

OIL SHIPMENTS TO SOUTH AFRICA

by tankers owned and managed by

**SIG. BERGESEN
D.Y. & CO.**

of

NORWAY

(JAN. 1979 . JAN. 1985)

OIL SHIPMENTS TO SOUTH AFRICA BY TANKERS OWNED AND MANAGED BY
SIG. BERGESEN D.Y. & CO.
OF NORWAY

(Jan. 1979 - Jan. 1985)

SURVEY

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Shipping Research Bureau
P.O. Box 11898
1001 GW Amsterdam
The Netherlands

phone: (020) 251300/270801
telex: 17125 COMSA NL

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The Shipping Research Bureau continues, as always, to welcome all relevant information concerning oil deliveries or suspected oil deliveries to South Africa, whether this is provided openly or on a confidential basis.

METHODOLOGY

The Shipping Research Bureau's main source of data regarding the listed tankers has been specialized shipping industry publications and computerized data-bases. These sources record the identity of the companies that own, operate and charter individual ships, plus the movements of these ships in and out of most of the world's ports, as reported by agents in those ports and by the companies operating these ships. (The Shipping Research Bureau cannot be held liable for the reproduction in this survey of any errors which these publications may contain). The Bureau has checked and supplemented this information by a variety of means.

The initial gathering of data was completed in June 1985.

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The Shipping Research Bureau is a Netherlands-based non-profit organisation which was established in 1980 to conduct research, and to publish occasional reports, on the ways in which South Africa tries to obtain its crude oil imports to counter the present embargo which is imposed by nearly all oil-exporting countries.

The main reports published by the Shipping Research Bureau contain extensively verified data regarding all identified crude oil delivered to South Africa within a specified period. The most recent main report, Secret Oil Deliveries to South Africa 1981-1982, was published in June 1984 and covers the period July 1981 to January 1983.

The main reports have a wide circulation.

The Shipping Research Bureau surveys have a limited circulation only. These occasional topical reports are produced to inform Governments and concerned organisations on short notice about new research findings and/or current developments regarding the crude oil supplies to South Africa. Shipping Research Bureau surveys focus on a limited aspect of the crude oil stream to South Africa.

After further extensive verification, the relevant parts of surveys may be included in forthcoming and future main reports of the Shipping Research Bureau.

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I. THE OIL EMBARGO AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA

A series of United Nations General Assembly resolutions have called on all States to cut off oil supplies to South Africa, and urged the Security Council to impose a mandatory embargo. Only six Nations were opposed to the latest resolution on an oil embargo of December 1983, five of them were West-European countries: the United Kingdom, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium and Luxemburg.

For the first time Norway abstained. As an important oil-exporting and shipping country, Norway had always voted in favour of oil embargo resolutions earlier and this new step caused considerable controversy.

All major oil-exporting countries have a policy that their oil should not reach South Africa. All member States of the Organisation of Petroleum-Exporting Countries (O.P.E.C.) ban supplies to South Africa. In 1981, the Organisation of Arab Petroleum-Exporting Countries (O.A.P.E.C.) passed a strong resolution supporting the tightening of measures. Other major oil-exporting countries introduced restrictions which effectively ban the sale of crude oil to South Africa. Thus there is virtually no more "non-embargoed" crude oil available on the world market. Nevertheless, South Africa still manages to obtain crude oil from the outside world, albeit at considerable cost. Annually, South Africa has to spent about US \$2,000 million above the price of the imported crude oil, estimated to be about US \$3,000 million, to overcome the effects of the present voluntary oil embargo.

South Africa's annual need of crude oil, estimated to be about 15 million tons, has to be imported by means of very large tankers. Tankers owned and managed by Norwegian shipping companies are responsible for an exceptionally large proportion of the shipments of crude oil to South Africa. Although Norwegian tankers constitute only about 7% of the world's tanker tonnage, in the period January 1979 to January 1983 they transported over 25% of South Africa's crude oil import needs in this period.

Recent research of the Shipping Research Bureau on the Norwegian shipping company A/S Thor Dahl (published Dec. 1984) and this survey on the company Sig. Bergesen D.Y. & Co., indicate that Norwegian shipping companies are still very active in the secret

oil trade with South Africa.

Also from other sources, the ongoing heavy involvement of Norwegian shipping companies in this secret oil trade is confirmed. The Minister Seth, who was employed at the Norwegian Seaman's Mission in Durban, South Africa, stated on Norwegian television (July 8, 1985) that in the first four months of 1985 50% more Norwegian oil tankers had called at Durban, compared with the first four months of 1984. The Minister Seth also stated that these tankers used various methods to hide their true identity.

According to the estimation of the Minister Seth, on average once every month a Norwegian oil tanker calls at Durban to discharge crude oil. This would mean that in the first four months of 1985 at least six Norwegian oil tankers (4, plus 50% (2) = 6) called at South Africa to discharge crude oil.

Indeed, a spokesman from the Norwegian company Sig. Bergesen D.Y. & Co. confirmed that in the first six months of 1985, between 1 and 5 oil tankers owned and managed by his company had called at South Africa to discharge crude oil (Dagbladet, Norway, July 10 1985).

All in all, this would mean that in the first six months of 1985 some 8 or 9 Norwegian oil tankers delivered crude oil to South Africa.

Apart from the the company A/S Thor Dahl, the other Norwegian shipping company most deeply involved in the secret oil trade with South Africa, is the company Sig. Bergesen D.Y. & Co.. Almost all the crude oil shipped to South Africa on tankers owned and managed by Sig. Bergesen D.Y. & Co. originated in countries which embargo South Africa. The company thus violated the policy of these countries, which is not to sell any of their crude oil to South Africa.

