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?EDON
AUGUST 1973

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Document drawn up by

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Introduction

In the past few years the :truxxle in snuthwrrx fxfrics hrs ozcalatna dranatic'lly.-inrinblvu# am& an mla h:vr bra? Libwr.tod. Tho Iatriotic Front and Lwa o are nnkinm rapid udvancou towardm 'Wu-liberation Of their countriex.

In Eduth Africa our struggle is intensifying at all levcls.Never before hrs: the regime been in such a state of crisis, and it is increasingly resorting to armed terror to maintain the status gun. :?3Th6 Defence Forcb and other para-military sectors have become the "Learnerstone of the regime's survival tactics.

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m V... ', 1.; J

aiIt ls evlential for us to examine and find any contradictions in '-the military coleex which will enable us to exploit and weaken Withe'reglme s fighting capacity.

Attitiig in this coat&xt that we are lqokiHg ?t the_warf?gsl\$stance IIissue. I .

j The War Situ niogl.

QEFSSince armed struggle was first adepteDl as the only road to liberation 'ln southern AfriCa, there has been a steaay build-up of the South African armed farces, and increasing use of them against the Alliberation movements in southern Africa.

ithging the 1960'h it was largely the para-military police and permanent force members of the Defence Force who were deployed in Rhodexia and north&rn Namibia, and who also played supggpting 5/roles in the Iortugues e wars in Angola and Jowambique.

At this sta,u me the pos.1tion of civilian conscripts was that they were belng tr: ined for future action. Part of this training. _y'border duty'. Civilian units were sent close to areas of conflict, - but their participation remained on the whole minor;

\$Wlth the growth 5f the armed struggle, particularly in Kamibia, the picture began t0 change in the 70's. Increasingly 'border

, duty' came to mean active service as the army to : 0v: I plan the
' police. This process escalated suddenly after the overthrow of
the fascist regime in Portugal in 1974. Thousands of troops were
pushed into Namibia in the following months. The 'low-intensity'
war has changed into a 'medium/high' intensity war, with a
_ corresponding increase in the use of conventional weapons. This culminated
in the South African invasion of Angola, defeat, and withdrawal
back into Namibia in 1976,
& Since then, developments within the country, the escalating _
Namibian conflict, as well as the growing activities of freedom
fighters on South African soil, have forced the regime to admit
that it is now involved in total war.

13 ' .1 Coggorlgtiog 7;; r
' ' ions of the M30: features of this? 'total war' situation is the
_ extent to which white society is being drawn into the military
machine. This is taking place at all levels. The economy is being
geared towards the needs of war. Civil defence groups are being
set up. Almost every white household possesses at least one gun.
The Media are full of news and opinions on the developing war.
,f And - most importantly - the compulsory involvement of white
'2_South Africans in the military machine is being more and more
rigorously organised;

T
At the end of 1975 it was announced that civilian reservists
(i.e. those people who had completed their basic training) would
be called up for three-month periods (or more). This was at the
time of the invasion of Angola, and this measure was announced
as temporary. South Africa withdrew from Angola nearly two and
a half years ago but the three-month call-up has not been withdrawn.
Instead, it has been complemented by an increase in the basic
training period from one to two years.
All white male South Africans (including non-South Africans who
have lived in the country for two years) are registered for
military service at the age of 16 at school. They are required

:yto do two years basic training: 1m:1(ml"tmay on finishing schoel.
Those who reorive academic lefernnntv ere non3tnrcc, 936 if a
threenye: r coax: e is not Cnlplrtee within fiv-C jewrs, tho '
deferment ends.

7N0 provision is made for conscientious objection, except in very
exception 1 circumstances when noncombatant mili.tary service
'may be allowed. Penalties for evading service are severe. Seneone
who deserts in the face of the enemy can be shot; desertion
Qwhile on active servicVe leade to up to ten years' impris gohment;
:frefusing to undergo training can lead to up to three years'
-flmprisonment. Penalties also exist for in any way encouraging or
j_advising someone to avoid military service - 'up to six years'
:gjail.

q: _ \$1
antar the lniiital_ period of two years' training (an increasing
part of which indludes active service) a man must complete
eight thirty-day 'camps' in the following eight years. For those
_ "impleted their initlal training before the two-year period
KIMi.irrtrocilneed thnre are the three-montb 'camps' introduced in
(1975.

VApart from the large-seale mobilisation of the white population,
'7the regime is alsb beginning to draw recruits from the African,
,Indian and Coloured pepulation into its military machine. Already
fAfficans, Coloureds and Indians are serving in South Africa's
armed forces on a voluntary basis, and there is talk of introducing
lLcompulsoxy military service Nfor Indians and Coloureds.

