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MANIFESTU UF UMKHDNTO WE SIZWE
ISSUED UN DECEMBER 16, 1961
Units of Umkhonto we Sizwe today carried out planned attacks egeinst
Government installe-
tions, particularly those connected with the policy of apartheid and
race discrimination.
ENUmkhonto we Sizwe ie a new independent body, formed by Africans.
It includes in its ranks
South Africans of all races. It is not connected in any way with a
soâ\200\224celled 'Committee for
National Liberation' whose existence has been announced in the
press. Umkhonto we Sizwe
will carry on the struggle for Freedom and democracy by new methods,
which are necessary
to complement the actions of the established national liberation
movement, and our members,
jointly and individually, place themselves under the overall
political guidance of that movement.
EMlt is, however, well known that the main national liberation
organisations in this country
have consistently followed 3 policy of non-violence. They have
conducted themselves peaceably
at ell times, regardless of Governmet attacks and persecutions up0n~
them, and despite all
Government inspired attempts to provoke them to violence. They have
done so because the
people prefer peaceful methods of Change to achieve their
aspirations without the suffering
and bitterness of civil war. But the people's patience is not
endless.
EMThe time comes in the life of any nation when there remains only
two choices:submit or
fight. That time has now come to South Africa. We shall not submit
and we have no choice
but to hit back by all means within our power in defence of our
people, our future and our
freedom.
EMThe Government has interpreted the peacefulness OF the movement as
weakness; the peoples'
non-violent policies have been taken as a green light For Government
violence. Refusal to
resort to Force has been interpreted by the Government es en
invitetin to use armed Force
against the people without reprisels. The methods of Umkhonto we
Sizwe mark a break with
the pest.
EMWe are striking out along a new road for the liberation of the
people of this country. The
Government policy of force, repression and violence will no longer
be met with non-violent
resistance only! The choice is not ours; it has been made by the
Nationalist Government which
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has rejected every peeceeble demand by the people for rights and freedom and answered every $% \left(1\right) =\left(1\right) \left(1\right)$

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The following "plan envisages a process which will place in the <code>inl201eld</code>, at- a date <code>inl201xed</code> now, simultaneously in pre-selected areas armed and trained guerrilla bands who will <code>inl201nd</code> ready to join the local guerrilla bands with arms and equipment at their disposal. It will further coincide with a massive propaganda campaign both inside and outside South Africa and a general call for unprecedented mass struggle throughout the land, both violent and non-violent. In the initial period when for a short while the military adv. [sic] will be ours the plan envisages a massive onslaught on preâl200\224selected targets which will create maximum havoc and confusion in the enemy camp and which will inject into the masses of the people and other friendly forces a feeling of coninl201dence that here at least is an army of liberation equipped. and capable of leading them to victory. In this period the cornerstone of guerrilla operations is â\200\234shamelessly attack the weak and shamelessly <code>inl202ee</code> from the strongâ\200\235.

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We are convinced that this plan is capable of fulli¬\2011ment. But only if the whole apparatus of the movement both here and abroad is mobilised for its implementation and if every member now prepares to make unlimited sacrii¬\201ce for the achievement of our goal. The time for small thinking is over because history leaves us no choice.
.PART 11.

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AREAS.

- 1. Port Elizabethâ\200\224Mzimkulu.
- 2. Port Shepstoneâ\200\224Swaziland.
- 3. North Western Transvaal, bordering respectively Bechuanaland &

Limpopo.

4. North Western Capeâ\200\224South West.

PAR T 1 II .

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- .Simultaneous landing of 4 groups of 30 based on our present resources whether by ship or airâ\200\224armed and properly equippedln such a way as to be self sufi¬\201cientln every respect for at least a month.
- 2. At the initial stages it is proposed that the 30 are split up into platoons of 10 each to operate more or less within a contiguous area and linking their activities with pre--arranged local groups.
- 3. Simultaneously with the landing of the groups of 30 and thereafter, there should be a supply of arms and other war material to arm the local populations which become integrated with the guerrilla units.
- 4. On landing, a detailed plan of attack on preâ\200\224selected targets with a view to taking the enemy by surprise, creating the maximum impact on the populace, creating as much chaos and confusion for the enemy as possible.
- 5. Choice of suitable areas will be based on the nature of the terrain, with a View to establishing base areas from which our units can attack and to which they can retreat.

