

NZA/2000/0010/2

STICHTING
VOOR HET
Nieuwe Zuid-Afrika



101NE

Democracy, Development and the Role of political parties: the Experience of the NZA

**Final Seminar Foundation for the
New South Africa**

Lord Charles Hotel
Somerset West
December 7, 8 and 9th, 2000

Final Seminar Foundation for the New South Africa

This paper holds proposals for the contents of the final seminar of the Foundation for the New South Africa, which is to be held in the Lord Charles Hotel in Somerset West, shortly after the local elections, December 7, 8 and 9th, 2000.

Objectives

At the end of the year 2000, the activities of the Foundation for the New South Africa (NZA) will come to an end. For this reason, the NZA Board wants to hold a final seminar. Theme of this seminar is: "Democracy, Development and the Role of political parties: the Experience of the NZA".

The final seminar is meant to serve as an evaluation of experiences with party political co-operation between South Africa and the Netherlands. Hopefully, it may include lessons that are useful for future projects of co-operation in a broader context, such as, for instance, party political co-operation in the Southern African region and party political co-operation between parties in the Netherlands and those in so-called young democracies.

Topics for discussion

NZA specific: lessons learned

- The future of democracy in South Africa; its chances and its challenges. Is there room in South Africa for a multiparty democracy?
- Democracy in South Africa and the Netherlands: a mutual learning process? The lessons for the Netherlands after seven years of co-operation with South African parties. The lessons for South Africa. What have we both learned?
- Did the NZA succeed in its original intention of supporting the development of a well-functioning, sustainable, pluralistic party politics system? Which elements in the NZA model were useful, which elements were in need of adaptation, and why?
- The NZA functioned on the basis granting subsidies in proportion with the number of seats in the national parliament, both in South Africa and in the Netherlands. Was this a suitable method? Did this method favour existing power relations, or was there enough flexibility to allow for change?
- Was the NZA budget adequate to achieve the objectives of the programme? What are the consequences of the ending of the programme for the longer term?

General

- The role of political parties in democratic development. Functions and roles of political parties: Political parties in their relation to government (ruling parties, opposition parties); political parties in their relation to society (economy, culture, religion, welfare and poverty); clientelism.
- In what way does party-to-party co-operation complement government-to-government support?
- What are the possibilities and risks of foreign funding and other forms of support to political party development? What are the conditions to make foreign assistance to political parties successful and justifiable? Examples: an equilibrium between outside funding and own financial contributions can be maintained; the prevention of the parachuting of political parties by interventions from abroad or by certain interests? Is the promotion of a multiparty democracy not in itself a kind of foreign interference with developments in a country?
- Are the differences in culture, stage of development, wealth and experience between parties in "old" and in "young" democracies obstacles to effective co-operation or a source of enrichment? How can assistance and co-operation take account of the various stages of development in which the democratisation process may find itself: before, during and after transition? Can such forms of support also be directed at political movements that have not yet been established as political parties?
- Targets of funding: How can assistance and co-operation be aimed at authentic development towards a sustainable democracy that is rooted in the culture and society of a specific country? Purposes of funding political parties abroad: capacity building at local level; media access, research and think-tank function; political skills.
- Triangular relations: Democratic development in South Africa in relation to democratic development in the Southern African region and the role of shared experiences of Dutch, South African and other Southern African parties.

Agenda

Thursday 7 December

Conference Chair for the day:
Klaas Groenveld

14.00	Welcome and Reception of Participants
14.30	Opening <ul style="list-style-type: none">● Klaas Groenveld, <i>Acting Chairperson NZA</i>
14.40	Opening speeches <ul style="list-style-type: none">● Netherlands representative● South African representative
15.10	Introductions: Experiences with NZA <ul style="list-style-type: none">● Volcker Hauck: to be confirmed● Wilmot James: Building parties in the new multi-party democracies
16.00	Group photograph
16.15	Tea Break
16.45	Plenary Discussion
18.15	Closure
19.00	Dinner: Lord Charles Hotel (informal)

Friday 8 December

Conference Chair for the day:
to be confirmed

9.30	Start morning session <ul style="list-style-type: none">● Jan Nico van Overbeeke Introduction on comparative experiences in South Africa and Mozambique Lessons for the future● Kehla Shubane Introduction comparative experiences in party to party support Lessons for the future
10.30	Coffee Break
11.00	Plenary discussion
12.30	Lunch
14.00	Afternoon session <ul style="list-style-type: none">● Jos van Gennip Foreign support for political parties: pros and contras● Patricia Keefer: <i>Director, NDI Southern Africa</i>
15.00	Tea Break
15.30	Plenary Discussion
19:00	Farewell Dinner: Taphuis Restaurant, Spier Wine Estate (informal)

Agenda

Saturday 9 December

Conference chair for the day: **Alvaro Pinto**

9.30	Start morning session
	Inputs by political parties (10 mins. Per party)
9.30	First six parties
10.30	Coffee Break
10.45	Second six parties
12.00	Lunch
13.00	Plenary Discussion
14.30	Concluding remarks by the conference chair
14.50	Closure of Conference by Klaas Groenveld

Background

The *Stichting voor het Nieuwe Zuid Afrika* was founded on 24 January 1994 by the Dutch political parties CDA, D66, GPV, Groen Links, PvdA, RPF, SGP and VVD was joined shortly thereafter by the SP. The main objective of the NZA was to support the process of democratisation in South Africa. This was to be done by capacity building and strengthening of political groups and improving their functioning in a democratic, non-racial and plural society. It was the vision of the NZA that a well functioning, durable, party political system within the framework of parliamentary democracy is essential. Support from the side of Dutch parties is given by co-operation and debate on a project basis between political parties in the Netherlands and in South Africa. The South African parties had the initiative: the NZA was demand driven.

NZA concentrated on financing projects of a permanent nature that were intended to enhance quality. The premise was that all democratic parties in the Netherlands were able to contribute to the work of the Foundation. Support was given in South Africa to all political parties, which fulfilled conditions such as the following:

- Support for national unity and reconciliation. This precludes ideologies of racial or ethnic exclusivity, as well as incitement to racial or ethnic hatred.
- The principle of peaceful resolution of conflicts, dialogue and democratic tolerance. This precludes advocacy of, or resort to, violence as a political tool.
- Acceptance of and participation in free and fair elections.

As regarded the apportionment of the available money, each party received a floor amount. The remainder is divided on the basis of the number of seats in the National Assembly. For 1997, the total budget amounted to 5 million Dutch guilders, for 1998 4, for 1999 3 and for 2000 2 million guilders.

In the vision of the NZA, capacity building was regarded as strengthening political parties from top-leadership down to local constituencies, party infrastructure, and the promotion of a democratic culture on the part of the party leadership and cadre. To be more specific, the NZA gave preference to the fields of political education, leadership training, strengthening management capabilities, peaceful interactions between parties, communication and media relations, enhancing financial and administrative capacities and increasing policy development capabilities.

The activities of the NZA were much appreciated in South Africa. During his visit to the Netherlands, former President Nelson Mandela said in his speech to the Dutch Parliament on 12 March 1999: "We value the commitment of the Netherlands to continue a development co-operation relationship with South Africa, and are confident that you understand our desire to negotiate an agreement that will make us partners, and not passive recipients of aid. We hope that the excellent work of the Foundation for the New South Africa to assist the political parties represented in our Parliament will be able to continue for some further years."