VWar-Resista ce 1 .

;;Just as the strength of the liberation army lies in the support
'rit gets fro&the majority of the peeple, so the weakness of the
l5repreStsive army lies in the growing dennraliscition that takes
efplace within its ranks as the war deveIOps.

phAlready, the ProeVese of demoraliaaation is takinr: place, and white
SeuthV Aflica is proving to be not as united a: the regi.ne would like
us t0 believe. To counter this a 'tote 1 wer' 3psychocis 15 being

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encouraged within the white Gnaunity. #ithin thv military iterf
large enyhasiSAis beihg pluc d on the maintenance of marale.

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to units in Namibia to Tefbrt on the 'p:ycH010wic&l uituatlon
of the troops.1 Due to the restrictions on th9 media in relation
to internal military matters it is difficult to come by hard
_ evidence of dcnoralination within the army, but it teens clear
a that the doubling of the period of initial service, plus the
growing number of casualties, has had an effth on the morale
of men in the aTmy, as well as on those engible for military
service.

There certainly is some evidence that certain forms of resistance
to the war are already taking place. _, .

The firs t of these is conscription avoidange. This is where Those
who are eligible for military service avoid that service by
TLilaatying the country, 9r by using vaTious ruses to keep the military
aT bay, such as applylng for deferment or exemption, nnt .
informln the military of theiT pTsent whereabouts, etc. .

iTrAccbrding to information given by thE relevant minigyer ln the
lt,:South African pbrliament, the numbers of these who failed to
report for servTcT \$nvm 1975 - 1977 were:

1975 - 3 314 (595 were convicted for the offence)

1976 - 3 566 (893 convicted)

1977 - 3 814 (507 convicted)

, ' It is not knwn how many of these were being called up fothhe
f'first time; or Were ahoiding further swrvice. Nor is it known
-tswhat percentage rTmained inside the country or left.

Further figure: given by the reglme show that in 1976, 63 104 me?
were callsd up. Of these 37 73C (66') a v710c far exenAtinr or
deferment, 36 448 (58%) successfully. If we put these figures
. alongside the above figure for those who failed to report for
. duty in 1976, we find that in 1976, ?6 656 men ware abliged t9

n

W report for service, and 17? (3 566) failed to do so.

A 1%? \$011t 1:1"th0 f5lv(k3y Iitnat: if; 'ay lf'ig i& th:?: hp V-s'imxztt
(the hand Light Inf.ntry) had over 157 of it: total returnngth of
trained men on the 'blacklist' - 1.9. their name; and learn knowt
addresses handed over to the military police. It added that the
success rate of tracking these men down was less than 10%.

3 It 218 well known that in the past years thousands of white South
Africans have left the country, with emigration exceeding immigration
in 1977 for the first time since the early 60's. It cannot be
calculated how many have left the country to avoid conscription,
but there is evidence that it is an important factor.

For instance, a report in the Cape Times of 12 January 1977
referred to newly qualified doctors who had deferred their service
until they completed their Studies, and then left the country as
soon as they qualified. Another report in the Cape Times (29/10/77)
quotes Minister of the Interior, Mulder, as saying: "There is an
exodus of professional people - even South Africans - who are
going to other countries.... We are taking note of the fact that
they are deserting the ship when we need you".

Many of those conscription avoiders who leave the country are
ineligible for citizenship of other countries (Belgium, France, the
Netherlands etc) others acquire citizenship by marriage. Some
register as students, seek work permits, or live illegally
abroad, and some keep travelling.

A few have actually made attempts to contact solidarity organisations
in the UK, or foreign governments, to seek political asylum.
In 1976, about 30 conscription avoiders have
approached the AA 21. In addition, some have written to the
Home Office, or sought help through MP5. or have recourse to other
organisations working in the solidarity field in Britain (notably
the South African Liberation Solidarity Committee - which
will deal with in more detail later.)

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'EfIn Hollang about 20 to 25 couacripticn hvoiarr.

l frafuge there since 1976, ace ordin9 ta haw p359? reports. he Orin
ngnother form of War-resistance currently takinkf.

1515 Some evidence is conscription refusal - 1.9. yeople Ogenly
jgrefueing to do service on the prounds of political, moral or

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avoideru are thsre. Other canntrioc to Wkioh con cri9timn avnidorr
have gorw or are likel" to go are: the 613 Lurtralia Low 2osland

V! . J l i i 9

Swaziland, Lesotho, Canada, Israel, \$cahdinuvian countries, and
other Euroyeen countries.

