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Health care in SA

is â\200\230sadly

Own Correspondent

DURBAN â\200\224 Health care in South Africa was â\200\234sadly

deficientâ\200\235 and did not meet the needs of communities who suffered the greatest burden of disease.

This was the message of researchers from the Centre for the Study of Health Policy in the Department of Community Health at the University of Witwatersrand.

Their paper on health care was delivered to delegates at the 19th annual congress of the Association for Sociology in South Africa, being held at the University of Durban-Westville.

The researchers said blacks were the least healthy population group with unacceptably low life expectancy and nutritional status, and unacceptably high infant mortality rates.

Preventive care was unsatisfactory and a large proportion of the population was not immunised. For

deficient

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example, in 1984 only 39 percent were fully immunised against measles; 44 percent against diphtheria; 44 percent against tetanus and 63 percent against tuberculosis. :

In many urban areas there was an inadequate supply of doctors, hospital out-patients departments, clinics and day hospitals.

â\200\234Even in the metropolitan area, access is very much determined by race and social class. In the rural areas and the homelands, the situation is much more bleak,â\200\235 the researchers said.

The ratio of doctors to patients varied from 1:14 000 in Lebowa and kwaZulu to 1:32 000 in Kangwane.

â\200\234These are huge ratios, particularly given the fact that many of these doctors are located in the hospitals providing secondary care.â\200\235

â\200\230The majority of people in the homelands were thus dependent on clinics staffed by clinic sisters for primary care. |
The researchers said in |

a typical homeland area, there should be one clinic for every 10 000 people.

However, in kwaZulu

there was only one clinic
for about every 27 000
people â\200\224 the worst ratio
in the homelands â\200\224 and
one clinic for about every
- 17500 people in Lebowa.
| â\200\234To provide adequate
| care, each clinic serving
10000 people would need
| to be staffed by two qual-
ified primary health care
nurses.â\200\235

The researchers found
that health care services |
did not give priority to
those most in need.

Studies showed that in
1985 the per capita ex-
penditure on health care
varied from R115 for
blacks to R249 for col- |
oureds, R245 for Indians
and R451 for whites.

â\200\230â\200\234According to the
Browne Commission, in
1984 and 1985 only
12,7 percent of public ex-
penditure went to the
homelands where per-
haps 40 percent of the
pog:xlation lives.â\200\235

) Natal there were 5,9
beds for every 1000
whites and 5,3 for every
1000 blacks. However, in
the homelands there
were 2,7 beds for every
1000 black patients.

ANC terrorism.

* BUSINESS DAY, Tuesday, July 6 1988

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OW that the dust has settled on the proliferation of strikes, stayaways and labour protests that marked the last several months, a more balanced analysis of events is possible: What quickly emerges is that what initial-

- ly appeared to be union successes
. may in fact be quite the opposite.

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| " Certainly the organised labour movement demonstrated its ability

| to apply pressure. It was able to bring the economy, if not to a halt, then to a crawl. Politically, it was able to pull the crowds, whether

- through support or because of fear
| of reprisals. But that aside, what did
- the unions actually gain?

The Labour Relations Amendment Bill, ostensibly one of the main targets of the three-day stayaway, has whipped through Parliament unchanged, with little more than polite noises from the 1. Minister concerned that he is prepared to discuss future amendments with unions. Whether or not such amendments actually materialise is another matter. .

stayaways and there will be a next round employers have in place legislation which does exactly what Margaret Thatcher did to drive back British unions bent on self-destruction: it confines the activities of trade unions to the workplace.

~_ The choice for unions is clear: if industrial action is restricted to labour issues, they are acting within the protection of the law. If their motives are political, they run the

Meanwhile, for the next round of

| risk of severe penalties, including

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| Blunt instrurhent

court orders confiscating their
assets. . :

Some on the left may scoff at the
idea of business actually resorting
to this mechanism. But beleaguered
managers are growing impatient
with the argument that, because
government is so short-sighted as to
deny black political aspirations nor-
mal expression, unions should auto-
matically become substitutes.

Profits for many, many busi-

nesses in this country are marginal.
Take away that margin â\200\224 for ex-
ample, by stopping production for
three or four days a month for
several months in a row, often in
contravention of negotiated agree-
ments â\200\224 and benign attitudes to-
wards unions tend quickly to sour.

It has not gone unmarked that the
stayaways were noticeably less ef-
fective in those organisations that
took a hardline â\200\234work or be firedâ\200\235
approach. As with the mine strike
last year, it was the more liberal
employers â\200\224 the â\200\234soft targetsâ\200\235 of
radical unionism, one might say â\200\224
that bore the brunt. This is now
working its way through in the form
of new agreements being ham-
mered out in many industries on far
less beneficial terms for the unions
than was the case six months ago.

