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The Worst of 1993 - South Africa

The general mood in South Africa regarding developments during 1992 is best described by despondency. The hopeful start of Codesa was abruptly broken off, when the regime failed to effectively put a stop to the increased political violence in the townships. This became clearly apparent when the massacre at Boipatong took place and the ANC decided to suspend its talks with the government. The Goldstone Commission's findings of military involvement in 'dirty tricks' operations did lead to changes at the top of the security forces, but the political violence continued, especially in Natal. At the end of the year this situation worsened when a new element was added to the spectrum of violence in the country with attacks aimed specifically at whites. This new element of terrorism seemed to aggravate the peace process in that white organisations threatened retaliation against blacks. Yet at the beginning of 1993 hopes were expressed that this year might see positive results of constitutional negotiations, eventually culminating in general elections.

White South Africa reacted with indignation, shock and apprehension, when in December 1992 a golfclub in King William's Town was attacked which resulted in the death of four whites. The responsibility for this act of terrorism was claimed by the military wing of the Pan-Africanist Congress, APLA (Azania People's Liberation Army). According to APLA this signified the beginning of the Year of the Great Storm. This unexpected new turn of events, which might have uncontrollable consequences for the peace process, was widely condemned as an act of terrorism, by i.a. the government, the ANC and the Council of Churches (SACC), and caused concern abroad. One of APLA's commanders, Sabelo Phama, warned that these attacks would be intensified, resulting in the killing of white individuals or groups. He claimed such actions to be justified as long as these whites continued to support the government politically, economically and militarily. The PAC, which had been negotiating in 1992 with the government on a peaceful political settlement, did not officially react; it did not explicitly condemn the APLA attack, whereas

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some leaders expressed their endorsement, which obviously did cause concern among the more moderate PAC wing, witness the resignation of some prominent members. The ANC, while condemning the indiscriminate killing of whites, agreed with the PAC and the major black daily newspaper *Sowetan*, that the reaction by the government, the police and the media (white commercial newspapers; the state radio and television) was a typical example of white prejudice and racism. Now that the victims were white South Africans, such was their

reaction, the government, police and white media immediately condemned this brutal attack as a dastardly act, a massacre, or plain terrorism, while the police immediately started a manhunt and offered a substantial reward for information. The double standard becomes apparent when it is noted that during that same weekend twenty black people were killed in brutal attacks. Thousands of blacks have been victims of massacres and terrorism since 1990, without the police offering rewards or immediately starting manhunts. The Conservative Party threatened retribution raids into Lesotho, from where the APLA guerrillas are supposed to be operating. Other extreme right-wing groups, like the *Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging* (AWB) and the *Wit Wolwe* (White Wolves) which claim to have infiltrated the South African army and police, reacted by threatening to kill blacks just as indiscriminately. While it is true that the effective competence of these extreme right-wing white organisations should not be overestimated, these threatened actions could very well cause disruption or at least delay of the delicate negotiation processes.

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AWEPA becomes AWEPA

AWEPA, the Association of West European Parliamentarians for Action against Apartheid, has broadened its scope in Europe and its focus in Africa. A new name is therefore being adopted, the **Association of European Parliamentarians for (Southern) Africa**. For historical reasons, the acronym remains basically the same: **AWEPA**.

AWEPA is still devoted to the total eradication of apartheid. With parliamentarians now from West and Eastern Europe, AWEPA concentrates on human rights, democratisation and (human) development within the present Southern African Development Community and South Africa, its future member. The following issues are of paramount importance for parliamentary attention and action:

- dialogue for democratisation and human rights;

- support to young multi-party democracies, e.g. Namibia, Mozambique, Zambia;
- the sending of electoral observer teams and voter education trainers, e.g. South Africa, Mozambique;
- the promotion of socio-economic recovery in all of Southern Africa;
- improving development cooperation relations between Europe and Southern Africa;
- the promotion of research and policy debate with regard to post-apartheid regional cooperation;
- the stimulation of debate and research on the topic of South Africa and the Lomé Convention;
- the promotion of human resource development;
- the solution of the Southern African refugee problem before the year 2000;
- a special focus on the children of apartheid, Southern Africa's future potential.

transition to democracy and legitimacy in South Africa, what has been negotiated is an agreement on joint administration of the Walvis Bay enclave, Namibia's only deep-water port.