A week later, the National Assembly adopted the following resolution:

"That the House, whilst it

1. expresses its sincere thanks and appreciation to *the Nederlandse Stichting voor het Nieuwe Zuid Afrika* for the financial support they have been granting all political parties since 1994 for the implementation of specific projects that have received prior approval;
2. wants to assure the foundation that its financial support is contributing to the empowerment of all political parties in Parliament;
3. wants to point out to the political parties the importance of the correct control and application of these funds, and;
4. would like to express its sincere appreciation to all other donors for their financial contributions;
5. appeals to the NZA and all other donors to continue with current projects in the interest of multiparty democracy and participation in the political dispensation in South Africa."

However, the Dutch minister for Development Co-operation decided to a so-called policy debate between the South African and Dutch governments. On the basis of this debate the South African government had to decide on sectors entitled for

funding from the Dutch Department. Because of the choices made by the South African government, the activities of the NZA were excluded from further funding by the Netherlands.

Evaluation

Although the support to political parties by international aid agencies is not unique, it should be noted that assistance to different political parties in a specific country is exceptional and unprecedented. There is a kind of “natural” tendency among governments and government officials to look at political parties with a certain amount of suspicion. This suspicion is extended to funding co-operation between political parties in the Netherlands and those abroad. The NZA repeatedly met with such emotions in Dutch society.

In the view of the parties participating in the NZA, however, political parties are an essential element in the building up of a democratic society. Political ideals can only be realised with the active participation of citizens. Society is not a mechanism, which can be moved with the push of a button. Democracy needs an active society consisting of people who feel responsible for public affairs. In the same way, the creation of a strong civil society needs democracy, a forum in which those in power have to account for what they do or don't. These elements are interrelated. Communities and organisations in the field of civil society provide a basis for the orientation of state power, hence for the control of the state by society. Even democracies may degenerate into such a state, if a government and a parliamentary majority aspire to control all aspects of civilian life and the citizens lose interest in politics and society.

Political parties may be seen as mediators between organised civil society and the formulation of public policies. They are directed at bearing political responsibility in the framework of the state, but they are no organs of the state. They ought to be rooted in society, and in this sense they are part of civil society. As mediators, parties have their own responsibility, based upon a view on man, the organisation of society and government. They are indispensable as frameworks for citizens to express their political commitment. Also, the establishment of party political organisations contributes to political stability. Thus, political alliances and loyalties will depend less on charismatic leaders, who may accidentally come up and may even take on authoritarian attitudes, and will be channelled through more durable and predictable institutions.

The strong point of the NZA was that its projects were demand driven. It is the counterparts in the developing democracy that took the initiative in formulating and proposing projects and in selecting the kind of support they sought. If they met the required standards, projects were then approved by the board of NZA. The NZA did not finance election campaigns or elections. Nor were its subsidies limited to campaigning capacities only, but the NZA focused strongly on structural support and sustainability.

Sources

- *Annual Report 1999*, Stichting voor het Nieuwe Zuid Afrika, Oostzaan 2000.
- Hauck, Volker, *Building the Capacities of Political Parties in Southern Africa: Reviewing the Strategy of the Netherlands*, ECDPM Discussion Paper, Maastricht April 2000.
- *Policy Letter*, Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy, The Hague 17 February 2000.

NZA Secretariaat:

Dromerstraat 55
1511CM OOSTZAAN
Nederland

Tel: + 31 (0)75 6842649

Fax: + 31 (0)75 6842679

E-mail: mijnsbergen@planet.nl

Seminar Secretariat South Africa:

SPORTS VENTURES SA

P.o.Box 411671

Craighall

2024

Tel/Fax (ISDN): +27 (0)11 7880674

E-mail: bea@sportsventures.co.za

www.sportsventures.co.za

Seminar Venue:

Golden Tulip The Lord Charles
cor.Faure & Stellenbosch roads

Somerset West

Tel: +27 (0)21 8551040

Fax: +27 (0)21 8551107

E-mail: info@the-lord-charles.co.za

De verloren liefde van zwart Zuid-Afrika voor het ANC

Steeds meer zwarte Zuid-Afrikanen raken teleurgesteld in het ANC. In plaats van een daadkrachtig beleid voert corruptie de boventoon.

Van onze correspondent
Hans Moleman

JOHANNESBURG

Joe Mafereka keek raar op van het ontvangstcomité, toen hij een paar weken geleden op het vliegveld van Johannesburg aankwam, terug van een tripje naar Europa. De ANC-voorzitter van het parlement van de provincie Vrijstaat werd verwelkomd door rechercheurs van een speciale politie-eenheid, die hem arresteerden op verdenking van een moord in de taxiwereld.

Taxibaas Mafereka, wiens chauffeur en lijfwacht ook werden aangehouden, zei dat hij van de prins geen kwaad wist. Maar een paar dagen later, na enig aarzelen, besloot de ANC-top hem toch maar voorlopig politiek op non-actief te stellen.

Het is een ingreep die past bij de strengere aanpak van rotte elementen in de partij, die de Zuid-Afrikaanse president en partijleider Thabo Mbeki de achterban belooft.

ANC-politici die niet deugen 'zullen voortaan worden verwijderd', luidt de leuze waarmee de regeringspartij campagne voert voor de gemeenteraadsverkiezingen van 5 december. De belofte geeft een goede indicatie van de zorgelijke conditie waarin de partij verkeert die het politieke landschap van Zuid-Afrika domineert.

Want als je moet gaan beloven dat je fraudeurs, lantaerfanters, criminelen en andere qua gedrag niet voor het politieke ambt geschikte comrades nu kwijt wilt, dan betekent het impliciet dat je deze types tot dusverre kennelijk de hand boven het hoofd hebt gehouden. Dat dit desastreuze gevolgen heeft gehad voor de kwaliteit van het openbaar bestuur, voor een falen van mooie plannen voor betere huizen, gezondheidszorg, onderwijs etcetera, laat zich eenvoudig raden.

Wat is er toch aan de hand met het ANC, vroeg commentator Xolani Xundu zich onlangs af in *Business Day*, de toonaangevende zakenkrant van het land. Vroeger kon je trots zijn op de beweging die de apartheid verjoeg, maar de laatste jaren is het een organisatie geworden die geen vertrouwen meer oproept, zo vertolkt hij het ongenoegen van veel zwarte kiezers. 'De partij gaat de lokale verkiezingen in met een gedesillusioneerde aanhang. Als je de verhalen op straat hoort, vinden velen het niet eens de moeite waard om hun stem uit te brengen op 5 december.'

'Ze hebben het gevoel dat gemeenteraadsleden van het ANC weinig of niets hebben gepresteerd. Dat die alleen maar goed zijn in het rondrijden in dure auto's en in het verhuizen naar betere wijken, waar ze vervreemd raken van de mensen voor wier belangen ze behoren op te komen. Mensen klagen over vriendjespolitiek, dat je alleen een baantje bij de overheid of een semi-staatsbedrijf kunt krijgen als je een vriend of familie bent van een politicus.'

De slumerende crisis in het ANC is geen verzinsel van een commentator van een rechtse zakenkrant. Zo zou de propagandaafdeling van het ANC de kritiek van Xundu waarschijnlijk een jaar geleden nog wel hebben afgedaan. Maar ook in de beweging zelf lijkt de laatste tijd het besef te groeien dat er iets lelijk mis is, en dat er moet worden ingegrepen voordat het zwarte electoraat daadwerkelijk afhaakt.