'17The legal position for colscription avoidermlyhu seek as ylum abroad

5918 generally much the same as for other refu wees. They h.afe to
urove that they are likely to be parse cuted for their religious

or political beliefs if they return to bouth 3l rica, and they

Ehave to claim asylum in the first country they arrive in after leavix

:E,80uth Africa (unlass in transit). In pratice thislhas raiged some
VEprOblems.

? he-Brltlsh government, for instance, has granted asylum to

2military refugeeE without actunily calling it politidal asylum.

.inallows pacplllto stay in Britain on 'humanitarian' grounds.

hi ffig thbm ' blanket regidence and work permit. So far about

rl

\$our%South Afridin military refugees have been given 'asylum'

inn this way. The situation is similar in Holland. In Bptswana

.gjccertain problemthaVe emerged due to Botswana' 5 generally difficult

??refngee situatioE, and to the difficulties caused by some military
frefugees trying to get frOm Botswana to Ehrnpc.

.1 '1

:1An Interc:wtng method Of avoi.ding conscription and rnmaining ln

the country was reveaLed by lolice Jinis tor Kruger when he ,aid:

FMany ynung men who have joined the police forca since October 1976

13th no intention of making it a career but had done so to evade

17military nervicef. (Rand Daily M511 10/5/77). Subsequently, Kruger

passed a law compelling people to :enuin in the yolica force for

at Least 94 months of germanent service.

pl ce of which thorn

religious beliefs (conscientious objection). According to
information given in parliament, the number of people who
A for training then refused to participate was 11,700

1975 was 11

1976 4 13

1977 - 15

'1 In addition, the number of those who failed to report for service,
were caught, and then gave conscientious objection as a reason for
not reporting, were as follows:

1975 - 150

1975 150 " A A

1977 86 '

'MAA reported in the Sunday Daily Mail of 10 May 1977, that the army
refused to confirm or deny, said that between 100 to 120 Jehovah's
Witnesses were in detention barracks last year for refusing to -
agent; see fig

Another form of resistance is desertion. Desertion is generally
regarded as being when someone actually doing service leaves the
army without intending to return. It is not clear what constitutes
desertion legally because South Africa has not formally declared
war, but it is possible for the law to be interpreted to include
as deserters those people who merely fail to report for training.
Whatever the legal position, the South African regime has denied
on at least one occasion that any servicemen have deserted while
serving in Namibia, claiming instead that 31 members of the army
had gone absent without leave, had been charged and sentenced.

'-Defence Minister; Botha, specifically denied that between 10 and
100 men had deserted as had been reported in a Geneva newspaper
by article written by Rolf Freiberg of the Inter-parliamentary Fact-
finding Commission on South Africa.

... -1, - ' -w 'r'Vr

JKRTUQIWhilQ Gommunitv una murmgepistunca

,. 919 Can 1:0 that certain fargr 01 mgyurwnirtance are alrrrdy :aking
1 ' place on a small but sianificnnt 10310. It cvn b0 3316 math zone
I confidence, that)as the armed struggle develops, these fonus
'1 of war-resistance will increase. It is vital for our struggle to
-R anticipate the develocment of theve forms of war-resistance, to
actiVely encourage them, and - most importantly - to look to the
3; poss3lbility of encourun ging ana organising more active forms of
Tgywar-reuistance - like information gathering within the military,
NLgaabotage, anti-war proparanda, pro-llberatl0n movement prepaganda,
tifencourag sing people to defect etc.

'iIIIn order to be able to do these things it is limportant to understand
l:_ha white cnmmu3lty and the divisions and divergent interests
lw1thln it. It is from the white communi.ty that the bulk of the
liafance Force is drawn. At the moment it is only for white males
that mllltary 531vlce is compulsory. . , . 1

_lgime llke3 to present the white community as 3nited 3gatnst
tho_ threat fro3 outside', and in lmlortant ways the white community
has buried some of its internal differences in the lnterests of
maintaining a solid front to the liberation foro.eS. But bene\$th
gthat front lie many divis ion - class and national - which are
likely to begin to hate their teeth as the prOSpect of unlimited
, war, or imminent defeat, looms more and "Dre dackty.

'Nhiie it would be wishful thinking to believe that large rectinns
.of white South Africa are going to take the side of the Liberation
movement at this or any: :ta.e of the struggle, it is poasihie that
signifigantly large numbers Vlll become fed up with the war, and
'refuse to participate, and Verhaps even actively resist the military
llmmmw1w.'

