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**STATEMENT OF SYDNEY MUFAMADI
MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
OF THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS
TO THE INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY CONFERENCE
20 FEBRUARY 1993**

Chairperson,

Members of the Diplomatic Corps,
Distinguished delegates and special guests from the world
anti-apartheid movement,
Members of international observer missions,

Comrades and Compatriots,

This conference takes place at a time when we, the people of South Africa, are busy negotiating a path away from the problems which beset our country. All processes of transition are replete with difficulties. Ours is no exception. This conference is a monument to our time-honoured, shared commitment to overcome those difficulties. The act of convening this conference alone speaks to the importance we attach to the continuing role of the international community in helping to transform South Africa into a zone of Peace, Democracy and Development.

The majority of parties and organisations have committed themselves to a negotiated, democratic settlement. It goes without saying that peace and a climate for free political activity are some of the indispensable conditions for the realisation of such an outcome. We chose, out of our own intuition and hope, to participate in activities leading up to the conception and signing of the National

Peace Accord. We were convinced then, and we remain convinced to this day, that we need a multilateral instrument with which to combat the scourge of violence. We are gravely concerned at this problem because of the dreadful human tragedies it is causing and the awesome problems it is creating for the process of transition.

It is important from the onset to deal with some of the media constructions regarding this problem of violence. We do so because we believe that state owned and controlled media has been largely and particularly responsible for choosing to paint pictures which only a film director with an over-heated imagination could believe. The consequences of such a choice are not obscure: it diverts the attention of those who seriously want to address the problem, away from the real issues which lie at the bottom of the problem itself.

It is our contention that the violence problem is a manifestation of the past which we inherit. Supporting evidence for this charge is as persuasive as it is massive. Yet as far as the other side is concerned, if it is not "Black-on-Black" violence, then it is political competition between the ANC and the Inkatha Freedom Party which sometimes expresses itself in violent conflict. What they are not saying is: that in order to give the majority of our people who are excluded from the organs of power, an illusion of participation, they created toy structures in the form of Bantustan parliaments and governments. By so doing, they imposed illegitimate governmental structures on our people - structures run by people who develop a propensity to use violence to decimate popular organisation because they see

popular organisation as posing a threat to their privileged positions. Evidence which was put before the Goldstone Commission showed that two hundred IFP men were taken to the Caprivi Strip by the South African Defence Force for training in the art of killing. It is anybody's guess as to what these men are doing today!

It has been said in some quarters that we cannot have elections in a situation of continuing violence. In his opening address, our National Chairperson, O.R. Tambo, alluded to the existence of people who are gripped by the fear for change. It is not inconceivable that such people will find it prudent to connive at the violence which, in their estimation, will help to undermine the process of transition. There is already evidence of systematic organising by elements within the security establishment, who have a nostalgia for the good old days of unfettered White rule. It is our estimation that as the process of transition reaches advanced levels, for instance, as we get close to the non-racial democratic elections, the more will those elements who are haunted by the spectre of electoral defeat, attempt to intensify violence. Nothing can be more absurd than to suggest that they should be rewarded for that.

It is of pressing importance that something be done about this. We believe that the Goldstone Commission has done a lot of work in this regard. The Commission will continue to require the assistance and co-operation of all people of goodwill. The Commission has expressed a desire to investigate all armed formations in the country. We understand this proposal by the Commission to be one which will

entail investigation of all armed formations, including Umkhonto we Sizwe, the South African Defence Force, the South African Police, APLA and all Bantustan police and military formations. We hold ourselves in readiness to co-operate with the Commission. In his report to the United Nations Security Council (dated 22 December 1992) the UN Secretary-General stated that such co-operation is not forthcoming from, amongst others, the Chief Minister of KwaZulu, who has refused to co-operate in investigations of the KwaZulu police. Like you, we find this disconcerting.

It is for that reason that we suggest that everything should be done to avail the Goldstone Commission such assistance as it may require from the international community and to help it secure the co-operation of all parties whose contribution is deemed necessary to ensure that violence does abate and is put well on the way to extinction.

As a solution, the National Peace Accord is incomplete and provisional. For there are many issues germane to the problem of violence which are not within the competence of peace accord structures: issues such as investigation of incidents of violence, the conduct of the security forces, in particular their covert operations, and several others. It is for that reason that we think that communities need to be empowered to develop their own capacity to handle investigations. We have had cases where "suspects" (as the police call them) were acquitted in court because of shoddy police investigations. In general, the rate of arrests and successful prosecutions relative to the many incidents of violence, has been appallingly low.

