

INKATHA FREEDOM PARTY

WOMEN'S BRIGADE

ANNUAL GENERAL CONFERENCE

THEME:

"THE BURDENS OF WOMANHOOD WITHIN
THE ENVIRONMENT OF
VIOLENCE AND FAILED NEGOTIATIONS"

ADDRESS BY MANGOSUTHU BUTHELEZI

ULUNDI : SATURDAY, 11TH OCTOBER 1992

The Acting Chairperson of the Women's Brigade; the Reverend Captain Zondi and other religious leaders present; the National Chairman of the Inkatha Freedom Party; the Deputy Secretary-General; the National Chairman of the Youth Brigade; Amakhosi; members of the Royal Family present; members of the National Council; members of the Central Committee; Honourable members of the Consular Corps; delegations from parties and organisations which have fraternal ties with us; distinguished guests; delegates to this Conference; daughters of Africa; mothers and daughters of our Nation; members of the IFP present at this Conference; Comrades all!

It is my privilege to stand up as I have done for nearly two decades now at similar conferences to address this Annual Conference of the Women's Brigade of the Inkatha Freedom Party.

I wish to add my welcome to the welcome that you have already received by the Chairman on behalf of the Central Committee and on my own behalf. We thank the Lord who alone saw to it that you travelled in safety from your homes to this Conference. I thank you for the sacrifices you have made over the years to be here. I know what it means for us as the poorest community in South Africa to save a few pennies in order to attend these Conferences. With the economy of our country in the parlous state in which it is, I appreciate even more how big your sacrifices have been in order to save the pennies to enable you to be at this Conference today.

I am not unmindful of the fact that these are pennies you can hardly afford to sacrifice when you have families to feed, children to clothe, children to educate and when roofs over the heads of so many millions of our people are in such short supply as is evidenced by the squatter camps that are dotted all over our countryside. I have dwelled on this issue because I do not want a single one of you to fail to understand how deeply conscious I am of your sacrifices for our cause. The sacrifices you have made over the years and the sacrifices I know you have made to be at this Conference have placed extremely burdensome economic demands on you and your families. Thanks to you all.

Our theme for this Conference is "The Burdens of Womanhood within the Environment of Violence and Failed Negotiations." One can characterise the themes I have chosen for our conferences in the past few years as "variations on a theme." I am saddened by the fact that we have been forced to live in this environment of violence for so many years. The violence we see in our communities is worse now than it was this time last year. This is extremely distressing as we are forced to survive in this dark tunnel of destruction of life and limb without even any light at the end of the tunnel.

This is a very difficult time for all of us. In the atmosphere of violence and intimidation in which we have to live and in which we are forced to eke out an existence, there are many who have thrown in the towel. It is easy for those of us who have mustered enough courage to persevere to look at those who have taken the line of least resistance as though they were cowards and worse. We should not spend too much time calling others names. When others have collapsed let us say: "Thank you God, for there go I but for Your Grace."

We should pray for them to regain their courage and strength to stand the trials of our era of violence and intimidation. Those of us who have up to now been able to survive should thank the Lord for giving us the strength that has seen us through. We must understand that each day we are able to withstand the pressures of these trials is a victory for us each and every day. We must remember that we need that strength to survive each and every day. By the looks of things these

trials are going to remain very much part and parcel of the scene for as long as we can see ahead. I am sad to say our road is still a long, hard road. Brace yourselves for more hardships.

There are a lot of simplistic assessments that we see even amongst our clergy who pontificate about this situation of violence and tell us that if there is an interim government tomorrow, all violence we see will automatically vanish. I really do wish that these pontifications were accurate predictions. I really do. But most unfortunately I have been in politics in Africa long enough to know that not even a majority government has proved to be an adequate panacea for these kind of political ills in Africa.

You need only to cast your eyes across our borders to see the internecine war in Mocambique which has lasted for so long. It is only a few days ago that a Peace Accord was signed between President Joachim Chissano and Mr Alfonso Dhlakama of Renamo. You need only to look at Angola to realise that the first election since Angola achieved her independence has been taking place only a few days ago. Even this has become controversial.

To look nearer home you need only to look at the so-called Peace Accord which was signed by President de Klerk, Dr Mandela, myself and other leaders on the 14th September 1991 to see how difficult it is to achieve peace once violence becomes endemic in any society. We are still in for a hard time.

All the things I mention here should not make you abandon hope of us ever achieving peace. You should in fact be inspired and your hopes strengthened by the knowledge that violence does not create the kind of environment in which God meant us to live and within which to relate to each other as fellow human beings, and as creatures whom He made in His image. So it does come to an end and we will also achieve peace.

