions-busting and military self-sufficiency, tough repression of democratic political dissent juxtaposed with attempts to choose non-white politicians who can be co-opted into a system of 'power-sharing'. The focal point at which the internal and external aims of 'total strategy' merge relates to the ANC and the 'threat to the security of the state'. Despite internal evidence to the contrary, Pretoria still insists that the ANC is an 'external' 'terrorist' organization which can be controlled and even obliterated by cutting it off from access to South Africa's borders.

The Lusaka Accord with Angola and the Nkomati Accord with Mozambique were solemnly signed four years ago, but for South Africa these accords merely provided a breathing space for increasing technological self-sufficiency and military proficiency. The commonwealth EPG report in 1986 confirmed that, 'South Africa violated both these Accords from the very outset, giving the region further proof that it could not be trusted to honour even solemn Treaty obligations.' The EPG initiative was ended abruptly by South African attacks on three Commonwealth capitals in the region, and their report concluded that the South African overnment was 'not yet prepared to negotiate fundamental change.' 4

Since that time South Africa has proceeded with its plans to neutralize and try to 'bantustanize' its neighbours in the interests of its own political and economic security, becoming more brazen in its actions against the frontline states.

In early 1988, terror tactics carried out by or attributed to South Africa against cities in the region included a blast caused by a vehicle loaded with explosives in Zimbabwe's second city, Bulawayo; a commando attack on a house in the Botswana capital, Gaborone; and a car bomb in the Mozambican capital, Maputo, that maimed the South African writer and lawyer, Albie Sachs.

These followed similar actions in 1987: a heliborne commando raid into Livingstone, Zambia; a bomb in a television set that exploded in the Harare home of a senior ANC exile, killing his Zimbabwean wife; a commando raid in Maputo in which a Mozambican couple were shot dead in front of their 2-year-old child; the fatal poisoning of an ANC member in Maputo; a pre-dawn rocket attack on an ANC house in Harare; the murder of several South African refugees in Swaziland; and a car bomb explosion in a suburban Harare shopping centre. There were fatalities in almost all of these attacks and most of those killed were nationals of the country in which the attacks occurred.

The campaign of political assassinations has been escalated inside and outside South Africa, with Pretoria taking this terror campaign as far afield as Europe. The assassination of Dulcie September, the ANC representative in France; the defused bomb at ANC offices in Belgium; and the exposure of a plot to kidnap ANC officials in Britain are well known examples of this. So is the murder of Sicelo Dlomo in a South African township, a few weeks after the teenager was interviewed on a U.S. television program about his torture in detention by South African police. There are many other cases which have received less publicity, because the victims are less well known internationally or because South Africa's comprehensive censorship laws have suppressed them. Conventional military strikes as far afield as Tanzania no longer seem implausible in an atmosphere where external attack is the response to electoral backlash at home and where growing support for a neo-Nazi party further polarizes opinion. Mid-air refuelling technology has provided South Africa with the capability of mounting long-range air raids at least as far as the equator. The escalation of violence across southern Africa can be seen as a South African 'signal' demonstrating their capacity to destroy or dominate the region.

The spectre of a hostile nuclear neighbour haunts the region, as South Africa improves its capability in that field. Since purchasing its first nuclear research reactor almost 30 years ago, South Africa has constructed its own fuel enrichment plant and now fits the profile of a likely nuclear weapons state.³⁵

CONCLUSION:

Toward Solutions

to the Crisis of Displacement in Southern Africa

Southern Africa is facing an onslaught which has caused the destruction of schools, health and administrative centres; the disruption of main arteries of transportation, industrial and other economic installations; and the displacement of entire village populations. Two countries in particular, Mozambique and Angola, have borne the brunt of this desperate struggle but the international community is slowly becoming aware of their plight. As well as providing emergency food aid, many countries are increasing development assistance. This is admirable, but not enough. There are difficult political and moral issues to be addressed, not least among them the access of the aggressor to military equipment and technology from outside the country, despite the international embargo, while the victims lack protection for the movement of food and other emergency assistance.

The massive displacement of people in Mozambique and Angola, and the destruction of self-sufficiency in the countryside, is not a 'natural' disaster but part of a deliberate strategy to impose South African hegemony over the region. Combating the problem requires a broad range of action, which must be inter-linked if it is to be effective, in terms of emergency assistance, development and security assistance, provision of transport and industrial technology, but all of this gives temporary respite unless serious action is taken toward solving the root cause of the problem.

Emergency Assistance

It is obvious that urgent international action is required, in concert with the countries of the region, to provide food and emergency aid, to improve distribution, to provide agricultural inputs, to support and improve local seed production, and to facilitate a return to normal production.