onslaught. Those will be allocated as follows: â\200\224

- (a) Eastern Capeâ\200\224Transkei
- (b) Natalâ\200\224Zululand
- (c) North Western Transvaal
- ((1) North-Western Cape
- 2,000
- 2,000
- 2,000
- 1,000
- 2. TO realise our target in each of the main areas it is proposed that each of the four areas should have an overall command whose task it will be to divide its area into regions, which in turn will be allocated a <code>i¬\201gure</code> in proportion to their relative importance.
- 3. The preparation for equipping the initial force envisaged in 1 above will take place in three stages, thus:
- (a) By importation of Military supply at two levels:
- (i) Build up of i^2 01rearms, ammunition and explosives by maintaining a regular i^2 02ow over a period of time.
- (ii) By landing additional [supplies] simultaneously with the arrival of our external force.
- (b) Acquisition and accumulation internally of <code>inl201rearms</code>, ammunition and explosives at all levels of our organisation.
- (0) Collection and accumulation of other military such as food,

medicines, communication equipment etc.

- 4. It is proposed that auxiliary guerrilla/sabotage units in the four main 'areas be set up before and after the commencement of operations. They may engage in activities that may serve to disperse the enemy forces, assist to maintain the i^2 01ghting ability of the guerrillas as well as-draw in the masses in support of the guerrillas.
- 5. It13 proposed that ln areas falling outside the four main guerrilla areas lM. lM
- 6. In order to draw in the masses of the population the political wing shoulgl arouse the people to participate in the struggles that are designed to create an upheaval throughout the country.

PART V.

DETAILED PLAN OF IMPLEMENTA TION.

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In order to implement the plans set out above in Parts 1 to 111 we establish Departments which are to be charged with duties to study and submit detailed reports and plans in respect of each of their Departments with the following terms of reference: \hat{a} 200\224

1. Intelligence Department

This Committee will be required to study and report on the following: $\hat{a}\200\224$ (a) The exact extent of each area

5. Logistics Departmentâ\200\224 Technical and Supply C&mmittee

lts Functions are:â\200\224

- (a) TO manufacture and build up a stock of arms, ammunition from internal sources.
- (b) To organise reception, distribution and storage of supplies from $\ensuremath{^{7}}$
- (c) To organise the training of personnel in the use of equipment referexternal sources.

red to in (a) and (b) above.

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- (d) Obtaining of all other relevant supplies necessary to prosecute an armed struggle, to wit, inter alia, medical supplies, clothing, food, etc., and the storage of these at strategic points.
- (e) Acquiring equipment to facilitate communications.
- (f) To undertake all duties and functions that fall under the Department of Logistics.

PART VI

MISCELLANEO US

- 1. Immediate Duties Of the National High Command in Relation to the Guenilla Aleas $\,$
- (a) T0 map out regions in each area with a view to organising Regional and District Commands and N. K. [sic] units.
- (b) To achieve this we strongly recommend the employment of 10 full time organisers in each area.
- (0) The Olganisers shall be directly responsible to the National High Command.
- (d) The NHCls directed to recruit and arrange for the external training of at least 300 men in the next two months.
- 2. Pelsonal
- (21) Intelligence Alex Secundus Otto
- (b) External Planning Committee Johnson, Thabo and Joseph together with a senior ANC rep. as well as co-opted personnel, seconded to us by friendly Govts.
- (0) Transport Comlnittee Percy secundus Nbata.
- ((1) Logistics Dept. Bri-bri secundus Frank
- 3. Special Directives to Heads of Departments.

The Heads ofDepartments are required to submit not later than the 30th

- May, 1963, plans detailing: $\hat{a}\200\224$
- (a) The structural organisation of their Department
- (b) The type and number of personnel they require to be allocated to them and their duties and functions.

- (0) The funds required for their work both for immediate and long term . purposes.
- (d) Schedule of time required to enable them to fuli¬ $\20111$ given targets and what these are.