But that knowledge should not make us under-estimate the kind of challenges that we face and the kind of burdens you will carry as women of our nation before we pass the winning post.

Life is a struggle even where there is no violence. But life is even a worse struggle where people have to carry the extra burdens that you have to carry as women of our nation in an environment of violence.

We know that it is our mother who carry us within their bodies before we are born. We know that it is mothers who carry us after our birth on their backs before we learn to stand and walk life's road on our own. We know that it is our mothers who feed us from within their bodies when they offer us their breasts. We know that it is women who worry about the next meal for their children. We know that it is women who worry about the next meal for their families. We know that it is women who worry about clothing, feeding and educating their children. We are aware that most of us who are educated would not be where we are if it was not for the sacrifices of our mothers.

Daughters of Africa, I salute you. From what I have said, it is clear that even in what can be described as normal times, your burdens as women are enormous. When we have a situation of abnormality such as the low density civil war that we have amongst Blacks in South Africa, your burdens almost become abnormal. We know that although violence is everywhere that the KwaZulu/Natal region and the Transvaal have become war zones. There is almost not one of us, whether we are in the Cape, the Orange Free State, Transkei, Ciskei or KwaZulu/Natal, who has no

relatives on the Reef. So apart from the violence that occurs in regions where we live, the Transvaal violence affects almost all of us.

This violence must stop. We cannot continue our struggle for liberation while it continues, and that, my sisters is that. We have now to say, enough is enough, no further. We now have to take the steps that are vital for peace. We cannot tolerate prevarication for what has to be done. We can no longer pussyfoot around issues hoping against hope that sense will prevail and people will do what everybody knows that they have to do.

I have drawn a line. Things that I know must be done, and you know must be done, and the whole of South Africa knows must be done, can be listed.

- Umkhonto must go
- negotiations must be put back on track
- mass action must be suspended
- marches against capitals to topple governments must be abandoned
- and importantly, very importantly, the State President must understand once and for all that Dr Mandela is utterly wrong in his continued insistence that the way forward must be chartered in bilateral discussions between the ANC and the Government.

A lot more has to be done. I know this. I make the point strongly though that what we and others do will be futile unless these things that I have listed as needing to be done, are now done.

I also say that every political party has its role to play. I agree, but the Government has a role to play as the Government. I have always demanded that we need continuing constitutionality in the process of forging a new constitution out of the South African experience if we are going to avoid an awesomely ugly bloodbath and if all the powers of the State are put up for grabs in winner-takes-all battles before the new constitution is enacted and introduced.

The reality is sometimes harsh. It is a harsh fact that Mr de Klerk's February 2 1990 address, and what he has done to date, has just not been enough. The harsh reality is that the policy of appeasement that he has followed to woo the ANC back into negotiations, has been destructive of the real progress.

I have as I say, drawn a line. The appeasement politics that I complain of has led to the final de Klerk cul-de-sac - that is the Record of Understanding that he and Dr Mandela signed on 26th September. Mr de Klerk will now have to fight his way out of that cul-de-sac. The Record of Understanding will lead us nowhere.

It must be rejected. I have set the pace. I have said no to it, and no it will be. I am not being clever and I am not being brash. I am not self-opinionated when I say that it must be rejected because I say it must be rejected. Mr de Klerk has the power to say no with the same effect. Dr Mandela has the power to say no with the same effect. The three of us will have to say yes before anything works. Other parties will have to say yes before anything works. That is the reality of it.

I have said that I can no longer continue in discussions or negotiations with Government until the so-called Record of Understanding is put to a full assessment in a multi-party forum. The National

Multi-Party Conference of Review that I have been calling for for some months, would be a suitable forum.

I want to pause to make a point. Mr de Klerk's response to my drawing the line, and thus far and no further, was that he would not debate in public with me, and that he would write me a long letter. That response is his prerogative. The point that I am pausing to make now is that that response is not compatible with his subsequent statements that:

- TBVC countries must realise that the South African Government is their friend, and he indicated that life could be very difficult for them if radicals came into power.
- self-governing territories face a situation in which their very existence is at stake.

I hope these are not threats. If they are threats then Mr de Klerk must speak more plainly. He must say that he is threatening with a possible attempt to turn off our life-support systems. Again that is his prerogative if that is what he wishes to do. I and the whole of South Africa want to know what he meant.

I return to my theme. The Government has a role to play in making these things happen which I say must happen for peace.

Following my drawing of the line and saying no further, I called for a meeting of friendly leaders, and Brigadier Gqozo and President Mangope immediately responded, and we had a consultative meeting. Consultations were taken a step further when we had our Conference of Concerned South Africans on the 6th October. We have formed a Steering Committee and we are bringing together all those who, like us, reject the Record of Understanding signed by Mr de Klerk and Dr Mandela.

