in ro

'to

raise fundsâ\200\231

bberie

 \hat{a} \200\230says members wing,

volved in the recent wave beries in the country.

Mr Heitmann said in a radio interview the most important reason was to raise funds for

S Ay)79y

JOHANNESBURGâ\200\224The Southern African correspondent Weekly, Mr Helmut

of Janeâ\200\231s Defence Romer-Heitmann, of the ANCâ\200\231s. military

Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), are in.

of armed rob-

A GANG of armed robbers held up a Newlands East, Durban, bottlestore and escaped with R25 000 in cash and took watches and Jjewellery from the manager and staff before making their getaway in a stolen car.

Police spokesman Cagt Hamilton Ngidi said five black men confronted the staff at the bottlestore in Garrick

man was armed with an AK-47 rifle, another

Place at 620 pm. One 3

Crime 'neporter â\200\230

with a shotgun, While three carried pistols.

They forced manager Leona¥d Buckley, 50,gto hand over the cash and

. a pistol and also forced

staff to hand over their jewellery.

The men then made their getaway in a car which had been stolen at gunpoint from a man in Kwa Mashu a few minutes earlier.

While fleeing they exchanged shofs with a nearb shopkeeper, but nobody was injured.

â\200\224

MKâ\200\231s activities.

"Some MK members were their own pockets.

Armed robberies were by the mine

fles into South Africa.

He predominantly be readily availaï¬\201le 1£1ng cally impossible for

South Africaâ\200\231s borders. Some of the weapons had been in South ca for some time, as they had been dumped b{1 ormer MK members who had left the organisation. -

When approached by the Mercury for commentin% last night, ANC internal leader Walter Sisulu said: â\200\230As a matter of policy, this would never be permitted by the African National Congress.

the ANC are also individuals and they may entl \tilde{A} @ance their own interests. \hat{a} 200\231

He said the only such

 $\hat{a}\200\230$ had hag}')ened in Natal, where

the ANC had allegedly held up the S A Perm branch in Umzinto and robbed it.of R40 month.
â\200\230They (Press.rggorts) spoke of high officials ing involved. But they were not high officials â\200\224 they were branch members, â\200\235 said Mr Sisulu. â\200\224 (Sapa); !

Mr Heitmann did not exclude the

ANC leadership, because gr the organisation $200\231s$ image, he said

Mr Heitmiann said it was easy to bring AK-47 rj.

pointed out that these weapons, which were used for armed attacks $\label{eq:mozambique} \text{Mozambique and it was p}$

the security forces to

 \hat{a} \200\230However, members of

case he was aware of
0 members of

to 000 last

possibility that acting independently to fill

not likelghbo be welcomed
could under-

SUNDAY 3JANUARY 1993

Allister Sparks in Johannesburg looks

forward with hope despite 8 grim 1992

IFOR South Africa, 1992 was a gritn yuw in which more than 3,000 people died in political violence. A year in which talks broke down and massacres followed, crime boomed and the economy crashed, hope gave way to despair and trust to dirty tricks, and President F. W. ¢ Klerk and Nelson Mandela fell to cursing cach other.

Yet, even as the yeuar cnds with threats of secession from Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi and of race war froin the Pan-Africanist Congress, there are signs of hoï¬\201e. Everything points to 1993 being the yeur of transformation, when real change will take place and South Africa will shift from white to black rule.

By mid-year, the Nautional Party any the African National Congress will jointly be administering the country. By yearâ\200\231s cnd, or March 1994 aj the latest, the first one-person-one-vote elections will have been held, ushering in majority rule.

The paradox is that this hopeful prognosis grows directly out of the disasters of 1992, which shocked the two major parties into realising they had better $\hat{a}\200\230$ work together or have nothing left to fight over.

