


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CIIR briefing paper

ANGOLA



One Hand Tied: Angola and the UN

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
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UNAVEM II DEPLOYMENT



One Hand Tied: Angola and the UN

Introduction

The Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) government and União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) rebels signed the Bicesse accords (sometimes known as the Estoril Accord) in Portugal on 31 May 1991 to end 16 years of civil war. The negotiations were hosted by Portugal and observed by the US and the then Soviet Union. The accords ratified a ceasefire, under which MPLA and UNITA forces were to be integrated into a 50,000-strong military force, the Forças Armadas Angolanas (FAA). The signing of the accords was made possible by the ending of the cold war, which made US-Soviet co-operation feasible, and the desire of the Soviet Union and Cuba to reduce their considerable financial commitment to Angola.

Under the terms of the May 1991 Bicesse accords the MPLA remained the legitimate and internationally-recognised government, retaining responsibility for running the state during the interim period and for setting the date of elections. In November 1991 President Jose Eduardo dos Santos announced that legislative and Presidential elections would be held in September 1992. Held on the last two days of September 1992 the turnout was over 91% (4.4m) of registered voters (4.8m people out of an estimated electorate of between 5.3 and 5.8m), providing the first opportunity for Angolans to express their political will in what the UN and other foreign observers concluded was a 'generally free and fair' process. President dos Santos, as winner, received 49.56% of the vote compared with 40.07% for rival UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi. In the legislative election, the MPLA obtained 53.7% of the votes compared to UNITA's 34.09%. Under Angolan law, the failure of the top finisher in the presidential election to receive over 50% of votes cast requires an election run-off. A run-off of the 1992 election has yet to occur because UNITA rejected the results and returned the country to civil war. Since the fighting broke out again in late October, 40,000 people have been killed, many tens of thousands injured and two million displaced from their homes in a war that neither side can win outright.

Background

Except for the May 1991 - October 1992 interim period war had raged in Angola since 1975. Conflict began in 1975 when the MPLA, UNITA and the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA) competed in trying to occupy Luanda by 11 November, the official date for independence. The Soviet Union and Cuba supported the MPLA, which was able to control Luanda but little else. South Africa invaded Angola in support of UNITA and Zaire invaded in support of the FNLA; by October, it looked as though Luanda would be captured before independence day. However, a massive Soviet airlift of military equipment and Cuban troops reversed the tide. Zaire abandoned its invasion force and the South Africans withdrew. The revelation of South African backing for UNITA and the FNLA eroded international support for them, and the MPLA was able to form a single party socialist government that obtained widespread diplomatic recognition. The US, however refused to recognize the MPLA

government until May 1993.

UNITA was initially formed to fight Portuguese colonial rule. In 1975 UNITA joined the short-lived transitional government. In November 1975 it proclaimed its rule over Angola and joined the FNLA against the MPLA. In the war that followed (1975-6) UNITA was driven out of its Huambo headquarters and its forces were scattered and driven into the bush. UNITA then regrouped and waged a devastating war against the MPLA government, which it saw as urban, mestizo, and northerner dominated. It portrayed itself as anti-Marxist and pro-Western, advocating pluralist democracy. However, the movement had its roots primarily amongst the Ovimbundu of southern and central Angola.

Meanwhile, the war spread and UNITA continued to make gains with South Africa intermittently operating in Angola in support of the rebels. The largest South African incursions were in 1981-3, in part in retaliation for MPLA support for the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) in its guerrilla war against South African-occupied Namibia.

In late 1983, the UN Security Council demanded that South Africa withdraw from Angola. Shortly afterwards, the two countries signed the Lusaka Accords under which South Africa agreed to withdraw if Angola ceased its support for SWAPO. However, the withdrawal was slow and was reversed in 1985 when South Africa launched another invasion in support of UNITA to counter a government fully-fledged operation (with Cuban support now numbering up to 50,000) to destroy UNITA: Luanda clearly believed that without South African support UNITA could be destroyed through a military solution.

US covert assistance to UNITA, which had been suspended by the Clark Amendment in 1976, was restarted after the repeal of that amendment in 1985. The US began to supply significant covert funding to UNITA in that year, and starting in 1986 provided Stinger anti-aircraft missiles. Between 1986-1991 UNITA received US covert aid totalling some \$250m. By 1987 there were major battles in the south of the country. These culminated in a major conventional battle at Cuito Cuanavale, Cuando-Cubango province. The South African Defence Force (SADF) and UNITA besieged this garrison town manned by MPLA and Cuban forces. However, growing casualties of white South African soldiers and vulnerability from MPLA airforce strikes eventually convinced the South Africans that they were in a 'no-win' situation. Although fighting for Cuito Cuanavale resulted in a military stalemate, the outcome was a psychological defeat for the SADF teaching it that it could not win militarily in Angola and prompting significant re-thinking of military strategy.

Cuito Cuanavale also marked the beginning of new diplomatic attempts to end the Angolan conflict. In 1988 the former Soviet Union signalled that it was no longer prepared to indefinitely continue to arm the MPLA. By January 1989 President dos Santos made an offer of peace to UNITA leader Savimbi. This led to a peace process brokered by eight African nations and a meeting in Gbadolite, Zaire on 22 June, at

which Dos Santos and Savimbi shook hands and agreed on an immediate ceasefire. The agreement, however, because of the absence of written undertakings led to a dispute over its terms, especially over Savimbi's future role.

The following eighteen months saw simultaneously, the most sustained efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement and some of the fiercest fighting of the entire war. Between April 1990 and May 1991 six rounds of Portuguese-led talks took place between UNITA and the MPLA in Portugal. Finally in May 1991 these finally resulted in a ceasefire - the Bicesse accords, temporarily ending a conflict that had already produced between 100,000 and 350,000 battle dead.

The main contending parties

The MPLA

By May 1991 the MPLA had moved a long way from its Marxist-Leninist roots and was adopting a free-market economy. Although many observers expected the MPLA to collapse in the interval between the May 1991 ceasefire and the elections in September 1992, this did not happen despite some deterioration in its efficiency. By mid 1992 an increasing number of MPLA officials believed that their party would be defeated in the elections due to its corrupt reputation and because the electorate was expected to favour a change of administration after years of single-party rule. Expecting defeat, many senior officials engaged in corrupt practices to provide themselves with financial security. In May-June 1992 applications at consulates in Luanda by senior MPLA officials for visas and resident permits, particularly the Portuguese, increased dramatically. Evidence also emerged in June 1992 of another tactic designed to maintain their power. A plot by members of the MPLA to assassinate Savimbi in August was exposed by Western intelligence and foiled by Western government intervention. They warned President dos Santos to keep his party radicals under control and in line with the spirit of the Bicesse accords.

Even in MPLA strongholds, such as the towns of Malanje and Cacusó (Malanje province) the government was not fully confident of its chances. In an attempt to rally support the MPLA invested over \$1m in street lighting in Cacusó. In September 1992 FUBO (government special forces - no translation available) were transferred to Malanje city under the supervision of Governor João Bernardo (a former intelligence chief) to prevent FALA (UNITA's armed forces) from infiltrating the city. The FUBO units were under orders to encourage anti-UN sentiment in an attempt to depict the UN as pro-UNITA. This involved shouting anti-UN slogans during the day and firing gunshots at night. Most of the shots were exchanges between UNITA and MPLA supporters but some were directed towards the UN compound. If the MPLA fared badly in the elections it intended to blame the UN for helping UNITA. In the event the MPLA and dos Santos won in Malanje and Cacusó.

The MPLA also created a new highly-trained and armed paramilitary police unit, the Rapid Deployment Police, called until recently the Emergency Police (and popularly known as the Ninjas). Up to 4,000 strong, this unit was filled with elite troops from the

regular army and officials from the security forces in contravention of the Bicesse agreements. The Ninjas demonstrated their military effectiveness (as will be discussed below) in late October 1992 when they operated against UNITA in Luanda. The Ninjas have subsequently been fully involved in fighting against UNITA across the country as the government's elite unit, and their number expanded to 30,000.

Until June/July 1992 Western intelligence assessments continued to forecast that Savimbi was likely to win the presidential elections and that he would even win significant numbers of votes in the towns. By September, however, the UN and the three observer countries to the peace accords, US, Russia and Portugal aware that UNITA might not win the elections, with the final result being close, and that demobilisation would not be completed on time, proposed compromise power-sharing arrangements. On 8 September following separate meetings between senior officials from observer countries and between President dos Santos and Jonas Savimbi, Portuguese officials announced that the MPLA and UNITA had reached an agreement on forming a coalition government whatever the election result. Both sides, however, denied this, saying that they were prepared to consider forming a government of national unity only.

Why UNITA lost the elections

Jonas Savimbi, UNITA's leader, has dominated the movement since its foundation in 1966. Savimbi's charisma, use of witchcraft, and strong leadership were thought to be an electoral asset, especially in rural areas. A human rights scandal in mid-1992 over UNITA's execution in late 1991 of senior officials Wilson dos Santos and Tito Chingunji was paradoxically believed by some Angolans to have strengthened Savimbi's electoral chances by emphasizing that he was a strong man. However, graffiti on walls in several towns in September 1991 pointed to popular ambivalence: 'MPLA steals but UNITA kills'.

There appear to be two main reason for Savimbi's loss of support. The government embarked upon an effective and sophisticated publicity campaign using the expertise of a Brazilian PR firm (the same PR firm that former Brazilian President Collor de Melo used). The content of Savimbi's speeches, including anti-white and anti-mestizo rhetoric, and UNITA's arrogant behaviour in the cities, such as setting up roadblocks with impunity, frightened many urban voters as did his saying that UNITA would purge state sector employees suspected of having supported the MPLA in the past. Because many Angolans are dependent on state employment for their survival these tactics seem to have convinced many undecided urban voters not to risk voting for Savimbi.

Support bases

Ethnic arithmetic also contributed to the election result. This is best illustrated by the legislative election results. In these the MPLA drew much of its support from the Kimbundu people of Luanda, Bengo, Malanje and Kwanza Norte provinces (873,000 votes, which was 73% of the votes cast there). UNITA derived most of its support from its Ovimbundu core areas of Huambo, Bie, Benguela and Cuando Cubango provinces (582,000 votes: 57% of the vote). As the Kimbundu and Ovimbundu ethnic

blocks are about the same size, the voting allegiance of the other main ethnic groups - the Bakongo and Lunda-Chokwe - proved critical. The Bakongo, who are concentrated in the north-west along the Zairean borders, supported, as in the past in the elections, Holden Roberto's FNLA.