Walvis Bay and the disputed offshore islands now have a Joint Administration Authority (JAA) under two Chief Executive Officers, Nangolo Mbumba (Namibia) and Carl von Hirschberg (South Africa). The ten functions of the JAA have been listed as follows: management of the commercial harbour and freight and marine services; management of the fishing harbour and fish inspection; water supply from the Kuiseb delta; maintenance of roads and bridges; customs and excise; industrial development; tourism; health services; nature conservation; and aliens control. The Walvis Bay town clerk announced on 21 December 1992 that these new JAA functions would be implemented after taking into consideration availability of funds.



President Sam Nujoma and Prime Minister Hage Geingob during the election rally in Namibia.

The Namibian government has shown great patience in the ongoing dispute over Walvis

Bay, refusing to allow the matter to create tension and confrontation between the two countries, even though, according to the Namibian Foreign Ministry, the dispute does stand in the way of stronger and friendlier ties.

Democratisation for Development

The AWEPA Plan of Action for 1993

Since its establishment AWEPA had a three-pronged focus on European policy toward Southern Africa. These focal points in the 1980s were: the abolition of apartheid in South Africa; the independence of Namibia; and support to the regional development efforts of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). In the early 1990s there came a shift of emphasis due to a number of factors: opposition groups were legalised in South Africa and negotiations to end apartheid began; Namibia gained its independence; and SADCC developed into SADC, the Southern African Development Community. These developments have important implications for European policies and for the work of AWEPA.

AWEPA campaigned successfully in the 1980s for a number of issues given high priority by its Southern African partners, for example: sanctions against South Africa; political and transitional support for the emergence of independent Namibia; and logistical security support for development projects in destabilised areas of the SADCC region. AWEPA has also campaigned for more attention and support to the needs of children and refugees in Southern Africa, in particular as victims of South African destabilisation and proxy warfare in Angola and Mozambique. A premature end to the sanctions debate was effectively brought about by the demise of certain components of the legal apartheid system and the independence of Namibia. However, the bitter legacy of apartheid is such that for decades it will be necessary to promote socio-economic recovery throughout the region.

The activities of AWEPA for 1993 reflect the changes in both Southern Africa and Europe, while maintaining the continuity of political action in the European Parliament, in the AWEPA national sections and in the activities directed toward the EC Presidency and European governments. The central focus of attention during 1993 is support for democratisation processes and human rights in Southern Africa. This is seen on all sides as the prerequisite for sustainable and people-oriented regional development. The countries in the region the most in need of support at this time are Mozambique and South Africa, struggling toward elections, and Angola suffering from the post-election resumption of civil war. Young democratic regimes in Namibia and Zambia are also examples of countries weakened by drought, but in need of support to strengthen democratic structures. The AWEPA international secretariat provides background information, briefings and documentation to parliamentarians of all political colours in support of their initiatives, questions, reporting, etc. on Southern African development and cooperation issues. AWEPA also organises conferences, seminars and workshops on issues of mutual interest and concern. For 1993, the following five major activities are planned:

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Copenhagen, Denmark, 12-13 March 1993
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Maputo, Mozambique, 19-21 April 1993
3. International Conference
Children of Apartheid: International Action for Southern Africa's Youth
Stockholm, Sweden, 4-5 June 1993

4. Central and Eastern Europe Conference
Trilateral Cooperation - East-West-South
Warsaw, Poland, September 1993.
5. EC Presidency Conference
Improving Development Cooperation: Mutual Advantages for Southern Africa and Europe
Brussels, Belgium, October 1993

Each of these conferences acts as a focal point for action around specific policy theme areas and campaigns, for which special background documentation is developed and distributed among key decision-makers. The publication of conference reports and other materials forms part of the continual flow and exchange of information, especially but not exclusively for parliamentarians, for which AWEPA is responsible in its parliamentary and NGO networks in Europe and Southern Africa. AWEPA also plays a major role in Europe in the organisation of international, multi-party parliamentary fact-finding missions and electoral observer delegations to Southern Africa. Past experience in Namibia and Angola will be built on in 1993, in the organisation of electoral observer missions to Mozambique and South Africa. In addition, with regard to the thematic areas of children and refugees, fact-finding missions will be organised to Angola, Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Reports of these missions are given during international conferences and seminars. Reciprocally, AWEPA organises small delegations of leading Southern Africans to consult with European governments on development cooperation and to address larger audiences on the important changes taking place in their region. As part of its programme for the promotion of socio-economic recovery, AWEPA provides technical assistance, research and documentation, and training seminars for Southern Africans involved in development

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Year of Promise

At the end of 1992 agreement seems to have been reached between the National Party and the ANC on two principles:

- both sides agree that a continued breakdown of the negotiations would be disastrous for the economy, which is steadily declining anyway;
- both sides agree that they have a 'shared responsibility' for the election of a government of national unity, which may have to last for as much as ten years. In early 1993 the formation of a Transitional Executive Council is expected, which is likely to be announced at a reconvened CODESA meeting in February. This TEC is to control the government until the new constitution is enacted.

