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SUBMISSION TO THE
COMMISSION ON REGIONS
REF: 1/11/11.43

June 11, 1993.

Dear Mr. Eloff,

I enclose a submission for the attention of the Regional Boundary Commission. The submission consists of a short written report and two research papers I have recently presented:

Fox, R.C. 1992: 'Regional Proposals: their Constitutional and Geographical Significance'. Paper presented to the *Second Southern African Geographers Conference*, School of Geography, Oxford University, December 1992.

Fox, R.C. 1992: 'Regionalisation and Language Policy in South Africa: One Possible Scenario'. *South African Geographical Society Newsletter*, August 1992.

I hope that this material is of assistance in your deliberations.

Yours sincerely,

R.C. Fox (Dr.)
Senior Lecturer.

SUBMISSION TO THE COMMISSION ON THE DEMARCATION/DELIMITATION OF REGIONS

R.C. Fox
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It is well accepted within the geographical literature that regions should have two key attributes:

- o A low degree of variation within each region;
- o A high degree of variation between regions.

Regions can usually be delimited using only one variable, or criterion, fairly easily; problems arise, however as soon as additional variables are examined. The cause of this problem lies in the fact that most phenomena have different spatial distributions i.e. their patterns of concentration and dispersion are different.

Factors which have been used to delimit regions include the following:

- o Physical Geography e.g. climate, relief, drainage, vegetation;
- o Cultural Modes e.g. language, religion;
- o Forms of Production i.e. the mix of agriculture and industry, commercial or subsistence orientation;
- o Demographic Characteristics, particularly the distribution of population and settlement;
- o Functional Organisation, especially the patterning of metropolitan areas and their associated hinterlands.

One common practice is to aggregate together the smallest administrative divisions in a country, i.e. the magisterial districts, so that relatively uniform regions are produced from these building blocks.

Regions and regional boundaries, however, exist in the minds of people as well as planners. It is quite often the case that communities of people possess a **regional identity**: a sense of belonging to a certain, named, part of the country with which those people have strong personal associations. These regional identities often reflect the history of occupance and the activities pursued in that region and so regional identities may or may not be coterminous with regions delimited using the factors mentioned above.

One of South Africa's major problems, which a future unified state will have to address, is the regional identities which have been fostered by the balkanization of the country. Thus Development Region D consists of the following sub-regions (more could be added to this list): the Eastern Cape, Ciskei, Border, and Transkei. The regional dispensations of the ANC and NP will both present the state with the very difficult task of building either a Border/Kei (or a Kei) regional identity that transcends the current divisions. Similar problems will arise if the National Party's North-West Region is demarcated from their *Seven Region* proposal.

It appears to me that the major problem with the boundary delimitation process is that peoples' regional identity is not being considered at all. Rather the process is apparently focussing on political trade-offs and certain of the factors detailed above in a highly 'top-down' manner. The

boundary commission should be travelling the length and breadth of the country, convening meetings and hearing the views of communities, organisations and individuals as to what their regional identities actually are and who they do or do not wish to be associated with in 'their' region.

The Proposed Regions of the ANC and NP

My 'Regional Proposals' paper discusses the evolution of these delimitations. This section attempts to make a number of criticisms of what are probably the two proposals at the top of the political agenda: the National Party's *Seven Region Proposal* and the African National Congress Party's *Ten Region Proposal* (Figures 1 and 3 in my paper).

One problem which both proposals will have to overcome is the selection of a focal point; a major metropolitan and administrative centre within each region. In the NP's proposal this applies, for example, to the Cape of Good Hope Region (where Cape Town and Port Elizabeth are alternatives), the North-West (Potchefstroom, Kimberley, Mmabatho), Kei (East London, King William's Town/Bisho, Umtata), Natal (Pietermaritzburg, Durban, Ulundi). In the ANC's proposal this problem is less marked because they propose more regions but there are cases such as the Northern Cape (Mmabatho, Kimberley) and Border/Kei (East London, King William's Town/Bisho, Umtata). The focal administrative and political centre in each region is a sensitive issue given peoples' regional identities i.e. where a choice has to be made between competing centres some people will inevitably perceive the administrative centre selected to be 'theirs' and other people will not.

In terms of the organisation of economic activity in the country the NP's *Seven Region Proposal* presents a number of economically and functionally illogical features. Port Elizabeth/Uitenhage is placed in the Cape of Good Hope Region and separated from half of its hinterland. This has presumably been done to add the pro-NP votes in the white and coloured communities of Port Elizabeth to NP strength in the Western Cape. In terms of planning and administrative activities it is ridiculous to separate a metropolitan area from the hinterland which is dependent on it for goods and services. A similar problem occurs in the North-West Region where Potchefstroom is artificially hived-off from the West Rand and in the Transvaal Region where Pretoria is cut off from the rest of the PWV area. The PWV should be left functionally intact, as the ANC propose, as one large metropolitan area. If wealth is to be redistributed from the PWV to other areas it should be done by legislative mechanisms rather than by attempting to split up a geographic entity.

