THE CITIZEN

PPIAT) 2

Wednesday 26 February 1992

Zulu impis do

2 P Yo WS

battle

in $\hat{a}\200\230$ Place of the Gun $\hat{a}\200\231$

Mhlupheki Shange died because he was a good man in a bad place in a violent coun-

gz lived in district, in the rural heart of Natal, where Zulu warriors have been Kkilling each other in tribal wars for more than a century.

One night last month a band of armed men sur-rounded Shangeâ\200\231s hut and demanded that he join them in a war party.

 $\alpha\200\234$ He refused to go, $\alpha\200\235$ his mother told police. $\alpha\200\234$ So they killed him. $\alpha\200\235$

Chased impi

Police chased the impi across a boulder-strewn hillside and arrested 21 people. They seized six AK-47 assault rifles, ten .303 carbines and a shotgun.

The impi was about to do battle in the latest round of the faction fighting which rages almost continuously in Msinga.

 $200\234Msinga$ is known as $200\234The$ Place of the Gunâ\200\231,â\200\235 said Creina Alcock, a de-

velopment worker who
has lived in the area for 17
years. -

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ It is like coming across a dinosaur $\hat{a}\200\224$ no Whites or missionaries came here in the old days, so tribal traditions and structures remain strong. $\hat{a}\200\235$

~ Mrs Alcock, whose husband Neil was killed in an ambush in 1983 while mediating between rival Msinga factions, said one reason for the violence was a tradition of trial by combat.

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ You get young men growing up dying for a fight, so they deliberately provoke wars. $\hat{a}\200\235$

Much of the fighting is between members of the same clan, although one clan will sometimes take on another in a feud dating back to ancient history.

AK-47 favoured

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ In almost every instance, the original root cause of the ill-feeling is unknown to all concerned, $\hat{a}\200\235$ said KwaZulu police officer Brigadier Sipho Mathe.

In the old days wars were fought with sticks and spears, and casualties were relatively low. Now the weapon of choice is the AK-47, and scores of

inga people die every
year.

Last month at least 14 people were killed and 15 injured in a bloody battle when two impis of 300 men each clashed over the murder of a tribal leader in nearby Ladysmith.

Sergeant Eddie Aucamp, special police unit based in Msingaâ\200\231s main town of Tugela Ferry, said the pastoral beauty of the district belied its dangers.

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ We have orders not to drive $\hat{a}\200\231$ around at night. Even in broad daylight, on the main road, we $\hat{a}\200\231$ ve been shot at, $\hat{a}\200\235$ Sgt Aucamp said, pointing out a bullet hole in his vehicle.

His unit, charged with confiscating illegal fire-

arms, has seized an average of 650 a year over the last three years.

Weapons range from

a member of a.

home-made guns crafted from plumberâ\200\231s supplies to vintage muzzle-loaders and modern automatic rifles.

Most of the Soviet-designed AK-47s $\hat{a}\200\224$ and some of the fights $\hat{a}\200\224$ are imported from Johannes-burg, where hundreds of Msinga men work in industry and the gold mines -

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ If two i men brawl in Sow% km away, there $\hat{a}\200\231$ ll be a faction fight here, $\hat{a}\200\235$ said Lieut Tommy Pakkari, who led the police squad that rounded up S $\hat{a}\200\231$ s killers. .

Police efforts to negotiate peaceful settlements seldom succeeded. â\200\234These people believe

- fighting is the only way to

settle an argument. $\hat{a}\200\235$

More warlike

Faction fighting occurs throughout Natal, but is particularly bad in Msinga, a district of about 200 000 people. Some researchers believe the reason is fierce competition for resources in a moun-

tainous area where only 10 percent of the land is arable. -

Anthropologist John
Argyle said that while environmental factors might
play a part, Msinga
people seemed to be
more warlike than Zulus
elsewhere.

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ It $\hat{a}\200\231$ s hard to pin down, but for example, when a group of Msinga residents were moved to another area, fighting erupted

there, \hat{a} \200\235 he said.

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ It $\hat{a}\200\231$ s a cycle which is difficult to escape $\hat{a}\200\224$ a pattern of revenge that has no beginning and no end. $\hat{a}\200\235$

There were similarities with fighting in other parts of Natal province between Zulus i rival political groups â\200\224 the Inkatha Freedom Par-

which they want exclusive - control. The national

leadership can appeal for

peace, but what counts is

the local competition. $\hat{a}\200\235$ $\hat{a}\200\224$

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Local Government

ELECTIONS

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The latest ANC. biueprint for the transition period and beyond is both a concession and a challenge to the Government,

writes Political Editor - SHAUN JOHNSON.

