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MEMORANDUM FOR DISCUSSION WITH
A DELEGATION OF THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS
LED BY J.P. PRONK, MINISTER FOR DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION
SUBMITTED BY
MANGOSUTHU BUTHELEZI
MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS
PRESIDENT OF THE INKATHA FREEDOM PARTY
CHAIRMAN OF THE KWAZULU-NATAL HOUSE OF TRADITIONAL LEADERS

Cape Town, 23 March 1995

The Kingdom of the Netherlands has had such an ixL\portant role in the unfolding of our rec

history and the consolidation of democracy in our country, that I welcome this opportunity of

discussing with you some of the burning issues facing us in the new South Africa. You will understand, I am sure, that in meeting with Ministers of this Government, your delegation to

South Africa is in fact dealing with members of different political parties comprising a Government of National Unity. As Minister of Home Affairs I therefore wear more than one hat,

since I am a member of Cabinet but, as the President of the Inkatha Freedom Party, \hat{a} 200 \231I_am also the

leader of the opposition within Cabinet. Moreover, as know that ours is an extremely comple $\boldsymbol{\boldsymbol{x}}$

country consisting of diverse forms of societal organization and societal administration, a nd to a

certain extent I myself am the expression of such complexity and diversity. In fact, not on ly am

I an elected member of Parliament and a Minister, but, as you know, I am also the Chairman of

the House of Traditional Leaders of the Kingdom of KwaZulu-Natal which reflect a form of traditional community organization and governanLe based on shared land and consensus rather than majority rule. I hope therefore, that I am in a position to give a broad perspective a nd that

you will feel free to pursue any issues arising fro#n this brief presentation.

Allow me, first of all, to comment on some of the tasks and challenges of my Ministry in particular. There are many priorities facing us, but three are particularly important. One is the

issue of translating into legislation the right to freedom of expression enshrined in our present

constitution. Coming from a country as liberal as the Netherlands, I am not sure you will readily

comprehend how strictly censored our people have been, not only with regard to political matters.

but equally resulting from the previous Government's self-proclaimed guardianship of the country's morals. During last year's budget debate I indicated that never again should we be told

what we could or could not say, write, see or read and that I would be introducing legislat ion to

attend to this.

Another very important issue is the illegal entry into South Africa of aliens. Although we are

facing problems with citizens of a number of countries --including I might add several Euro pean

countries-- choosing to reside here without being entitled to do so, the crux of the crisis we are

facing is that vast numbers of people from neighboring states, and from Mozambique in particular,

are flooding into South Africa seeking opportunities not available in their own countries. I am

aware of perceptions in Europe of South Africa being the potential saviour of Africa, or mo re

especially of sub-Saharan Africa, but I must impress upon you the fact that we are a developing

country ourselves, with huge and politically explosive problems confronting us. We are extremely

willing to assist our neighbours, all the more so since they suffered so much as a result of their

solidarity in the struggle against apartheid. but by the same token, this cannot be by mean ${\sf s}$ of

millions of our people losing their jobs, housing, access to health care and so on. As both a

country and a Ministry, we are struggling with thiLs, and must reach an accord with our neighbours

on how to address the issue. Experience in Europe suggests that until and unless one's neighbours

are able to provide for their own people. this problem will not go away, and I believe we must

therefore do everything possible to assist our neighbours in developing their economies.

A third key concern is the registration of voters for the up-coming local government elections.

The elections are scheduled for November 1, this year, but I am really worried that many millions

of people will in fact be unable to vote by due date $200\230$ by virtue of the fact that un like the general

election of April last year, this time voters have to be registered in order to exercise their right

to vote. The key concern is whether the registration effort is in fact succeeding or failin ${\sf g.}$ Let me

stress that my Ministry is doing everything possit&le to expedite our brief, but the proble m is

unfortunately not purely technical. More important is the fact that insufficient numbers of people

appear ready or willing to be registered as voters - only 10% of eligible voters have so fa $\ensuremath{\mathtt{r}}$

registered - and this is a political problem. In general, it can be said that there is a greater

propensity to register in the White, Coloured and Asian communities, which comprise only 30 $\ensuremath{\S}$

of the population. The other 70%, for a variety of r#easons, are not registering at an adeq uate rate.

This problem is particularly acute in rural areas which are organized as traditional commun ities,

some of which are extremely isolated from any registration office and have never used ident itv

documents and vital records. A potentially chaotic and difficult situation has been made wo rse

by the political tensions which generate in a forced coalition such as the ${\tt GNU.}$ For instance while

my department controls central government's structures and resources needed both for the

issuance of identity documents and for voters' roll registration, the entire function of voters' roll

registration has been transferred and put under the control of a task force which reports to the

Minister of Provincial Affairs, Constitutional Development and Local Government, Mr. R.P.