Our meeting was not a matter of us as Black leaders getting into an alliance with right-wing parties. It is amazing that both the Afrikaans press and the English press have tried to portray this picture. One insane editor even went out of his way to call us 'the new right.' If you look at this carefully, you will realise that it is in fact racist. The only white political parties that were represented by leadership at the meeting for concerned South Africans were the Conservative Party led by Dr Andries Treurnicht and the Volksunie Party led by Mr Beyers. Political parties and governments that were represented included the Bophuthatswana Government with a government delegation led by President Koosi LM Mangope; the Ciskei Government represented by Brigadier Oupa Gqozo; the delegation of the Ximoko Party of Gazankulu led by Chief Nxumalo; Mr Ismail representing the National People's Party and the Inkatha Freedom Party led by myself. There were also many observers who attended the meeting including the President of SACOB and the Executive Director of SACOB. A number of highly respected academics and a number of smaller organisations also participated in the meeting.

Now is the ripeness of time to get a National Multi-Party Conference of Review off the ground. I can deliver. Can Mr de Klerk deliver? We reached consensus in the Conference of Concerned South Africans that constitutionality must be preserved and that the only way forward is through negotiations.

My sisters, I read you the Press Statement which was drawn up as a consensus document at that

conference:

"The Conference for Concerned South Africans has recommended the total scrapping of CODESA, and the creation of a new negotiation forum which will include both the parties who were at CODESA and those who did not participate.

They called for a National Multi-Party Conference of Review of both the negotiating process and the peace process.

The conference also agreed to make representations to the South African government with regard to the advisability of proceeding with the forthcoming special session of parliament. It was felt decisions taken at this special session would again represent exclusive, and unacceptable, decision-making, to which the participants could not be bound.

The conference totally rejected bilateral and binding agreements, with vast implications, being concluded exclusively between the Government and the ANC alliance. It called for negotiations to set up an inclusive and totally Southern African negotiating forum.

The conference, held at the Indaba Hotel north of Johannesburg, emphasised time and again that it did not see itself as a rival negotiating body. Neither was it an attempt to create an alliance. The participants had come together as true democrats insistent upon creating a process in which an all-inclusive vision for Southern Africa could be attained, and the way ahead defined.

They stressed that the agreements between President De Klerk and Dr Mandela would not stand up to democratic scrutiny in any multi-party forum.

The conference discussed at length ways and means of overcoming the polarisation and frustration caused by bi-lateral agreements between the South African Government and the ANC.

It noted the significance of the fact that one of the agreements was that the ANC would reconsider its commitment to mass action, and that an ANC spokesman had, as recently as this week, stated publicly that mass action would continue. This was confrontational in the extreme and brought into serious question the sincerity of any agreements entered into by the ANC alliance.

It was the most recent example of precisely who was intent on employing spoiling tactics.

There was total agreement that without the immediate disbandment of the ANC's private army, Umkhonto we Sizwe, the demobilisation of its military personnel, the surrendering of its arms caches, and the cessation of recruitment and training for military purposes, negotiations cannot go ahead.

The conference resolved unanimously to resist any enticement to return to negotiations which could in any way be hijacked and turned into the farce which had resulted in the South African Government and the ANC arriving at the so-called Record of Understanding.

Democracy and the Southern African population demanded that the representative base of constitutional negotiations be broadened to include such organisations as the Conservative Party, the PAC, Azapo, the AWP and others. The conference believed that without this broad representative base, any future negotiations would also be doomed to failure.

The overriding consideration in any future development on negotiations would have to be primarily concerned with the future of the country, and not with party political manipulation.

The conference elected a steering committee which will form a liaison structure for members represented at the conference and for planning the way forward."

We are ready to begin tackling the stumbling blocks to negotiations. As I said I can deliver.

I want, my sisters, to deal very forcefully with one issue - whether our Conference for Concerned South Africans amounted to the establishment of an alliance. The answer is that there is no alliance. When the IFP sat down to negotiate with others, the ANC and the SACP, nobody talked about an alliance against the CP, and AWP and the PAC, and AZAPO. Why must there be this attempt to humiliate what we were doing by presenting it as an alliance blocking negotiations. In any case, which negotiations are they talking about since CODESA was frozen when the ANC/SACP alliance walked out of CODESA.

I think it is very important for the world to understand that it was the South African Government's handling of the ANC which must be so dominantly blamed for the present negotiation crisis we are in. I discuss a progression of Government appeasement under a number of headings.

