

INTERNATIONAL FREEDOM FOUNDATION NO. 9/1990

THE ROLE OF THE â\200\234CABALâ\200\235 IN THE
UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT

There is increasing evidence that a power-bloc within the United Democratic Front (UDF) has played a seminal role in influencing the thinking of internal ANC-allied organisations, particularly with regard to the adoption of a more flexible approach to negotiations and the use of non-violent means to achieve political power. Identified as a Cabal by its detractors, it has not only dominated key leadership positions within the UDF, but has also controlled the policy direction of the UDFâ\200\231s affiliates. Its principal objective has been to influence the setting-up of the ANCâ\200\231s internal structures and the orientation of the organisationâ\200\231s position on negotiations. Despite finding itself increasingly marginalised by hardline factions within the SACP/ANC/UDF axis, since the unbanning of the ANC in February 1990, the Cabal still enjoys important influence in the UDF today.

1. IDENTIFYING THE CABAL

The Cabalis not a structured organisation with secret membership, but rather a loose amalgamation of individuals within the UDF who have been pursuing an autonomous agenda, separate from that of the ANC. Aspects of this agenda include:

- * Support for the concept of â\200\234dual powerâ\200\235;
- * Support for the principle of negotiations and for their immediate commencement;
- * Flexibility on the issue of pre-conditions to negotiations;
- * A pragmatic approach to contact and cooperation with organisations not necessarily allied to the SACP and ANC;
- * Support for a â\200\234non-violent strategyâ\200\235, rather than the â\200\234armed struggleâ\200\235, to attain political power; and
- * Concern at the uncontrollability of the militant youth.

Those individuals who constitute the Cabal are also members of the ANC, COSATU and even the SACP. All espouse a socialist position but are not necessarily committed to a hard-line Marxist-Leninist approach. Importantly, many individuals identified with the Cabal are Indians, and therefore not fundamentally committed to the black nationalist militancy of their non-Cabal counterparts within the UDF and the ANC. This in itself has been an important factor in the antagonisms prevalent between the Cabal and its opponents.

Key internal leaders who fall into the Cabal grouping include Murphy Morobe, UDF acting Publicity Secretary; his close associate Mohammed Valli Moosa, UDF acting General Secretary; Elijah Barayi, President of COSATU; Archie Gumede, UDF co-President; Fatima Meer, senior member of the Natal Indian Congress (NIC); Cassim Saloojee, President of the Transvaal Indian Congress (TIC); Eric Molobi, National Co-ordinator of the National Education Crisis Committee; Farid Essack, senior Western Cape UDF leader and formerly National Co-ordinator for the Call of Islam; and Azar Cachalia, UDF Treasurer.

1.1 Tracing its roots

Agitation against the emergence of the Cabal in the UDF can be traced back to 1986. In a letter on the Cabal written by Aubrey Mokoena, Chairman of the Release Mandela Committee, to the ANC in June 1990, it was indicated that he, along with a number of other UDF colleagues, had addressed the ANC's National Executive Committee (NEC) on the question of the Cabal in Lusaka in 1987.

A commission consisting of Beyers Naude; Chris Dlamini, Vice President of COSATU, and Sman-galiso Mkhathshwa, head of the Institute of Contextual Theology was subsequently established to investigate the Cabal. The commission never functioned effectively however and no report was ever

issued. In his letter Mokoena identified the Cabal as a secret clique of activists who have been

doing what is perceived as good work on the surface, but with a hidden double agenda. He attacked

the Cabal for deploying personnel in strategic organisational positions within the UDF who could

not be traced to any of its affiliated organisations.

One of the critical factors responsible for the emergence of the Cabal was the 1985/86 State of Emergency, which resulted in the arrest and imprisonment of the UDF's first generation

of leadership. These included Terror Lekota, UDF Publicity Secretary, and Popo Molefe, UDF General Secretary and both

extremely close to the ANC. The leadership vacuum created by their arrests led to their replacement

by leading Cabal individuals, including Murphy Morobe and Valli Moosa who, in October 1988, formally took over the posts previously held by Lekota and Molefe.

