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PIETERMARITZBURG CRISIS C()-()RDINA'Iâ\200\230IN(} COMMITTEE

The Pietermaritzburg Crisis Co-ordinating committee is an ad hoc grouping of a broad rang e of

representative organizations in the Pietermaritzburg region. These include the following: Churches

Cosatu

Democratic Party

Ethos

Federal Theological Seminary

Five Freedoms Forum

Lawyers for Human Rights

IDASA '

Imbali Support Group

Joint Academic Staff Association of the University of Natal

Midlands Democratic Womenâ\200\231s Organization

N atal Indian Congress

Muslim Relief Agency

Combined Ratepayers Association

Northdale Ratepayers Association

N ational Union of South African Students

National Medical and Dental Association

National Education Crisis Committee

Pietemtaritzburg Agency for Christian Social Awaxeness

Pietennan'tzburg Council of Churches

Pieterman'tzburg Democratic Association

St J osephâ\200\231s Scholasticate

,â\200\230BUnited Democratic Front

The committee was fonned on the morning of Thursday 29 March once the full dimensions of the

crisis facing Pietermaritzburg became appalent.

The crisis committee has met daily since then and has set up a number of working groups. These

are:

- Monitoring
- Police
- Relief and Refugees
- Press and publicity
- Missing persons and body identification
- Funerals
- Legal

 \hat{a} 200\224 Medical and health

MONITORING

A twenty four hour monitoring service has been set up in central Pietetmaritzburg. The Democratic Party has provided of \[\]\cap 201ce facilities and their telephones and the Centre f or Adult

Education of the University of Natal provided computers and computer programmes.

Calls received from people in the affected communities are inimediately cross checked wit

reliable informants in the areas $\hat{200}230$ and then, where necessary the police and/or the SADE are

approached to provide protection. Where possible monitors are sent out to areas to observ e and in

some cases to take wounded people to hospitals. All calls are carefully documented.

Over 200 incidents of violence have been recorded by the monitoring group since Thursday 10

am. Of these 195 were attacks or actions by Inkatha or police on non-lnkatha supporters. Some of

the calls have come from Inkatha membexs warning that Lnkatha militants were about to attack.

The death toll in the attacks since Sunday 25th is at least 85.

A consistent feature in many of these incidents has been the seemingly partisan behaviour of the

police, in panicular the kitskonstabels.

The monitoring group also found that when police were contacted by the monitoring of $\$ \201ce the

reaction by the police was exceedingly slow, often extending to delays of several hours. A clear

example of this was the attack on the house in which three members of the Irnbali Support Group

were besieged, shot at, and their motor car riddled with bullets and the car destroyed with petrol

bombs. The monitoring group has also found that the SADF have not been effectively deploy ed by

the police. Again the Irnbali Support Group incident is apposite. A ten vehicle group of SADF

troops waited fruitlessly for their police escort to arrive on the evening of these attacks in Imbali.

The monitoring group has also experienced difi \neg \201culty obtaining details of the dead contained 1n

government morgues.

Partly as a result of such complaints about the police force the delegation was mandated to meet

senior police ofi¬\201cers on Monday 2 April.

POLICE GROUP

The police group of the crisis committee comprises representatives from the monitoring group,

churches, Cosatu, women $\hat{200}231s$ organizations, a legal person and the Democratic Party. On Monday aftemoon the delegation met with 8 senior police of $\bar{1}$ 201cers, including Brigad ier du

Toit, Colonel Vorster and representatives from the Riot Unit.

The delegation explained the work of the Monitoring Group and registered its dismay at the slow

(or nil) reaction to calls put through to the police to take action in cases of $coni^{-201}$ rmed incidents of

violence. The police representatives promised to inform their men about the monitoring group

although they were unwilling to provide a "hot-line" telephone number to a senior person in case

of difi¬\201culties.

A further complaint was made about the many allegations of panisan behaviour by police. The

police demanded that documented evidence of this be produced. They claimed that they were impanial.

The police admitted that they had been unable to protect a number of areas where people h ad been

killed, houses destroyed and property and livestock looted. This they ascribed to being undermanned and staffed with inexperienced policemen (who, for example could not distinguish

between refugees in 202eeing with their goods and looters stealing them).

The police representatives were unwilling to discuss the deployment of the SADF in the townships

and said that such decisions were made at a higher level. They were also unwilling to discuss the

way the existing troops in the area were used, saying that this would reveal their strate gy.

The issue of the delays in the removal of bodies, particularly in the case of the KwaMnya ndu and

KwaShange areas was raised.

The Crisis Committee was very \hat{a} 00\234 \hat{a} oncemed that dislocated poeple might not be able to trace where

their dead relatives were before they were given paupers funerals and buried by the State . The

police said that because of the large number of dead, mortuaries as far a $\ddot{}$ -\201eld as Pine town had had

to be used. They agreed that they would allow bodies to remain in mortuaries for an avera ge of 14

days. They were unwilling to allow the distribution of photographs of the dead to the refugee

camps to enable relatives to identify the dead. They were persuaded to agree to have a se t of such

photographs at the Plessislaer Police Station.

RELIEF AND REFUGEES

From Tuesday 27 March refugees began to $in\202000$ into Edendale. Most of these come from the

devastated areas of KwaShange and KwaMnyandu where the full weight of the Inkatha assault was unleashed. Thousands of other refugees came from neighbouring EziBomvini. They i¬\202e d down

into the nearest part of the Edendale Valley, Esigodeni, where they were congregated in c huches

and church halls. Most of them $i \neg \ 202ed$ with little more than the clothes they were wearing.

Refugees also came from Caluza, the part of Edendale that bore the bmnt of attacks by a force of

between 2 and 3 thousand warriors from Tuesday onwards. Others refugees from a renewed assault at Table Mountain joined those at the camp at $Masona^200\231s$ Mill. By the weeken d there were an

estimated 14 thousand refugees cramed into limited space. Providing food, bedding, sanitation,

and basic medical help has proved a major undertaking.

The Pietermaritzburg Council of Churches has provided staff and a depot for the supply of resources to the refugee camps.

The refugees were very disturbed by the looting of their houses and property and by reports of

their livestock being driven off by the attackers. The refugees want to try to collect wh atever of

their property remains. They are insistent that they require an army and not a police esc o rt to do

so.

The rebuilding/resettling of these thousands of people requires massive resources and mem bers of

the relief and refugee group have engaged in negotiations with a number of bodies about this.