- (b) The portions of the country that are naturally suited for our opera- 'tions and their location within each area.
- (0) Points along the coast which would be suitable for landing of men and supplies and how these are going to be transferred from the point of landing to the area of operations.
- (d) The situation of enemy forces in each area, thus: a\200\224
- (i) the military and the police as well as their strength
- (ii) military and police camps, and towns, and the distances be-

tween them,

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- (iii) system 01 all forms of communication in the area,
- (iv) the location Oftrading stations and chiefs and headmen $\hat{a}\200\231\5$ kraals,
- (v) air $i\neg \201$ elds and air strips in the areas.
- (6) Selection of targets to be tackledln initial phase of guerrilla operations with a view to causing maximum damage to the enemy as well as preventing the quick deployment of re enforcements.

In its study the Committee should bearln mind the following main

targets: â\200\224

- (i) strategic road, railways and other communications
- (ii) power stations
- (iii) police, stations, camps and military forces
- (iv) irredeemable Government stooges.

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(t) A study of climatic conditions in relation to seasons, as wella5 diseases common to the area.

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- (g) The population distribution1n the areas as well as the main crops.
- (h) Rivers and dams.
- ' (i) And generally all other relevant matters

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- 2. External Planning Committee which shall be charged With the followillg. tasks: $\hat{a}\200\224$
- (a) Obtaining ofarms, ammunition and explosives and other equipmellt

(b) 111 co-operation with our internal machinery, making arrangement for the despatch of items in 1 above into the country force and for the continued supply of military equipment.

3. PoliticalAut/zority

direction of the revolutionary struggle as set out in Nos. 6, 7 and 8 of Part1 and to set up a special committee to direct guerrilla political educatiOn. 4. Tlansport Committee.

This Committee is assigned the following duties: \hat{a} 200\224

- (a) The organisation of transport facilities for our trainees
- (b) To organise transport for the re entry of our trainees
- (c) To undertake any transport duties assigned to them from timeto

time.

- 6. Before these operatiOns take place political authority will have been setup in secrecy in a friendly territory with a view, to supervising the struggle both in its internal and external aspects. It is visualised that this authority will in due course of time develop into a Provisional Revolutionary Government.
- 7. This Political Authority should trim its machinery so that simultaneously with- the commencement of operations it will throw out massive propaganda to win world support for our struggle, more particularly: \hat{a} 00\224-
- a) A complete enforcement of boycott,
- b) Enlisting the support of the international trade union movement to refuse handling war materials and other goods intended for the South African Government,
- 0) Raising a storm at the United Nations which should be urged to intervene militarily1n South West Africa.
- (1) Raising of large scale credits for the prosecution of the struggle, e) Arranging for radio facilities for daily transmission to the world and to the people of South Africa.
- g) Stepping up transport plans, e.g. a weekly or bi weekly airlift of trainees outside the country in order to maintain a regular, if small i-202ow of trained personnel.
- h) In order to facilitate the implementation of the military aspect of the plan it is proposed the National High Command appoint personnel to be quartered at Dar under the, auspices of the of 1-201ce there.

PART IV.

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INTERNAL ORGANISATION.

In preparation for the commencement of operations when our external team lands, intensive as well as extensive work will have been done. For instance, guerrilla units will have been set Up in the main areas mapped out in Part 1 above as well as in the other areas away from. the immediate scene of operation.

_ Progressivelyl sabotage activity throughout the country will be stepped up before these operations. Political pressure too, in the meanwhile will be stepped up in conjunction with the sabotage activity.

In furtherance of the general ideas set out above the plan for internal organisation is along the following pattern: \hat{a} 200\224

1. Our target is that on arrival the external force should $i\neg\201$ nd at least 7,000 men in the four main areas ready to join the guerrilla army in the initial

Plans.

- (e) Other matters relating to the efi¬\201cient execution of the Departments; 73
- 4. Olgalzisation of A leas. Olganl'SOIs and Setting up Oproper Mac/ziner

Rethau and James for this task.

Document 74. $a\200\234$ The A. N. C. calls on you $a\200\224$ SAVE THE LEADERS! $a\200\235$ Two-page i-202yerissued by the ANC, October 1963

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The A.N.C. calls on you $\hat{a}\200\224$ SAVE THE LEADERS!

THE PEOPLEâ\200\231S LEADERS ARE ON TRIAL! Their crime? They dared to challenge White supremacy, apartheid and injustice. They were determined to struggle for a free South Africa for all, regardless of skin colour.