If language is taken as a criterion for regional delimitation then both the NP's *Seven Regions* and the ANC's *Ten Regions* (see Figure 1 in my 'Regionalisation and Language Dominance' paper) have roughly half of their regions dominated by one language and the others are split between two or more languages. For example, in the ANC's dispensation the Western Cape, Border/Kei, Natal, Western Transvaal and Orange Free State are dominated by Afrikaans, Xhosa, Zulu, Tswana and South Sotho speakers respectively. The Northern Cape and Eastern Cape are split between Afrikaans and Tswana and Afrikaans and Xhosa speakers. The remaining regions of the PWV, Eastern and Northern Transvaal are the most heterogeneous in the country with three or four languages spoken in each.

Of the two proposals the NP's follows language divides most closely, particularly the boundary

*R.C. Fox. Submission to the Commission on the Demarcation/Delimitation of Regions.
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between Afrikaans and Xhosa in the Eastern Cape and Afrikaans and Tswana in the Northern Cape. One area of inconsistency with the ANC's proposal is that it stresses the need for a single Xhosa region (Border/Kei) and accepts a Zulu region (Natal) but splits the Tswana into two regions (Western Transvaal and Northern Cape).

To conclude this section, I would propose **accepting** the ANC's *Ten Regions* as they are better from an economic and development administration perspective **but** consideration should be given to accepting the NP's North-West Region (establishing a Tswana block). This could be created by extending the ANC's Western Cape boundary to the north-east and eliminating the boundary between the Northern Cape and Western Transvaal. Thus there would be a total of nine regions.

Redistribution of Resources

The South African space economy is characterised by marked inequalities. Figures 10, 11 and 12 in my 'Regional Proposals' paper demonstrate that the country's core economic areas are the PWV, Western Cape and to a lesser extent the Orange Free State and Eastern Transvaal. Depending on the policy outcome, it is from these areas that wealth will have to be redistributed out to the peripheral regions.

Table 1, below, attempts to derive a composite development index for South Africa's current development regions so that core and peripheral regions can be clearly discerned. The Table calculates rankings from socio-economic indices derived from the Development Bank's *South Africa: An Inter-Regional Profile* (Erasmus et al, 1991). Each region is ranked from 1 (low score) to 9 (high score) for each variable and the rankings added to get a composite index. The maximum that a region could score would be 63 and the minimum would be 7.

Table 1: Socio-Economic Indices, Development Regions 1989

DEVELOPMENT INDEX	DEVELOPMENT REGION								
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	J
Literacy rate (%) (Ranking)	81.3 (9)	59.0 (1)	70.2 (7)	65.5 (4)	68.4 (6)	65.2 (3)	61.2 (2)	78.8 (8)	67.5 (5)
Unemployment rate (%) (Ranking)	9.6 (8)	14.5 (5)	11.1 (5)	25.0 (1)	18.7 (2)	8.7 (9)	16.7 (3)	13.6 (6)	14.7 (4)
Dependency ratio (Ranking)	1.3 (8)	2.4 (4)	1.6 (6.5)	3.1 (2)	2.8 (3)	1.6 (6.5)	4.8 (1)	1.1 (9)	1.9 (5)
Nominal GGP (Rm) (Ranking)	26788 (7)	3947 (1)	12939 (4)	14644 (5)	30505 (8)	19366 (6)	6246 (2)	80295 (9)	12219 (3)
Nominal GGP/capita (R) (Ranking)	7627 (7)	3585 (4)	4918 (5)	3116 (2)	3554 (3)	9835 (9)	1461 (1)	9424 (8)	6830 (6)
Personal income/capita (R) (Ranking)	4343 (8)	1984 (4)	2184 (6)	1630 (2)	1737 (3)	2347 (7)	725 (1)	4558 (9)	2166 (5)
Life expectancy (Ranking)	65.5 (9)	62.6 (1)	63.2 (3)	63.7 (4.5)	63.8 (6.5)	63.7 (4.5)	62.9 (2)	64.7 (8)	63.8 (6.5)
Sum of ranks	56	20	38.5	20.5	31.5	45	12	57	34.5

Source: Erasmus, J. et al 1991: *South Africa. An Inter-Regional Profile*. Development Bank of Southern Africa, Midrand.

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
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A three tier geography appears from the aggregate rankings:

- o **The Core:** Region H (PWV) ranked 57 and Region A (W. Cape) ranked 56.
- o **The Middle Tier:** Region F (E. Transvaal) 45, Region C (OFS) 38.5, Region J (W. Transvaal) 34.5, Region E (Natal) 31.5.
- o **The Periphery:** Region D (E. Cape) 20.5, Region B (N. Cape) 20, Region G (N. Transvaal) 12.


Any national policy that attempts to rectify the imbalances between regions will have to address the problems of the lagging peripheral regions: the Northern Transvaal (Region G), Northern Cape (Region B) and Eastern Cape (Region D). It is extremely difficult to see how a federal dispensation could solve the imbalances between regions. The most peripheral regions have little potential to solve their own problems being devoid of major metropolitan areas, possessing little capital, few economic resources and negligible locational advantages. Some form of redistribution mechanism, perhaps along the lines of the German Lander system, needs to be set up at the national level by a strong state. It is pertinent that **however the boundaries are drawn these peripheral areas will still exist and their problems will have to be addressed.**

ANC & NP REGIONS



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
SOUTH AFRICA: DEVELOPMENT REGIONS TBVC STATES, SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES



Roddy Fox RU GIS


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NORTHERN CAPE, BOPHUTHATSWANA,
WESTERN TRANSVAAL REGION
(PROPOSED, APRIL 1992)




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
ANC SUPPORT: DEVELOPMENT REGIONS, TBVC STATES, SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES 1992



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
ANC SUPPORT: DEVELOPMENT REGIONS



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
NP SUPPORT: DEVELOPMENT REGIONS, TBVC STATES, SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES 1992




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NP SUPPORT: DEVELOPMENT REGIONS




DOMINANT LANGUAGES 1980, ANC REGIONS 1992



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REGIONAL CONTRIBUTION (%) TO THE GROSS GEOGRAPHIC PRODUCT OF AGRICULTURE HUNTING, FORESTRY & FISHING 1989




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GGP = Rm 11,629

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
REGIONAL CONTRIBUTION (%) TO THE GROSS GEOGRAPHIC PRODUCT OF MINING AND QUARRYING 1989



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REGIONAL CONTRIBUTION (%) TO THE GROSS GEOGRAPHIC PRODUCT OF MANUFACTURING 1989



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Regional Proposals: Their Constitutional and Geographical Significance

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It is the intention of this paper to attempt to shed some light on the reasons for, and consequences of, the debate over regions during the current negotiating process in South Africa. Consequently, this paper falls into three sections. The first examines the regional dispensations proposed by the African National Congress (ANC), National Party (NP), Democratic Party (DP) and 'homeland' leaders: the different stances as regards electoral systems and federal/national powers will also be assessed. The second part of the paper will speculate on the levels of electoral support to be gained by the ANC and NP in the Development Regions, TBVC States and Self-Governing Territories. This will demonstrate possible patterns of political dominance under a federal dispensation. Finally, the ethnic and economic geography of South Africa will be examined and suggestions made as to their role in shaping NP policy. Particular attention will be paid to the economic potential of the various regions of the country since this will be the resource base which future national and regional powers have to tap to pursue redistribution policies.

Regional Dispensations

Number of regions and their boundaries

The NP has proposed since 1991 that the existing nine Development Regions (Figure 1) can be used as a starting point in negotiation (Humphries 1992); although there has been a noticeable change in this stance recently. One reason for the use of the nine regions is that they have become increasingly entrenched in the country's administrative structure since they were introduced in the early 1980s. The nine regions have also been viewed by the NP as having the advantage of technical neutrality as they were initially drawn up using planning criteria. Regional development documents from the 1980s (Republic of South Africa 1988, 5-6) describe these planning criteria as follows:

- Most important nodes and their sphere of influence;
- Geographical distribution of the population;
- Natural resources;
- Existing infrastructure;
- Physical characteristics and topographic features in particular;
- Economic activities; and
- Statistical and political boundaries"

The document goes on to say:

- "Besides that the planning regions should serve as building blocks in the demarcation of development regions, the following criteria were also considered:
- Demarcation within a Southern African context;
 - Homogeneity in respect of development needs, development potential and physical characteristics;
 - Functional relationships;
 - Ethnicity;
 - Identifiable regional cores; and
 - Associated metropolitan areas."

The regions drawn up using these criteria (Figure 2) left the Orange Free State and Natal unscathed; a feature in common with virtually all of the other dispensations that will be discussed below. The Cape and Transvaal Provinces were split into Western, Northern and Eastern portions and the Transvaal was further divided by the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vaal Triangle (PWV). Generally speaking this left one TBVC State/Self-Governing Territory in each Development Region. However, some of the homelands were split between Development Regions: Transkei fell into Regions D and E, Bophuthatswana into Regions B, C, H and J. The result of overlaying these functional planning regions on the mosaic of states created through grand apartheid has been the triplication and quadruplication of second level government throughout the country. Tables 1 and 2 demonstrate the multiplications which have arisen through this system. It is to be hoped that this system, with its obvious deficiencies, can be overcome if, and when, the homelands become reincorporated into South Africa.

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Table 1: Administrative Subdivision of Homelands

HOMELAND	SEPARATE DIVISIONS	DEVELOPMENT REGIONS
Transkei	3	D,E
Bophuthatswana	7	B,C,H,J
Venda	3	G
Ciskei	1	D
Gazankulu	3	G
Kangwane	3	F
KwaNdebele	1	H
KwaZulu	21	E,F
Lebowa	12	G
Qwaqwa	1	C

Table 2: Administrative Subdivision of Development Regions

DEVELOPMENT REGION	SEPARATE DIVISIONS	SEPARATE 'GOVERNMENTS'
Region A (W. Cape)	1	1
Region B (N. Cape)	3	2
Region C (O.F.S)	3	3
Region D (E. Cape)	4	3
Region E (Natal)	25	3
Region F (E. Transvaal)	5	3
Region G (N. Transvaal)	20	4
Region H (N. Transvaal)	20	4
Region J (W. Transvaal)	3	2

More recent NP thinking was displayed at the August 1992 regionalism conference (Development Action Group 1992). The nine regions were reduced to seven (Figure 3) in response to three developments: the ANC's proposals for 10 regions (Constitutional Committee of the ANC 1992), the Northern Cape/Western Transvaal conference of April 1992 (Beeld 1992), and the NP's electoral prospects in alliance with conservative black homeland leaders.