Meyer, while I am the political head with respect to the issuance of identity documents required

for such registration.

The result might well be very low registration and that elections on November 1 are not adequately legitimised or that the date will have | to be shifted or staggered per Province. Certainly, in KwaZulu-Natal which has an IFP-led Government, we are doing everything in our

power to impress upon people the urgency of registering timeously, and we hope to see much

improved results shortly. During the April 1994 elections, we were assisted by several Euro pean

countries and the European Community itself in fields such as voter education and monitorin g_{r}

and should there be a willingness to again assist, this would be very important for the consolidation of democracy and I am sure we would be extremely grateful. In fact, these loc al

government elections will be the real acid test off whether democracy has taken roots in our r

country after the April 27, 1994 elections.

I must add however, that improved voter registration does not resolve all the problems, or even

the major problem in KwaZulu-Natal, with respect to local government elections, and I belie ve

this is an opportune moment to reflect upon events from an IFP perspective rather than as ${\tt M}$ inister

of Home Affairs. As far as local government is concerned, delegates to our Special General Conference held on March 4 and 5 resolved that registration should be stepped up, but that the

decision as to whether we participate or do not participate in the elections depends upon whether

international mediation has taken place.

It is important to preface my remarks with a brief overview of how we view the present cris is on

international mediation, and how it relates to both the constitution-making process and to local

government. As you know, the IFP took exception to the process that resulted in the interim

constitution, and that it took great exception as well, to much in that constitution. We objected

to the fact that the Constitution reflects a non- African $\hat{a}\200\230$ approach based on majori ty rule rather than $\hat{a}\$

consensus for it empowers a Constitutional Assembly and establishes a substantially unitary state

from the time we walked out of the World Trade Center Negotiations process in July 1993 until

the elections themselves, we engaged in extremely intense negotiations, bilaterally and trilaterally

with the ANC and NP, in order to find sufficient commonality expressed by way of constitutional

amendments to enable us to enter the elections. The process almost failed, but was saved at the

eleventh hour by an agreement between the country's three most senior leaders. The Agreemen t

for Reconciliation and Peace, signed by Presidents

1994, and which was the sole basis upon which t

Mandela, De Klerk and myself on 19 April

he IFP entered the elections, provided for

outstanding constitutional issues in respect of both the Monarchy and the Interim Constitut ion, to

be addressed by means of international mediation a

s soon as possible after the elections. These

outstanding issues were clearly identified in the ansolidated Terms of Reference agreed upo

earlier.

However, we have totally failed in over 10 months

to abide by the Agreement they signed. As one of th

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of intense pressure, to get the ANC and NP $\,$

e three signatories, I have exhausted private

conversations and correspondence with the other signatories as avenues to take things furth er . And

in other fora - ie, the National Assembly, Senate, Cabinet, Constitutional Assembly,

Constitutional Committee and Management Committee - IFP representatives have tried everything

possible to get the ANC and NP to honour their word. For all that we tried, it was to no avail.

and a stage was reached when it was clear to us that our walking out of Parliament last month to seek a fr \hat{A} ¢

stress that were it not for the Agreement of Reconci

ve were getting nowhere. This resulted in sh mandate from our constituency. I must

iation and Peace, the IFP would not have

participated in the election and I would not be here as Minister of Home Affairs in the Government of National Unity. Once it became clear that the ANC and NP were not going to implement the Agreement, we had no choice but to o

The other parties signed the Agreement knowing full

reneged on this. In essence, we agreed between oursel

btain a fresh mandate.

well what its consequences were and have

ves that notwithstanding the important role

of the Constitutional Assembly in the process of constitution-making, there were certain is sues

that would not be addressed by the CA itself, but would be addressed by the mechanism of

international mediation. The issue now is not whether this is a good or a bad idea as the o ther two

parties are intimating, but whether the Agreement is going to be implemented or not. We are

insisting that the Agreement be honoured for the simple reason that the very issues it was intended

to resolve remain the core issues surrounding our rejecting the Interim Constitution and the

present process of constitution-making and our refusing to participate in the April 1994 el ections.

If we were lured into the elections on false pretenses, we believe the ANC and NP should be straight and honest with us. They should inform us of

this, so we at least know where we stand.

If this is not the case, then the Agreement should simply be implemented.

Instead we get one story after another which amount to nothing but prevarication and obfusc ation $\bar{\ }$

for example, that there is nothing to mediate, or that we should first agree on the terms o ${\sf f}$

reference, or that if there are constitutional issues in contention, that the Constitutional Assembly

should deal with them. These are all non-issues, and we are not going to be fobbed off in this

manner.

