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20 'fMAY, 1992 - SWEDEN LN H /0 GY/OM 3/ 03"

hadies and Gentlemen,

At the outset let me thank you for the opportunity to meet the distinguished members of the Institute of Foreign Policy. This moment in our history is of critical importance to our nation. Our deliberations have an added urgency because of the events at Codesa IT. What we, as South African politicians, do or fail to do will have very serious consequences for South Africa, for the region, for the whole of Africa and can have impiicatinns for many parts of the world. It is my firm conviction that we must all act quickly and decisively to defeat all attempts to stall, subvert or derail the negotiation process under way in South Africa.

As early as 1987, the ANC'S analysis of the situation indicated that the crisis of apartheid was of such magnitude that unless decisive measures were taken an apocalyptic future faced the entire sub-region. The regime had failed to destroy the democratic movement despite an unprecedented reign of terror. But we were not able to defeat the regime through a combination of armed and mass struggle. We COHclUded that steps should be taken to find political solutions through negotiations.

After consultations with the ANC leadership in exile I, while still in prison, initiated discussions with representatives of the government. At the same time the ANC leadership in eine began talks with a number of South African organisations, as well as the Frontline States, to develop a strategy for a negotiated solution to the South African question.

This resulted in the OAU'S Harare Declaration of 1989, which was subsequently endorsed by the Non Aligned Movement. It also served as the basis for the unprecedented UN Consensus Resolution on South Africa taken in 1989. These documents constitute an internationally .acaeped framework for the negotiation process in South Africa. The two years since our release and the unbanning Of the ANC have been difficult and demanding. Violence of an unprecedented ferocity and scale has been unleashed against the democratic forces. This has been COupled with secret funding of political organisations willing to serve the interests of the regime. The result has been a serious destabilisation of the whole process.

Because of this, and in recognition of the feet that it was in fact the government itself that was the major obstacle to progress, in April 1991 the ANC suspended all constitutional talks. We concluded

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that the only solution lay with the installation of an interim government of national unity.

This is what we concentrated on trying to achieve, holding extensive Consultations and discussions with the government and all other political organisations in Our Country.

Despite the government's initial rejection of our call for an All Party Congress, an interim government and a democratically elected constitution making body, these proposals have now been agreed upon in principle. This was largely due to extensive mass campaigns and thorough-going public debate on these issues, which found expression in fora such as the Patriotic Front Conference of October 1991.

The process culminated in the historic Convention for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa), which was held on the 20th and 21st of December 1991.

Codesa established five working groups, each of which had representation from the 19 organisations participating in Codesa, their task was to deal with:

1. The creation of a climate for free political activity and the role of the international Community.
2. General constitutional principles and the constitution making body.
3. Interim government or transitional arrangements.
4. The future of the Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei - those bantustans that became "independent" from South Africa.
5. Time frames and implementation of the whole process.

These working groups have been in regular session from February 1992 until their report back to Codesa II on 15th and 16th May. Broad agreement was reached by all parties on many issues. But the central question was the need for an Interim Government of National Unity to oversee the transition. This would be done in two phases.

The first phase would see the appointment of a Transitional Executive Council to oversee the process leading to free and fair elections to a national assembly which would be charged with the task of drawing up a new constitution.

The Second phase would come into being after free democratic elections, the first in the history of our country. The elected national assembly would have two functions: to sit as a constitution making body, where decisions would be taken by a two thirds majority, and to serve as a legislature for the purpose of government, where matters would be decided by a simple majority. And this is where difficulties arose, as there are serious differences between the democratic forces and those of the regime on the constitution making body.

Despite all our efforts, and extensive compromise on our part in an effort to reach an understanding on the way forward, Codesa II

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stalled. The Pretoria government re  
narrow self-interest as opposed to  
country. We are deeply disappointed  
deliver the breakthrough so many wor  
The government has placed four major  
movement, namely:

mains intransigent, acting in  
the national interest of our  
that Codesa II has failed to  
Red so tirelessly to achieve.

obstacles in the way of forward

1. Unacceptably high percentages to draft a constitution, in  
essence a veto through the back door.

2. Entrenched regional and local boundaries and powers to be  
determined in the interim and to be binding on the future  
democratic constitution.

3. An undemocratic and unelected Senate with veto powers,  
and

4. A determination that the interim constitution, a mrnhwv?sm  
to ensure continuity during the transition, has wide powers  
powers and so becomes a permanent feature remaining in  
force indefinitely.

It is our view that agreements reached at Codesa can only be treated  
as a whole package, therefore breakdown over the

Constitution making body affects the entire process. The essence of  
the problem is not one of percentages or arithmetic. It is that the  
National Party is trying to hold on to power at all costs, introducing  
minority veto powers in a variety of ways that can only result in a  
paralysis of decision making, strife and great instability.