Supplementary food, including sugar, oil and pulses are required for vulnerable groups who make up as much as 25 percent of the affected population in rural and urban areas. Other forms of emergency assistance include logistical support, health care, water supplies, relief and survival items, agricultural inputs, psychological counselling for traumatized victims, even plastic surgery for badly mutilated victims.

Emergency- related development assistance is needed in the form of boreholes and wells, pumps, transportation, land clearing and housing for resettlement programmes, assistance in rebuilding rural health and education facilities, etc. The sooner people are back on the land, where this is possible, the sooner they will be able to feed and clothe themselves and avoid becoming dependent upon international food aid.

Two development-related points should be taken into account in the provision of food and other emergency assistance. The first is that due to South Africa's selective methods of economic and military sabotage, this assistance is required largely by two countries in the region. Others, although subject to sabotage and economic sanctions, are able to produce food and manufactured goods. Thus, where possible, food and emergency supplies should preferably be purchased in the region. This helps to strengthen regional economies and may also reduce illness among recipients who are accustomed to certain types of food. In some cases, the country in need could produce a surplus if distribution could be arranged; thus reducing transport costs and stimulating an existing local industry.

The second point about the provision of this emergency assistance is that when it comes from outside the region, as some of it must, it is essential to ship it through regional ports and transportation routes, thus injecting the transportation costs into the region rather than further strengthening the South African economy by using its ports. At present, as South Africa batters the region, emergency traffic transits its ports and railways, supplementing its income to continue to cause destruction. This is absurd.

Development Assistance

The international response to regional development assistance has been positive, provided in accordance with the needs of SADCC, which has become in its short history an important force in the development of the region and the reduction of dependence on South Africa. Structured in a decentralized manner where individual states take responsibility for different sectors, it has been effective particularly in the priority areas of transportation and food security, although some

projects have been delayed due to lack of funding and technical assistance. Mozambique's railways are being repaired and upgraded, as is the Tanzania-Zambia railway system and preparations are underway for upgrading the line to Lobito. The combined use of regional routes in 1987 reduced the region's traffic through South Africa to 50 percent of the total for the first time in a decade.³⁶ Communications systems have been redirected so that phone, telex and other links are no longer relayed through South Africa. Zimbabwe, responsible for food security, has created a national early warning unit, and produced the first drought assessment report in 1987.

Under the SADC system, transportation is the responsibility of Mozambique, food security of Zimbabwe, energy of Angola and manpower development of Swaziland. Tanzania is responsible for industrial coordination, Malawi for fisheries and wildlife, Lesotho for tourism and soil and water conservation, Zambia for mining, and Botswana for agricultural research and animal disease control.

Security Assistance

The main area in which international assistance is lacking, often because it is not viewed as development assistance, is in the provision of security. This does not mean personnel or weapons but items such as metal plating to protect vehicles carrying emergency assistance from ambushes or landmines, radios for coordination and summoning of assistance, boots, transport, training. Even planes and trucks carrying the symbol of the Red Cross have been subject to attack in remote areas of Mozambique and Angola. Agencies such as Oxfam have had trucks destroyed while carrying petrol to transport emergency supplies.

The Palme Commission, made up of influential international leaders and policy-makers, concluded last year that 'Upholding the territorial integrity of the Frontline states requires a far greater commitment from outside the African continent. Development and defence are inextricably inter-related and mutually supportive.'³⁷

The influential daily newspaper in Britain, the Financial Times, went a step further in a recent article, concluding that the West should begin arming the Frontline states. The article, entitled 'Constructing a Cage for South Africa', said: 'While it may not be possible to browbeat President Botha into changing his domestic policies, it surely would be possible to deter his incursions into neighboring countries if he knew that they could count on Western military aid.'³⁸

There exists a misconception that there must be political accommodation with surrogates to end the wars in the contiguous

states. But political decisions must be made by those who make policy -- and peace must be negotiated with those who originate war, as seen in Angola's current contacts with South Africa. While the Mozambican government rejected negotiations with the MNR, it has not rejected a political solution in favour of a military one. What it has done is to define who it should talk to at the political level and who it must deal with at the military level. It was therefore necessary to talk to South Africa and that is what Mozambique did - before, during and after Nkomati. That South Africa acted in bad faith and breached the Nkomati Agreement is now well documented. But this does not alter the validity of the identification of the source of the problem. And it shows the determination of the states under attack to resolve their problems.

None of the contiguous states have attacked South Africa, nor do any of them pose such a threat. It is South Africa which has attacked its neighbors and, in recognition that it is Pretoria and not its surrogates which makes both the policies and the wars, those states have talked to South Africa.