1.2 Securing control of the UDF

According to opponents of the Cabal, it methodically set out to change the objectives and nature

of the UDF. Those originally behind the formation of the UDF in 1983 were adamant that it was formed

on the understanding that the UDF, first and foremost, operated as a front of organisations and never as an organisation in itself. The Cabal saw the existence of the UDF as a vehicle to

parallel the existence of the ANC and, ultimately, to influence the latter.

According to a discussion document on the UDF published by the radical South African Youth Congress (SAYCO) at the beginning of 1990, the UDF initially ran in accordance with the true

ethics of a front. Leaders were elected at AGMs, issues were debated, and no floating members of the

UDF leadership were allowed who did not enjoy a grassroots support base. Later, in the interests

of security, debate was tempered and officials were appointed, rather than elected.

In the document SAYCO states that decisions were often presented to the UDF Executive Committee by individuals who claimed that the decision originated from head office when, in fact,

no one at head office knew of the decision. SAYCO concluded that these anomalies pointed to the existence

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tence of some group or structure outside the normal structures of the UDF that made decisions for the frontâ\200\235.

The strategic and policy thinking of the Cabal was strengthened further by various think-tanks and resource centres which, according to SAYCO, â\200\234like mushrooms ... began to crop up in the name of the UDFâ\200\235. The emergence of these think-tanks, coupled with the Cabalâ\200\231s consolidation of control over the UDFâ\200\231s finances, saw resources increasingly being channelled into Cabal orientated activities. By the end of 1988, the Cabal had effectively entrenched itself within the UDF and was ready to influence political events on a national level.

2. THE BATTLE FOR SUPREMACY

1989 saw the Cabal make a number of successful attempts at stamping its authority over the internal wing of the â\200\234national liberation movementâ\200\235. It was primarily behind the creation of the MDM; played a key role in Winnie Mandelaâ\200\231s fall from grace; was behind moves for closer cooperation with the Democratic Party (DP) and calls not to boycott the 1989 general elections for the white House of Assembly; helped formulate fresh perspectives on negotiations; played a key role in the formation of the National Reception Committee; adopted a conciliatory approach towards Inkatha; and has

had an important impact on ANC/UDF policy with regard to the strategy of â\200\234dual powerâ\200\235.

2.1 The Mass Democratic Movement

Though the concept of the MDM was first mooted by the SACP in 1987 in its official publication, Umsebenzi, it was key Cabal figures who gave the concept definable parameters. In July 1989 both Valli Moosa, himself a SACP member, speaking at COSATUâ\200\231s Second National Congress and Murphy Morobe, in his address to the TIC, defined the MDM as constituting a fighting alliance, with the UDF and COSATU representing its â\200\234strategic coreâ\200\235. Bringing COSATU into the MDM may well have been a tactical move by the Cabal to include the leadership of the trade union movement. Key MDM spokesmen representing COSATU included Elijah Barayi and Jay Naidoo, COSATUâ\200\231s General Secretary.

In a document ostensibly written by the Cabal, that was later used by Aubrey Mokoena in his attack on the entity, it was stated that the Cabal should consider taking full control of the MDM: â\200\234The MDM could become one of the most important vehicles for change according to our views.â\200\235 Linking the Cabal to the MDM, Mokoena slammed the concept of the MDM, it having, in his words, been â\200\234...used by the Cabal to dignify its cliquismâ\200\235. He added that â\200\234by now, everybody knows how many forms of mischief have been committed in the name of the MDMâ\200\235. Not surprisingly, in recent months reference to the MDM by spokesmen of both the ANC and a number of internal groups has diminished considerably.