This realisation DLegan to dawn last September, when the year reached its nadir with the tassacre of 29 ANC demon-

strators who were gunned down Ly the Gasked ariny 03 whey

marched on Bisho, the capital of that nominally independent black homeland. % The bloodbath shocked militants on both sides into pulling buck from their headlong rush into confrontation: It discredited radicals within the ANC,

who were threatening to dominute as the ncgouiations remained deadlocked and township violence escalated, ond allowed Mandela and the other moderates to regain control over ANC strategy. Eea On the government side, it muted the hardliners in the Cabinet who had wanted the security forces to confront the $ANC\hat{a}\200\231s$ $\hat{a}\200\230mass$ action $\hat{a}\200\231$. demonstrations. Within two wecks Mandela and De Klerk held a crucial meeting which laid the foundations for a new impetus to co-operation, :

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Several other factors contributed to this changed political chemistry. One was the growing division in De Klurk's Cabinet between young Ministers, aware that most of their careers still lay ahcad in a system where black voters would be the

mujority, and an' old guard sctin

its ways and intent on justifying the past,. - \cdot

The young Ministers begar questioning the National Pur $ty\hat{a}\200\231s$ strategy of trying to defea

e ANC at the polls by building an alliance with Butheleziâ\200\231s Inkatha * Fréedom . Party $a\200\234$ and

'lother "homeland groups. To -

them, this seemed unlikely to

succeed, given the ANC $\hat{a}\200\231s$ over-

whelming dominance in" the opinion polls, compared with | Butheleziâ\200\231s 8-10 per cent showing and the negligible support for the other homeland leaders. Morcover, it looked like playing yesterdayâ\200\231s politics in & way that would hur' (â\200\230 their own career R R HÃ@w TREN g P ahit Buthelezi and form & coalition with the sure winners instead. Fortuitously, this coincided with some hard thinkin ANC, where the realisation was growing that while it could win

political power, its ability to govern could be paralysed by a recalcitrant civil service, army and police for¢e. Rather than risk this, why not offer the National Party -a temporaryâ\200\231 coulitiondeal? » . | -The -proposal, caused a bricf: L spat g the ANG, butavas evenst $a\200\230$ tually $a\200\230$ endorsed Ey the national executive. It played into, the. " hands of the young Ministersâ\200\231 just as Bisho was tilting the bal-- ance of power in the Cabinet in their favours enyn o -0, . Twn ather factors did the same. Derek Keys, the technocrat Finance Minister, gave goliticnl leaders. & doomsda riefing on the vutlook if South Africa did not halt its steep economic decline and boost its growth rate to match that of its population. Mandels, in particular, was alarmed, and there has been no further talk of nativnalisation from the ANC. 2 At the same time, the ANCâ\200\231s negotiating committee pub-Jished a document on $a\200\230$ regional $isma^200^231$, showing its position to be

far less centralist than was

thought, and not too distant: from the National Purty $\hat{a}\200\231s$ federalist ideas. b

in the

1993, the year when apartheid will die

So the scene was set for a con-

vergence of the moderates. $\hat{a}\200\230$ The Mandcla-1J¢ Islcric mesting wao

followed by two months of talks between - the Constitutional Affairs Minister, Roelf Meyer, - and the ANCâ\200\231s secretarygeneral, Cyril Ramaphosa. -

Meyer is the National Partyâ\200\231s leading young moderate, and Ramaphoss, Who came toâ\200\231politics from the trade union movement, is South Africaâ\200\231s most experlenced black negotiator. During their long sussions together the broad outline of a deal was agreed.

 $a\200\230$ Lurly in December, $a\200\235$ two

teams, cach 20-strong and headed by Meyer and Ramaphosa, mct for five days in a secret bush resort in the northern \hat{a} 200\230I'ransvaul and reached a series of agreements. Another series of meetings will start on 20 January, one week before De Klerk opens what will almost certainly be the last session of the white-dominated - parliament. Soon afterwards, probably in - February,". \hat{a} \200\230'the constitutional convention, Codcsa, is likely to be reconvened to ratify the informal National Party/ANC accords.