In April 1993 a newly constituted Board for the SABC, until now state-controlled, must then administer new ground rules for media reporting on elections, which are to be held before the end of 1993 or latest beginning 1994. General elections can not be delayed beyond that period because then chances are that eventually whites-only elections will have to be held under the old constitution, and De Klerk is unlikely to take that risk. In order to organise these elections, political progress must rather rapidly lead to tangible results this year if the planned timetable is at all to be kept. If all goes well, the elections will result in a constitutional assembly and interim parliament, which in turn will lead to an interim government of national unity.

In the meantime both NP and ANC will have to reckon with dissatisfaction of members, who oppose such far-reaching compromises to the opposite side - which again might strengthen the chances of violent reactions in both camps. Dissatisfaction among the NP would strengthen the right-wing military opposition to De Klerk's reforms. On the other hand, the President has weakened this opposition in his purge of the military top in December 1992, after the Goldstone Commission found proof of military complicity in dirty tricks operations aimed at discrediting the ANC. Six generals were sacked and 17 other high-ranking officers, but the chief of military intelligence, General Christoffel van der Westhuizen (who featured prominently in previous scandals) remained in office, although he is widely regarded as 'holding the smoking gun' (SouthScan 8-1-1993). Despite the purge, it seems that the military apparatus continues with its covert WHAM (Winning Hearts and Minds) activities against those they consider opponents of the State. This WHAM project is still protected by South African legislation, but must for all practical purposes be regarded as subversive.

The impending power sharing of NP and ANC leaves Inkatha's Chief Gatsha Buthelezi (in view of his dwindling support base erroneously regarded as the third most important political leader of the country) even further isolated from the national peace process, as he can now only form an alliance with conservative homeland leaders and extreme right-wing white parties. Buthelezi's

reliance on international support has been decisively undermined. With the new administration in the USA, he can no longer count on a sympathetic hearing in Washington.

The start of APLA's terrorist campaign in the last month of 1992, together with the continued violence in the townships, might be seen as boding ill for constitutional progress in

the year 1993. Yet, it seems that despite last year's misfortune, political developments will speed up again in 1993. Or, as Archbishop Desmond Tutu aptly put it in his Christmas sermon:

'May the best of 1992 be the worst of 1993!'

(text written before
20 January 1993)

The Mozambique Peace Process

Cease-fire holds, but election delay likely

After a few initial violations, Mozambique's 15 October cease-fire is holding. Most main roads are open and there is regular bus service between Maputo and Beira for the first time in a decade.

The United Nations Security Council seems determined to avoid the fiasco caused in Angola by trying to monitor the cease-fire and elections on the cheap. On 16 December it approved a \$331 million budget and a force of more than 8000 for Mozambique - 15 times the number of people it put into Angola. Aldo Ajello has been named interim special representative of the UN Secretary General, with responsibility not only for monitoring the cease-fire and election, but also for humanitarian assistance.

Ajello spent nearly a month in New York in his eventually successful effort to gain a strong UN presence. That period was matched by political paralysis on the ground in Mozambique. Implementation of the peace agreement has now fallen more than two months behind the very tight schedule imposed by the accord. That timetable is now widely seen as unrealistic and will need to be extended. For example, Renamo and government military forces were to have been in assembly points by 14 November 1992 and demobilisation was to have been 40% complete by 12 January 1993; by early January Renamo had not yet presented its list of assembly points. 'In light of the recent experience in Angola, I believe it to be of critical importance that the elections should not take place until all the military aspects of the agreement have been fully implemented,' UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali told the Security Council on 3 December. Thus it is generally forecast that the election will be postponed from October 1993. Because the rains begin in November, the earliest probable date is April 1994. Some political parties have already called for delays of one to two years.