UNITA therefore failed to win sufficient support outside its 'natural' strongholds to win the elections. Outside these areas a break-down of votes cast shows that the MPLA outpolled UNITA by an aggregate margin of 944,000 (54%) to 578,000 (33%). Many northern villages balanced a Presidential vote for Savimbi against a legislative vote for the MPLA, hedging their bets for the future. Communities worst hit by the war voted in both polls for the MPLA and dos Santos. Bakongo votes which were expected to go to UNITA or the FNLA went to the MPLA. UNITA probably lost votes in the provinces of Cunene, Lunda Sul, Namibe, Moxico and Zaire because people from these areas were underrepresented in UNITA's leadership. The claim of the MPLA to be a party appealing to all groups as opposed to UNITA's reinforcing of tribalist sentiment was to some extent vindicated. UNITA did win 70 legislature seats and the vote does show that if UNITA had accepted the election results it had made sufficient gains to eventually become a national 'peasant party' attracting support beyond its original ethnic base.

The Post-Election Crisis

Savimbi disputes election results

When the initial returns from the 29-30 September legislative and presidential elections showed the MPLA leading in both polls UNITA refused to accept the results. UNITA claimed electoral fraud, pulled out its members from the new joint army (FAA), and threatened to return to civil war. In response, Western nations and the UN encouraged a recount of the Presidential poll and a delay in the public release of the election results on 10 October. Four investigative commissions plus 18 provincial teams from the National Electoral Council (CNE) set about investigating UNITA's allegations. The investigations focused on consistency of polling records; security of ballot boxes; control of surplus electoral kits; and control of supplementary polling stations.

The original count had indicated that dos Santos had won the Presidential poll with 50.7%. The CNE reassessment of all ballot papers accepted only those which followed the strictest interpretation of the electoral code. As the vote for dos Santos fell below the crucial 50% mark to 49.57% (equivalent to 1,953,355 votes) and Savimbi won 40.07% (1,579,298 votes), a second round of voting was necessary. The MPLA had won a clear victory in the legislative elections with 129 seats in the 223-seat parliament against 70 for UNITA.

The international community's objective was to seek a compromise solution - Savimbi was to accept UNITA's defeat in the legislative elections while retaining an incentive to remain in the democratic process through the Presidential run-off. Savimbi appeared to formally accept this. On 16 October he pre-empted the CNE's formal announcement on 17 October of a run-off. The UN Special Representative on 17 October released

her organization's assessment on the elections, calling them 'generally free and fair'. The Organization of African Unity (OAU), the European Community (EC) and various other international organizations and member states also registered their support for the UN's conclusion.

UNITA offensive

In a bid to consolidate control of UNITA strongholds before any run-off and to take over strategic areas, UNITA forces launched a military offensive. Fighting first broke out in Huambo on 17-18 October and by the end of the month in Luanda. The latter culminated on 1 November in street battles in the city centre and residential districts with at least 1,200 people being killed, many of them innocent civilians. The fighting focused around UNITA positions at the Hotel Turismo (which is now burnt out) and in the Miramar suburb. By 2 November the government's counter-offensive had pushed UNITA troops back to the outer suburbs and fighting in the city ended. Savimbi's nephew and right-hand man Elias Salupeta Pena and UNITA Vice-President Jeremias Chitunda were shot dead by soldiers on 1 November trying to flee Luanda. Savimbi's top military commander, Gen Arlindo Pena Ben-Ben escaped injured, but his foreign affairs spokesperson Abel Chivukuvuku, was injured and is now in government custody. The government also holds 15 other senior UNITA officials although in a deal it freed Fatima Roque, responsible for UNITA economic policy. A UN ceasefire from midnight on 2 November despite initial collapse was eventually successful in Luanda from 3 November. Fighting for the control of strategic locations continued in other provinces.

The government claims that UNITA had launched a coup attempt in Luanda and cited the captured diaries of UNITA officials as confirmation. However, an examination of these diaries by Africa Watch (UNITA admit they are authentic) does not support this allegation. According to the diaries, UNITA's strategy was brinkmanship, which would force the government into a favourable power-sharing deal; the fact that so many senior UNITA leaders were in Luanda on 1 November suggests that UNITA was in fact taken by surprise at the fighting. However, the brinkmanship itself, as UNITA re-mobilized its forces, was a clear violation of the Bicesse accords.

UNITA's strategy of brinkmanship pushed the government to the breaking point and prompted the 72-hour attack by the Ninjas and pro-MPLA vigilantes on UNITA positions in Luanda and in towns across the country. Across the country over-zealous MPLA supporters razed UNITA offices, killed UNITA officials and purged UNITA from the towns. Militarily, the government was successful in decapitating a significant portion of UNITA's political leadership and support structure and destroying UNITA's urban armed militia.

The government, however, failed to confront UNITA's armed forces (FALA) and, despite this was over-confident that it could militarily defeat them. The serious losses of UNITA's political wing in Luanda also meant that many of the rebels' senior western-educated leadership no longer had any input in the movement. Pressure from military commanders in the field for a return to full-fledged hostilities against the MPLA grew, and several seem to have started military engagements on their own

initiative.

By mid-November the UN reported that 57 of Angola's 164 municipalities were under UNITA control and that UNITA maintained an advantage in 40 additional ones. It also occupied the provincial capitals of Uige (Uige), Caxito (Bengo) and Ndalatando (Cuanza Norte). In spite of mediation attempts and the Namibe ceasefire agreement (see below) UNITA continued to make territorial gains in the north. These continued military gains strengthened the position of those in the MPLA seeking a military position. President dos Santos installed a new government on 2 December. Of the 53 members, 11 were affiliated with other parties that gained seats in the legislative elections. UNITA was offered five posts: the Ministry of Culture and four vice-ministries. Among the other appointments was General João Baptista de Matos as the new armed forces chief. He replaced General Antonio Franca 'N'dalu' who had been negotiating with UNITA in an attempt to avoid renewed civil war.

On 27 December the government launched its counter-offensive against UNITA, marking a return to full blown civil war. Fighting spread across the country with UNITA being pushed back from many locations and FAA gaining control of Benguela city and Lobito (Benguela) after fierce fighting. The government's strategy was to deal UNITA a final blow on the battlefield by capturing Huambo city and possibly UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi himself. Although the MPLA captured Huambo, the strategy failed because MPLA forces over-extended themselves and could not sustain their battlefield gains under renewed pressure by UNITA forces. By late January the government was again seeking a negotiated settlement. On 28 January 1993 the UN estimated that UNITA controlled 105 of the 164 municipalities.

From 3 January UNITA battled to capture the second city, Huambo, shelling it despite a majority of its residents having voted for the movement in the elections. The town fell to the rebels on 8 March, at a cost, according to UN estimates, of 15,000 casualties. The UN Special Representative in Angola, Margaret Anstee, described this fighting as the heaviest in 17 years of civil war, with UNITA now in control of 3/4 of the municipalities.

UNITA's position

UNITA's objective of gaining control of strategic areas outside Luanda means it now controls two-thirds of the country. The government retains a presence in the towns of Malanje (Malanje province), Menongue (Cuando Cubango province) and pockets around Kuito (Bie province) and Luena (Moxico province) with control of a sizeable coastal strip from just north of Luanda to the Cunene river border with Namibia. But UNITA's cutting off the cities from the surrounding countryside has turned many provincial capitals into islands of government control in a sea of UNITA domination. The latter's overall strategy is to control all areas outside Luanda and bring the economy to a standstill, creaming off assets - especially diamonds and oil - to fund further conflict with the government and strengthen its own hand in negotiations.

Arms and mercenaries

Renewed conflict is being fuelled by both sides actively procuring new flows of arms and foreign expertise. The government is using its oil revenue remittances to fund the conflict; UNITA is using its access to diamond-producing areas to fund its purchases of weaponry as well as those captured from government forces. In United Nations Security Council Resolution (SCR) 804 (1993) passed in January, UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali reported that: 'there are also disturbing unconfirmed reports that new supplies of arms may be entering Angola'. UNITA appears to have been procuring weapons from the Ukraine, Bulgaria and South Africa. Many of these shipments transit through South Africa's homeland of Bophuthatswana. The government has also been engaged on the international arms market. On 23 April it unilaterally declared that the Triple Zero clause in the Bicesse accords, which prohibited either side from purchasing arms, was obsolete. The government called on 'all countries with which the Angolan government has diplomatic relations of cooperation to help it to equip its forces with material and logistical means'. In fact, Luanda had already purchased weapons from arms dealers in a range of countries, including the Russian Federation, Israel and South Africa. Both sides are also active in the mercenary market in South Africa and Europe looking for recruits.

The human cost

Since late October reports of violations of human rights by both sides have increased. Civilians have become victims of calculated violence including 'limpeza' by UNITA (ethnic cleansing) or 'Caca homem' (manhunt) by MPLA vigilantes of suspected UNITA supporters in the slums around many cities. Reports from the central and northern provinces indicate that both sides have engaged in killings and intimidation of people, especially if they were not from the home ethnic group. These tactics have caused massive civilian displacement and have encouraged ethnic divisions. Humanitarian agencies estimate that at least 40,000 people have been killed, and tens of thousands injured in the conflict since the polls closed on 30 September.

Angola's Emergency Needs

On 3 June 1993 the UN announced a special appeal for Angola, including 100,000 tonnes of aid, although some observers thought that severe conditions of drought, famine and inability to farm because of the war were already apparent by late April and question the delay in the appeal. The numbers of people displaced as the conflict continued to grow is estimated to have reached 2 million by June 1993. According to the government Angola requires 27,000 tonnes of food per month plus medical supplies. Commercial food imports into Luanda are practically nil, due to lack of foreign exchange, with the government being forced to spend money on armaments, and exporters being reluctant to send ships into a war zone. Angola needs to import 100,000 tonnes of commercial non-aided food.

