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MEMORANDUM FOR DISCUSSION WITH SENATOR DENNIS DECONCINI, FROM ARIZONA, USA
BY MANGOSUTHU G. BUTHELEZI, CHIEF MINISTER OF KWAZULU
AND PRESIDENT INKATHA FREEDOM PARTY

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Senator DeConcini, I hope you will accept that it was Jjust not possible for me to receive you properly in Ulundi. I have just returned as you know from a trip abroad and I returned to deal with a very full diary. But I am pleased that it was possible for me to receive you and Mrs. DeConcini and your delegation here.

I always make every effort to meet Senators from the United States because it is vitally important for the future of this country that foreign governments generally, and the US Government in particular, are fully informed on what is happening here.

My own perspectives of the South African situation remain positive despite the difficulties that we are experiencing in creating the circumstances in which negotiations which now can be held, will succeed.

All +the major Parties in South Africa have committed themselves to participate in negotiations about the constitutional future of our country. Thats- s .the â\200\230dominant,: â\200\230eentrad;s plus facteor ig.s our politics. Negative factors are the remaining distrusts and fears that exist between race groups and what appears to be the intention of the ANC +to use the negotiation process to establish its own dominance more than to establish a multi-Party democracy in which other political Parties have as much chance of winning elections as they do.

This is a central problem and far too few analysts are looking at 1t Everyone knows that revolutionaries throughout the world, and down through the ages, have not shown a great ability to struggle to establish multi-Party democracies in which other Parties can form governments.

If the ANC does turn out to be such a revolutionary movement, +then it will be making history. What it is now doing, however, is not very promising of this history.

Firstly, however serious Dr Mandela is when he says that he  $\mid$  is committed to negotiate a peaceful settlement of the South African

situation, there are realities behind the ANC scenes which need examination.

One of these realities is that more than half of +the full-time members of the ANC's National Executive Committee are members of the South African Communist Party. This fact, together with the fact +that there is no ANC member who is not also an SACP member on the South African Communist Party's National Executive, gives the SACP control over the ANC. They are more than working partners

The implications of these facts are quite frightening. When Dr Mandela receives the highest possible Cuban award from Dr Fidel Castro and when Dr Mandela embraces Colonel Gadaffi and receives millions of rands of aid from him, and when he embraces Yasser Arafat and condemns the allied war against Iraqg, then the whole world should sit up and take note.

I am particularly concerned about these connections because during the years preceding Mr FW de Klerk's bombshell address to Parliament on February 2 1990, the ANC, without knowing what was coming, began talking about the need for a two-phase Socialist struggle. The first phase would be the winning of the protelarian battle and the second phase would be the winning of the Socialist battle.

The South African Communist Party is formally and officially adopting the position that Communism has not failed, only its administrators failed. It says that Communism is good and can be made to work in South Africa.

Firstly then, as I say, I do not know how far the ANC is down the road to produce history which shows that it as a revolutionary organisation is capable of struggling to establish a true, multi-Barty democracy because it remains Communist connected and Communist driven.

The second reason why I am concerned about the negotiation process and the ANC's involvement in it, is that the ANC still keeps its own revolutionary army, Umkhonto we Sizwe, intact and at the ready. It =isi . still recruiting young -South<Africans for training â\200\234in â\200\234#it. Its high command is still intact. Its cadres are still intact. It has caches of arms hidden around the country. Umkhonto we Sizwe is war ready and it is being kept war ready, and it is not being kept war ready because the ANC is totally convinced that they will have no need of it in the future.

A real and true commitment to the politics of negotiation would be more credible if it was accompanied by the demobilisation of a revolutionary army which is clearly not needed to end apartheid.

A third reason why I am concerned about the ANC is that whereas before Mr FW de Klerk made his famous February 2 address, the ANC said +that the only negotiation it would be involved in was negotiation for the handing over of power to the people, foe. it o itself, it is now demanding something different.

Now the ANC is demanding the handing over of power to an Interim Government and it will make quite sure that if that ever happens, o 7 the ANC, will ©be in +the driving seat of that Interim Government. The ANC lis being true to its revolutionary commitments.

A fourth reason why I am concerned about the ANC is that issues which should be settled at the negotiating table are made part of

its current mass action programmes. This is a two-fold danger. Firstly that issues which should be dealt with at the negotiating table are dragged into street cormer politics, and secondly that

mass action with its power plays and intimidatory intentions are in those street corner politics.

If we are to build a new South Africa, we will have to build on democratic constituencies to which all political Parties would have to defer. Mass action programmes do not build constituencies. They are used only to build up power.