The UN operation has only been agreed through 31 October 1993, although the Security Council requested a report by 31 March on the 'precise timing' of elections, which suggests a postponement is desirable. However, the high cost of the UN operation makes an extension beyond April 1994 unlikely.

January will see a major three-way diplomatic

tussle as Ajello, the Mozambique government and Renamo try to establish their relative power. So far, Renamo has refused to allow government access to areas it controls. The government still has not provided housing to Renamo which it promised in March 1992, and Renamo president Afonso Dhlakama has refused to go to Maputo without housing for his staff. Without the presence of Dhlakama, other Renamo officials cannot take decisions, blocking implementation of the accords. Ajello has tried to act unilaterally, but government officials have blocked this. (In the course of January the housing issue has been brought to a solution).

Meanwhile, as in Angola, ordinary people have moved faster than politicians and military men. Tens of thousands of refugees and displaced people are already returning home so they can plant before the rains. Commerce and movement have been resumed in wide areas of Mozambique.

Peace at last

Mozambique president Joaquim Chissano and Renamo president Afonso Dhlakama signed a general peace agreement in Rome on 4 October 1992. It came into force on the cease-fire day, 15 October 1992 (known as 'E-day'). The accord includes seven protocols and four related documents; it sets a very precise timetable (see our last issue).

There is to be a new joint army of 24,000, an air force of 4000, and a navy of 2000. Each side will contribute half of each force. All other armed people are to be demobilised within 180 days.

A Supervisory and Monitoring Commission (CSC) has overall responsibility for the entire process. Under it are a Cease-Fire Commission (CCF), a Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force (CCFADM), and a Reintegration Commission (CORE). The CCF will oversee the cease-fire and demobilisation, CORE oversees the reintegration of those who are demobilised, and CCFADM will control the creation of the new army forces. Membership of these commissions is set out in appendix III. Also there is to be a joint Renamo-government commission on civil administration, and government appointed commissions on elections, police, and internal security. In many respects, the accord mirrors the Bicesse accord in Angola. On three key issues, however, there are significant differences. The Rome accord specifies that elections must be held within one year of the signing, that is by 4 October 1993, compared to 18 months in

Angola. Although election rules will be similar to those in Angola, several differences will make it more difficult for minor parties to gain parliamentary seats in Mozambique. The Rome accord gives Renamo rather than the government effective administrative control of Renamo controlled areas. And it gives a much larger role to the United Nations.

Huge UN operation

After a month of intense negotiation and lobbying, the UN Security Council on 16 December established the United Nations Operation in Mozambique, which has the acronym ONUMOZ (although this corresponds to neither English nor Portuguese). It will be much larger with a much broader brief than UNAVEM II, the UN operation in Angola. UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali stressed that ONUMOZ will have four interlinked components:

- **Political:** to facilitate implementation of the agreement and chair the CSC.
- **Military:** to 'monitor and verify' the cease-fire, concentration of forces, and demobilisation; 'to authorize security arrangements for vital infrastructures'; and 'to provide security for United Nations and other international activities'.
- **Electoral:** 'to provide technical assistance and monitor the entire electoral process'.
- **Humanitarian:** 'to coordinate and monitor all humanitarian assistance operations'.

A budget of \$331 million is proposed and more than 8000 people will be involved. Dr. Boutros-Ghali argued that 'there seems no alternative' but for ONUMOZ to take over security of the Beira and other corridors, and he proposes five self-sufficient infantry battalions of 850 people each to do this. In addition there will be an engineer battalion supported by private companies for mine clearing and road repair. ONUMOZ will have its own air force of 24 planes, a communications unit, three logistic companies to provide supplies, and a military medical unit. ONUMOZ's verification function would be carried out by 354 military observers in the 49 assembly points, as well as 'at airports, ports and other critical areas, including Renamo headquarters.'

A civilian technical unit will implement the demobilisation programme and distribute food and medicines to assembly points. ONUMOZ plans an electoral division with 148 international election officers and 1200 observers for the election itself (compared to 400 in Angola). The UN intends 'to play the main coordinating role for the provision of technical assistance to the whole electoral process.' It also intends to verify that political parties enjoy freedom of organisation and access to the media, and will even monitor the contents to news broadcasts to check on fairness.

Finally, there is to be a new UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UNOHAC) which replaces, and is at a higher level than, the former office of the UN Special Coordinator for Emergency Relief Operations

(UNSCERO). It is headed by Bent Bernader who will be deputy to Ajello.