Over de verkiezingen van dinsdag hoeft het ANC zich overigens

nog geen grote zorgen te maken. Opinie-onderzoek wijst uit dat de partij van Thabo Mbeki weer een ruime meerderheid zal halen. Misschien wat minder dan de 66 procent van de laatste parlementsverkiezingen, maar toch genoeg om de verdeelde oppositie ver achter zich te laten.

Zuid-Afrika kent nog geen oppositiepartij die een geloofwaardig alternatief is voor de oude bevrijdingsbeweging. De Democratische Alliantie van Tony Leon, waarin de van oudsher blanke Nationale Partij onlangs is opgegaan, torst te veel bagage uit de apartheidstijd mee om die rol te kunnen vervullen.

Maar Mbeki en zijn partijbestuur beginnen in de gaten te krijgen dat het ANC niet kan rusten op de povere lauweren van de eerste zes regeringsjaren. Als er de komende vijf jaar geen orde op zaken wordt gesteld, en de arme zwarte meerderheid van het land te weinig verbetering in het dagelijks leven ziet, is de kans groot dat

er wel een vitale tegenpartij wordt geboren.

De partijstrategen hebben ook gezien wat er in buurland Zimbabwe is gebeurd, waar vanuit de vakbeweging en burgergroepen binnen een jaar een Beweging voor Democratische Verandering ontstond, die de corrupte oude helden de wacht aanzegde. De nieuwe helden wonnen in een klap bijna de helft van de stemmen.

De crisis in het ANC heeft een bekend patroon, voor wie de ontwikkeling van post-koloniaal Afrika volgt. In welk land waar de bevrijdingsbeweging aan het roer kwam is het immers wel gelukt om alle mooie beloften waar te maken, om de idealen van vroeger om te zetten in integer bestuur, in een betere toekomst?

Het meest recente voorbeeld is Zimbabwe, waar president Robert Mugabe na twintig jaar van toehoudend wanbestuur tot een dictator is geworden die zijn land nu ruïneert, alleen maar om aan de

macht te blijven. Zuid-Afrika staat aan het begin van een soortgelijk proces, zeggen critici van de regering. Het ANC herbergt een aantal kleine Mugabes, die als ze de kans krijgen grote ellende kunnen veroorzaken.

Maar het hoeft niet zo te gaan. Thabo Mbeki heeft nog voldoende gelegenheid om de pessimisten over Afrika op hun nummer te zetten. Dan moet hij echter radicaler dan nu het roer omgooien.

'Het ANC is, ondanks de recente beloften van beterschap, nog steeds op de verkeerde weg', zegt een zwarte academicus die lange tijd een trouwe aanhanger van het ANC was. Hij wil zijn kritiek alleen kwijt als hij anoniem kan blijven. 'Ik wil geen problemen op mijn werk', verklaart hij.

Hij kent, via zijn advieswerk en zijn kennissenkring, tal van hoge ANC-ers van nabij en is de laatste jaren steeds cynischer geworden over de ontwikkeling van de partij. 'Het ANC heeft de overgang van de apartheid naar het nieuwe

De aidskweste heeft hem het meest getroffen. 'Als je analyseert hoe Mbeki en het ANC dat aanpak hebben, dat is echt verbijsterend. Hoe kun je het in je hoofd haren nieuw leven te blazen in een achterhaalde discussie over de vraag of hiv wel tot aids leidt, terwijl je mensen bij duizenden aan het sterven zijn?'

Het debat toonde de grote zwakte van het ANC: bijna niemand binnen de partij, binnen de regering, deed zijn mond open toen de president hier aan het blunderen sloeg. Waar was opeens het scherpe intellect van minister van Onderwijs Kader Asmal, de strijdvaardige stem van Ronnie Kasrils van Waterbeheer, de rustige overtuigingskracht van het economisch geweten Alec Erwin?

Alleen de oude staatsman Nelson Mandela riep op het gerommel te staken. Het had geen effect op Mbeki, een nieuw bewijs dat het absoluut niet botert tussen de eerste president van het nieuwe

Zuid-Afrika goed gemanaged. Dat was vooral te danken aan de stijl van Nelson Mandela. Maar sinds Mbeki de leiding heeft, zie je een degeneratie die je moedeloos maakt.

'Wat mij grote zorgen baart is dat een openlijk debat in het ANC niet gewenst is. De machthebbers doen alsof ze nog ondergronds zitten. Ze verwarren kritiek met afvalligheid. De partij isoleert zich, kiest ervoor critici te verketteren, terwijl een stevig debat over de koers en keuzes juist de vitale kracht van democratie is.'

Het ANC is ten prooi gevallen aan die zo voorspelbare boosdoener: de arrogantie van de macht. 'Er heerst die typerende eenpartijmentaliteit die alle voormalige bevrijdingsbewegingen teistert. Waarom zou je je immers druk maken, als je toch praktisch een tweederde meerderheid in het parlement hebt? Kritiek wordt eenvoudig weggezet met de dooddoener: 'het volk heeft ons gekozen, wij zijn de macht.'

Zuid-Afrika en zijn opvolger. Mandela en Mbeki, zo nemen politieke insiders waar, zijn tegenwoordig amper nog *on speaking terms*.

Geen enkele minister in het hele kabinet heeft de moed tegen Mbeki in te gaan, stelt de anonieme academicus. 'Niet omdat ze te dom zijn om zelf te denken. Nee, ze zijn bang. Bang als schooljongens voor de boze bovenmeester. Want als je de president tegen de haren in strijkt... Hij is een man van achterkamertjespolitiek, van afrekeningen.'

'Pas kort geleden drong het een beetje tot Mbeki door hoe ernstig de schade is die hij heeft aangericht, hoe hij de reputatie van zijn regering in het buitenland heeft besmeurd. Maar zie wat hij doet: hij erkent zijn fouten niet volmondig, maar probeert er met een vaag verhaal onderuit te komen.'

'Dat is nou de nieuwe stem van de Derde Wereld, de man die hamert op een Afrikaanse renaissance. Het probleem van het ANC begint aan de top, bij de stijl van de president. Thabo Mbeki denkt dat hij alles weet, op alle gebieden. Als hij zo doorgaat, wordt hij een regelrechte ramp voor Zuid-Afrika.'

Is de ontwikkeling van het ANC een direct gevaar voor de jonge democratie van Zuid-Afrika? Steven Friedman, politiek analist van het onafhankelijke weekblad *The Mail & Guardian*, vindt het nog te vroeg om de stormbal te hijsen. 'Claims dat we aan het afglijden zijn naar een autoritair systeem lijken eerder het gevolg van vooroordelen dat Afrikaanse regeringen altijd autoritair worden.'

Het mankement bij het ANC zit anders in elkaar, betoogt Friedman. De partijstrategen weten dat er de komende vijf jaar echte verbeteringen aan de achterban moet worden geleverd. Onder druk van alle malaise die ze om zich heen zien - vooral bij het lokaal bestuur, dat het essentiële instrument voor de verbeteringen zou moeten zijn - maken ze echter een kapitale denkfout: dat redding alleen kan komen van krachtige centrale sturing, eenheid in de gelederen, afkeer van kritiek.

'Men ziet daarbij over het hoofd dat het openbaar bestuur eenvoudig te zwak is en het land te gecompliceerd in elkaar steekt.'