Figure 3 shows the Cape of Good Hope Province as an expanded Western Cape whose borders have moved to the north, to the Orange River, and east, to include the Port Elizabeth metropole. The North-West province consists of the Northern Cape beyond the Orange River, Western Transvaal and four of Bophuthatswana's seven divisions. The Transvaal includes Pretoria, which has been excised from the PWV and the Northern and Eastern Transvaal Development Regions. Kei Province is Transkei, Border, Ciskei and that part of Eastern Cape Development Region D to the East of Port Elizabeth. Natal/KwaZulu and the Orange Free State were left untouched. The following sections will be discussing, in part, the importance of these seven regions and why NP thinking has shifted.

The ANC's discussion document *Ten Proposed Regions for a United S.A.* made a number of amendments

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to the NP's nine Development Regions. An organising principle in the ANC's proposal was that the pre-1913 Land Act boundaries be used where possible. Furthermore, they put forward the idea that those Provincial, district or magisterial district boundaries which people identify with, and which do not have any racist/apartheid connotations, should be used wherever convenient. This explains the shifting of Development Region D's boundary (Figure 1) eastwards: the old Cape boundary encompassed East Griqualand (in Natal) and Umzimkulu (the detached eastern portion of Transkei). This also accounts for the slight changes to the Northern Cape/Western Transvaal and Orange Free State/PWV boundaries.

Given that the ANC's criteria are otherwise broadly similar to the NP's then it is not surprising that their regions are similar. The main difference is over the re-amalgamation of Transkei by the ANC. The reason the ANC give for this is that the NP's Development Regions D and E split Transkei and, "This might or might not have made sense from a purely economic point of view but from any other perspective would be manifestly unviable. No-one regards northern Transkei as a natural or organic part of Natal." (ANC 1992, 13). The NP's subsequent seven region proposal seems to have accepted this ethnic/historical/political argument; perhaps because NP electoral prospects will be low in Transkei and there would be little to be gained from splitting it into two.

One interesting consequence of this argument is that it could, and probably has, influenced NP thinking in terms of re-amalgamating much of Bophuthatswana with the Northern Cape and Western Transvaal. It could easily be argued that an alliance with President Mangope should enhance the NP's electoral prospects and potential power base in this region. Some of the major players in the Northern Cape/ Western Transvaal/ Bophuthatswana region have also mooted this idea (Beeld 1992). The electoral ramifications of this will be examined in a later section.

The Democratic Party's *Discussion Paper on Constitutional Proposals* (Democratic Party 1992) deals in part with regions and it is worth examining briefly because of the 'honest broker' role the DP has played at CODESA. The DP's regions are very much a compromise between the NP and ANC positions. The DP favour a federation of ten states: the nine development regions and a state consisting of the Ciskei, Border, Transkei area. They also propose considering the incorporation of parts of the Northern Cape and Western Transvaal.

The homeland leaders have expressed a number of ideas about their borders (Humphries 1992 and Shubane 1992). For example, President Holomisa of Transkei and Brigadier Gqozo of Ciskei have laid claims to various parts of the Eastern Cape, Border, and also various portions of each other's territory. More pertinent to this discussion, however, was the establishing of the Northern Cape regional forum in April 1992. Prominent academics in Politics and Planning Departments at Potchefstroom University and the University of Bophuthatswana met with regional interest groups, political parties and the Bophuthatswana administration and they agreed upon the boundaries of a new region (Figure 4) whose population was deemed to be Tswana and Afrikaans speakers. This forum seems to have lobbied successfully as the region is now shown on the NP's seven region proposal (Figure 3); as was mentioned previously, it could well be in the electoral interests of the NP to have such a region.

Entrenchment of Powers and Electoral Systems

Delimiting regions becomes a very important part of the constitution when strong powers are devolved to that level of government. The two major players in the negotiation process, the ANC and NP, favour a unitary state and a federal state respectively. Hence the ANC's discussion document was entitled *Ten Proposed Regions for a United S.A* (author's emphasis). Humphries and Shubane (1992) summarise the tensions and shifts within ANC policy but concludes, in line with their discussion document (ANC 1992), that the ANC is committed to elected regional authorities. Regional powers could either be specifically stated in the constitution or given in more general terms and be subject to periodic review by the national legislature. It is fair to state that the ANC favours a strong central state which may well devolve powers to Provincial level. The Provinces would be responsible for implementing policy under any dispensation.

The ANC's legislative proposal is for a 400 person constituent assembly with 200 members selected from regional lists and 200 from national lists. Proportional representation is to be used at both regional and national levels and so the delimitation of regions is not all important. In fact the ANC favour using the original four Provinces, presumably with reincorporated TBVC States and Self-Governing Territories, as the regional basis for election to the constituent assembly (Weekly Mail 1992, Daily Dispatch 1992a).

In contrast to the ANC, the NP have been trying to establish the right of minority parties to block legislation at the regional and national level (Humphries and Shubane 1992). The NP propose an upper house of regional representatives - this house has the right of veto over legislation from the lower house.

The regional delegations to consist of an equal number of members from the parties which achieved a certain minimum number of votes.