The scale of the problem is greater than initially thought as the population has been re-estimated at 12 million, and many people returned home for the election and did not leave. An as yet unpublished UN World Food Programme report suggests that a significant proportion of Angola's harvest will rot due to disruption by fighting. It

estimates that 1.9 million conflict and drought-affected persons will require 337,000 tonnes of food assistance' (this figure may now be 383,000 tonnes which means 20% of Angolans are at risk unless food aid gets through). Where the fighting has not affected the population, there has been severe drought, particularly in the southwestern provinces of Cunene and Namibe (which is probably why UNITA is not attacking them). WFP estimates that 18-20,00 people are at risk in the former province alone, although figures from the administration suggest that it could be double that (out of a population of 362,000).

Drought during the wet season has meant that cattle waterpans (family and communal) are dry, the granaries are empty and the fruit has failed on the trees. The onset of the dry season (June-October) in this agro-pastoral area will see cattle beginning to die. In the north of the country, the situation is different but equally difficult. Here cassava is an important crop, but it takes 18 months from planting to harvesting. Planting probably only took place in October last year, which means it will not crop until April 1994. Maize and sorghum millet may also have been planted, but will not have been weeded let alone harvested, due to the renewed fighting.

In terms of preventive programmes there is little the UN can do. There is little point in providing seeds and tools or re-starting to demine roads. The immediate need is emergency relief to feed the displaced and to try to get to areas where people are attempting to survive. But the primary need is to get the fighting stopped so that planting and reconstruction can begin. It is in this political sphere that the problems have to be solved, but it can also be said that the renewed fighting stemmed from faults in the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM).

UNAVEM I

The deployment of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I) in January 1989 was the outcome of a complex international diplomatic process which culminated in agreements on both the implementation of SCR 435 (1978), leading to the independence of Namibia, and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. The agreements - tripartite between Angola, Cuba and South Africa, and bilateral between Angola and Cuba - were signed at a ceremony at United Nations Headquarters (New York) on 22 December 1988. In the bilateral agreement, Angola and Cuba agreed upon a timetable for the staged and total withdrawal of the 50,000 Cuban troops which were in Angola.

Prior to the New York Accord, Cuba and Angola requested the UN to establish a UN military observer group which could verify the two countries' compliance with the agreement. On 20 December the Security Council passed SCR 626 (1988) which established UNAVEM for 31 months - until the month after the completion of withdrawal of Cuban troops on July 1, 1991.

On 3 January 1989 UNAVEM began its operations when an advance party of 18 military observers arrived in Luanda to verify the 10 January departure of the first 450 Cuban soldiers. The observer team increased subsequently to 70 military officers, who

verified and recorded all Cuban military personnel and equipment movements. A mobile team also monitored Cuban redeployment northwards from all locations south of the adjusted 13th parallel, as specified by the New York Accords. Once the move northwards was completed, the number of observers was reduced to 60. Cuban personnel and equipment withdrawal was completed by 25 May 1991, fulfilling the terms of SCR 626 (1988).

UNAVEM II

On 17 May 1991 the Angolan government requested the UN to participate in the verification of the implementation of the peace accords. A de facto suspension of hostilities came into effect on 15 May prior to the formal signing of the ceasefire agreements on 31 May. On 30 May, the UN Security Council adopted SCR 696 (1991) entrusting a new mandate to UNAVEM II (called UNAVEM below), establishing the operation for 17 months, until after the 1992 general elections in the autumn.

In accordance with the peace accords a series of commissions were established in June 1991. These included the Joint Political-Military Commission (CCPM); Joint Verification and Monitoring Commission (CMVF); Joint Commission on the formation of the Angolan Armed Forces (CCFA) and a political commission as well as several working groups. These groups dealt with demobilization, de-mining, police, humanitarian aid, extension of central administration and other matters. UNAVEM was represented on all these commissions.

UNAVEM II's original mandate

UNAVEM military observers were deployed around the country at some 46 assembly points as well as a series of 'critical points' (ports, airports and border posts which could be used for contravening the agreements). In essence the military observers' mandate was to monitor that the CMVF joint monitoring groups worked effectively. UNAVEM verification teams were to work closely with these groups and assist in the investigation and resolution of any alleged violations of the cease-fire. UNAVEM military observers were also engaged in counting troops and weapons in the assembly areas and monitoring un-assembled troops, demobilized troops, and troops selected to join the FAA. UNAVEM police observers were also deployed in all 18 provinces to visit police facilities, examine the activities of the police, and when necessary investigate violations of political rights.

When it became clear in late 1991 that food shortages at the assembly points were threatening the peace process, UNAVEM launched an emergency food programme. The US airlifted almost 200,000 ready-made-meals (surplus combat rations from Operation Desert Storm (Gulf War)) to Luanda in early October for distribution to both MPLA and UNITA forces. The shipments aboard two C-5A Galaxy transport planes were only a complement to a World Food Programme commitment to distribute \$27m of food and aid announced at the same time.

UNAVEM's initial strength was 350 military observers and 90 police observers provided by 24 countries. In May 1992 the police observers were increased to 125 officers.

UNAVEM's expanded mandate

The Bicesse peace accords provided for 'free and fair elections' under 'supervision of international observers'. Following a request by the Angolan government UNAVEM signed a technical assistance agreement with the Angolan government in January 1992. On 6 February 1992 Miss Margaret Anstee was appointed as UN Special Representative to co-ordinate UN operations in Angola and head UNAVEM. Following a familiarisation tour by Anstee to Angola, the Security Council passed resolution 747 (1992) on 24 March, enlarging UNAVEM's mandate to include electoral observation.

Election Monitoring

In March 1992 UNAVEM was enlarged to include a 100-strong Electoral Division. Offices were established in the capitals of all 18 provinces. The UN defined its role as: 'to observe and verify, not to organize elections'. The electoral process itself was organized by the CNE with technical assistance provided by personnel from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). UNAVEM electoral observers were responsible for monitoring the three electoral phases: registration of votes; electoral campaigning and the 29-30 September elections themselves.

During the elections 200 teams of two people each (400 people) were deployed. These teams were responsible for monitoring all stages of the poll and reporting back any electoral malpractice. 225 electoral observers were made up from staff already on the ground: the other 185 came from member states and the UN secretariat in Geneva and New York. The international observers were originally intended to leave Angola on 4-5 October but in late September the UN Secretary General extended their mandate till 8 October, the day the CNE was originally due to announce the election results.

UNAVEM since the elections

On 30 October 1992 the UN Security Council passed SCR 785 (1992) condemning the outbreak of renewed hostilities, supporting the Special Representative's statement that the elections were 'generally free and fair' and extending UNAVEM's mandate to 30 November 1992. On 30 November 1992 the UN Security Council again renewed UNAVEM's mandate (SCR 793 (1992)) until 31 January and again called for an immediate ceasefire.

SCR 804 (1993) on 29 January renewed UNAVEM's mandate until 30 April and reaffirmed previous SCRs on the conflict, registering grave concern over 'the continuing non-implementation of the major provisions of the Acordos de Paz para Angola (Bicesse accords)'. It also advocated greatly reduced UNAVEM staffing levels. By 7 January UNAVEM had been reduced to 225 military and 70 police observers and some international staff. These staffing levels were further cut back to 64 (30 military observers; 6 police observers and 28 international staff) and limited to the cities of Benguela (Benguela province), Lobito (Benguela province), Lubango (Huila province), Namibe (Namibe province), Sumbe (Cuanza Sul province) and Luanda. UNAVEM withdrew from the oil-rich Cabinda enclave in early March following an attack on its

compound by unidentified gunmen. SCR 804 also stressed 'its readiness to take action promptly, at any time within the period of the mandate on the recommendation of the Secretary-General to expand substantially the United Nations presence in Angola in the event of significant progress in the peace process'. All the above resolutions were reaffirmed on 12 March in SCR 811 (1993). The resolution also appealed to both parties to 'strictly abide by applicable rules of humanitarian law, including unimpeded access for humanitarian assistance to the civilian population in need'.

Following the September election results, when the legal requirement of a presidential run-off in 1992-1993 became clear, UN officials sought to increase UNAVEM's presence to 5,000. UNAVEM hoped that an increased number of observers would be able to deter electoral fraud and provide a strong show of support for the democratic process. However, the outbreak of renewed conflict postponed these plans and UN energies were re-focussed on trying to negotiate a new ceasefire.

Mediation attempts

Since the 29-30 September presidential and legislative elections, the UN has tried to actively mediate in the conflict. Margaret Anstee played a central role on 10 October in getting both sides to agree to an investigation into allegations of electoral fraud. The UN Security Council Ad Hoc Commission to Angola, composed of representatives of Cape Verde, Morocco, Russian Federation and United States, also visited Angola between 11 and 14 October with a mandate to meet key political, military and diplomatic figures. In an attempt to generate support for the full implementation of the Bicesse agreements, UN Under-Secretary for Peacekeeping Operations, Marrack Goulding, followed on a 6-12 November mission to assess the role of UNAVEM and investigate how to resume the peace process.

In the first outbreak of fighting in Huambo on 17-18 October and then in 30 October - 1 November fighting in Luanda, UNAVEM negotiators were able to broker cease-fires. UN-sponsored talks in Namibe province between MPLA and UNITA on 26 November also produced a signed agreement that both sides would fully implement the Bicesse accords; a nation-wide cease-fire; termination of offensive troop movements, and the expansion of UN involvement in the process. However, UNITA continued to make military gains in northern Angola thereby undermining the agreement.

Following the Namibe negotiations, an increase in armed conflict further eroded UNAVEM's mediation attempts. Although UNITA agreed to further peace talks on 8 January, the government would not negotiate with UNITA until it demilitarized and withdrew from occupied territories. However, once UNITA began to make renewed military gains, the MPLA compromised and accepted further negotiations. UN-mediated peace talks between MPLA and UNITA on 28-30 January 1993 in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) achieved little, except identifying key issues blocking progress towards a ceasefire.

UNITA cancelled a second round of negotiation with MPLA scheduled for February 10 in Addis Ababa claiming, many think spuriously, that its team could not leave

Angola because of the Huambo fighting. On 14 February Portugal, Russia and the US, the three co-signatories of the Bicesse accords, issued an ultimatum to UNITA giving it three days to decide to return to the negotiating table. If this did not happen, they said, they would 'not fail to draw the necessary conclusions'. At the end of three days they extended the ultimatum by two more days, and finally UNITA agreed upon a meeting with the government in Addis Ababa on 26 February. However, in spite of an extended 1 March 0600 GMT deadline, UNITA failed to turn up to talks in Addis and UN officials cancelled the talks. Given that UNAVEM had put up its own transport and communications facilities at the disposal of the UNITA delegation, it is clear that UNITA wanted to recapture Huambo from the government before it re-entered negotiations.