Fifthly I am concerned about the ANC because it has already given clear indications that it will follow procedures of going to the negotiation table, meeting difficulties, thumping the desk when it does mnot get its way and then leave the negotiation table +to undertake mass action protest against its opponents.

On a number of occasions, Dr Mandela has threatened to withdraw from the politics of negotiation. One has only to read the ANC's 5th April Open Letter to the State President to see the point I am making. The constant threat will be do this or do that, or we will walk out.

The ANC and Dr Mandela himself, talk about the ANC as a government - in-waiting. It lis working only for its own empowerment and we stand in danger of the ANC being prepared to work for the crushing of every other political Party to achieve power. It wants power to reside in the ANC and not in the people who can elect and remove governments.

Sixthly, I am concerned about the ANC because quite clearly it is intending to pursue winner-takes-all politics and is opting for an all-or-nothing political system. The Harare Declaration which was authored by the ANC outside South Africa without consulting other Parties was rushed to the OAU for endorsement and +the ANC is saying this is what South Africa shall have.

Dr Mandela lis now saying that he is ready immediately +to enter negotiations but that the South African Government must agree to hand over full control of all the organs of the State to an Interim Government.

There will not be a one-Party State in South Africa. Of  $\hat{A}$  \* with a  $\hat{A}$  \* very confident. There will not be a Communist State either. There will be a multi-Party democracy. This is what South Africans want, whatever the ANC does. South Africans will increasingly become aware of the ANC's double agenda.

I am totally confident that apartheid is doomed and a multi-Party

democracy will come, not because I have some kind of wunshakable faith in myself, Mr de Klerk or in any other set of political leaders. I am confident because there is now no one Party in the political driving seat. There is an interdependency in the

political field which is going to be far stronger than the ANC believes it to be.

The ANC will step by step move into a position in which it finally has to fight off +the whole of the rest of South Africa in attempting to do what it is going to attempt to do. Change in South Africa is not Party politically driven. Change in South Africa lis coming about because the people of our country want to shed apartheid and adopt a democracy. Black, White, Indian and Coloured South Africans are now joining together in this momentous movement away from the past and into the future.

The present situation of flux and change and fluidity is nobody's Party political wvictory. However important the threat of escalating violence was as a factor in the process of change, and however important the threat of increasing extermnal hostility to South Africa may have been, the actual revolutionary attempts made and the actual isolation of South Africa did not bring about the end of apartheid.

Apartheid was unworkable economically, it was politically impossible to enforce and it was mass rejection of apartheid inside the country by South Africans on the ground in every day life that spelt out the end of it.

The ANC must now drop its old-style politics. Dr Mandela mnmust cease seeking excuses about why he does not want the IFP intact and powerful at the negotiating table. His rather umnseemly political

attitude +to what he calls the funding scandal of the IFP reflects his basic fear of the IFP's ideological and political independence.

The South African Government made R250 000 available to Mr MZ Khumalo to assist in the holding of two peace rallies. Mr Senator, I attach copies of the speeches I delivered on these two occasions so that you can see what that money I did not know about, bought.

Mr Khumalo has publicly stated that he did not refer the matter to me when it came up because he knew that I would say no to receiving funds from the South African Government because it would create the very misunderstandings that the funding has now created.

Now . Dr .Mandelaâ\200\231 â\200\2301Sâ\200\231 saying that\*he ' will. find! dte" difficuli â\200\234 sto

negotiate if Inkatha Freedom Party was present, and in so doing, states that the IFP as the IFP, and I as President of the IFP, were responsible for the debacle.

He expects us +to forget the horrible atrocities +that +the ANC committed in the name of revolution and to accept the ANC back in South Africa with open arms, but he wants to use things in real and

 $^{\prime}$  imagined from +the IFP's past for reasons for not wanting +to negotiate with it now.

This ANC hypocrisy and the violence that there now is because of the ANC's past commitment to violence, training for violence and action for violence, must be looked at very seriously as stumbling blocks to the peaceful solution of our country's problems.

The issues that I have raised here, Senator, need to be discussed

openly with the ANC. After the ANC's 5th April Open Letter to the State President did so much damage to the beginnings that were made on the 29th January to normalise relationships between the ANC and the IFP, Dr Mandela agreed with me that it was urgent that the ANC's National Executive and the IFP's Central Committee should now meet.

. Mr Alfred Nzo, when he was still Secretary-General, wrote in June

to confirm the ANC's acceptance of the need for such a meeting on dates suitable to Dboth Parties. I have written to Dr Mandela offering dates for the meeting. The ball is in his court. The two organisations must now meet if the drive for peace lis going to continue gathering momentum and we if are going to move on to the next step of "holding . an all-Party Conferénce 'to' 'â\200\230plan the negotiation process.