NP regional, constitutional and electoral thinking has been fundamentally affected by their need to broaden their support in the non-white race groups. Thus they are trying to establish a National Front - an alliance with coloured MPs, and conservative black homeland figures such as President Mangope, Chief Minister Buthelezi and Brigadier Gqozo. It is with these alliances in mind that their seven region proposal should be assessed. This should garner support in the proposed Cape of Good Hope, North West and Natal whilst attempting to split the ANC's vote through the support of Brigadier Gqozo in the Kei Region.

One further aspect to the NP's regional proposals is their desire, in a federal state, to lock revenue into the various regions (DAG 1992). This almost certainly explains why Port Elizabeth has been taken out of the Eastern Cape - to weaken the ANC's Eastern Cape power base - and why Pretoria has been put into the Northern Transvaal - to give this poor region (with many rural Afrikaaners) a revenue source. The NP are not saying that they will not pursue some redistribution policies, for example Minister Gerrit Viljoen in October 1992, "Where a region was unable to provide services to maintain generally agreed norms and standards, financial transfers between regions and between central government and regions should be considered." (Daily Dispatch 1992b, p.2). Thus there is a linkage between redistribution and basic needs or welfare issues.

The President's Council report on *A Proportional Voting System for South Africa in a New Constitutional Dispensation* was published on October 8 1992 (Republic of South Africa 1992) and its chief recommendations are worth examining as they will almost certainly influence NP policy. The Council propose a fixed party list system in the regions (although these are not delimited) to elect 300 members to a lower house of parliament. A further 100 seats to be allocated as 'compensatory seats' to allow national proportionality to be achieved. Each member of parliament would be elected by c52,000 voters given a total electorate of just under 21 million. The Council does not focus on a second, or upper, chamber of Parliament as this will be open to negotiation after the first general election.

One clear item of consensus is the proportional representation (PR) system. The Democratic Party also want a National Assembly of 400 members elected through proportional representation. 300 members to be elected by three member constituencies and 100 by national lists. The DP further propose a Senate of c80 Senators, a quarter elected by PR by members of the National Assembly and the remaining three-quarters coming from the regions depending on the population size of each of the nine or ten regions.

Electoral Support

Calculation of the amount of electoral support in each region has almost certainly affected NP thinking. As a minority party in post-apartheid South Africa they seem to have responded by looking for regional concentrations of power and a federal dispensation. This section of the paper will speculate on National Party and African National Congress support in order to assess the degree to which either can dominate at the regional or national level.

A number of simplistic assumptions have been made in this section about electoral behaviour. Firstly, support for parties is different in the different race groups. Secondly, it is further possible to distinguish cleavages within a racial, or ethnic, group for example, Afrikaans and English speakers in the white electorate, supporters of the ANC or Inkatha amongst Zulu speakers. Thirdly, at present it is not possible to assess the impact of other criteria - age, sex, rural or urban place of residence, class, religion - on which the electorate may cleave (Fox 1992).

National Party support can be computed using data recently published for the South African electorate (Calitz 1992). The electorate consists of c.21 million persons aged over 18 in South Africa, the TBVC states and Self-Governing Territories. NP support can be calculated from speculative support levels given in Fox (1992) and subsequently supported by ANC members such as Rory Riordan of the Human Rights Trust (Eastern Province Herald 1992). It is possible to assume that the NP will gain 68.6% of the white vote - this being their level of support in the 1992 white referendum in coalition with the DP. Secondly, 10% of black voters may support the NP but this figure will rise to 35% in Natal/KwaZulu to allow for an alliance with Inkatha (Human Science Research Council (HSRC) polls quoted in the Weekly Mail 1992). Amongst the Asian and 'coloured' electorate NP support can be estimated at 50%.

Figures 5 and 6 and Table 3 show the pattern of support using these levels. The National Party, in alliance with Inkatha, only has over 50% support in one region, Natal at 50.1%. Although 49.8% is very close to a majority in the Western Cape. Other areas of significant, although minority, support are the Northern Cape, Eastern Cape, KwaZulu and the PWV. Since these figures are based on racial distributions

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black,

then these maps reflect the distribution of white, 'coloured', and Indian voters.

The lowest levels of support are in the TBVC States, and Self-Governing Territories with the exception of KwaZulu. It is clear from this assessment just how important it is for the NP to try and build alliances with parties having homeland support. Linkage with Bophuthatswana's President Mangope should enhance NP prospects of gaining control of their proposed North-West Province, whilst alliance with Ciskei's Brigadier Gqozo should be seen as an attempt to split support for the ANC in the proposed Kei Region. On the basis of this analysis, the NP could hope to carry Natal/KwaZulu, the Western Cape, Northern Cape/Bophuthatswana/Western Transvaal. There would also be significant support in the PWV (35.1%). Table 3 shows that the NP under this scenario would get 29.8% of the national vote.