On 10 March UNITA leader Savimbi, boosted by UNITA's 8 March capture of Huambo, demanded that UN Special Representative Margaret Anstee be removed as well as making other more outrageous accusations. Savimbi alleged that Anstee was partisan in favour of the MPLA and said UNITA would not participate in any further peace talks negotiated by her. The following day UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali expressed his support for Anstee and reiterated a warning that the UN would withdraw from Angola when its mandate expired at the end of April unless significant progress was reached in ending the conflict. UNAVEM also failed to obtain a truce so that relief organizations could bring food and medicine to thousands of wounded and besieged civilians in Huambo.

On 25 March government/UNITA talks began with US and UN mediation in Abidjan (Ivory Coast). UN Secretary-General Boutros Ghali tried to keep the pressure on Savimbi by writing a letter to him on 14 April urging him to move ahead in the negotiations. Eventually after several suspensions due to tit-for-tat delaying tactics by the government and UNITA there appeared to be progress with UNITA leader Savimbi announcing on 27 April, following talks with Ivory Coast Foreign Minister Amara Essy, that he agreed to a ceasefire. This ended a dispute over whether there should be a 'cessation of hostilities' or a formal ceasefire, but the focus of dispute then shifted and the talks collapsed on 21 May. Agreement was reached between both sides on a power-sharing formula, but UNITA refused to agree to Article 11 of the draft peace protocol or 'memorandum of understanding'. Article 11 demanded that UNITA fighters withdraw from areas they had illegally occupied since fighting broke out in October 1992. During the talks both UNITA and the government called for an enlargement of UNAVEM II's mandate, arguing that the UN should set up an 'intervention force' as well as providing and distributing humanitarian aid.

On 19 May, the new US Clinton administration recognized the MPLA government. The new administration sworn in in January 1993 had been holding off from recognizing Luanda in hope that this would give it extra leverage over UNITA. However, increasing frustration at UNITA's continued intransigence in the Abidjan talks over Article 11 and a growing number of intelligence assessments stating that UNITA was unable to capture Luanda, thereby failing to achieve an all-out military victory, in the conflict, convinced the Clinton administration to recognise the Angolan government. However,

beyond the gesture of recognition, the Clinton administration will not open a full diplomatic mission in Luanda until the government meets a number of conditions, namely the release of political prisoners and the formation of a government of national unity.

This long-delayed recognition of the Angolan government will increase pressure on UNITA to come to an agreement but is unlikely to have an immediate result. In late March Savimbi warned his supporters to expect US diplomatic recognition of his adversary. The timing of the US announcement probably contributed to the 21 May collapse of the Abidjan talks. Further talks may though follow after a period of intensified fighting. Indeed, conflict has subsequently increased in the northern provinces.

The UN Security Council, showing increasing exasperation with UNITA, passed a further resolution (SCR 823 (1993)) on 30 April. It reaffirmed past resolutions and extended UNAVEM's mandate until 31 May 1993. The Security Council also condemned recent attacks on international humanitarian flights, particularly by UNITA, which had shot down on the 26 April a World Food Programme aircraft in eastern Angola. UNITA is trying to deny delivery of food aid to isolated government-held towns in an attempt to capture them. At the same time UNAVEM further reduced its presence to Luanda, Luena (Moxico), Lubango (Huila) and Benguela (Benguela).

A draft resolution on the extension of UNAVEM's mandate for a further 60 days, with reduced staff, was not adopted as had been expected due to a disagreement within the Security Council. UNAVEM's mandate expired on 31 May but was renewed by a compromise resolution on 1 June (SCR 834 (1993)) which extended the mandate for 45 days to 15 July, retaining UNAVEM's staffing levels at the Secretary General's discretion. The UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali is considering further reducing the UNAVEM to about 50 military observers, 18 civilian police, 40 international staff and 75 local staff. SCR 834 also held 'UNITA responsible for the breakdown of the talks [Abidjan] and for thereby jeopardising the peace process'.

UN representative Margaret Anstee, who was in New York for the Security Council debates had lobbied and failed to get UN immediate support for armed UN troops to escort food and medical supplies along neutral humanitarian aid corridors. Anstee had already appealed to President Eduardo dos Santos and UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi to open up ten air corridors and four land-based corridors to distribute badly-needed aid across the country to the estimated 1,000 Angolans dying a day.

Margaret Anstee had also already indicated on several occasions that she wanted to retire but the UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali had encouraged her to remain until a lasting peace accord was reached. Following the collapse of the Abidjan talks Anstee was allowed to retire. Her replacement will be the former Malian foreign minister, Alioune Blondin Beye. Beye was director of the Legal Department of the African Development Bank, based in Ivory Coast and has twice been a candidate for secretary-general of the Organization of African Unity. Boutros Ghali had earmarked Sergio

Viera de Mello, the Brazilian-born representative for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Cambodia for the Angolan job, but UNITA opposed his nomination on the grounds that he comes from Brazil, which they accuse of being too friendly with the Angolan government. Once a ceasefire is achieved UNAVEM's mandate will be renegotiated and UNAVEM III created.

Why the transition failed

The integration of FALA (UNITA's army) and FAPLA (the government's army) into a single, neutral FAA national force of 50,000 failed. The formation of the FAA, intended to begin on 1 August 1991 and to be completed roughly one year later, was to have been comprised equally of government and UNITA personnel. Even at the start, the danger of the self-implementing nature of the Bicesse accords became evident when both sides failed to place all their troops in the 48 established cantonment areas by the 1 August deadline. By 27 September 1992 demobilisation was badly behind schedule: only 65% of MPLA and 26% of UNITA forces had returned to civilian life (40,000 of the original 150,000) and only 8,800 soldiers of the FAA had been integrated. Meanwhile both sides were also illegally maintaining secret armies while the government had created a paramilitary police force (Ninjas). Because the creation of the FAA was a condition for the 29-30 September elections going ahead, a symbolic creation of the FAA took place on September 27, with the FAA becoming the responsibility of the mixed commission (CCPM) overseeing the Bicesse agreements.

The demobilisation process was also weakened by competition between Portugal, Britain and France to provide training and equipment for the new FAA. Each country was pushing for a significant role in the process and this led to a string of delays. This competition also convinced senior MPLA and UNITA officials that the creation of the FAA was not a key priority for the international community but more of an opportunity for these countries to make a profit.

UNAVEM and the international community also failed to push several key initiatives in facilitating demobilization. For example, the government and UNITA maintained significant fleets of trucks that could transport soldiers, food and supplies. Neither side, however, was willing to contribute to the process. The government appears to have sold many of its trucks to the private sector while UNITA withheld theirs from international inspection.

Lack of transport and poor accommodation, especially for demobilizing government forces, provoked a crisis in 1992, with soldiers rioting and 'spontaneously demobilizing' even if the government had hoped to try and retain them. Margaret Anstee travelled to Washington in July 1992 to push for the US to assist in the demobilization effort, gaining use of several US C-130 transport planes for the process between July and September. Often they were diverted from their scheduled flight plans to pick up rioting government soldiers in an attempt to reduce tensions. By August 1992, only 29,000 government troops remained in the cantonment areas. More than 36,000 had been formally demobilized.

The FAA also lacked sufficient facilities. By mid-1992 only two of the 16 designated installations for the new army had been partially refurbished, while the FAPLA cantonment sites were mostly disorganized, poorly equipped and under-staffed. Lack of discipline, lack of food and low morale was frequently cited as the major problem in these camps by UNAVEM military observers.

In contrast UNITA's FALA remained disciplined and cohesive throughout the interim process. UNITA also continuously delayed mass demobilization, citing the lack of guarantees of employment, food and housing for its soldiers. In spring 1992 UNITA indefinitely postponed demobilization of many of its forces, citing on this occasion, lack of documentation, funds and civilian clothing. UNAVEM officials report that at demobilization ceremonies they monitored UNITA soldiers waiting for further orders from their commanders, even after they were technically demobilized. This raises the serious question whether UNITA ever intended to fully demobilize its forces and whether reports in mid 1992 that UNITA had a secret 20,000 strong army are not true. Although UNAVEM investigated these reports and travelled nation-wide searching for the army they were unable to find evidence at the time to support these allegations including from defecting UNITA officials N'zau Puna and Tony da Costa Fernandes. However, UNAVEM's intelligence was consistently poor and capacity to seriously investigate such claims was limited by logistical constraints. By August 1992, only 4,999 FALAs had been demobilized and slightly more than 26,000 remained in the cantonment areas.

UNAVEM II's main weakness was its limited mandate in Angola. It had not participated in the drafting of the Bicesse accords, except for having a military observer present and should have probably not accepted such a limited mandate. It was restricted to:

- a) ...the monitoring and verification of the steps taken by the PRA (government) and UNITA to ensure the cease-fire: termination of hostile actions and propaganda between all parties; confinement of all troops to assembly areas; demobilization and demilitarization of the armies followed by the creation of the new Angolan Armed Forces (FAA); and the collection and disposal of weapons.
- b) ...the monitoring and the verification of the neutrality of the Angolan police forces, responsible for the maintenance of law and order in the country. Police actions were not to infringe on the political rights of Angolan citizens.

Many ordinary Angolans, mistakenly believed that UNAVEM's role included the power to intervene. Before and after the elections international observers saw frustrated Angolans attempting to get UNAVEM to fully investigate and intervene when political killings and intimidation took place. This led to widespread disillusionment and even active hostility to UNAVEM in urban areas. In many such cases UNAVEM underinterpreted its role as it could have mobilized groups of police monitors to

investigate such incidents. Many Angolans partly blame UNAVEM for the failure of the transition process.

Interpretations of UNAVEM's mandate differed amongst UNAVEM officials though it is clear that UNAVEM's presence on its own often acted as an important deterrent against widespread conflict breaking out during the transitional period. During the elections themselves there were occasions when UNAVEM officials found that in the interest of peace they had to play a role beyond their electoral observation mandate - mediating for example over disputes at polling stations or ballot counting. Technically these actions were illegal.

