THE 10-DAY synod of the white Neder-duitse Gerefor-meerde Kerk (NGK), which begins in Pretoria today, will be the most important meeting in the 300-year history of this church.

Representing some 65 percent of all Afrikaners and 40 percent of the whites, it is the most powerful and influential church in South Africa because of its very close ties with the Government and various Afrikaner national political parties.

The synod takes place at a time of tremendous ferment, the debate and tensions inside the NGK about its racial policies, relationship with the Government and with the

NGK synod

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racial policies

this week that in view of this decision by $a\200\230$ its eldest daughter church $a\200\231$, the church was experiencing $a\200\230$ its most serious crisis of

three black NG churches. | e
The NGK is facing grow- O Science:
ing international and do- Doctor Pierre Rossouw,
By

Hennie Serfontein

mestic ecumenical isolation because of two recent important Church meetings which directly affected the position of the NGK.

Six weeks ago at Ottawa the World Alliance of Reformed Churches (WARC) declared apartheid a heresy in conflict with reformed tradition and the | Scriptures, and suspend-

(ed the membership of the \prime NGK.

And a few days ago, at Belhar, Cape Town, the synod of the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Sending-kerk (for coloureds) con: firmed the Ottawa decision. It declared apartheid â\200\230a theological idolatry and heresyâ\200\231.

Reconciliation

Reconciliations and continuous links with the white church would only be possible if the NGK repented and â\200\230confessed its guilt for providing the moral and theological foundations for apart-

. heidâ $\200\231$.

The Keikbode, the offi-

cial mouthpiece of the
. NGK, said in an editorial

the chief executive officer and director of ecumenical affairs of the church, said that the eyes of the world, and in particular of

the member churches of

the WARC would be focused on the Pretoria synod.

Although the agenda and the reports of the synod are still confidential, it is an open secret that a number of contentious reports affecting sensitive political and racial issues \hat{a} \200\230will be debated.

These include matters such as the Immorality and Mixed Marriages Acts, church unifications and the relationship with the three black churches, and its support for apartheid in church and politics as stated in the booklet Human Relations and the SA Scene in the Light of the Scripture.

But the NGKâ\200\231s synod also faces serious criticism by a small group of theologians, ministers and lay persons from inside the church itself.

In the controversial book Stormkompas, and in the open letter signed by ministers and theolo-

gians, apartheid in church and politics was categorically and unequivocally rejected on scriptural grounds.

And last week 33 lay persons called on the synod for a reflection after the Ottawa decisions on $a\geq 0$ practical implications of neighbourly love $a\geq 0$.

Professor Willie Jonker,

the moderate theologian of the University of Stellenbosch, said in an interview in the Kerkbode that the deadlock between the NG Kerk and the black NG churches could be broken only by the white church. He stated that the key to break the deadlock was the qualifications added by the NGK to its support for separate development, it

~ must comply with the de-

mands of justice and neighbourly love.

Professor Jonker urged that the NGK should not merely confine itself to an abstract discussion of separate development. It should look at the application of Government laws in practise and how this was viewed by the black churches.

Humiliation

He warned: â\200\230The many concrete examples of racism in our church and political life and the humiliation and suffering which that caused (the blacks) make it impossible for them to believe our honest intentions.â\200\231

However, the chances

| that the NGK synod will

respond to the urgent

pleas of this small hand-

ful of concerned members are remote in view of the refusal of the moderature officially to receive the open letter.

It is most unlikely that any major decisions will be taken, or that there will be any fundamental policy changes, or that there will be serious criticism of and rejection of Government policies and

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Answer needed

All these contentious matters will probably be referred to a special the-ological committee with the task of reviewing the existing policies on racial

| and political matters.
This committee will then
probably have to report
back to a special synod |
two years later. (NGK synods meet only once every !
four years). !
| However, a clear answer must be given in
reponse to the Ottawa and
Belhar decisions, and on
the NGKâ\200\231s relations with

! the black churches. In- \cdot

tense debate on these

matters is expected. -

Membership of the secret Afrikaner Broederbond \hat{a} 200\224 to which more than 50 percent of all NGK ministers belong â\200\224 will also be discussed. About 550 delegates from all four provinces, Namibia and Zimbabwe will elect a moderator on the first day. The strongest candidates are: Dominee Kobus Potgieter, the present acting moderator, strong conservative and a senior Broederbonder; the moderate Professor Johan Heyns

(also a Broederbonder); the hard-line conservative Dr Dirk Fourie, the present actuary (also a Broederbonder); and Dr

! Pierre Rossouw, a moder-

ate conservative who is a non-Broeder.

Whoever is elected will make no difference to the main line of thinking to be followed by the NGK.

IN AN SABC-TV interview at the weekend
the Minister - of
Defence, Mr Magnus
Malan, defined destabilisation as â\200\234actions
aimed at creating a situation in a country
whereby you can disrupt the country or
overthrow the Governmentâ\200\235.

The governments of the African Frontline States â\200\224 such as Angola, Mozambique and Zim-babwe â\200\224 are convinced this is precisely the policy South Africa is following in Southern Africa â\200\224 particularly in respect of their countries.

. In recent months there have been numerous reports in the overseas Press dealing with South Africaâ\200\231s alleged destabilisation of its neighbouring states and its support and backing for the rebel guerrilla Unita movement in Angola and the Mozambique Resistance Movement (MNR).

 $\hat{a}\200\230$ There 1S growing concern in Western diplomatic circles about South Africa $\hat{a}\200\231$ s clandestine activities in its neighbouring states which are g{ohtically hostile to the

epublic.

The Western concern is connected mainly to efforts directed at achieving an internally-acceptable settlement in South West Africa.

