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Sun. Star 28/6/92

Mandela warns Govt

BY JOVIAL RANTAO

IF President FW de Klerk introduces the state of emergency as a solution to resolve the country's problems, Nelson Mandela will personally lead a defiance campaign of unprecedented dimensions against the Government.

The ANC president delivered this warning in an address to a rally celebrating the 37th anniversary of the movement's Freedom Charter at Kliptown, outside Soweto, yesterday.

The Mass Mobilisation Campaign, which was the only alternative to negotiations, was now top priority of the ANC.

"Those who say there's no alternative to negotiations have based their arguments on a mistaken assumption," Mandela said.

The ANC leader, who has flu, went back to bed after his speech. He is due to leave today for the OAU summit in Dakar, Senegal.

He denied reports that he would meet Foreign Affairs Minister Pik Botha in Senegal for talks.

kwaNdebele opts out

KWANDEBELE, which is ravaged by domestic problems because of the "independence" issue, will miss this year's National Schools Sports Association's (Nassa) tournament at the University of the North near Pietersburg in August.

Although Nassa secretary Eddie Mafoni did not specify reasons for the homeland's withdrawal from the event, it is well known that all is not well in kwaNdebele where there has been unrest because of the Legislative Assembly's decision to go ahead with plans for "independence", contrary to the wishes of the majority of the people.

The absence of kwaNdebele means

that Lebowa will have to produce two soccer teams.

"This is because kwaNdebele will not be taking part," said Mafoni. Nassa's tournaments only cater for high schools and secondary schools in the homelands.

So far, Gazankulu, Lebowa, Ciskei, kwaZulu, Qwa Qwa and Venda are set to contest the R30 000 Coca Cola sponsored event.

Of the six contestants, only Venda, Lebowa and Ciskei have paid their affiliation fees.

Last year kwaNdebele took part in the tournament, which was hosted by Ciskei.

New Nation
June 28 - July 1 1987

On to disaster with Mandela

THE aim of the African National Congress has always been to rule South Africa as a one-party state.

With difficulty they've been persuaded to discuss constitutional rights for the large minorities of whites, Coloureds, Indians, Zulus and other powerful tribes.

President de Klerk has led the whites to understand that non-whites must have an equal say in government. But it'd be disastrous to change from white to ANC Xhosa tribe domination.

Prosperous South Africa, riddled with civil wars, would become as destitute as the new neighbouring African

states. The Zulus are great fighters. They often defeated the British.

When violence breaks out between the Zulus and ANC supporters, Nelson Mandela says the government police and military support the Zulus. Rubbish.

They're trying to keep the peace so South Africa can advance to a fair democracy. The ANC now demands that South Africa be banned from the Olympics.

This would bitterly disappoint non-white athletes. It'd destroy the unity among the races encouraged by sport. But the ANC is afraid blacks and whites actually liking each other would lose it support.

News of The World
28/6/92 - London

ANC's blueprint for the next crucial weeks



UNLIKE past mass ANC protest plans, the four-phase Operation Exit is intended, says one official, "to start with a whimper and end with a bang".

PHASE ONE: Meetings

This began on June 16 and continues until the end of the month, the deadline set by the ANC for a break in the deadlock at the Codesa multiparty talks.

Emphasis in this period will be on local and regional activities. The key date is June 26, anniversary of the 1955 "Congress of the People", when the ANC endorsed its foundation-stone policy document, the Freedom Charter.

This time around, the ANC hopes to present to "people's assemblies" across the country its proposed "Transition to Democracy Act".

This first period is intended to establish a momentum for the rest of the campaign.

PHASE TWO: Marches

This begins on July 1 if, as the ANC believes, the government does not meet the

June 30 deadline over the Codesa deadlock.

Actions will remain largely regional. Simultaneous national actions will begin - most probably in the form of simultaneous marches on a given day.

Phase two will last through July, and is intended as a rolling, mobilising and momentum-gathering process. Actions will, however, begin targeting specific Government institutions.

PHASE THREE: Strikes

During early August the campaign will reach its crescendo, with a week-long general strike and stayaway and "intensified civil disobedience", says organiser Ronnie Kasrils. The precise details remain unclear, but the ANC and its trade union ally, Cosatu, expect it to include factory occupation and attempts to disrupt the operation of key civil service offices.

South Africa's anti-apartheid movement has never pulled off a successful, week-long national strike. The last, suspended after two days, was attempted following the Sharpeville massacre and the banning of

the ANC in 1960. It was broken by a massive, joint police and military crackdown.

PHASE FOUR: Exit gate

Dubbed "exit gate" by ANC planners, this will begin after the general strike and is intended as the period in which the De Klerk Government negotiates itself rapidly out of power - or at least accepts demands for a representative constituent assembly, and introduces legislation for the establishment of the transition executive authority to oversee elections.

The ANC is not, however, underestimating the difficulty of achieving this. Kasrils says the campaign will be open-ended and will continue until democracy is achieved.

This may be over-bidding on the ANC leadership's part.

Endless action in the wake of the national strike will be difficult to sustain, particularly if violence begins playing a major role.

Much will therefore depend on international pressure brought to bear on De Klerk during the third phase.

ALLEGED KILLERS *tell of Boipatong battle plan*

Massacre confession

By JACQUES PAUW

KWAMADALA hostel dwellers have broken down under exhaustive police interrogation and have confessed to their involvement in the Boipatong massacre.

In the process, INSIGHT has established, the hostel dwellers have provided police with more names of hostel residents allegedly involved in the killings, raising expectations of more arrests and eventual convictions.

Now that the SAP has become a dominant factor in re-starting the negotiating process, they finally seem to have made a breakthrough in attempting to solve the spiral of violence which has engulfed South Africa and led to the deaths of at least 49 Boipatong residents since last Wednesday.

The alleged Boipatong killers have, according to a police source, provided the police with a "battle plan" drawn up by the leaders of the murderous hostel impi.

Magistrate

The first formal confession to a Vaal magistrate was made on Friday by one of the six hostel-dwellers earlier detained by police, following days of exhaustive interrogation by a team of police experts.