2.2. The fall of Winnie Mandela

The controversy generated by the Stompie affair provided the Cabal with the opportunity to flex its growing strength within the MDM when the movement launched a scathing public attack against Winnie Mandelâ\200\231n February 1989. A statement issued at a press conference at that time by Murphy Morobe, Elijah Barayi and Archie Gumede, on behalf of the MDM, read: â\200\234We are outraged at Mrs Mandelaâ\200\231s obvious complicity in the abduction. Had Stompie and his colleagues not been abducted by Mrs Mandelâ\200\231s football team, he would have been alive todayâ\200\235. Importantly, the Cabal was able to utilise the widespread antipathy which had built up against Winnie Mandela at a grassroots level to reinforce its attack. The attack which had the cautious support of senior ANC leaders in Lusaka, was an attempt to marginalise a hard-line militant whose actions and statements had increasingly become an embarrassment to the MDM.

Though initially successful, the attack on Winnie Mandela faltered when her supporters called for her â\200\234rehabilitationâ\200\235. Key individuals within the MDM who supported her included Sydney Mafumadi, an SACP member and COSATUâ\200\231s Assistant General Secretary; Cyril Ramaphosa, Gener

al Secretary

of the National Union of Mineworkers; and Frank Chikane, President of the SA Council of Churches.

The attack on Winnie Mandela was perhaps the single most important action responsible for the sub-

tle, but obvious marginalisation of Morobe, Gumede and Barayi by the ANC today. The Cabal underestimated the support Winnie Mandela had with the militant youth spearheaded by SAYCO);

with hard-line elements in the ANC's military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK); and with key ANC leaders

including senior SACP member Chris Hani. Nelson Mandela's personal commitment to his wife was

also underestimated.

2.3 The 1989 general elections

The MDM's often contradictory response to the 1989 September general elections highlighted the

divisions between the Cabal and non-Cabal factions within the movement. In a major break with

the past, the Cabal advocated close cooperation with the Democratic Party (DP) in the House of

Assembly (HOA) elections based on the important role the party could play in facilitating change

through parliament. The recognition of the importance of parliament marked a major departure from

conventional thinking in the movement, which had previously focused on the role extra-parliamentary

forces could play in the achievement of â\200\234peoples powerâ\200\235. It represented a significant shift away from the doctrine of â\200\234peoples warâ\200\235 and â\200\234armed struggleâ\200\235, towards the consideration of at least the simultaneous use of a â\200\234non-violent strategyâ\200\235 to achieve power.

The recognition of the importance of â\200\234white politicsâ\200\235 by the Cabal was reinforced by Cassim Saloojee, TIC President, who, in an interview with Leadership in June 1989, stated that â\200\234...important issues could nevertheless be raised by a movement such as the DP in the House of Assembly, where power really residesâ\200\235. This shift in the UDFâ\200\235s thinking on â\200\234apartheid electionsâ\200\235 first surfaced in 1988 when Archie Gumede suggested that the UDF participate in the October 1988 municipal elections. The Cabalâ\200\235s position on the elections for the HOA, received unexpected support from the ANC when, at a meeting with the Five Freedomsâ\200\235 Forum in early July 1989 in Lusaka, the organisation stated that it would not oppose white participation in the HOA.

Up until the decision by the DP to contest seats in the House of Delegates, the MDMâ\200\235s line was that participation in the HOA was acceptable as parliament had legitimacy in the eyes of the white community. The decision by the DP to contest seats in the House of Delegates, however, threw the MDM into confusion. The NIC was particularly angry as they had been engaged in frequent discussions with the DP. The NICâ\200\235s Vice President, Mewa Ramgobin, responded that the DP would be opposed on all fronts â\200\224 including the HOA. His statement was, however, immediately contradicted by a senior NIC member, Farouk Meer, who indicated that the MDM would not support a boycott of the HOA elections. Also countering calls by more militant sections of the MDM which were calling for a complete boycott of the elections, Murphy Morobe made it clear that the elections for the white chamber were arguably different to the elections for the other two chambers. Morobe himself was immediately contradicted by UDF spokesman Jerry Coovadia, who, at an IDASA seminar in Durban, said that the MDM would put all its efforts into opposing the â\200\234fraudulent electionsâ\200\235.

Confusion mounted with a statement issued by COSATUâ\200\235s Assistant General Secretary, Sydney Mafumadi, who rejected any special preferences being given to the HOA, as there was no difference between the three houses because all the participants were taking part in a â\200\234factory of repressive legislationâ\200\235.