DOUBLE AGENDA POLITICS

The ANC's one and only goal has been to secure unilateral control over the transitional process and the future South African Government. And there is no doubt in the minds of most South Africans that the ANC will use any means at its disposal to achieve these ends. The ANC has two options, either to take control of the present government through armed insurrection and mass action politics, or gain control through the process of negotiations. Of crucial importance is that the ANC never has been, and never will be, interested in any form of democratic power-sharing.

When the ANC failed to guarantee its control over the transitional period at CODESA, they resorted to violence couched in terms such as 'protest politics' and 'mass action'. However, the escalation of violence resulting from mass action has shocked the world. The Bisho massacre has brought moderates of the ANC-led alliance to the fore, leaving the hardliners to take a back seat. The resumption of negotiations are back on the political calendar. But one needs to bear in mind that the option of armed struggle and mass action has not been abandoned. For as long as the ANC has realistic anxieties about its loss of symbolic status and leverage on negotiations, it will continue to adopt strategies outside negotiations in its struggle for legitimacy.

This is not just a perception gained from media reports. A detailed synopsis of events following the ANC's unbanning is concrete evidence of the ANC's divisive ploys, and the government's tolerance of what amounts to ANC violence in permitting this to happen.

THE ANC'S REVOLUTIONARY OPTIONS PRIOR TO 1990

1. The armed struggle which transformed into a people's war

For most of its period in exile the ANC remained committed to a belief in the armed struggle. They advocated a view that the only way apartheid could be destroyed in South Africa was to

match the military might of the South African security forces with the overwhelming force of the Black masses, under the leadership and supervision of Umkhonto we Sizwe, the ANC's military wing, thereby paving the way for a fully fledged armed struggle. This would supposedly compel the government to transfer power to the ANC.

The impetus behind the move towards a 'people's war', was that the ANC had come to realise that the insurrection of the South African Government could not be achieved through the soldiers of Umkhonto we Sizwe alone. They needed the support of the people, and the force of numbers to pose a threat to the ruling regime. The ANC's strategies of ungovernability and people's war sought to debilitate and eventually break down the machinery of the State, while at the same time heighten the spirit of defiance and resistance among the people on the ground.

2. Laying the foundations for a two phase struggle for socialism / SACP options

Through the influence of the Africa Institute in Moscow and its alliance partner, the SACP, the ANC was schooled in the importance of winning the support of the masses first before the struggle for socialism can begin, hence the two phase struggle for socialism emerged.

3. Umkhonto we Sizwe options

History illustrates that throughout the life of the ANC-in-exile, certain elements within the ANC strongly supported military opposition. These elements maintained their support even after it became clear that a moratorium or renouncement of the armed struggle would be needed before the process of negotiations could begin. For fear of being excluded from the future political option in South Africa, the ANC had little choice but to adopt a more compromising stance towards its adversaries.

However, tensions began in 1984 with rising levels of violent Black protest within the country and the subsequent recruitment of increasingly radical elements within the ANC. The absorption of this radicalism was done at the expense of some of the ANC's political and diplomatic efforts. These were undermined by the widespread condemnation of the ANC's attacks against 'soft' targets, as well as the increasing influence of ANC military leaders like Chris Hani who effectively managed to articulate and put into effect the demands of the radicals. This gained Hani widespread support from the ANC's rank and file, as well as from militant Black youths in the violent-strewn townships of South Africa.

The ANC's support for the armed struggle is unlikely to regain the intensity it had in the past. Its military efforts are meagre in comparison to the military might of the South African security forces. However, the radicalism of the ANC's military hardliners is still clearly evident in the politics of today. It is these hardliners who are pressurising the ANC executive to withdraw from negotiations and engage in militant mass action and protest.

TRUNCATED ANC POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

1. Seizure of power option

The history of the ANC clearly indicates that the ANC's one and only goal has been to secure unilateral control over the transitional process and the future South African Government. In

order to achieve this goal the ANC will use any means at its disposal to achieve these ends.

2. Steps which could be useful in the seizure of power

- * remaining a liberation movement

If the ANC remains a liberation movement it does not have to prove the legitimacy of its claims that it is the vanguard of the struggle and has the majority support of the South African people. As a liberation movement the ANC does not have to justify its lack of organisational structures, and it remains unaccountable to the South African public.

- * patriotic front/alliance politics

This is a tactic employed by the ANC at CODESA and during its mass action campaign. At CODESA the ANC rallied the support of numerous representative bodies to strengthen its bargaining power at the negotiation table, and at the same time marginalise its opposition. Instead of entering negotiations just as the ANC, it rallied all its allies to enter as separate entities, for example, the SACP, the NIC and the TIC. The strength of numbers and allies obviously increases its political muscle. The success of the ANC's mass action is largely attributable to its alliance relationship with COSATU.