According to the police source, more confessions are expected before the end of the weekend in an investigation in which police said 200 detectives, overseen by two advocates of the Attorney-General's office, have questioned between 600 and 700 KwaMada inmates.

In another development, INSIGHT has established that police have arrested 15 people for a series of attacks on the Meadowlands hostel in Soweto in 1991.

It is believed that at least one of the suspects has confessed to being an ANC member.

This area of Soweto has been caught up in the terrifying cycle of violence, leading to at least 106 deaths, hundreds of injuries and 88 evacuated houses.

► See Pages 4, 11, 26, 28

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IT'S BEEN CALLED the Factory of Death, and that's far from unfair. What goes unnoticed is that KwaMadala Hostel has no monopoly on the dealing of death and knows plenty about the receiving, report RIAN MALAN (right) and DENIS BECKETT



On the inside looking out

MNTWANA Zulu, uncle of the king, pillar of the Zulu royal house, hostel leader, cannot believe his ears when it is put to him that the build-up to the June 16 stayaway was entirely peaceful.

He blinks quizzically, draws himself up, turns to his interpreter, and starts: "In the beginning, my house was burnt down."

That was nearly two years ago, but it's a long story the prince has to tell. He speaks astonishingly calmly for a man at the vortex of an international crisis, but with diminishing coherence. En route, he calls for a list of people who took refuge in the hostel after being driven out of their township homes by arson or attack. It runs to 13 pages.

By the end this is the picture that emerges from the hostel:


On June 13/14, the weekend before the massacre, at least three people were murdered in Boipatong. The first was a woman named Nomvula, accused of consorting with an Inkatha boyfriend and dispatched in the small hours of Saturday.

The second was David Mbele, a 37-year-old Boipatong resident and schoolteacher who had tenuous, if any, structural connection with Inkatha but was known in the township as "a really Zulu, following the culture of the forefathers". His home was attacked by three or four hundred people on Saturday afternoon. He was shot while running away and when a fire engine arrived the crowd chased it off.

The third was BL Khumalo, an Inkatha member, burnt-out body retrieved by police from his burnt-out Passat at 2.35 pm on Sunday.

Two more presumed Inkatha sympathisers were allowed to live and their homes burnt down, one in Boipatong's Sego Street, one in Matthews Street in nearby Bophelong.

It was a rough weekend for Inkatha associates around Boipatong, and also for the "really Zulus" who may not have anything to do with Inkatha but who dare to maintain such customs as the wearing of a leather wristband to denote a certain status in regard to the esteem of the ancestors.



PRISON AND FORTRESS . . . KwaMadala, a prison as well as a fortress. Inset: hostel leader Prince Zulu.

MAIN PICTURE: DERBIE YAZBEK

It was a weekend that went by unrecorded. No outrage, no press coverage — not a mention until Mbele's death rated a few lines here and there.

"Nobody cries for us," says Inkatha's Humphrey Ndlovu, acting as the prince's interpreter, "nobody prays for us."

He has a case. At the beginning of April two massacres at the squalid settlements of Crossroads and Zonkiszwe near Alberton —

sleeping people attacked, women and children cut to pieces, the same story — left 32 corpses on the ground but, the Inkatha people believe, there was no outcry simply because the victims were Zulu/Inkatha and the assailants Xhosa/ANC.

In the last week of April, the Inkatha people say, the homes of 18 of their supporters and/or presumed supporters were attacked and torched in the Vaal townships around Boi-

patong, and not a word of that episode has featured in public print until today.

Some of those 18 families joined the swelling queue of refugees flocking to KwaMadala, which has become a prison as well as a fortress. Those inside cannot leave. Their children can't set foot in school. They can't get treatment at the hospital, where staff turn away "Inkatha murderers". The few taxis upon whom they used to rely no longer come near.

Ask why, and they refer you to a crippled youth leaning against a wall. In February he went to meet his mother in Boipatong, and he wound up in intensive care with a bullet in the spine. A month earlier, one Bongani Mbatha made the mistake of wearing an IFF T-shirt on an outing. He was stoned to death. In May a boy named Thapelo went shopping in downtown Vereeniging, presumed to be safe territory. He was abducted and burnt alive.

THE KwaMadala people carry a heavy load of resentment. The place was born in resentment. Some 150 Iscor workers were forced out of the main Iscor hostel, KwaMasiza, two years ago. After four months of sleeping on the veld, their numbers being augmented by arson victims and other outcasts from the townships, they broke into KwaMadala, where they continue to be augmented from the same sources. In the process they acquire ever more plain criminal baggage and anti-social trappings.

Ironically many of them — 410 — continue to work at Iscor where, on shift, they co-exist in apparent harmony with the very people with whom they're at war by night. At Iscor the Inkatha/ANC conflict is invisible, while a conflict between two factions within the ANC has recently led to at least five murders of ANC people by other ANC people.

What happened on the night of Wednesday June 17 is yet to be properly explained. Whatever lies behind it cannot mitigate the barbarity of the perpetrators. But if future massacres are to be forestalled rather than bewailed, it may be helpful to pay some attention to the perspective of hostel residents who see themselves as clamped in a vicegrip of persecution.



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Paperwork of troubled times

IN their offices in an annexe to an estate agent's premises in central Vereeniging, Inkatha officials riff through an enormous pile of "Violence Statements". A typical entry, a complaint by a man aged 37:

Date and time: 19/05/92, about 3 am.

Damage: House burnt.

How many people: About 150.

Why did they attack you? My son who was killed was an IFP member.

Did the police take action? They took fingerprints.

Are you an IFP member? No.

Another typical entry comes from a 22-year-old woman: 12/04/92 about 4 pm. They attacked me at home ... ANC comrades, I can identify them ... about 30 people ... hit with knobkerries and sjambeks on head and whole body ... They warned me to stop loving (an IFP member) of which it is difficult for me."

One document in the file was on a Cosatu letterhead. The Inkatha secretary flipped past it. We stopped him and asked to see

Amid a welter of verbal heat, cold paperwork reflects an interesting background

It was dated December 19 1991 and addressed to a taxi-owner. It read (spelling and grammar unchanged):

Mr (X)

We challenge you here in Hostel 3 Block H Room 4, and those drivers who was deliver Inkatha to Jabulani in Sowetho on 8-12-91 please, Date 21-12-91 in hostel, time 8 am on Saturday, so if you do not attend that meeting we will see.

