

# THE STAR 21/10/93

## IFP student leader slain

■ OWN CORRESPONDENT  
and SAPA

An Inkatha Freedom Party student leader at the University of Zululand, Michion Mkhize (26), was stabbed to death at nearby Vulindlela township outside Empangeni on Tuesday night, the IFP said.

The organisation said in a statement that Mkhize, the vice-chairman of the IFP's university branch, was in a group of IFP sympathisers attacked by eight men at about 5 pm.

Mkhize and another unidentified student were stabbed to death and three others were injured.

KwaZulu Police could not confirm Mkhize's death yesterday.

### Hacked

The IFP claimed the attack was politically motivated and linked to a planned IFP meeting on the campus this Saturday.

Mkhize was the second IFP leader killed in Natal since the weekend.

Wembezi IFP leader Duke Mbongwa was

hacked to death during a so-called faction fight at Mangweni near Loskop at the weekend. He was the chairman of the Mangweni IFP branch.

Also in Natal on Tuesday, Delelwa Duso (61) was shot dead in Umlazi's C section and Derrick Gumede (25) was fatally shot in the head.

And in the Ntonjeni district of Izingolweni, in southern Natal, three men were murdered and dismembered during an attack on a funeral vigil.

Police blamed the funeral attack on a family feud.



# The Argus

LIBERTY  
AND PRESS  
FREEDOM

Editor-in-Chief:  
A P DRYSDALE

Deputy Editor:  
J C B HOBDAV

122 St Georges Mall,  
Cape Town, 8000  
Telephone: 488 4911

## Where would this vengeance stop?

**F**OR many people incensed by malevolent acts of violence, there might be some emotional satisfaction in the call by ANC Western Cape secretary Tony Yengeni for "Nuremberg-style trials" and the carrying out of the death sentences imposed on Chris Hani's assassins last week.

But there has been as much criticism of the acquittal of Winnie Mandela on murder charges as there has been of the acquittal of Gaye Derby-Lewis in the Hani case. There have been calls for the trial of prominent ANC officials allegedly responsible for horrifying deeds in ANC camps, just as there have been demands for the trial of those allegedly involved in state-sponsored crimes.

But where would this sort of vengeance end? And what would it achieve other than to stir up emotions on all sides? Certainly the country's judicial system cannot allow known criminals to escape justice, now or in the future. By the same token it cannot be made subservient to the demands of politicians, or face criticism because its judgments satisfy judicial, rather than political, criteria.

Mr Yengeni, and others like him, should recognise that sooner or later, whatever happens, the country will have to put this violent era behind it and seek true national reconciliation. It would be better, by far, to begin the process now, before further damage is done to the cause of unity and peace.

# Talks: pressure on Buthelezi promised

## ■ STAR AFRICA SERVICE

Maputo — Both the UN leader and Foreign Affairs Minister Pik Botha have pledged to try to bring IFP leader Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi back to the negotiation table.

Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali said the UN would

continue to apply pressure on Buthelezi to rejoin the negotiation process.

Buthelezi's refusal to continue negotiations was a major stumbling block. "He is a problem but we will continue to work with the IFP through discussions to get them back to the negotiation table."

Foreign Affairs Minister Pik Botha also promised to work towards a solution.

"We can't proceed without the IFP, the CP and General Constand Viljoen's group. We can't go on until substantial numbers of major political parties agree to the transitional constitution."

He said if the process went

on without them, South Africa was likely to be in for a very troublesome time.

Botha said he was convinced Buthelezi believed what he was saying and added that it was time all the other parties — including the NP — took another serious look at federalism.

THE STAR 21/10/93

## 24 die in clan battle in Natal

### ■ STAFF REPORTERS

Twenty-four people were killed, five wounded and more than 100 huts destroyed in faction fighting at Loskop near Estcourt, Natal, yesterday.

Police said the Mnyangweni and Ngondini clans clashed in a macabre replay of fighting that saw two killed 12 days ago.

And on the East Rand, violence continued with police reporting the deaths of five people yesterday.

Police believe the battle in Loskop was related to an age-old fight for land.

Natal SAP spokesman Captain Henry Budhram said the attack occurred early yesterday. Firearms and sharp instruments were used. "Some people were hacked. Others stabbed, shot and burnt."

Revenge has been cited by police as the motive for the latest clashes after the recent death of two members of the Ngondini clan. Two days later, 62 Mnyangweni huts were gutted in the district, said Budhram.

He said it was still unclear how the fighting started yesterday, but police and SADF members were investigating.

Security forces were patrolling the area, which was "quiet but very tense" early today.

On the East Rand, five people, including an assistant constable, died in violence yesterday.

Police said the off-duty policeman was shot dead by unknown gunmen in Tembisa.

A man burnt to death in Ramakanope West in Kattlehong and the body of a man with a gunshot wound was found at Kwesine Hostel in Kattlehong.

Two men were shot dead in separate attacks in Tokoza.

# THE STAR 21/10/93

## Fire guts ANC election office

Damage estimated at thousands of rands was caused by a fire which swept through the newly opened ANC Randfontein election office early today.

Uhuru Moiloa, the ANC West Rand voting co-ordinator who ran the office, said he had been told by police that a white man was seen in the area shortly before an explosion was heard and "the place went up in flames".

Police said an arson docket had been opened. — West Rand Bureau.

*Warning that new govt could replace diplomats*

# 'ANC will review envoys'

■ BY CHRIS WHITFIELD  
POLITICAL CORRESPONDENT

The ANC, unhappy about recent "unilateral" appointments of SA heads of mission to foreign posts, has warned that these envoys will all be subject to review — and possible changes — if it comes to power.

ANC international affairs administration head Yusuf Saloojee told The Star yesterday: "It is normal international practice that when a head of state changes in any country, the credentials of all heads of mission be-

## THE 'unilateral' appointment of heads of mission raises concern, even in South Africa's Department of Foreign Affairs

come invalid. In our case it would be no different."

This would include all ambassadors around the world.

"It is possible the new government may want to retain some or all, but certainly it is

not automatic that they remain," Saloojee said.

There are more than 80 such posts in SA embassies and trade missions. Many of these were recent appointments as SA was welcomed back into previously hostile territory.

It is understood that the concern about recent appointments is shared in some quarters of the existing foreign service.

Some believe that the system applied in the US, where all ambassadors automatically tender their resignation when the government changes, should apply

in South Africa.