THE PEOPLESâ\200\231 LEADERS ARE IN DANGER! Vorster seeks to hang some, to imprison others indeï¬\201nitely. The whole of South Africa has become a jail, with thousands imprisoned. Husbands and sons disappear; many are beaten; some die. Others are brought to trial, in White courts; with laws made by the all-White parliament, with White prosecutors and, judges. Our leaders are then accused of crimes like sabotage and treason.

We say IT IS TREASON TO REMAIN SILENT IN THE FACE OF INJUSTICE. We say OUR DEMANDSARE REASONABLE, CORRECT AND JUST. THIS IS RECOGNISED ALL OVER

THE WORLD.

Today the whole world condemns South Africa, and every international organisation from the United Nations downwards, tries to exclude South African representatives of the apartheid system. Rejection of apartheid is universal, yet when we seek to end apartheid, our organisations are made illegal, our leaders are removed from us, our homes and families destroyed by apartheid policies. Is it not right and natural to in\201ght these things? And when all other means are removed, should we not oppose force by force?

S TAND BY THESE LEADERS. $\hat{a}\200\231$ Vorster and Vewoerd seek to destroy% them and thus destroy us all. Only we can save them. We can save them by demonstrations, strikes, mass action. Do not be afraid! The Government: may seem very strong. But they are not strong. They are alone, isolated and, despised by most South Africans and the whole of the rest of the world. If

we, the people, really start to move, to protest, to withdraw our labour, to refuse to move when evicted, to reject being herded into Bantustans, we » can MAKE APARTHEID UNWORKABLE. It only exists because of US. We cangbring the whole country to a standstill. ONLY SUCH MASS ACTION CAN SAVE MEN LIKE SISULU, MANDELA, KATH» RADA, MBEKI, BERNSTEINVand the OTHERS!

PROTECT THESE LEADERS! The Government say they have been able to destroy the underground movement with the Rivonia raid. The A.N.C. and its allies live on and i-201ght on. Umkhonto continues to prepare for the i-201ght and to strike at the Government. LET US PROVE THE GOVERNMENT IS WRONG BY OUR MILITANTACTION. a>20

SA VE THES E LEA DERS! Vorster wants to terrify White South Africa, to exact his price. Whatever sentences are passed on these men will never bring our i-201ght to an end. We still demand the right to govern ourselves, an end to pass laws and oppression and to racial discrimination. If we continue to i-201ght for these things, we are i-201ghting for ourselves and our children and the leaders who sacrii-201ced themselves.

FREE THESE LEADERS! Let us show the world we are not terrorised, - not passive, not indifferent, not idle. Let us raise a cry that will echo round the world \hat{a} 200224FREE THESE LEADERS! Among them are men and women of all races. We are proud of them all, Black, White, Indian and Coloured. We will be united to i = 201ght apartheid in eyery possible way to the very end.

The AFRICAN NA TIONAL CONGRESS calls on you to organise now

to save the Peoplesâ\200\231 leadersâ\200\224Smash Apartheid Tyrannyâ\200\224

Free South Africa!

THE PEOPLE SHALL RULE! AMANDLA NGAWETHU!

WHITE MAN \hat{a} 200\224eYou are on trial .

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The Government is putting the $a\200\230$ Rivonia $a\200\231$ men on trial. Vorster claims he has caught the $a\200\230$ trouble-makers $a\200\231$. WHITE MAN $a\200\224$ DOES THAT MAKE YOU FEEL SAFE?

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Vorster seeks the death sentence for some of them, imprisonment for the

rest.

WHITE MANâ\200\224WILL YOU SLEEP BETTER AT NIGHT?

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The prosecution will make your <code>i-\202esh</code> creep with stories of $a\200\230hellisha\200\231$ military plots, sabotage, threats to the safety of the state. . .

WHITE MANâ\200\224â\200\224-DO YOU KNOW WHAT THIS MEANS?

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leadership; to keep the freedom i-201ght going. Never has the country, andour people, needed leadership as they do now, in this hoilr of crisis.