';lThere is hnwever, at the present mo.nent, one .:ectnr of the white
:.'South African cdmmunity from which more active wez-resis tars - 1. 9.
13-those who might enter the military and subvert it from wi thin -
might come. That sectbr con5l3ts mainly of thase white progressives a
vlgsthidents, acaC83lcs , jouxnalists, teachers, rtists, religiwx
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leaders etc _ who have a revolutinary a; ro ch tn the Loutd ufricad
Ltrugrlo and are still worliim,: 'abwvo grannit-inaide the countrt.
It I'LL fl-.2 airimgttt ti'm rank? P? 0 jvb Lt (t, fWir' 5:33; wt
wiieasit), who already have z':,33f",irlvthigfth Level 0? goliticzzl
M Qconuciou;necu, that we n"e likely to get cadrer who will infiltrate
3Q the militxry.

up
333 The ANC'S ;ro&ch to war-Resistance
The imporw nce 9f an undrwr handing of the white community, and
particularly the possible role of white 'radicats', in relatimn
Tyto war-res istanee, lies in the fact that it helps IS to answer
Vfthe question of what appIoach the ANC should adopt to waruresistance
We have shown that some forms of war.resistance are already
occurring to.mnhzextent. Should we wait for this process to take
138 natural counse, or should we actively encourage war-resistance?
his questian obviously relates to the question: uha3 sort of work
Jiwithin the military do we consider to be must important or likely?
She answer will hQ chting ent on the stage that the struggle is
.th ht any momen33 and on the devel0pments wifuin the society as a
whole.

Basically our s3raktgy must be to undermine the military machine.
Whis can take various forms:

, 1) Infiltration of cadres into the army for Var ous purposes;
I .2) Agitation against the war - dcmornlisaticn gigipersonnel,
encouragement of conscription avoidance and desertion.
EfTheE e b;victa ska are not contradi.ctory 8nd in many ways sup lament
i R
3"eaCh other.

I
3LIIf we accept the principle of infiltration of the army it is
aential 3o elaborwte a programme which will nako this possible.
We must also contider the qde tion of x Lat ta do with those that
have alr' dy 'dfaft-Godged'. Here there are two categories - those
that remain inside Louth l:rica and those that have left. As many