The Cabal had the last say over its hard-line opponents, however, when, in early August 1989, Morobe gave the MDMâ\200\235s final position on the elections, stating that it would not participate in the elections, but nor would it campaign for a white boycott. This coincided with the ANC view that it had â\200\234no intention of mounting a boycott campaign among our white compatriotsâ\200\235. Morobeâ\200\235s position was supported by senior UDF member, Farid Essack, who stressed that there had never been a resis-

tance
coalition for a boycott of the elections.

2.4. The view on negotiations

The Cabal's view of the 1989 elections coincided with a major reassessment of the concept of negotiations. Though the ANC had been making concessionary noises on the prospects of negotiations with the SA government, the Cabal proposed radical new approaches to the issue.

One of the first indications of this reassessment was a policy document on negotiations circulated within the MDM towards the end of 1989. According to British media reports, the document urged the abandonment of the 'necessarily crude, confrontational politics of the Botha era'. It pointed out that to insist that negotiations must centre on the government's total capitulation was not a realistic objective. The paper emphasised politics based on step by step bargaining, rather than an all-or-nothing approach stressing that insisting on pre-conditions for negotiations was illusory because negotiations, by definition, imply 'give and take'.

Leading Cabal individuals have for some time been adamant about the importance of negotiations. Fatima Meer from the NIC stated that, '...if we enter the negotiation chamber with the attitude that to compromise is to sell-out, then negotiations will fail before they begin'. In a speech to COSATU's Second National Congress in July 1989, Valli Moosa stressed the importance of negotiations by stat-

ing that we must never forget that pursuing negotiations are in the interests of the people and against those of the regime. Commenting on the disruptive elements within the MDM during the 1989 elections, Murphy Morobe stressed that from our side we would prefer people to engage in debate ... to resolve issues through debate.

Coupled with this shift towards negotiations, the Cabal also emphasised the need to resolve problems with the minimum of force. In a lengthy interview with the weekly paper New Nation at the beginning of the year, Murphy Morobe alluded to this position when he said: Our struggle is not about violence but about the achievement of peace and democracy. When possibilities exist for the resolution of our conflict with the minimum force being used, that is the situation that has to be encouraged. This approach contrasts starkly with militant statements emerging at this time from the SACP, Umkhonto we Sizwe, and SAYCO.

The Cabal, in its document on negotiations, is scathing of the militancy of the youth and elements of MK who have little respect for the negotiation process. The Cabal fears that the negotiation process may be derailed, resulted in a visit to India earlier this year by certain MDM leaders in order to ensure that country's support for the peace process in SA. Indian officials assured the SA leaders that, should the transformation of SA come about peacefully, India would be prepared to contribute funds to future ANC/UDF election campaigns. Indian officials stressed that India would not be able to cope with an influx of Indians from SA if negotiations failed. The Cabal therefore supports swift negotiations to pre-empt the seizure of power, and that pre-conditions be scrapped in order to facilitate the process.

2.5. The view on Inkatha

Notwithstanding the general antagonism towards Inkatha by most components of the SACP/ANC/COSATU alliance, the Cabal attempted to adopt a more flexible approach towards the resolution of the Natal conflict which recognised the participation of Inkatha. For example, the Natal peace initiative launched between COSATU, the UDF and Inkatha in 1989 was supported by the Cabal. Speaking at COSATU's Second National Congress, the initiatives taken by the MDM, Valli Moosa said of significance was the commencement of talks with Inkatha to resolve the Natal conflict an initiative which had the crucial support of Oliver Tambo.

Following the unbanning of the SACP and ANC however, relations deteriorated rapidly between the MDM and Inkatha. Despite Mandela's willingness to talk to Buthelezi, it was the hard-liners in the ANC who effectively dictated policy towards Inkatha. A key anti-Inkatha figure was ANC and SACP member, Harry Gwala the ANC convenor of the Natal midlands area who personally intervened to stop Mandela holding talks with Buthelezi.