To the extent that this is the result of inefficiency on the part of investigating police officers, this can be remedied by making available more expertise from the international community. Material resources could also be mobilised on a more popular basis by the anti-apartheid movement, to assist in the training of volunteers from the communities. We have been able, with the help of local non-governmental organisations, to raise the skills of our people in areas such as legal issues relating to violence, mediation, negotiation, conflict resolution, monitoring with regard to police investigations, and court monitoring. We believe that such activities will enhance our capacity to intervene on the side of peace and will strengthen the peace accord structures.

Another area which merits attention is the problem of people who have been forced to leave their homes in violence stricken areas. To those people, the peace process and life itself, will only have meaning if conditions can be recreated for them to return to their homes, and for their homes to be restored at least to their original condition. The AAM could also lobby governments to make resources available to assist communities in their peace-process driven programmes of reconstruction.

The ANC firmly believes that central to our capacity to intervene effectively with regard to the problem of violence, is a rapid movement forward towards the creation of multi-party structures of control in those areas we consider to be crucial to the electoral process. For any advance from confrontation and conflict to co-existence, to friendship and to fraternity, calls for a breakthrough. It calls for the

overcoming of the inertia and deep-rooted hostilities. Hence the need for signposts, new ideas and new formulae. Thus we have put a proposal before the government of the day, as well as to the other players in the South African political scene. We call for the establishment, as a matter of urgency, of a Transitional Executive Council whose task shall be to see to the levelling of the playing field in preparation for elections. It will also be necessary to establish, as one of its sub-structures, sub-council on law and order and defence which will bring all armed formations and police forces under joint control. For leaving the regime and other Bantustan administrations with their ominous military capacities will not help the process of transition. It might even tempt some of them to consider the Savimbi option. It is thus hard for us to find any rational grounds to justify the decision by the Swiss government to sell Pilatus planes to the South African government in blatant violation of the arms embargo.

It does appear that it will be necessary for us to explore possibilities of forming a local peace-keeping force made up of members selected from existing police and military formations, including our own people's army. This will help reduce the intolerable high levels of violence, and to create a climate conducive to free and fair elections. The expert help, as well as resources from the international community will sorely be needed in this regard.

A lot more still needs to be done, both by ourselves, as well as by members of international observer missions presently stationed in the country. The ebb of violence in some areas at the moment is attributable in part to the presence of

those international observers. The people of South Africa are benefiting from their presence. Their continued presence and their redoubling of their efforts, will certainly inhibit those who have invested in violence.

The international observers must have seen for themselves, and perhaps even experienced, the effects of existing legislation in some Bantustans which produce conditions that are inimical to the climate for free political activity. Those are laws which effectively bar people from participating in the activities of their own organisations. In the case of Bophutatswana, the reasons for this can only be found in the fact that, although there was sufficient consensus at Codesa on reincorporation of the so-called independent bantustans into South Africa, Bophutatswana entered a reservation. Lying at the core of their denying other parties and organisation the space to organise freely, is their fear that in conditions of relative peace and freedom to associate, the will of the people will find expression. Similar anti-democratic tendencies are displayed by the Ciskei military council.

Since some of these Bantustans operate offices in foreign countries, it should be possible to mount campaigns aimed at persuading them to think properly.

We are going through difficult yet exciting times. Never before have we faced such formidable problems as we face today, just as we have never had such unprecedented opportunities to resolve them. The democratic movement which leads the transformation from Apartheid to Peace, Democracy and Development,

continues to need your support. With your support, I am sure we will march (as we have already begun), down the road to our cherished goal.

By way of conclusion and with your permission Chairperson, I propose to outline in summary form, steps which we think need to be taken by the international community with regard to the problems we have been discussing:

1. Initiate and intensify media campaigns aimed at countering the South African regime's deliberate distortions as to the nature of violence.
2. Expose and isolate parties that are trying to derail the process of transition to democracy.
3. Upon request, governments should make resources (both human and material) available to the Goldstone Commission.
4. Pressurise parties to co-operate with the Goldstone Commission as and when the commission proposes to conduct investigations which would require their co-operation.
5. Make resources available to the ANC to help improve the skills of its personnel who are involved in the Peace Accord structures.
6. Both the AAM and governments to assist the reconstruction programme which is so vital to the restoration of peace in violence-torn areas.
7. Avail expert advice to the parties in the peace process with regard to the establishment of an internal peace-keeping force -- i.e., once such a decision is formally taken.
8. Reinforce the capacity of international observers to intervene in the problem of violence.

9. Pressurise those Bantustans that are obstinate, to yield space for free political activity.