

MEMORANDUM FOR DISCUSSION WITH MR GEORGES KIEJMAN,
DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND

- MRS JOELLE BOURGOIS, FRENCH AMBASSADOR
- MRS LAURE KIEJMAN
- MRS DANIELE FRAGER, ADVISER TO THE MINISTER
- MRS VALERIE MICHEL, PRIVATE SECRETARY TO THE MINISTER
- MR JEAN DE LA SABLIERE, CHIEF DIRECTOR AFRICA,
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
- MR ALAIN DU BOISPEAN, DIRECTOR SOUTHERN AFRICA,
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
- MR CHRISTOPHER THIERRY, INTERPRETER
- MR PATRICK DE SAINT EXUPERY, JOURNALIST "LE FIGARO"
- MR JEAN-PIERRE ALTHIER, JOURNALIST AFP
- MME STENLA HUGUES, JOURNALIST RFI
- MR SIMON VERDE, SECURITY OFFICER
- MR PHILLIPPE SAUVENT, FRENCH SECURITY

BY MANGOSUTHU BUTHELEZI, CHIEF MINISTER OF KWAZULU
AND PRESIDENT OF INKATHA FREEDOM PARTY

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Mr Deputy Minister, I welcome you, your Ambassador, your colleagues, and members of your delegation to Ulundi. I really do appreciate your coming to Ulundi to see me. Your time must be under considerable pressure and the extra time you have taken to see me means a lot to me.

I would like to present you with a brief outline of my thinking on current day South Africa and the options that are open to us in our search for a way forward through negotiations.

Firstly let me state that my commitment is to negotiate a new democracy into existence which will establish one South Africa in which there will be a federal system of government resting on universal adult franchise. That democracy shall be entirely race-free with everybody in it equal before the law and the constitution.

I believe that the only way to establish a true democracy in this country is through the kind of consensus politics that could be established in a federal system in which:

- federal states determine which of their powers and freedoms they wish to surrender to a central government. This would leave them with original powers which a central government could not erode
- the central government had only the limited power necessary for national, domestic and foreign policy, and no powers to erode independent tax bases of federal states.

South Africa is a plural society and I am quite determined that we will not follow the East European and Soviet route of attempting to force separate ethnic communities into a unitary state.

I reject racism as an organising principle in society. I believe that my rejection of ethnicity in constitution building is amply demonstrated in my acceptance of the findings of the Buthelezi Commission, and my endorsement in principle of the constitutional recommendations of the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba.

These findings and recommendations were totally non-ethnic and non-racist. Regionalism based on geographic, historic and economic factors will have to be expressed in the constitutional principles we adopt.

Quite clearly we are going to be faced with considerable difficulties in our way forward to a federal future. In the first place, South Africa is at present a unitary state and history is certainly not resplendent with examples of how unitary states convert themselves into federal states. In the second place, we have to deal with the reality that revolutionaries always return home from exile regarding themselves as the government come home to establish a strong centralised political system.

In fact I can think of no precedent in 20th century history in which revolutionaries returned home to establish government by consensus, and to adopt a political system in which other parties are free and able to win an election and to form a government.

The whole of the ANC/SACP approach may sound very plausible when they talk about it, but the underlying facts worry me a great deal. The ANC/SACP Alliance:

- has refused to convert itself into a political party
- has retained Umkhonto we Sizwe as a revolutionary army, ready to go into action if negotiations fail
- have espoused mass action, and have made full use of strike action, boycott action, and stayaway action to mobilise political strength in undemocratic street corner politics
- have employed confrontationalism in the negotiation process, and finally ended up walking out of CODESA and leaving it without a quorum and therefore totally inoperative.

Our difficulties are increased by the concerted attempt the ANC is making to establish itself as the only party or alliance with whom Mr de Klerk needs to negotiate. They want to establish a primary ANC/SACP Alliance role, and a secondary party role in which other parties follow the lead being taken by the Government/ANC/SACP Alliance negotiation pact.

The ANC has attempted to back out of even the limited multi-partyism in CODESA. The Record of Understanding stands as a huge obstacle to the negotiation process. Multi-partyism can only come into its own if the Government and the ANC now desist from having bilateral negotiations in which conclusions are reached, which the Government makes binding on the whole of South Africa, and all the parties in it are promulgating proclamations and enacting laws.

I do not myself draw up impossible demands and I do not issue ultimatums. I simply call for a National Multi-Party Conference of Review at which the Government and the ANC will be quite free to table their Record of Understanding, or any other bilateral agreements they may have concluded. These agreements and the Record of Understanding could then be subjected to multi-party scrutiny and amendments, acceptance or rejection, as the Conference would decide.