Gwala was supported by Chris Hani who, from Transkei, called for the 'isolation' of Buthelezi. This hostile position found ready support from the militant youth. At SAYCO's National Congress in April, its President, Peter Makoba, called Buthelezi an 'enemy of the people' and said that 'there's no way we can win Buthelezi back' he is a lost cause.

The Cabal spoke out on attacks against Inkatha when Archie Gumede criticised the COSATU/ANC stayaway, on 2 July 1990, that called for the dissolution of Kwazulu. Believing the stayaway to be 'unwise', Gumede pointed out that Buthelezi had a legitimate constituency, and that it was '...a first class recipe for intransigence on the part of Buthelezi ... and a first class recipe for continual killing of people'. Gumede's protests, however, were quickly repudiated by the ANC's internal leadership core.

2.6. The role of the National Reception Committee

The formation of the National Reception Committee (NRC) in 1989 to oversee the release of ANC prisoners, including Nelson Mandela and other Rivonia trialists, was viewed by the Cabal as an opportunity to manipulate the policy decisions of the ANC. According to the Cabal document alluded to by Mokoena, 'the functioning of the NRC has catapulted our people into also being the leaders of the people'. Key Cabal individuals on the NRC included Murphy Morobi and Valli Mootsa.

In his letter to the ANC on the Cabal, Mokoena wrote, 'there was a blatant attempt by the Cabal to marginalise the Release Mandela Committee (RMC) when the leadership was released'. In fact, as an entity, 'the RMC played virtually no role in the programme surrounding the release of the Rivonia trialists.

Of interest is the fact that the Cabal thought highly of the NRC's Chairman, Cyril Ramaphosa. This man shows a great deal of promise and should continually be nurtured. The extent to which Ramaphosa's implied linkage with the Cabal may have been responsible for his recent public demise, on a political level, is difficult to gauge. A leading figure in COSATU, Ramaphosa is known to harbour political aspirations of his own. Initially close to Nelson Mandela following his release in February, it is known that a serious disagreement arose between the two after Mandela felt that Ramaphosa's role primarily remained within the trade union movement. Ramaphosa was replaced by Zwelakhe Sisulu as Mandela's personal confidante.

According to the British publication, Africa Confidential, Ramaphosa is known to have become increasingly disillusioned at the incompetence and corruption he found within the ANC after his trip to Lusaka with Walter Sisulu in January 1990. Aware of the capabilities of Ramaphosa, the Cabal felt that there was a coincidence of interests between themselves and Ramaphosa, notwithstanding his more hard-line political position, which could be exploited vis-a-vis their influencing of the ANC.

2.7. The great debate: dual power vs peoples power

Underpinning the Cabal's approach to the resolution of SA's political problems is the strategic concept of 'dual power', in contrast to the concept of 'peoples power' still dominant in the strategic thinking of both the SACP and the ANC.

2.7.1. Dual Power

According to the publication Work in Progress, the concept of 'dual power' was first posed by UDF Assistant General Secretary, Valli Moosa at a UDF national workshop in April 1990. Importantly, the concept was given support by the SACP in the form of an anonymous contribution in its latest edition of Umsebenzi, edited by Joe Slovo.

The concept of 'dual power' has its origins in the period that fell between the fall of the Tsar in Russia in March 1917, and the Bolshevik seizure of power in October 1917, when Alexander Kerensky's government found its control over the institutions of state challenged by local Soviets â particularly in Petrograd. 'Dual power' in South African terms, argues Valli Moosa, is 'a situation ... where the regime no longer has sole monopoly over the control of all institutions (including state institutions), geographical areas and other aspects of peoples lives'. At the April UDF workshop he stressed that 'building dual power' should be the most important strategic objective of the liberation movement.

Setting the scene for 'dual power' in SA, the Umsebenzi article argues that there are two powers (government and ANC) within SA today: 'These powers exist side by side and are cont

esting for political control.â\200\235 The article poses questions concerning, for example, the use of Homeland structures by the ANC and the passing up of key opportunities to seize control of crumbling state structures in the townships, i.e. municipal councils. â\200\234Dual powerâ\200\235, its proponents believe, will finally lead to the attainment of â\200\234peoples powerâ\200\235.