Dat maakt Mbekis centralisatie van de macht een gevaarlijke illusie: 'Politici en partijbestuurders denken zo orde te scheppen in de wereld, maar ze houden zichzelf voor de gek. Ze scheppen alleen orde op hun bureau, en blijven blind voor het feit dat hun maatregelen in werkelijkheid weinig effect sorteren.'

Friedman heeft een welgemeend advies aan de ANC-leiding. Probeer niet alles te willen controleren, want je bereikt er je doel niet mee. Het ANC moet weer de energie en het enthousiasme terugkrijgen van weleer, toen het als brede beweging verschil in aanpak en debat zag als een bron van kracht, en niet als een bedreiging van de partijlijn. 'De leiders moeten leren loslaten. Dat biedt meer kans op een gezonde, effectieve democratie.'



Secretariaat:
Dromerstraat 55
1511 CM Oostzaan
Nederland
Tel: +31 (0) 75 684 2649
Fax: +31 (0) 75 684 2679
E-mail: mijnsbergen@planet.nl

7 December 2000

Dear Delegate

On behalf of the Board of the Foundation for the New South Africa, a hearty welcome to our Final Seminar "Democracy, Development and the role of political parties: the Experience of the NZA"!

For those of you who had to travel some distance to come to Somerset West, we hope the journey was safe and without difficulties.

All of us look forward to the opportunity to exchange experiences and views on the important topics which engage us in different ways, both within South Africa, Mozambique and in other "young democracies". We look forward to a stimulating and informative discussion, and thank you all, participants and resource persons alike, for giving your time and talent to this event.

Attached to this welcome note are some administrative notes and information which we hope will be clear and helpful. Should you have any queries or needs, please contact any one of the following for assistance:

Diana Burnett (NZA Secretariat South Africa)
Annemarie Mijnsbergen (NZA Secretariat)

Welcome!

DR. KLAAS GROENVELD
Acting Chairman

NZA FINAL SEMINAR "DEMOCRACY, DEVELOPMENT AND THE ROLE OF POLITICAL PARTIES: THE EXPERIENCE OF THE NZA"

Administrative directions for the convenience of Delegates

1. NZA is responsible for the cost of accommodation, breakfast, lunch and dinner as well as refreshments during the course of the seminar. All costs beyond these basic charges are to be borne by each participant and must be settled directly with the hotel before departure.
2. The following costs are not covered by the NZA:
Mini-bar and snack expenses
Telephone, personal fax and Internet charges
Laundry
Entertainment
Room service (including breakfast)
3. Participants on International flights are requested to reconfirm their flights from South Africa. Diana Burnett (Seminar Co-Ordinator, at the Registration desk) will be able to assist you in this matter. Please supply her with the necessary flight documents.
4. South African Delegates flying back to other destinations in South Africa (i.e. Johannesburg, Durban, Bloemfontein) are requested to re-confirm their return flights with Diana Burnett at the Registration desk in order to arrange airport transport at the correct times.
5. On 8 December 2 buses will be ready to transport all Delegates at 19h00 to Spier Wine Estate for the Farewell Dinner. Please ensure you are on time and at the Reception are at 18h45. The bus will return to the hotel at +- 23h00
6. Should you need any further assistance please contact one of the Organisers as follows:

Diana Burnett:	Seminar Co-Ordinator (Registration Desk)
Annemarie Mijnsbergen	Seminar Organisor

Amendments to the Agenda

Thursday 7 December

14.10 **Opening speeches**

- **Frene Ginwala**, Speaker of the National Assembly

15.10 **Introductions: Experiences with NZA**

- **Theo Brinkel**: Lessons for co-operation and capacity building

Friday 8 December

Conference Chair for the day: **Carl Niehaus**

14.00 **Support for political parties: pros and contras**

- **Barbara Groeblichhoff** (co-reference Jos van Gennip)



<version française>

<search/news/about ecdpm/index/oneworld/euforic>

Building the Capacities of Political Parties in Southern Africa: Reviewing the Strategy of the Netherlands

Volker Hauck

(Full Text of ECDPM Discussion Paper 15, April 2000)

For related ECDPM publications

To order a paper copy

This paper should be cited as:

Hauck, V. 2000.

**Building the Capacities of Political Parties in Southern Africa:
Reviewing the Strategy of the Netherlands
(ECDPM Discussion Paper 16). Maastricht: ECDPM.**

Table of Contents

- Introduction
- Recent Democratisation Process in Africa
- Building Political Capacity
- Development in the Netherlands: Learning form Others
- The Dutch Approach and Focus of Operations
- Lessons form South Africa and Mozambique
- Future Implementation of a Good Governance Policy
- Annes: Profile of NZA

Introduction

Democratic governments of the Western world see good governance principles and democratic processes as preconditions for successful development. They support these through various types of initiatives, programmes and projects channelled through bilateral and multilateral organisations, as well as via non-governmental organisations (NGO's) and political foundations. Assuming that good governance and democracy are among the key ingredients for societies in the South to move ahead, the question is how democratic capacities can best be developed in these countries? Moreover, what role should financing partners play, in providing appropriate assistance to emerging processes and structures and what type of institutional set-up is required to support these agendas?

This paper, which is based on experiences from the field, contributes to a wider debate on the strategic choices and options on how best to support this complex development agenda. Strengthening democratic development and good governance on the African continent has been of major concern to the international community throughout the 1990's. Like other donor countries, the Netherlands Government has joined in this cause and it has financed cross-cutting activities such as civic education, election processes and the setting up of democratic institutions. It has also supported the development of individual political parties.

After introducing political capacity building and the broader international discussion on the subject, this paper reviews the Dutch approach to capacity building of political parties. It shows how the **Foundation for the New South Africa (NZA)** has learned from other donor experiences, it draws on NZA's experiences from South Africa and Mozambique, comparing and contrasting them with the approaches used by other donors active in this field.

Although final conclusions on which way to go cannot be drawn, the paper points to an array of ways forward. It recommends further dialogue with partners from the South to discuss experiences gathered during the past decade and to review whether existing instruments are best structured and positioned to address good governance and democratisation agendas.

Recent Democratisation Processes in Africa

Since the late 1980's, a wave of democratisation has swept sub-Saharan Africa, influenced by the democratic revolution in Europe and reacting to internal pressures. In most of the 50 sub-Saharan African countries, democratic reforms were realised through constitutional changes and elections were held during the 1990's. Until then, there had been only four functioning multi-party democracies: Senegal, Gambia, Botswana and Mauritius. Generally speaking, elections were held in accordance with set procedures and principles, but showed at the same time that democratisation in this part of the world has a long way to go before any comparison with western-type democratic systems could be made. In only one-fifth of the elections held in the former one-party states, have governments changed and when it came to new elections thereafter, only Benin and Madagascar saw a replacement of the elected governments.

Commentators have expressed their disappointment, referring to manipulations by the big and mighty that leave the true proponents of democracy, like human rights organisations or lawyer associations struggling for democratic changes for years. But there is awareness that the democratisation process is very young in the sub-Saharan African continent and that it will take considerable time before voting on issues and policies will replace voting according to ethnic or personal solidarity. It is also recognised that the democratisation process with new rounds of elections continue. The most recent experiences are the March 2000 presidential election in Senegal, which brought a new political party to power after 19 years rule by the former president Diouf, and the Guinea-Bissau multi-party presidential elections of January 2000. Elections held last year include Malawi's second pluralist presidential and legislative elections in May 1999, and South Africa's second round of post-apartheid national elections from June 1999. In Nigeria, the military handed over power to the new president Olusegun Obasanjo in May 1999, after the first elections in 16 years. In former long-term civil-war ridden Mozambique, the second national elections were held in December 1999.