On March 6, 1994 the Special General Conference Jadopted a very measured, if not moderate view, largely on my suggestion, in agreeing to go back to the Constitutional Assembly. I say this

because the delegates to Conference were not impressed by the breach of the Agreement and \boldsymbol{w} ere

very angry. However, they took into consideration, as did I, the fact that Deputy President Thabo

Mbeki, who had been mandated by President Mandela to deal with the issue, had called me fro m

the USA during our 3 March National Coua:il deliberations on this very issue, pleading with me

to give the ANC a chance to pursue a satisfactory resolution of the matter. In the end, and after

much sometimes very heated debate, we agreed. Conference resolved to give the other parties one

month to start implementing the Agreement, fai]iTg which the IFP's Parliamentarians were

instructed to withdraw from the Constitutional Assembly. The Conference also made it very clear

that our withdrawal from the Constitutional Assembly would carry the necessary consequences that the IFP would not recognise the final Constitution produced by such an Assembly. We also

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must realize that we accepted the Interim Constitution only because of the agreement for Reconciliation and Peace, the breach of which forces | us to reconsider to which extent we an d our

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provincial government in KwaZulu-Natal may co sider ourselves bound by the spirit of the Interim Constitution.

So Far Deputy President Mbeki has not been in touch

with me. The following is a letter that I wrote

to him on the 20th of March, on seeing no response from him about this matter of internatio nal

mediation in spite of his return from Washington and

The Hon Mr T M Mbeki

Executive Deputy President

Office of the President and Deputy Presidents Private Bag $\rm X1000$

CAPE TOWN

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Dear Deputy President

INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION

I wish to thank you for your call from the United Staje

talk to our National Conference in such a way that de

day should not make it difficult for you to do son

international mediation is concerned.

 $\ensuremath{\text{I}}$ am enclosing a copy of the resolutions that were tak

I was rather concerned when I heard that you have g hear from you since it was my understanding that you on your return from Washington. I am not complainin carry for the whole Country.

I however appeal to you now that something be done

the Netherlands.

20 March 1995

s on the 4th of March when you asked me to isions they were going to reach the following wething to find a way forward as far as the

cen by Conference on the 6th of March 1995. one again on official business before I could

were going to get in touch with us in the IFP g knowing as I do the responsibilities that you

to try and find the way forward in this matter

of the Agreement that we signed with President Mandela and Deputy President de Klerk on international mediation on the 19th of April 1994. \mid We had to postpone our National Council

meeting that was scheduled for the 18th of March bgcause of the fact that it had not so far been

possible to know from you as someone who was designated by the President to go into this matter $\frac{1}{2}$

what next, as far as this matter is concerned.

I will be grateful if I can know if you think there is a way forward as AmaKhosi of KwaZulu see a

nexus between sorting out this issue of international mediation and the forthcoming local government elections . I know that all sorts of motives are attributed to us, when we talk in this way.

I wish you to accept our bonafides and that we do genuinely see a nexus between this issue of

international mediation and the local government elections. I therefore see some urgency ab out this

since there are time frames for these elections.

So far it was resolved that our people register for the local authorities elections without committing

ourselves to participating in the forthcoming local authorities elections. Believe us when we state

that we are willing and even eager to do so should a solution be found for resolving the problem of

international mediation. It is this which makes the whole matter urgent in our view, thus t his letter.

Awaiting to hear from you Mr Deputy President. My respects and warm regards.

Yours sincerely

M G BUTHELEZI PRESIDENT - INKATHA FREEDOM PARTY

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Even though Mr Mbeki carries quite a lot as the Executive President it is quite extraordina $\rm ry$ that he

has not been in touch with me, after his return from these overseas trips.

Moreover I must express my disopointment at the comment made by President Mandela last Saturday when he intimated that he saw no reason for international mediation going ahead at all, and

that he was not prepared to consider it at all unless he was first convinced of its necessity. Really,

I thought that the person to whom he had delegated the issue should not be preempted in this

manner, and I thought moreover, that leaders of such stature do not consider whether they a re

prepared to honour agreements they make. They simply honour them.

You should note that this is where the linkage with local government comes into play, for the

President made his comment after a meeting with His Majesty the King of the Zulus. His Majesty

was not a signatory to the Agreement and is in fact immaterial as far as the Agreement is concerned, and the ANC is using His Majesty as a grutch to support its rejection of mediati on.

But the issue at stake is not centered on the King, buton the institution of the monarchy a nd the

restoration of our Kingdom in the context of provincial self-determination and a Provincial

Constitution for KwaZulu-Natal. And the institution of the monarchy is inextricably linked with

the Kingdom of KwaZulu-Natal, with the role of traditional authorities within it, with the principle

of pluralism and how people choose to organise themselves, of subsidiary and of federalism.

It is very unfortunate, but I must state — even as a merpher of Cabinet — that the ANC-led central

Government is interfering in provincial affairs, espedially in matters that should not conc ern it.