Some individuals within the Cabal do not talk of â\200\234dual powerâ\200\235 but of â\200\234empowermentâ\200\235. Both concepts, however, represent the same strategy. Expanding on â\200\234empowermentâ\200\235, TIC President, Cassim Saloojee, stated that it is engaging â\200\234the system seriously at a whole number of levels, with the clear intention of making gains â\200\224 and, in the process developing a sense of potential powerâ\200\235.

â\200\234Dual powerâ\200\235 also de-emphasises the role of violence in attaining power. It emphasises negotiations rather than the waging of â\200\234peoples warâ\200\235. In The Weekly Mail earlier this year, Morobe warned against the emphasis of mass mobilisation â\200\224 a position that contrasts sharply with groups such as SAYCO, which are urging the transfer of power through mass action.

2.7.2. Criticism of dual power

Opponents of â\200\234dual powerâ\200\235 argue that its attainment will lead to co-option i.e. joint responsibility for the implementation of state policy, rather than â\200\234peoples powerâ\200\235. The August 1990 edition of the ANCâ\200\231s publication, Mayibuye, launched a scathing rebuttal of the concept of â\200\234dual powerâ\200\235 â\200\224 attack-ing its central premise of representing President de Klerkâ\200\231s strategy to â\200\234co-opt democratic structures

into becoming joint administrators of the apartheid system²³⁵. The article points out that proponents of ²³⁴peoples power²³⁵ have as their strategic objective the transfer of power to the people as a whole. The article sees the replacement of ²³⁴apartheid structures²³⁵ with what it calls ²³⁴organs of peoples power²³⁵. Opponents of ²³⁴dual power²³⁵ categorise it as a phase in a revolutionary situation when, for a moment, the major forces of conflict enjoy relatively equal strength ²²⁴ but that it should not be a strategic objective. Posing the question as to whether the ANC supports dual power, the article answers emphatically, ²³⁴certainly not,²³⁵ and stresses instead the need to build ²³⁴peoples power²³⁵ in order to move rapidly towards a ²³⁴peoples national government²³⁵.

2.7.3. Manifestations of dual power

Despite the criticism, ²³⁴dual power²³⁵ in the SA context is a potentially sophisticated strategy and is based on the recognition that the violent overthrow of the state is unattainable. The evident failure of ²³⁴peoples war²³⁵, spearheaded by MK, coupled with the prospect of negotiations has prompted a visible shift in strategy by components within the ANC/UDF axis. Encompassing aspects of ²³⁴dual power²³⁵ it sees the negotiation process as a means to ²³⁴strip the government of its control over the institutions of state power and over society in general.²³⁵ Manifestations of this include the following:

- * The control and running of Homeland administrations sympathetic to the ANC (eg Transkei and Kangwane);
- * The MDM's²³¹ participation in the conference which led to the formation of the Consultative Business Movement, which facilitated direct interface with the business community;
- * The MDM's²³¹ entry into negotiations on the Soweto rent crisis and the subsequent agreement signed between the Transvaal Provincial Administration, Soweto Peoples Delegation headed by Cyril Ramaphosa and the Greater Soweto City Councils;
- * The ANC's²³¹ offer to help resolve the violence in Natal via joint patrols comprised of both the South African Police and MK units;
- * The growing conflict of loyalties emerging in SA's²³¹ security forces ²²⁴ most evident in the wave of strikes among prison wardens which was spearheaded by POPCRU;
- * COSATU's²³¹ participation in the drawing up the SACCOLA (labour) Accord alongside ²³⁴big business²³⁵ and the union's²³¹ willingness to serve on the National Manpower Commission attached to the Department of Manpower;
- * The increasing role played by the National Education Crisis Committee in influencing the Department of Education and Training's²³¹ policy on black education;
- * The proposed formation of a National Civic Association by the UDF early next year to repl

ace col-
lapsing local authorities; and

* The recent approach by the UDF to Hernus Kriel, Minister of Planning and Provincial Affairs, to serve on the National Land Commission.