Thanks

Secretary

The taxi-owner's reply is not on file. On January 20 this year he received the following answer from Central Committee of Vietnam, Block H, Room 4, Vietnam 3, Sebokeng:

Dear Mr (X),

We wish to thank you for your letter dated 20-12-92 but at the moment regret

to your apologise we have not suitable any chances for playing with time. We don't want your history, just we want to know you come or not.

We are given you for the last chance... We want to tell you comrade any problem at your company we are (not) very far. Kindly call at this office as soon as possible on Monday evening Time 1730 Date 27-01-92. Hoping to hear from you very soon.

On September 9, 1991 Vitus Mvelase wrote on Inkatha letterhead to the Vaal Civic Association as follows:

We have been delegated by the general meeting of the above mentioned regional party to request peace talk meeting between your committee and its regional committee on Saturday the 14 September

1991 at any neutral venue.

Your cooperation will be highly appreciated.

The reply from the Vaal Civic is dated seven weeks later, October 28. It expresses appreciation but records that the proposal is to be "discussed by all organs of the VCA for purposes of acquiring proper mandate (and) by all other political organisations, some of which may have had direct conflict with the IFP".

It went on to say that the VCA, "as the organisation holding a neutral position, non-political"; was to facilitate the meeting, and ended: "The VCA requests therefore, that IFP members exercise patience, as the discussion may seem to take long. It has to take place anyway to avoid conflicts in future."

Eight months later, Vitus Mvelase has difficulty understanding how this delaying approach squares with the attitude of an organisation that consistently claims that it is the peace-seeker and that it is the victim of Inkatha aggression.

Sun. Star 28/6/92

Hostels: police get confessions

■ Massacre:

Concentrated police investigations of the massacre at Boipatong are producing startling results. Police, long criticised for failing to control hostel dwellers, have gone on the attack.

By Jacques Pauw

CONFESSIONS to police who swooped on hostel related violence in the aftermath of Boipatong, have shown that hostels have become a primary source of politically related violence in Transvaal townships.

Besides KwaMadala hostel dwellers confessing to a magistrate to their involvement in the Boipatong massacre, Soweto police have arrested 15 people in connection with attacks and counter-attacks involving the Meadowlands hostel.

Police Commissioner General Johan van der Merwe warned this week that steps would be taken to control hostel dwellers.

General Andre Prins, of the SAP's Crime Intelligence Service, refused

to reveal details of the Boipatong confessions, but he confirmed that investigators had made "a significant breakthrough" and that prosecutions would follow.

The ANC has demanded this week that the Government phase out the hostels, convert them into family units, instal fences, use the security forces to permanently guard them and conduct regular weapons searches.

ANC secretary general Cyril Ramaphosa said between July 1990 and April this year there had been 261 attacks on township residents by hostel inmates, leading to more than 1 200 deaths.

Commenting on the police investigation at Boipatong, Ramaphosa said on Friday he was perturbed by

the fact that only six people had been arrested out of hundreds questioned. The ANC demanded action.

Van der Merwe also said on Friday that residents of the KwaMadala hostel were involved in the Boipatong killings, that police had evidence of how the massacre unfolded and ringleaders would be traced.

According to INSIGHTS information one of the Boipatong suspects revealed a "battle plan" compiled days before the attack.

Spears sharpened

He said that the impis had been instructed to sharpen their spears in preparation. The hostel dweller made no mention of any police complicity in the massacre.

Van der Merwe said police have now established that between 200 and 300 hostel dwellers were involved in last Wednesday's attack. A search of the hostel had uncovered 276 spears, 44 crowbars and other dangerous weapons.

He also described the massacre as a "revenge attack".

The Meadowlands arrests followed months of attacks and counter attacks between Inkatha and ANC supporters, leading to widespread

condemnation of the police's alleged failure to act.

According to human rights organisations, the bulk of the aggression in the area flows from the Inkatha supporting inmates of the Meadowlands hostel.

The International Commission of Jurists said in its report about Meadowlands: "Unhappy, ordinary people have come to see attack as the best means of defence so Inkatha's action has led to a whole cycle of attack and counter-attack."

According to a police source, senior ANC members are implicated in the confessions of some of the suspects arrested this week.

The police investigation of the Boipatong tragedy will be evaluated by Mr P A J Waddington, director of Criminal Justice Studies of Reading University in the UK, Mr Justice Richard Goldstone announced in London Friday.

The former chief justice of India, Judge Bhagwati, has also been appointed to join the Commission's investigation into the killings. This follows a call by President de Klerk to have a jurist of "international repute" involved in the proceedings.

Judge Bhagwati and Dr Waddington arrive here this week.

U NB

The cost of water in Randburg goes up on Wednesday, July 1.

Sun Star

28/6/92

NATIONAL

**Hostel men confess to
involvement in killings**

THE first KwaMadala hostel dwellers have broken down under exhaustive police interrogation and have formally confessed to a Vaal magistrate to their involvement in the Boipatong massacre.

In the process, INSIGHT has established that hostel dwellers have provided police with more names of men who allegedly took part in the killings.

INSIGHT has also established that 15 people are being held for a series of attacks in 1991 on hostels in Soweto. It is believed one of the suspects has confessed to being an ANC member, while two more claimed to have been recruited by an ANC defence unit. — Pages 1,4.

Sun. Star 28/6/92

**Mandela warns FW:
No state of emergency,**

IF STATE President F W de Klerk introduced a State of Emergency to resolve the country's problems, Nelson Mandela would personally lead a defiance campaign of unprecedented dimensions against the Government.

This warning was delivered by the ANC President when he addressed a rally to celebrate the 37th anniversary of the movement's Freedom Charter at Kliptown, outside Soweto, yesterday.

The rally was attended by many of the grey-haired veterans who had adopted it there.

Mr Mandela said he had delivered the warning to Mr de Klerk earlier this week. — See Page 4.

Cowhide collusion

YOU know those famous weapons the police gave back to Inkatha? And how the police said they were harmless? And nobody believed that? Well, they were harmless.

