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VOS I F P

S Afrlcans have lost  
falth in FW â\200\224 SACC

ORDINARY South Afri-  
cags had lost faith in

President F'W de Klerk.

and confidence in the  
emergent negotiation

Churchm charged yester-

"'These exposures have

created a serjous moral |  
â\200\230 crists Im the comnoy,

SACC generz] secretary

the Rev Frapk Chikane -

said in 2 detailed review  
of pofitical developments

since June 22 â\200\224 when

church leaders launched  
thezr Naaonal che In-  
it

fanding scandal hadled to.

fears that the peace p).â\200\230oâ\200\224-'\_a  
3 ". cess and prospects for ne-

godations wcre â\200\234temin- -

â\200\230ally threarenedâ\200\235.

â\200\234Tt has caused ordinary  
South Afticans to. loose  
faith and trest in Mr De  
Klerk. Those of us who

- called him.2 man of integ- .

urity bad â\200\230to swallow our

wordsâ\204ç, Mr Chikane said:  
This had resulted in a

â\200\234stridentâ\204ç demand for an

. interim â\200\234government â\200\230:0r

some other form of tran-

The government slush' is situational. administrationâ\204ç,

- Which would ;. remove

go \_\_, \_\_â\200\230f&:gn'mn: huan, ...1

because It 152 play-  
-er in the uegou;znnon pro-

Q:..â\200\234)S i i

Mr Chikane concluded  
it was not yet the time to  
lift' remaining sanctions,  
and impeded the internat-  
jonal community to main-  
tain them until change in  
South Africa. was â\200\234irre-  
versible and profoundâ\204ç,





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â\200\224 e Bu eSS

' Dwindling |

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Comrnunists  
are left out  
in the cold

By Dominic Evans

THE DEFEAT of the Soviet  
hardliners leaves the worldâ\200\231s  
remaining Communist pow-  
ers more isolated than ever.

Countries dependent on  
Soviet support to prop up  
shaky economies will take no  
comfort from Mr Boris Yelt-  
sinâ\200\231s warning that Russia,  
which faces its own economic  
crisis, cannot afford to con-  
tinue its largess to former cli-  
ent states. " S

Others, accustomed in the  
past to the comfort of a pow-  
erful ideological sympathiser  
in the Soviet Union, will have  
to struggle to resist renewed  
calls for change.

Many one-party African

states, some of which claim  
Marxist credentials, have  
been forced towards change  
since the eastern European  
revolutions began two years  
ago.

Ghana and Burkina Faso,  
for example, whose regimes  
until recently paid lip service  
to Marxism, are both moving  
towards greater pluralism.

The main Communist states

now under pressure are.

@ Afghanistan: Since Soviet troops withdrew in 1989, the Kabul government has continued to receive oil, wheat, military and financial aid worth millions of pounds from Moscow.

Despite Soviet support, President Najibullah's forces control only a handful of cities, including Kabul, while Muslim Mujahideen rebels control much of the countryside.

Iran, which with Pakistan hosts five million Afghan refugees, has expressed hope that the defeat of the Moscow coup may aid moves to establish an Islamic and non-aligned government in Kabul.  
@ Cambodia: The agreement

between the Phnom Penh

Preside

Population: 10 million

Ruling Party:

Communist

Party of Cuba

Population: 12 million

Ruling Party: Hezb

al-Watan (Homeland

Party)

government and the three Cambodian guerrilla factions on big troop cuts has led all parties to the verge of ending the 12-year civil war. Agreement has yet to be

' reached on a system for

future elections, but an interim authority, the Supreme National Council, is due to take over in November under United Nations auspices. The 12-member council, presided over by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, will contain a majority of Communists.

UN poll plans may be undermined by China and Vietnam, which may seek to impose a "red solution".  
China: The world's last totalitarian giant is not about to fall apart, despite the shock China's leaders must have felt at the reformers' victory in Moscow. :

Dissidents may take heart and increase their calls for democracy, but the Chinese military, unlike its Soviet counterpart, showed few qualms when called upon to put down popular demonstrations in 1989 with ruthless force.