Sonmie of the smaller parties, in particular the Inkatha Frecdom Party, are expected to protest and ay threaten to walk

ut, but if they do the deal will still go ahead. L fat e

Strenuousâ\200\231 elforts will. be made .to include them,: especially Inkatha, and meetings are scheduled for carly January between the National Party and Inkatha and between Mandela and Buthelezi. But the critical decisions have been 'reached between the msjor players and | Buthelezi will be told he has no power of veto. ". - s

I'he new Codesa will announce details of a Transitional Executive Council, which

WULOR S FPFYSYol e
of equal numbers of ANC and
National Party members, with
some from the smaller partics,
and will prepare for the elections. The Cabinet will remain
in office, but only nominally,'to

ive legal effect to Transit onal ixecutive Councilâ\200\231s decisions. - The election, which the ANC wants this year but the National Party says may take a little lon-

cr, will :be for a Constituept

ssembly to draft the new con-,

L stitution., The assembly \hat{a} \200\231, will

 $\hat{A}Ydouble \hat{a}\200\234as$ "an - interim $\hat{a}\204$ ¢ parljagy,

.ument, and an .interim govern-:
-anen_of national yaity,will take
â\200\230over until the constitution is

agreed upon. Then & new Southâ\200\231

Africa will be born. ", 73 "

Row over Bush s ANC talks

group

NEW YORK: A 17-day health mis

sion by two senior Bush admmistration officials to eight African nations, including South Africa, has got off to a controversial start with the disclosure that the top-level group plans to have talks with the African National Congress but with no other black or non-government groups in South Africa.

The delegation is headed by Secretary of Health Louis Sullivan, a member of the Bush Cabinet, and Ronald Roskens, head of the US Agency for International Development.:

Although the mission has no political objectives, it is the first Cabinet-level group to visit South Africa since visits by the Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Herman Cohen, and the President has given it top priority.

Bush announced at the United Nations World Summit for Children in New York on September 30 that he would send Sullivan and

b A 2T

Roskens to Africa to help determine what \hat{a} 200\234America can do to advance child survival across that continent and across the world \hat{a} 200\235.

They will administer an estimated \$80 million (R200 million) for child survival and health-related activities in Africa, including Aids and its devastating effect on mothers and children, plus the same estimated amount for family planning activities.

It is the kind of American assistance from which South Africa has been excluded in the past.

Some observers say the visit is clouded by plans, agreed to by South African Government officials in Pretoria and the US Em

~ bassy there, for the group to hold

official talks with Nelson Mandela and other ANC leaders without seeing members of other black, coloured or Indian communities. $a\200\234$ The problems they are address-

ing are universal ones, $\hat{a} \geq 00 \geq 35$ said one South African source, $\hat{a} \geq 00 \geq 34$ and they should address them equally in all communities. One can only assume that the disclosure here that they are to have talks with the ANC is intended to make their overall visit to South Africa more palatable in the US $\hat{a} \geq 00 \geq 35$

Anther criticism expressed of the visit, which otherwise has been warmly welcomed, is that by agreeing to meet the ANC (after initial talks with senior South African Government officials) the delegation might be seen to be signalling a future course of US diplomacy: to recognise the ANC as the main or sole organisation representing South African blacks.

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ It is a pity that what is a humanitarian mission should be tarnished in this way, $\hat{a}\200\235$ said a diplomatic spokesman.

The mission will be in Johannesburg and Pretoria on January 13 and 14 and in Cape Town on January 14 and 15. }.»*â\200\230gr

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ILANGA, JANUARY 3-5, 1991

" Diakoniaâ\200\231s Paddy Kearney last week had much to say about Mercedes Benz cars allocated to KwaZulu Government Cabinet Ministers. The

jmoney spent on cars

:should rather be spent to

',;3 combat poverty suffered
3 by "homeland residents."

3,!