Humphrey Ndlovu was to accompany us to the Kwame Nkomo hostel, where we were hoping to find some truths.

We called at the Inkatha offices in Johannesburg to collect him, and there found an entirely unexpected truth that we could barely believe.

A pile of cowhide shields lay on the floor. What were they doing there? Simple, said Humphrey, these are the weapons the police returned to us.

This was startling indeed. Universal South African wisdom, echoing loudly across the globe, is that on June 14 the police confiscated an armoury of Inkatha weapons, to cheers and plaudits all round, and on June 15 they meekly returned them: proof of cynicism and collusion.

THE police have said they only returned non-dangerous weapons. The police might as well have saved their breath, all they got was horse-laugh.

"The return of the weapons" has become instant lore and a sizable contributor to the build-up of distrust.

To many people, including us, the police claim had sounded like a weak after-the-event effort to mitigate the damage. We had taken it for granted that at minimum they had returned some aggressive weapons.

Which is why the pile of shields was a shock. There were about 150 of them, one of which was made of heavy wood and could be used to bash someone on the head, like a breast board.

A handful had solidish wooden spines attached. From the rest, the spines had been removed. They were nothing but hide, about as lethal as a rolled-up newspaper.

If indeed these were what had been returned, an astonishing myth has been allowed to prevail, the myth that the police purposefully delivered weapons of violence to Inkatha.

But are these what were returned? Could Inkatha have cleaned out the offensive portions in the meantime as a PR trick?

NDLOVU laughs without mirth. What PR? We're the first journalists to have seen the pile in the nine days it has been there.

The only people who have been there are furious Inkatha members claiming they've been tricked. They understood that the police would return both shields and unfortified sticks.

Now they pitch up to stake their claims and find nothing there but emasculated spineless chunks of old cowhide, and walk out in disgust. "They are sweating us", says Humphrey.

Later we found a shopkeeper downstairs who said he had seen the police offloading the "weapons", and this was precisely what they were — shields, mainly without spines, a few with spines.

Then we spoke to the reporter whose story initiated the furore and he said the same. His original story refers correctly to "shields and sticks" but does not make it explicit that the sticks were (a) few and (b) attached to the shields.

From that basis, the tale of the returned weapons has become international.

Sun. Times

28/6/92

OPINION

Propaganda war

BOIPATONG has already secured its place in the dreadful South African history of massacres; it seems likely also to secure a place in the history of political cynicism. Seldom, even in this country of tendentious political discourse, has tragedy been exploited as cold-bloodedly or as recklessly as the massacre.

The facts, of course, are still in dispute. The most likely explanation of the tragedy is that it was a revenge raid by the hostel-dwellers, who constitute the country's most marginalised and disadvantaged class of workers, for the "necklacing" of a woman from the Kwamadala hostel. The most popular version, however, is that President De Klerk sent paramilitary forces from the notorious Koevoet unit, under the command of white police officers driving Casspirs, to slaughter black people simply because they were black.

The latter version has grown in the telling. It has also been discredited by investigation. Headlines proclaiming "a link" between Koevoet and Boipatong have turned out, on investigation by the Goldstone commission, to rest on an alleged assertion by a policeman who now denies he made the assertion. The people of Boipatong, no doubt mindful of the "comrades" who have taken control of the township, trot out similar versions of the same story. Whites, strangers and Casspirs, not surprisingly, feature prominently in the accounts of the slaughter.

The police, meanwhile, have been acting as though, on this

occasion, they were innocent: 200 detectives collecting forensic evidence from the hostel and systematically questioning witnesses and gathering statements for trial. Their efforts have to some degree been stymied by an unwillingness among the people of Boipatong — apparently under orders from the "comrades" — to talk to them.

ANC leaders, including Mr Nelson Mandela and Mr Cyril Ramaphosa, have not awaited discovery of the truth: they immediately proclaimed to their followers and the world the guilt, not only of the Zulu-speaking hostel-dwellers and the Inkatha Freedom Party, but of the police, the government and President De Klerk himself. Sycophantic elements of the press have made their task easy.

These are the tactics developed when South Africa was a closed society, its police protected by outrageous laws, its press hobbled, its courts manipulated and its international credibility at zero. They may continue to work for a while, a week, perhaps, or a year, depending on the issue, but South Africa has become sufficiently open a society for the truth to be established and publicly verified. The truth of Boipatong will begin to emerge when the police bring people to trial.

Meanwhile, the Goldstone commission plays an indispensable role in cutting through the worst of the propaganda, and it will be strengthened in its role by the inclusion of eminent foreigners in its ranks. That is one ray of light.

Sun. Times

28/6/92



Live frugally and esteem learning above all else

AT THE end of a week in which political leaders squeezed every possible advantage from the massacre of innocents at Boipatong, and every last drop of bathos, the impression that remains is nausea: a lingering taste of foulness on the tongue, a scent of decay in the nostrils.

Allowances must be made. The anger of the crowds was greater than the anger of the leaders who addressed them, and new dangerous voices — among them a man who professed to be a minister of the church — were calling black people to a race war. The PAC began to reap the harvest of its own intolerance as the ANC leader was denounced, with a poetic inversion that was surely unconscious, as a lamb leading his people to slaughter.

Radicals are displacing moderates. Winnie Mandela for Nelson Mandela, Chris Hani for Thabo Mbeki, hot-headed Peter Mokaba for Cyril Ramaphosa, PAC for ANC, and a new breed of violent radicals lurk at the corners of the stage. The ANC leaders had plenty of reason for a show of ferocity, and their political demands were not, if you examined them closely, outrageous.

Yet Mr Mandela's accusation that President De Klerk was, like a Nazi, allowing black people to be killed because they were black was untrue, recklessly intemperate, and calculated — whether deliberately or not — to whip up racist feelings. His habit of resorting to extravagant invective is, in a leader of his stature, a weakness.

Chris Hani leaped into the fray with a fresh flood of warlike rhetoric, and Mr Ramaphosa's lugubrious descriptions of Boipatong were so transparently manipulative and politically expedient as to raise the suspicion that the ANC leaders were not altogether displeased to have more blood for the cause. The IFP's Themba Khoza was not slow to take the gap by suggesting — without evidence — that the ANC itself might have perpetrated the massacre.