In order to prevent local conflicts, the UN stresses the need to give similar assistance to everyone: demobbed soldiers, returned refugees and local people in need.

Draft election law

A draft election law is to be circulated to political parties early in 1993. This could be followed by a meeting of parties and then a special session of parliament, perhaps in February, to pass the law. That session will also approve the setting up of an election commission, and approve laws on access to media, financial assistance to parties, and foreign election observers.

The peace accord specifies an election similar in most respects to the one in Angola. There will be separate presidential and parliamentary votes conducted at the same time. The president must receive more than half the votes and if no one does there is to be a run-off election within three weeks. Parliament is to be elected by proportional representation. The parliamentary vote will be different from Angola in two ways. First, there is to be a national threshold, and parties must receive between 5% and 20% of the national vote (to be determined in the election law, almost surely at the lower end to allow smaller parties some access). Second, party lists will be on a provincial rather than a national basis.

Five parties registered

By the end of 1992, 21 parties had announced their existence, but only five had completed registration formalities: Frelimo, Unamo, PPPM, PCN, and Fumo. Under the peace accord, Renamo must register as a party, but is allowed to operate before registration. Two factors will determine if parties other than Frelimo and Renamo gain seats in parliament. First will be the level of the national threshold (at least 5%) which would have excluded all but Unita and MPLA in Angola. This will force the small Mozambican parties into coalitions. If a 'third force' is to emerge, it must involve most of the main new parties. Second, the election will be won or lost in Nampula and Zambezia provinces, which have 40% of the country's population. Several of the new parties are concentrating their efforts there and largely ignoring the capital, Maputo. (The election arithmetic means that a party gaining more than 13% of the vote in Zambezia and Nampula would pass a national 5% threshold, and gain seats in parliament.)

Mozambique is not Angola

The collapse of the Angola peace process shocked everyone involved with the Mozambique peace. Repeatedly in public and in private officials say they want to learn the lessons of Angola.


Most importantly, the UN has accepted the lesson that the process cannot be done cheaply. Ajello commented that in Angola 'we tried to spend less, then we spent more and

still lost everything.' The UN also accepts that military changes must be completed before the election.

The government is also making more of an effort to accommodate Renamo and other opposition forces. 'We must do everything to ensure that what happened in Angola does not happen here,' President Joaquim Chissano told a rally in Pemba on 28 November. In particular, this means that all demobilised soldiers, whether from the government or Renamo, must be welcomed home and helped to reestablish themselves.

So far, the government press seems open to articles about Renamo and other opposition parties.

(this report was done early January)



Publications on Mozambique

Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin

During the transition process from cease-fire to the taking office of the new government, after the multi-party elections, AWEPA will publish the Mozambique peace process bulletin. It will contain a selection of articles from the international press, occasional documents, relevant resolutions, situation reports and reports of fact finding missions.

It aims to keep officials of governments and NGOs, MPs, journalists, researchers, etc. informed on developments in Mozambique. The article on Mozambique in this AWEPA bulletin is excerpted from the first issue of the Peace Process Bulletin.

Bilingual edition of the Peace Agreement

The full text of the Mozambique Peace Agreement of Rome, 4 October 1992, has been published in a bilingual Portuguese - English edition. It also has additional documents on the composition of the commissions established under the Peace Agreement.

Bilingual edition of the Mozambique Constitution of 1990

These publications are available from our office.

Democracy Strengthened in Namibia

True democracy is more than just holding elections, multi-party or not. The Namibian elections from 30 November to 3 December 1992, as the first elections organised and run by Namibia since independence on 21 March 1990, were a true test of how solid the foundations of democracy are. The recent post-election fighting in Angola has shown that elections in and of themselves are no guarantee that the process of democratisation has been furthered. The success of Namibia's elections for local and regional government helped to consolidate democracy, to complete the national legislature, and to increase optimism for the future of the young nation.

At the regional level, candidates were elected to the 13 Regional Councils, from which two representatives each will sit in the second chamber of Namibia's legislature, the National Council. At the local level, representatives were chosen to run the local authorities. Regional Councils, although accountable to the central government, promote the particular socio-economic development needs of their region and supervise the operation of local government administration.