Not a surprising state-

 $a\200\234$ ment to come from Dia-

konia, a sort of left-wing
political grouping dressed up as a "inter-church

help agency", to use the description given to it by an obedient servant in the media.

As usual Diakoniaâ\200\231s morality is selective. Have you heard Mr Kearney protesting of late about the profligacy in the Transkei? That "stateâ\200\231s" military dictator runs a whole independent army. What does he need it for? To keep himself in power, perhaps?

Why does Mr Kearney not suggest that all that money wasted on guns in the Transkei be spent to uplift the poor? Is it perhaps because it is the "homeland" of one of Ke-arneyâ\200\231s political heroes?

And when the Transkeiâ\200\231s military dictator arran-

ged for the ANCâ\200\231s AK47-toting Chris Hani to fly around in a military

Nauseating humbug

helicopter worth millions and millions of rands, did Kearney raise his voice in protest and suggest that the money rather be spent on education, development, social upliftment and health?

And now that Messrs
Thambo and Mandela
are being feted in the
same independent country, has Mr Kearney suggested that the money

might be better spent on

helping the poor? If he has, he must have done 80 very privately.

If there is one movement that has done more than most to halt apartheid in its tracks, it is Inkatha. Even Mr Mandela himself had the good grace to publicly accept this fact. Far from helping thu government carry $a\200\234$ out its grand apartheid designs", as the writer of the Kearney article put

it, KwaZulu and Inkatha
effectively blocked apartheid.

KwaZulu was punished'

financially by the South African Government because it refused to play along with Pretoria. Transkei was allocated far more money from the central treasury because it was Pretoriaâ\200\231s handmaiden.

For more than a century successive white administrations have deliberately kept that part of KwaZu-Iu which whites choose to call "Zululand", undeveloned to suit their own selfish economic needs.

That cannot and will not

. be allowed to continue,

no matter what political system is ultimately accepted by all South Africans.

As we see it, the KwaZu-lu administration has sought to redress that economic imbalance within the limits imposed by funds allocated by the central treasury.

Yet, what thanks does KwaZulu get for fighting and halting apartheid? Instead, it gets kicked in â\200\230the teeth by agencies like Diakonia. Kearneyâ\200\231s â\200\230humbug and arrogance is â\200\230nauseating.

Call to Afrikaners

KwaZulu Chief Minister
-~ and Inkatha Freedom
. Party President, Dr M G

Buthelezi, has made a call to Afrikaners to rise to meet the demands

* being made upon them

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by history. The call, an sedited version of which is printed below, is mar*~ked by a generosity of

&'spirit for which Zulu { leaders have been known

since before the days of $a\200\231$

King Shaka.

I want at this closing time

w0f 1990 to extend a par-

i

ticular hand of friendship to South Africaâ\200\231s Afrikaners. I want to say that Blacks are becoming proud of a State President who has risen out of the Afrikaner volk to head South Africa into a democratic future. We are proud of the support that Whites are giving him. We are at last

witnessing the emergence of White decency in politics which so many of us always knew was there.

The God-fearing decency that Afrikaners have aspired to can now be theirs for the taking because they are turning their backs on racism born of fear. They are recognising their dependence on Blacks and they are recognising that the interdependence in which White dependence on Black is reciprocated by Black dependence on White, provides a powerful mould for democratic

safeguards.
We cannot un-write
history and the

democracy we must
establish will have to start
where the history of con-

quest and subjugation left off and where apartheid was abandoned. We will have to start where we now are. We have no other starting point. This is where we are. Let us go forth into 1991 with a mission to make strong and to make steady the springboard from which we will have to launch into a new democracy.

Let us make 1991 a year in which we as Blacks and Whites together secure it as a year in which all our children and the generations to come recognise as a year in which political justice and courage, both from Black and White, laid the foundations for democracy that could never be shaken.