Of course, the international anti-apartheid movement, anaemic and close to death after two years of negotiations, was revived; its glee was palpable as it launched into a new campaign for sanctions, sports boycotts, and the

renewed isolation of South Africa. Not surprisingly, the first victims were the usual soft targets, innocent sportsmen and desperately conciliatory businessmen.

So far, the ANC's methods have all displayed more theatricality than threat. There is a curious dissonance between the ANC's strategy, which rests on the myth that the Nationalist government is a pushover, and its tactics, which are evidence of impotence. Propaganda, boycotts, sanctions, stayaways, strikes, international pressures — these are the methods of the weak.

Strip away cheap political theatre, and what is left is the ANC's real dilemma: it faces a government which is too weak to govern, and too strong to be overthrown. Trapped between an immovable National Party, and an irresistible tide of anger rising on its left, the ANC needs evidence of success if it is to continue negotiating.

The ANC's dilemma? It is South Africa's dilemma.

President De Klerk has done much in three years to strengthen his party and to widen its power base. The core support consists of half the Afrikaners and most of the English whites; the remaining Afrikaners, scattered in disarray on his right, have nowhere else to go in a pinch. A majority of the coloured people, and probably of the Indians, and a scattering of black people now lean towards the National Party.

THIS is not to say the Nationalists will win an election — I am sure they would lose — but that they are in a much better position at home to resist the ANC than they were when Nelson Mandela came out of prison.

Abroad, too, they are in a much stronger position, not only because Mr De Klerk has assiduously gathered diplomatic support. The national reserves of gold and currency, which dropped steadily until mid-1989, have risen since then from practically nothing to about R10-billion; foreign debt shrinks steadily.

In his hands, President De Klerk has an array of immense powers: control of

the money supply and the budget, of borders and of tariffs, of transport networks and vehicle fleets, of taxation and expenditure, of the appointment of judges and the deployment of public prosecutors, of police, army and bureaucracy. It is only the inevitable tide of demography, of numbers, that ensures the eventual defeat of his party.

Indeed, his position might seem well-nigh impregnable, except that this mighty array of powers does not, ironically, enable him to govern wisely or well — or, in some case, to govern at all. The bureaucracy is so overblown, so corrupt, and so determined to defend its own privileges that perhaps it is beyond rehabilitation.

WHAT Boipatong has shown, above all, is the cost of a police force which nobody trusts, which does not investigate with vigour, which cannot prevent its own members from opening fire at the most disastrous moments, which will not disband its covert units, and which does not even suspend an officer found by a court, on balance of probability, to be a poisoner.

If the ANC's dilemma is that it lacks the power to achieve its strategic aims, the dilemma of the government is that it cannot direct its power to its own strategic ends. The result is confusion, mayhem and political cynicism. As John Hall lamented this week, we need statesmanship, and we have none.

For the ordinary citizen, chilled by the shadow of anarchy, the only sensible course of action is to batten down. In capricious times, go back to old truths: live frugally, without ostentation; neither a borrower nor a lender be; make your home your castle, or your fortress; avoid the limelight, travel with care, take no risk; cultivate disbelief and caution; prepare for the rainy day but disperse your savings and trust your family above your bank; take a lesson from the world's greatest chroniclers of insecurity, the Jews, and esteem learning above all else.

Hope will return. Until then, take care to survive.

KEN OWEN

AND THE PATIENT MAN OF PEACE

THE essence of John Hall, national peace broker, can perhaps best be seen in the sports he enjoys — trout fishing, sailing and golf: they all require patience and an acute sense of timing.

His sailing abilities reveal his character: cautious, ready to batten down the hatches at approaching trouble.

Mr Hall, the 57-year-old chairman of the National Peace Accord, is described as a man without ego, a unique attribute in the corridors of power.

He dismisses the acclaim given to him for his role as chairman of the Peace Committee — "I don't do the work, I just chair the meetings," he said.

But his sense of responsibility and concern for the escalating crisis in the country was illustrated this week by his cancellation of a foreign business trip.

He felt he could not absent himself from the country at this time. Which does not mean Mr Hall feels his presence is crucial to peace.

This week he expressed his frustration at the continuing violence, the contraventions of the peace accord by all the political parties and the slowness of establishing effective peace structures.

Appearing on a television programme with representatives of the main political parties, Mr Hall had to hear each representative contravene the spirit and letter of the accord to which they were party.

At times he is tempted to walk away. What stops him is the negative message this might give to the country. But Mr Hall is a man who hates to admit defeat. His optimism and dogged determination to see a project succeed carries him through.

Cosatu general secretary Sam Shilowa says Mr Hall is "a person you can relate to".

A leading businessman with the SA Chamber of Business insists: "John can sometimes be a bit impulsive; deep down he is very emotional and sometimes arrives at conclusions without thinking them through."

Themba Khoza, Transvaal organiser for the Inkatha Freedom Party, agrees with Mr Shilowa's assessment of caution: "Like all businessmen, he does not want to step over to either the IFP or ANC side. He is a good man, but he can't get people to accept peace. He is a mere facilitator, but so far the IFP has had no objections to him."



DETERMINED: peacebroker John Hall, who blasted President De Klerk for spending money on overseas trips that could have been 'better used' here

John Hall. Resolute optimist who can't face up to defeat

What all agree on — in a country where consensus is as elusive as a strong currency — is that, as Mr Shilowa puts it: John Hall is "trying his best to maintain his neutrality with the ANC/SACP/Cosatu alliance and the government and Inkatha".

Val Pauquet, who does media work for the Peace Secretariat, says that John Hall, "inspires confidence in people, he allows them to reach heights they did not believe they were capable of".

But this does not mean that the man who is also chairman of Rand Mines and an executive director at Barlow Rand is a push-over.

Sidney Matus, a former director of Spar who is now retired, was a vice-president with Mr Hall of Sacob after its formation in 1990.

He says: "He is very

charismatic and laid-back, but he can get tough when he has to."

One example is contained in the latest issue of Negotiation News where Mr Hall is quoted as saying: "No one will invest in SA while violence is underway, and while there is no political settlement. I'm just writing to the State President and everyone else."