This survey focuses on the role of the following vessels owned and managed by Sig. Bergesen D.Y. and Co.:

BERGE BRIONI	combined carrier
BERGE BRAGD	oil tanker, former Berge Queen
BERGE KING	oil tanker
BERGE PRINCE	oil tanker
BERGE PRINCESS	oil tanker
BERGE QUEEN	oil tanker, renamed Berge Bragd
BERGE SEPTIMUS	oil tanker
BERGEBONDE	combined carrier
BERGEHUS	oil tanker

MAIN PROPOSALS IN THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE U.N. AND THE
O.A.P.E.C. REGARDING AN OIL EMBARGO AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA

a) The United Nations (U.N.)

On 5 December 1983, the United Nations General Assembly adopted resolution 38/39 J on an oil embargo against South Africa.
Vote: 130 in favour, 6 against and 14 abstentions.

Some main proposals were:

"The General Assembly,
(....)

1. Reaffirms its recommendation to the Security Council to consider urgently a mandatory embargo on the supply of petroleum and petroleum products to South Africa under chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations;
2. Urges all States that have not yet done so to take effective legislative and other measures to ensure the implementation of an oil embargo against South Africa;
3. Requests all states concerned to take effective action against corporations and tanker companies involved in the illicit supply of oil to South Africa."

b) The Organisation of Arab Petroleum-Exporting Countries (O.A.P.E.C.)

On 6 May 1981, the Council of Ministers of the Arab Petroleum-Exporting Countries (O.A.P.E.C.) adopted a resolution (number 26/5) on the strengthening of the oil embargo against the South African régime. The resolution was signed by representatives of the following states:

The United Arab Emirates	The State of Bahrain
The People's Democratic Republic of Algeria	The Kingdom of
The Syrian Arab Republic	Saudi Arabia
The State of Qatar	The Republic of Iraq
The Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	The State of Kuwait.

Some main proposals regarding shipping companies and tankers (petroleum carriers) were:

- " 6. Since petroleum carriers known to unload their cargoes in South Africa take many precautions in order to avoid their navigational routes being known and resort to showing false papers - on many occasions - for their itineraries, it is possible to require their captains to show official papers showing the ports at which their carriers have anchored over a period of not less than one year, to prohibit the loading of petroleum on any vessel which has broken the embargo and to blacklist it.
7. Should companies and carriers violate the laws relating to the embargo, we propose the imposition of a penalty, ranging from refusal to supply them with the remaining loads of the quantity contracted for to placing them on a blacklist or the imposition of both penalties together, according to the size and character of the violation."

II. THE POLICY OF THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT REGARDING NORWEGIAN OWNED AND MANAGED OIL TANKERS ENGAGED IN THE SECRET OIL TRADE WITH SOUTH AFRICA

In late 1979, it was for the first time revealed that Norwegian oil tankers took part in secret oil deliveries to South Africa. A number of press articles since 1980 have exposed more examples, including the sale of Norwegian crude oil to South Africa during the years 1980/81.

Information gathered by the Shipping Research Bureau and the Norwegian Council for Southern Africa, shows that Norway for several years has been the main country involved in the transport of crude oil to South Africa. A number of Norwegian shipping companies are involved in more or less secret oil deliveries. Sig. Bergesen D.Y. & Co., which is Norway's largest shipowner, has played an important role in this business.

In general, the public reaction to these transports to South Africa, has been strong condemnation of the companies fuelling Apartheid. Churches, trade unions, various political parties and anti-Apartheid organisations have demanded that the Government and the shipowners should halt these transports.

Shipping has always been a major trade in Norway, and traditionally the Norwegian Shipowners Association (Norges Rederiforbund) has been a strong lobby organisation in the country. The shipowners have replied that shipping to South Africa is legal, and as long as the trade is not forbidden, they will continue to do business with South Africa as usual. They have strongly opposed unilateral Norwegian sanctions against South Africa.

The Norwegian trade union movement, LO (Landsorganisasjonen), has strongly condemned the oil transports, but has not supported total shipping sanctions against South Africa. The main reason is lack of support for that demand from the Norwegian Seamen's Union (Norsk Sjømannsforbund). Both the LO and the Seamen's Union have supported the demand that all Norwegian tankers going to South Africa, should be registered by the Government or the United Nations. They have also supported the idea of a United Nations' conference of oil exporting and oil transporting countries, to discuss a more efficient oil embargo against South Africa.

Several church societies, including the large Church of Norway (Lutheran), and movements like the Norwegian Council for Southern Africa, have called for even stronger measures, aiming at a complete shipping boycott of South Africa.

During the years of discussion on this question, the political situation in Norway has changed:

- The Labor Party had a minority government until autumn 1981, supported by the Socialist Left Party;
- The Conservative Party formed a new minority government after the general elections in 1981, and were supported by the Centre Party and the Christian People's Party;
- During the summer of 1983, the Centre and Christian People's Party joined the government (now a majority government), and this coalition is running for re-election at the General Election in early September 1985.

In February 1984, the Norwegian Parliament discussed sanctions against South Africa. The Minister of Foreign Affairs (Conservative) opposed unilateral Norwegian oil sanctions, claiming that they would be inefficient and that they would only harm Norwegian interests. The debate showed little support for his views. Representatives from the Labor Party, the Socialist Left Party, the Liberal Party, the Centre Party and the Christian People's Party, jointly asked the Government to "support international measures against transport of oil to the country". This was a clear signal from Parliament that a more active policy was wanted.

As a result of the debate in Parliament, an expert group with members from five different Ministries was appointed, and asked to consider further Norwegian sanctions against South Africa. The expert group presented a report in December 1984, with few recommendations concerning oil and shipping questions. Strong protests, in particular from church representative, forced the Government to go much further than the expert group suggested.

Concerning oil and shipping, the Norwegian Government suggested:

- * the Ministry of Justice was asked to consider a law prohibiting the sale of Norwegian crude oil to South Africa (at present this is only a 'gentlemen's agreement' with the oil companies).
- * in agreement between the Government and the Shipowners Association, there should be established a registration of the transport of crude oil with Norwegian registered tankers to South Africa.