In conclusion, the strategy of dual power works towards making the ANC/UDF axis indispensable in the running of the country, having as its final aim the transfer of power from the state to the ANC.

3. THE FUTURE OF THE UDF

The unbanning of the ANC has cast questions over the continued relevance of the UDF, especially by those groups hostile towards the Cabal. SAYCO was the first organisation to express discontent with the UDF structures. In its discussion document on the UDF, SAYCO has called on it to undergo major restructuring to once again operate as a frontâ\200\235 accountable to its affiliates and not as an organisation. In April SAYCO decided at its National Congress to disaffiliate from the UDF and to merge with the ANCâ\200\231s Youth League.

The most scathing attack on the UDF to date has come from Aubrey Mokoena who, in his letter to the ANC, stated that, â\200\234if the UDF is allowed to exist and knowingly provide harbourage to the Cabal, there will be serious consequences beyond thisâ\200\235. The Cabal document, on the other hand, stressed the importance of the UDF not disintegrating with the unbanning of the ANC. â\200\234Murphy [Morobe] et al must push for the parallel functioning of the UDF and ensure that a resolution with this message be taken at the GC [General Council] (6 May)â\200\235.

The ANC's view of the UDF is no doubt being guided primarily by its view of the Cabal. An ANC document leaked to the press in August 1990 entitled 'Report and Recommendations of the Commission on the Cabal', chaired by SACP ideologue Govan Mbeki, made it clear that the manipulative role of the Cabal required urgent attention, and that the Cabal was 'very much a national problem'.

Indications of where the UDF is heading emerged at the UDF's General Council meeting in April, where it was agreed that the UDF would continue to exist, but that the ANC would assume leadership at the level of national policy making. The ANC stressed at the meeting that the UDF's continued existence was contingent on it becoming a 'patriotic front' to include organisations that would not readily identify with the ANC.

A key reason behind the ANC's reticence to disband the UDF completely is its fear of being swamped by UDF affiliates. The ANC is loathe to inherit current UDF structures that would result in sectarian elements like the Cabal gaining a strategic foothold within the organisation. It has adopted instead the position of encouraging the autonomous existence of local groups that would form the basis of a 'patriotic front' 'separate and subordinate to the ANC. The UDF will further only attend to local issues such as rent and water supply problems.

The fate of the UDF will be sealed at the ANC's national congress targeted for June 1991. Though it will not be disbanded, the UDF will probably be renamed and undergo further restructuring to fulfil its now downgraded status as a 'patriotic front'.

4. DEALING WITH THE CABAL

The ANC will avoid confronting the Cabal openly, due to both the embarrassment it would cause

the movement and to the fact that it still constitutes a powerful constituency within the UDF. Rather,

allow key approach has been adopted that seeks to undermine the influence of the Cabal on a number of levels:

- * By subordinating the UDF to the policy direction of the ANC, a measure of control can be exercised over the Cabal operating outside the structures of the ANC;
- * In building its own internal structures, the ANC is simultaneously gutting, and thereby deliberately weakening UDF structures with the incorporation of senior non-Cabal UDF members into their own administrative structures; and
- * Finally, individuals associated with the Cabal, due to a variety of circumstances, have been effectively sidelined. Cyril Ramaphosa remains distant from public politics; Elijah Barayi is no longer

heard from; Valli Moosa has adopted a low profile, while Murphy Morobe, who has played a pivotal role in the UDF, has been given a bursary to study abroad for one year at Princeton University.

Despite the marginalising of the Cabal, it has played a key role in reorientating internal ANC-allied structures on a range of issues. The views of the Cabal often did, and continue to, coincide with the pragmatic wing of the ANC headed by Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo. The Cabal's demise in the long run will only serve to strengthen the militant faction of the SACP/ANC axis placing increasing pressure on the successful resolution of SA's political problems.

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