"How dare he take the taxpayers' money and go overseas on jaunts to Tokyo, Russia and Singapore when that money should be applied at this time to solving problems at Codesa and in this country."

A native of Nottingham, England, Mr Hall came to SA with his parents in 1948 and attended his final years of school at Athlone High in Johannesburg.

OUR country is on the brink of disaster. First there is the crisis in the negotiation process itself. The central blockage stems from the refusal of the NP government to move together with all of us in the process of truly democratising South Africa.

The continuing direct and indirect involvement of the government, the state security forces and the police in the violence as well as your unwillingness to act decisively to bring such violence to an end has created an untenable and explosive situation.

The government persists in portraying the crisis as a creation of the ANC. This attitude is unhelpful and extremely dangerous. The government is placing party political interests above national interests by trying to minimise the seriousness of this crisis.

We are of the view that the response and concrete steps by your government to these demands will play a critical role in determining the direction and place with which bona fide negotiations can take place.

Why the ANC stopped talking

On Friday the African National Congress delivered its memorandum to President FW de Klerk setting out the reasons for its decision to break off negotiations. Here is an abridged version ...

The negotiation crisis

IN MY letter to you written from London in 1989 I outlined the kernel of the political problem which the government and the ANC would have to address. I stated: "Two political issues will have to be addressed. Firstly, the demand for majority rule in a unitary state; secondly, the concern of white South Africa over this demand, as well as the insistence of whites on structural guarantees that majority rule will not mean domination of the white minority by blacks. The most crucial task ... will be to reconcile these two positions."

The crux of the deadlock in negotiations

lies in the failure of the government to face up to the need to reconcile these issues.

In the first place, you have chosen to reject internationally accepted democratic principles which define a democracy. You have chosen to equate majority rule, which is the quintessential hallmark of democracy, with black domination. In the second place, you have interpreted the "structural guarantees" as establishing a white minority veto.

The government positions have been directed basically at subverting the sovereignty of the constituent assembly, subjecting it to the veto of a second House and ensuring that a

minority in the constituent assembly shall be able to frustrate an overwhelming majority.

In our view constitution making should be a unifying and legitimising process which should enjoy overwhelming support. Hence, we advocated that the constituent assembly should arrive at decisions by a sixty-six and two-thirds percent majority.

The government and violence

THE negotiations crisis and the issue of violence, particularly with regard to the government's involvement in it, are inter-related.

The Boipatong massacre is but a tragic culmination of policies and practices followed by the government. In this instance, the wilful negligence on the part of the SAP in relation to the KwaMadala hostel is extensively documented. Ministerial defences of the SAP and your govern-

ment's failure to act against the KwaMadala hostel make government collusion an inescapable conclusion.

It is your government which legalised the carrying of dangerous weapons, under the pretext of their being cultural weapons, in 1990. The fact that the majority of the deaths and injuries have been caused by these so-called "cultural weapons" has not moved you to restore the ban on carrying them in public on all occasions.

How do we explain the failure of such a formidable force such as the SAP to arrest people involved in the massacre?

In those few instances where security force personnel and police or IFP members have been arrested, how do we explain the fact that inadequate police investigation is the basis for their acquittal, laughably light sentences and ridiculously low bail?

We believe your failure to acknow-

ledge the centrality of apartheid in violence can no longer be ignored.

You ignore the reality that the security forces and the police are the products of apartheid, have been trained in the ideology of apartheid, deployed in its defence, brutalised by that experience and nurtured to see the ANC, its allied organisations and black people in general as the enemy.

This basic failure by you and your government induces you to perceive the political rivalry between the Inkatha Freedom Party and the ANC as the central cause of the violence.

Conclusion

NONE of us can escape the gravity of the crisis facing our country. The point has been reached where your responses will be looked at by us to determine whether you are taking concrete measures to terminate forthwith the involvement of the government, the state security forces and the police in the violence.

Similarly, specific measures are expected of you to make negotiations a bona fide exercise in charting the way to a democratic South Africa.

Sun Times

28/6/92

Sun. Times

28/6/92

Man confesses: 'I was a killer at Boipatong'

THE SA police claim they are on the verge of a breakthrough in their investigations into the Boipatong massacre following a confession by one of the attackers.

Last night, Lieutenant Colonel Johan Mostert confirmed that a man had made a statement to a magistrate on Friday night in Vanderbijlpark.

Sunday Times Reporters

Colonel Mostert said the police expected to arrest more hostel dwellers soon.

The man who confessed provided the police with in-depth details of the bloody attack and names of other hostel residents involved.

Over 40 people were killed in the early morning attack on Wednesday, June 17.

Meanwhile, the Gold-

stone Commission — assisted by two international experts — will face a tangle of contradictory evidence when it begins investigating the Boipatong massacre on Thursday.

Police commissioner General Johan van der Merwe admitted on Friday the police had not been able to get a single statement as residents of the

Vaal Triangle township were unwilling to speak to them.

Violence-monitoring groups, which have been collecting evidence for the past week, say they have statements from residents testifying to police involvement in the attack.

But General Van der Merwe said the police investigation, which involved the interrogation of more than 600 inmates of the Kwamadala Hostel, had indicated that between 200 and 300 hostel-dwellers may have taken part in the massacre.

The police had confiscated 276 assegais, 40 iron rods and other dangerous objects, General Van der Merwe said.

"Some of the weapons, which had traces of blood on them and are being examined," he said.

However, the Goldstone Commission will also have to investigate allegations that members of Koevoet were responsible for the massacre. General Van der Merwe has dismissed the allegations as "infamous lies".

The commission will be seeking answers to the following questions:

- Was the attack in revenge for the alleged necklace murder of a hostel-linked woman?

- Was the death of a policeman near Sebokeng on the day before the massacre related in any way?

Hampered

- What happened during the eight hours which elapsed between the time police were alerted to the attack and their arrival on the scene?

- To what extent has ANC control of the area hampered access to information and witnesses?

- Were Koevoet police units involved?

- Were whites involved in any way?

Meanwhile, the streets of Boipatong have become battle zones.

Trenches have been dug across strategic streets as Casspir traps and barricades made of boulders, tree trunks and burnt-out tyres are manned by ANC youths in overalls.

