

- (a) In 1966 an armed unit of seven ANC cadres proceeding South was intercepted in Botswana, and later deported to Zambia. This shocked South Africa into tightening its security and applying increased pressure on Botswana, which became independent in the same year.
- (b) Early in the following year, two leading cadres, also proceeding South, were also intercepted in Botswana and jailed for 18 months.
- (c) Later that year, a detachment of over 50 ANC cadres entered Zimbabwe with Zapu Freedom Fighters. In the course of the clashes that followed, a number of ANC cadres fell, some were later arrested and sentenced in Rhodesia where they are either in death cell or are serving life sentences. The majority of the cadres were arrested in Botswana and South Africa.
- (d) In December of the same year, and during the first part of 1968, a total of about 40 ANC cadres entered Zimbabwe as part of a ZAPU-ANC group. There was protracted fighting in the course of which several ANC men fell. Some returned to Zambia, others were captured by the enemy, and a few reached South Africa.
- (e) Towards the end of 1968, a number of ANC cadres in South Africa were arrested. Some of these had established camps and were training new recruits in the country. They were sentenced in Pietermaritzburg in 1969 for periods of up to 20 years.
- (f) In that same year some were arrested. Some were later released, but 22 of them including Mrs. Winnie Mandela were detained and subjected to torture and harassment until recently when they were released but placed under house arrest. Their case is not yet over, and they may further be arrested and detained.
- (g) In the meantime, the underground organisation had been issuing leaflets periodically. The first were distributed on a large scale in 1967 and there were several distributions between then and December 1969. In the course of underground activity numerous ANC functionaries were detained, tortured, sentenced and persecuted in countless ways by a regime that spends millions of 'Kwacha on the repression of the liberation movement and which has a vast army of well-paid black informers

in its security net-work. For example, in December 1968, some 80 men, women and children, all members of the ANC, in the district of Zeerust, Transvaal, were arrested, sent to Pretoria, where they were brutally torture. Some were later released but others still detained.

The above is not a story of success and achievement, but it is a record of bitter struggle and sacrifice involving repeated death. It is also, incidentally, a record of death and defeat for the enemy, in the Zimbabwe battles.

Each of the main activities mentioned in this summary took months to prepare, the period of preparation often unduly stretched by lack of funds and immigration problems facing key personnel involved in planning.

2. 1970 - FURTHER ARMED CLASHES.

In August this year, 4 leading ANC freedom fighters were ambushed by boers in the Caprivi Strip, after being betrayed by an African contact. In the ensuing clash, 3 of them fell and the 4th was captured, wounded. He was subsequently tortured most brutally by the enemy at Katima Mulilo and his fate and whereabouts are at present unknown. He is the Chief Political officer in the ANC, a member of the ANC Revolutionary Council, and member of the 8-men National Executive Committee of the ANC. The other three included 2 cadres who had fought in Zimbabwe and were subsequently arrested in Botswana in 1967. One of these was the Acting Chief of Staff in the Party.

3. 1970 - ACTIVITIES AND OBJECTIVES.

Despite these set-backs, however, and despite the vigilance of the South African regime and its extensive network of spies and informers, significant successes are being scored in our preparations for commencement of the armed struggle inside South Africa. Underground political organisation in the country is fundamental to a firm and enduring start of armed confrontation. Isolated and localised incidents could have negative results. Such organisation, however, proceeds slowly for a variety of objective as well as subjective reasons. Nevertheless, encouraging progress is being made in this sphere of underground organisation. The series of distribution of propaganda leaflets is based on techniques of underground organisation which continue to baffle the enemy, and has considerably boosted the morale of the masses and strengthened their faith in the ANC, in their united power, and in their certainty of victory in the all-Africa struggle for liberation. The set of leaflets distributed in July this year were particularly effective. Reports we continually receive from different parts of South Africa all point to a rising tempo in the revolutionary mood of the masses. Impatience with the regime and its collaboration is becoming violent. A prominent African Minister of Religion, formerly stationed in Zambia, was bombed by ANC youth in the Cape Province for attacking the Liberation Movement at a Church conference and telling lies about ANC leaders in Africa in an ill devised attempt to curry favour with Vorster.

The efforts of those of us who for the time being are working from

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outside South Africa are two-fold. First, to assist with political organisation of the masses as an essential part of our preparations for armed struggle, and to establish the strongest contact with them. Secondly for leaders and cadres to enter South Africa quietly, quickly. A wide variety of our activities are directed towards the achievement of these two strategic objectives.