HE MAJOR parties to

negotiations are nearing

an advanced stage in de-

signing a mutually acceptable $\hat{a}\200\234$ package $\hat{a}\200\235$ for how South Africa should be ruled during transition and how a final nstitution should be drawn up.

It is a process not unlike that of building model aeroplanes. Each has been busily cutting and gluing pieces together, and | showing the product of their la~ bours to the others. Each has then gone back and altered its

model in the light of what it has

seen, trying to make it look a little more like the others. The ultimate object of the exercise - is to settle on a single structure which includes parts taken from each $\hat{a}\200\224$ and can still fly.

This is the context in which the ANC \hat{a} \200\231s newest model for interim government and constitution-making, presented at Code-

sa this week, should be seen. It is an adaptation of earlier positions, and includes clear attempts to address the Governmentâ\200\231s concerns; but without discarding the principles of the original design. It will, no doubt, prompt an updated â\200\230model from the Government.

In two areas, in particular, the latest ANC scenario seeks to satisfy \hat{a} 200\224 or at least take the sting out of \hat{a} 200\224 Government objections. R

Firstly, the Government has insisted from the outset of the

negotiations process that it

would not accept a transitional arrangement which involves leaping into a â\200\234constitutional vacuumâ\200\235, or ceding power to an unelected body which would rule by decree. The ANC previously demanded that the present Parliament be dissolved or suspended, and power transferred in toto to a representative, but unelected, body.

Now the ANC is proposing that the tricameral Parliament be maintained â\200\224 possibly in a rationalised form â\200\224 in order to give legislative effect to decisions taken by an â\200\234interim government councilâ\200\235 appointed from the ranks of Codesa. This offers the Government a compromise: Parliament survives,

but loses its ultimate authority.

Secondly, the Government has been set against the idea of

a constituent assembly (CA) drawing up a new constitution ever since the ANC first proposed the body. Now, however, the ANC proposals offer the possibility that a CA could operate as a legislature subject to checks and balances at the same *ime as it performed its constitution-drafting function. This would allow for an interim Cabinet operating under suf-

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ficient or even full consensus, and interim measures suâ\200\230ch as the requirement of a two-thirds majority for legislation to be passed. There would also â\200\230be agreement that .all parties receiving more than 5 percent of the vote under proportional representation, would be represented in the CA.

" In these and other areaÂ\$,.the ANC and Government positions

are converging markedly â\200\224 not to the extent that full agree-ment is imminent, but rather in the sense that details of similar concepts are being debated.

The ANCâ\200\231s detailed step-bystep plan for a two-step path towards a final negotiated solution is set out, in its distinct phases, in the accompanying

diagram. In summarised form,

it would operate as follows:

Phase one, which can only come into being once agreement has been achieved on the matter at Codesa, would seek to â\200\234level the political playing fieldâ\200\235. Interim structures would be charged with ensuring equal treatment for all political competitors, particularly regarding elections.

Codesa would appoint from its ranks an interim government council (IGC), in effect a supreme transitional Cabinet with final powers over Parliament and homeland structures.

â\200\230Beneath the IGC would operate independent commissions charged with overseeing elections and ensuring equal access to the public media. There would also be four multiparty committees, enjoying final control in the key areas of security, the Budget, foreign relations

and local government.

The international community would be invited to become involved, at least at the level of

the electoral commission.

Phase one would lead to elec-

tions for a CA. The first phase should not last for more than six months beyond the date of its inception. A

Phase two begins once the CA has been elected. All South Africans over 18 would vote on the basis of proportional representation.

The main task of the CA would be the drafting of a final constitution, but it would appoint an interim Cabinet and perform transitional legislative functions. The process of constitution-making should not exceed nine months, and incentives and penalties would be devised to ensure the timetable was adhered to. The constitution could include â\200\234sunsetâ\200\235 clauses to help ease the country into full-blooded democracy.

The new ANC â\200\234transitional packageâ\200\235 takes the tactical fight to the Government: it cannot but demand a serious and considered response from Dr Gerrit Viljoen and his strategists. There are certainly still points of difference â\200\224 the Government will argue that the IGC is still a form of â\200\234rule by decreeâ\200\235, for example â\200\224 but, many of its elements will not be easily dismissed.