For instance, traditional matters are a provincial competence, but the central Government is

- ~ constantly dealing with His Majesty on a bilateral basis, ignoring the Provincial Government of
- which he is the Constitutional Monarch. It has taken it upon itself to provide security for the King.
- It is trying to pay the amaKhosi directly from central Government coffers. It is attempting to
- dictate the form of local government appropriate to traditional communities. These are all instances of issues which international mediation is intended to address the status of the

Monarch, of the Kingdom, of the Kingdom's rightlto self-regulation. More than half of the

province's population reside in areas where traditiorLl rule is the norm, and these people have

taken great exception to what the central Government and the ANC in particular are doing. It is

for this reason that amaKhosi have insisted upon the Agreement on international mediation being

honoured prior to their committing themselves to participating in the local government elections.

This is why there is such a clear nexus between the issues identified by ourselves and the other

signatories in the Consolidated Terms of Reference for international mediation, and local government elections and the position of the amaKhosi in this regard. They are not issues w hich

the Cape Town's Constitutional Assembly should determine on the basis of whichever party or parties can put together the requisite majority. They are instead, issues which the three s ignatories

agreed before the elections should be addressed by means of mediation and negotiation prior to

the Constitutional Assembly coming into being, and that the Constitutional Assembly would in

essence flesh out the constitution on the basis of agreement first reached by way of mediat ion.

South Africa is a fledgling democracy with great pronijse. We must therefore do everything in our

power as political parties and as leaders to ensure that this democracy does not flounder. That is

why it is so very important that this Government roots out corruption, that it develops a c lean

administration, that it abides by the Constitution, and that its leaders abide by agreement s. It is

therefore untenable for leaders and parties to shrug off their obligations in a cavalier fa shion, for

this not only heightens $mistm\tilde{A}$ $\otimes t$ within Parliament and Cabinet itself, which is surely the last thing

we need in a Government of National Unity, but it seriou 'ly undermines the very foundation upon

which the new order is being built. It is our view that the people of KwaZulu-Natal in particular

have the right to constitute an intrinsic part of a united South Africa, and moreover, that they have

the right to determine for themselves the nature of the federal relationship they have with the rest

of the country as well as the manner in which they choose to rule themselves, all within the

constraints, of course, of the new constitution. For instance your country is a kingdom and yet

is part of the European Union which is increasingly resembling a federal system.

No one is talking of confederalism, let alone secession, but you would imagine from the hyperbole

expressed by our opponents that we are attempting to pursue a constitutional path that will

automatically result in a Bosnia in South Africa. Nothing \hat{A} could be further from the truth. Our

constitutional proposals, which we believe will be endorsed lby the vast majority of the people of

 ${\tt KwaZulu-Natal,\ are\ perfectly\ in\ line\ with\ modern\ Western\ constitutionalism,\ offering\ our\ people}$

the highest protection possible against the possible abuse of state power, offering them the highest

level of participation in legislative and administrative processes, and offering them highe st level

of autonomy commensurate with a modern and developing country. I wish to stress that our

proposal for the restoration of the Autonomous Kingdom of Kya Z ulu-Natal is based on the not ion

of the Constitutional Monarchy in which the King reigns but does not govern.

The point I would like to stress is the necessity of constitution-making being as consensus -based

elections, but was achieved at the very last minute on the basis of the Agreement for

Reconciliation and Peace. We need to return to the ethos that produced that Agreement, which

W@@emus for only in that way can we groceed with constitution-making

on the basis of consensus and mutual trust, and only in that way | can we avoid unfortunate results

arising from the failure to honour the Agreement.

Our country has witnessed a miraculous transformation, and we aic rightly acclaimed for having

achieved as much as we have. We must of course, build on this in every way possible. We must t

build our economy. We must create maximum opportunity for the maximum number of people.

We must deliver the services people need. We must create a rl%hts culture. We must protect the

autonomy of civil society. As individuals, communities political parties, leaders and governments, we must in fact do everything expected of a mi¬\201dern registration, for that is what

we have deliberately set out to create, and that is what we have in fact created, albeit im perfectly.

But we murt 20 all this deeply aware of the fact that we are rooted in Africa, not Europe.

culture is largely a hybrid of Africa and the West, and we need to take the best from each as we

build that which is uniquely South African. This requires great tolerance and understanding from

all of us, so that we do not create a destructive backlash whigh harms us all.

No matter the common South Africanism that unites us all, South Africa is a plural society and

the acknowledgement of this is a necessity in our process of constitution-making. I therefore fear

the consequences of refusing to accept this reality, and I fear the consequences of pretending that

unity and uniformity can and should be imposed from above. I hope that reason and honour wi $11\,$

prevail in the crisis facing us, and that the constitution we create will be a truly South African

constitution which will serve us and our descendants for generations to come.