4. DIFFICULTIES WITHIN THE PARTY.

In the course of these activities there have been successes as well as failures; plans have had to be abandoned because of faults, mishaps, security leakages, or unavoidable delays accountable to factors beyond our control. Sometimes our gains have been compromised by internal problems as was the case during 1969, when our Party went through, but survived, a series of severe internal crises. In the course of these crises, energies were diverted from the problems of the struggle to those engineered by professional self-seekers and disrupters who, aided by enemy agents, took full advantage of the Party's limited ability to deal with them as drastically as any armed struggle demands. It is thanks to these limitations that it has not been possible to maintain the level of discipline which the sheer magnitude of the approaching conflict in South Africa calls for. However, experience has shown that the firm co-operation of the Government of Zambia is indispensable to the success of our efforts at maintaining the level of discipline which minimises internal difficulties for the movement. Given this co-operation, our internal troubles will be minimal.

5. FRONTLINE PROBLEMS.

This lack of discipline, coupled with the exploits of wreckers within the movement, interferes with our frontline activities and therefore serves the interests of the enemy. For this reason, apart from others, the ANC has to expel some of its cadres.

Other frontline problems are to be expected. Separated from South Africa by enemy territory in Zimbabwe and a friendly African independent State, Botswana, which as yet feels unable to co-operate effectively with the liberation movement, the problem of effective contact with South Africa and of reaching its borders remains enormous. Besides, the South African regime is fully aware of the change in the fortunes of white domination in South Africa which would inevitably result from the presence, in substantial numbers, of militarily trained ANC members that country. The regime is therefore throwing everything into preventing our entry into South Africa.

But these problems are well within our capabilities, given adequate backing by Africa. In this connection the prompt provision of Travel Documents, and the equally prompt clearance for entry for our members coming into Zambia, has allowed us a measure of mobility as a result of which some of our preparatory plans have been very successful. The issue to our members of Tanzania and Zambian Travel Documents as well as a number of Algerian passports has positively helped to advance our plans. Emulating Vorster's agents, Black prophets of doom in high places have been flying from country to country to deliver the joyful tidings of the "disintegration" of the ANC of South Africa. We make bold to say that a

rude shock awaits them, as it does to Vorster and his racist regime. This is precisely because facilities placed at our disposal have been used to considerable advantage in the execution of plans.

6. CURRENT EFFORTS

We are at present intensifying our efforts, firstly, in building up our organisational underground machinery in South Africa in accordance with an agreed plan and time schedule. This requires considerable sums of money, which has not been forthcoming from the OAU for several years now. In our view lack of funds for the ANC is unhelpful to the revolution in Southern Africa. Every report we receive from our activists in South Africa carries a desperate clamour for funds by men and women determined to sacrifice for the freedom of Africa.

We have made hitherto unsuccessful bilateral approaches to African countries for funds for our work inside South Africa. We continue this effort against the background of practical difficulties being experienced by the Party in the enemy territory. Perhaps some day the OAU will be able to give us some support in this respect.

We are also elaborating new plans to overcome the problem of hostile borders. One of our main problems in this regard is that of security. It has proved most dangerous, for the protection of our plans and the survival of underground units in the South, to have in our centres of planning large numbers of cadres who have defected from the struggle, and who, from their past involvement in our activities, can deduce our plans from a combination of observed facts. On the other hand, it might be impossible to eliminate defections, which South African agents encourage and work for. This creates a serious problem of security.

7. STRENGTHENING THE MOVEMENT.

In the meantime, we continue to strive for a compact, disciplined, united organisation of dedicated and committed cadres, but we do not permit this effort to become our preoccupation because, in the final resort, the ANC, like the struggle itself, is in South Africa and involves millions who are oppressed. Only a few of us are outside South Africa, and the problems of the few must not stand in the way of the struggle of the people in South Africa. In any case, true discipline, dedication and commitment will be revealed in the field of action on enemy territory. It is, therefore, towards the creation of a powerful political weapon of struggle inside South Africa that our main efforts are directed.

8. CONCLUSION.

Without the revolutionary stand taken by African States, headed by Zambia and Tanzania in the South, the task of the South African oppressed would be immeasurably greater. But precisely because of this stand on the part of their African Brothers, their challenge and responsibility of the oppressed to fight is the greater. The African National Congress keeps this fact constantly in mind and it is a source of power and strength for us and we strive those in whose immediate behalf we strive and work - the 18 million oppressed Blacks in South Africa

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