The agreement meant, that the shipowners every third month should send statistics to the Ministry of Commerce and Shipping, containing the number of ships delivering crude oil to South Africa and the volume delivered. No names of ships and/or companies would be mentioned.

In addition, the Minister of Commerce and Shipping has raised the question of oil and transport sanctions against South Africa with his colleagues from various countries. The other Nordic countries have been asked to do the same. The Minister has had meetings with colleagues from the U.S.A., the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Liberia. Panama and Greece are among the countries that will be contacted. So far, this has given few concrete results.

In June 1985, Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee discussed the Government's plan. The suggestions of new sanctions were supported, but the Committee also wanted to go further.

- * Parliament asked for a quick response from the Ministry of Justice, considering a law prohibiting the sale of Norwegian oil to South Africa.
- * A unanimous committee wanted a registration of Norwegian shipping links with South Africa. The registration should include all Norwegian owned ships, including those under flags of convenience, and should include all types of ships calling at South Africa (not only tankers/combined carriers). The registration should be made by independent institutions or by the Government. The list of ships that had been to South Africa should be available to the public, and should be published.

All parties, except the (right-wing) Progressive Party, supported these demands.

As a result of this, the shipowners have protested strongly, and their Association has said that it will no longer co-operate with the Government concerning statistical information on a voluntary basis. The shipowners will only accept to give information if they are forced to do so by law.

In the newspaper Aftenposten (19 July 1985), the deputy Minister of Shipping and Commerce has given the Government's reply to this attitude. A registration of calls at South Africa will require a separate law. He said that a suggestion of such a law will be presented to Parliament early in the autumn of 1985. The Ministry now works on the

practical solutions for registration. All ships calling at South Africa will be asked to report directly to the Ministry. Special documents will be made for the purpose, and all ships have to obtain these documents. There will be penalties introduced for ships violating the registration - similar to the law prohibiting the removal of flag, registration signs or names on the ship.

The Ministry has not yet decided if it will follow Parliament's recommendation concerning publication of the names of ships. The deputy Minister said the Government wanted to avoid blacklisting of legal activity.

During July 1985, a heated political discussion has taken place in Norway, concerning Norwegian owned and managed oil tankers delivering crude oil to South Africa. The shipowners strongly deny that they take part in a hidden trade, and claim that their business is open, as it is perfectly legal. On the other hand, the authorities have promised to investigate accusations made by a former priest in the Norwegian Seamens Church in Durban and by seamen, that some tankers have called at South Africa without a flag and with their names hidden. To do so is a violation of Norwegian law. The shipowners in question, including Sig. Bergesen D.Y. & Co., deny these accusations.

III. OIL SHIPMENTS TO SOUTH AFRICA BY OIL TANKERS OWNED AND MANAGED
BY SIG. BERGESEN D.Y. & CO. OF NORWAY
(January 1979 - January 1985)

1. Since January 1979, altogether 21 cases of a Sig. Bergesen oil tanker delivering crude oil to South Africa, have been identified by the Shipping Research Bureau.

These tankers, if carrying a full cargo, could have transported a total volume of over 5.2 million tons of embargoed crude oil to South Africa, worth over US \$1,000 million, and constituting about 7% of South Africa's need of crude oil in this period.

Tankers owned and managed by Sig. Bergesen D.Y. & Co., listed in order of the month in which they called at South Africa apparently to discharge crude oil there. (Jan. 1979 - Jan. 1985) (see also Annex A for full details)		
Name Tanker	size (in metric tons)	Month the tanker called at South Africa
Bergehus	205,807	January 1979
Berge Septimus	284,512	June 1979
Berge Brioni	227,557	July 1979
Berge Septimus	284,512	April 1980
Berge Septimus	284,512	September 1980
Berge King	284,919	January 1982
Berge King	284,919	June 1982
Berge King	284,919	September 1982
Berge Queen	280,476	September 1982
Berge King	284,919	October 1982
Berge Queen	280,476	November 1982
Berge King	284,919	December 1982
Berge Queen	280,476	January 1983
Bergebonde	155,048	January 1983
Berge Prince	284,522	January 1983
Berge King	284,919	April/May 1983
Berge Prince	284,522	May 1983
Berge King	284,919	June/July 1983
Berge Princess	284,507	April/May 1984
Berge Bragd	280,476	November 1984
Berge Prince	284,522	December 84/ January 1985
5,709,858 tons dwt		

2. Since 1982, Sig. Bergesen D.Y. & Co., in co-operation with the oil traders owning the crude oil cargo and with the South African Authorities concerned, tried to hide the apparent crude oil deliveries to South Africa in several ways:

- * usually confidential charterparties were concluded between Sig. Bergesen D.Y. & Co. and the oil traders in question: in 15 of the 16 cases since 1982, the identity of the oil trader which chartered the tanker, was not reported.
- * in several cases the cargo was apparently loaded off port in the Arabian Gulf by "ship-to-ship transfer" from other tankers; in some other cases one shipload was collected through calls at two or three different oil-exporting countries (multi-porting). Such practices make it increasingly difficult to determine in which country the oil originated which was ultimately shipped to South Africa.
- * on departure from the Arabian Gulf area, in 15 of the 17 cases no destination was reported, or an incorrect destination was given, such as "France", "Indian Ocean", "Gibraltar", "Singapore" or "Dakar". During the voyages in question, the vessels did not call at these ports, but sailed to South Africa and then immediately returned to the Arabian Gulf area.
The two cases that the correct destination was reported after sailing from the Arabian Gulf area. concerned the voyages of the Berge Brioni, a combined carrier, and the Bergehus, a tanker, both in 1979.
- * the calls at the South African ports were kept strictly secret since 1982: in 12 of the 15 cases, the standard shipping industry publications report no port at all between departure from the Arabian Gulf and return to that area. In the remaining 3 cases, some vague indications were reported, such as "Cape (fo) -/-".