Let us make 1991 a year of reaching out to

each other across racial

divisions. Let the Afrikaners enter 1991 relying on God to lead them safely through this - time of difficult transition. They must let God speak to South Africa and the world through their actions. They must help establish Christian faith as an essential ingre-*. dient of the democracy that a Christian country will rely on.

Afrikaners are privileg-

-ed at this time of South

Africaâ\200\231s history. They live under the searching international spotlights which will shine upon every decent deed. The whole world is poised to rally behind every decent. democratic act the â\200\230Afrikaners can make. Let them move with certainty and let them dispel the

doubts that exist amengst some Blacks that they cannot do so.

Above all, let the Afrikaners show the world that they can assist in putting a democracy together in which democratic victories can be turned into victories from which Afrikaners and Whites generally can go forth with Blacks to do battle against what really is the common enemy â\200\224 poverty, ignorance and disease.

Let us have a victory in South Africa which enables us to do that which others have failed to do in Africa. Let us go forth into the world of politics and economics where no African country has been before. Let us pioneer new attacks on poverty which were born in the way we put a democracy together. Let us act now for the sake of the future.

To Afrikaners of right-wing persuasion who want to seek refuge in that which so patently failed everywhere in the world, I say please come in from the cold.

Minority government has never worked anywhere in the world. It will not work in South Africa.

The interdependence of Black and White makes it

imperative that we have -

an integrated political

system.

Let me add the thought

that if the principles of democracy will not suffice to secure White interests in a non-racial, open democracy, they will not suffice to secure Afrikaner interests in a closed Afrikaner society. There is only grief ahead for those who seek division for fear of democracy.

There is a vast South African throng coming together and moving forward to march into the future. We can do it. We can put a democracy together that works. We can put a democracy together which stabilises South Africa because it establishes the circumstances in which the mortal enemy of democracy - spreading mass poverty - is trounced.

Let the Afrikanersâ\200\231 moral fibre and let his yearning for Christian Godliness now rise to help him to participate in moving away from apartheid in such a way that every race group in this country ends up being . governed in the way that they are willing to be governed.

between Bop and the ANC

'y

THE African National Congress and the Bophuthatswana government are headed for a confrontation over deportation of activists, the ANC has â\200\230said.

Mmabatho ANC branch chairman Job Mokgoro yesterday said the refusal by the University of Bophuthatswana council to oppose the. deportation of lecturer Mr Paul Daphney would almost certainly lead to the collapse of examinations â\200\230set for this and next month. i

He said a summit meeting of the ANC, at national level, would be held to consider mass action against the homeland government's $\frac{3}{200}\frac{34^2}{200}\frac{230}{230}$ = actions. Daphney is Mmabatho ANC branch secretary.

David Green, another ANC activist and a medic at a Mmabatho hospital. Referring to the case of Daphney, Mokgoro said the Union of Democratic University Staff Association would

certainly go ahead with-

the threat to call for the withdrawal of internal and external invigilators, a move Mokgoro said would automatically lead to the colapse of the examinations.

Reply »

In a written reply to an earlier Udusa demand that Unibo keep Daphney on dts payroll despite the deportation_order, Vice-Chancellor Professor R Malope said: \(\frac{a}{200}\230\alpha\200\230\alpha\)hile it (deportation) causes the

university occasional difficulty it is not in my view a situation which we expect to effectively op-m".

Concerning the future position of Daphney, Malope said: $a\200\230I$ assure you ... we shall fulfil our obligations completely and sympathetically so long as he is employed by the university.

â\200\230â\200\230However, if at a subsequent time we are denied his services the university is rightly constrained to act lawfully in its employment procedure and we would be obliged to follow that requirement in this caseâ\200\235â\200\231..

In the case of Green,
Mokgoro said ANC struc- |
tures such as the National
Education and Health
Workers Union would be
called in to assist in pressuring the homeland. Sapa.