The National Party is creating obstacles in an effort to prevent it  
suffering any loss of power. This is what lies at the heart of the  
problem, and fundamentally affects the very process of  
democratisation of the country.

Such intransigence and lack of will to compromise from a government  
wracked by scandals of such magnitude that should bring any government  
down is not surprising, but is nevertheless most disturbing. The  
Question is not which minister is responsible for the death squads,  
the instructions to kill activists, the running of covert police  
operations or the squandering of millions of tax-payers money. Rather  
it is that the whole government is part of this corruption and abuse  
of power. The only solution lies with the installation of an interim  
government of national unity  
immediately.

We reject the arguments of those who claim that the process is moving  
too fast and must be slowed down.

Our people cannot postpone their hunger. Seven million people -almost  
the equivalent of the entire population of Sweden - live as squatters  
in abject poverty. We cannot say to them: postpone your hunger, your  
need for water and sewerage, your right to education and a secure  
family life.

Our people can no longer endure the legacy of apartheid, including the  
intolerable violence that has cost 700 lives in the last two months  
alone. This is unacceptable in the tragic conflict

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that is tearing Yugoslavia apart. But that is recognised as a war, while in South Africa it is called "black on black Violence". The violence, and how to bring it to an end, is one of the principle challenges facing us. The regime is singularly failing to tackle the problem, primarily because the police, the army, the National Party and the government are themselves a creation of apartheid. Inexcusable things are happening in our country. While the Structures created through the Peace Accord play an invaluable role, mediating in areas of genuine conflict, this process does not work when dealing with hired killers and elements of the security forces who bear the primary responsibility for fuelling the conflict.

It is only an interim government, through multi-party commissions which would be established to control the army, police and security forces, that can tackle this problem effectively.

To us, the way forward is very clear, and requires firm and decisive action. In addition to finding ways to implement the excellent recommendations and agreements of the National Peace Accord, we are asking the international community to discuss with us sending monitoring teams to South Africa to investigate the violence. This will help place the perpetrators under the spotlight for all the world to see. It would also assist in creating a climate of free political activity so that free and fair elections are possible.

These impending elections place an enormous responsibility on the shoulders of the ANC and the broad democratic movement. Our people have never voted. In fact, we come from a tradition of resistance and boycott. Unlike the white South Africa, we have no voters rolls or electoral lists. Our people, irrespective of political affiliation, need to understand not only why to vote, but how to vote. To do this we need to embark on a massive public Voter education campaign which should be coupled with efforts to enhance the democratisation of society and the peace process.

It is only the ANC and the democratic forces that have the credibility and confidence of the people to do this. Even if they were willing to play a role, any such attempts by the government will be dismissed as manipulation and propaganda.

This is a reflection of the particular responsibilities the ANC has towards the whole country, irrespective of party political affiliation. It has been our constant persuasion that has kept the process on track, and indeed prevented complete breakdown at Codesa II.

We are the architects of the whole process, and have made enormous compromises to try to ensure its success. We cannot, however, compromise on matters of principle. We express our grave concern about President de Klerk's recent statement that he is against majority rule. Given all these uncertainties, we can only consider the process irreversible when the oppressed are themselves part of the power structures in a meaningful way.

How does all of this affect our relations with a staunch supporter like Sweden?

are very optimistic about the future.

ve come from, developments over the past two years have been rapid, even if they have not achieved as much as we would have liked. We are convinced that an interim government is merely months away. And we are counting on friends like you to make that interim government successful, ensuring it marks a real turning point in the life of our people.

Sanctions are Clearly a burning issue. We certainly do not want a situation where our friends, because they support our positions, are disadvantaged in the future. We are convinced this will not happen if sanctions are maintained until the installation of an interim guvernmnt. Let all the groundwork be done now; send exploratory teams out, do all the surveys and investigations that are necessary for investment and trade in the near future. Signing agreements and contracts with this white minority government that cannot last much longer is not a solution. Sustaining economic pressure, however, is a sure way to guarantee the establishment of an interim government.

Despite the obvious setbacks, we

Knowing our past and where we ha

Furthermore, we look to extending all-round ties well into the future.

South Africans have benefited greatly from the

developmental assistance Sweden has provided while we were in exile.

We want the democratic perspectives you brought to us throughout these years to be part of what renewed links with the international community brings to our country and our people.

We hope that the ending of people to people's sanctions has already resulted in a flourishing of links between our countries. Tourism, air links, sporting and cultural contacts should be expanded rapidly. This would help create the climate and contact necessary for future trade and investment, to the benefit of both our people.

We know you are impatient, but we ask you to exercise restraint for jugt a little longer. Installatinn of an Interim Government is essential for a secure and stable base from which to proceed. Our Victory will be your victory too.

Thank you once again for your attention and the opportunity to speak to you today.

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