① Sun. Times 28/6/92

Dramatic move as ANC-government struggle goes abroad

UN CHIEF FOR SAPLEACH VISIT

Foreign Minister P.W. Botha to visit South Africa.
The decision followed nearly three hours of talks between the two men in Abuja, Nigeria, about the political crisis in South Africa caused by the rupture between the government and the ANC.
Mr Botha went to brief the UN secretary-general about the situation in the country and ask that Codesa parties be allowed to take part in any UN Security Council meeting on South Africa.
It will be the UN secretary-general's first visit to South Africa. No official statement has yet been made about his itinerary or the timing of his visit, but it is understood he will consult all major parties to acquaint himself with the current crisis.
Mr Botha also met Nigerian President Ibrahim Babangida and the country's foreign minister. The meetings between Mr Botha and the Nigerians were immediately slammed by the ANC's director of external affairs, Mr Thabo Mbeki.
"We don't understand why this meeting should take place in Nigeria," said Mr Mbeki. "Presumably the Nigerians will explain."

Jockeying

Mr Boutros-Ghali, meanwhile, is also due to meet ANC leader Nelson Mandela in Dakar, Senegal, today where the heads of African states are gathering for the annual Organisation of African Unity summit. Mr Mandela will tell Mr Boutros-Ghali tonight that he wants the UN Security Council to approve the sending of a peacekeeping force to South Africa.
A delegation of top Inkatha officials, headed by Chief Minister Mangosuthu Buthelezi, also arrived in Abuja yesterday for talks with Mr Boutros-Ghali.

The jockeying for international support follows a week of intense political activity in South Africa during which the ANC broke

BACKGROUND TO THE CRISIS: P25

off all negotiations with the government until it meets a series of demands aimed at installing an interim government and controlling political violence.
Yesterday, to underscore the point, Mr Mandela told 10 000 cheering supporters at a gathering in Kliptown, Soweto, commemorating the 37th anniversary of the Congress of the People, that the ANC National Executive Committee had decided that there would be no further talks with the government until all the ANC demands were met.
"If the regime insists on invoking white minority rule and opposes genuine democracy, there can be no negotiations," he said.
Mr Mandela will instead propose to the UN secretary-general in Dakar tonight that an international monitoring group along the lines of those deployed in Angola and Namibia should be sent to South Africa. It would consist of a permanent group capable of determining possible areas of conflict and, once conflict occurred, of determining who was responsible. It would liaise closely with Peace Accord officials.
The ANC will also call for strict adherence to the phased lifting of sanctions subject to the installation of an interim government.
The ANC was involved this week in a round of briefings of foreign diplomats in Johannesburg prior to Mr Mandela's departure for the OAU meeting.
Aides said yesterday that Mr Mandela would also use the opportunity at the OAU summit to appeal

□ To Page 2

② Sun. Times 28/6/92

Struggle goes abroad

□ From Page 1

for increased pressure on Mr De Klerk's government to accede to the ANC's demands for an interim government.

Both sides said this week they regarded international support for their positions as crucial in the coming weeks.

Mr De Klerk, in an important shift from the country's earlier isolationist stance, invited foreign participation in the Goldstone Commission and hinted that fact-finding missions would be welcome. Mr Botha wrote to 50 foreign ministers defending the government's position at Codesa and repeating the invitation for fact-finding missions.

He told the Sunday Times this week: "In general the government has done well in fact-finding missions and therefore I am in favour of more such visits because it is in our interests that the truth comes out."

"We are struggling to get the truth known. I am afraid that in this regard we are in a manner still paying the price for apartheid. Some parties overseas find it difficult to accept that apartheid is finally past."

He said the government

believed its strength lay in the support it could expect in the international community.

Last night, in apparent response to the government's initiative, the European Community urged the ANC to resume talks with the South African government on a new non-racial constitution and expressed concern about continuing violence in the country.

The EC said it was vital for the negotiations, broken off by the ANC five days ago, to continue.

The EC leaders said in a statement following their two-day summit in Lisbon that all parties should return to Codesa and work towards setting up a transitional government.

They noted Pretoria's willingness to allow foreign observers to take part in an investigation of the Boipatong massacre and said this could be discussed during a forthcoming visit to South Africa by three EC ministers.

Demands

The effort by both sides to glean foreign support came as formal contact between the government and the ANC effectively ceased.

An ANC messenger delivered a memorandum to Mr De Klerk's office on Friday and a copy to Constitutional Development Minister Roelf Meyer, spelling out the organisation's demands before negotiations can resume.

They included the creation of a sovereign Constituent Assembly to draft a new constitution and the establishment of an interim government of national unity.

Specific demands on the control of violence include the control of the security forces, the control and phasing out of hostels and international monitoring of the violence.

Mr Meyer said President De Klerk would respond to Mr Mandela's memorandum by the end of the week.

The reply is expected to contain a response to the 14 demands contained in the ANC's memorandum and to express the government's own concerns about violence which it wants the ANC to address.

Mr Meyer said people would have to judge who was being constructive in their approach to breaking the impasse — the ANC or the government.

● The foreign ministers' meeting at the CAU, after much heated debate, yesterday adopted a proposal for the creation of an all-African peacekeeping force to be used in civil wars on the continent.

Sun Times 28/6/92

IFP man shot

AN Inkatha Freedom Party member was shot dead and three others were injured at Odondolo Reserve in Empangeni on the Natal north coast after they were abducted and their home was set alight by an armed group yesterday morning. A fifth man escaped.

Violence spreads to every corner of a caged society

by Richard Ellis
Johannesburg

MEMBERS of South Africa's fastest-growing club met as usual last week. There was Thembi, a young black woman who was kidnapped, kept prisoner for 10 days and gang-raped by 22 men; Jean, a middle-aged white woman who was sexually assaulted and beaten by burglars; and Thabo, a schoolboy who suffers nightmares since witnessing the murder of his parents.

These victims of violence, the human casualties behind South Africa's slide into anarchy, gather a few afternoons each week at a trauma clinic in Johannesburg to receive counselling to exorcise the demons that haunt them. Even in a society anaesthetised by a daily murder toll of 44 and an assault rate running into hundreds, the continuing torment suffered by these people is harrowing: many cannot sleep or eat; an unusual sound can reduce them to tears. Some wish they were dead.