Building Political Capacity

The point has been made by policy makers, practitioners and academics that political capacity and good governance are at the heart of development. Development interventions can only work, if the broader institutional and political environment of a country is able to incorporate and manage interventions by different actors of society in accordance with set national policies. Hence, political capacity refers to "the ability of States to respond to societal demands, allow for channels to represent societal interests, and to incorporate societal participation in decision making and conflict resolution."

Although there is no empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that the level of democracy determines the degree of (economic) development, building political capacity and stimulating good governance has become a new avenue in development co-operation during the recent years.

The South had only marginally been included in this debate, even though some countries had taken strong individual positions to keep donors out of this realm. It is only through the current ACP-EU negotiations for a successor agreement of the Lomé Convention, that it has become a broadly discussed subject between the North and the South.

In operational terms, the donor community has struggled considerably with the question of how to support the emergence of democratic processes and structures in developing countries. It is obviously one of the most sensitive areas of intervention. Programmes and projects risk going beyond purely technical activities, touching on and potentially changing the inner power structures of a society. Hence, the question of "what can states and donors do in order to provide democratic development?" was widely discussed within the international co-operation community during recent years. One response was to support human rights movements, the building of legal systems and the promotion of democracy. Moreover, a stress was put on making civil society work, by creating independent and accountable organisations supported by a favourable State, which was in turn requested to provide an enabling institutional framework for civil society to grow and to function.

There is general recognition that civil society represents a countervailing force to government, which can engage positively with it in order to build bridges between various groups of society. Civil society actors can range from grass roots people's organisations to associations pursuing broader objectives for the "common good", so-called advocacy groups. Opinions differ to what extent political parties are part of this civil society. They are, however, seen as one of the driving forces to facilitate the rooting of democratic values and practice. It is only through political parties that interests and opinions formulated among civil society can be brought to a higher level, get anchored into government policies and be transformed into action.

The Netherlands government has closely followed these discussions. In its sub-Saharan Africa policy document of 1998, it spells out the development of nation building, democracy, human rights and good governance as pillars of its policy to foster political development. Stimulating electoral processes, building up civil society, renewing government institutions and improving of their functioning are identified as key areas of support. Consequently, the Dutch government has funded interventions at different levels to stimulate democracy and to build political capacity. A wide array of examples include: Funding for institutional and technical aspects of election processes, such as election commissions; Parliamentarians sent to visit democratic institutions in the North; Financial and logistical support to create a free and independent press and provision of civic education through civil society organisations. Next to these instruments, political parties in sub-Saharan Africa received attention. Although it is recognised that many of these are operating within an entirely different context and are hardly comparable with their western counterparts, political parties in these countries are commonly recognised as an essential element in the building up of a democratic society.

Generally speaking, donors have followed a very cautious approach to supporting political parties in sub-Saharan Africa. A number of them "burned their fingers" by directly supporting individual parties, seeing their funds transformed into luxury goods or used to enhance non-democratic behaviour by party leaders. Consequently, some donors like the German political foundations (Stiftungen) turned away from political parties, only supporting civil society or some technical aspects of the election process. Other donors, however, have taken note that there is no democracy without political parties and have continued to finance different types of political party projects in sub-Saharan Africa. These experiences found a reflection in the Netherlands and resulting in an attempt to learn from others and to create a Dutch approach to political party capacity building, reflecting also the culture of the Dutch political landscape.

Developments in the Netherlands: Learning from Others

Dutch experiences of supporting democratic developments are not limited to the present decade. In the 1970's and 1980's, the Netherlands Government supported democratisation processes in Chile. But it was only in the early 1990's that intense discussions on democratisation in developing countries re-started with an attempt to formulate answers to the challenges of transition after the end of the Cold War. In 1992, a Round Table on *Democratisation in Sub-Saharan Africa* was organised in Maastricht, in which the debate on institutional questions related to the democratisation process was re-opened. A main outcome of the discussion was the need to support the emergence of a civil society and to provide new bases for citizen participation. The role of political parties in this context was critically looked at, seeing it as a double-edged sword for the democratisation process. On one side they appeared to be a possible basis for representing and organising different interests and opinions of society. On the other side, questions were raised concerning their legitimacy, leadership, the obvious lack of political programmes and the degree of internal democracy.

Simultaneously, Dutch political parties started to discuss possible support to the democratisation process and the first post-apartheid elections in South Africa. Following an invitation by the Minister for Development Co-operation, members of political parties examined whether the Netherlands could assist the electoral process in South Africa by supporting one or more political parties. This initiative resulted in the setting up of the NZA in 1994 with the prime objective to enhance the process of democratisation in the Republic of South Africa through supporting political parties and groups. Funding was received from the Netherlands government based on a co-operative agreement between NZA and the Minister for Development Co-operation.

The discussions in the Netherlands on how to support political parties in the South was influenced considerably by the experiences of the German political foundations (or *Stiftungen*), the US government financed National Endowment for Democracy and the British Westminster Foundation.

Long work experiences in the area of political assistance to developing countries has been recorded by the older German political foundations. Their initial task was to provide civic education to the German population. In the late fifties, the FES was the first to expand its civic education mandate beyond the German borders. The others started to follow soon after. The *Stiftungen* receive almost all their funds for their international activities from the government, but have full autonomy in the use of these funds. Although activities of the older *Stiftungen* in developing countries can be traced back thirty years, it is only in the last ten years that their claim to provide assistance to democratisation processes is fully justified. Up to the late eighties, the HSS, FES and KAS co-operated with many authoritarian regimes and single parties. In particular their activities in Latin America and in Zaire during Mobutu's reign cast clouds on projects executed in the name of supporting democracy.

Contrary to other donors, the particular approach of the *Stiftungen* is their long-term partnership with particular organisations and political parties and the short-term funding of new political initiatives. All *Stiftungen* are committed to the partisan support of specific sections of the political and social realm, with a special focus on interest and advocacy groups, as well as the media. In the past, co-operation with African political parties has been extensive, like Frente da Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO, Liberation Front of Mozambique), Kenya African National Union (KANU) or Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM, Revolutionary State Party) in Tanzania, but experiences showed that those parties in power also oppressed political development. This led to a policy not to fund individual parties, with the exception of South Africa, and to support civic education programmes and to strengthen political party think tanks or parliaments and electoral commissions. The *Stiftungen* do, however, recognise the important role of political parties in the transition process to democracy and their role as a link between civil

society and the state. Project activities are analysed and lessons are drawn from previous experiences to possibly put political parties again on the agenda.


From the USA, the *National Democratic Institute (NDI)* and the *International Republican Institute (IRI)* execute political party support programmes all over the world. The NDI is the most active on the African continent with reported activities in fifteen countries. Both have executed projects since the mid-eighties funded primarily through the umbrella body responsible for the allocation of democratisation funds, the *National Endowment for Democracy (NED)*. Compared to their German counterpart organisations, NDI and IRI activities are much less autonomous in character. Cuts in the budget of NED and increasing funding through the US Agency for International Development (USAID) has transformed them almost into a sub-contractor for USAID which defines the terms of reference for their engagements abroad.