The point is that unionists must
be aware of their dilemma as they
plan future strategies. They can
achieve the dubious political gains
of mass action any time, and on
virtually any pretext. But against
this they must weigh the industrial

cost, in terms of lost negotiating
ground, lost support and, finally,

lost jobs, of using the labour move-
ment as a political battering ram.

by masatting | â\200\224â\200\224
%% sireets Ing innocent Arabs in
-+, That stage, thank heaven, has not

- Whites, knowing

- the beastliest kind of attack, can
- Israeli soldier, that â\200\234]
answered only by hatretdr""'.fj A

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tat Ellis Park on Saturd
i ; aturda
- 8ave point to the '-recen{

| -Africa by attacking white civilians.

such organisations inevitap
pm a policy of violence to a grol::(
naked terrorism, Succumbing to
irbarism great:lâ\200\231! than the evils

) success, its policy of terror-
ism depends on white South Afr.
- Âçans permitting fear to govern their
- responses. All hope of peace in Al-

- been reached in South - Africa. -

they are a target of

still steel themselves A

; against
fear and rage which thoss attacr.
are intended to induce. They can
still resolve to resist the view &- e
cently attributed to an embittereq

A civilised outcome ins i
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MHE car bomb which explodedV

; ... threat from the ANCâ\200\231s is
â\200\230Hani to end the â\200\234sweet lifeâ\200\235 in S%l:tl;

ANC has made the descent, as

geria was lpst when French colons,
in similar circumstances, retaliateciâ\200\231 1

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people who constitute
of all races v_mnts;;tute th&;gg)grlty.

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Dukakis or Bush:
does it make any
difference to SA?

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E A poll were taken, I imagine
- most readers of this newspa-
r would say they favoured

Vice-President George Bush
to succeed Ronald Reagan. Their
opinion is understandable. It is
also mistaken.

Massachusetts Governor Michael
Dukakis, the Democratic presiden-
tial nominee, has taken a pl_'edictablï~\201
craven stand on SA, bowing as a
candidates must to special interests.

To appease the Reverend Jesse
Jackson, his seconds have agreed
that the country should be labelled
â\200\234terroristâ\200\235 in the party manifesto
and that â\200\234a date certainâ\200\235 should be
set for the departure of all remain-

ing US companies.
| The candidateâ\200\231s own position

paper on SA is equally risible.
e supports.â\200\230the Anti-Apartheid
| Amendments: â\200\230Act of 1988 even
| though it would deprive him of al-
most all policy-making power in
1 southern Africa, should he be elect-
ed. He vows to press for total sanc-
tions in the UN Security Council.

Unlike the Soviet Union, Cuba, the
' MPLA, Unita, most of Africa, the

European allies and the current

administration, he is in favour of
~delinking Cuban withdrawal and
' Namibian independence, thus align-

ing himself with P W Botha's most
'but let-he-also-ideally advisers. :

Tekrly

| Bush, by contrast, advocates con-
tinued 'engagement'. Early drafts
of the Republican platform talk of
'democratic enhancement' and of
finding 'tough, rational answers for
what we can do' to strengthen black |
' bargaining power through support

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for education, unions and private |
enterprise.

Both candidates are lying. Neither
will be able to fulfil his campaign
promises once elected. Both agendas
are the purest political fluff.

The most important thing to re-
member about the SA debate in this
country is that it is almost entirely
unconnected to SA. An analo-
might be the dispute over the word-
ing of Nicene Creed. In theory, the
question was how Christians might
most effectively communicate their

devotion. What actually was at issue
was the allocation of temporal
power between ecclesiastical
actions. T

Until November 1985 'and Rea-

fan's landslide re-election 'SA was
argely a marginal matter, of signifi-
cance only to such marginal inter-

ests as students, clergymen and a
few city and state legislators, most
of whom, being marginal, saw in it

- an opportunity to make themselves

less so. Even civil rights groups

&lamd it low on their of priori-
es. G ;

Reaganâ\200\231s crushing vi'ctoxfy

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SIMON BARBER in Washington i

LUDUKAKIS . . . predictable a D

changed that. His opponents were in
desperate need of pi;â\200\231:â\200\230va'ideological |
Wweapons to claw their way back. SA,
or to be more precise the beguillin
myth that a US administration coul g
end apartheid within a political
txmefraxxÃ©ï¬\201 if it so wished, was an
obvious choice.

It wasiâ\200\230an obvious choice for |
several reasons.

First, it had to do with race and

- Tace is the one subject that has only

to be whispered to turn the white

es_tablisl;ment to guilt-ridden jelly.