Also deported was Dr

 $\hat{a}\200\230SO$ Chris Hani, the military leader of the $\hat{a}\200\234$ phanwmarmy $\hat{a}\200\235$ oftheANC/-

December 16 as $\frac{200}{230}$ mood of militancy. Itâ\200\231s the mood of the fighting people, a people that are very im-Men â\200\235»

I say to this loudmouthed braggart: â\200\234Your bomb throwers and lim $a\200\230$ pet mine planters who attack only civilian soft targets have already been soundly beaten by the forces of Zulu military power. If you cannot beat the Zulu forces, who are only armed with traditional weapons, how can you ever face the forces of law and order, which in one of the world $\hat{a}\200\231s$ most sophisticated anti-insurgency forces, second only to that of Israel! Donâ $\200\231t$ chance arm. \hat{a} \200\235

Congmssasconsumted 0'0â\200\23100â\200\230&0%'0--

L AdVice 16 Ch

your ;
The African National

not inside South Africa, but in its traditional homeland, Transkei. That is from where Hani operates militarily. If it was not for the power of the White settlers in the eastern frontier of the Cape in the 1820s, when the forces of Shaka the Zulu warrior king crossed into Xhosa land during the period of the first Mfecane, then surely the Xhosa nation would have been eaten up just like all other Black tribes.

My advice to Mr Chris Hani and his fighting people is, \hat{a} 200\234Stay inside the protected ring of negotiations offered by the legal

government of the Re. public of South Africa.

Forget your militant

mood, mass mobilisation and mass action, and accept that your organisa-

tion is but only one of the

many other racial groups future course of this, the most powerful military andeconomceounn'ym a dying Black Africa.â\200\235

Within what these

(o= I N o6 D NE U Rt e B O

6,/

ris Hani/

braggarts call $\hat{a}\200\234\hat{a}\200\230$ the regime $\hat{a}\200\235$, these people have

prospered and developed
as no other Black nation

in Africa during the past. 150 years. Destroy $\hat{a}\200\234$ this $a\200\234$ regime $a\200\235$ and replace it by an ANC/SACP socalled $\hat{a}\200\234$ people $\hat{a}\200\231$ s democ $racya^200^235$, and you will have \hat{a} 200\230chaos, misery and starvation which will in no time change this beautiful and bountiful country into yet another beggar nation. We, the silent White and Black majority will $a\200\230$ not allow Hani and his cohorts to destroy that \hat{a} 200\230which took centuries to achieve. Come the day that they put their idle \hat{a} 200\230threats into practice, that

 $a\200\230$ day they will have to deal

 $a\200\230$ with the anger of this all-

 \hat{a} \200\234powerful bloc.

This bloc consists of who will not bend :hekneew&epewerof ~barbarism. If we have to

fight to preserve that

 $a\200\230$ which has been built-up

avertheeentmgs then I

 $sny"iohent. \hat{a} \ 200 \ 235$; INOBEN

0r/03 **"**91

Â¥

s the battle for the middle ground in the - build-up to crucial constitutional talks el 12INS Momentum, wavermg homeland leaders are increasingly making their positions clear as to where tiiey may be seated at the negotiating table. And bidden agendas are rapidly unfolding to reveal a szrics of sophisticated rnoves on the part of government 10 secure the support of leaders m the homelznds and Indizn and coloured pariizneats. The most recent was this wesk's meeting berwesn the Natiemal Party on the one hand and leaders of self-povernig; homelands ind InG-a0 znd coloured pariizments orl the omer.

At the end of the mesting, there

were clear signs that mn alliznes of sorts was beginning 10 ernerpe: after momhs of lobbiying by the government.