Table 3: Estimates of NP and ANC Electoral Support 1992

REGION	NP(%)	ANC(%)
REGION A	49.8	21.8
Western Cape	49.8	21.8
REGION B	30.0	44.8
Northern Cape	38.3	35.2
Bophuthatswana	10.0	68.0
REGION C	21.9	54.7
Orange Free State	23.6	52.8
Qwaqwa	10.2	67.7
Bophuthatswana	10.0	68.0
REGION D	20.7	55.8
Eastern Cape	34.2	40.4
Ciskei	10.0	68.0
Transkei	10.0	68.0
REGION E	37.0	41.8
Natal	50.1	27.0
KwaZulu	35.1	44.9
Transkei	10.0	68.0
REGION F	22.6	54.0
Eastern Transvaal	27.4	48.7
KaNgwane	10.2	67.7
REGION G	12.6	65.1
Northern Transvaal	23.3	53.3
Venda	10.0	68.0
Lebowa	10.1	67.9
Gazankulu	10.1	67.9
REGION H	31.9	43.7
PWV	34.9	40.3
KwaNdebele	10.1	67.9
Bophuthatswana	10.0	68.0
REGION J	21.6	55.1
Western Transvaal	29.1	46.8
Bophuthatswana	10.0	68.0
NATIONAL SUPPORT	29.8	46.6

ANC support can be calculated using the following proportions: black 68% (but 45% in Natal/KwaZulu), white 3%, 'coloured' 20%, Indian 30%. These figures are the ANC's own speculation (Weekly Mail 1992)

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and are similar to those arrived independently by Fox (1992). They include HSRC figures for Zulu speakers.

To a certain extent the patterns shown in Figures 7 and 8 are the mirror image of Figures 5 and 6. Very strong ANC support in the TBVC States and Self-Governing Territories and a majority in the Northern Transvaal and Orange Free State. Lowest levels of support are in the Western Cape, Northern Cape and Natal/KwaZulu. The ANC would have a majority in five of the nine Development Regions to the NP's one, but a national level of below 50% (46.6%). The PWV is significantly dominated by neither the NP (31.9%) nor ANC (43.7%).

It is intriguing to relate these levels of regional and national support to the ANC's proposal for a constituent assembly in order to see how and where the balance of power might lie. If 200 seats were to be national and 200 regional then the ANC and NP would gain 93 and 60 of the national list seats (given their PR support of 46.6% and 29.8%). Table 4 shows that the ANC would have half or more of the seats in six of the nine Development Regions: Regions B,C,D,F,G,J. The NP would have one, Region A, the Western Cape. Clearly, the conclusion of this analysis for the NP is that if it wants a federal system in which it can dominate regions then it will have to increase its level of support.

Table 4 NP and ANC Support in the ANC's Proposed Constituent Assembly

	NP SEATS ←	→ ANC SEATS
NATIONAL LISTS (200)	93	60
REGIONAL LISTS (200)	94	60
Region A (22)	5	11
Region B (6)	3	2
Region C (14)	8	3
Region D (25)	14	5
Region E (45)	19	17
Region F (10)	5	2
Region G (22)	14	3
Region H (47)	21	15
Region J (9)	5	2
TOTALS	187	120

Ethnic Regions

The potentially stabilising affects of politically autonomous ethnic regions have been discussed by Cloete (1991). He maintains (Cloete 1991, pp.27-28) that there are a number of critical features:

- whether the conflicting interest groups are geographically concentrated or dispersed over the country;
- whether regional autonomy will increase regional or ethnic nationalism to the extent of possible secession by that ethnic group or region, thus endangering the integrity and security of the state;
- whether regionalism will obstruct effective nation building by entrenching ethnic differences instead of promoting a new national identity;
- whether regionalism is the best, or only possible, instrument for achieving a feasible compromise between the national interest and regional or ethnic interests; and
- whether societal forces in the state concerned can cope with the complex balance of interests and power necessary to sustain a *federal* regional system successfully over time."

South Africa, including the TBVC States and Self-Governing Territories, can be divided into six broad zones using 1980 language data as an indicator of ethnicity (Figure 9). One of the most marked features

shown and discussed in *The Language Atlas of South Africa* is the marked concentration of language in contiguous areas (Grobler et al 1990). Afrikaans dominated in the Western Cape, Tswana in the Northern Cape/Western Transvaal, Xhosa in the Eastern Cape, Zulu in Natal and the Eastern Transvaal, South Sotho in the Orange Free State, North Sotho in the Northern Transvaal. The only heterogeneous areas were in the Transvaal where the PWV and Eastern Transvaal have an admixture of Afrikaans, English, South Ndebele, Siswati, Venda and Tsonga. English was very much a minority language in terms of its geographic spread but was dominant in the national metropolises of Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban/Pietermaritzburg.

One of the recurrent themes amongst the Afrikaaner right has been the need to find a homeland or volkstad in the country's northern interior. Figure 9 shows that this would be difficult to identify as Afrikaans only dominates in a few magisterial districts: Newcastle in Natal; Middelburg in the Eastern Transvaal; Boksburg, Brakpan, Randfontein, Roodepoort in the PVV; Potchefstroom in Western Transvaal; Sasolburg, Bloemfontein and the Fauresmith area of the Orange Free State.

Both the NP's seven regions or ANC's 10 regions would give some form of ethnic homogeneity to the Western Cape, Border/Kei, Natal/KwaZulu, Western Transvaal/Northern Cape and the Orange Free State. Whether this is a desirable idea for a country that needs to create a national consciousness is another matter. Certainly, a strong federal system as proposed by the NP or DP would tend to reinforce identification with region and hence ethnicity, as Cloete (1991) suggests above. Presumably, the ANC would hope that a stronger central state could counteract these tendencies. One probable advantage of ethnic concentrations is that it can make language policy easier as regional languages can readily be identified.