Projects executed under the auspices of one or the other party institute relate to elections, civic education, parliamentary strengthening, and political party capacity building. Regarding the latter field of work, activities are directed towards technical assistance for party building, training of members of parliament, as well as assistance to political parties with respect to election monitoring, party-related election campaigning including the formulation of electoral themes and positions. In the case of NDI, projects are undertaken with a chosen number of major parties in a country, rather than with one particular sister party. The selection of beneficiaries is done in-house, based on an analysis of the political orientations and strengths of the individual parties.

The British **Westminster Foundation (WF)** is not affiliated to any particular political party in Great Britain and tries to play a neutral role in democratisation assistance. It was established in 1992 to provide support to building and strengthening pluralistic democratic institutions overseas. Its particular objective is to enhance democratisation through technical assistance on a non-partisan basis. Next to supporting electoral processes, supporting independent media, trade unions and political non-governmental organisations, the strengthening of political parties and parliaments is one of the core activities of the Foundation. The main geographic areas of work on the African continent are the Anglophone countries.

The British government's annual grant to the Foundation is channelled abroad for approximately 50 per cent via the Foundation and for 50 per cent via British political parties. The all-Foundation resources serve to carry out cross-party projects, where a range of political parties from an overseas country can be involved. Other project activities of the Foundation itself relate to non-party projects and include support to media, civil society, trade unions and to the electoral process. Support to individual political parties is provided through the second 50 per cent, which is channelled through the UK political parties. Support projects are primarily technical, and relate to party-building, party organisation and electoral support on a party to party basis.

The following chart compares the different funding and executing arrangements of the Netherlands, Germany, the United States and the United Kingdom.



Political Parties	PvdA	VVD	CDA	D66	GL	RPF	GPV	SGP
Germany:								
Funding	BMZ °							
Foundation	KAS*	FES*	FNS*	HSS*	HBS*	RLS*		
Political Parties	CDU	SPD	FDP	CSU	B90/G	PDS		
United States:								
Funding	USAID °							
Foundation	NDI*				IRI*			
Political Parties	DP				RP			
United Kingdom:								
Funding	DfID °							
Foundation	WF* (50%)				50%			
Political Parties					LP*	CP*	LD*	
° primary funding source for international activities * provision of funding for projects/ programmes								

The Dutch Approach and Focus of Operations

The Dutch approach differs from the foundations and institutes presented above. The NZA is unique in the sense of being a political foundation supported by all political parties represented in Dutch parliament, with the exception of the extreme right. Its particular method is to provide funds to all political parties in the recipient country irrespective of their *couleur politique*. NZA is 100 per cent financed by the Netherlands Government. Political parties have worked through their party think tanks to establish the Foundation. All parties have two seats in the Supervisory Board. Contrary to the political foundations of other countries, NZA has a minimal management structure; it is run by a nine-person Board assisted by a one-person secretariat.

Similar to comparable organisations in Germany and the United Kingdom, the influence of the funding organisation on NZA is considered to be relatively low. Its activities are certainly performed within the overall policy framework provided by the government. But contrary to the statements made by the American IRI, NZA does not publicly state that it conducts programmes and activities which are in line with the national interests of the Netherlands government.

Classification of Funding - Executing Organisation:

Executing organisations	Funding Influence Low	Funding Influence High
Single body	NL (NZA), GB (Westminster Foundation)	n. a.
Multiple bodies	DE (Stiftungen), GB (Political Parties)	US (NDI, IRI)

The main aims of NZA, as mentioned in their statutes, are the initiation of activities directed at the preparation for and execution of electoral campaigns, training in political values and democracy, the creation of governing bodies within the context of a democratic South Africa and capacity building of political parties. Capacity building, as defined by NZA, is primarily seen as strengthening the respective party organisations from top leadership down to local constituencies, party infrastructure, and the promotion of a democratic culture on the part of party leadership and cadre.

The creation of NZA was motivated by the conviction that an instrument was needed which could help stabilise the particular political situation of post-apartheid South Africa. Involving the already established Association of West European Parliamentarians for Action against Apartheid (AWEPA) or other Dutch co-financing institutions was not considered. While these organisations had established track-records in working with specific civil society organisations or with a selected number of parties and political movements in the Southern African region, there was a need for a politically-neutral instrument able to interact across borders on a party-to-party basis, without excluding any legally established and accepted political party in the recipient country.


During the 1944 discussions leading to the establishment of NZA, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Development Co-operation declared their intention to eventually extend this type of support to more countries in Africa. It was only in 1997, however, that activities were expanded to Mozambique. The *Foundation for the Enhancement of Democracy in Mozambique* (FEDM), was created for this purpose, possessing similar objectives as NZA and supported by most political parties.

This decision to expand beyond South African borders and the value added of working with other political parties in sub-Saharan Africa were extensively discussed during a NZA organised conference in 1996. Studies prepared for this event expressed only cautious support to the experiment undertaken by NZA in view of the salient characteristics of African politics to absorb - primarily foreign origin - resources and to retain or redistribute those to domestic supporters in a spoils system. It was strongly suggested to await a full evaluation on the effectiveness of NZA's support given to South African political parties before extending the system to other countries.

At the NZA conference in 1996, first experiences from NZA's work in South Africa were gathered, comparisons with those of other countries' Foundations and Institutes were drawn up, and future options for NZA to support democratic processes in developing countries were reflected on. A main topic during the conference was whether to continue with the present model, as applied to the work with South Africa, to widen the scope of activities to other countries and continents, or to widen and deepen, i.e. work in other countries with political parties *and* organisations of civil society. A main conclusion of the event was that NZA had shown itself to have a unique character in the family of political development oriented organisations. Next to projects and programmes of co-financing organisations and other development NGOs supporting the creation and enhancement of civil society, the type of activities NZA had undertaken towards strengthening political parties were seen as a valuable contribution to help stabilise a political

system in transition. It was noted, however, that few countries in Africa could offer similar conditions as South Africa, where basic conditions for democratisation were largely satisfied. In order to respond to apparent needs in neighbouring countries, the Foundation would have to show willingness to adapt its model and to adjust its own organisation to become a long-term agency for their partners in the South. An extension of its mandate to support civil society was critically looked at since NZA was not considered to possess comparative advantages in working in this particular field of political development and democratisation. The conference concluded with the recommendation that NZA only work through political parties.

Organisation NZA



* Each party appoints two persons to the Supervisory Board and one person to the Board. The political offices of the big parties are taking an active role in supporting NZA

Lessons from South Africa and Mozambique

NZA now has a record of five years of operations and has executed projects in South Africa and Mozambique. Being a new institution in the landscape of Dutch development co-operation and having spent a considerable amount of funds on a range of projects, the organisation merits a closer look. Between 1994 and 1996, an annual amount of Hfl. 5 million was made available to a variety of projects in South Africa. New projects amounting to Hfl. 12 million were approved for an additional period of three years, ending in 1999. In Mozambique, work started towards the end of 1997 with a one-year pilot project, totalling Hfl. 600,000. A successor project is under implementation.

In South Africa, NZA was the only institution providing funds to political parties for capacity building projects after the 1994 elections. Money was principally used for technical training of party cadre and for basic institutional and organisational support. The formula used to allocate funding consisted of a base level support, constituting 25 per cent of the overall budget, made available to all parties, large and small, on an equal basis. The remaining 75 per cent of the overall budget was distributed according to the number of seats held by a party in the National Assembly. Only parties that were represented in the National Assembly were eligible. Funding to other parties was rejected in case that this might encourage new parties to form, simply to access the funds.