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Aat city hotel ' By Philip Zoio

ANC member Jeremy Seeber, yesterday convicted ges of attempted

and unlawfully

causing ap explosion, told

the Johannesburg Magis-

trateâ\200\231s Court that he was acting on instructions of an ANC military commander when he planted ap explosive device in a Johannesburg hotel in 1986.

Seeber (25) told the court how S desire for democracy in South Africaâ\200\231 drew him into active involvement jn the ANCâ\200\231s - armed struggle,:

In a written explanation of his plea of

Braamfont, tember 26 1986, The device exploded, causing 'slight injuries to Michael Pay]-_son, Richard Zuma and Henning Snyman and Rgg 000 damage,

In his plea explanation –Seeber said he Was following " ANC military Strategies at time when the ANC and jts $\frac{3}{200}$ Umkonto we * Sizwe, were 5 '

Questioned by prosecutor J
" van der Bijl, Seeber said the
« vietims were unfortunate ca. Sualties of a war situation,
I regret that I had to go to
such an extent to demonstrate
my opposition for the Government as it was then,â\200\235 he saiq.

Seeber testified that his par--ents had brought him up on

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Principles of democracy and racial equality,

In 1986 he was introduced to

members in Swaziland

In September he was given ctions by his co, der, Whom he knew only by his code.

. Peration was later de-Scribed by MK commanders ag Successful, Seeber sajq.

Mr van der Bijl said the act

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Seeber wa gust 1990. H

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Seeberâ\200\231s lawyer Gilbert

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ELSEWHERE IN TH.WOLD

Mandela vows struggle | f supremacists take power

" African National Congres
er Nelson Mandela

guage Beeld newspaper, widely

read among South Africaâ\200\231s 5 mil-

lion white minority. His organiza- -

tion, South Africaâ\200\231s largest black * MANDELA Attacks - group, has attacked a March 17 = : hltes-only vote -whites-only referendum on politi- - :

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ cal reform as racist, preferring to quicken the pace of democracy talks. President F.W. de Klerk, stunned by rightwmg vnctones in recent parliamenta elections

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SCUTH AFRICA'S pro-apart heid Conservative Party (CP) backed away from a boveott of nexi month's whites-oniv referendum on constitutional reform yesterday, but then came close 10 surrendening on the spot 10 President F W de Klerk.

The leader of the CP, Andries Treurnicht, was overnded in a deeply divisive caucus of party MPs and officials, and emerged talking not of wictory but of carry mg on the battle bevond the plebiscite

The CP eventually advised its SUppoTiers 1o reject Mr de Klerk's plea for endorsement of negotia tons with the black majority afte: Mr Treurnicht had recommended a boyrott of the poll A dejected party leader said the referendum would not be the last word, and the CP would continve to demand a general election

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ We advise our people 10 vote 0o n ths referendum. but we say should we lose this i not the end

ol

ad

of referendum

s, . From Chris McGreal in Cape Town

of the political war in South Af rica. There is still a white pation. it cannot - be wshed away, That white nation will comtinuwe 10 de mand s fresdom, $\hat{a} \geq 00 \geq 35$ he said

Mr Treurmicht saxd the P would recogmse the referendum result $a\200\234$ as the actual situation, but not for all eternity $a\200\235$. He would seek a common strategy with the paramilitary Afrikaner Resictance Morement (AWR), which at first had savd that it would do its best to disrupt the poll, bt reconsidered after the CP decision.

The Cormvention for a Democratic South Afnca (Codesa) and the Anglo-American mining house boih talled on whites 10 support Mr de Klerk, saying a

noâ\200\231 vote would be disastrouns. he ANC is expected 1o follow suit today. <

A meeting of the partial CP us after Mr de Klerk announced the referendum question on Monday had initially decided to carry threugh Mr Treurmichtâ\200\231s bovepit threat,

But when regional CP re - tatves arrived yesierday they overturmed the decision, m the face of furous objections from those in the cawcus who resented the speed with which the vote s to be held, and rejected Mr de Klerkâ\200\231s assertion that the referen. dum fulfifled his election pledge to seek white votersâ\200\231 approval for oonstitutional changes. The polt

- $SA\hat{a}\200\231s$ right abandons boycott

clearly does not meet that promise because South Afnicans still only have 3 very broad picture of the new system. But the right knew it had been out-manoeuvred. It has, after all, constantly called on Mr de Klerk 10 go back 10 the white electorate for a mandate.