Our houseIS on $i^2\00^230$ ItIS the duty of the people of our landa $200\224$ every man and every womana $200\224$ to rally behind our leaders. There15 no time to stand and watch. Thousands; are in jail including our dynamic Nelson Mandela. Many are banished to remote parts of the country. Robben Island is a giant concentration campão $200\230$ for political prisoners. Men and women, including my wife, rot in cells under Vorstera $200\231$ s vicious laws to imprison without trial. Men wait in the death cells to be hanged. Men die for freedom. $200\230$

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South AfricaIS in a permanent state of emergency. Any policemanma arrest any South Africanâ\200\224and need not bring him to trial. People may b hanged for appealing to the United Nations to intervene. Under the Bantu Laws Amendment Bill, the pass laws will turn children into orphans, wives? into widows, men into slaves. We must intensify the attack on the pass; laws. We must in\201ght against the removal of the Africans from the Western: Cape. We must reject once and for all times, the Bantustan fraud. No act of Government must go unchallenged. The struggle must never waver. we" the African National Congress will lead with new methods of struggle. The: African people know that their unity is vital. Only by united action can we" overthrow this Government. We call on all our people to unite and struggleâ\200\234; Workers and peasants; teachers and students; Ministers of Religion and al Churches. We call upon all our people, of whatever shade of opinion. We: say: â\200\224 The hour has come for us to stand together. This18 the only wayt freedom. Nothing short of unity will bring the people their freedom. - . 1W warn the Government that drastic laws will not stop our struggle Ifo liberation. Throughout the ages men have sacrii¬\201cedâ\200\224they have given theigt lives for their ideals. And we are also determined to surrender our live To .our freedom.

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must come. Changes for the better, but not without sacrii¬\201ce sacrii¬\201ce. My sacrii¬\201ce.

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We face tremendous odds. We know that. But ourf- unity

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determination, our sacrii \neg \201ce, our organisation are our weapons. wem succeed! We will succeed!

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Amandla!

Document 73. $\hat{a}\200\234$ Operation Mayibuye. $\hat{a}\200\235$ Document found by the polic Rivonia, July 11,1963

PART].

'The white state has thrown overboard every pretence ofitxle

, democratic process. Armed to the teeth it has presented the people with only one choice and that is its overthrow by force and violence. It can now truly be said that very little, if any, scope exists for the smashing of white supremacy other than by means of mass revolutionary action, the main content of which is armed resistance leading to victory by military means. The political events which have occurred in the last few years have convinced the overwhelming majority of the people that no mass struggle which is not backed up by armed resistance and military offensive operations, can hope to make a real impact. This can be seen from the general mood of the people and their readiness to undertake even desperate and suicidal violent campaigns of the Leballo type. It can also be gauged by their reluctance to participate in orthodox political struggles in which they expose themselves to massive retaliation without a prospect of hitting back. We are conin\201dent that the masses will respond in overwhelming numbers to a lead which holds out a real possibility of successful armed struggle.

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Thus two important ingredients of a 4 revolutionary situation are

present: â\200\224

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a) A disillusionment with constitutional or semi-constitutional forms of struggle and a conviction that the road to Victory is through force;
b) A militancy and a readiness to respond to a lead which holds out a

real possibility of successful struggle.

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In the light of the existence of these ingredients the prosecution of military struggle depends for its success on two further factors: \hat{a} 200\224

'A. The strength of the enemy. This must not be looked at statically but in the light of objective factors, which in a period of military struggle may well expose its brittleness and

disposal to spark off and sustain military operations.

B. The existence of a clear leadership with material resources at its .

The objective military conditions in which the movement <code>i¬\201nds</code> itself makes the possibility of a general uprising leading to direct military struggle an unlikely one. Rather, as in Cuba, the general uprising must be sparked off by organised and well prepared guerrilla operations during the course of

' which the masses of the people will be drawn in and armed.

We have no illusions $200\231$ about the difi-201 culties which face us in launching and successfully prosecuting guerrilla operations leading to military victory. Nor do we assume that such a struggle will be over swiftly. We have taken into account and carefully weighed numerous factors and we mention some of them:

/ . ----H a) We are faced with a powerfully armed modern state with tremendous industrial resources, which can, at least in the initial period, count on the support of three million whites. At the same time the State is isolated practically from the rest ofthe world, and if effective work is done, will have to rely in the main on its own resources. The very

concentration of industry and power and the interdependence of the I $\$ {arious localities operates as both an advantage and a disadvantage for the enemy. It operates as a disadvantage because effective ' guerrilla operations can within a relatively short period create far greater economic havoc and confusion than in a backward, \hat{a} 200 $\$ 230 decentralised country.