However, frequent strikes by the SADF into southern Angola and the recent shooting down of a Russian MiG aircraft over Angola have raised fears in some quarters that South Africa could be preparing the climate for a

- . full-scale invasion of Angola along the lines of Israelâ\200\231s
- i recent occupation of Lebanon if diplomatic efforts to

?c.l;mve a\Cuban withdrawal
ail.

Evidence that there was ificial South African in-

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ate destabilisati

reports.

volvement in the abortive Seychelles coup attempt last year, and the killing of SADF troops in Zimbabwe in August, described by the SADF as an â\200\234unofficial missionâ\200\235 has done nothing to disgglthewidely held belief that

uth Africa is following a policy of deliberate destabilisation in its neighbouring states.

Recent pronouncements by the Prime Minister, Mr P W Botha, that a Cuban presence in Angola cannot be tolerated and that South Africaâ\200\231s â\200\234sphere of influence extends to all its neighbours in southern Africa has led to intense speculation that South Africa could have adopted a more hardline foreign policy stand â\200\224 dictated by military thinking.

The provocative comment by the Minister of Defence, Mr Malan, after the shooting down of a Russian MiG aircraft â\200\224 that the MiG pilots â\200\234better watch it or we'll clobber themâ\200\235 â\200\224 has lent further credence to the theory that South Africa has adopted a more aggressive approach to the presence of communist tranns in southern Africa.

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ petter watch it or we'll clobber them $\hat{a}\200\235$ $\hat{a}\200\224$ is being seen as signalling a more aggressive approach.

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Malanâ\200\231s retort: who is destabilising'

The appearance of the Minister of Defence, Mr Magnus Malan, on television at place against the background of mounting allegations that the SADF is pursuingap on of South Africaâ $200\231s$ neighbours. Political Correspondent JOHN

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the weekend took

olicy of deliber-BATTERSBY

Reports from Washington $\hat{a}\200\230$ that the US CIA chief, Mr $\hat{a}\200\230$ William Casey, had visited South Africa recently to work out a plan to create a cordon of states bordering

South Africa free of infiltration by the banned African National Congress indicate more than an academic interest on the part of the United States.

The deal is believed to

involve the exchange of assurances that the Frontline States will ensure that any ANC presence in their countries is limited to political activity while South Africa will cease its incursions into

neighbouring states.

I%: a recent speech, the Foreign Minister, Mr Pik Botha, said South Africa could not tolerate the existence of a ring of Soviet-suppo_.'ted Marxist states around South

Africa.;i

While Western countries, other than the US, have

become sceptical of denials by South Africa that it is involved in a policy of destabilisation, there will be gen-

commâ\200\224â\200\224â\200\224â\200\224â\200\224

eral relief at Mr Malanâ\200\231s dismissal of the â\200\230â\200\234Lebanon optionâ\200\235 in Angola.

Mr Malan said that such a move by South Africa would be playing into the hands of the Soviets.

â\200\234Have you thought what would happen if we moved into Angola at this stage and if we wanted to prop up a government there with South African soldiers?

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ It would mean enormous economic expense for this country and we would be going into a Vietnam situation.

 $\hat{a}\200\234I$ think it is the best situation that could come about for Russia which is in the $\hat{a}\200\230$ rrocess of confronting a $Vi\tilde{A}\otimes t$ -nam in Angola though the Cubans and it (Russia) is a powerful country.

 \hat{a} \200\234I would rather grant Rus-.

sia that position than lead South Africa into that pothole, $\hat{a}\200\235$ Mr Malan said.

Mr Malan said that while militarily the SADF was lambasting Swapo, the solution would have to be a political and not a military one.

He said that with the 40 South West African internal parties arguing amongst themselves there was not much chance of a victory against Swapo.

 \hat{a} 200\234And that is part of the

- reason why we must get the

Cubans out if we want to find $: \ddot{\exists} \ 201 \ s: luuon in this area, <math>\hat{a} \ 200 \ 235 \ he$

Mr Malan said that the B:lltical struggle could only

won if you could create a

litical striving and formuate goals that would unite the entireâ\200\231 population and give them something they were prepared to stand up for. $\hat{a}\200\234$ Then only can you win. Otherwise you cannot $\hat{a}\200\224$ no matter how strong you are militarily, $\hat{a}\200\235$ he said.

Mr Malan denied that
South Africa was pursuing a
policy of destabilisation of its
neighbours and said that, on
the contrary, it was countries
like Mozambique, Zimbabwe,
Angola, Zambia and Lesotho
that were bent on destabilising the Republic through acts
of terror and allowing their
countries to be used as passages for terrorist
organisations.

ignificantly, Mr Malan referred to guerrillas of Unita and the MNR as freedom

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fighters and said that those

erganisations were making $\hat{a}\200\234$ Erogress of such a nature $\hat{a}\200\235$ that the governments of those countries blamed South Africa as a destabilising factor to divert attention from those $\hat{a}\200\230\hat{a}\200\234\hat{a}\200\230$ freedom

 \hat{a} \200\230 organisations \hat{a} \200\235.

ut perhaps the key to South Africaâ\200\231s strategy was revealed in Mr Malanâ\200\231s distinction between \hat{a} \200\234politically matureâ\200\235 nations \hat{a} \200\224 such as Swaziland, Malawi, Botswana, and the four in ndent homelands \hat{a} \200\224 and \hat{a} \200\234politically immatureâ\200\235 nations such as Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Angola, Zambia and Lesotho. \hat{A} ® The mature nations realised that it was in their in-

terests to co-operate $\hat{a}\202\co-$ nomically and in other '

spheres with South Africa while continuing $200\231$ to argue their political differences.

The immature nations refused to co-operate with South Africa in any sphere and committed themselves to overthrowing the â\200\234minority regime in the southâ\200\235 and to supporting organisations

such as Swapo.

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