MM/326/23 THE WASHINGTON OFFICE ON AFRICA Ree. aug. 26, 1986

110 MARYLAND AVENUE, N.E. WASHINGTON, D. C. 20002 (202) 546-7961

August 21, 1986

Dear Friend,

On August 15th, he Senate overwhelmingly passed a selective sanctions bill, 84-14. While the Senate-passed version is not the comprehensive economic sanctions contained in S. 2570, there are some significant actions included in the bill. Grassroots activists, student anti-apartheid groups, Congressional allies and other supporters have forged an effective coalition to force the national debate on sanctions to the front burner of American politics. We have spent long years battling the Congress and especially the more conservative Senate, to get meaningful sanctions legislation passed. The anti-apartheid successes in the Congress are due to that hard work. But, the battle for an end to U.S. support for the apartheid government is far from over.

This fall we have two important southern African issues that need our support. Of course, final action on the sanctions fight will begin when the Congress returns from recess on September 8th. In addition, an opportunity to prevent U.S. funding for the South African-backed UNITA terrorists in Angola will come up for a vote in the House of Representatives. The Intelligence Authorization Act, HR 4759, contains the Hamilton amendment to prohibit any U.S. funding for UNITA without full Congressional debate. This legislation is an important first step towards ending U.S. support for South Africa's war of destabilization in Angola.

The members of the House-Senate Conference Committee to reconcile the two differing versions of Congressional sanctions legislation have not been selected. Over the recess, the Senate leadership may try to encourage the House to accept the Senate-passed version of the bill without a conference. They attempted this manuever last year also. However, there will probably be a Conference Committee convened in early September immediately following the recess. We have enclosed an **outline of the legislative process** to help you follow the progress of the bill to the White House and for a possible override vote. The enclosed **Action Alert** and **comparison sheet** outlines the additions to S. 2701 during the Senate debate last week and the differences between the House and Senate sanctions legislation. Also enclosed is a **flier** on the House bill to limit aid to UNITA, HR 4759. Please reproduce, mail and distribute it to the networks in your area immediately. **The vote on HR** 4759 will take place within a week or two of September 8th.

Concurrent with the legislative maneuvering on sanctions, news reports indicate that the Administration may be planning to issue another Executive Order imposing limited sanctions on South Africa. Last year, the President derailed the Congressional momentum towards meaningful sanctions against South Africa by taking such action. An Executive Order could attract support from the 37 Republicans who voted in the Senate in support of the sanctions bill and therefore sustain a possible Presidential veto of the

stronger Congressional sanctions. We must prevent the Administration from undercutting Congressional and national support for meaningful sanctions against South Africa.

One amendment added to the Senate version of the sanctions bill concerns the issue of whether federal regulations on trade and investment in South Africa, pre-empt state and local action. The present Senate bill does not seem to affect divestment of state, local and university pension funds or other retirement funds administered under state charters and constitutions. However, there seems to be some implication for selective purchasing laws (procurement restrictions) where federal monies may be used. If S. 2701 becomes law, all of the exemptions to the "ban" on new investment or bank loans contained within that bill, will apply to all federal funds. A local government that had a total ban on all purchases from any corporation doing business in South Africa may (if federal funds are used for purchasing a given item) conflict with the exemptions allowed in the federal legislation on South Africa.

The full debate on this issue is just beginning. It involves an issue that has been rehashed repeatedly: pre-emption. In contacting the Congressional leadership and the Conferees in support of the strongest sanctions possible, encourage them to include statements in the conference report which clarify the position that federal legislation does not pre-empt local and state action on this issue.

If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me.

Sincerely


Jacqueline M. Wilson Network Coordinator

JMW:dqt Enclosures

HOW A BILL BECOMES LAW

This graphic shows the most typical way in which proposed legislation is enacted into law. There are more complicated, as well as simpler, routes, and most bills fall by the wayside and never become law. The process is illustrated with two hypothetical bills, House bill No. 1 (HR 1) and Senate bill No. 2 (S 2).

Each bill must be passed by both houses of Congress in identical form before it can become law. The path of HR 1 is traced by a solid line, that of S 2 by a broken line. However, in practice most legislation begins as similar proposals in both houses.



Compromise version approved by both houses is sent to President who can either sign it into law or veto it and return it to Congress. Congress may override veto by a two-thirds majority vote in both houses; bill then becomes law without President's signature.

This complimentary chart is reproduced from Congressional Quarterly's highly acclaimed series CONGRESS AND THE NATION (see reverse side).