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a
fall into the Luttvr 6;: gary W3 will concentrit" on
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"- . t - . i : .. At '32 . M, . a- nu . v 2, -N ,7 K 2' '
thl VH5 L . 4' t. 1'2 v 2, :N. L: W K. 'v) , , ' IN." ' X 11:..4LIL' KtL Q' .Z'L q 2 1 s: M
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uvvle" Nun be v: has county, tr cuccx On thnlz ocuztty, aha uhah
fbr political recruitment into Gne of the following area
1) Uverteas solidarity work (eg A. movements);
F) ActiVitiea 0? the U10 Mxturust _iusi0n;
3) Internal underground;
4) AK.
ft Any individual who indicates potential in the last three categories
iVimth be referred to the relevant Structures of the organisation.
,We believe (a belief that needs to be turned into a strd' tegy) that
Viconscription avoidance is not an end in itself and that we should
xfbx'leaving the country.
influence people to remain in the country and become actively
Vinvolved in all asPecth of the struggle. The mere fact of being
canscripted, gn\$ having to fight; should not be the sine qua non
M
3; This once again brings us to t& 183 me of the relationship of.
war-resistanceawprk to overall political work within the white
21 community. An attempt to channel war-resistance from -mere
j. ?'iv A
conscription avoidance or desertion into active resistance must
be based on our overall :trategy and tactics.
:W3Pfesently there are whites in South Africa (albeit a smallnnumber)
kWho are .olitically oonsciouv and committod, EMS whe are finding
ways of :vmidiqq con:;cri tion. They believe that they can play a
more uraningful role by relaining in the country. It is. this
section that must be won over to the movement a d waich will
V provide a pesrible reservoir of rcyruit: for the various ttwls
Of the mnvement.
It is 124%ort Ant that we intensify our work in thiy fiela to envure
' that we rcach and lpcruit potential cadres before they Ze:ve fqtth
itkfrita. LL ths .3n: c-vt W101 0? CV? ;hr'h i_if't T'lCPI Who
J. .. I___,....
left Louth Afxica are not politically motivated. Lresently, in an
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1%.
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 -ad hoc manner, we come into contact with 9939 m
 ,twere.politically involved at home have tron brvught clnsrr 99 the
 Y movement sud are beind involvrd ln vcrinun aryect? of thp 19:: grtfsn?
 yCil'Z-Farig'w :1, 9:97:11: \$913:er rmtAin'gF ,3 HvaTVf'I', ii; 3'. :1 i 72:: 7233-211";
 L9 7. '1
 :fuy some strucinro (99\$ Unhmlngion) which "111 hr 9L9 n: tn have
 Viacoe: s to L9' rrer numbers of conccrintion zvoidors for the pur9ote
 Qtlof politi.cising them, monitoring their aetivities obtaininn any
 5fr9levant informa tion etc. This willL 9190 ennbln u: t0 nnintain a
 flpolttical control over the direction of this issue. It 19 also
 3possibte that through the9 9 structures we might come into contact
 " with pototial recruits wha will return home to cantinue the
 fstruggle. Q
 on War-Resistance
 390therw0rpanisatidns workin'
 QQThe war-res istanca issue in relation to South Africa is slowly
 9anining recognitian both inside and outside the country as an
 %?lssue of incortaQbe and concern to all those interested in bouth
 QAfricaQ llberatian.
 Ana.
 Inside the country church groups, student gromps and the like have
 taken up the issQe within the limitations allowed by law. In a
 recent undergrouna leaflet the ANC called on soldiers to resist
 the war.
 Outside the country, various solidarity organisations, anti-abartheid
 movements and ARC external brcznohes have taken up the issue to
 isome extent. In 30 don, an ad hoc group consisting nf Cpeople
 I(some of them conscription avoiders) who are in tha AA: hun been
 ' working 9n the i9sue of war9resister9 in the UK. It has playe&
 a Large ;irt in getting the UK governnent t0 gr nt 'asyluv! Of
 7 9039 sort to war-reitsters, and has eXy lored many other ar99s of
 1 the problems an6950991bilitie9 of warwrouistancc work (this
 ,idocument being ajpart of that process).
 Jhere 19 one organisation in particular which has taken u; the war-
 -9tstL"CT 19' EsueJin a big Way, and in so doing ha: creat9d many
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 9r09lewr. 991: orgrrri"!tinn is 9919009 _ the inutB :fricen Hiberttitn
 Support Cmanittee. L-a'Lacnzrn s an OI":j-ZT:1'2j.Sia.tiOn Of rise :rnwih .'fric.i 315-.
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i the couaqtry hen Btndked in Sheffield in thb UK, WC? inVo
VSSsome extant in the British Socialist iorkerg Party, and
L working fuLl-time with balseom; Bill Anderson. who left
iTI firm
rincw Le.vag
lvceE to
is new
South
j Africa havvng served in the South Afxican army in Namibia and who
?3jtold the westeranress about torture carried outhy South African
3-tr00ps in Namibia arzs inst the 30pm); :tion. and who new 3l
Squall-tine for unlucum, Don Jorton, the third member, is
30 works
a former
saethddist :ninister in South Africa, now based in the U.S.
. Stag po iitic3 andw
m3_tue ANC shnuld aabpt to thy: organig tion.
, mg
55l3 its inmgurmljhocumntw Hubli hed in November 1977, Salscom
i9SalScom has launched.wholeheartedly into the war-resistance issue,
and its method of work and existence are Proving a problem for
th3 AKC and solidarity groups. It is neces sary to exa3ine Salscom -
gprogrammeq w in order to help decide what approach
'fdescribes the condition3.,hich led to the formation of Okhela
l
fk(and itself) as follow
"The rise of th.e Black Consciousness Jovdment'ih South
Africa in the late 196C's was to have a profound effect
I l on the progressive white movement ins3jue and outside
thw country....o.Hluck fraugv hna :tmtcd cleurly the
futility, and in f:ct dannor, of relying on white-dominetvd
3 . multi-r'qinl orwunisutinwr w? nrentveof fundh
K
czanro in . nth Africa.....
nental
'QEhe res,onse of the white con nunity toward.: black
consciousn 35 went three differep w ,3'
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contvnued to work in Muluw-runl3l or,rav
l. Same refused 1031:08Pt thr row rcnli
'2.)
o Other: fglt that there? was: nothing" that
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"could do and dishes n63d in Sisillurionent.
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3. Snme re: orde a to the RCA
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hue 3 S A Q. J;
x 3
- - ----_-_-_,..._ . 333.3,- -3 3.-;3.

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' movement. A vacuum had been left in the 1909 political world, and
131
ruei-tinn wu: not 'what can we do for Taiwan' but rather
but rather indeed now: Ad 31% "Utilitarianism" LL xur
tun g 112 G1; .- x 1. .A'

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This is a fairly reasonable assessment of the political climate
as far as white people were concerned after the banning of the liberation
'the rejection which white progressives experienced from the black
Afrocentric movement led them and their organisations - HuSms,
the Christian Int. title etc. - to seek a role specifically geared
towards the conditions of the time.