UNAVEM failed to use effectively its only two weapons - publicity about violations and the threat of withdrawal. Even though threat of withdrawal was not likely, since UNAVEM's presence undoubtedly saved lives in areas it was stationed it was never mentioned as a possible weapon. Compromise and diplomatic discretion were often the preferred approach used by UNAVEM. This contributed to both sides increasingly violating the peace accords by intimidating suspect opposition sympathizers, and not disarming and demobilizing their armed forces properly when they found they there was little UNAVEM would do. UNAVEM was virtually silent over human rights abuses, including the much publicized murders of Tito Chingunji and Wilson dos Santos, allegedly by UNITA.

UNAVEM's intelligence was poor. Communication flows between the provinces and its Luanda Vila Espa headquarters were sporadic and liaison between different departments at Vila Espa itself was often fragmentary due to factionalisation amongst the staff and bureaucratic procedure. Many UNAVEM officials were poorly briefed and did not speak Portuguese let alone a vernacular dialect. This meant many officers relied on locally employed translators. The overall consequence was that UNAVEM was generally poorly informed and when it had valuable intelligence, bureaucratic procedure slowed down decision making and response.

The UN's attempt to use Angola as an experiment in conducting elections with limited resources is also significant. UN Special Representative Margaret Anstee described her position before the elections as: 'flying a 747 with only enough fuel for a DC3' (Financial Times 11.5.92). Until the elections Angola (population of 12m) had only 576 UN officials costing \$132m. In January 1993 the annual cost of UNAVEM was roughly estimated to be \$39m. By contrast, the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia (population of 1.5m) successfully supervised, with a wider mandate, the 1989-90 transition to independence with a budget of \$430m and some 7,150 officials.

Financial and logistical constraints, including from the US, also contributed to the pressure on UNAVEM to push for the holding of the elections on schedule and to plan for a prompt withdrawal. 185 international observers were flown into Luanda on 19-23 September and were budgeted to stay until early October. External events also decisively influenced UN decisions. For example, once it became clear that a General

Peace Accord (GPA) was to be signed in Rome (Italy) on 4 October ending Mozambique's civil war, planning began to prepare for shipping UNAVEM equipment and personnel to Mozambique. Margaret Anstee herself hoped that following her Angolan experience she would become UN Special Representative in Mozambique. This was certainly a possibility, because until early 1993, UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali had not appointed a permanent Special Representative in Mozambique.

Lessons

- Mediation: Current UN mediation attempts are important in trying to end the resumed civil war and should receive maximum international logistic and diplomatic support from member states. Any ceasefire should be drafted to ensure that it does not reward the gains of further conflict by breaking the Bicesse accords.
- Expand Mandate: As the UN Special Representative to Angola Margaret Anstee has indicated UNAVEM's current mandate is 'increasingly irrelevant'(Independent 21.1.93). During the March-May peace negotiations in Abidjan (Ivory Coast) both the MPLA and the government agreed that UNAVEM's mandate needs expanding. It should provide for the effective enforcing of demobilisation of soldiers from both sides. It should also provide for a greatly expanded force on the ground to supervise the process .

Under an expanded mandate UNAVEM should:

- provide and assist the distribution of urgently needed humanitarian aid to the zones most requiring assistance.
- should provide its terms of reference over human rights abuses and what actions it will take and how individuals and groups can call UNAVEM's attention to such abuses and;
- fully investigate any ongoing human rights abuses or renewed violations of the Bicesse accords or any subsequent signed peace accords. When UNAVEM obtains such information we believe it should be more transparent, making it publicly clear, earlier, when infringements have been committed and who by.

ANNEXES

ANNEX I

ABIDJAN PROTOCOL

D. Agreement between GRA (the Government of the Republic of Angola) and UNITA on the principles and procedures contained in the Abidjan Protocol on ceasefire and national reconciliation. (Initialling by Heads of Delegations).

D+7. Meeting between the General Staffs of FAA and FALA under the auspices of the United Nations in the presence of UNAVEM and the Observers, to be established:

- * Number of men, areas where stationed and types of forces;
- * Confinement, quartering areas of forces;
- * Details of movement of UNITA forces, weapons and equipment to the confinement/quartering areas;
- * Phased quartering of Rapid Deployment Police.

D+10. Date of formal signing of Abidjan Protocol by GRA and UNITA and start of implementation.

(Date of formal signing by GRA and UNITA, in Cote D'Ivoire, of Abidjan Protocol establishing a ceasefire throughout the national territory, resumption of Angola Peace Accord action to be implemented and national reconciliation.)

D. Recommendation by the United Nations Secretary-General to the Security Council to strengthen UNAVEM II and adoption of a new United Nations mandate, the entry into force of which shall depend on the full implementation of the action provided for in paragraph 11.5 below.

(The start of the new United Nations mandate in Angola will require a prior decision by the Security Council specifying and authorising that mandate in accordance with the specific tasks the Government and UNITA agree to assign to UNAVEM, contained in an annex to the present Protocol.)

D+15. Ending of on-the-spot hostilities and of all offensive movements and military actions.

(The ending of on-the-spot hostilities means the military forces shall remain where they are. The military forces may be supplied with food and medicines, but cannot however receive any military, lethal or similar material. All offensive movements and military actions shall be forbidden. The General Staffs of both parties shall be encouraged to take joint steps to reduce the possibility of violations of the ceasefire, investigate incidents and allow the evacuation of the wounded.)

D+15. Establishment of verification and monitoring mechanisms by reinforcing UNAVEM II personnel.

(The United Nations shall form and deploy joint GRA/UNITA/United Nations teams to monitor and verify the cessation of hostilities everywhere in the country. (The observer countries undertake to make every effort to ensure that the United Nations has the necessary resources to perform this task.)

D+15. Establishment of secure conditions for UNAVEM II.

(UNAVEM II in coordination with GRA, shall take measures to ensure the physical safety of UNITA delegates, so as to enable them to work continually in the reactivated CCPM without hindrance or risk. The three observer countries undertake to make efforts to ensure increased resources for UNAVEM II to perform this task.)

8. Reactivation of the CCPM with full guarantees for its participants, with the United Nations as a member.

(The CCPM shall resume its activity and assume responsibilities, as provided for in its Statutes, contained in an annex to the present Protocol.)

8.1. GRA and UNITA may appoint their representatives in the CCPM, who shall enjoy the rights, immunities and other legal guarantees previously set out in the Peace Accords and shall immediately enjoy full freedom of movement and speech in accordance with the law.

8.2. The reactivation of the CCPM shall imply the formation of a new Military Commission responsible for military affairs related to the ceasefire. On matters related to the ceasefire, the CCPM shall act on the basis of recommendations made by the Military Commission. This Commission shall be chaired by the United Nations and include the Government, UNITA and the observer countries. In the event of a deadlock in the Commission, the United Nations shall play the role of arbiter. When UNITA's high-ranking officers are already incorporated in the FAA, the Military Commission shall continue to function within the framework of the FAA, keeping the CCPM informed on military issues related to the ceasefire. The duties of the Military Commission shall cease as soon as the incorporation and demobilisation process is completed.

9. Start of the process of release of all prisoners, civil and military detainees and all people held as a result of the conflict between the Government and UNITA, henceforth referred to as prisoners. This process shall take place under the supervision of the ICRC, in coordination with GRA and UNITA technical teams.

9.1. The ICRC shall initiate contacts with both GRA and UNITA immediately after the ending of hostilities to get lists of the people to be released.

9.2. The aim shall be to establish a permanent working group in Luanda for the release of prisoners, coordinated by the ICRC, entrusted with verifying the release of all prisoners including those on the lists drawn up before the elections.

9.3. This group shall present proposals to the CCPM on the immediate release of all prisoners.

9.4. The ICRC shall supervise the process and shall have free access to all areas where there are prisoners. The ICRC shall also have the right to interview prisoners.

9.5. The ICRC shall also propose the reunification of families, for which it shall hear without hindrance all the direct family members of prisoners.

9.6. In the event of a deadlock in the decision of the working group, or CCPM, or obstruction of its activity by one of the parties, the ICRC shall make the matter publicly known.

10. Formation of joint Government/UNITA/UNAVEM teams to assess the situation in the humanitarian field in the areas not yet reached by humanitarian aid, in order to extend it to all the national territory.

(The formation of these teams is specifically aimed at facilitating the extension of humanitarian assistance to all areas of the country which do not currently get it. Another aim is to establish, within the framework of the CCPM, a permanent humanitarian assistance working group based in Luanda.)

11. Phased movement of UNITA forces from cities and other places to confinement/quarterming areas.

11.1. Phased movement means that part of the UNITA forces will move in each phase. The details of the phased movement, numbers and time table of the phases shall be agreed at the first meeting between the two General Staffs referred to in paragraph 2. At the end of this process, all the UNITA forces shall have been moved to the confinement/quarterming areas.

11.2. The first movements shall be limited in character and shall involve the movement of UNITA forces from some cities to the established confinement/quarterming areas.

11.3. The first phase of movement of forces shall be progressively monitored and verified by the strengthened UNAVEM II personnel. Subsequent phases shall be monitored and verified by the peace keeping forces in accordance with the new United Nations mandate.

11.4. As soon as they arrive, the peace keeping forces will replace the UNAVEM II personnel in the appointed cities or places.

11.5. At the end of the process of phased movement of UNITA forces to confinement/quarterming areas and before any demobilization, the Government and Unita shall have to decide if the composition of the FAA is to comply with the numbers fixed in the Bicesse Accords or if these numbers are to be changed, always maintaining the principle of the proportions between the Government and UNITA provided therein.

12. The extension of the State administration to areas previously occupied by UNITA shall take place immediately after verification by the United Nations of the movement of those forces to their confinement/quarterming areas and of conditions in those cities for the return of the State administration.

13. The return to barracks of the Rapid Deployment Police. GRA shall requarter the Rapid Deployment Police in phases, the time table of which shall be determined at the meeting of General Staff provided for in 2.

(The movement of all these police forces shall end at the same time as the completion of the movement of UNITA forces to the confinement/quarterming areas.)

14. Start of the verification and monitoring of the Rapid Deployment Police.

(On agreement between GRA and UNITA, the Rapid Deployment Police shall be quartered. Its weapons and equipment shall comply with its mission and shall be verified by the United Nations.)