But the battle is not only bheing fought 2t a polical Jevel. Reports in

the past week suggest that the gov- -

eromenl may ¢ven have a miljtary agenda znd that tHe coups in Ciskei znd Vendz may have been engineered by the security establishmenL

Despite the past weekâ\200\231s reports on the Ciskei 2nd the decsion. by . homeland leaders to fornmize a joint plan with the government 10

lmmch 2 mmlid-perty conference, the- <</pre>

ANC doesniot beheve fthas lo't the

10:38

Tid4 3198

 $\frac{200}{231}he bai \frac{201i}{201e} for the$

- _The imvolvement of homeland I:zdm-s i the agreement on the mult-party« conference is â\200\234another case of classic vacillaring poimcs says ANC pationz! executive commitse member Aziz Pabad

 $a\200\234a\200\234Clearly$ they are hedging their

bets and will nifimately throw in their lot with the side that engoys ${\bf S}$

the decisive support of the people. $\hat{a}\200\235$ If, however, the agreement is

interpreted as a clear signal that

homelznd leaders- have»chosen

sides, it has very serious imiplica-

ions for the ANC znd could lzy the basis for the emergence of & conservative, non-racial alhzmce egr.mst $\ensuremath{\mathsf{T}}$

ELECTORAL POLITICS

While the unphcznons may not be immediztely apparent, it could impact heavily when the struggle

 $\mbox{-}$ emzers the crucial stage of electoral

politics.

It is therefore crucial Iha!. Lhe democratic movement estzblishes exacily wiere the homelend lead ers will direct their Support.

Pzhad, however, points out that-..

the shift in the position of home-~1zmd leaders does not in ey way ireflect the direction i wb:ch mass

s:.vpormwi¬\2021move. s =
â\200\230Thxs mmzm:m wz'_l'eonnme

10 be 1he teoam of the democratic movement, \hat{a} \200\235 he says.

He cautions, however, that the ANC would be committing a fatal mistake if it remzined complacent and sat beck without mobilising the

rural population zround policyâ\200\231

1ssues.

Close 1o 15 million people, or

more than 51 percent of the coun-Ty's African population, is based in the 10 homelznds, and the ANC

- carmot afford 10 ignore this base.

Pahad wzms that the 11lusion that governmer will-be able 10 knock

5 Toge:her a super-alliznce of conser-

~vatives will become 2 rezlity umiess work zmong the masses is nensi-

- fied. -The degree of pressure

bronght 10 beer on the homeland leaders is 2 direct fimction of the extent of mass mobilisaton in the homelzands.

It is nstrucuve, m the regard, thar Hudson Nisanwisi-of Gazankulu $\hat{a}\geq00\geq30$ began adopting open public positons in favour 6f z federaf South Africen state and reaxon..l govern-IDemt 25 SOOT 28 mass resistance the homeland tzpered off.

- .Pahzd concades thar the ANC let up ormass mobilisation in the rural areas. But this was not by design, he says, znd.it should be obvious 10
- . gltthat $200\234 mass\2cuon$ is rhe oxygen of thecrgzmsanon T 3
- : ashckaâ\200\224fcrunvovulalwersm
- " befare coming to d:eANC.Pah:m o poms ot thaz the orga.msaacn

He reiterated esrlier commmerns following the Ciskei coup i April last year tar, \hat{a} 200\234f the ANC is able

to establish stroctures I the bome- -

lands without delay, we will have [

made 2 remarkahle psychalogical - \hat{A} £ hreakthrough \hat{a} \204¢, 3

and political Headdedauhem:ucm:fâ\200\230?aoâ\200\224 pleâ\200\231s resistznce can be harnessed IO rasToots (rgemsatica, the passibility exists that the whole of the

Ezstern Cape would be tensigrmed

inlo 2 erez of liberanonâ\204¢.