There are calls for a return to CODESA. I believe that there can be no simple return to CODESA. CODESA is fatally flawed by that in it which made it possible for the ANC to walk out, and leave it hamstrung. CODESA is also flawed by the narrowness of its representation. There can be no finally negotiated solution for South Africa in which the KwaZulu Government, AZAPO and the PAC, as well as the CP, the AWB, and the Nuwe Volksunie are not party to the decisions being made.

I have withdrawn from all further negotiations with President de Klerk until negotiations are established on a multi-party basis. I repeat that I am not blocking anything, because, as I have said, the National Multi-Party Conference of Review could be used as a clearing house both for suggestions for a way forward and retrieving all the real gains that had been made in CODESA.

I am truly alarmed at Dr Mandela's latest ultimatum that unless a date for an election for an interim government was decided upon when he and Mr de Klerk will be meeting again in the near future, he will withdraw from all further negotiations with the Government.

The IFP is totally committed to democracy, and it is this commitment which motivates us to reject elections in times of violence to produce a Constituent Assembly which will become the country's Constitution Making Body. There can be no free and fair elections given the levels of violence which beset democracy. An election now would only produce very skewed results and give rise to a ruling party in a Constituent Assembly which would write a constitution to best suit its own power.

For me, at heart, democracy is about minimising the power of a government, and maximising the freedom of the people. No revolutionary party has ever done what the ANC says is what it intends doing - establishing a multi-party democracy in which all parties will be free and equal.

I also want to say very clearly that the violence that is now dominating South Africa is multi-faceted and has its roots in a very varied range of factors. There can be no simple solution to the violence. No party could put an end to violence on its own, and indeed there can be no quick fix for violence from the best co-operation which could be expected in a multi-party front against violence. Having said that, the most effective measures against violence will be those the Government, the IFP and the ANC commit themselves to in joint projects against violence.

I have said publicly, and I will repeat again today, that I will put political problems aside to have face-to-face meetings with Dr Mandela, and to share platforms with him to bring about an end to violence. We need very prominent and very public joint-appearances between Dr Mandela and myself, which will have to be followed by concerted IFP/ANC action against violence on the ground. Unfortunately Dr Mandela has difficult constituencies to deal with and has been unable to bring himself, or his organisation, to the fore to co-operate with me and the IFP. We are ready and waiting to act against violence with Dr Mandela.

I wish to respond to some of the things that it was reported were said by the President of the ANC after your meeting yesterday, Mr Minister.

After Dr Mandela's release many leaders of the ANC stated that they did not want their leader to meet with me. Although we were old friends and former colleagues in the ANC Youth League, and had corresponded for the duration of his incarceration, it took about a year before we could meet. The ANC opposed our meeting despite the fact that Dr Mandela wanted to see me shortly after his release from jail, and had phoned me to ask for such a meeting.

Although he had expressed a wish to me to visit me in my home, our first meeting could only take place in the presence of members of the Executive of our two organisations. This was on the 29th of January, 1991.

In March, 1991, there was a very serious eruption of violence in the Greater Pietermaritzburg area. It was Dr Mandela who had phoned me to ask me whether we could go together to Pietermaritzburg to address Joint Peace Rallies of our members, in an effort to end the violence. I agreed to go with him. Two days before we were due to go to Pietermaritzburg, I received information to the effect that Dr Mandela was no longer prepared to go with me to Pietermaritzburg. I phoned him to verify this. He admitted that he had been approached by Mr Harry Gwala, with a busload of members of the ANC from Pietermaritzburg, who came all the way to Johannesburg to object to his going with me to Pietermaritzburg to address a Joint Peace Rally. So that Joint Peace Rally did not take place.

When the President of the ANC visited Transkei after this, some of the Chiefs asked him why he had up to then not met with me. His reply was that he could not meet me as some of his colleagues in the ANC objected so much that they almost "throttled" him.

In May this year I addressed a big IFP Rally at the very spot where we should have had the Rally in 1990, and I made an appeal during the course of my address, that it was time for the President of the ANC and I to address Joint Peace Rallies in an effort to diffuse the violence. Spokespersons of the ANC scoffed at the suggestion and they accused me of not being sincere.

When the ANC President decided to take the issue of violence to OAU in Dakar in July this year, it resulted in the OAU taking the issue before the UN Secretary-General on the 15th and 16th of July this year.

In his address to the United Nations Security Council, the President of the ANC described the IFP as "a surrogate of the South African Government, with which he cannot make agreements."