The picture was somewhat different in Mozambique, where a cautious start was made with a one-year pilot project. In accordance with the recommendations as formulated during the NZA seminar in 1996, the approach used for South Africa had to be adapted to the Mozambican context. Only three parties have seats in the national parliament. To enable all political forces to participate during the local elections, a base fund of Hfl. 15,000 was made available to 19 political parties, all registered and having shown active participation during the 1994 presidential elections. The balance of funds was distributed proportionately in accordance with the votes the parties had obtained during the elections. In both countries, the proportional funding was accepted and supported by political party leaders. It should not be a surprise that political party representatives very much valued the contributions made. However, the impression of both

projects was that the appreciation for the programmatic work was genuine. The Foundation was particularly appreciated for being one of the few funding organisations willing to support the growth and stabilisation of a multi-party democracy beyond elections alone. Funds helped to organise and strengthen party institutional structures, to facilitate the creation of in-house think tanks, to train party members in their work with the media, or to simply provide very basic knowledge on the functioning of a democracy to party members, as was the case in Mozambique.

Evaluations for the two-year project in South Africa and the pilot-project in Mozambique, were generally positive. Worries that resources had been absorbed and redistributed in a spoils system, as has been noted in a number of other cases, could not be confirmed. In general, the projects were considered to provide a useful contribution to the political development in the respective countries and evidence was received that project funds were in most cases used in accordance with objectives. It was equally observed that objectives and expected results had been formulated very broadly, making it difficult to assess outcomes in detail.

The evaluations found little doubt about the usefulness of such activities. But projects with a general focus, such as enabling smaller parties to participate in political debate in order to counterbalance information provided by others, or projects fostering small political party capacities to articulate and communicate policies to the public are difficult to appraise. Hence the evaluations noted that it was not easy to get an idea on what role the projects precisely played in stabilising the respective political landscapes. The Foundation was advised to develop impact assessment criteria. These would have to be combined with a set of sharper criteria for project selection and approval in order to avoid losing the focus of intervention. Political capacity building through supporting political parties bears the risk of supporting projects with a too diverse nature.

The evaluations were also critical on the possible development of dependencies. The fear is less in South Africa, where party leaders consider private funding to be more significant than the funds originating from the government run election funds. Moreover, the South African context provides a certain potential for income generating projects and membership funding. Mozambique, being one of the poorest countries in the world hardly provides for the formation of a variety of sustainable independent political parties. The situation is further aggravated by the fact that most economic activities and public employment are indirectly controlled by the ruling party. There are indications that independent candidates for the 1998 local elections lost their government jobs.

Recommendations were also made regarding the institutional set-up of the Foundation. The present operational structure with an Executive Board, a one-person secretariat and no representation in the recipient countries were considered to be insufficient in view of the need to ensure a better focus of activities. A professional structure was regarded as a necessity to enable an improved selection and monitoring of projects as well as the build-up of an institutional memory for the different areas of work. Moreover, this would provide better opportunities for an improved presentation and outreach on NZA's work within the Netherlands.

Future Implementation of a Good Governance Policy

The wave of democratisation, which started in Africa after the collapse of the Berlin wall, has not stopped. It continues in a considerable number of countries, new rounds of national and local level elections have been announced and many individuals and organisations are looking for knowledge and institutional assistance from outside. Many leaders are hoping for support that will enable them to contribute to the democratisation of their respective countries. The practice of NZA's work in South Africa and Mozambique so far shows that the Foundation has proved to be a useful instrument to make a good governance policy operational within a limited framework

and to contribute to a much wider change process. But it is uncertain whether the present institutional set-up would suffice to accommodate possible requests to expand into other regions inside as well as outside the African continent. In view of the ongoing discussion on how to implement good governance policy effectively, and looking at the means to implement new tasks lying ahead, it is advisable to properly review the existing instruments.

Classification of Donor - Recipient Organisation:

Recipient:	One foundation per donor country	Multiple foundations/ parties per donor country
One party	n.a.	- DE, former system (multiple Stiftungen working with [sister] parties); - GB (political parties assisting a [sister] party, under umbrella of WF)
Different parties (receive contributions for individual activities)	- NL (NZA)	- US (NDI & IRI)
Multiple parties (for cross party activities such as election observation training)	- GB (WF)	- US (NDI & IRI); - DE, present system

A key question is to what extent the existence of a small single-issue organisation is legitimate in view of calls for more efficient and effective aid-management structures. Overhead costs could be reduced and institutional expertise be brought together by executing different types of good governance through a joint umbrella organisation. Support projects to political parties cover just one aspect of the much wider continuum of political development and good governance. Thematically, they are often very close to activities implemented by civil society organisations or advocacy groups, such as civic education projects, election monitoring or training for people elected to national parliament or local government.

The British have taken account of this thematic closeness, and have found a formula through which different projects aiming at building pluralistic democratic institutions can be executed. Through its flexible structure, the WF is in a position to respond to a variety of project applications, ranging from supporting independent media, human rights groups, election processes and parliaments to the capacity building of individual political parties. Moreover, it is in a position to guarantee a long-term partnership with its counterparts in the South, has an institutional memory and capacities to support long-lasting democratisation processes in different parts of the world. And it allows for British parties to act jointly on cross-cutting democratisation processes, such as elections or civic education, but to let individual parties twin with their counterparts sharing similar political norms and values at the same time.

In view of challenges arising from the transformation of former one-party regimes into States with elected governments, and recognising that answers to obvious expectations from the South should be found, a second round of reflection - with participants from the South - on how to master the next decade might be advisable. Different Dutch players active in the field of democratisation and civil society support should be drawn into this process to review experiences from the past decade and to discuss whether existing instruments are best structured and

positioned to meet good governance aims. This could also give a sign to the international community that the Netherlands is seriously looking at ways to further improve the implementation of its good governance policy.

The agenda for rethinking possible alternatives or modifications to the present system should be formulated with participants from the South. Such an agenda could be elaborated around the following headings:

- *Compatibility*: A range of actors is executing different types of activities that aim to foster of good governance and democratic practices. How do we ensure that these actions are compatible with each?
- *Funding strategies*: A variety of project proposals are emerging from stakeholders in different countries, from human rights groups to political parties. How do we respond to such requests in a focused and coherent way?
- *Performance measurement*: A unified system with shared indicators to continuously monitor and evaluate good governance and democratisation activities is advisable in view of different organisations utilising a variety of evaluation approaches.
- *Institutional set-up*: How do we increase the institutional memory of the different organisations involved to ensure adequate technical and local backstopping of activities, and to facilitate long-term engagements in a country?

Annex: Profile of NZA

The Foundation for the New South Africa (Stichting voor het Nieuwe Zuid-Afrika - NZA) was established on 24 January 1994 as a funding mechanism to support capacity building for South African political parties. At that time, South Africa was moving towards its first-ever national democratic elections (held in April 1994) and much of the funding assisted political parties to participate more effectively in the elections than would otherwise have been possible. The policy framework of NZA is based on the report 'Hope has its price' by J.J.A.M. van Gennip and K. Groenveld.