3. All cases listed above, were presented to the company Sig. Bergesen D.Y. & Co. by the Shipping Research Bureau. The company was asked to correct and/or amplify the Bureau's findings. In all cases the company replied that the vessels concerned, traded as stated in the findings of the Shipping Research Bureau.

Tankers owned and managed by the Norwegian company Sig. Bergesen D.Y. & Co., which apparently delivered crude oil to South Africa.

Period: January 1979 - January 1985

Name Tanker size in tons dwt	Area in which the Tanker loaded its presumed crude oil cargo, prior to sailing to South Africa <i>Purported destination of the loaded Tanker, as reported on departure from the Arabian Gulf area</i>	Month the Tanker called at South Africa <i>Type of call as reported by standard shipping industry publications</i>	Area to which the Tanker sailed immediately after departure from South Africa	Oil company reported to be the owner of the Tanker's presumed crude oil cargo
Berge Brioni 227,557	Arabian Gulf (Oman) <i>for: "Cape Town Jly 20"</i>	South Africa July 79 <i>reported call</i>	Brazil	Shell (timecharter)
Berge Bragd (former Berge Queen) 284,976	Arabian Gulf (S.Arabia, U.A.E.) <i>for: "Singapore", later "Indian Ocean"</i>	South Africa November 84 <i>secret call</i>	Arabian Gulf	--
Berge King 284,919	Arabian Gulf (S.Arabia) <i>for: "Singapore", later "Gibraltar"</i>	South Africa January 82 <i>secret call</i>	Arabian Gulf	--
Berge King 284,919	Arabian Gulf (U.A.E.) <i>for: "Rotterdam"</i>	South Africa June 82 <i>secret call</i>	Arabian Gulf	--
Berge King 284,919	Arabian Gulf (Iran) <i>for: "Rotterdam"</i>	South Africa September 82 <i>secret call</i>	Arabian Gulf	--
Berge King 284,919	Arabian Gulf (Qatar, off port AG) <i>for: "--"</i>	South Africa October 82 <i>secret call</i>	Arabian Gulf	--
Berge King 284,919	Arabian Gulf (Iran, Oman) <i>for: "--"</i>	South Africa December 82 <i>"Cape (fo) -[-"</i>	Arabian Gulf	Transworld Oil (voyage charter)
Berge King 284,919	Arabian Gulf (off port AG) <i>no destination given</i>	South Africa April/May 83 <i>secret call</i>	Arabian Gulf	--
Berge King 284,919	Arabian Gulf (S.Arabia) <i>for: "--", later "France"</i>	South Africa June/July 83 <i>secret call</i>	Arabian Gulf	--
Berge Prince 284,522	Arabian Gulf (off port AG) <i>for: "France"</i>	South Africa January 83 <i>"Cape (fo) -/-"</i>	Arabian Gulf	--
Berge Prince 284,522	Arabian Gulf (off port AG) <i>no destination given</i>	South Africa May 83 <i>secret call</i>	Arabian Gulf	--
Berge Prince 284,522	Arabian Gulf (S.Arabia, U.A.E.) <i>for: "Havre"</i>	South Africa Dec 84/Jan 85 <i>secret call</i>	Arabian Gulf	--

Tankers owned and managed by the Norwegian company Sig. Bergesen D.Y. & Co., which apparently delivered crude oil to South Africa.

Period: January 1979 - January 1985

Name Tanker size in tons dwt	Area in which the Tanker loaded its presumed crude oil cargo, prior to sailing to South Africa <i>Purported destination of the loaded Tanker, as reported on departure from the Arabian Gulf area</i>	Month the Tanker called at South Africa <i>Type of call as reported by standard shipping industry publications</i>	Area to which the Tanker sailed immediately after departure from South Africa	Oil company reported to be the owner of the Tanker's presumed crude oil cargo
Berge Princess 284,507	Arabian Gulf (off port AG) <i>for: "Port de Bouc"</i>	South Africa April/May 84 <i>secret call</i>	Arabian Gulf	--
Berge Queen (now Berge Bragd) 284,976	Arabian Gulf (Oman, off port AG) <i>for: "--"</i>	South Africa September 82 <i>secret call</i>	Arabian Gulf	voyage charter by unknown company
Berge Queen (now Berge Bragd) 284,976	Arabian Gulf (off port AG, U.A.E.) <i>for: "Japan", later, "Europoort"</i>	South Africa November 82 <i>secret call</i>	Arabian Gulf	--
Berge Queen (now Berge Bragd) 284,976	Arabian Gulf (off port AG, Iran) <i>for: "--"</i>	South Africa January 83 <i>"Cape (fo) -/-"</i>	Arabian Gulf	--
Berge Septimus 284,512	Neth. Antilles <i>for: "Mena al Ahmadi"</i>	South Africa June 79 <i>"Cape Town Jne 6 79/Jne 11 79"</i>	Arabian Gulf	Shell (timecharter)
Berge Septimus 284,512	Neth. Antilles <i>for: "Durban"</i>	South Africa April 80 <i>"Durban Apr 21 80/Apr 26 80"</i>	Arabian Gulf	Shell (timecharter)
Berge Septimus 284,512	Neth. Antilles <i>for: "Durban"</i>	South Africa September 80 <i>"Durban Sep 15 80/sep 22 80"</i>	Arabian Gulf	Shell (timecharter)
Bergebonde 155,048	Far East (Brunei) <i>for: "--"</i>	South Africa January 83 <i>secret call</i>	Arabian Gulf	--
Bergehus* 205,807	Arabian Gulf (Iraq)	South Africa January 79 <i>reported call</i>	Arabian Gulf	voyage charter by unknown company

*sold, renamed Energy Endurance. December 1981 scrapped.

SOME BACKGROUND INFORMATION REGARDING THE COMPANY SIG. BERGESEN
D.Y. & CO.