The IFP regarded this as an infringement of the provisions of the Peace Accord. The IFP then asked for arbitration between us in this matter. Dr Kenneth Kaunda, the former President of Zambia and Judge of the Supreme Court, Mr Justice Kotze, presided at the Hearing.

Dr Kaunda then sent word to me that I should come up to Johannesburg as he wished to see me. I did so. Dr Kaunda then told me that he and the Judge agreed that if they were to make the arbitration between the IFP and the ANC on Dr Mandela's 'surrogacy' allegation, there would be no reconciliation. He then told me that if I agreed and if Dr Mandela agreed, he, Dr Kaunda, would rather abandon arbitration and instead mediate between us. I agreed to Dr Kaunda's mediation. Dr Kaunda then told me that he was going to approach Dr Mandela in the same way, and would get in touch with me after his meeting with Dr Mandela, to convey to me his reaction to the suggestion that we should talk.

Dr Kaunda came to Ulundi to see me on the 23rd of October, to tell me that the President of the ANC had agreed to talk to me in an effort to diffuse the violence. Dr Kaunda then said that he was leaving the whole process in the hands of the Chairman of the National Peace Committee, Mr John Hall, so that he could prepare an agenda for a meeting between myself and Dr Mandela.

Mr John Hall came to see me on the 29th of October. He told me that he had talked with Dr Mandela on the 28th of October, and that he had agreed to have a meeting with me and that he would work on an agenda for such a meeting. But, just the following day, the President of the ANC addressing a Patriotic Front Conference in Port Elizabeth, stated that he was not prepared to have a one-on-one meeting with me. He went on to say that previous meetings with me had not brought about any Peace, and that he could only see me in a meeting attended by all the signatories of the Peace Accord.

In view of this background you will understand, Mr Minister, when I say that even the conditional agreement to see me which Dr Mandela spelled out yesterday, is of no meaning to me as he chops and changes all the time. And, by his own admission, he stated that when he wished to meet with me after his release, his own colleagues in the ANC Executive almost "throttled" him.

Neither as Chief Minister of KwaZulu, nor as President of the IFP, have I ever forbidden any free political activity in KwaZulu. KwaZulu unlike the so-called 'independent' states is part of South Africa. It is a lie to state that there is no free political activity in KwaZulu. Our members and political leaders in the IFP have been targetted in KwaZulu and killed in their homes or whilst waiting to board taxis, busses and trains, to go to work. There is a lot of political intolerance in the whole of South Africa.

I have not armed any member of the IFP with guns or any dangerous weapons. The issue of the so-called traditional weapons is a red-herring which is used for propaganda purposes to give the impression that the people that are killed in the endemic violence are killed with the so-called 'traditional weapons' when statistics - not only of the South African Police, but also of the South African Institute of Race Relations - prove beyond any shadow of doubt, that the people who are dying in the violence die from the fire-power of the AK-47 rifles and other firearms.

It is the ANC who has a military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe, whose cadres have been arrested on many occasions after our members have been killed. They have caches of arms stashed away all over the country and they refuse to show them to the Police. Dr Mandela has told President de Klerk twice that he is not prepared to disband this private army whose Founder and Commander-in-Chief is Dr Mandela himself.

When the State President decided to ban the carrying of cultural weapons in areas that were declared 'unrest areas', we agreed to co-operate with him. But we are not prepared to agree to a ban of the cultural accoutrements of the Zulu Nation in all circumstances.

The residents of Hostels are opposed to fences being put around hostels, and it is their democratic right to refuse to change their Hostels into Concentration Camps, with these imposed fences.

South African political parties and leaders are of course playing out their roles in the full glare of national and international publicity. I welcome the violence monitoring teams that are in South Africa, but I am totally opposed to the suggestion of bringing the United Nations Peace Keeping Force into the country. That would retard rather than develop the political solutions, which alone could bring about the end to violence. We face very much more of a political problem than we face a military problem.

The courts of the land really are free, and the Goldstone Commission and the Peace Accord structures offer us the most effective and the most promising way forward in uncovering the causes of violence, and mobilising the forces against violence. I have now repeatedly stated that the National Multi-Party Conference of Review that I am calling for, should take the whole peace process and the negotiation process under review.

The two processes are intertwined and interrelated, and in part the artificial separation of the two in CODESA contributed to CODESA's failure.

These in very broad terms are my positions on negotiations, the peace process, and the way forward. Almost everything I said could be turned into a long debate, but I do hope that I have said enough to give you insights into where I stand on some crucial issues.

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