A Department of Foreign Affairs spokesman noted that career diplomats represented whichever government was in power, but would not be drawn on the position of political appointments.

Saloojee said the ANC was "a little dismayed" that so many new ambassadors were being appointed unilaterally.

"The ANC is quite certain there will have to be a review and possible changes to the Department of Foreign Affairs as well as diplomatic representation abroad," he said.





## LETTERS

■CHRIS LOUW'S article under the heading "FW's men: Whisky pals and experts" (*The Weekly Mail*, April 8-15, 1993) might make interesting reading to the uninformed. However, it also highlights the danger of posing as fact information gained by hearsay.

The assertion that, during his early days as president, De Klerk was "grilled under harsh television spotlights about his politics by his colleagues", ostensibly to prepare him for media interviews, is void of all truth.

Minister Amie Venter, though a fellow student of De Klerk, was never one of his roommates.

It is also not true that De Klerk and Minister Adriaan Vlok ever worked together prior to becoming colleagues in cabinet.

Anybody professing to know the state president well will also tell you that he is a "team-man" par excellence and that he detests "cliques". The reference to the "De Klerk clique" is thus not only misleading, but also totally out of character of the person about whom the article professes to convey inside knowledge.

The whole article conveys a warped picture of De Klerk and his style of management. — **Casper SC Venter, press secretary, State President's Office**

●Chris Louw replies: I note that Mr Venter focuses on minor issues and offers no challenge to the substance of my article. My source, by the way, on the matter of De Klerk being grilled by his colleagues under television lights was Piet Coetzer, chief director of the National Party's federal council. He volunteered the information over lunch in May 1990 in Verena's Restaurant in Cape Town. It was reported in *Die Suid Afrikaner* in June 1990 and never refuted.

# FW's pals didn't groom him for the TV cameras

■PHILLIP VAN NIEKERK'S thumb-suck article (*WM* May 7-13 1993) accuses the Inkatha Freedom Party of being "hell-bent on delaying elections".

Either Van Niekerk has not understood the mechanics and the spirit of the multiparty negotiation process or he is simply being naughty if not deliberately inflaming passions against the IFP. The IFP sired the negotiation process, overcoming the distinct frigidity of the ruling party. The IFP went further to impress upon the then powers that be that no seed would be deposited until all the people were free to participate. We wept when some of Van Niekerk's heroes put the process on ice for some 10 months last year. Yet we used the forced stalemate to convince more groupings to come to the negotiating table.

To talk of the IFP even dreaming of delaying elections is disinformation. Frank Mdlalose's right to read his paper was incontrovertible and would have taken a mere 10 or so minutes. Distributing a paper before it is read formally is standard practice and a courtesy to those who might like to react. It is not a bar to its being read in formal session. Perhaps some of Van Niekerk's "knights in shining armour" were not keen to hear their names associated with violence.

As for setting a date for elections, the IFP is on

record as saying that any date is welcome as long as everyone thinks that the practical arrangements can be made ready by that date.

Van Niekerk admits that there are thugs mowing down people and that there are leaders (whom he names) encouraging such behaviour. Has he got some secret tranquillisers that will stop this kind of behaviour to allow us to have free and fair elections with no intimidation or mass psychosis? Certainly his rich reservoir of invective against the IFP just will not do. — **Dennis Madide, IFP**

■YOUR report by Ivor Powell regarding the Venice Biennale (*WM* March 26-April 1, 1993) named David Koloane as having been part of the selection process for the exhibition. This information was incorrectly included in the press release from which Powell quoted. I wish to clarify the situation, by saying that at no time was David Koloane consulted on the selection for the Biennale. — **Christopher Till, director: culture, Johannesburg City Council**

■IN 1984 Nasionale Pers, a National Party organ, approached the government for a licence for TV broadcasting. It argued that the revenue of the press was being eroded and that its economic viability for survival was being threatened by the

growth of advertising on SABC.

The government granted M-Net a broadcasting licence in 1986. The licence was granted specifically on condition that *only* Nasionale Pers Ltd may manage M-Net.

M-Net's licence conditions have been changed on numerous occasions by the government, always creating a favourable climate for M-Net's long-term viability. The NP — via Dagbreek Trust, Servgro International Limited, Nasionale Pers, Telkom, Rembrandt Group and the Perskor Group — is planning at the multi-party negotiations for M-Net to be more accessible to everyone having a TV set. This would spread Nasionale Pers influence; not just in South Africa, but also in Africa.


The government is also vigorously attempting to grant additional licences to M-Net so that it may use Telkom's fibre optic cable, which is connected to the rest of the world's major television programme distributors. This would allow M-Net to broadcast globally syndicated programmes, ensuring that a future SABC becomes insignificant by not being able to acquire many international programmes of high quality. This manipulation has vast implications for the long-term economical viability of the SABC.

The most disturbing fact is that the BBC has signed joint agreements with M-Net to broadcast into the rest of Africa. The BBC, by having a joint service with M-Net, has given Nasionale Pers credibility to infiltrate the rest of Africa. The BBC must be held responsible for having indirectly assisted the NP to spread its propaganda and ideology into Africa. M-Net to date owns 50 percent of the Kenya Television Network and is expanding into sub-Saharan Africa as well.

The licencing condition that Nasionale Pers only, as a minority shareholder, may manage M-Net is an infringement of the listing requirements of the JSE. — **Anwar Ismail, Cape Town**

Letters should be addressed to: The Letters Page, The Weekly Mail, PO Box 260425, Excom 2023. The editors reserve the right to edit for clarity and space.

Weekly Mail 21 to 27 / 93



**T**

The Government, with one wary eye on the possible need for an elec-

A general strike by the militants of the Left seems, unless it can hold out, an insufficient deterrent to the desperadoes of the Right. As things stand, a strike might endure two days or three, and at the end of it the transition process will still have to

That alone may require the tripartite alliance to kick Cosatu quietly under the table before the strike card, which may have greater value in a lower-stakes game, is wasted in the run of this particular play.

At a press conference on Tuesday, Gomomo sounded quite truculent as

It takes little imagination to appreciate Cosatu's fears of the extent the ANC may find itself forced to trade off the reconstruction and development programme against economic

Somewhere in here are the makings of a struggle for the soul of the next government. This strike may not happen. If it does, its first victim could be the alliance, which would take a dent even if the ANC finds it necessary to play along for now.

# THE STAR 21/10/93

## Alliance seeks early summit

The Freedom Alliance last night rejected suggestions that a summit of political leaders be held only once an interim constitution is agreed to and stressed it take place earlier.