Economic Potential of the Regions

In a federal system where tax revenue is raised in each state then the location of wealth becomes very important as does the drawing of boundaries. Consequently, three of South Africa's most important economic sectors will be examined below: agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing; mining and quarrying; manufacturing (Erasmus et al 1991).

Agriculture

With a Gross Geographic Product of Rm 11,628 agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing is the least important of these three sectors. Figure 10 shows the dominant position of the Western Cape (the NP stronghold) in this economic sector. The Orange Free State, Eastern Transvaal and Natal follow in importance. Production in the TBVC States and Self-Governing Territories is usually low in comparison to adjacent portions of South Africa. One potential objective under a federal system would be to redress these imbalances within each region.

On a national scale there is also the problem of the very low production levels in the black areas of Regions D and E where a significant amount of the country's high potential land lies. Table 4, which shows the divisions of agricultural potential (measured as tons of biomass/hectare) for South Africa, the TBVC States and the Self-Governing Territories, indicates that 25 percent of the land capable of producing between 7.5-10 tons/hectare and 30% of land capable of over 10 tons/hectare lies in KwaZulu and Transkei (McGladdery 1992). At the national level, therefore, it could be demonstrated that there is a great need to rehabilitate the agriculture of these regions. Under a strong federal system, where only basic needs were to be addressed by redistribution, it is difficult to see how the Kei Region's agricultural problems could be addressed - particularly when the Port Elizabeth metropole is excised from the region under the NP's seven region proposal.

Mining and Quarrying

Figure 11 shows the importance of the PWV in this economic sector. Over one-third of national production (valued at Rm 24,936) derives from there. Other major mining areas were the Western Transvaal (20.8%), Orange Free State (14.9%), Eastern Transvaal (14.2%) and those portions of Bophuthatswana in Western Transvaal. The NP could only realistically expect to gain control over one of these regions, the Western Transvaal, given the voting patterns postulated previously. Power in the PWV is likely to be shared between the ANC (21 seats) and the NP (15 seats).

Manufacturing

The PWV was even more dominant in the manufacturing sector (Figure 12) with 44 percent of the Gross Geographic Product of Rm 50,986. Interestingly, Natal with 18 percent and the Western Cape with 12 percent follow. These latter two being areas of great electoral significance to the NP. By way of contrast, the ANC is almost certainly going to gain the support of the two poorest regions, the Eastern Cape and Northern Transvaal, and two of the richer regions, the Eastern and Western Transvaal.

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Table 5: Percentage of total primary productivity (tons biomass/ha) by political division

POLITICAL DIVISION	0-0.9	1-2.4	2.5-4.9	5-7.4	7.5-9.9	> 10
South Africa	100	96.8	83.6	79.6	72.0	65.3
Transkei			0.7	6.2	16.5	18.7
Bophuthatswana		2.4	7.1	4.0		
Ciskei		0.05	1.7	0.9	0.03	0.8
Venda		0.8	0.5	0.9	0.7	0.5
Gazankulu			1.5	0.2	0.001	
KaNgwane				0.7	0.5	1.2
KwaNdebele				0.04		
KwaZulu			0.5	4.7	9.3	12.7
Lebowa			4.4	2.8	0.8	0.4
Qwaqwa					0.3	0.3

Conclusion

It is difficult to reach firm conclusions about such a fluid situation. Boundaries and powers are being negotiated before a constitution is devised for the country; in part because the NP hope that this will give them more power and veto rights. The analysis above, however, shows that the NP have limited electoral prospects. Furthermore, it appears likely that under any of the scenarios discussed above the country will display ethnic dominance in at least half, probably more, of its regions. In terms of wealth creation it is most pertinent that the richest region - the PWV - has neither NP nor ANC in a majority. The NP could, however, hope to dominate the Western Cape and Natal/KwaZulu: two of the country's wealthier regions.

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Figure 1




Figure 2




Figure 3





Figure 4



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Figure 5




Figure 6




Figure 7




Figure 8




Figure 9




Figure 10




Figure 11





Figure 12



SOUTH AFRICAN GEOGRAPHICAL SOCIETY NEWSLETTER

The South African Geographical Society, PO Box 128, Wits 2050.

Newsletter Editor, Dr. R. Fox, Department of Geography, Rhodes University, Grahamstown 6140.



EDITORIAL

As the new editor of the newsletter I have attempted to present a mix of discussion, news, activities, feedback and notices: in so doing I have not been able to make this issue a comprehensive coverage of the activities of all institutions and people. I hope, however, that this will be possible in the next number, which should appear towards the end of the year, but I must appeal directly to all members to submit news of your activities, letters to the newsletter and conference reports to me so that I can include them. In order to promote some discussion a brief, and I hope stimulating, article follows; the newsletter will be glad to print any responses and will be willing to follow with other short and topical issues that are submitted.