The Namibian election results are shown in the table below. Voter turnout was approximately 82%. SWAPO followed its triumph in the independence elections with another resounding victory at the regional and local level. SWAPO won outright victories in 10 of the 13 new regions (see map), losing 3 to DTA. In the local elections, SWAPO won outright majorities in 32 local authorities, DTA in 9 and UDF in 2. In seven local authorities SWAPO will have three councillors, while DTA and UDF share the remaining four.

The following are excerpts from the post-election address by Prime Minister Hage Geingob to the Namibian National Assembly on 7 December 1992:



'With the completion of the recently held elections, we have come full circle in entrenching democracy in our country. The people of Namibia deserve to be congratulated for the mature way in which they behaved during the elections and during the days leading up to the elections. Their enthusiasm is most encouraging. Our political parties too deserve to be congratulated for conducting active and peaceful campaigns...

'First of all, I congratulate SWAPO on its landslide victory. This victory has also placed on the ruling party at three levels, increased responsibility. But the party also has increased opportunities to deliver goods at macro as well as micro levels. The people, in giving their mandate to SWAPO, have shown in no uncertain terms that they look up to it. Now it is SWAPO's turn to ensure that their faith and trust is justified. 'I also congratulate DTA for fighting every seat and thus giving people a choice. Where DTA won, it won decisively, and where it lost, it lost decisively. In its victory and in its defeat, it truly became the official opposition, to give fight to the ruling party on every issue. As the official opposition, DTA also has the heavy responsibility of being the alternative government. This requires that DTA must provide the people of Namibia with alternatives to government policy. I hope DTA will acquit itself in this role.

'I also congratulate the newly-elected leaders, but I must remind them of their responsibility too... As a Namibian patriot

said in 1977, somewhere in the bush during the height of the liberation struggle: 'Leadership is not a necklace that you wear around your neck. Leadership connotes responsibility.' This patriot was none other than our distinguished Deputy Speaker, Comrade Kameeta. Our new leaders would do well to remember his wise words. We look forward to welcoming the leaders of the National Council, and in doing so, the completion of our bi-cameral parliament.'

Namibia's new regional structures are designed 'to decentralise government and to bring government to the people', according to Prof. Gerhard Tötemeyer, Director of Elections. The newly-elected leaders are poised to increase the direct involvement of the people in administration, decision-making and economic development. The successful elections thus bode well for both democracy and development in Namibia.

Joint Administration of Walvis Bay

The South African liberation movements agree with the United Nations (UN Security Council Resolution 432) and the Namibian Constitution (Article 1) that Walvis Bay is part of Namibia. The present South African regime isn't ready to go that far yet, despite its broad international campaign to project itself as being worthy of acceptance in the international community. In this period of

**Namibian Election Results
Regional Constituencies**

Region	SWAPO	DTA	UDF
Kunene	3	1	2
Omusati	9	-	-
Oshana	9	-	-
Ohangwena	10	-	-
Oshikoto	9	-	-
Okavango	6	-	-
Caprivi	2	4	-
Erongo	4	1	1
Otjozondjupa	4	2	-
Omaheke	1	5	-
Khomas	6	3	-
Hardap	2	4	-
Karas	5	-	-
	70	20	3

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Improving Development Cooperation: Mutual Advantages for Southern Africa and Europe
Brussels, Belgium, October 1993

Each of these conferences acts as a focal point for action around specific policy theme areas and campaigns, for which special background documentation is developed and distributed among key decision-makers. The publication of conference reports and other materials forms part of the continual flow and exchange of information, especially but not exclusively for parliamentarians, for which AWEPA is responsible in its parliamentary and NGO networks in Europe and Southern Africa. AWEPA also plays a major role in Europe in the organisation of international, multi-party parliamentary fact-finding missions and electoral observer delegations to Southern Africa. Past experience in Namibia and Angola will be built on in 1993, in the organisation of electoral observer missions to Mozambique and South Africa. In addition, with regard to the thematic areas of children and refugees, fact-finding missions will be organised to Angola, Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Reports of these missions are given during international conferences and seminars. Reciprocally, AWEPA organises small delegations of leading Southern Africans to consult with European governments on development cooperation and to address larger audiences on the important changes taking place in their region. As part of its programme for the promotion of socio-economic recovery, AWEPA provides technical assistance, research and documentation, and training seminars for Southern Africans involved in development

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cooperation structures with Europe. This helps to build up local institutional capacity to identify and remove bottlenecks and so make the most out of available development assistance possibilities. AWEPA also works to promote external investment and trade, in support of Southern African efforts and in cooperation with SADC and the Southern African Regional Business Council and national SADC Business Councils.