Widen and Tighten Sanctions

South Africa escalated its wars against neighbouring states in 1987 and the patterns that emerged into 1988 have serious and long term consequences for the region. The flow of displaced people out of Mozambique doubled; open South African aggression rapidly escalated the warfare in southern Angola; there were car bombs aimed at refugees in Zimbabwe, raids on Botswana, Zambia and Mozambique, assassinations in Swaziland and Lesotho. This action against its neighbours proves by any definition that South Africa is a 'threat to international peace and security', the prerequisite for sanctions in the terminology of the United Nations. Yet this action remains elusive.

Sanctions passed by the US Congress, European Economic Community and Commonwealth countries have so far only given the South Africans a taste of what to expect and time to prepare alternatives, in Africa and elsewhere. The South African finance minister has admitted that even these limited sanctions are biting, and oil is costing well above market price, yet there has been little real sanctions momentum where it matters, particularly in the sphere of military technology.³⁹

As well as imposing new sanctions, it is necessary to widen and tighten existing ones. Much more concrete action can be taken toward the enforcement of the international arms embargo by governments, through closing loopholes in legislation, by trade

unions in refusing to handle arms shipments to South Africa and exposing the sources of origin, action against shipping lines that carry this illicit cargo and against members of the United Nations who persist in arming apartheid. It has been argued that South Africa is almost self-sufficient in military equipment through its state-owned arms manufacturing company, Armscor, but major areas of technological weakness remain. Much of the technology that has contributed to this self-sufficiency has been acquired in breach of the embargo over the past eleven years. South Africa is now an exporter of arms, said to be in the top ten of the world's military purveyors with sales of more than 4 000 million rand.⁴⁰ General Malan boasted to parliament in May that recent usage in southern Angola gave Armscor weaponry a stamp of approval as 'battle-tested'. To gain from this South Africa must have purchasers, and international pressure must be exerted to prevent purchase of arms from South Africa. The oil embargo should be made compulsory. Sceptics will argue that South Africa will continue to obtain oil in breach of an embargo, but the point is that the cost of doing so will increase the overall cost of maintaining apartheid. Many countries continue to trade in Namibian natural resources despite a UN decree forbidding this, and governments involved in this illicit trade should be put under pressure by their parliamentarians, trade unions, etc. as well as by the UN. We should not forget the psychological impact of sanctions, which were particularly effective in the case of Rhodesia, where the population was cut off from international sporting and cultural contacts, passports were not recognized, direct air links were prohibited and so on. This added to the feeling of isolation and frustration. The oil embargo became a psychological, as well as an economic, weapon in the case of Rhodesia because, although the flow of oil did not actually stop, it was reduced enough to cause tightly imposed petrol rationing, adding to the hassle factor of daily life. The international excuse that sanctions will cause too much harm to South Africa's neighbours is rejected by all of them. Yet some sections of the international community make self-serving demands that these countries in the region should be the first to impose sanctions. Some sections of the international community are also quick to take advantage of sanctions for profit by offering their goods and services to replace those withdrawn. This action should be exposed and tough 'third country' sanctions imposed. This may not prevent the practice but it will raise the cost of their actions until such time as it is too high to be of benefit. The harsh reality is that while the international community debates whether or not to impose sanctions against South Africa, South Africa is already imposing sanctions against other states

in the region. 'The abolition of apartheid,' said Botswana's Vice-President, Peter Mmusi, 'could be the greatest single contribution which could be made to the economic development of the region.'

Information Exchange

Sanctions are only one aspect of what must be a multi-faceted approach to resolving this problem. New and imaginative plans are necessary to increase internal pressure on the South African regime by exposing a broader range of the population to alternatives, by creating conditions outside the country for discussions which are not presently possible inside, such as those in Dakar and Frankfurt. As the costs increase and the alternatives begin to be better understood, polarities change. There should be more international understanding of the internal dynamics of conflict within the society and of the pressure from the ultra-right neo-Nazi sector as well as from the liberation movement.

The South African authorities have effectively censored international access to information about the escalating violence within the country, thereby reducing the horror and brutality and, to some extent, the pressure to end apartheid. They cannot directly stifle news of the devastation they have wrought elsewhere in the region, but some parts of the media and certain international organizations ignore South Africa's role, preferring to present it as an internal matter. This attitude prevails among government officials in some countries despite the hard historical evidence of South Africa's involvement. More action must be undertaken in the information sphere to sensitize the people of the international community, their governments and their media as to the true nature of the problem, and to provide accurate information about the ongoing crisis.