COMPANY DETAILS

Name company	Sig. Bergesen D.Y. & Co.
Address	Bergehus Drammensveien 106 Postboks 7600 Skillebekk Oslo 2 Norway
Phone	Norway (02) 567800
Telex	71172 SIGDY N
Manager	Sig. Bergesen
Partners	J.E. Jacobsen P.C.G. Sundt
Subsidiaries and affiliated companies	Larina Shipping Inc. Monrovia, Liberia Biornstad Shipping Companies, Oslo, Norway Bergehus Skips-A/S, Oslo, Norway Snefonn, Skibs-A/S, Oslo, Norway Siganka A/S, Oslo, Norway Park Shipping PTE, Ltd., Singapore Fram Newsprint Carriers Inc., Monrovia, Liberia General Ore International Corp., Vaduz, Lichtenstein International Marine Owners Co. Ltd., Vaduz, Lichtenstein

OIL TANKER AND COMBINED CARRIER TRADE

Berge Big	tanker; 285,400 tons dwt; blt 1973; flag Norway. Laid up since March 1982
Berge Borg	tanker; 285,700 tons dwt; blt 1973; flag Norway. Laid up since March 1982
Berge Boss	tanker; registered owners: Sig. Bergesen D.Y. and Biornstad Shipping Companies. 222,971 tons dwt; blt 1972; flag Norway. Laid up since December 1981. Sold in November 1984, renamed <u>Ossa</u> . Ultimately sold to Taiwan breakers November/December 1984

Berge Bragd	tanker; registered owners: Bergehus Skips-A/S, Sig. Bergesen D.Y. and Siganka A/S. 280,476 tons dwt; blt 1971; flag Norway. Former Berge Queen, renamed in November 1983
Berge Chief	tanker; registered owners: Sig. Bergesen D.Y. and Biornstad Shipping Companies. 289,979 tons dwt; blt 1976; flag Norway. Laid up since May 1981
Berge Duke	tanker; 284,002 tons dwt; blt 1973; flag Norway
Berge Edda	tanker; registered owners: Bergehus Skips-A/S and Sig. Bergesen D.Y. 164,702 tons dwt; blt 1970; flag Norway. Laid up since January 1982. Sold in May 1984 and renamed <u>Maritsa</u>
Berge Emperor	tanker; 423,700 tons dwt; blt 1975; flag Norway. Laid up since April 1981
Berge Empress	tanker; 423,748 tons dwt; blt 1976; flag Norway. Laid up since June 1981
Berge Enterprise	tanker; 360,700 tons dwt; blt 1981; flag Norway
Berge Gdansk	ore/oil carrier; launched at Gdynia Poland, April 1983. Not yet operating; 79,500 tons dwt
Berge Gdynia	ore/oil carrier; launched at Gdynia, Poland, December 1983. Not yet operating; 97,500 tons dwt
Berge King	tanker; registered owners: Bergehus Skips-A/S and Sig. Bergesen D.Y.; 284,919 tons dwt; blt 1970; flag Norway
Berge Lord	tanker; 284,500 tons dwt; blt 1973; flag Norway
Berge Odel	bulk/oil carrier; 155,048 tons dwt; blt 1974; flag Norway
Berge Pilot	tanker; registered owners: Sig. Bergesen D.Y. and Biornstad Shipping Companies; 289,979 tons dwt; blt 1975; flag Norway. Laid up since April 1981, sold in February 1985
Berge Pioneer	tanker; 360,700 tons dwt; blt 1980; flag Norway
Berge Prince	tanker; 284,522 tons dwt; blt 1979; flag Norway
Berge Princess	tanker; registered owners: Bergehus Skips-A/S, Snefonn Skibs-A/S, Siganka A/S and Sig. Bergesen D.Y.; 284,507 tons dwt; blt 1972; flag Norway
Berge Tasta	tanker; registered owners: Bergehus Skips-A/S, Snefonn Skips-A/S and Sig. Bergesen D.Y.; 158,909 tons dwt; blt 1969; flag Norway. Laid up since February 1982. Sold June 1984, renamed <u>Kition</u>

Bergebonde	bulk/oil carrier; 155,048 tons dwt; blt 1973; flag Norway
Inayama	ore/oil carrier; registered owners: General Ore International Corp. and Larina Shipping Inc.; 86,213 tons dwt; blt 1964; flag Liberia. Adapted for ore cargoes only. Laid up since August 1982. Sold to Chinese breakers in December 1984
Larina	ore/oil carrier; registered owner: Larina Shipping Inc.; 178,750 tons dwt; blt 1972; flag Liberia
Marshall Clark	ore/oil carrier; registered owners: General Ore International Corp. and International Marine Owners Co. Ltd.; 86,179 tons dwt; blt 1965; flag Liberia. Adapted for ore cargoes only. Laid up September 1982 - November 1984
Shigeo Nagano	ore/oil carrier; registered owners: General Ore International Corp. and Larina Shipping Inc.; 82,092 tons dwt; blt 1965; flag Liberia. Adapted for ore cargoes only

OTHER TRADE

In the LPG trade, the company Sig. Bergesen D.Y. owns and manages another nine LPG-tankers. In the bulk, ore and roll-on-roll-off trade another seven vessels . Two of these vessels, the Berge Adria and the Berge Bri-
oni, were originally designed as ore/oil carriers. After the grave ac-
cidents with the two sister-ships of these ore/oil carriers, the Berge
Istra and the Berge Vanga, which exploded and sank, respectively dis-
appeared completely, in December 1975 (Istra) and November 1979 (Vanga),
the company decided to take both ships out of the oil trade. They are
now registered and used as ore carriers only.

SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT VOYAGES OF SIG. BERGESEN TANKERS IN 1984

Name Vessel	Area from which vessel sailed prior to a suspected call at South Africa	Month of suspected call at South Africa	Area to which vessel sailed after a suspected call at South Africa
size in tons dwt	dates of departure		date of arrival
Berge Enterprise 360,700	U.S.A./ Caribbean Feb 2/Feb 6	March 1984	Arabian Gulf April 3 1984
Berge Enterprise 360,700	U.S.A./ Caribbean Nov 12/Nov 22	December 1984	Arabian Gulf Jan 14 1985
Berge King 284,919	U.S.A./ Caribbean Aug 26/Sep 6	September/ October 1984	Arabian Gulf Nov 1 1984
Berge Princess 284,507	West Africa Feb 28	March 1984	Arabian Gulf Apr 4 1984

According to research of the Shipping Research Bureau it is possible that in all four of the above mentioned cases, the vessel in question called at a South African port. The Bureau, however, was not able to determine whether the vessels at the time of their possible call at (a) South African port(s) carried a cargo of crude oil.

Therefore, the Bureau welcomes all relevant information concerning the voyages of the vessels listed in the table above, especially on two points:

1. Did these vessels actually call at a South African port during the periods indicated?
2. Did these vessels, during their call at a South African port deliver any crude oil, or discharge crude oil to another vessel, in or near South African territorial waters at any time during the periods indicated?

BACKGROUND INFORMATION REGARDING THE OIL EMBARGO AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA

(from: "Secret Oil Deliveries to South Africa 1981-1982", published in June 1984 by the Shipping Research Bureau, Amsterdam, pages 3 - 6)

1. The oil embargo against South Africa

Probably no current world issue causes a more universal reaction of anger and condemnation than does the South African policy of apartheid. Repeatedly, apartheid has been condemned by the international community, both in the United Nations and in the International Court of Justice, as "a flagrant violation of the purposes and principles of the UN Charter", as a system which "seriously disturbs international peace and security" and as "a crime against humanity". Thus the United Nations and most of its member states have been looking for practical actions against apartheid in South Africa. A policy of trade sanctions against South Africa is considered to be one of the few remaining peaceful means whereby the world community can impose pressure on the South African government to end apartheid, and simultaneously express solidarity with all who suffer under and resist apartheid.

In 1977 the United Nations Security Council imposed a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa. The next trade sanction that will have the greatest potential of success is an oil embargo.

South Africa is very vulnerable to an oil embargo: the country has no commercially exploitable oil deposits of its own, nor does it have sufficient stocks of oil to last more than a year or two. And its three "oil-from-coal" plants will not provide more than a third of the country's liquid fuel needs over the coming decade. The possibilities for a further reduction of oil consumption in South Africa have been exhausted already for some years: nearly all liquid fuel consumption takes place in two sectors of the economy only: road transport, and the armed forces. Substitution of liquid fuels by other energy sources in these sectors is virtually impossible.

The strategic relevance of oil is also reflected in events in Southern Africa, whereby oil installations became targets in the armed conflicts in the region.

A further tightening of the oil embargo against South Africa is feasible. The trade in crude oil is hardly to disguise completely: crude oil is carried in super tankers a third of a kilometer long, and a tanker delivery has to be made to South Africa roughly once every five days. So monitoring of this trade is possible.

Introduction of embargo legislation also seems feasible. The General Assembly of the United Nations has, with an overwhelming majority of the world's nations in favour, repeatedly urged all countries to impose an oil embargo against South Africa. Many Governments have responded: nearly all countries exporting any significant amount of oil, including all members of OPEC and OAPEC, now have a policy that their crude oil should not be sold to South Africa. Thus nearly all crude oil which is traded internationally, is embargoed. To make the embargo fully effective, moves will need to be made by the governments of --Western and "flag-of-convenience"-- countries in which the oil and shipping companies are based. These governments could introduce legislation which makes it illegal for oil and shipping companies under their jurisdiction to participate in the oil trade with South Africa. A complete stop of all crude oil shipments to South Africa does not seem too heavy a burden on the tanker nations: it would make only 3-5 very large tankers (VLCC's) redundant. This is a small figure, particularly when compared to the size of the world fleet of VLCC's --about 600 tankers with capacity over 200,000 tons-- and the number of VLCC's laid-up due to lack of employment -- 140 in Jan. 1985. Indeed: several non-oil-exporting countries have ordered or advised their companies and nationals not to get involved in the trade or shipment of oil to South Africa.

To impose sanctions against tanker companies which have violated the oil embargo is feasible too: the present over-capacity on the tanker market enables oil companies and oil-exporting countries to demand -- without additional costs-- that the companies which are to transport their oil have never been involved in the shipment of crude oil to South Africa. The fear of some experts that South Africa may start its own tanker fleet with 5 or 6 large tankers is completely unfounded: which oil-exporting country would allow transport of its oil on such South African owned tankers?

Probably the best international step to cut off the supply of oil to South Africa, is to make the oil embargo against South Africa binding for all countries. This requires a decision of the United Nations Security Council. In the past, however, such a proposal has been vetoed by the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France.

2. "Secrecy is essential"

"Secrecy is essential". This was the key statement in the speech about South Africa's oil supplies, made by the South African Minister of Internal Affairs to the Parliament on 9 March 1983:

"The struggle against boycotts is by no means over. U.N. attempts to prevent crude oil deliveries to South Africa continue. Any relaxation in respect of secrecy can help to spotlight the target and enable our enemies to identify our friends and partners who deliver to us".

Indeed: the South African Government, desperately needing the imported oil to fuel its economy and its military apparatus, conspires on secrecy with oil and shipping companies. In 1977 a draconian oil-secrecy legislation was introduced, the Petroleum Products Act. In 1979 and in 1984 this legislation was tightened even further. To reveal information about South Africa's oil situation can be punished with seven years of imprisonment.

But despite all efforts to keep the oil supplies to South Africa secret, this report contains details about 57 apparent crude oil shipments to South Africa; together they constitute about half of South Africa's oil import needs over the period July 1981 - December 1982. This report also identifies the oil and shipping companies linked to the 57 cases, in South Africa labelled as "our friends and partners who deliver to us".