# Picking up the gauntlet Exploding myths

Dr Mangosuthu Buthelezi's speech at the Monday opening of a special sitting of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly underlines the crisis negotiations are in.

Dr Buthelezi categorically stated that "we will never again be thrust into a future we have not determined for ourselves." In doing so he picked up the gauntlet thrown to the floor by the ANC/National Party alliance.

Dr Buthelezi repeated the view that federalism represented a "bottom line" for the Zulu nation. It is also, he said, an "indispensable condition to ensure adequate checks and balances in a South African context and to defeat totalitarian and oppressive tendencies which are operating in our country."

The Chief Minister correctly identified the characteristics of 20 federations world-wide as being dual citizenship of both member states and the federal state, the inalienable right of member states to exist, the right of final decision-making powers by member states which exceed the degree of autonomy presently enjoyed by KwaZulu, as well as a central legislature made up of member state representation.

These characteristics are not evident in constitutional drafts which have emerged from the World Trade Centre. In any event the constitution agreed upon by the

ANC and Government is only an interim one, and may be rewritten within a matter of months by a constituent assembly dominated by these two parties.

The opening of the special session saw some of Dr Buthelezi's strongest criticism of Presi-

dent De Klerk thus far. FW De Klerk was accused of being a "hand maiden of the ANC and South African Communist Party."

There are presently no "multi-party talks" at the World Trade Centre. These were destroyed by the ruling of Communist Party member Pravhin Gordan's ruling, in his capacity as Negotiating Council Chairman, that sufficient consensus existed on the issue of setting an election date before a constitution had been agreed upon. This served notice on other parties at the talks that if they disagreed with aspects of the deal between the ANC and the Nationalist Government, their

views would simply be ignored. They were, in other words, irrelevant.

Attempts to settle South Africa's form of state, and the issue of the finality of the constitution emerging from the World Trade Centre were repeatedly made by the KwaZulu Government, the IFP and other parties through 1992 and into this year. These attempts even to place these issues on the negotiating agenda were simply ignored.

Dr Buthelezi said "we warned other participants of the danger of postponing the resolution of these issues to a later stage in negotiations." Fundamental issues would not disappear, though clearly attempts to keep these off the agenda were meant to avoid addressing them.

Presently we do not have a constitution which reflects a political settlement. A just settlement must accommodate the fundamental needs and interests of both a (tem-

porary) majority and minorities. If such solutions are not negotiated we are laying the foundations for bitter conflict. Already well founded warnings along this line are being deliberately misrepresented by certain parties as a threat of violence.

Since the KwaZulu Government and IFP left the talks, intensive bilateral have been held with the Government and the ANC. However the most important issues remain unresolved. On the issue of the form of state Dr Buthelezi states "the Government was incapable of moving one inch from its position to meet us half way."

This rigidity has led to the formation of the Freedom Alliance, an alliance of parties whose policies are in fact at odds in many respects, but also share common concerns. The formation of this alliance is necessary in order to strengthen the negotiating power of parties opposed to ANC and the Government which together have deemed these concerns irrelevant.

As Dr Buthelezi says, negotiations have now been transformed into a power struggle between the ANC and Government on the one hand, and the Freedom Alliance on the other. The

ANC and Government appear determined to impose their agreements on the rest of the country through all available means. This is the meaning of De Klerk's threat to hold a national referendum to break the impasse. This would however achieve nothing in this direction, as the reasons for the crisis would remain.

## Coalition politics

THE formation of the Freedom Alliance represents a further development in the direction of coalition politics in South Africa.

In future centre-left coalitions will tend to coalesce around the ANC. Centre-right coalitions will have the IFP at their core. This is natural and inevitable in a relatively advanced and pluralistic country like South Africa.

As usual left leaning commentators and journalists have failed to grasp the significance of recent political trends owing to their obsession with personalised and largely irrelevant comment.

The end of the Westminster two-party system of government of a ruling party and loyal opposition as the alternative government has certain consequences. Proportional representation means that there will be a tendency for parties to

emerge which can only rule the country as part of a coalition.

The NP and DP face a serious crisis. Though they believe they occupy the centre in South African politics, this is not possible for any white-based party. Neither has the substantial black constituency necessary for this.

The Freedom Alliance, which is a negotiating and not an electoral alliance, does not represent some atavistic return to apartheid, or an attempt to maintain the status quo. Apartheid is dead.

Broadly, and in spite of considerable differences, the Freedom Alliance parties believe in a federal, decentralised, multi-party and plural society where private enterprise is the engine of economic growth. The ANC represents failed experiments of most of the Third World with its

- sympathy for socialism, statism and central control.

The emergence of a strong alliance against that of the ANC and NP should be welcomed. Should the ANC and NP take this power seriously negotiations may yet produce a genuine political settlement, together with a sound constitution.

**THE South African Institute of Race Relations** has an impeccable record of anti-apartheid opposition, and has performed an invaluable service to South Africa in meticulously recording the effects of apartheid over decades.

Consistently advocating liberal goals, the Institute continues to work for the non-violent democratic transformation of South Africa. It remains one of South Africa's most respected research institutions.

A book recently published by the Institute and authored by its Executive Director, Mr John Kane-Berman, attempts to explain political violence, in particular by highlighting factors ignored by many commentators.

Entitled "Political violence in South Africa" the book dismisses simplistic attribution of violence to the machinations of a "third force" supposedly located within state security structures and the Inkatha Freedom Party, one of the holy cows of the political left in South Africa.

At the same time Mr Kane-Berman states that it is "beyond question" that the Government and IFP are involved in political violence.

In spite of the attraction to the "third force" theory by large sections of the media and left-wing academia he points

out that no evidence has emerged of a "third force", in spite of ever recurring allegations to this effect. Variations of the "third force" theory, such as pseudo-academic reports by ANC fronts such as the Human Rights Commission and the Community Agency for Social Enquiry (CASE), that violence is switched on and off in line with the strategic priorities of the Government, are convincingly shown up as fatuous nonsense.

The central argument of the book, is that though the apartheid sta-

te was the original cause of violence, it presently has important causes in "strategies that were adopted in the 1980's in efforts to force business, government, the media, and the international community to pay attention to the aspirations of the people who had no parliamentary franchise."