Alternatively, in the Bisho massacre the ANC was able to use its Communist SACP link to shoulder much of the blame for the disaster.

CODESA provided an ideal opportunity for the government to intervene, but it failed to do so. The South African Government allowed the issue of the inclusion of His Majesty the King and the KwaZulu Government to remain unresolved, despite the vociferous demands from the Zulu people throughout the country. Yet, during the preparatory formulation of CODESA the Government permitted the ANC, SACP, NIC and TIC to enter as separate bodies, increasing its voting power fourfold. The ANC and its allies publicly questioned the validity of KwaZulu's inclusion, but nobody questioned the representativeness of bodies such as the NIC and the TIC.

- * terminating the armed struggle whilst retaining military preparedness

What public investigation has the Government made into the establishment and advancement of private armies, and the stock-piling of arms caches? The continued recruitment of new intakes to Umkhonto weSizwe and the training of these recruits for active service, constitutes a major threat to peace. The militarisation of civil society in the face of hostility and dissension will have disastrous consequences for the negotiation process. Yet when the Government attacked the ANC on this issue, the ANC refused to disband its private army. Why does the Government so readily respond to the ANC's demands, yet fails to make a legitimate demand that before negotiations can resume the issue of Umkhonto weSizwe must be resolved. There must be a public declaration from the ANC of Umkhonto weSizwe disbandment and a visible display of this statement, as well as a public commitment against the stashing of arms caches, the training of military personnel and the instigation of violence.

- * employment of labour power

This is particularly evident in all the ANC's mass action campaigns. The ANC relies on its support

from COSATU to pull off nationwide stay-aways, general strikes, consumer boycotts and marches. The ANC derives most of its impact from these campaigns by using the economy as the political battlefield. The economy is an immediate indicator of the ANC's political muscle because the ANC can prove how much capital is lost through lost man hours and stalled production.

* mass action

The mass action campaign of June 16 was an attempt on the part of the ANC to achieve the political impact it was incapable of achieving at CODESA to justify its legitimacy. In order to guarantee its control over the transitional process, the ANC has done everything in its power to marginalise its opposition, mounting a concerted campaign to destabilise both Ciskei, Bophuthatswana and KwaZulu, and discrediting any party alien to its cause. It was this political onslaught by the ANC, outside CODESA, which finally led to its defeat on the floor of CODESA II.

Hence the manoeuvre to distance itself from CODESA and its move to the streets in order to justify its legitimacy by trying to break the deadlock at CODESA through pressure and coercion. The 'Leipzig option' clearly reveals to what extent the ANC intends to bring the Government down if it is unable to seize total power. It targets the national communication system, the transport system, the public service and the economy. Plans were carried out for a prolonged political strike, a programme of escalating mass action, the deliberate sabotage of government operations, sit-ins, stay-aways and protest action at all major police stations, prisons and post offices. The upsurge of militancy in the townships in the wake of these proposals had disastrous results.

* withdrawal from CODESA

From the outset at CODESA the ANC has attempted to monopolise and direct proceedings. The Government made no moves to stem the ANC's domination of CODESA's Management Committee and chairing most Working Groups, placing it in an effective position to influence the publicised results. The ANC sought to dominate the democratisation process under the guise of national interest, by proposing a transitional process which serves to entrench centralised power in a unitary system of government.

At the convening of CODESA II certain difficulties were experienced which could not be overcome in time to present a united front to the world. There was a deadlock in Working Group 2 when no consensus could be reached concerning the matter of special minorities required to amend the interim constitution. The ANC, in declaring the deadlock in CODESA, could not countenance its defeat, so it withdrew from all the commitments which flowed from all the agreements reached in the other working groups. The ANC wanted an all-or-nothing victory, and without it they withdrew from CODESA by shifting the blame on to the government, accusing it of not being serious about negotiations, relinquishing power and establishing a democracy. This effectively put a halt to the negotiation process, because with the ANC withdrawal, together with its allies, CODESA was left without a quorum. Instead of negotiating the ANC has taken to the streets and is resorting to direct confrontationalism in mass action politics.

Instead of CODESA insisting that the deadlock reached in Working Group 2 must be carried over as one of the many outstanding issues experienced at CODESA 1, the ANC was allowed to get away with the domination of the negotiation process.

* dictation of negotiation terms

The ANC's attempts to foster destabilisation in South Africa is clear, yet the South African Government makes every attempt to negotiate with the ANC.

The Constitutional Development Minister, Mr Roelf Meyer, has demonstrated his extreme willingness to address the ANC's 14 point demand statement issued on 23 June 1992.