Despite its size, more than 92 per cent of China's population belongs to the same ethnic group. This, and the government's willingness to impose martial law on restive minorities means any disintegration of China on the Soviet

-piur UJ "Se[[lLIINng

model is unlikely. The Chi-

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ETNAI

Prime Minister: Do Muo

Population: 64 million

Ruling Party:

Communist arty

nese economy, which is in much better shape than Moscow's, is another factor keeping revolution at bay. :

Standards of living have improved greatly in the past 10 years and shops are full of a wide range of goods. Further economic liberalisation may follow, if only to stem, rather than encourage, pressure for political reform. Cuba: Havana has pledged not to abandon President Castro's austere version of Marxism-Leninism.

But the country faces severe financial difficulties. The crumbling of the East European bloc cost Cuba an estimated 90 per cent of its foreign markets, and the recent reduction of Soviet support estimated at more than \$1-5 billion last year has led to shortages of food, fuel and spare parts.

Dr Castro, a long-standing opponent of perestroika, banned reports on recent Soviet reforms. But with Cuba barely 100 miles from the US mainland, state control of the media cannot prevent news of a changing world filtering through to a restive population.

North Korea: Pyongyang is expected to maintain its strict Stalinist ideology, while seeking to ease its growing diplomatic isolation.

For decades, Moscow was North Korea's closest ally,



â\200\234before Pâ\200\230reÃ©i(ji-ent G

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A e  
Prime Minister:

Hun Sen  
Population: 6 million  
Ruling Party:  
Communist Party\*

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President: Kim |l Sung  
Population: 22 million  
Ruling Party: -

Korean Workers Party

Premier: Li Peng  
Population:  
1,110 million  
Ruling Party: Chinese  
Communist Party

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shifted the financially  
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h Korea.  
The Soviet turmoil may  
delay the transfer of power  
from North Koreaâ\200\231s ageing  
leader, Kim Il-sung, to his  
son. This had been expected  
next year.

@ Vietnam: Since 1986, Hanoi |  
has attempted wide-ranging|"  
economic reforms, allowing  
private enterprise and foreign  
investment. But the countryâ\200\231s  
economic and diplomatic iso-  
lation, due in part to a reso-  
lute refusal to institute corre- |  
sponding political reform, has  
stifled any economic  
resurgence. :

Since the Soviet Union, |  
Vietnamâ\200\231s main ally, with- |  
drew most of its aid and pref- |  
erential trade terms last year, |  
Vietnamâ\200\231s attempts to |  
improve ties with China have |  
intensified. Relations with :  
China will now become  
increasingly important, not  
least in the attempt to resolve  
the issue of Cambodia.

In 1979, Vietnam invaded  
Cambodia and ousted the Chi-  
nese-backed Khmer Rouge |  
forces. !

Now the two countries  
appear to be assisting UN |  
attempts to resolve the Cam- |.  
bodian civil war. :

Increased government vigi- |  
lance is likely as Vietnam |  
tries to ensure that the events |  
in the Soviet Union are not |  
mirrored at home.

er-coup

Afghan leader

Q (AL C J i J\_Gf\_ o

'Man

of the

momentum

Frederik van Zyl Slabbert is a politician

without a party, but as Justin Cartwright

reports this may qualify him perfectly

as leader of post-apartheid South Africa

roads seem to lead to Dr

Frederik van Zyl Slabbert. The more tense the situation, the more apparent it becomes that Slabbert is crucial to a peaceful outcome. Last month he was made chairman of the Metropolitan Chamber, a quango set up by the government to look at non-racial and democratic ways of integrating and improving the administration of the black and white cities which orbit uneasily around Johannesburg. This is the first of what will be many interim arrangements for the practical changes in South Africa, and the first step on the road to a transitional government.

Nat long ago a poll in The Sowetan newspaper rated him the third best choice after Nelson Mandela and Archbishop Desmond Tutu for president of South Africa. He has the ear of FW, de Klerk, the state president, of leaders of the African National Congress, of

N

I 3 South Africa, any number of

upbringing was based on lies and falsehoods led eventually to his gaining a seat in South Africa's parliament as a Progressive party member. By 1981 he was leader of the party, which soon became the official opposition. Across the floor he faced P.W. Botha.

There is a Mount Rushmore quality about Slabbert. You get the feeling that he is motivated by an almost monumental sense of justice. He is not - and this is why he is universally respected in the thrall of any faction in the present struggle. Even as leader of a political party it became clear that party advantage was never his first interest. By 1986 he had decided that parliament was a sham. The real struggle was taking place outside parliament, between the ANC and the security establishment, a conflict which still rumbles on.