Coercion was a core component of these strategies, implemented mostly, but not exclusively by organisations within the ANC camp. According to an Institute of Race Relations survey a third of urban blacks have been victims of coercion, and two-thirds of blacks claiming to support ANC opponents. This translates into hundreds of thousands of people.

Violence in the black community can be attributed to "the revolutionary thrust of earlier years" which has "not run out", especially the campaign by the ANC and its internal allies to make South Africa "ungovernable".

Through the 1980's a fearsome campaign of violence, murder and atrocity was carried out by political activists in the black community, particularly youths. This was directly supported and encouraged by the ANC.

"These coercive strategies, intensified struggles, assassination campaigns, and volcanic upsurges of fired up people

have had two consequences."

Firstly, "they have got out of hand," and secondly, "they have provoked violent backlashes from at least some of their targets and set off a vicious cycle of attack and counter-attack."

Mr Kane-Berman states that the ANC's "people's war was partly directed at the state but it was also a declaration of war against sections of the black community, some of whom, however, fought back."

Institute of Race Relations research shows that newspapers, including the commercial press, have played down categories of violence in which ANC opponents are victims, especially councillors and police. "While newspapers have printed vast numbers of articles about the "third force" and assigned teams of reporters to expose criminal activity on the part of security forces and IFP members, the coverage of killings of IFP people has been minimal in comparison."

The book also claims that the liberal intelligentsia bear some responsibility for the moral vacuum which developed in South Africa. Many "liberals" either acquiesced in the kind of strategies employed by revolutionaries, or failed to speak up for their many victims. South African churches are also criticised, especially the South African Council of Churches which developed and promoted a theology which legitimised violence. "Coercion has indeed flourished in a climate in which it has become acceptable in some intellectual circles," says Mr

Kane-Berman.

An important part of creating an intellectual climate favouring ubiquitous violence was a process of "stigmatisation". This was a major strategy of revolutionaries and their supporters during the 1980's.

This strategy took the form of "hanging the deadliest political labels" on opponents' necks. Extreme language was routinely used by the ANC alliance against opponents, who were dehumanised and demonised.

Stigmatisation provides a licence for violent attacks against the stigmatised. Two studies are referred to which contend that systematic stigmatisation in Nazi Germany was necessary in order to prepare public opinion for the discrimination and murder perpetrated against Jews.

Mr Kane-Berman asserts that successful stigmatisation by revolutionaries and their supporters may help explain the limited press coverage given to the murder of IFP members. "Having being labelled as "collaborators" and therefore as targets in a "just war", IFP members could be murdered without prompting very much attention in the local and foreign media."

The thesis set out in "Political violence in South Africa" is convincingly argued, and unlike the "third force" theory is supported by a great deal of evidence. Mr Kane-Berman does not argue that violence can be at-

tributed to revolutionary strategies in any exclusive way. He does however ask that these should be placed at the centre of inquiry into ongoing violence in South Africa. It is an eminently reasonable demand, and the Institute's attempt to restore balance to this inquiry is certainly very welcome.

ILANGA 21-10-93

# Preparing for civil war

The balance of military power is now a factor in South Africans' calculations

**O**n Monday I wrote about the fears of white South Africans who have been passing through London. The days since have seen even further polarisation in the conflict between the black tribes of South Africa. General Bantu Holomisa, the chairman of the Transkei military council, has expelled the South African ambassador. The Transkei, which was established as one of the two homelands for the Xhosa, is a military dictatorship allied to the African National Congress. It is used as a base by the terrorist Azanian People's Liberation Army, which has made attacks on whites in the eastern Cape. The Transkei is now a no-go area for whites; it is formally an independent state, though financially dependent on South Africa.

That is the position on the ANC and Xhosa side. In another of the homelands, Ciskei, another military dictator, Brigadier Oupa Gqozo, has been formally charged with the murder of the brother of the man he overthrew in his military coup. He is hostile to the ANC; in 1992 his soldiers massacred 28 ANC supporters. Although he has been charged by the Ciskei Attorney General, he seems still to be in power.

The fear of the white South Africans whom I have been seeing is that these tribal hostilities will lead to civil war in South Africa, either as an outcome of the proposed democratic general election in April, or because of the breakdown of order during the constitutional talks even before the general election.

In military terms, there are three important groups. The first is the modern, white-led, South African army, recruited from all the black tribes, but with a strong cadre of Zulu non-commissioned officers. The second is the military force associated with the ANC. The third is the military force associated with Inkatha, Mangosuthu Buthelezi's Zulu political party.

So long as it acts in unity, the South African army, which was built to maintain the old apartheid structure, is the strongest of these forces. It cannot prevent terrorism, or local tribal massacres, but it is far more powerful and heavily armed than either of the other two. In the event of the break-up of the South African army, or its refusal to intervene, most white South Africans think that the Zulus, with their strong military tradition, would at least be able to maintain them-

selves in the Zulu homeland of Kwa-Zulu, or more generally in the south-eastern province of Natal, with its commercial centre Durban. They do not believe that the South African army would remain united if called upon to suppress a Zulu revolt against an ANC controlled government, even if the ANC won a democratic general election.

There are therefore three military powers, the largely white-officered army, the Xhosa/ANC forces and the Zulu forces, in precarious equilibrium, none of them able to dominate the others. Fringe groups are actually fighting, and small local massacres are almost an everyday event. Any political solution which does not match this military balance risks the outbreak of a general civil war.

At present there is an uneasy alliance between President de Klerk's white government and the ANC, both of which regard the Zulus with fear and anxiety. This alliance is not personally close, President de Klerk and Nelson Mandela have lost their earlier trust in one another. Each of them has to maintain the unity of his own party as best he can. The more extreme ANC supporters probably sympathise with General Holomisa's letter to the Nobel peace prize committee, which asked them to withdraw the award from President de Klerk. The old hostility of the ANC towards the whites is still a potent force, and so is white, and particularly Afrikaner, conservatism.

Nevertheless, President de Klerk and Mr Mandela are partners in the constitutional talks which were intended to lead to democratic elections in April. The Zulus have withdrawn from these talks, though, and without Zulu consent no constitution seems likely to produce a peaceful transfer of power.