At present four particular demands have been highlighted, namely: violence, political prisoners, cultural weapons and hostels. These demands raised by the ANC are all direct attacks against the IFP putting the IFP in the firing line. It is an attempt by the ANC to make the IFP appear to be the stumbling block to negotiations.

Dr Mandela has demanded a ban on the public display of cultural weapons - a ploy that can only be construed as a direct attack on the IFP.

Mandela has demanded that all migratory labour hostels are to be fenced off. This leaves the hostel dwellers, when outside the hostels, probably more vulnerable to community action than ever, as they can be easily identified and easily tracked.

The ANC and its allies, together with the tacit backing of our local media, continue to use of widespread, defamatory and destructive propaganda to portray hostel dwellers as the aggressors in the Transvaal violence. Yet, in reality, most hostel dwellers live in fear and uncertainty, isolated and vulnerable to the forces outside the hostel walls. This distorted propaganda in no way contributes to the creation of a climate of political tolerance, or adds to the public's understanding of the South African political scenario, particularly the plight of the hostel dwellers.

And despite the rising tensions, there is no visible recourse to justice. The safety of the hostel residents is often placed in extreme jeopardy, as their pleas for help are not effectively and timeously dealt with by the South African Government's Police and Defence Force.

On the negotiation front, South Africans are told that it is impossible to restart formal negotiations because the South African Government and ANC cannot agree on the release of political prisoners. Yet, while the Government and the ANC talk about the release of political prisoners, people are dying. As pointed out by Dr Alex Boraine, the Executive Director of IDASA, is it too much to ask from the Government and the ANC to appoint an independent arbitrator to resolve the matter such as the release of political prisoners, which has been on the agenda for years. Is it justified that this issue stands in the way of negotiations and the ending the violence? As every day passes more and more innocent civilians are losing their lives, their families and their homes. Must South Africa bleed to death for the want of political statesmen.

* Conclusion: process of setting up and then contravening the National Peace Accord and destroying negotiations

The ANC is constantly and blatantly violating the principles agreed to in the National Peace Accord or the guidelines of the Goldstone Commission.

The ANC and SACP contravened Clause 2.4, by using language that could incite violence or hatred. On 18 April a newspaper article quoted defamatory remarks made by ANC's regional

chairman, Harry Gwala, and secondly at a mock trial held in Pietermaritzburg on 26 June eleven Inkatha leaders, including myself as President of the IFP, were 'sentenced to death'. Even a letter written by Mr Gwala to the adjudication panel as an explanation for the mock trial in Pietermaritzburg was found to violate the spirit of the Accord. In addition a South African flag was ripped from a flagpole and burned, a coffin was burned and posters were displayed by the SACP that the National Peace Committee found contained 'language calculated or likely to incite violence or hatred'.

The National Peace Committee panel held that the ANC contravened the preamble of the National Peace Accord which condemned violence and called for ways to create peace. The ANC also contravened section 2.2 by failing to encourage compliance by its followers to principles of democracy and political tolerance, and section 2.1 which called for respect for the activities of other political parties and organisations. The ANC contravened section 2.3 which dealt with threats, intimidation and hindering the rights of others to support opposing political groups, and finally section 2.5 by failing to notify public authorities of its decision to hold the gathering and taking into account local sentiment.

In addition to the National Peace Secretariat's first findings, the IFP has recorded several other serious incidents illustrating the ANC's blatant disregard of the commonly agreed principles listed in the National Peace Accord. The National Peace Secretariat's findings have exploded the myth that the ANC can be exonerated from complicity in violence. The contempt the ANC has shown towards the National Peace Accord has been a tragic setback for peace and will have a detrimental impact on future peace prospects.

The Accord's failure to address the escalating violence is not a failure of the Peace Secretariat, but that of radical politicians who blatantly refuse to dedicate themselves to the peace process. Had the ANC abided by the agreed-to principles of the National Peace Accord, the lives of many innocent people could have been saved. Yet, despite these findings, the Government has not taken any legal action, or given the National Peace Accord formal legal powers to take action against the ANC. This creates the public impression that the National Peace Accord is useless and meaningless.

This is why I cannot understand the demands for a meeting of signatories of the Peace Accord, which even the State President suggested. I do not see that we are going to solve the problems of South Africa by staging farces after farces, as a facade to delude ourselves and the general South African public that all is rosy in the garden. Members of the South African public are tired of charades that we have had to go through to please the international community, and to bluff the South African public into believing that all is well. I am prepared to participate in any initiative that gives any hope that we can resolve the problem of violence and be able to achieve peace without which we cannot have any meaningful negotiations. Without an end to violence, there is just no way forward. There can be no free and democratic elections without peace.