Perhaps the biggest secret trade in history is the oil trade with South Africa. Annually about 15 million tons of crude oil disappear from world trade statistics because they are sold and shipped to South Africa. The value of this volume of oil is about US \$ 3,000 million. South Africa, however, pays a much higher price. In order to overcome the oil embargo, the country has to spend an additional US \$ 2,000 million annually: for extra emergency stocks; on special factories which produce high-cost low-value petroleum products from coal; as a bonus to companies who secretly sell and ship the embargoed crude oil to South Africa; and on the intensive off-shore oil-search in which no oil company has been prepared to take a risk-bearing share.

A giant secret trade such as the oil trade with South Africa attracts fraud. The case of the tanker Salem is well-known: a complete cargo of a super tanker was stolen and secretly delivered to South Africa. The tanker next was loaded with seawater and sank some days later under mysterious circumstances

off the West coast of Africa. The South African governmental oil procurement agency SFF had to pay for the Salem oil twice: once (US \$ 56 million) to the thieves, and later a part (US \$ 30,5 million) to the genuine owner. And although this Salem-case occurred in early 1980, at present court cases against persons involved are still pending in several parts of the world.

Misspending of much larger quantities of money on oil procurement have recently been reported in South Africa. In April 1984 the Opposition in the South African Parliament produced a dossier on this matter: the oil purchasing agency SFF allegedly paid US \$ 306 million more than was stipulated in oil contracts; the oil traders named to have profited are John Deuss (Transworld Oil/T.W.O.) and Marc Rich.

Other types of malpractice surrounding the delivery of crude oil to South Africa are more common. To hide such deliveries, false destinations are reported, forged certificates of delivery are produced, bribes are offered to falsify log-books, or two separate log-books are kept to hide an oil delivery to South Africa. Other suspect practices well-known to the insiders in the oil trade with South Africa include: keeping tanker calls at South African ports strictly secret and out of the shipping industry press; using special code names for radio- and paper-contacts with South African ports; putting pressure on crew members not to disclose information about oil deliveries to South Africa; employing in this trade old tankers, about to be scrapped or laid-up, in order to reduce the impact of possible retaliatory actions such as black-listing; and using temporary post box companies which are dissolved shortly after the oil delivery takes place.

Note 1: Some major oil-producing countries consume all crude oil they produce. They do not export their crude oil. Thus they are not referred to as oil-exporting countries.

The United States of America is an example of a very large oil-producer which exports very little crude oil.

Note 2: The only major oil-exporting countries known not to have adopted a policy of an oil embargo against South Africa, are the United Kingdom and Canada.

The United Kingdom says that in practice it does not export its North Sea oil to South Africa, though it has not imposed a legal oil embargo and it apparently has not officially oil companies not to sell British crude oil to South Africa. In the United Nations General Assembly, the United Kingdom has repeatedly voted against relevant resolutions on an oil embargo against South Africa.

There are no indications that crude oil originated in Canada is supplied to South Africa.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE SHIPPING RESEARCH BUREAU

(from: "Secret Oil Deliveries to South Africa 1981-1982", published by the Shipping Research Bureau, Amsterdam, pages 99 - 101)

During the past five years, several calls have been made at an international level for the establishment of an effective monitoring mechanism regarding the oil embargo against South Africa. In July 1979, the Council of Ministers of the Organisation of African Unity (O.A.U.) passed a resolution that "welcomes proposals for methods of monitoring and cutting down the shipments of oil to South Africa". The final declaration of the International Seminar on the Oil Embargo Against South Africa, sponsored in March 1980 by the United Nations Special Committee against Apartheid and two Netherlands organizations, stated that "an essential component of an effective oil embargo against South Africa is the creation of a machinery to monitor all shipments of oil to South Africa". Similar calls for such a monitoring mechanism were made by the OAU Sanctions Committee (Arusha, March 1981), by the Nairobi summit of Heads of State of the OAU (June 1981), and in the May 1981 Paris Declaration on Sanctions Against South Africa (which was endorsed by 124 governments).

As a result of this clear need for a mechanism to monitor the violations of the oil embargo against South Africa, the Shipping Research Bureau was established in March 1980 by two Netherlands-based non-governmental organizations which co-sponsored the March 1980 conference on oil sanctions. The Bureau was established after a process of consultations with the United Nations Special Committee against Apartheid, the Southern African liberation movements, and other concerned bodies.

Both founding organizations have a long history of support for the struggle for freedom in Southern Africa:

The Holland Committee on Southern Africa was founded in 1961 as the Angola Committee. It has sought to make known and give support to the liberation struggles in Southern Africa. Until their independence, the Committee's activities focused on the Portugese African colonies. Since then, the Committee changed its focus to the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe (prior to its independence), South Africa and Namibia.

The national stature of the Holland Committee on Southern Africa is illustrated by the fact that it raises something approaching one million dollars each year, most of it from members of the public. Most of the funds raised are for direct humanitarian assistance to the liberation movements in South Africa and Namibia.

Since 1970, the Working Group Kairos contributes to the awareness in the Netherlands of the policy of apartheid and the resulting violations of human rights in South Africa. Kairos primarily operates within the Churches and the Christian community in the Netherlands. But it also directs its activities towards Christian and non-Christian organizations like political parties, trade unions, etc. In 1973, the Working Group Kairos started a debate with Shell about the company's policy in Southern Africa. Later, resulting from this, Kairos asked Shell to end its ties with the white minority regimes in Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa. Prior to Zimbabwe's independence, Kairos urged the Netherlands Government to adopt effective legislation regarding the mandatory oil embargo of Rhodesia. Recently, together with many Church organizations, a nationwide campaign has been started to stop the deportation of women and children to the so-called homelands in South Africa. Kairos supports the liberation movements of South Africa and Namibia.

In 1977, the Holland Committee on Southern Africa and the Working Group Kairos joined forces in opposing the oil link between the Netherlands and South Africa. Since March 1979 the two organisations have been engaged in a nationwide campaign for the Netherlands to join the oil embargo against South Africa, and for the termination of all Shell links with that country.