NZA was, partly, a response to requests from the senior leadership of the African National Congress (ANC) to assist their party campaign in the elections. The ANC and other political organisations, not part of the traditional party-structure of South Africa, lacked resources to run campaigns and to put up candidates for election. A motivation to establish NZA was to support political parties who intended to participate in the National elections (in 1994).

Since the Dutch government cannot give direct assistance to political parties in other countries, an institution, the Foundation for the New South Africa was created. Nine Dutch political parties participate in NZA. The Foundation feels that the political expertise of its members may generate an incremental value within the regular Dutch development cooperation.

NZA can provide assistance to all parties who commit themselves to an electoral contest and principles like national unity, non-violence, democracy and non-racism. Prior to the 1994 elections, assistance was granted based on the expected electoral strength. Since then, assistance is based on the number of seats in the National Assembly.

Although the support to political parties by international aid agencies is not unique, it should be noted that assistance to different political parties in a specific country is exceptional and unprecedented.

The objective of NZA, according to the articles of association, is "to support the democratisation process in South Africa, notably by strengthening political groups in that country as the pillars of a democracy in which the equality of all South Africa's inhabitants plays a central role". NZA's activities aim to foster democratisation in South Africa by creating an efficient and lasting multi-party political system. This is done by strengthening South African political parties, and by improving the way they function in a democratic, non-racial, plural society.

While political parties are eligible for specific assistance, in practical terms they could only access the funds on the basis of approved projects. The role of the NZA became one of guidance and support to parties, on whose initiative the development of projects depended. The approach of NZA is demand-driven: The political parties identify the projects. If these projects fall within the objectives and criteria of NZA, they are eligible for funding.

Since 1994 NZA has received requests to expand its activities to other countries. Broadening and deepening of activities is a sensitive process. On this issue, research has been undertaken, conferences and meetings were held and identification missions to Ethiopia and Mozambique have taken place. In 1998/1999 NZA executed a pilot project in Mozambique; since early 2000, a full programme of activities is under implementation. In response to various requests to broaden NZA's activities and to engage in other countries, preparations are currently underway to create a new institution to channel Netherlands support to political party capacity building abroad.

© ECDPM, Comments to Peter Ballantyne

oneworld
europe

euforic

Party AEB

Delegate **Mr. Cassie Aucamp**
Title Leader

Party DA/NNP

Delegate **Mrs. Dolfina Beets**
Title Accounting Officer

Delegate **Mr. Theo Brinkel**
Title NZA Boardmember - Newsletter

Party UDM

Delegate **Mr. Malizole Diko**
Title Secretary General

Party ANC

Delegate **Mrs. Bathabile Dlamini**
Title Secretary General Womens League

Party ANC

Delegate **Mr. Toine Eggenhuizen**
Title Finance Department

Party DA/NNP

Delegate **Mr. Jacques Fouche**
Title Manager: IPL

Party DA/DP

Delegate **Mrs. Leigh Goldschmidt**
Title National Fundraiser

Party ACDP

Delegate **Mr. Louis Michael Green**
Title Deputy President

Delegate **Mr. Klaas Groenveld**
Title NZA Acting Chairman (VVD)

Party ANC

Delegate **Mrs. Bertha Gxowa**
Title MP, Treasurer General Womens League

Delegate **Mr. Wim Haitsma**
Title NZA Boardmember (GPV)

Party DA/DP

Delegate **Ms. Kylie Hatton**
Title Co-Ordinator

Party Inkatha Freedom Party

Delegate **Mr. Velinkosi Hlabisa**

Party Inkatha Freedom Party

Delegate **Mrs. Nadiyah Hoosen**
Title Head: Dutch Project

Delegate **Mr. Wilmot James**
Title Guest NZA

Delegate **Mr. Chris Janse**
Title NZA Boardmember (GPV)

Party AZAPO

Delegate **Mr. Peter Jones**
Title Provincial Leader

Party National Democratic Institute

Delegate **Mrs. Patricia Keefer**
Title Director

Party DA/DP

Delegate **Mr. Greg Krumbock**
Title Executive Director

Delegate **Mr. Roel Kuiper**
Title NZA Boardmember (RPF)

Party UDM

Delegate **Mr. Archie Lewis**
Title Prov. Chairperson West. Cape

Party UDM

Delegate **Mr. Hennie Lombard**
Title Parliamentary Researcher

Party Inkatha Freedom Party

Delegate **Mr. Eric Lucas**
Title MP

Party ANC

Delegate **Mrs. Pemmy Majodina**
Title Treasurer ANC Youth League

Party ANC

Delegate **Mr. Naph Manana**
Title Co-Ordinator

Party Inkatha Freedom Party

Delegate **Mr. Nkethu Matima**
Title IFP YB Secretary

<p>Party Inkatha Freedom Party Delegate Mr. Sipho Matobela Title Co-Ordinator</p>	<p>Delegate Mr. K.Shubane Title NZA Guest</p>
<p>Party ANC Delegate Rev. Cedric Mayson Title Co-Ordinator Commission of Religious Affairs</p>	<p>Party DA/NNP Delegate Mr. Hennie Smit Title MP, Spokesperson Defence</p>
<p>Party UCDP Delegate Mr. I. Mfudisi</p>	<p>Delegate Mrs. Bea Stolte Title Member Supervisory Board</p>
<p>Delegate Mrs. Annemarie Mijnsbergen Title NZA Secretariat</p>	<p>Party DA/NNP Delegate Mr. Daryl Swanepoel Title Deputy Executive Director</p>
<p>Party ANC Delegate Mr. Spongy Moodley Title Training Officer Political Education</p>	<p>Party Minority Front Delegate Mrs. S. Thakur</p>
<p>Party AZAPO Delegate Mr. Nkutsoeu Motsau Title Political Commissar</p>	<p>Party Freedom Front Delegate Col. Pieter Uys Title General Secretary</p>
<p>Party Freedom Front Delegate Mr. Corne Mulder Title Guest</p>	<p>Delegate Mr. Jos van Gennip Title NZA Vice Chairman (CDA)</p>
<p>Delegate Mr. Jan Mulder Title NZA Treasury General (SGP)</p>	<p>Party Federal Alliance Delegate Dr. Andre van Niekerk Title Chief Whip</p>
<p>Party ANC Delegate Mrs. Mavivi Myakayaka-Manzini Title National Executive Committee</p>	<p>Delegate Mr. Jan Nico van Overbeeke Title NZA Representative Mozambique</p>
<p>Delegate Mr. C.G. Niehaus Title NZA Guest</p>	<p>Party Federal Alliance Delegate Mrs. Amanda van Wyk Title Liaison Officer</p>
<p>Party ACDP Delegate Rev. Chin Reddy Title Project Director</p>	<p>Party DA/NNP Delegate Mrs. Anna van Wyk Title Spokesperson ARts, Culture, Science</p>
<p>Party DA/NNP Delegate Mr. Renier Schoeman Title National Executive Director</p>	<p>Party UDM Delegate Ms. Annelize van Wyk Title MP</p>
<p>Delegate Mr. Alvaro Scholtbach Title NZA Boardmember (PvdA)</p>	<p>Delegate Mr. T. P.Venter Title Member Advisory Board</p>
<p>Party UCDP Delegate Mr. P.J. Seleko Title Deputy Chairman</p>	<p>Party Royal Netherlands Embassy Delegate Mrs. Caroline Weijers Title Head: Political Section</p>
	<p>Party ANC Delegate Mr. Tony Yengeni Title Chief Whip</p>