The CP faces a test of its national policies and strategy, unlike the Potchefstroom by-election, where s wvictory pushed Mr de

Klerk into calling the referendum Faced with the prospect of a party spht, the boycotters were prevailed open to give way.

The party suife was sl dogging Mr Treurnicht as he announced CP participation, and it came across as defeatist. $\hat{a}200\234$ Should we ose in this referendum it is the loss of one battle but $\hat{a}200\231$ s not the end of the war, $\hat{a}200\235$ be said

 $\hat{a}\200\2341t\hat{a}\200\231s$ not the end of the struggle for survival m freedom of a people. $\hat{a}\200\235$ Not omce did he sav he expected 10 win.

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South Africa

A normality all Its own

Our special correspondent describes some of the confusion that besets a country

between apartheid and democracy

HOUGH the restaurant 1s (00 new to be listed in the telephone book, lunchtime

secs it thronged. Most of its patrons are the Striped :d set who busy themselves in centra annesburg $\hat{a}\200\231s$ tall office buildings,

urprised to sce the manager scribing the plat dujour 10 a

¢mber of the African National

but no
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Congress | ears and two weeks ago the
_ANCwas still banned, its members regarded
as dangerous revolutionaries. Now they e

1 ons of the ancien $r\tilde{A}@\text{gipe}$; no wumbrils ar tolling; no gullotines swishing. Afer d cades of sbnormality, Seuth Aftica is no mal at last. This is the most extraordinar thing about it.

Normal countries, of course, have prol lems, and il this respect South Africa is su per-normal. Apartheid has left it divided

\ DOt just black against white, but black

â\200\234against black, Xhosa against Zulu, Coloured

« (mixed race) against Indian, and so on. To-

- *day the old alliances and divisions are all
- . changing. On the one hand some frightcned whites, and not just Afrikaners, are taking
- up arms against the reforms being intro-

kduced by President FW. de Klerkâ\200\231s National

rgovernment. On the osher inter-racial mar592,

nage 18 becoming almost 4 commonplace among young liberals, and the dinner parties of cabinet ministers may include black guests met for the first time six months ago n talks aimed at bringing peace to the townships

For many the change is confusing "oloy nearly 3m are thus classificdâ\200\224 y joining the National Party. theid oltcn treated them cru Mo 1968 and dis-neir homes {(most no-1 Districe Six in Cape Town), and

gâ¢h the ANC has made a bid for their support (recrutting Allan Boesak, a Col ourcd leader), they seem to fear the black masses more than their former white oppressors. Their representatives have been defecting to the Natonalists and, o judge by the paucity of Coloured marchers in recent ANC demonstrations, their votes will g0 the sanic way.

South Afnicaâ\200\231s Indians have long been mvolved in politics {even hefore Mahatma Gandhi was forced off the pavement by 4 Pretonia policeman in 1893 and decided to \hat{A} » the white government). In this they have differed {rom the Indians of East and Central Africa, who have preferred to stick

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Indian_organisations {closely allied 10 the

ANC) are represented at Codesa, the Con-

vention for a Democratic South Africa,
where 19 groups are trying to reach agreement on the path to a new constitution, but_

they spegk for ever fewer people.

Coloureds and Indians know that the main players on the South African stage arc the 4.5m whites and the 2?m blacks. For more than 40 years the National Party has spoken for the whites, invariably defeating the only opponents it allowed to challenge it; and for even longerâ\200\224it has just turned 80a\200\224the ANC has spoken for the blacks, untested in formal elections but probably with majority suppon,

Since Mr de Klerk took aver the Nationalists 1n 1989, these two ancient antagonists have come not perhaps to love one another but certainly to need each other. The Nationalists can hardly revert to apartheid and repression: to do so would send South Al rica up.a bloody cul-de-sac. The ANC can hardly return to the armed struggle: without Soviet support it would be even less menacing than in the past. In the organisatansâ\200\231 mutual need lies the cause for optimism.

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The optimistic outlook foresees agreement at Codesa on a set of constitutional principles, which will, if the governmenigels its way, be endorsed by a referendum (maybe in September). The current Parliament, in which blacks are not represented, will then legislate itself out of existence. to
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