Earlier this month, Chief Buthelezi announced a new political movement, the Freedom Alliance. This includes among its leaders Brigadier Gqozo and Constand Viljoen, a retired white general still thought to have considerable influence in the army. The Freedom Alliance has not had a good press. It is generally

described as an extreme conservative grouping, and is contrasted with the ANC. These labels are misleading. There are plenty of people in the ANC who are interested in power but not in democracy. The Freedom Alliance represents Zulu interests and the interests of other tribes and groups who share the Zulu fear of the ANC. It is not very pertinent to call the Freedom Alliance conservative; and it is absurd to call the military dictator Brigadier Gqozo right-wing because he is opposed to the ANC, while calling his fellow military dictator, General Holomisa, left-wing because he works with the ANC. Such labels have no meaning.

The terms which the Freedom Alliance are seeking to agree do however go to the heart of the dispute. The preamble of its manifesto commitment to five principles: "the recognition of the guidance of Almighty God in the affairs of men and nation; the recognition of the right of self-determination of the peoples of Southern Africa; the preservation of law, order and constitutionality; the protection and promotion of free market enterprise and private ownership and the commitment to eradicate poverty; the rejection of the notion of a unitary state, of racism, discrimination and sexism, of any form of totalitarianism and tyranny over the freedom of man and society."

**T**he principle of self-determination and the rejection of the unitary state are the heart of the issue. Is South African to remain a single state, or is it to become a loose federation of tribally determined states? The principle of private enterprise is also a genuine issue between the Freedom Alliance and the ANC, but is less important. Earlier this month in Lisbon, Mr Mandela dismissed the federal option for South Africa and rejected any limitations on the ability of the proposed Constituent Assembly to rewrite a negotiated constitution.

We in Britain have hardly any

ability to influence these events, but they are important to us, if only because there are very large numbers of British citizens living in South Africa. There is no overriding moral principle to distinguish the two constitutional approaches. There are some multi-national states which work well as unitary states, some which work best as federations, and some which have to break up completely.

These are practical rather than moral questions. Yet when that is said, it is not morally acceptable to force a nation to remain subject to a power it deeply resents. If the Bloc Québécois wins a majority in Quebec, or the Scottish National Party wins a majority in Scotland, there will be no justification for refusing the French Canadians or the Scots the right to secede.

So it is with the Zulus. If a majority of Zulus reject a South African unitary state, it will not be morally right to try to force them into it. There should therefore be no assumption that the ANC, even if backed by President de Klerk, is morally right and the Freedom Alliance morally wrong. The unitary state of South Africa was created by the white man to serve the white man's purposes. Now that he is giving up his power, there is no more moral law which says that the unitary state must survive him.

Politicians must look to the realities of power, political and military. In political terms it may be possible to obtain a voting majority for a unitary state, just as a vote in the whole of Canada would support the continued union of Canada - whatever Quebec thought. In the main Zulu areas, and in some other areas as well, there would be majorities for a loose federal constitution or for outright separation.

In military terms the situation is even more difficult. A unitary state probably means a civil war. The Zulu people would fight for their independence, probably successfully. Such wars are indeed often lost by the succeeding group; the Ibos lost the war in Biafra, and the south lost the war of the States. In each case, the national army decided the matter in the field. My South African friends do not believe that the South African army would or could take the field against the Zulus. The Freedom Alliance must therefore be taken seriously; any constitutional agreement they do not accept could destroy South Africa.

William  
Rees-Mogg

THE TIMES - 21/10/93  
LONDON

## P. 12

THE Freedom Alliance has rejected a government and African National Congress proposal that a summit of leaders, or plenary session at the World Trade Centre, be called only once a final draft of the interim constitution needed to be endorsed.

The Alliance executive stressed in a statement yesterday the summit of leaders should take place before the interim constitution was finalised "otherwise such a summit is going to be locked into the dichotomisation between support and opposition to the final constitu-

TO PAGE 2





It appears to be an expedient response to a fuss that was greater than you expected. Will this apparent way of handling such problems persist beyond the elections?

I do not think so, because the government of national unity should be armed by then with a broad consensus on an economic policy framework. Actually, my opponents should be glad that I took this stand on the petrol price. I could quietly have let the slate run into the red, remained popular and allowed the government of national unity to inherit a deficit. I did the responsible thing.

How much chance do you stand of creating stability, and how do you go about doing it, in the run-up to the elections?

Look at it from three vantage points. Government has the primary duty to continue with all possible efforts to maintain law and order, and where improvement is possible

we will try to improve.

Second, the negotiating process is the main means of creating stability. Once there is a sufficiently inclusive accord and followers see their leaders bound by that accord, much of the motivation for political violence will fall away, because much of it is aimed at the negotiations.

Third, it is not my sole responsibility to ensure stability. That is what the Transitional Executive Council has been created for. It will become a shared responsibility between all political leaders. That in itself will be helpful.

It is not conclusive that any final settlement will be as inclusive as you would like. Is it possible to create that stability and hold an election or a referendum in the face of opposition from, say, the CP, Inkatha or the homelands?

Last Monday I said I saw the possibility of a negotiations crisis developing in that agreements were not

sufficiently inclusive. Therefore the first prize would be to find ways in the next three or four weeks of making agreements sufficiently inclusive. We will expend all our energy to achieve that.

Should we not achieve that, then we will have to look for a solution to the problem. As a democrat, I say a referendum should be considered carefully. Whether or not all parties participate in a referendum, you do get a result within each region. With known population figures, it would therefore be possible to ascertain people's views even if particular parties boycotted the referendum. Thus you can, inasmuch as there may be allegations of illegitimacy, legitimise the process.

The problem of violence in the run-up to elections will have to be managed carefully. We cannot give the power to radicals who decide in an unlawful manner to upset the democratic process, and dictate whether a democratic process can take place or not.

How do you prevent a Savimbi-type situation after an election?

Principally by ensuring the election is managed properly so there cannot be a foundation for allegations of irregularities. If you ensure correct procedures there is no legitimate basis for rejecting the result.

What is your prognosis if, for example, Inkatha rejects the holding of the election regardless of support for your proposals in a referendum?

There are numerous possibilities. But, first of all, Chief Minister Buthelezi is basically a democrat. That is how I got to know him and I do not for a moment expect him to act against the law or to be intransigent to the extent of your speculation. Second, I regard him and his party as significant role players, and I am going all out to ensure they become part of agreements reached.

We cannot force anybody to participate in a referendum, but it would allow one to say what the majority of all the people in the country and in each region want. I also have not heard an absolute rejection of the referendum idea. There was a time when Buthelezi

suggested a referendum be held in Natal. If we hold a referendum simultaneously in each and every region, his attitude might be different.

How do you plan to break the impasse with the Freedom Alliance?