What is happening to the National Peace Accord applies to the Goldstone Commission. Its first results were released earlier this year in the form of guidelines by Mr Justice Goldstone on ways to prevent continued violence, pertaining especially to mass action and the way police handled conflict. This special inquiry was initiated following the ANC's mass action campaign and its findings have been widely publicised. Its importance was highlighted when the Goldstone Commission requested the aid of an international panel of nine experts, including Professor Peter Waddington from Reading University. This inquiry was chaired by Mr Justice Goldstone himself. This supports the recent findings by the National Peace Secretariat that the ANC is the prime

instigator of violence in this country. Yet, with its usual disdain, the ANC has totally ignored all recommendations concerning mass action made by the Commission. The ANC continued with its march to Bisho regardless of the predicted consequences.

CODESA was the first successful attempt to get all the political players together in one forum to negotiate the future of the country. It was the first time that people in South Africa expressed the hope that a future democratic solution to South Africa's problems was a possibility. The ANC was solely responsible for destroying this forum, and its withdrawal from CODESA was condemned by all fronts. The fact that CODESA was rendered without a quorum, and the ANC could bring the negotiations at CODESA to a premature halt, has robbed the entire process of negotiations of its credibility. Yet despite the ANC's spoiling tactics the Government is still showing its willingness to meet the ANC's demands so that negotiations can resume.

The Record of Understanding signed by President de Klerk and Dr Nelson Mandela, the President of the ANC, has given a stamp of credibility that both the National Party Government and the ANC believe they are the two big boys of South Africa who must determine the future of the rest of us with no participation at all by us in the determination of our future destiny.

It appears that the ANC is the party the South African Government has earmarked solely for negotiations, feeding the ANC's propaganda that an agreement between the Government and the ANC is all that is needed to secure a future, democratic government. Where the Government has not actively sought the favour of the ANC to negotiate, they have remained silent - a silence which the IFP perceives as a tacit acceptance of the ANC's questionable strategy to gain political control. You all know the old saying that if you can't beat them, join them. This seems to characterise the political behaviour of the government.

The ANC has gone out of its way to embarrass the South African Government. Yet, despite these attempts to put the Government on the spot, with the ANC laying out demands that are impossible for the Government to meet, the Government still shows an incomprehensible willingness to tow the ANC's line. Why has the Government not demanded that the ANC cannot partake in revolutionary activity parallel to the process of negotiations.

Why has the Government not met with the other participants at CODESA to formulate new guidelines for negotiations, which the ANC will be forced to adhere to. It was the ANC that destroyed the progress made at CODESA. How can the Government now allow the ANC to dictate the future process of negotiations. The process of negotiations will never be the same again, because the results of mass action have made agreements so much more difficult to reach. To this end it is inconceivable that once the present impasse has been resolved, we could all return to CODESA and take up from where we left off. Safeguards must be made to ensure that the ANC is never again given the political muscle to end the process of negotiations.

DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE

1. Involvement with CODESA

COSATU is deeply involved in this mass action campaign, which lends credibility to the IFP's concern that the economy is becoming the battleground where politicians wage their wars. In the current fragile business environment the general strike, as part of the mass action campaign, caused extensive damage to the economy, enough to guarantee a drying up of investment capital, local

and overseas. Without economic growth and stability, the future government has no hope of addressing the needs of our disadvantaged masses.

2. Democratic infiltration into organisations

There are various bodies and organisations which the ANC has attempted to infiltrate, including the civics, sports and the performing arts. The ANC's recent bid to take over the Performing Arts Council of Transvaal follows in the wake of their concerted campaign to forcibly manipulate South Africa's sporting arena, dictating the outcome of the sports boycott against South Africa and actively meddling in the administration of South Africa's participation in the Barcelona Olympics. As in the sporting world, the ANC is now attempting to utilise the cultural forum as a platform from which to air its political views and entrench its hold over the future government of this country.

So too in the civics. Through various civic organisations the ANC has attempted to create alternative structures to the present town councils, in an attempt to forcibly oust formally appointed township administrators from their posts. Through the civics the ANC airs its views about the state of politics and violence in the townships, as well condemning the hostel system.

It is common knowledge that the ANC operates under the names of these various organisations, using them as a front in which to promote its views and publicise its intentions.

3. Open letter to the State President

Dr Nelson Mandela's open letter to Parliament on 6 April 1991 clearly indicated that the ANC is the major stumbling block to the success of the negotiation process. Both the ANC and the SACP embarked on a well-orchestrated propaganda campaign discrediting government initiatives and slandering all forms of political opposition. The ANC's open letter to the State President imposed deadlines for various impossible demands to be met, placing the prospect of future negotiations in jeopardy during that period. In short the ANC walked out of a negotiation process in which the IFP and the Government were involved, destroying the newly established peace agreement between the IFP and the ANC signed on 29 January of that same year.