The Board of the Shipping Research Bureau consists of two representatives from each of the two founding organizations. The Chairperson of the Bureau, Cor Groenendijk, an auditor by profession, is also Chairperson of the Working Group Kairos.

The principal purpose of the Shipping Research Bureau is to conduct in-depth research, and to publish reports, on the means whereby the oil embargo against South Africa is circumvented. Other objectives are to conduct research on legislative and other means whereby countries could more effectively enforce the embargo, and to develop relationships with those countries, and with inter-governmental and non-governmental bodies which would be able and willing to make effective use of the research results.

PUBLICATIONS OF THE SHIPPING RESEARCH BUREAU

1. Oil Tankers to South Africa; Amsterdam, March 1981. Main report.

This is the first main report produced by the Shipping Research Bureau. It covers the period January 1979 to March 1980. Currently out of print.

2. Oil Tankers to South Africa 1980-1981; Amsterdam, June 1982. Main report. ISBN 90 70331 05 5

This second main report lists apparent crude oil deliveries to South Africa during the period January 1980 to June 1981. The report includes a chapter on the use of trans-shipment ports in the supply of crude oil to South Africa, the role of Rotterdam as such an oil-trans-shipment port is highlighted.

The chapter on the companies involved focuses on the Royal Dutch/Shell Group, Transworld Oil/John Deuss, Vitol Trading, Havtor A/S and Hansen-Tangen.

3. Secret Oil Deliveries to South Africa 1981-1982; Amsterdam, June 1984. Main report. ISBN 90 70331 15 2

A 100 page main report, listing 57 large oil tankers and their corporate relations (owner, manager, oil company) apparently involved in the supply of crude oil to South Africa. Period July 1981 to January 1983. Chapters highlight the secrecy surrounding the shipments of crude oil to South Africa and the extra costs South Africa pays annually to circumvent the oil embargo.

The chapter on companies focuses on Transworld Oil/John Deuss, Shell, Vitol Trading, Marc Rich, Scandports, Marcotrade/Tradinaft on the oil side and on the shipping companies Sig. Bergesen d.y., A.P. Moller-Maersk, Cast-Eurocanadian Shipholdings, Denholm (UK), Helmer Staubo, Lorentzens Rederi Co. and Hansen-Tangen.

4. Oil Supplies to South Africa: the role of Norwegian tankers; Amsterdam, December 1980. Survey.

Summary of the findings regarding Norwegian tankers shipping crude oil to South Africa in the period January 1979-March 1980. Currently out of print.

5. Oil Supplies to South Africa: the role of tankers connected with the Netherlands and the Netherlands Antilles; Amsterdam, January 1981. Survey.

Summary of the findings regarding the role of the Netherlands and

the Netherlands Antilles in the supply of crude oil to South Africa: companies, flag of tankers, trans-shipment. Currently out of print.

6. The oil embargo against South Africa and the role of Rotterdam; Amsterdam, November 1982. Survey.

This survey, published in Dutch only, summarizes the involvement of Rotterdam in the shipment of crude oil to South Africa in the period January 1980-June 1981.

7. Oil and Tanker interests that facilitate the exploitation of Namibia's natural resources; Amsterdam, April/August 1984. Survey.

A 25 page survey, presented at a seminar of the United Nations Council for Namibia in Ljubljana, April 1984.

The report briefly introduces the strategic importance of oil products and petrochemicals in the Namibian economy, and the use of these products by the South African occupation Army in Namibia. It then analyzes the origin of the petroleum products, the oil companies which produced these products and the shipping companies which transported the products to Namibia.

The importance of an oil embargo against South Africa to end the occupation and exploitation of Namibia is discussed.

8. The oil embargo against South Africa: West European involvement and possible actions; Information Note No. 57/84, published by the United Nations Centre against Apartheid, New York, November 1984.

Paper prepared by the Shipping Research Bureau for the Founding Conference of the Association of West European Parliamentarians for Action against Apartheid, Copenhagen, 2-3 November 1984.

The paper briefly outlines South Africa's lasting vulnerability to an oil embargo and the economic sectors which are the main consumers of oil products.

The loopholes in the oil embargo are discussed, with the emphasis on the role of the West European companies which supply embargoed crude oil to South Africa. The paper concludes with some possibilities for actions by West European politicians.

9. Oil shipments to South Africa by The tankers Thorsaga, Thorshavet and Thorsholm, owned by A/S Thor Dahl of Norway (1981-1984); Amsterdam, December 1984. Survey.

One of the most persistent shipping companies in the crude oil trade with South Africa is the Norwegian shipowner A/S Thor Dahl. This survey identifies thirteen apparent deliveries of crude oil to South Africa in the period November 1981 to September 1984.

10. John Deuss/Transworld Oil. Zuid Afrika's belangrijkste olieleverancier; Amsterdam, January 1985. Survey.

Between 1979 and the end of 1983, John Deuss/Transworld Oil delivered at least 16,4 million tons of crude oil to South Africa, worth well over US \$3,000 million.

Detailed information is given on tanker calls, quantities, commissions, secretive practices and the use of false documents. This survey is published in a Dutch version only, but an English summary of its findings is included.

11. Newsletter

In February 1985 the Shipping Research Bureau published the first issue of a Newsletter on the Oil Embargo against South Africa.

12. West European involvement in breaking the Oil Embargo against South Africa; Amsterdam, May 1985.

Paper presented to the PCR workshop on Strategies towards Economic Isolation of South Africa, by the World Council of Churches Commission on the Programme to Combat Racism. May 20-23 1985 in Frankfurt am Main, Federal Republic of Germany.

This 27 page paper is an updated version of the Information Note No. 57/84, published by the United Nations Centre against Apartheid. New York, November 1984.

Extensive information on the involvement of West European countries, oil and shipping companies (number of shipments, approximate amount of crude oil in tons, company addresses) has been added. The paper concludes with recommendations on possible actions by solidarity movements, churches, trade unions and others in Western Europe.