As part of the programme to strengthen young democracies in Southern Africa, AWEPA is involved in organising a two-week training seminar on the role of parliament in a multi-party democracy for some 30 Southern African officials, to be held in Copenhagen in May 1993. This programme is in response to requests by Southern African parliamentarians for a more structured way to exchange

detailed and technical information and experience from among the expertise available within the 1500-strong AWEPA membership. With regard to countries in transition, such as Namibia, Mozambique and South Africa, additional information on parliamentary processes is supplied on request from the region.

AWEPA is also involved in the dialogue for democratisation and human rights in Southern Africa. Following the organisation of a regional conference on Reconciliation in Southern Africa (1991) and national conferences on Reconciliation and Democratisation (1992) in both Namibia and Mozambique, AWEPA is supporting local efforts to strengthen respect for human rights, democratic principles and political tolerance, in particular in cooperation with e.g. church groups and women's

organisations. In support of the democratisation processes in Mozambique and South Africa, AWEPA will be directly involved in electoral education, multi-party workshops, training of independent peace accord and electoral monitors, organisation of European parliamentary observer delegations, and post-election support to improve the new parliament's institutional capacity.

The AWEPA Plan of Action for 1993 will be implemented in association with the African-European Institute, with various United Nations agencies, such as the Special Committee against Apartheid, UNHCR and UNICEF, with the AWEPA European Parliament and national sections, and with the cooperation of parliaments, governments, NGOs and other democratic forces in Southern Africa.

Southern Africa: a framework and strategy building the community

Excerpt from the annotated theme document for the 1993 SADC Annual Consultative Conference

At the Summit meeting in Windhoek last August, all the member States signed the Treaty and adopted a Declaration establishing the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The treaty provides a framework and the basic principles for the economic integration process in the light of the realities of Southern Africa. It is hoped and expected that a democratic South Africa in her own interest and that of the region will join the new Community.

The treaty provides that the actual substance of the integration process will be realised through protocols and agreements entered into by SADC member States. Chief among these arrangements, would be to facilitate the involvement of the people of the region and non-governmental organisations, particularly the business community in the integration process.

Context

The context of the integration process was, in fact, established by the theme document for the 1992 Consultative Conference, which made the case for integration based on the following grounds:

The poor performance of the economies of most member States, the continued dependence on the export of a few raw materials and the on-going global changes in the structure of the world economy, make it imperative that SADC member States urgently transform and restructure their economies. The aim would be to make them more productive, diversified and regionally and

globally competitive in the face of fast and far reaching economic and political changes in the world, especially the technological developments.

The small size of their economies and the low incomes, which make it difficult for them individually to attract and sustain the necessary investment for development and growth and economic restructuring at higher levels of efficiency and productivity.

The inadequate socio-economic infrastructure and the high per capita cost of providing this infrastructure on account of the small size of these economies.

The economic disparities and inequities among the countries of the region, particularly with respect to South Africa which cannot be the basis of the longterm growth and development of the region.

The political geography of the region which has made the majority of the countries of the region landlocked, which necessitates their close collaboration with coastal states.

The need to establish and maintain peace in the region, both to reduce defence expenditures and to minimise the threat of conflict. Southern Africa has a history of violence arising from colonialism and apartheid and all countries have to work to inculcate a culture of social harmony and tolerance among all the region's peoples.

Issues

The 1992 Theme Document concludes that

one of the main causes of the region's poor economic performance has been the low participation of the people in the development and political process, which has in turn led to poor accountability, low work ethic and productivity and a culture of dependence. This malaise will afflict any regional integration process, unless arrangements are put in place to create a popular constituency in support of its objectives and programmes, and to involve the people in determining its content and direction. Early in the process of building the Community, measures will be taken to canvass this popular support and appropriate mechanisms established to involve the people in the process of integration.

The process

A number of concrete steps will also be taken to promote greater contact among the peoples and organisations of the region. These include:

- removing visa and other restrictions for travel between SADC member States; and
- encouraging more cross-border educational, business, cultural and sporting exchanges.

A programme of building the Community must be approached systematically and phased over many years, perhaps decades.

Success will require new institutions, mechanisms and procedures and a strong capacity to manage the process.

Source: SADC