DISCUSSION

Regionalisation and Language Policy in South Africa: One Possible Scenario

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This short discussion piece needs to be hedged in with a sprinkling of explanation because of its speculative nature and its intention - to provoke discussion. To start: I am assuming that the TBVC states will be reincorporated into South Africa and that the ANC's proposed regionalisation becomes a part of South Africa's future constitution. These two things may not happen but it is perhaps time to start addressing the consequences of what might happen if they did. Secondly, I will be looking simply at one language policy alternative - the bilingual programme in which English is the official national language and regions have one or two other official languages, depending on their relative importance. There are a number of language policy alternatives but my reason for selecting this particular one is that it has been adopted in Namibia since Independence in 1990. Given the strong influence which the Namibian experience has had on the political parties aligned to the left of the National Party it is reasonable to start speculating about a similar policy being adopted here. The intent of this short discussion paper is to overlay the ANC's regions (Constitutional Committee of the ANC 1992) on the language distribution map of South Africa (Grobler *et*

de V. Cluver (1990) in order to ascertain which languages will be represented where. In this way it becomes possible to make some assessment of the future implications of this particular language policy.

It is perhaps useful to start with the account given by de V. Cluver (1990) as to the reasons put forward by the United Nations Institute for Namibia against the use of Afrikaans and for the use of English as an official language in Namibia.

"Arguments against selecting Afrikaans as the official language:

- * Afrikaans is an 'imposed or colonial language'.
- * 'Outside Southern Africa, Afrikaans has no practical value, and therefore it serves as an instrument of isolation and insularity'.
- * Afrikaans is 'the language of the oppressor' while English 'is now considered by many to be the language of liberation'.
- * Afrikaans does not offer social mobility to the Namibian population and offers only limited economic and political mobility.
- * Afrikaans has a polarising rather than a nation-building effect.

Arguments in support of English as the official language:

- * English will help to bring the various Namibian communities together in one nation.
- * English will promote contact between Namibia and its neighbours.
- * English is the international language of science and technology as well as the international language of trade and will therefore give Namibians access to the data banks of the world and trade routes of the world.
- * English is seen by many Namibians as the language of liberation from South African colonialism.
- * English is seen as the language that will give social mobility to the population".

(de V. Cluver 1990, p.163).

Whether English is viewed in South Africa as the language of liberation to the same extent as it was in Namibia is certainly debatable; but it seems to me that many of the arguments given above could, depending on your political persuasion, be replicated here.

The regionalisation of South Africa is open to negotiation at present. It does seem likely that the country will be divided into either nine (the NP standpoint) or ten (the ANC proposal) regions in a post-apartheid, reincorporated South Africa. I shall be using the ANC's ten proposed regions (Figure 1) to try and ascertain which languages will be represented at regional level. I have selected the ANC's proposal as it is less well known than the NP's demarcation of the country into nine development regions - Regions A-H. If nothing else, the ANC has graced the regions with names rather than initials. The principal difference between the ANC proposal and the NP's development regions is the splitting into two of Development Region D by the ANC such that the Eastern Cape is distinct from the Border-Ciskei-Transkei region.




Figure 1

Figure 1 overlays the ANC's regions on the linguistic distribution map derived from the *Language Atlas of South Africa* (Grobler *et al* 1990). The dominant language in each magisterial district was defined as the one with a simple arithmetic majority. This map provides us with some very thought provoking material if we now attempt to discern regional language dominance. Some regions have a seemingly clear pattern: Afrikaans in the Western Cape, Xhosa in Border/Kei, Zulu in Natal, Tswana in Western Transvaal. Other regions have two obviously dominant languages: Afrikaans and Tswana in the Northern Cape, Afrikaans and Xhosa in the Eastern Cape, Sotho and Afrikaans in the Orange Free State, Sotho and Venda in the Northern Transvaal. The Eastern Transvaal and the PWV are more problematic with Siswati and Zulu probably the most dominant in the Eastern Transvaal and Ndebele, Tswana and Afrikaans in the PWV.

It becomes quickly apparent from the above that it is possible to delimit one, two or even three regional languages using this procedure. However, there are problems with this approach since there is a pronounced rural bias in the methodology. Each magisterial district is treated equally regardless of population size and so very substantial urban minority languages do not feature on the Figure 1: I am thinking particularly of Asian languages in Natal. Further problems arise with political acceptability: will it be politically feasible to suggest that Afrikaans is not taught, even as a regional language, in Western, Eastern and Northern Transvaal? Do we then have to opt for a language policy that operates at sub-regional level or one which teaches up to four languages at any one place contemporaneously? I do not know the answer to these questions but I would welcome debate in subsequent SAGS Newsletters.

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FEEDBACK

SAAG'S not drooping yet!

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Courtesy of a kind invitation from the Southern African Association of Geomorphologists (and an air fare from the British Council), I found myself as Keynote Speaker for the Biennial Conference at the University of Durban-Westville, 1 - 3 July 1992, under the theme "Geomorphology and Land Management". It is nearly sixteen years since last I spent more than a few hours in South Africa - and nearly as long since I last dared call myself a geomorphologist - it was fascinating to revisit, review and reassess the state of South African geomorphology.

What did I see? To help me, I chose a few highly idiosyncratic indicators of academic health, reflecting my prejudices and weaknesses!

Choice of pleasant working environments:

Full marks here. Coasts and mountains and national parks seem to have attracted more than their fair share of study sites. Only a few hardy souls braved the deserts and the homelands.

Vigour in debate:

A touch of tachycardia. Rock glaciers brought out the gladiators. Gully versus sheet erosion caused a mild sweat. But not a lot else. A little stirring and kite-flying, plus a proactive Chairman - alas, they were all men - might be prescribed for the next meeting. Participation by the many postgraduates and honours students might have been good too. It was a delight

- end -

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