We have reached an agreement with the alliance that we will enter intensive negotiations, so there is not an impasse at the moment.

How do you view the positions of the Bophuthatswana and Ciskei governments and the CP and the Afrikaner Volksfront? Do you think their agendas are conducive to a settlement?

If you analyse the Freedom Alliance, on basic issues they do not share the same views with each other at all. They are bound together by a common purpose on certain aspects of the process, but on policy issues there are fundamental differences between them.

It is not my task to develop a policy for them. But I believe we can never return to any form of racial discrimination.

The fundamental question is whether the alliance can accept that basic principle. Most of its members agree that there should not be any form of racial or ethnic discrimination in any part of SA. I think that the aspirations of minority nations such as the Afrikaner nation, the Zulu nation and so on can best be accommodated in basically a federal system. But within each component part you will have to give full political rights to all inhabitants of that region.

It is only the CP that is out of step on this issue, and they will have to come around. I do not think there is unanimity in the Volksfront on the possibilities in this regard. There are different emphases and I do not think they have one clear view which they share with each other.

We pursued the entrenchment of regional autonomy long before the alliance was formed. We believe in the same basic principles (as most of the alliance) with regard to regionalism and federalism — full-scale and proper devolution of power to regional governments typical of countries like Germany and America.

That devolution must be properly entrenched so that future central governments cannot undermine it. Regions should also, through the distribution of income and direct access to taxation, not be dependent upon the central government. The central government will have the task of assisting poorer regions.

The NP appears to be losing a great deal of support. Some polls suggest the Freedom Alliance has more support than the NP.

Some of the polls used to reach those conclusions were based on very small samples and were not taken countrywide. It is true that we took a dip in support for a number of months, but I have no doubt that is already changing. Without stars in my eyes and without just being optimistic, I am absolutely confident the NP will come out of this election either the strongest or the second strongest party.

## Dhlomo warns on 'hijacking'

LINDA ENSOR

CAPE TOWN — Those in favour of regionalism and federalism should guard against their cause being hijacked by groups promoting their own personal ambitions, Institute for Multi-Party Democracy executive chairman Oscar Dhlomo warned yesterday at Sacob's annual congress.

Dhlomo said their cause could be thrown into "utter confusion and discredit by groups that see in regionalism/federalism an opportunistic avenue to promote personal political ambitions and hostile ethnic chauvinism that had little to do with good government and democracy".

"This implies that over and above focusing on the type of future constitution, democrats should also focus even more resolutely on the nature of the Bill of Rights likely to emerge."

Dhlomo felt that withdrawing from and/or boycotting the negotiation process would not solve problems and would only weaken the regionalism/federalism lobby and divide its advocates.

He expected the next draft constitution to go a long way towards satisfying the need for effective regional government.

Dhlomo stressed that whether the constitution worked in practice would largely depend on the development of political tolerance and a democratic political culture. This in turn would depend on a strong economy.

JOHN DLUDLU

Both said they had had good sales

Visiting companies — especially those dealing in the clothing and textile industry — were concerned about SA's high import tariffs.

Cellular phones were among the main attractions for SA businesses visiting the show.

Forum suspends talks with govt

# FW asked to act on Shill housing row

A ROW has erupted between the National Housing Forum and Housing Minister Louis Shill with the forum appealing for "urgent intervention" by President F W de Klerk and the negotiating council to end the crisis.

The forum has suspended negotiations with government until the issue is resolved. It has asked for a reconfirmation of government's commitment to key principles — notably no unilateral restructuring.

It accused Shill of being "deliberately provocative" and acting in direct contravention of explicit understandings. These accusations are contained in separate letters to De Klerk and the negotiating council's planning committee. Efforts to resolve differences with Shill had failed after "a series of unilateral actions" and the forum had concluded that it would be futile to continue trying to resolve the problems with Shill and his department.

The forum called on De Klerk, as the ultimate authority in the Cabinet, and the negotiating council at Kempton Park to intervene urgently. "We urgently call on members of the planning committee to take whatever steps deemed necessary to resolve the crisis," it said in its letter to the council. A similar appeal was made to De Klerk, with the forum emphasising the need to elevate the housing issue above party political considerations.

The confidential letters, dated October 15, contained a threat to make the contents public within seven days if the forum's demands were not met.

Forum members said the problems with government began in June when Shill took office. He rejected agreements already

GRETA STEYN

reached and reopened issues that had been settled. The ensuing confrontation had "damaged" the relationship between Shill and the forum.

In a letter to Shill, the forum's members (excluding Saccola, whose participation could not be confirmed in time), spelled out their "concern over the steady deterioration in the relationship between government and the forum".

A major issue of concern was Shill's announcement in May of a new capital subsidy of R7 500 on the disposal of state rental stock, and the decision this month to expand the subsidy dramatically. The forum had not been consulted and had been notified of the announcement extending the subsidy only one hour before the embargo on October 11.

Also of concern was Shill's announcement in Parliament of new policy initiatives, including the introduction of a safety net for the private sector to facilitate housing finance, and a new policy on rental payments in townships. The forum had not been consulted on these issues either and had no information on the department's plans and envisaged time frames.

The forum was also unhappy about Shill's announcement of key elements in its agreement with government to replace the National Housing Commission and SA Housing Advisory Council with new bodies. The forum had asked Shill in vain for a joint announcement to indicate to the nation that the issue of housing had, "in the national interest", been elevated above party political considerations.

□ To Page 2

## Shill

The forum also expressed fear that government was again preparing to act unilaterally, despite the failure to reach agreement on interim housing arrangements. It had indications that "state machinery has been mobilised" to finalise project proposals for approval by October 29. "This is despite the inability to reach agreement to create the capacity to translate the broad mutual understanding into detailed project guidelines and an explicit understanding that the R500m set aside will remain intact until implementation of the agreement be-

tween the forum and the National Housing Department."

The forum members who supported the letters included the ANC, the Inkatha Freedom Party, the PAC, the DP, the Association of Mortgage Lenders, Cosatu, the IDT, the Development Bank of SA, the Urban Foundation, the Construction Consortium and the Kagiso Trust.

Although the forum has suspended talks on housing, it will continue implementing the agreement on hostels.

● See Pages 3 and 7

□ From Page 1

## ANC declares it will nationalise both cellular telephone networks

THE launch of SA's two new cellular phone networks is in the balance, with the ANC demanding nationalisation of both.

