

RC-AP

PROBLEMS RELATING TO THE DEVELOPMENT
OF OUR ARMED STRUGGLE.

Until Rivonia and its disastrous aftermath, the masses of our people were politically ready and organised for a nation-wide launching of armed struggle provided only that a substantial number of them gained knowledge of the use of firearms and explosives. MK operational units were established and limited military training commenced in different areas. The whole plan of preparation was centrally controlled and directed from a headquarters based in the country.

A scheme for the mass training of cadres abroad was embarked upon, while at home small sabotage units went into action against enemy installations. The key factor in the strategy of the armed struggle was then, as it has since remained, the return into South Africa of the military^{ly} trained militants. There was at the time a vast underground political machinery which was in immediate contact with the masses of the people, and which was available to give political guidance to the people. What was needed urgently was to supply each area and each organisational unit with experts in the techniques of armed struggle.

But in the period following the Rivonia arrests, the enemy made gruelling inroads into the political machinery of the Liberation Movement and in the process dealt the Movement a severe strategic blow. It followed this up with the creation of an extremely high level and efficient State security apparatus, geared to the destruction of the movement and the prevention of any political re-grouping.

To strive for the elimination of actual and potential political activists in South Africa is a key factor in the strategy of the fascist regime, for, in the absence of an internal political machinery, a most dangerous development could be postponed almost indefinitely, namely, the introduction into

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various parts of South Africa of large groups of Africans trained in the use of firearms and in the techniques of war. Furthermore, without such a machinery, those of them who succeeded in entering the country could not for long survive police vigilance. From the point of view of the Liberation Movement, the reconstruction of a political machinery in the country is indispensable both as a necessary basis for conquest of power and as a precondition for the fulfilment of the major strategic task of ensuring the return to South Africa of personnel specially trained to lead and guide the armed struggle.

But can any such reconstruction be successfully done from and by a machinery based, outside the country - in Zambia and London? The Morogoro conference found that years of trying to re-establish the political organisation in the country had failed more as a result of defects in our structure and methods of work than because of the efficiency and sophistication of Fascist terror. A major remedial measure was the establishment of the Revolutionary Council, with the express task, inter alia, of creating a powerful political machinery capable of surviving, and protecting itself against, the undoubtedly high-powered enemy offensive on the liberation movement. For the Revolutionary Council this is the primary task, for, in the final analysis, the armed struggle is a political struggle of the people organised into and under the leadership of our movement. Without such organisation the armed struggle proper must remain a remote dream.

Does this mean the armed struggle must be postponed until a network of ANC underground branches and cells has been established? No. Not at all. No such network is possible unless the people are able to protect it with gunfire. A viable lasting political organisation will grow with, and not prior to, the commencement

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of armed struggle.

Does this mean then that no political mobilisation of the masses is possible until our trained personnel now waiting in Zambia and elsewhere have been infiltrated into and deployed in bases throughout the country. Again, no. The regime can be relied upon to pull out its entire army and police force to surround and eliminate any such group the moment it is sighted or known to exist in a given area. To sum up, no meaningful entry of trained personnel into the country is possible in the absence of an effective underground machinery, and no meaningful machinery can be created except by properly and specially trained political and military activists. This is the vicious circle our past efforts have been aimed at breaking. A change in our past tactics is called for:

Firstly, trained activists, no matter how few, must be sent to areas where the chances of survival are comparatively good. They will serve as nuclei, however sparsely distributed, around which a local underground network, linked directly to headquarters outside the country, can begin to grow. Each cell, capable of communication with the external directing machinery, would immediately open up the possibilities of a relatively safe "underground railway" for the movement of personnel, including senior political leaders, as well as materials into the country. This would be possible even if such a cell consisted of only two people provided one of them has been specially trained and prepared for his mission. With proper planning, based on our past experiences and on knowledge of the enemy's methods and tactics, the destruction of one such cell would not prevent the inflow of activists from outside and the consolidation of newly created cells.