15. Start of the verification and monitoring of the neutrality of the police.

(Mechanisms for the verification and monitoring of the neutrality of the police shall comply with the new United Nations mandate.)

35. Establishment by the National Assembly of the date for holding a second round of presidential elections and conclusion of the electoral process.

36. Swearing in of the President of the Republic.

37. Dissolution of CCPM monitoring bodies.

Observations:

The dates in this memorandum should be seen as temporary goals to be reached, if possible. As a general rule, all actions should be completed in chronological order, and no specific action should be carried out before the completion of all previous actions required. An exception to this rule will be if the United Nations and the Observers consider, by consensus, that the Government or UNITA are deliberately delaying or obstructing the process. In the event of one of the parties not abiding by that decision, the United Nations Secretary-General and Security Council shall immediately be informed accordingly.

ANNEX II

RELEVANT UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS ON ANGOLA

RESOLUTION 545 (1983)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 2508th meeting,
on December 20th 1983 by 14 votes to none,
with 1 abstention (United States of America).

The Security Council

Having heard the statement of the Permanent Representative of Angola to the United Nations,

Deeply concerned at the continued occupation of parts of southern Angola by the South African military forces in flagrant violation of the principles and objectives of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law,

Gravely concerned at the massive loss of human life and extensive destruction of property brought about by the continuing attacks against and military occupation of the territory of Angola,

Recalling its resolutions 387 (1976), 428 (1978), 447 (1979), 454 (1979) and 475 (1980),

Bearing in mind that in accordance with Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter, all Member States shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations,

Conscious of the need to take effective measures to maintain international peace and security in view of the continued violation of the Charter by South Africa,

1. Strongly condemns South Africa's continued military occupation of parts of southern Angola which constitutes a flagrant violation of international law and of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Angola;
2. Declares that the continued illegal military occupation of the territory of Angola is a flagrant violation of the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Angola

and endangers international peace and security;

3. Demands that South Africa should unconditionally withdraw forthwith all its occupation forces from the territory of Angola and cease all violations against that State and henceforth scrupulously respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Angola;

4. Considers, moreover, that Angola is entitled to appropriate redress for any material damage it has suffered;

5. Calls upon all Member States to desist from any action which would undermine the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Angola;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to monitor the implementation of the present resolution and report to the Security Council accordingly;

7. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

Also see UN Security Council Resolutions: 546 (1984), 567 (1985), 571 (1985), 574 (1985), 577 (1985), 602 (1987) and 606 (1987). All of these condemned illegal military occupation of Angola by South Africa, demanded withdrawal and redress for damage caused. All were adopted with only the USA abstaining on occasion and the UK once.

RESOLUTION 626 (1988)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 2834th meeting, on December 20 1988

The Security Council,

Noting the decision of Angola and Cuba to conclude a bilateral agreement on 22 December 1988 for the redeployment to the north and the staged and total withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, according to the agreed timetable,

Considering the request submitted to the Secretary-General by Angola and Cuba in letters dated 17 December 1988,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General dated 17 December 1988,

1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General and the recommendations therein;
2. Decides to establish under its authority a United Nations Angola Verification Mission and requests the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps to this effect

in accordance with his aforementioned report;

3. Also decides that the Mission shall be established for a period of thirty-one months;
4. Further decides that the arrangements for the establishment of the Mission shall enter into force as soon as the tripartite agreement between Angola, Cuba and Soouth Africa on the one hand, and the bilateral agreement between Angola and Cuba on the other, are signed;
5. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council immediately after the signature of the agreements referred to in paragraph 4 and to keep the Council fully informed of further developments.

Decisions

In a letter dated 22 December 1988, the Secretary-General referred to his report of 17 December concerning proposed arrangements for verifying the redeployment northwards and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and proposed to the Security Council that the United Nations Angola Verification Mission be composed of contingents from the following Member States: Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Congo, Czechoslovakia, India, Jordan, Norway, Spain and Yugoslavia. In the same letter, the Secretary-General informed the President of the Council of his intention, with the consent of the Council, to appoint Brigadier-General Pericles Ferreira Gomes of Brazil as Chief Military Observer of the Mission. In a letter dated 23 December 1988, the President of the Council informed the Secretary-General as follows:

"I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 22 December 1988 concerning the proposed composition of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission and your intention to appoint Brigadier-General Pericles Ferreira Gomes of Brazil, as Chief Military Observer of the Mission has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They considered the matter in informal consultations held on 23 December and agreed with the proposals in your letter."

RESOLUTION 696 (1991)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 2991st meeting, on 30 May 1991

The Security Council,

Welcoming the decision of the Government of the People's Republic of Angola and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola to conclude the 'Acordos de Paz para Angola',

Stressing the importance it attaches to the signing of the 'Acordos de Paz para Angola'

and to the fulfilment by the parties in good faith of the obligations contained therein,

Stressing further the importance of all States refraining from taking any actions which could undermine the agreements mentioned above and contributing to their implementation as well as respecting fully the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Angola,

Noting with satisfaction the decision taken by the Governments of the People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba to complete the withdrawal, ahead of schedule, of all Cuban troops from Angola by 25 May 1991 (S/22644),

Considering the request submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations by the People's Republic of Angola in its letter dated 8 May 1991 (S/22609),

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General dated 20 May 1991 (S/22627) and the addendum dated 29 May 1991 (S/22627/Add.1),

Taking into account that the mandate of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) established by Security Council resolution 626 (1988) of 20 December 1988 expires on 22 July 1991,

1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General dated 20 May 1991 (S/22627) and the addendum dated 29 May 1991 (S/22627/Add.1) and the recommendations therein;
2. Decides accordingly to entrust a new mandate to the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) (henceforth UNAVEM II) as proposed by the Secretary-General in line with the 'Acordos de Paz para Angola' and requests the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps to this effect;
3. Further decides to establish UNAVEM II for a period of 17 months from the date of adoption of this resolution in order to accomplish the objectives stated in the report of the Secretary-General (S/22627);
4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council immediately after the signature of the 'Acordos de Paz para Angola' and to keep the Council fully informed of further developments.

RESOLUTION 747 (1992)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3062nd meeting, on 24 March 1992

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolution 696 (1991) of 30 May 1991 which decided to entrust a new mandate to the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II) as proposed by the Secretary-General in line with the 'Acordos de Paz para Angola',

Welcoming the continuing efforts of the Secretary-General to implement fully the mandate entrusted to UNAVEM II,

Noting with satisfaction the efforts made so far by the Government of the People's Republic of Angola and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola to maintain the ceasefire and expressing concern over the delays and gaps in the completion of some major tasks arising from the 'Acordos de Paz',

Stressing again the importance it attaches to the fulfilment by the parties in good faith of all obligations contained in the 'Acordos de Paz',

Welcoming the appointment by the Secretary-General of a Special Representative for Angola who will be in charge of all current and projected activities of the United Nations in connection with the 'Acordos de Paz' and will also be the Chief of UNAVEM II,

Taking into account the further report of the Secretary-General dated 31 October 1991 (S/23191),

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General dated 3 March 1992 (S/23671) and the addendum dated 20 March 1992 (S/23671/Add.1),

1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General dated 3 March 1992 (S/23671) and the recommendations contained therein concerning the operational plan for United Nations observation of the elections and the enlargement of UNAVEM II;
2. Calls upon the Angolan parties to cooperate fully with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and with UNAVEM II, including in the discharge of its expanded mandate;
3. Underlines the necessity recalled in paragraph 18 of the report of the Secretary-General that the United Nations electoral mission will have the explicit agreement of the two parties to the 'Acordos de Paz';
4. Decides to enlarge the mandate of UNAVEM II to include the mission provided for in paragraph 22 of the report of the Secretary-General for the remainder of its existing mandate period;
5. Urges the Angolan parties to comply scrupulously with the provisions of the 'Acordos de Paz' and with the agreed deadlines; and to this end, to proceed without delay with the demobilization of their troops, formation of a unified national armed

force, effective operation of joint police monitoring units, extension of the central administration and other major tasks;

6. Calls upon the Angolan authorities and parties to finalize political, legal, organizational and budgetary preparations for free and fair multi-party elections to be held in September 1992 and to make available as soon as possible all available resources for the electoral process;

7. Encourages all States to contribute voluntarily and requests the United Nations programmes and specialized agencies to provide the assistance and support necessary to prepare for free and fair multi-party elections in Angola;

8. Urges the parties to establish as soon as possible a precise timetable for the electoral process in Angola so that elections can take place at the date fixed and requests the Secretary-General to extend his cooperation to this end;

9. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council informed of developments and to submit a further report to the Council within three months of the adoption of this resolution.

RESOLUTION 785 (1992)

Adoption by the Security Council at its 3130th meeting, on 30 October 1992

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 696 (1991) of 30 May 1991 and 747 (1992) of 24 March 1992,

Recalling also the statement made on its behalf by the President of the Security Council on 27 October 1992 (S/24720),

Taking note of the letter of the Secretary-General dated 29 October 1992 (S/24736), in which he recommends an extension of the existing mandate of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II) for an interim period,

Deeply concerned at the deterioration of the political situation and the rising tension in Angola,

Deeply concerned also at the reports of the recent resumption of hostilities by UNITA in Luanda and Huambo,

Affirming that any party which fails to abide by all the commitments entered into under

the 'Acordos de Paz para Angola' will be rejected by the international community, and that the results of use of force will not be accepted,

1. Approves the recommendation of the Secretary-General to extend the existing mandate of UNAVEM II for an interim period, until 30 November 1992;
2. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to it by that date a detailed report on the situation in Angola together with long-term recommendations, accompanied by the financial implications thereof, on the mandate and strength of UNAVEM II;
3. Strongly condemns any such resumption of hostilities and urgently demands that such acts cease forthwith;
4. Calls on all States to refrain from any action which directly or indirectly could jeopardize the implementation of the 'Acordos de Paz' and increase the tension in the country;
5. Reiterates its full support for the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and UNAVEM II, and its strong condemnation of the attacks and baseless accusations made by UNITA's radio station, Vorgan, against the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and UNAVEM II;
6. Supports the statement by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General certifying that the elections held on 29 and 30 September 1992 were generally free and fair and calls upon UNITA and the other parties to the electoral process in Angola to respect the results of the elections;
7. Calls upon the parties to the 'Acordos de Paz' to abide by all the commitments entered into under the Accords, in particular with regard to the confinement of their troops and collection of their weapons, demobilization and the formation of the unified national armed force, and to refrain from any act that might heighten tension, jeopardize the continued conduct of the electoral process and threaten the territorial integrity of Angola;
8. Urges the leaders of the two parties to engage in a dialogue without delay so as to enable the second round of the presidential elections to be held promptly;
9. Reaffirms that it will hold responsible any party which refuses to take part in such a dialogue, thereby jeopardizing the entire process, and reiterates its readiness to consider all appropriate measures under the Charter of the United Nations to secure implementation of the 'Acordos de Paz';
10. Decides to remain seized of the question.