4. ANC/IFP agreement

On Tuesday, 29 January 1991 the IFP and ANC had a joint meeting. The IFP believed at the time that the ANC shared the realisation that the peace and stability of South Africa rested heavily on the ability of our political organisations to reach some form of consensus on ways to end the hostilities in affected communities and creating a mood of political tolerance and freedom of political activity. Yet despite the joint statement issued by the IFP and the ANC, calling for an end to the present state of violence in the Natal and the Transvaal, and despite a joint commitment to the prevention of any further acts of violence and destruction amongst our members or carried out by our members, the ANC has destroyed the trust of the IFP by continuously violating the content of this agreement, in the same way that it violates the National Peace Accord and the recommendations of the Goldstone Commission.

5. Regeneration of democratic manoeuvres such as mounting a campaign against traditional weapons and action against that

Dr Mandela has demanded that the public display of weapons must be banned. The IFP has always firmly supported any moves to disarm people of dangerous weapons. We have more than met the Government half way on this issue. The IFP has agreed to do everything in its power to prevent IFP supporters carrying cultural weapons in declared unrest areas. Any expectations beyond this, constitute a direct attack against the IFP and the Zulu nation, some of whose members sometimes carry these cultural accoutrements of South Africans of Zulu extraction. The ANC is fully aware that the IFP will resist a blanket ban on cultural weapons. They raise it in order to project the IFP internationally as the source of the violence, when in fact the largest portion of deaths have occurred from the use of AK 47 rifles by cadres of Umkhonto weSizwe.

Genuine traditional or cultural weapons play a negligible role in political violence, and this matter has been exploited by the ANC as a smoke-screen, disguising its own clandestine agenda. With all the furore about cultural weapons, the percentage of killings conceivably attributable to genuine traditional weapons is negligible, and this can be supported by the statistical findings of various renowned sources, including the South African Institute of Race Relations.

This outcry against traditional weapons was the beginning of a concerted attempt to marginalise the IFP, KwaZulu and the Zulu nation in the future governance of this country. The focus on traditional weapons is totally disproportionate, when considering that the issues of relevance remain unresolved, such as the disbanding of the ANC's private army, Umkhonto weSizwe. Yet rather than confronting the ANC directly on this issue, the government continues to debate the issue of cultural weapons, adding legitimacy to the ANC's demands. The State President has been quiet as far as raising the issue of Umkhonto weSizwe until a few days ago when he spoke to the Cape National party Congress.

This whole scene leaves you as women carrying the biggest burdens that are brought about by the ANC's people's war and by the poverty that is worsened each time there is mass action.

The economy of South Africa is now in dire straits. The burdens of this are carried by you as women of our nation, for it is you who are concerned about feeding, clothing, education and housing. I know that many of you who are here come from squatter areas where our people wait in the hope that the economy will turn and that they will get jobs to enable them to earn a living.

It is women who are losing their loved ones almost daily, whether it be husbands, children, brothers or sisters. The burden of death in families is invariably borne by women.

Schools are being destroyed and it is your children who find themselves without schooling facilities. Clinics are destroyed by these anarchists and it is you who have to struggle without any ante-natal care. Homes are torched and destroyed daily and it is you as women who worry about shelter for the family, and it is you who worry about getting something on the backs of your family. The burden of violence that has devastated everything that sustains life is borne by women.

As is happening at present, the severe drought that we have destroys even the little flame of hope for growing food for the family. The burden of all this is borne by you as the women of our nation.

It is not often that females participate in the destruction of facilities, but at the end of the day it is

women who must bear the brunt of it all.

The fact that negotiations have been messed up by the mass action politics of the ANc/SACP/COSATU alliance makes the burdens of our women even heavier as it destroys any prospects of us having a democratic society in this troubled land.

On Thursday we were visited by the President of the PAC, Mr Clarence Makwetu who came with a very high-powered delegation of the PAC National Executive. He came to talk to us of his concern about the current violence. He stated that the PAC would like to play an honest broker's role in this violence. We could not reject their initiative inasmuch as we have supported the involvement of international members in trying to diffuse violence and to get negotiations back on track. I, however, believe that as long as there is so much pussy-footing, this will remain a difficult task.

I wish to assure you that we admire the resilient qualities of our women who have carried the burdens of our oppression in the past and who continue to carry the burdens that violence now places on your shoulders. We pray God to continue to give you that strength to carry these burdens.

There is an old maxim from which I ask you to derive strength to carry your burdens. NIHIL DESPERADUM! NEVER DESPAIR!

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