Secondly, every activist or his cell, must be armed and ready

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to defend himself or his machinery or to attack the enemy where this would serve the best tactical interests for the struggle.

In this connection the fact should not be lost sight of that in the present mood of our people, an armed clash with the enemy, in which the latter suffers casualties, has a greater organisational effect than wordy propaganda which ends up with the propagandist being cheaply arrested and tortured into betraying those who responded to his propaganda.

Thirdly, the entry of activists into the country, must, like the mobilisation of the masses by propaganda and various actions, be a continuing process and should not be interrupted by long intervals of inaction, following some sweeping round-up by the enemy.

In fact the arrest of some or even most trained personnel must be accepted as casualties that are unavoidable at this stage of, and in the peculiar circumstances pertaining to, our struggle in South Africa. Such arrests, or even their possibility, should not interrupt the stream of politicians and guerrillas flowing in from everywhere in ones and twos. Provided that they are armed with a leaflet in one hand and a gun in the other, determined to use both to greatest advantage for the struggle, it should not be long before armed struggle becomes an established fact in South Africa. An important point to mention in this regard is that in the context of armed revolt in Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Angola and even Namibia, armed clashes on whatever scale in South Africa are bound to have a tremendous impact on the rate of progress of the revolution in Southern Africa as a whole and particularly on the internal situation within South Africa.

Fourthly, the dual operation of internal re-construction and infiltration of men from outside was seen by the Morogoro

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conference as absolutely urgent. It is more urgent now if only because, in terms of results, we have to date done nothing about it. Therefore the build-up towards the armed struggle must proceed on an intensive scale involving bold operations of a kind calculated to place South Africa well within the Theatre of armed revolution in Southern Africa. The preparations for such bold operations ^{must themselves be intensive.} ~~These are,~~

^{of activity.} ~~Revolutionary Thinking on forms of struggle must focus on 5 areas~~
 (a) the urban areas in the country, with a politically advanced and numerically powerful working class that is willy-nilly in the throes of a vicious class struggle sharpened by the racist and fascist character of the oppressor class. No time should be lost in mobilising this tremendous force and placing it in the vanguard of the revolution, and thereby assigning it its historic role.

(b) The rural areas including in particular the Reserves or Bantustans which continue to be the pool for cheap labour in the industrial ~~Cities~~ and ~~Sugar~~ Plantations, and the dumping ground for embittered Africans endorsed out of the towns. Add to this the thousands of our people who are being kraaled and ~~stuffed~~ ^{stowed out} in "Transit Camps" and whose exploitation amounts to the practice of naked slavery.

The migratory nature of African labour in South Africa, coupled with the ruthless enforcement of ^{the} Pass Laws, provides a unique link between ~~City~~ and ~~Country~~ side which can be exploited by developing underground activity in the ^{cities} ~~City~~ simultaneously with guerrilla actions in the country areas.

(c) The Former Protectorates. If the Governments of these newly independent ~~States~~ are concerned to maintain good relations with the South African racists, the masses of the people are not, and make no distinction between themselves and their oppressed kith and kin in the Republic. Besides, these territories will unavoidably become our operational ~~future~~ bases ^{as} soon as the

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armed struggle commences inside South Africa. They should therefore be prepared and organised for that purpose.

(d) Africa: For a long time to come, indeed for all time, and despite the so called "outward look^{ing}" policy of the Vorster regime, our revolution will continue to need the support, the resources and the facilities available on the African continent. No single state should be left as the unchallenged "sphere of influence" of our enemy. For this reason despite its present role, and even because of it, ways should be found of using Malawi and other states "friendly" to South Africa in our own interests.

(e) The International Community: Our people are second only to the Vietnamese in the volume of international support they enjoy. This should mean that we have potential activists of a wide ~~ranging~~ variety that can be called upon to play specified roles of a practical nature in an offensive to score a succession of victories against the enemy at both the political and the military levels.

As our plans begin to unfold the enemy should be subjected to a many-sided onslaught mounted from all over the country, all over Southern Africa, all over the African Continent and from all over the world.