RESOLUTION 793 (1992)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3144th meeting, on 30 November 1992

The Security Council

Recalling its resolutions 696 (1991) of 30 May 1991, 747 (1992) of 24 March 1992 and 785 (1992) of 30 October 1992,

Taking note of the further report of the Secretary-General of 25 November 1992 (S/24858 and Add.1),

Deeply concerned by deterioration in the political and military situation in Angola and especially by the troop movements which have taken place and by the hostilities which occurred on 31 October and 1 November 1992,

Welcoming and supporting the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative aimed at resolving the present crisis,

Disturbed by the non-implementation of major aspects of 'Acordos de Paz para Angola',

Reiterating its support for the statement by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General that the elections held on 29 and 30 September 1992 were generally free and fair and taking note of the acceptance by UNITA of the results of the elections,

Noting the intention of the Secretary-General to continue, in this as in other peace-keeping operations, to monitor expenditures carefully during this period of increasing demands on peace-keeping resources,

1. Approves the recommendation of the Secretary-General to extend the existing mandate of UNAVEM II for a further period of two months until 31 January 1993;
2. Appeals to the troop and police-contributing States to lend cooperation to UNAVEM II in order to restore as soon as possible its mandated strength;
3. Welcomes the joint declaration of the Government of Angola and UNITA made in Namibe on 26 November 1992 and urges them to take immediate and effective actions in accordance with the declaration;
4. Demands that the two parties scrupulously observe the cease-fire, immediately stop all military confrontations, and in particular offensive troop movements, and create all the conditions necessary for the completion of the peace process;

5. Urges the two parties to demonstrate their adherence to, and fulfilment without exception of, the 'Acordos de Paz' in particular with regard to the confinement of their troops and collection of their weapons, demobilization and the formation of the unified national armed force and to refrain from any action which might heighten tension or jeopardize the return to normalcy;
6. Strongly appeals to the two parties to engage in a continuous and meaningful dialogue aimed at national reconciliation and at the participation of all parties in the democratic process and to agree on a clear timetable for the fulfilment of their commitments in accordance with the 'Acordos de Paz';
7. Reaffirms that it will hold responsible any party which refuses to take part in such a dialogue, thereby jeopardizing the entire process, and reiterates its readiness to consider all appropriate measures under the Charter of the United Nations to secure implementation of the 'Acordos de Paz';
8. Calls on all States to refrain from any action which directly or indirectly could jeopardize the implementation of the 'Acordos de Paz' and increase the tension in the country;
9. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to it by 31 January 1993 a further report on the situation in Angola together with his longer-term recommendations for the further role of the United Nations in the peace process, which should be clearly defined in scope and time and based on a wide degree of support in Angola;
10. Decides to remain seized of the question.

RESOLUTION 804 (1993)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3168th meeting, on 29 January 1993

The Security Council

Reaffirming its resolutions 696 (1991) of 30 May 1991, 747 (1992) of 24 March 1992, 785 (1992) of 30 October 1992 and 793 (1992) of 30 November 1992,

Having considered the further report of the Secretary-General dated 21 January 1993 (S/25140 and Add.1),

Having considered also the request submitted to the Secretary-General by the Government of Angola in its letter dated 21 January 1993 (S/25155),

Gravely disturbed by the recent outbreak of heavy fighting in many parts of Angola and the further deterioration of the already dangerous political and military situation in that country,

Gravely concerned at the continuing non-implementation of the major provisions of the 'Acordos de Paz para Angola',

Concerned at the recent absence of dialogue between the Government of Angola and UNITA, and welcoming the meeting between them under United Nations auspices in Addis Ababa to discuss the cease-fire and political matters,

Also concerned at the outrageous harassment and physical abuse to which UNAVEM II personnel have been subjected, and the looting and destruction of United Nations property, as described in the above-mentioned report of the Secretary-General,

Further concerned at reports of foreign support for and involvement in military actions in Angola,

Regretting that the deteriorating situation has made it increasingly difficult for UNAVEM II to carry out its mandate,

Recalling that democratic elections were held on 29 and 30 September 1992, which the Special Representative of the Secretary-General certified as being generally free and fair, and that steps have been taken to set up a Government of National Unity which would reflect the results of the legislative elections, and deeply regretting the failure of UNITA to take part in the political institutions thus established,

Reaffirming its commitment to preserve the unity and territorial integrity of Angola,

Recognizing that the Angolans themselves bear ultimate responsibility for the restoration of peace and national reconciliation of their country,

Reiterating its support for the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative aimed at resolving the recent crisis and resuming the political process, in particular through the completion of the electoral process,

1. Notes with appreciation the above-mentioned report of the Secretary-General;
2. Strongly condemns the persistent violations of the main provisions of the 'Acordos de Paz', in particular the initial rejection by UNITA of the election results, its withdrawal from the new Angolan armed forces, its seizure by force of provincial capitals and municipalities and the resumption of hostilities;
3. Demands that the two parties cease fire immediately, restore at their meeting in Addis Ababa continued and meaningful dialogue, and agree on a clear timetable for

the full implementation of the 'Acordos de Paz', in particular with regard to confinement of their troops and collection of their weapons, demobilization and formation of the unified national armed forces, effective restoration of the Government administration throughout the country, the completion of the electoral process and the free circulation of people and goods;

4. Supports fully the Secretary-General and his Special Representative in their continuing efforts to restore the peace process and to carry out the mandate of UNAVEM II under extremely difficult conditions;

5. Urges once again the two parties, and in particular UNITA, to produce early evidence of their adherence to and fulfilment without exception of, the 'Acordos de Paz';

6. Appeals strongly to the Government of Angola and UNITA to confirm as soon as possible to the Secretary-General that real progress has been made towards implementation of the 'Acordos de Paz';

7. Appeals to all Member States to render economic and technical assistance to the Government of Angola for reconstruction and development of the country;

8. Calls upon all Member States to support those concerned in their efforts for the implementation of the 'Acordos de Paz';

9. Urges all Member States to take all necessary steps to stop immediately and effectively any direct or indirect military or paramilitary interference from their territories and to respect scrupulously the provisions of the 'Acordos de Paz' concerning the cessation of supply of lethal material to any Angolan party;

10. Strongly condemns violations of international humanitarian law, in particular the attacks against the civilian population, including the extensive killings carried out by armed civilians, and calls upon both parties to abide by their obligations thereunder and the appropriate provisions of the 'Acordos de Paz';

11. Demands that UNITA immediately release foreign nationals taken hostage;

12. Strongly condemns attacks against UNAVEM II personnel in Angola, and demands that the Government and UNITA take all necessary measures to ensure their safety and security;

13. Expresses its condolences to the family of the UNAVEM II police observer who lost his life;

14. Approves the recommendation of the Secretary-General to maintain a Special Representative for Angola based in Luanda, with the necessary civilian, military and police staff with the mandate as described in paragraph 29 of the report of the

Secretary-General;

15. Decides to extend the mandate of UNAVEM II for a period of three months until 30 April 1993, with the proviso that, as a provisional measure based on security considerations, the Secretary-General is authorized to concentrate UNAVEM II deployment in Luanda, and at his discretion in other provincial locations, with the levels of equipment and personnel he deems appropriate to be retained in order to allow the subsequent expeditious redeployment of UNAVEM II as soon as this becomes feasible, with a view to the resumption of its functions in accordance with the 'Acordos de Paz' and previous resolutions on this matter;

16. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to it as soon as the situation warrants, and in any case before 30 April 1993, a report on the situation in Angola together with his recommendations for the further role of the United Nations in the peace process, and in the meantime to keep the Council regularly informed;

17. Stresses its readiness to take action promptly, at any time within the period of the mandate authorized by this resolution, on the recommendation of the Secretary-General, to expand substantially the United Nations presence in Angola in the event of significant progress in the peace process;

18. Reiterates its readiness to consider all appropriate measures under the Charter of the United Nations to secure implementation of the 'Acordos de Paz';

19. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

RESOLUTION 811 (1993)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3182nd meeting, on 12 March 1993

The Security Council

Reaffirming its resolutions 696 (1991) of 30 May 1991, 747 (1992) of 24 March 1992, 785 (1992) of 30 October 1992, 793 (1992) of 30 November 1992 and 804 (1993) of 29 January 1993,

Gravely disturbed by the recent outbreak of heavy fighting in many parts of Angola, the large number of casualties and massive loss of human life which have ensued and the further deterioration of the already dangerous political and military situation, bringing the country to the verge of the resumption of civil war,

Gravely concerned at the persistent violations by UNITA of the major provisions of the

'Acordos de Paz para Angola',

Further concerned at reports that military support and equipment continue to flow in contravention of the 'Acordos de Paz',

Noting with particular concern that a humanitarian tragedy of grave proportions is developing in Angola and the need, therefore, for increased international humanitarian assistance,

Deeply regretting that the second meeting between the delegations of the Government of Angola and UNITA, which had been scheduled to be held on 26 February 1993 in Addis Ababa under the auspices of the United Nations, did not take place because of the failure by UNITA to fulfil its commitment to send a delegation to Addis Ababa,

Noting with satisfaction the readiness displayed by the Government of Angola to participate in the Addis Ababa meeting,

Reaffirming its commitment to preserve the unity and territorial integrity of Angola,

Welcoming and supporting the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative aimed at resolving the present crisis through negotiations,