The main take made by Balscom, and by Okhela as well, was to conclude
5-from their analysis and perception of the situation that what was
needed was an organisation of whites that would operate as a
parallel liberation movement - i.e. that would operate clandestinely
inside the country and work outside the country mobilising support
for the internal struggle. Their mistake lies in the fact that they
transfer the strategies dictated by internal struggle to the
strategies of the revolutionary struggle as a whole, at all levels.
a, The extent of this mistake becomes clear if we look at Balscom's
attitude to the black consciousness movement and the ANC.' It is
precisely because they fail to distinguish between the particular
' conditions of open struggle and the overall conditions of struggle
that Balscom can say the following

"....; Various leadership groups are at work. On 0:91 things
at different levels inside the country and in exile.
All demand an new way or author to represent the
oppressed masses of their country, but at this stage
in the history of the liberation struggle, the various
elements appear to be in a state of confusion.
dlsuAity....."

"The National Liberation, EQVOMI nt, WA believe, will need
to be a broad umbrella organisation combining the
great forces in struggle again. The epzrtied

stat 31WQ fePl that no one onam ht lw r"svnth all this
 atBthis rtryo inllwuth B'rin _1
 ".....In the S11!) resi'icm eru 1,013 by tho 111111001; 13111: of the
 JAG ann A C the ROM grew in :3rid11r and cothnucd the
 tradition of rnaistance.....?h9re an b0 no Cnnbt that
 the BOB is by far the most politically active movement
 with a_massive following amongst the black pepulation
 in SoBth Africa..;..."
 "Thereiis a tendency amongst exile groups to be Sceptical
 and cBitical of internal political developments
 especially if these developments are seen as a.threat
 to that organisation' 9 wish for exclusive recognitien
 as tut liberation movement....."
 ."In enamary it seems correct to k 1 A
 indeed in the forefront Of the S truggle in South Africa
 with ' maBsive following among: t the peaple. That is not
 to sai that the BCJ is the National Liberghtion Movement,
 but if does mean that they are the most Bffective politica
 forne cowfronting the state at the moment and thnreforo
 the lhaderahip of any united force will have to come
 larvely from their Iank5."
 "WhileE they have ma ssupnort inniaa tho country, the BC?
 l has been unabLo to build a Lnb:twntinl sun ort base
 outxi&% the country, l 110.1 cur to th: monm 0ly the A B
 has on external up 0TB snG itu gntoxnalistic attitude
 to the nu,..;...9l long mm the 5T0 elnins that it is
 'the'Qleaitimate anB only vanguard movement, progress
 D
 on thB inSidB will be Leverely hindered."
 "The tfaditibnal liberation mnvombnts should be a little
 humblB and accept that a nnw force has BOVE6 into thB
 Vangu5%d Of the National Liberation jnvemen that will
 lead BuuthHBfrica to.total libOration."

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x 6'6- 1 I. . 6
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'emphasis cm t3? bILm d6 00 scimutnoas novcmunt in it: inauuu:6l
ldocument. It has even very Ieu:ntly 0161665 in.di:cussion that it
now recognises the 640 s: the 'mujor liEeration force' in South
Afr)... ca 0
VUur strangle ha'gdeVelbped to a stage where those who once supported
hg"llborltltnn:movem6nt"' .arn now beginnin3 to rocognig 6lthe ANC
:as the only llberntzon movement. The struggle, and our consistency
6n relation to it, are sllomlng the oorrectnes of our approach.
\$616606 1.: followng thi: trend. But we must recognise that
:baxscom'u existegce itself is antl6ANC. .
Vcom has choagn.to devote its major attention to the igsue of
wt ',
la
"We 6 ti868 fhaf it is 6666:mt 161 to 6stablish a very
'cleartprecedent op ieserticn bef6re we can expect to
see 666 lnlitiation of widespread dissension being taken
on the inside. Desertion can thus only b6 seen as a
mean6 to the end in esta blishing a very firm and clear
support base out6l 1&6 the country that can giv6 whatev6r
6ld nhcet :6ry to an initiative on the inside."
3613006 4 aim i6 tn ercnanWW dez6rtinn (vn-C cnnscription avoidance)
qna by r6 doiruv to crextn an external :u art dbage which,ln turn,
? WML'xiR d dl\$\$dvx\$5x
provide am part for intornullj 166\$6W Weaagghh- This is
What 66636 016 r 1: that Lalrcom wissheu to 15lw
extremely Vaguew
LuseVOf the war-r6sist6nce isssue to rccruit more people into its
anks in order 60 give itself a power b3 re from wuich to operate
n relation to the stru; wl us a w'qole,
' t0 encourgce mare active forz: of w :-rerl6tunce.
th at w6rlrr 1(turr W10 tuve ervec so ti;c ln tke