ANC secretary-general Cyril Ramaphosa said yesterday: "The ANC is adamant that telecommunications must be in the hands of the state, as is currently the position with Telkom."

Even if the present government rejected nationalised telecommunications, the ANC would "ensure that we nationalise telecommunications and insist on state ownership of at least 51% of both operators" when it came to power.

Ramaphosa gave two possible scenarios: a demand that Mobile Telephone Networks (MTN) hand over 51% of its shares to state ownership, or, because the state already owned 10% of MTN through Transet, "we could instruct them to increase this shareholding to a majority stake".

He said there was no way the ANC would deviate from this position, and added that "good progress is being made between the various parties". The parties include the ANC, Cosatu, Polwa, MTN and Vodacom.

It is understood that Vodacom, which is 50% owned by Telkom, has lifted Telkom

MELANIE SERGEANT  
and BILLY PADDOCK

to majority shareholder status already.

One industry source doubted whether a future government would be able to afford to buy a majority shareholding in both networks. It was estimated that each network would cost about R1bn to set up.

In an interview this week, President F W de Klerk said government's decision on cellular telephones had been based purely on economic considerations. The country could not wait a further 18 months

He said introducing cellular phones would make 30 000 new lines available immediately, bringing public telephones to people who did not have them.

Government's decisions on deregulating the telecommunications infrastructure, and on Telkom owning 50% of one licence, had been carefully evaluated on fundamental principles, he said.

Government sources said introducing cellular telephones did not constitute a restructuring of the telecommunications industry. It was rather a value-added service — much like faxes, answering machines

and PABXs — and would not replace the fixed line network.

Although the network operators and other parties involved in the discussions were sticking to an agreement not to make statements, it was understood that major concessions had been made already to appease the ANC alliance and iron out differences with those opposed to the licence.

For instance, it was believed that Vodacom could offer to extend its "roaming agreement" to allow MTN more time to share its network while the company was building its own.

## FW details referendum plan

SHOULD a referendum become necessary, President F W de Klerk would ensure that votes were counted separately in each region, to gauge the attitudes of voters regionally as well as obtaining a national perspective.

He hoped this would help to show that voters in each region supported the negoti-

For the full interview with President F W de Klerk see Page 14

ating process, even if particular parties chose to remain outside it.

However, in an interview this week, De Klerk said the "first prize" would be an inclusive settlement within three to four

BILLY PADDOCK

weeks, and he was devoting all his energies to achieving that.

Regardless of whether the Freedom Alliance took part in such a referendum, it could go ahead and could determine the route favoured by the majority. He was not in favour of an election based on a constitution that did not have sufficient support from significant parties, as this could lead to a catastrophe.

A referendum would legitimise the constitution as long as it and the election were managed correctly to ensure there were no irregularities. "Then if a party says: 'I

To Page 2

## De Klerk

don't like the result, they would not have a leg to stand on," De Klerk said.

However, Inkatha Freedom Party president Mangosuthu Buthelezi was "a democrat, and I do not for a moment expect him to act against the law or to be intransigent. I also regard him and his party as a significant role player and I am going all out so that they somehow or other are part of the agreements reached."

Meanwhile, it is understood that bilateral meetings between the Freedom Alliance and government and the ANC have only set out agendas for further discussion. These were made up of "exactly the same issues that have been dealt with in the negotiating council and in bilateral meetings over the past months".

Sources in the ANC delegation said they did not hold out much hope for a settlement as Buthelezi and the alliance "refuse to move an inch, but still demand that we, who have done a complete somersault on regionalism, must go even further".

Sapa reports that the Freedom Alliance

From Page 1

yesterday rejected a government and ANC proposal that a summit of leaders, or plenary session at the World Trade Centre, be called only when a final draft of the interim constitution needed to be endorsed.

The alliance said the summit should take place before the constitution was finalised. "otherwise such a summit is going to be locked into the dichotomisation between support and opposition for the final constitutional draft".

After eight months of negotiations, issues were still unresolved and an all-inclusive political solution had not emerged. "Therefore it must be acknowledged that there is a major crisis in the negotiation process which only the collective wisdom of the major leaders of southern Africa can resolve to find a way forward."

The leaders' direct involvement was needed to meet the announced April 27 deadline for elections. But the deadline should not be held to be more important than a long-lasting political solution, the alliance said.

## New flag and dual anthems favoured

A FLAG with green and gold vertical bars, and red, blue, green and white triangles symbolising courage, rain, land and peace, is favoured by the national symbols commission, which has also proposed that Die Stem and Nkosi Sikelel' iAfrika be dual anthems for the transitional period.

It recommended that the negotiating council, which will debate the proposals today, consider translating, adapting, and standardising the lyrics of the anthems where necessary.

Die Stem had been "engulfed in a history of exclusivism and racial oppression",

BILLY PADDOCK

while Nkosi Sikelel' iAfrika had not escaped "the narrowness of many other colonial missionary-inspired anthems".

The commission said that as the issues were so sensitive, these should not be seen as anything more than proposals. There were strong divisions in the commission and the report incorporated minority reports and objections.

More than 7 000 submissions were received for a flag and six were shortlisted. The commission said the submissions gen-

erally endorsed the colours green and gold. "Gold signifies wealth, resources and sun; green the environment, the land, the vegetation, fertility, growth and youth."

It urged negotiators to promote a process to elicit further submissions from the public for both a new flag and an anthem.

Some 119 entries were considered for an anthem and there was general agreement on eight of these.

The commission reported that apart from the two strong lobbies for Die Stem and Nkosi Sikelel' iAfrika, there was a

□ To Page 2

### Flag

third strong lobby calling for something totally new, which would be able to play a unifying role. Vunwe, a composition by Shalati Joseph Khosa, should be considered as the first alternative to the dual anthem option. This focused on a united SA.

However, "much more time and effort were needed . . . to manifest in effective and permanent national symbols".

□ From Page 1

Four mottoes were suggested, with Ubuntu (humanism) preferred above Ex Unitate Vires (unity is strength), Concordia Res Crescent (growth through agreement) and Conjunctus Viribus (united powers).

The shortlist of heraldic signs centred on leopards, guinea fowl, proteas and the maize plant.

◆ Picturest Page 3

NEWS

**Midlands clans  
kill 24 in  
bloody feud**

AT LEAST 24 people died when two clans clashed at Loskop near Estcourt in the Natal Midlands yesterday, police said.