1. Strongly condemns the persistent violations by UNITA of the major provisions of the 'Acordos de Paz', in particular the continued rejection by UNITA of the results of the elections held on 29 and 30 September 1992 which the Special Representative of the Secretary-General determined as generally free and fair, its failure to take part in the political institutions established on the basis of those elections, its failure to engage in meaningful negotiations with the Government of Angola, its withdrawal from the new Angolan armed forces, its seizure by force of provincial capitals and municipalities and the resumption of hostilities;
2. Demands that UNITA accept unreservedly the results of the democratic elections of 1992 and abide fully by the 'Acordos de Paz', and further demands that the two parties, particularly UNITA, produce early evidence, not later than 30 March 1993, that real progress has been made towards the implementation of the 'Acordos de Paz';
3. Strongly demands an immediate cease-fire throughout the country, and further demands the resumption without delay and without preconditions of a continued and meaningful dialogue under United Nations auspices so that a clear time-table for the completion of the implementation of the 'Acordos de Paz' may be established,
4. Reaffirms that it will hold responsible any party which refuses to take part in such a dialogue, thereby jeopardizing the entire process, and will consider all appropriate measures under the Charter of the United Nations to advance the implementation of the 'Acordos de Paz';

5. Strongly condemns verbal and physical attacks against the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and UNAVEM II personnel in Angola, and demands that these attacks cease forthwith and that the Government of Angola and UNITA take all necessary measures to ensure their safety and security;
6. Condemns the kidnapping of a UNAVEM II military observer in Cabinda on 23 February 1993 and demands that he be released unharmed and unconditionally and without further delay;
7. Supports fully the Secretary-General and his Special Representative in their continuing efforts to restore the peace process and to carry out the mandate of UNAVEM II under extremely difficult conditions;
8. Invites the Secretary-General to seek to organize a meeting between the Government of Angola and UNITA at the highest possible level with a view to securing the full implementation of the 'Acordos de Paz', this meeting to take place in good time before 30 April 1993 and to consider also the future role of the United Nations in Angola, and encourages the parties to respond positively;
9. Requests the Secretary-General, pending the submission of the report referred to in paragraph 16 of resolution 804 (1993), to present as soon as possible a progress report on the efforts for the resumption of the talks between the two parties in Angola at all appropriate levels;
10. Calls on all Member States, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations to accord or increase humanitarian relief assistance to Angola and encourages the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, with the resources at her disposal, to coordinate the provision of humanitarian assistance to the civilian population in need;
11. Strongly appeals to both parties strictly to abide by applicable rules of international humanitarian law, including unimpeded access for humanitarian assistance to the civilian population in need;
12. Appeals once again to all Member States to render economic, material and technical assistance to the Government of Angola for the reconstruction and development of the country;
13. Looks forward to the report of the Secretary-General referred to in paragraph 16 of resolution 804 (1993) on the situation on Angola together with his recommendations for the further role of the United Nations in the peace process;
14. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

RESOLUTION 823 (1993)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3206th meeting, on 30 April 1993

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 696 (1991) of 30 May 1991, 747 (1992) of 24 March 1992, 785 (1992) of 30 October 1992, 793 (1992) of 30 November 1992, 804 (1993) of 29 January 1993 and 811 (1993) of 12 March 1993,

Recalling its resolution 804 (1993), in particular its paragraph 15, by which it decided to extend the mandate of UNAVEM II for a period of three months until 30 April 1993,

Extending its support to the current and ongoing peace talks in Abidjan between the Government of Angola and UNITA under United Nations auspices and chairmanship and expressing the hope that those talks will result in an immediate cease-fire and in the full implementation of the 'Acordos de Paz',

Gravely concerned at the continuing attacks against international humanitarian flights operating in Angola, in particular the recent shooting down of a World Food Programme airplane,

Taking into account the letter dated 29 April 1993 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council,

1. Decides to extend the existing mandate of UNAVEM II until 31 May 1993;
2. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to it as soon as the situation warrants, and in any case before 31 May 1993, a report on the situation in Angola with his recommendations for the further role of the United Nations in the peace process and in the meantime to keep the Council regularly informed;
3. Stresses its readiness to take action promptly, at any time within the period of the mandate authorized by this resolution, on the recommendation of the Secretary-General, to expand substantially the United Nations presence in Angola in the event of significant progress in the peace process;
4. Condemns the attacks against international humanitarian flights operating in Angola and demands that these attacks cease forthwith and that both parties, in particular UNITA, take all necessary measures to ensure the safety of these flights as well as the security of UNAVEM II personnel;
5. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

RESOLUTION 834 (1993)

Adopted by the Security Council at its meeting on 1 June 1993

The Security Council

Reaffirming its resolutions 696 (1991) of 30 May 1991, 747 (1992) of 24 March 1992, 785 (1992) of 30 October 1992, 793 (1992) of 30 November 1992, 804 (1993) of 29 January 1993, 811 (1993) of 12 March 1993 and 823 (1993) of 30 April 1993,

Having considered the further report (S/25840 and Add.1) of the Secretary-General dated 25 May 1993,

Expressing grave concern at the deterioration of the political and military situation, and noting with consternation the further deterioration of an already grave humanitarian situation,

Gravely concerned at the failure of the talks between the Government of Angola and UNITA held in Abidjan under the auspices of the United Nations and the chairmanship of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General with participation of the representatives of the three observer states to the Angolan peace process - Portugal, the Russian Federation and the United States of America - and in particular at the failure to establish a cease-fire,

Welcoming and supporting the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative aimed at the earliest resolution of the Angolan crisis through negotiations,

Emphasising the importance of a continued and effective United Nations presence in Angola, with a view to fostering the peace process and advancing the implementation of the 'Acordos de Paz',

Reaffirming its commitment to preserve the unity and territorial integrity of Angola,

1. Decides to extend the existing mandate of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II) for a period of forty-five days until 15 July 1993 in accordance with the recommendations contained in paragraphs 36 and 37 of the Secretary-General's report (S/25840 and add.1);
2. Stresses the importance of the functions of good offices and mediation by UNAVEM II and the Special Representative, with the goal of restoring a cease-fire and reinstating the peace process for the full implementation of the 'Acordos de Paz';
3. Reiterates its demand that UNITA accept unreservedly the results of the democratic elections of 1992 and abide fully by the 'Acordos de Paz';

4. Condemns UNITA for its actions and armed attacks, which have resulted in increased hostilities and which endanger the peace process, and demands that it immediately cease such actions and armed attacks;
5. Welcomes the disposition of the Government of Angola to reach a peaceful settlement of the conflict in conformity with the 'Acordos de Paz' and pertinent Security Council resolutions, deeply regrets UNITA's refusal at the talks to agree to the withdrawal of its troops from the locations which it has occupied since the resumption of the hostilities, and demands that it do so;
6. Affirms that such occupation is a grave violation of the 'Acordos de Paz';
7. Strongly appeals to the two parties, and in particular to UNITA, to re-initiate as soon as possible the interrupted peace talks under United Nations auspices with a view to the earliest establishment of a cease-fire throughout the country and the full implementation of the 'Acordos de Paz', further undertakings between the two parties, and relevant resolutions of the Security Council, due account being taken of what was achieved during the discussion of the Abidjan draft protocol;
8. Holds UNITA responsible for the breakdown of the talks and for thereby jeopardizing the peace process, and reaffirms that it will consider all appropriate measures under the Charter of the United Nations to advance the implementations of the 'Acordos de Paz';
9. Supports fully the continuing efforts of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative aimed at carrying out the mandate of UNAVEM II under extremely difficult conditions;
10. Calls on all states to refrain from any action which directly or indirectly could jeopardize the implementations of the 'Acordos de Paz', and urges all States to refrain from providing any form of direct or indirect military assistance or other support to UNITA inconsistent with the peace process;
11. Welcomes the steps taken by the Secretary-General to strengthen the humanitarian activities being undertaken by the United Nations system in Angola under the overall coordination of the Special Representative, including the preparation of the United Nations humanitarian assistance plan for Angola, and strongly appeals to the Government of Angola and to UNITA to cooperate fully with the Secretary-General's efforts in this field;
12. Calls on all Member States, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organisations to respond swiftly and generously to the Secretary-General's appeal in implementations of the above-mentioned plan and to accord or increase humanitarian relief assistance to Angola, and encourages the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to continue to coordinate the provision of humanitarian assistance;

13. Reiterates its appeal to both parties strictly to abide by applicable rules of international humanitarian law, including to guarantee unimpeded access for humanitarian assistance to the civilian population in need, and commends in particular the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to establish agreed humanitarian relief corridors;

14. Reiterates its appeal to both parties to take all necessary measures to ensure the security and the safety of the personnel involved in humanitarian relief operations;

15. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to it as soon as the situation warrants, and in any case before 15 July 1993, a report on the situation in Angola with his recommendation for the further role of the United Nations in the peace process and, in the meantime to keep the Council regularly informed of developments;

16. Reiterates its readiness to take action promptly, at any time within the period of the mandate authorized by this resolution on the recommendation of the Secretary-General to expand substantially the United Nations presence in Angola in the event of significant progress in the peace process;

17. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

ANNEX III

Composition of UNAVEM II

Originally UNAVEM II's authorized strength was 350 military observers and 90 police observers. There were also a civilian air unit and a medical unit, as well as some 90 international and 120 local civilian staff. In May 1992, the Secretary-General recommended, and the Security Council agreed, to increase the police strength of the Mission to 126 officers. Military and police observers are provided by Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Congo, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, India, Ireland, Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Senegal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, former Yugoslavia and Zimbabwe.

During the polling, the Electoral Division will field a total of 400 electoral observers, comprised of approximately 100 observers coming from the existing staff of UNAVEM II; about 100 additional observers to be selected from UNDP and other United Nations agency personnel in Angola, plus volunteers from selected non-governmental organisations; about 100 additional observers from United Nations Secretariat; and a further 100 contributed by Member States.

Financial Aspects

The total cost to the United Nations of UNAVEM II for the 17-month period from 1 June 1991 to 31 October 1992 is estimated at approximately \$107 million. The costs of the operation are to be met by assessed contributions from the Member States. As at 31 August 1992, total contributions outstanding to the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I and UNAVEM II) from the inception of the operation through 31 October 1992 amounted to approximately \$25 million.

Taken from: United Nations peace-keeping operations, information notes.

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Alex Vines is a full-time researcher for Africa Watch and Human Rights Watch's Arms Project. He served in Angola during September to October 1992 as a UN electoral observer. CIIR would like to thank Human Rights Watch for providing the research time for this publication.

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