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## 'We won't rock the boat, unless...'

In Codesa 2 the ANC will not 'take advantage' of the government's can of worms that was opened by the media over the weekend, ANC President **Nelson Mandela** tells **HENNIE SERFONTEIN**

Over the weekend there were media exposures about government involvement in the killing of activists and about recent police involvement in planning assassinations and the tapping of the telephone of a judge of the Supreme Court. How do these affect the coming talks at Codesa 2 - especially in view of the fact that the government is expected to come with a bomb about alleged ANC involvement in recent violence?

They will not dare to do that, I can tell you, they just won't dare. Because if they do, we will put them on the carpet. My view is that we have condemned the government for complicity in the murders of our comrades by state officials and we will continue to do so. Nothing is revealed that is new. We have said all along that the government is involved in the killing of our people.

Significantly, we can say that in the violence of the last thirty years not a single member of the National Party has been killed or affected. That tells its own story.

The involvement of De Klerk himself and of the government in this violence is something that we have highlighted on a number of occasions.

But we are going to Codesa to ensure that that convention succeeds. We will not now take advantage of the revelations made involving the government. We are concerned solely with the success of Codesa and will continue to be concerned with it. If the government dares to come and raise the position of Umkhonto we Sizwe, they of course will open a can of worms. And I sincerely think they will not be foolish enough to do that.

**What is your reaction to the news that there has been a breakthrough at Codesa last night and an agreement reached on phase one of the Interim government?**

I have not yet been briefed by our negotiators and will only see them later today. But if the press reports are correct, I am very happy about that - because that is a major step, a forward movement of great significance.

**With the issue of violence so important, do you think the visiting OAU team can do anything about it?**

They are already doing something important - because there is a reduction of the level of violence already. The sinister forces that steer this violence are not keen to have their actions put under the spotlight by the OAU. We are convinced that the government itself is involved in the violence. If that is so, we do not think they can ignore the presence of the OAU.

**You have spoken about government violence. But what of the animosity between the ANC and Inkatha on the ground?**

What does animosity between the National Party and the Conservative Party mean?

Whatever one says about the ANC and Inkatha, what is important is that whoever is fomenting this violence has various strategies. Part of it is to present the violence as black on black. But that is a minor aspect. It is quite clear that there is another hand - a white hand - behind all this. It is very clear. I do not want to go in detail, but the government's reluctance to use its capacity to end the violence, the role of De Klerk himself, does support the claim that there is a white hand behind this violence.

**Will the violence end when the ANC is in control of the security forces?**

No. It is a problem that cannot end merely by us taking over control of the security forces. But we will be in better position to put up the mechanisms that have been set up after the Peace Accord last September. I believe in due course we would be able to control it.


**The government says violence could delay a transitional government as it will affect the elections. What is the effect of violence on the peace process?**

Naturally violence must interfere with free and fair elections. But we are making progress now, although violence is raging.

There are areas - mostly in those bantustans and homelands working very closely with De Klerk and the government - where there is no real political freedom. It is interesting that De Klerk has said nothing about this fact. He is working closely with KwaZulu, Ciskei and Lucas Mangope (President of Bophuthatswana.) In all these areas no other political organisation can hold a meeting or a conference. Nobody can take a job or become a teacher unless he takes a membership ticket from the ruling party. Not even people wanting to work in a hospital can get jobs. Sometimes patients are not treated unless they are members of the ruling party. De Klerk knows it, but he has done nothing - although he continues with his slogans of free political activities.

His whole strategy is to try and destabilize the recruitment campaign to strengthen the ANC and make people scared to associate with it. That is why he took the abnormal step to allow people to carry dangerous weapons. For decades this amounted to an offence and thousands were arrested for carrying

Pic: Hans Gedda



sticks and spears. Thus De Klerk, shortly after unbanning the ANC in 1990, made it legal for people to carry these weapons to enable them to kill the ANC. This gave Inkatha the capacity to attack our people. When asked about it, De Klerk has no answer.

Because there can be only one answer: to give organisations against the ANC the capacity to be able to frighten people away from the ANC. Nevertheless these elections must come - and we just have to find a strategy to deal with the situation to enable people to vote.