He could no longer stay in parliament and, as he sees it, he lied to. He resigned, causing great

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He surprised as

Cometh the hour, cometh the man: Frederik van Zyl Slabbert

Prime minister, remarked, den-

ounced in business circles and on the cocktail party circuit. He had been to Lusaka to meet the ANC. In February 1990 Nelson Mandela was released. It is not fanciful to suggest that without Slabbert's initiatives, Mandela would still be in jail.

Slabbert points out that in

the process which lies ahead  
the South African govern-

ment is both player and  
referee, while the ANC is  
struggling to transform itself  
into an effective political

party. The government has |  
rejected an interim admin- |

istration, but Slabbert be-  
lieves that interim  
structures will assume that

the role in all but name, The -

Metropolitan Chamber is the  
first such structure.

Sooner or later a multi-  
party conference must take  
place where all interested  
parties can stake a claim.  
There are elements both in  
the ANC and in the know-  
nothing tendency of the Afri-  
kaner right which can see no  
point in talks. But there will  
be talks and there will be  
further joint initiatives; it  
would be a great surprise if  
Slabbert was not asked to be  
chairman of any such con-  
ference. He would accept, but  
on the condition that the  
government and the other  
participants are serious about  
the agenda which, to s

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the Conservaiive party ~the maia

| â\200\234opposition ia pariames to the

ruling National party - of Chief

" Buihelezi, of busnesinen and

scademics, of foreipn arcassadors  
and African premisrs. Some are  
saying that Slabber:is idzly placed  
lo start a new, mon-racal party,  
drawing in al. thosewhao e keener

on social democrac; thenideclogy;

all those who do na wishto march  
forward inlo an -ncresnzly un-  
certain future unier Doreasingy  
tattered banpers.

How did ithappa? How d:Ã@a 15  
stone, rugby-playng, affikaans-  
speaking, former neolyy studeat  
from Pietersburg in the wvery  
conservative nortern Transvaal,

come, at che age of 5, to this

position of inflznce o â\200\224 al-  
though he would deny it - power?

As with many while Scuth Af-  
ricans, but few of (iem dnkaners,  
1960 was the yer thescaes fell  
from his eyes. H: was it Stellen-

' bosch university, sudyirg teology :  
in the divieity sool vhere five  
. former prime ministers pent their  
i formative years, Â»aen I Â»as sent  
. on mission woik lo Lasza, a @  
\* desclate black twmnsin dutside

Cape Town. Untilt hente had been

. unaware thal th: lives of black  
! South Afncans in the townships  
\* were anything other that arcadian.  
i He was frogmarchzd en of Larga

by the police, but he bal seen and  
heard encugh to Â«wovine him that

the Afrikaner people were being

deceived. A system of brutal re-

pression was being presented to  
them as a necessary system of  
separate development.

The realization that his people

T

pitterness among his colleagues in  
the Progressive party, including the  
redoubtable Heslea Suzman. She  
accused him of desertion. For many  
years she had fought a lone liberal  
battle in parliament; now, as she  
saw it, Slatbert had thrown it all  
away, causing a crisis in the party  
she had so heroically kept alive in  
the darkest days. But the issue went  
deeper: even if the Progressives  
were being used, they were doing  
excellent work exposing deaths in  
detention, abuses of police and  
ministerial power, and in providing  
advice, comfort and hope for de-  
tainedees and their families.

But, whether by accident or  
design, Slabbert had made what has  
proved to be his shrewdest move: he  
had established his credibility with  
black leaders. He also saw that, as  
an Afrikaner and a former party  
leader, he would be safe from the  
attentions of the security forces.

What Slabbert saw was that the  
ANC and the South African govern-  
ment had reached an impasse.  
Neither could move forward with-  
out the other. Worsening economic  
conditions and increasing unrest  
had made the government aware:  
that the country was sliding to a  
state of siege, at the same time that  
ANC could see that its armed  
struggle was largely symbolic.