The Situation Requires Urgent Action

It is two years since South African forces arrogantly violated the sovereignty of three neighbouring states with which it is not already openly at war. Those attacks, on 19 May 1986, on Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe, destroyed property and killed civilians. The attacks destroyed the peaceful mission undertaken by the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group. It is 10 years since the bloody massacre at Kassinga in Angola in which over 600 Namibian refugees perished. How many more people will die or be displaced while we are deciding what to do, in the next month, the coming year?

In January 1987, UNICEF released a report called 'Children on the Frontline' which said a child was dying every four minutes in Mozambique and Angola, equivalent, said the UNICEF Director-General, to a jumbo jet full of children crashing every day. 360 each day, over 10,000 each month, 130,000 each year. They died from war or war-related causes, from otherwise easily preventable diseases such as diarrhoea and measles, deprived of preventive and curative medical care through the destruction of rural health clinics, and from malnutrition. grave, and getting worse,' says the UNICEF report. 'They are caught up in externally supported civil conflict and economic destabilization which they are too young to understand or counter .

It does no harm to be reminded of those figures, lest we forget that, in the period since the report was published, at least another 200,000 children under the age of five have died, children who would have lived had it not been for war.

Dr. Allan Boesak, who heads the Dutch Reformed Mission Church in South Africa and is also President of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches, was recently asked what churches can do about the situation in South Africa. He replied that they should not cooperate with a violent government because to do so is to be responsible for its continuation. South Africa has an undeclared state of civil war, he said, adding, 'What has gone wrong with a society in which a policeman can shoot a six-year old in the back and get away with it?

If this was happening in Europe, Dr. Boesak said and white children were dying, something would have been done a long, long time ago.

25 Max 1988

NOTES & REFERENCES

The authors are Directors of the Southern African Research and Documentation Centre and authors of several authoritative books or studies on Southern Africa including *Destructive Engagement* cited below.

Destructive Engagement, Phyllis Johnson and David Martin Iedss, SARDC and ZPH, Harare, 1986; to be published in New York in September 1988 in an updated edition. *Beggar Your Neighbours*, Joe Hanlon, James Currey Publishers, London, 1986; *Frontline Southern Africa: Destructive Engagement*, a film by Toni Strasburg, Scope Films, London, 1987.

Figures in this paper concerning numbers of displaced people in the region are from UNHCR and from the government of Mozambique.

'Summary of Mozambican Refugee Accounts of Principally Conflict-Related Experience in Mozambique', report for US State Department by Robert Gersony, Consultant to Bureau for Refugee Programs, April 1988.

Roy Stacey, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, commenting on the above report in a speech to a UN-sponsored conference to consider the Mozambique emergency appeal, Maputo, April 1986.

The best analysis of 'total strategy' in its historical context and its application is the now classic paper by Robert Davies and Dan O'Meara, 'Total Strategy in Southern Africa: An Analysis of South African Regional Policy since 1978', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 2, April 1985. See also 'Destabilization and Dialogue: South Africa's Emergence as a Regional Superpower', John de St. Jorre, No. 26, 17 April 1984; and 'Eight New Realities in Southern Africa', No. 39, 28 February 1985, CSIS Africa notes, Washington DC.

See the references listed here and many other papers, documents, reports, etc.

10.
11.
12.
33

This is confirmed by the former head of Rhodesian intelligence, the late Ken Flower, in personal interviews with the authors; in a television programme, Mozambique: Struggle for Survival by Video Africa, Harare; and in his autobiography, *Serving Secretly*, John Murray, London, 1987. The authors have spent many hours in separate interviews with four of the men who trained, armed, administered and paid the MNR on behalf of Rhodesia and then handed it over to the South African military intelligence in early 1980. Letters in 1972 between Savimbi and Ramires de Oliveira of the Portuguese eastern military command, dealing with supply of arms, ammunition and medicine, and also confirming the use of Unita members in other countries to gather information on MPLA for the Portuguese. These letters, found in security files in Lisbon after the Portuguese coup d'état, were first published in *Jeune Afrique* in Paris and later in *The Times* of London. A padre involved as go-between has also confirmed to the authors the regular contacts between Unita and Portuguese military intelligence, maintained through timber merchants, Duarte and Oliveira. The authors conducted extensive interviews with four of these senior commanders in Lisbon and they spoke openly about Unita's role in support of the war they were fighting. 'South Africa imposes Sanctions Against Neighbours', SARDC, 1986; also unpublished SARDC study 'To Identify and Quantify the Economic and Social Cost of South Africa's Destabilization and Sanctions to Mozambique'; SADCC annual progress reports, conference reports and other publications; *Southern African Economist*, Feb/March 1986. *Children on the Frontline*, a report for UNICEF on the impact of apartheid, destabilization and warfare on children in southern and South Africa, January 1987. This report uses official Mozambique government figures of 100,000 military and civilian war deaths from 1980-85, and a further 100,000 deaths in southern Mozambique 1983-84 as a result of the disruption of food production and the interference or prevention of food relief distribution. The report estimates at least another 100,000 deaths in Angola in this period from war-related famine and its effects.