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timn wi?.htbe rroErzzai ('transforred int? charti, rcgorts
_"ltrssa Map: ') anC than hLLl01 aver iv the 'liberation
JWOVQment'. 15 the larg .:WI of thc value of this LQTt hf ivforlmtion
91103 in thv f:ct Jhat the 0Jeiay doe: mat know wr: he ve i.t, it ueems
such informrtion collected and passed on from an
rwu'nng 0? course thzt bulrzcom
ieaus Jhe IJTC dlane when it refers to tha liberation movement.
rlnky to have

. :3,

Lailszcsfs has 5120 said in discussion that if any potentiamHG

l ')Jcrult" ragged throughr its hands it would pass

It breas ks all rules of security to have an outside

niaation passing recruits on to us. -

Qular areas of its wark Which.need lcnking at.-

. slattmepts f0 entourage conscrption avoidance

A -eberJlon wlib n the country. This is dohe primarily through

: ' r0 20 MAJM\$ Owen ,

ublicltg and prqxaganda. Its main :sst _,ulma,11,.;1

ubllcatinn J0mkeer' which it has posted to people inside the

'ountry, lnd whlch has received a fair amount of publicity in the

oath African press. As a piece of propaganda 'Omkeer' is worthy

f shme praise. Jhat is problematic about 'Omkeer' is that it not

nLy pre: ants wthsue who read it with thb idea 09 warbre: istzznce

land the 10.1bl1lty of rotting out, but 5.t also pro"ents: them with

Ian orgunj tion 4&l-21 co: - wh0:e rnle in the st. uggie is 111-6eflnod.

Thus it i: confu\$ ing. 'Om eGr' i: concerned solely with en coulasing

cnn.crltinn vnlddnce and 60:01 tirn. It offers no possibillty

Iifor Work Lithin the militlxry. Ehir ,roblcm arise? grvcisely bacunse

ualucon 1: not a lib Iration movement and Jannot advocate or organise

_or6 active frsz of warwracs instance.

lh: other 710a nf\$5alstom': work worthy Hf note is its zzttoC .ts to

A ,we um tho lr'uefh? war rigiitvmce oytrpnally. In this ' me it

L ha; Lintl J 1 (: ted \$1 func--rlll i 1.1;; 011151 1 .rxign, the 1.51%: Luriigiug Of

rlnts go it anal and suzmort nv""l:rtions and gowerrmenta Jo

racagnisc tho lasu.n Of brurwsirtrnce in Dduth Africa, anU it
 mry'mlrrn (i acrdnw) thr ,ictetinr Of the promiar hf t%9 pxnw
 L_f fiix 'Uild ('ONn'l rte. '. 'Q" in of thefie thine" rz'r th'
 eight do nurnlvor i! w? taunchod wholc-hsnrtbfly into
 resis ance campaign.
 iIUELondon Salsc U hUU-also initiated a South African War .wevistow
 grQUp (?AUR) with the intention of aiding conscription avniEers
 and do :erters in the UK and encouraging a phiitiqul education
 process. It has also initiated the South African Military Refugee
 Fund (SAM&AF) in an a3tenpt to raise funds to aid bd\$r rmASLQf&5
 Again the problUU arises that it is Sals com which has initie tee and
 "organlrng tUese projects _ outs ide of the mean solidarity
 brganluwtlnnU. This creates competiTiOn between Salscom and the
 solidarlty movements. For instance, in the UK there is a danger
 thbt_d lvcom's_U#hlgh-profile' tactics will endanger the gains
 , 3by the AA! in relaton to thh rovernment etc. Also, we an: t
 ask what sort pf political education Salscom will give the peeple
 th come into iia hands. Another important point is .that Salscom's
 approach means that the issue of war-resiStance is not being fully
 arelated to other solidarity issues, like support for the a.rmed
 Kstruggle, the arms boycott etc., and thus the war-reSisters
 igaue can be blVWn up out of proportion to other gapect s _of the
 struggle.
 Th6'Conclurion Uh be drawn from all this is that there are areas
 2;.Uf Work in relufion to w.r-rn;istmnce which noea to be tackled.
 fQJThUUe is no douBt that this issue i: caytu?ing the imvginnUions
 E 6f the intornatibndi;Onmmunity. haLUCOJ documents (prOViOWFly
 ?"ubwltU(u) clalm that they ha ve the ruinort Of many leaGing :oople
 ,l eaxreed to serve on
 thU board of Alxn . It is Clea r tha t if we do not tackle the
 "angn of work nurvelveq, the wrong organisations will fill the
 result nt vacnuu.
 WM U
 ,Am
 Concluascns andUhecommendations V
 waphretistance ig an important gapect of armed \$truagle. It is