Five people were seriously wounded and about 100 huts gutted in an attack apparently motivated by revenge for the killing of two members of the Ngondini clan on October 9, and the burning down of 82 huts belonging to the Mnyangweni clan two days later. Police believed the fighting — which followed weekend fighting in the area in which Inkatha Freedom Party official Duke Mbongwa died — was linked to a land dispute.

Estcourt local dispute resolution committee co-chairman Dave Carnegie said the local chief would be asked to intervene in the dispute. Meanwhile, police reinforcements would remain in the area. Page 4

**BUSINESS DAY, THURSDAY 21 OCTOBER 1991**

**More civil servants**

ABOUT 200 temporary public service posts under the Transitional Executive Council administration would be advertised shortly, a spokesman for Constitutional Development Minister Roelf Meyer said last night.

BUSINESS DAY

## Hostel scandal

OCTOBER 21 - 1993

**I**MAGINE a large community living in a block of flats in Parkview or Norwood, unable to move freely in the suburb, even by bus or car, for fear of being attacked by fellow residents. If it happened in any ordinary city — whether in South Africa, Britain, the US, Russia or Japan — there would be an outcry. It would cause a stir even in Bosnia. But in Kattlehong, on the East Rand, the fate of the people in the Kwesine Hostel is well known but seems of only passing interest.

The hostel is an Inkatha Freedom Party stronghold to which many Inkatha supporters have fled from their township homes to escape attacks from ANC-supporting rivals. There could be as many as 3 000 people in the hostel — men, women

and children, some of whom were born there. They cannot leave in cars, or catch taxis, and must travel in groups by train to get to work. Even then there is a constant danger of sabotage to the railway line.

A group of white right-wingers, in a police-escorted convoy, delivered food to the hostel dwellers at the weekend, earning a rebuke from an ANC spokesman for "fanning existing tensions".

It is all very well for South Africans to sing peace songs, and organise soccer games with their political opponents as gestures of goodwill. But while the Kwesine Hostel scandal is swept under the carpet, what claims can we have to being a civilised society, let alone an aspirant democracy?





# Policemen un

□ 'It'll be a situation of mob rule if we leave'

**T**HEY were lucky.

Their van was riddled with bullets, but they escaped serious injury in Miller's Camp on Monday night.

But this year, 18 of their colleagues in the South African Police, serving in the Western Cape region, have not been as fortunate.

For them, hot lead spewing from weapons such as the AK-47 assault rifle, spelled and end to life on the perennial battlefield encompassing Khayelitsha and other townships in the region.

Despite having death as a constant companion, police have vowed not to withdraw from danger zones.

"We'd like to appeal to all law-abiding citizens to assist us in protecting them," said Western Cape police liaison head Raymond Dowd.

"Who'll maintain law and order if we leave? It will become a situation of mob rule."

Colonel Dowd said attacks against police had to be seen in the context of the political situation

THEIRS is a difficult job, maintaining law and order in an environment where some political organisations use the slogan "Kill a cop a day". On Monday night police came under fire again. Who is doing the shooting? Political Staff Reporter **DENNIS CRUYWAGEN** investigates.

prevailing in South Africa.

"There's instability and certain organisations are calling for police to be chased out of the townships. They want to intimidate us into leaving.

"We won't. We will maintain law and order and remain in all areas."

Attacks on police were not random, he suggested.

"They are well orchestrated. Monday night's attack was definitely an ambush."

Colonel Dowd said police believed that the "silent majority" in many townships welcomed a strong police presence in their area.

Before the ANC suspended the armed struggle, its military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe, was frequently blamed for attacks on security forces.

But the Pretoria Minute brought an end to ANC armed insurgency.

An MK spokesman, who

declined to be named, confirmed that the ANC's army had suspended hostilities.

"We are against attacks. We are not in a situation where we are fighting security forces. Our policy is to negotiate because we are a political army. We can't encourage attacks on police."

Regional ANC chairman Allan Boesak, without condoning Monday's attack, said the reputation and role of the police were some of the problems which had to be faced in the reconstruction of South Africa.

"It's tragic but true that the vast majority of people do not see police as their friends or protectors. As long as this perception remains, police can't perceive themselves to be part of the community."

The animosity proved just how hard the ANC would have to work to change the relationship, Dr

Boesak said.

The Pan Africanist Congress, the other major black liberation movement, has not suspended its armed struggle and its military arm, the Azanian People's Liberation Army (Apla), is still involved in hostilities with security forces.

Last Wednesday, the SADF killed five youths while raiding an Umtata house allegedly used by Apla.

Apla could not be reached for comment on Monday's ambush.

PAC spokesman Waters Toboti said the movement had resolved at its national congress a year ago to intensify the struggle.

"For us the struggle continues. We are not liberated yet and are still fighting for liberation. Our struggle is being waged on many fields, on the ground and from political platforms," he said.

After the Umtata raid, the militant Pan Africanist Students Organisation (Paso) vowed to "hit the enemy hard in retaliation."

After the Thatcher Memoirs...

## Tsar Wars resume in Britain

**L**ONDON. — The Conservative Party's Tsar Wars has broken out again, with former Prime Minister Lady Thatcher once more lasering her successor John Major to the ground.

Just as Ministers were breathing sighs of relief that publication of her memoirs, Thatcher: The Downing Street Years, fell a little short of the all-out blood-letting that was feared, the BBC's £1.3 million (R5.9m) television series on the same subject has begun, with

tionately endorsed Major after the Daily Mirror had pumped up a leaked version of her memoirs to make it look as though she was somewhat less than fond of the ground he walked on.

Now - outside of the confines of the polished prose of no fewer than three literary "advisers" - the BBC presents an entirely rawer picture of a former leader who believes she was scuttled by Cabinet "treachery with a smile on its

compromisers", "quislings" and "traitors" is some indication of the degree of resentment that still boils within her breast.

She also reveals a preoccupation with class (once telling Anthony Parsons, her ambassador to the UN: "I am very glad I do not belong to your class...upper middle-class intellectuals who see everyone else's point of view and have no view of their own."), a dislike of vain and indecisive men...and a startlingly unexpected tendency to

To which Lady Thatcher responds briskly: "It never occurred to me that I was a woman. I was prime minister...but I think that women have very often much more experience of taking tough decisions than men.

"After all, often we're left carrying the can and I think they resented that. But I knew that if we were to get through, we had to be tough and it was second nature to me."

Far less important than the woman thing were her origins and what she believed these represented to her colleagues.

From GARNER THOMSON