**With the violence in the townships do you have the capacity to control your own forces?**

We hope we have. Of course, the international commissions of jurists recently stated their view, after a visit of two weeks, that Inkatha and Buthelezi were responsible for this violence. They said the failure of the government to stop the violence has increased the violence by the ANC. They clearly made a statement that the ANC has resorted to violence in defence. We try to persuade our people not to use any violence. It is difficult, when people are being killed and when the government is doing nothing about it, to say that they should not use violence to defend themselves.

One should look at it not academically

but from the realities of what one should do if one is systematically attacked without the government doing anything.

**How long will it be before an interim government is installed?**

If the reports are correct that the transitional structures have been given executive powers, then we have made a breakthrough in the negotiations. The ANC has made it clear that a new interim government must be installed within six to nine months, and a constituent assembly within twelve months. We will press for that.

**Socialism is part of the ANC, but there are different comments from inside the ANC. What is the real position?**

We have never opted for socialism in the ANC at all. The Freedom Charter is based on private enterprise. There is no suggestion at all against the free market.

All that has happened is that we have targetted certain sectors of the economy for nationalisation - like the mines, financial institutions and monopolies. But the rest of the economy is based on private enterprise. Even the land will not be nationalised, although we will try to ensure a fairer distribution of ownership - but with no land owned by the state. It is not accurate that the Freedom Charter is a declaration for socialism.



Volgens die administrasie het die studente-verteenvoorders deurgaans die onderhandelinge gekompliseer deur hulle eise van vergadering tot vergadering te wysig en verskillende verteenwoordigers te stuur. "Wat nou moet gebeur, is dat 'n vaste agenda vir onderhandelinge geskep moet word, sodat die sake eerste opgelos kan word," het 'n woordvoerder aan VWB gesê.

'n Monstervergadering Maandag wat sowat vyf uur geduur het en deur 3 500 studente bygewoon is, het 'n voorstel deur die administrasie dat die Raad van die universiteit die strydbyle neerlê, verwerp. Studente het besluit om hul protes te verskerp en die SR het hom daartoe verbind om hul saak te lei.

SR-woordvoerder, Oupa Nrombele, het die SR egter later gedistansieer van die "boewery" wat na 'n kort "sit-in" uitgebrei het. Intussen het ook die rektor en vise-rektor, prof Njabulo Ndebele, hulle skerp oor die optrede uitgespreek.

**AS GEVOLG VAN DIE** gewelddadige aard van protes het meer konserwatiewe studente, van alle bevolkingsgroepe, hulle nou teen die protestmakers begin uitspreek en sê soos: "Gaan terug Fort Hare toe", is die week gehoor. Dosente glo dat dit tot langtermyn-verdeling op die kampus kan lei, as daar nie nou "lyne" getrek word van billike protes en toelatings-vereistes nie.

Sedert Augustus 1990 het die politieke hoogspanning wat sedert die laat sewentigs op die kampus geheers het en gereeld tot botsings tussen die polisie en studente gelei het, begin bedaar.

Nou sê dosente dat "ondanks die politisering van die kampus oor nasionale kwessies, daar geen kultuur bestaan van mobilisering onder studente oor studente-kwessies en strukture nie.


"Ek blameer die silent majority," sê een dosent. "Daar het 'n apatie onder hulle ontstaan, hoewel hulle genoeg seggenskap het om in te gryp." Ander meen weer die rektor, wat hom al baie kritiek op die hals gehaal het met UWK se toelatingsbeleid, moes lankal sy voet neergesit het teenoor die SR, omdat die universiteit nie alles vir almal kan wees nie. Daarbenewens is daar aantygings dat die SR in elk geval uiters ongewild is en dat hy wal gooi teen die hou van referendums omdat dit hom uit die stoel kan lig. Die SR kon nie vir kommentaar opgespoor word nie.

Gerwel sê die studente-leiers het nie die optrede gesteun nie, en kan daarom nie verantwoordelik gehou word nie. "Maar hulle moet verantwoordelikheid vir sekere aksies hier aanvaar. Die aard van dinge hier was nie nie-gewelddadig nie. Daar was dade van boewery."

Nog vergaderings tussen die administrasie en studente-leierskap is die afgelope paar dae gehou, maar volgens Michael Doman, skakelbeampte van die administrasie, sal die situasie kwalik genoegsaam bygelê kan word voor die heropening van die universiteit vir die tweede kwartaal.