Slatbert felt that the two sides  
could talk once Botha was out of the  
way. In 1986, with Alex Boraine, his  
colleague from the Progressives,  
Slabbert set up the Institute for a  
Democratic Alternative for South  
Africa (Idasa). It had no money and  
very little support. In the course of a  
casual conversation Slabbert was

You get the  
feeling that  
he is motivated  
by an almost  
monumental  
sense of  
justice

â\200\224 -

able to raise \$25,000 from a single  
benefactor in America. For the rest,  
the money came largely from  
Scandinavia

[data set about trying to convince  
the whites, but most particularly the  
whites, that the statement could be  
booked. A meeting with ANC  
leader Akl Bzo and Thabo  
Mbeki, who has become a close  
friend, convinced Slabber that  
there was room for manoeuvre.  
Wobed has since payfully described  
Shabben as â\200\234my future presidentâ\204ç.

The most extraordinary event  
took place in Jall, 1987, Sabbath  
and his colleagues had, against all  
odds, brought together a group of  
Afrikaner South Africans and a  
group of ANC exiles in Dakar,  
Senegal. As the Afrikaners moved  
into the tropical night, drums were  
beating and the air was heavy with  
apprehension. For ten days, at one  
point in front of a hostile audience  
of 2,000 people, the Afrikaners were  
both traumatised and liveried by

el > 1/

fiis contrast with the army. Mbeki.,

whose father Gona was soon to be  
released from detention by the  
South African government. It was  
the = audience in favor of accepting  
the Afrikaners.

â\200\234My name is Thabo Mbeki, I am  
an Afrikaner, â\200\235 be so by way of  
introduction. Coomans vept.

Brevier Breytenbach, the poet,  
who had helped set up while things  
(p from Paris, realised that nothing  
would ever be the same: in the closed  
world of the Afrikaner Slabbert and  
he have been friends: indeed Slabbert  
visited him in 197 while he was



erving seven ard a klf vears in jail  
br terronism axd usyang with  
the ANC. Breytepach credits  
â\200\230labbert with â\200\234de-tythobgisingâ\204ç  
tie ANC, but roae tx lesszautions  
Slabbert abou: beiy a politicizn  
withoul a constitacy. He also  
pels tat Slabbert nik caderest-  
nates the significany of, ;nd hasa  
listaste â\200\230or â\200\234mass Emocalic ac-  
ionâ\204ç. When the chipar dwn, the  
ANC, Inkatha ani the extreme  
fight-wing Afrikznerartix (such as  
he Afrikaner Weerunistewegirg,  
or AWB has shown Â«n pet peaple  
on the streets, He feas thatSlabbert  
â\200\224 theorist, acadent and deter-  
nined liseral â\200\224 magbe ud by all  
ides and pusted asce.

After Dakar, ther: werz howls of  
arotest and cals forprasenution for  
:reason back bome. Â¥ ttesame ime  
it became clear tla many Afii-  
kaners, as Slabberttac sispected,  
were desperate for : way cut of the  
cul-de-sac. Events coved at greal  
speec. There were sther meelings  
with the ANC. Somit wis, as Pik  
Botha, the South trca foreign

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mind, 5 the implementation of a |

process to create a genuine democ-  
racy in South Africa There are  
pressing problems of heath, un-  
employment, education and wealth  
creation whizh any administrztion  
will have to tackie and any settle-  
ment will have to add-ess.

Slabbert i3 perhaps hoping for  
some sort of interim adminstragjon

of rezsonable and likeminded |  
people. This may well be where his

mission comes unstusc. None the

less, tte process is having the

unlooked-for effect of introducing  
politics â\200\224 i3 the classic sense of  
negotiaion and discussion â\200\224 lo  
the Scuth African suation. â\200\234he

i pround rulesthemselves are now the  
subjectof the debate, tml tte timing |

of the landcver. I Arkaners must  
accept democracy, so must the  
ANC,; if South Africa must accep1  
democracy, so must black Africa. It  
is from these beliefs that Slaxbertâ\200\231s  
reputation has grown,

But there is nothing poripous or  
self-important about him. Seeing

Joe Sovo, of the South African |

Communist Party, &t Frankfunt  
Airpon recently, he said: â\200\234Hello,  
Joe, what are you doing here?â\204ç

â\200\234I'm addressing all e com-:

munist partÂçs of Europe.â\200\235  
â\200\234Hell man, that shccld take about  
five m.nutes.â\200\235

Imyprobatle as it may now seem, |

the troabled history of Sovth Africa  
is poirting to Slabbert rather than  
Mandela as the first president of  
new South Affca. @

Justin Canwright, Âç novelist and |

documentary flm-macer, was born  
in South Africa and has fived in  
England sirce 1965.