Second, it involved a policy, eco-

nomie sanctions, that in tg?s particu-

lar instance no sentient western gov-

ernment would ever willingly a opt,

s }Zyg} NESS i~\202i~\201)/

so there was little risk of the Reagan administration invalidating the .weapon b ng in.

v. Third, i ch as there was such a risk and emand for sanctions

- might be met â\200\230â\200\224 as it was with the , Presidentâ\200\231s executive order in 1985 " and the comprehensive Anti-Apart- â\200\234heid Act the followi:g tli' eau' â\200\224 it could safely be assum ere would be no positive effect in SA itself suffi- cient to kill the issue.

Fourth, there was in particular no chance that apartheid would dissolve during Reaganâ\200\231s last four years in office. In short, here was the political

- equivalent of a perpetual motion â\200\230machine, an ideological gun with an infinite magazine.

Should Bush be elected, the gun will still be needed. And because he : will maintain his predecessorâ\200\231s oppo- & sition to further sanctions, it will still be available. =3

Whatever he and his advisers now say he will do, Congress, whose con- tinued control by the Democrats is guaranteed, will at best persist in immobilising him, at worst drive â\200\230 - him back, year by year, new sanction

by new sanction. Â° OBUSH ... looking for answers If, on the other hand, Dukakis 4y ' wins, the weapon is no longer re- Over, and inasmuch as they are not, quired. The party of those who have their planks are valid in direct pro- had to resort to it will be in power, Portion to the extent they touch on and SA can l(:nce agaixlll s}}ige 0{5 â\200\230the Axgl:egncan votersâ\200\231 material wel l- scope â\200\224 which, tru told, is 2 g Y ; Â\$ wheâ\200\230:x:z most mainstream Democrat- The only people who will notice Jc politicians, Dukakis included, = When the language on SA disa would prefer it stayed. into the ether are the activists who o s forced its insertion in the first place. And since their candidate will have won, they are unlikely to carp excessively.

g8 ____An exception might be Jackson. ut what about Dukakisâ\200\231s cam- He will demand com tion for SA paâ\200\231lilgn promises, you ask. not being dec a â\200\234terroristâ\200\235 he fact is that in American elec- .Â« State, but that was part of his plan tion politics, there is no such thing-as. ,fam the start. He is what is known in ~a solemn oath. Platforms ge ener- *sthe trade as a shakedown artist. His ally torn up as soon as the electionis modus operandi has always been to

DQS!\200\230 Sir, O iy i
I REFER to the front page report in
. Business Day on June 24, in which it
| was stated that Mr Boya of the Unit-
ed Municipalities of SA (Umsa)
would be meeting me to discuss his
proposed United Forum to oppose
the National Council. - A
It is regrettable that Mr Boya
: . went to the Press and implied my
| possible involvement in his initia-
e * tives without prior consultation with
me..
t I would like to state that there is
| no basis whatsoever for a meeting or
discussion between myself and
Umsa.

%7!\200\2312 . e
: S R Kangwane

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extort impossible concessions so that

A list of those Dukakis might be
_expected to consider as replace-
ments to Chester Crocker would in-

- clude Don McHenry, the former UN
ambassador; Pauline Baker, the for-
mer staff director of the Senate
Africa subcommittee when it was
â\200\230chau'eq by Senator George McGov-
ern; Michael Clough, stucfy director
of the Secretary of Stateâ\200\231s advisory
ttee on SA; Stephen Davis, au-

thor of â\200\234Apartheidâ\200\231s belsâ\200\235, Inves-
tor l}aponsibility Research Centre
analyst and Dukakisâ\200\231s chief Africa

and, a long shot, Nancy Stetson, cur.
rent sgaff director of g o
committee,

~and Rotberg, whose vij seem
chiefly d:_iveg by fashion m career

: ogoportumty_, the rest all have doubts |
ut sanctions ::l:r the current leg-

time by a pealing vaguely for con-

'::rtedlallred gctitl)m Siaimd l%mi's

â\202¬ only way but knowin w

that it probably wonâ\200\231t hagpen. gll

e ANC to offer a vision of post-

. apartheid SA that whites can live

- with. Clough, rather more bravely

than the rest, says that more (unspe-

- cified) sanctions may be necessa

â\200\234blag

but the real focus should be on

Ã@mpowermentâ\200\235 in much the same

;ganner as the draft Republican plat-

rm. 3

Whoever is selected will have to

contend with a J)ermanent bureauc-

racy that broadly favours the cur-

rent a{proach and will continue to

take the newcomers aside and te]]

them what they can and cannot do.

Of course, Dukakis will be tempt-

to make zealous noises if and

when he takes office. Somethin of

the order of Vice-President Wa%ter

Mondaleâ\200\231s â\200\234one-man-one-voteâ\200\235 be-

tise In 1977 has to be e ted. But

Dukakis, like Jimmy garter,â\200\230 will

!eam and SA will fade, once more

into the background. :

Surely that is better than having

an endless series of sanctions battles

betwpen Congress and the admini-

stration, which there will most as-

suredly be if Bush succeeds?

A lesser of two evils, but

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