# tug of war over homeland votes

The ANC wants the 10 million voters in the TBVC homelands to be able to vote in the elections for an interim government, but the SA Government is doing its best to prevent this, writes HENNIE SERFONTEIN



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Pik Botha ... using technicalities as a smoke-screen.

At the root of the present growing dispute and confrontation between the ANC and the Government at Codesa about the future of the TBVC homelands, is a bitter battle of power. The question is who will dominate the proposed interim Parliament and/or the Constitutional Assembly.

In essence the dispute is about whether the estimated nearly 10 million black voters of these homelands will be able to vote in the elections for an interim Parliament/Constitutional Assembly.

Matthew Phosa, the ANC representative on Working Group 4 dealing with the homelands, told VWB: "All those people should vote and participate in the creation of bodies such as an interim government and/or Constituent Assembly. The terms of reference agreed upon by all parties at Codesa provide for it."

But Pik Botha, Minister of Foreign Affairs, at a press conference this week was adamant: Before the TBVC countries can participate in an interim government, the will of their people should first be tested, and agreement reached about all the legal, administrative and financial implications of their possible reincorporation into SA.

Botha is the Government representative at Working Group 4. It is clear that Botha, an experienced veteran of the protracted Angolan-Cuban-Namibian issue, is using all the above technical legal problems as a smoke-screen to complicate and delay the issue of reincorporation.

**WHILST IN PRINCIPLE** the Government has no objection to reincorporation, on condition that the homelands agree, this should only happen after an interim Government has been elected and established.

In practice it would mean that a NP alliance - perhaps known as the Christian Democratic Alliance (CDA) - will be in a much more favourable position vis à vis the ANC, if these four countries were to be excluded from the voting.

This explains why Stoffel van der Merwe,

the Secretary General of the NP, has been predicting that a referendum or elections for an interim government could take place well before the end of the year.

Because the basis of NP strategy is clearly that Codesa decisions on the interim Government and related issues be pushed through and be implemented as speedily as possible in the hope that because of technical and other dragging the feet tactics, the issue of the TBVC countries will not have been finalised yet.

However, it seems that the Government strategy is in serious jeopardy at the moment, as it is trying its best behind the scenes to prevent one of the four TBVC states from jumping the gun and unilaterally declaring its wish to be reincorporated forthwith.

The one reason is the swiftness with which Working Group 3, dealing with the issue of an interim Government, has moved to reach consensus.

**NEXT WEEK THE** Government will submit its revised proposals to explain that the proposed transitional councils will have full executive powers, thus removing the last serious obstacle to an agreement on the issue.

As the ANC view is that such an interim government must also have control of the homelands, the steering committees of Working Group 3 and 4 met last week, as number 3 expressed concern that number 4 was delaying the whole process, because of its inability to come to swift decisions.

As a result Working Group 4 has decided to postpone its next meeting for two weeks. Then the governments of South Africa and the TBVC countries should present their final proposals.

The ANC continues to keep up the pressure. Its proposals for a constitutional Assembly, tabled this week, stressed that all those living within the 1910 borders of South Africa must be able to vote.

A Key Question in the ANC-NP dispute

is the question of citizenship. The Government argues that SA citizenship of the TBVC residents can only be restored after their reincorporation.

This of course fits in with the Government's delaying tactics by skillfully exploiting the technical complications.

No, says the ANC. The SA Government can unilaterally pass a bill granting citizenship to all those living in the homelands, thus allowing them to vote, with the actual reincorporation a separate issue.

Phosa rejects the explanation of Botha and the Government, he told VWB: "All that is needed is a simple political decision. Arrangements to honour agreements and to allow for an adjustment period involving administrative and other matters must obviously be made. But that is a separate, minor and secondary matter."

Phosa says nothing prevents the Government from unilaterally reincorporating the homelands, even against their wishes.

He adds: "But the Government is clearly in cahoots with Bophuthatswana, who wants to remain independent. One must remember that the Government never asked either white or black South Africans to approve when these countries were given independence."

**ACCORDING TO THE MINUTES** of a sub-group of Working Group 4 the positions of the various homelands and the SA Government are as follows:

- Transkei and Venda want immediate reincorporation, with Transkei asking for a referendum.
- Ciskei qualifies reincorporation on the understanding that there will be strong regional government and a constitution for a federal state.
- Bophuthatswana still rejects incorporation, but says it is keeping its options open.
- The SA Government rejects the TBVC countries being part of an interim government and also rejects the concept of dual citizenship.