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
34

In addition, it estimates war-related deaths among infants and children as 380,000 in Mozambique and Angola 1980-85 through disruption of food production and destruction of health facilities. In 1986, these figures are given as 140,000 and a similar figure was anticipated for 1987. That totals 960,000 deaths to the end of 1987, excluding direct military and civilian fatalities in the latter two years. Thus the figure of one million dead in the two countries alone since 1980 is probably conservative. Zimbabwe's Senior Minister for Finance, Economic Planning and Development, Bernard Chidzerio, addressing a conference workshop on Child Survival and Development, Harare, 23 January 1988.

Prakash Ratilal, Coordinator of Mozambique's National Emergency Executive Commission, Maputo, 24 April 1988.

See 12 above.

SARDC study on the economic and social cost of South Africa's destabilization and sanctions against Mozambique, see 11 above.

Among the revealing documents found when MNR bases were overrun at Garagua in eastern Manica province in 1981 and at the Gorongosa headquarters in Sofala in 1985 were diaries and minutes of meetings with South African military intelligence officers. The meetings took place in Mozambique and in South Africa, between 1980 and 1984, and included discussion of resupply and communications, as well as targets.

SA Hansard 25 April 1985. A few months later Maj-Gen Jan Van Loggerenberg, chief of the Operations directorate, said in an interview: "It was not our intention to help to harm innocent people. We were helping Renamo overthrow the Frelimo government. They were attacking military and strategic targets." Questioned further on the justification for supplying Renamo when they were killing innocents, he replied, "Well I suppose the SADF did become tainted by its support for Renamo" (Sunday tribune, 27 October 1985)

SA Hansard, 6 February 1986.

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
35

Roland Hunter, who is still in prison, was an aid to the main MNR contact in South African military intelligence, Colonel Charles van Niekerk (later Brigadier). Those released were Trish and Derek Hannekom.

Paulo Oliveira at a press conference in Maputo, 23 March 1988.

An international investigation agreed on a factual report on the circumstances of the crash but did not determine the cause. A South African inquiry blamed the Soviet flight crew, but the Mozambican inquiry is still open and the government believes that a false beacon lured the plane off course until it crashed into a hillside at Mbuzini on 19 October 1986.

Prime Minister Mario Machungo in a lengthy economic report presented to the Mozambican parliament on 18 December, 1987. SARDC study, 11 above.

'The Emergency Situation in Mozambique: Priority Requirements for the Period 1988-1989', a report prepared by the government and the UNDP, March 1988.

Guardian, London, 22 July 1987.

Noticias, Maputo, 22 September 1987.

Francisco Pelucio Silva, UNICEF, Maputo.

Washington Post, 5 January 1988, in an article by M.L. Knox dated 11 January 1988.

UNHCR sources.

Children on the Frontline.

Angola Government figures.

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
36

Children on the Frontline.

Mission to South Africa, the findings of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group in Southern Africa, Penguin, London, 1986.

For information on South Africa's nuclear capability, see publications and testimony of the World Campaign Against Nuclear and Military Collaboration with South Africa, Oslo, and Destructive Environment, chapter 7, 'South Africa's Nuclear Capability: The Apartheid Bomb' by Abdul S. Minty. Robert Jaster's article in CSIS Africa Notes No. 81 of 22 January 1988 puts into an international context 'Pretoria's Nuclear Diplomacy'.

Herald, Harare, 25 December 1987.

News Bulletin, No. 17, March 1988, published by the Association of West European Parliamentarians for Action Against Apartheid (AWEPA).

Financial Times, London, 29 March 1988.

The South African Finance Minister, Barend du Plessis, has spoken often in recent months about the economic damage being caused by sanctions. In his budget speech on 23 March 1988, he told parliament that 'sanctions and boycotts' are 'a fact of our economic and financial life. And they serve a purpose insofar as they force us to put everything into using our resources to extract from them and maintain the maximum economic advantage.'

South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) comment, 12 May 1988, quoting Time magazine.

Speaking in Harare on 2 March 1988 at the UN-sponsored conference of artists, writers and intellectuals on child survival and development in southern Africa.