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b) The people are unarmed and lack personnel who have been trainedln , all aspects of military operations. A proper organisation of the almost 'unlimited assistance which we can obtain from friendly GoVernments $200\2307$ will counter-balance its disadvantage. In the long run a guerrilla struggle relies on the enemy for its source of supply. But in order to $200\2309$ make this possible an initial effective arming of the in 201rst group of 'guerrilla bands is essential. It is also vital to place in the in 201eld persons . trained invthe art of war who will act as a nucleus of organisers and commanders of guerrilla operations.

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c) The absence of friendly borders and long scale impregnable natural $\tilde{\ }$

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bases from which to operate are both disadvantages. But more important than these factors is the support of the people who in certain situations are better protection than mountains and forests. In the rural areas which become the main theatre of guerrilla operations in the initial phase, the overwhelming majority of the people will protect and safeguard the guerrillas and this fact will to some measure negative the disadvantages. In any event we must not underestimate the fact that there is terrain in many parts of South Africa, which although not classically impregnable is suitable for guerrilla type operations. Boer guerrillas with the support of their people operated in the plains of the Transvaal. Although conditions have changed there15 still a lesson to be learnt from this.

1.

Although we must prepare for a protracted war we must not lose sight of the fact that the political isolation of South Africa from the worldâ\200\230 community of nations and particularly the active hostility towards it from almost the whole of the African Continent and the Socialist world mayiéâ\200\230 resultin such massive assistance in various forms, that the state structure; will collapse far sooner than we can at the moment envisage. Direct; military intervention in South West Africa, an effective economic and? military boycott, even armed international action at some more advanc dz,â\200\235 stage of the struggle are real possibilities which will play an important rol In no other territory where guerrilla operations have been undertaken has . the international situation been such a Vital factor operating against the:

enemy. We are not unaware that there are powerful external monopol interests who will attempt to bolster up the white state. With effective wo they can be isolated and neutralised. The events of the last few years ha shown that the issue of racial discrimination cuts across world ideologi coni¬\202ict albeit that the West proceeds from opportunistic premises, 1'"

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such demand with Force and yet more Force! Twice in the past 18 months, virtual martialâ\200\230 law has been imposed in order to beat down peaceful, â\200\230 â\200\230 non-violent strike action of the people in support of their rights. It is now preparing its forces EM- enlarging and reerming its armed forces and drawing white civilain population into comâ\200\224 mandos end pistol clubs EM- for FullEM~scele military actions against the people. The Nationalist Government has chosen the course of force and massacre, now, deliberately, as it did in Sherpeille. ENUmkhonto we Sizwe will be at the front line of the people's defence. It will be the fighting arm of the people against the Government and its policies of race oppression. It will be the striking force of the people for liberty, for rights and for their Final liberation! Let the Governâ\200\224 ment, its supporters who put it into power, and those whose passive toleration of reaction keeps it in power, take note of where the Nationalist Government is leading the country! ENWe OF Umkhonto we Sizwe have always sought EM- es the liberation movement has sought EM- to achieve liberation, without bloodshed and CiVil clash. We do still. We hope $EH\hat{a}\200\224$ even at this late hour $EM\hat{a}\200\224$ that our first actions will awaken everyone to a realisation of the dieestroue situation to which the Nationalist policy is leading. We hope that we will bring the Government and its supporters to their senses before it is too late, so that both Governâ\200\224 ment end its policies can be changed before matters reach the desperate stage of civil war. We believe our actions to be a blow against the Nationalist preparations for civil war and military rule.' EMln these actions, we are working in the best interests of all the peoples of this country EMblack, brown and white EM- whose future happiness and well-being cannot be attained without the overthrow of the Nationalist Government, the abolition of white supremacy end the winning of liberty, democracy and Full national rights end equality For all the people of this country.

EMWe appeal for the support and encouragement of all those South

Africans who seek the happiness end freedom of the people in this country.

EMAfrika Meyibuye!

/EMleeued by command of Umkhonto we Sizwe.