Despite reports than the SA sec- 4%

T and not Ciskel military leader Oupz Gqozo, was in

control of the homelznd, Pahad -

believes the potential for realising the objective stll exists.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

Be cautions, however, that i its 5

anerpts to win the middle ground. the ANC should not lose direction of its stretegic objectives. Commpromises will be made, but not on the ANCâ\200\231s core objectives. He cites a comment by ANC deputy president Neison M:nn~'~ that the orgamsation will not act as

thzt homeland governments mnst resolve comflicts with the pecple

ey e g o B Cars RN IR : AL i ' AN ;

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WINNING FRIENDS: {Top) Nelson Mandeia and Ciskei leader Oupa Ggoza outside Ciskei State House. (Above) Foreign Affairs minister Pik

Botha and Bophuthatswana head Lucas Mangope sign an agreement.

mmiddieground

nezds to 2dopr & two-promged =pproach I winning over the heme-land leaders. While mzss mobilisation in the rural areas must not be negiected, homeland leaders must be eagaged If they show any signs of wanting lo come ito the fold of the democratic movernent, he says. Pabiad says homeland lezders embarking on programmes that do not have popular support will rapidly isolare themselves. He cites the example of massive opposition to Gaozoâ\200\231s conrmmued rule in Ciskei.

CIVIL SERVANRTS' STRIKE

The embanled Ciskei governmenr Iast vveek moved 1o talk 1o s stiking civil servamts, just as 2 rift opened up with the teritory s chiefs.

Suicers brought the Ciskei gov-ETTUNIEN! 10 2 commplete halt as the

. ucrest sgre2d 1o include postal workexs, entployess of a mummber of pamst=als, aud even hospitals,

Waonkers mitially dernended higher wages, it soon mmcinded a demand for Gaozoâ\200\231s resignation. Relaions with the region's chiefs WweTe 2iso sajd to be tense.

- Alrnost two weeks agn, Permouns Ctief Maxhoba Sandile, the most
- . senor chief nthe resion, was aest-
- = mmd brought 10 Gaozo after pub-

e st

Pik Botha that the Ciskei would get 2 new constitution.

Sandile szid the announcement, wiich has been widely seen as a move by Pretoria to assert its authority over its problematic homeland, hzd been made without consultation with Ciskelmms,

Sandtle spere four bours with Ggo-z0, and was then released. The Ciskel denied he had been errested, and said he bad merely been escoried to the meeting by police.

Gaozo then armeunced he would dismiss all anpomted chiefs arthe end of the momh.

Buz, without susiained organisz-tional work to direct militancy now

_sweeping through Ciskei, there is

always the danger that homelend leaders can continue pursuing their umpopular agendas and the Sowth Affican goverrment Iis strategy,

-Pzhad says the damocatic movemext meeds 10 exzrmine the governmentâ\200\231s super-zlliznce sralegy very carefully. This is no longer a seczer and itis clear than the government is determimed to construct a non-racial, conservative alliznee.

If the ANC is 10 win 2t the polls, it will have 10 respond in a way that enstres. that a conservative alliance

allows us 0 rob the government of $\hat{a}\200\230$ the Qpportmity 10 dr=w on the support of the homeland stuctmes, $\hat{a}\200\235$ zn ANC activist szid at the beight of unrestin the reralarees.. With noticezble shifts taking place in the positions of hameland leaders, the quesdon must be asked $\hat{a}\200\224$ has such a sirztegy been developed. Pahad says mnch'sraiegic thinking

remams 10 be dome around these Issues.:
In the mez2niime, there has been linde or no comact between the ANC and' homelz=nd leaders in recent

mQnins.
MANGOPE TURNED DOWN

Recertly Bopinthatswanzâ\200\231s Lncas Mangope tried 10 use the oppornmi-ty provided by last weskendâ\200\231s fimer-21 of ANC member Bachanz Mok-WEDZ 10 met with the orgamissrionâ\200\231s lezders. But he was turned down, and, justifiably so, given a mmber

of umresolved conflicts between the

 $bom\tilde{A}$ elend government and the people i the region.

Bur what of contact with other leeders? On the surface there seems 10 beno reason why the procass thet

. Started. last yezr, when the ANC

:emamsnzz:mwand enjoys minimal -« uapp&ms;w have W Over 2 nmmber

- efRomelnd leaders, did not contin-

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