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enamon forms of wur-reniLtanG. but it i; VitLL fvr our ;J"xr Le
to encourare JQTC active fnrnu of MST'TGLiUtane. and thi: Ergroach
should be central to our work in all uphares I latwd tn the
war-resistance 9issue.
;wE:I4 is urgent for the ARC to adopt a clarr app oach to the war-
esistance issue in order to cLarify u; soon as possible the current
iconfusion thathXlsts within and without our movement on this 1:1;sue.
?e recon send that this approach should take into acount the
vinevitable fact that many.war_resigters are coming, and will
,be conixg, unto exile, and that attempt should be made to draw
ias many of them as pnssible closer to our mpvement, by trying
to; involve the% in solidarlty work and, where fee sible, in the
Nari: of the M&itself.
WE recom:rend tagt tub ANC adopt a clear attitude to Salscom, and
_,that thiS attitude should centre on the observator- made in this
'd6cument - namely, that Salscom is in es sence an anti-ANC
organlaatlan, that its work in the area of warwresis tance is sowing
lzconfu ion, and those especLs of its work which are worthwhile Shmuld
,be tackled by the ANC or the major: olidarity orrunluaflon
EE reconnned thEt one of the inpnrtant harks in relatidn to war-
reels 3 .nce :huuld be 1r Lgan611E bot . inknrnul :nd vxternnl.
We suESPvt that internal Pragacan a hhwuid take account of what
sectiOnu of thq community - LyGCifiCULLY the white co:n:lunity -
'it is Ewing addressea to, and that the 'u::uo of wrerro 1lLl.c:
subuld be rais ed in the coxtox t of the overall cowcernn of the
.jparticulard condunity. As the unst Likely snurca of active waru
rESisters at/tHis stage is the progre:siVO whiter, we fvel thdt
erODaF nda should he aimec at these p-eople, raiting the i .ue
of,harazeulutuncn in the cont:::t nf the concern: hf progrexixe
j; whites _ cuLLidgEcn them tn ;t;v ln the Country, do their :elviCF
Iv
military froa within where pepsible etc.
-V__-__,. _ 1.1, .1- 9 __.L 1.1....E .,____.g.. ,...: .mWV , 7' A

f? facoLAend thpt extornxl prnQamano be anrQrssd to , th .Aric a:
vwroyd, r isimc the isaur mg n Tu u intance, an6 :nrfv.tlnw Awe
AAAuanibiLitioa for ?CtiV" ?QQms Of Tc:istance t0 thasc wan ml? h
Lbe able tn return home. JG also recommend that general yTOy\$KunCH
Ann the wa rQroclst'nce,iwsue be addresseQ to the oversea: public,
"Q gavernnonts, 'uAArnt arougs, etc.

Part of the function of work on war-resistance outs ide South Africa
the provis ion of service: to war-resisters - 1.9. help with
thtinyf, asylum, material assis tance where necessary, advice, and so
, on This s an important way of drawing peeple clnser to our
'ti'movement and thus should be tackled. m; the same time the pzight
wof thte amur-roulster should be kept in perspective tn iQQggQ
nest in nur movement, and shnuld not be allowed to take an
l

Aecnanend thak an all-out attert bQ QadQ to daaw war4resisters
in Qxihe close ta the Solldarity and liberation Qovements. This
attempt should include propaganda dichth Qt war-resisters
abm'Qd; avvistancevith asylum; advicQ and mathial aid; mobilw; sing
arou d the waraf aistance issue in relation to gnvernments, the
yublic, nolltlcal partmie churches, trade unions etc; the
invnlvomnt of war-resioter in.solldarity work; and the relation
bf the Whr-rnrlqtpnce iss ue\$ to oth.er issues such as arQQd I
.Qgruggle, arms boycott other refugees etQA

A In the Ff we roccmzend the following: (thiL cnutd blSO u ply to
.1.

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A,pther Euro can downtriec)

the ANS requvstgihe AAA to take u; the issue of war-rn: LVVAC
a"glivart of it? solidarity work. We recommend that this be donc
?tngcthnr with a cleQr ntLA.ement On the A IC'S ovvrall attitude
to war-r"tl"tuan,-an honld include a clc:r LtrtenQnA on (zlrunn
7x7anQ any other :uch nrrA,n tinn:

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. , the "mr.cgvzvcy of aflo;.ti?:.gf b Clair approach. to this: izmuo in an?
' , , 91"(191 1:0 11:: Quickly um 1:0; inble clarify the confusion which
'ariwen thrugh the efforts of urganisationn like Lalsccm, unC
3the grmwtu of waxbreaibtmnce in the cnuntgy.
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Wm-uu-m-nnoo- q.