The plight of the children is perhaps the most disturbing: Ruth, 11, was recently asked to draw a picture of her township home; on the streets outside she sketched 16 bodies, red dots denoting the blood. Every week the number of such victims grows. The Johannesburg Trauma Clinic plans to almost double the number of its part-time professional counsellors; it will not be enough. "We just don't have the resources to cope," said Lloyd Vogelman, the clinic's director.

Last week, with South Africa's peace process in tatters as political leaders continued

dependence Namibia, have hardened distrust.

While there is no evidence that President F W de Klerk has sanctioned such assistance to Inkatha, it does help his ultimate aim: to win, with the help of such allies as Inkatha, any forthcoming election. To do so, he needs to portray the ANC as divided, weak and incapable of running the country.


The township violence not only stops the ANC from organising meetings, but turns radical young supporters against it, believing it cannot protect them, let alone deliver jobs; many end up taking matters into their own hands.

"It's us against both Inkatha and the government forces," is a common refrain from the ANC.

Despite the worldwide furor over the Boipatong massacre, ANC members are not averse to carrying out such slaughters: in April, at least 23 Zulus were murdered by "Xhosa-speaking" men, coded language for ANC supporters. That incident caused little outcry.

The conflict has sunk to desperate levels, as each side seeks to undermine its rivals by finding the most hideous methods of death. It is no longer enough to spear babies to death or disembowel women.

A black policeman killed by the ANC in Sharpeville recently was dismembered and mutilated, his limbs and head displayed on lamp posts and traffic signs. What remained of his torso was then "necklaced" with a burning petrol-filled tyre and dragged around the township behind a van.



De Klerk: Inkatha support is vital

to feud over who was behind the massacre of 42 people at Boipatong township, there was an even deeper air of depression than normal at the clinic. Vogelman was sure the impasse would mean an increase in the number of people needing his help. South Africa, already one of the world's most violent countries, is descending further into bloodshed.

Some experts fear another Lebanon is developing as the three main political parties — the ruling Nationalists, the African National Congress and Inkatha — engage in a power struggle in the post-apartheid fallout. In the townships, there is undeclared civil war between the ANC and the Zulu-dominated Inkatha, which many ANC members regard as a government stooge since it was revealed Pretoria had funded the movement and given some of its members military training.

Such suspicions have been fuelled by growing evidence that the police have supported, or ignored, attacks by Inkatha on ANC.

Last week's revelations that the Boipatong killers might have been helped by members of the Koevoet (Crowbar) police, a notorious counter-insurgency unit in pre-in-

In a country where the strongest have always ruled, supporters of all three parties see violence as a necessary tactic. "Violence is a very effective method of silencing opponents, messing them up and boosting your supporters," said Vogelman, who also heads a project studying violence at Johannesburg's Witwatersrand University. "There's no tradition here of democratic, peaceful change. While the parties have been negotiating, they have all had one eye on the general elections and ways in which to undermine their opponents and do whatever they have to do to win."

As political violence has become commonplace, so "ordinary" crime has rocketed, fuelled by South Africa's deepening recession, growing poverty and worsening unemployment. It is often hard to distinguish the difference: criminal gangs have been used by the ANC, Inkatha and the police to carry out their dirty work.


Violence has become almost normal behaviour. A group of five-year-old boys in a township took part in a necklacing because they had seen their older brothers do it. Psychologists studying the effects of violence on township children report that it is commonplace and accepted.

But it is different in white areas, where the effects of South Africa's lawlessness are spreading. Since Boipatong, white dinner parties in Johannesburg's plush northern suburbs have been dominated by discussion of civil war. After the euphoria of last March's "yes" vote for negotiations, there is again a fear of the future. A white father described how his teenage daughter ran screaming into his bedroom because of a nightmare caused by watching the violence on the evening news. She spent the night lying at the bottom of his bed, clutching an alarm panic button.

Old divisions have surfaced. When an embittered

Sunday (1) -
Times
~~Express~~
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London

Sunday
Times
~~Telegraph~~ (2)
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London



Mass protest: students took to the streets last week to demonstrate against President de Klerk. A black caller told a Johannesburg radio station after Boipatong that it was now time to "start killing whites", the station was so swamped by panic-stricken whites that it issued an appeal for calm.

The question now is whether ways can be found to quell the political violence that, since a peace accord was signed last September by the three main parties, has

claimed 2,400 lives. There is one thing all three antagonists are agreed upon: the only lasting solution lies in a political settlement, soon. Without it, South Africa's descent into chaos will be guaranteed.

Once, De Klerk and Mandela might have settled their differences in a private chat away from publicity or the suspicious eyes of hardline colleagues. No longer. The close relationship has been re-

placed by mistrust and suspicion. Even more entrenched feelings bedevil any possible rapprochement between Mandela and the Zulu Chief Buthelezi.

Finding someone upbeat about South Africa's prospects is not easy, as the latest joke in business circles suggests: "What's the difference between an optimist and a pessimist? An optimist doesn't have all the facts."

WORLD NEWS 1-23

Pictures: Juda Ngwenya



Cry the beloved country: a relative of one of the Boipatong dead breaks down at a memorial service

28 JUNE 1992

On the ba

**Chris McGreal in Sebokeng, where
the sentries know a strange face after
dark may mean death to the unwary**

WE HEARD Isaac's warning shout before we saw him. Then his young face peered from the back of the burnt-out delivery van. A woollen cap was pulled down over his ears against the biting cold of the township night.

Your face is your passport in Sebokeng, where strangers after dark often mean death to the unwary. A white face is cause for particular alarm - everyone will tell you that the killers may be black, but the whites are putting them up to it. Isaac searched the faces until he found one he knew, and the hostility evaporated, perhaps out of relief.

Isaac Dipholo's lookout post is perched at the end of his street, with a clear view of his neighbours on the larger barricades along the road. Like much of Sebokeng's youth, Isaac, 17, spends his nights watching for strangers. Behind the breeze-blocks, tree-trunks and trenches, young men have resolved that if others will not protect their community, they must do it themselves.

The barricades went up weeks before the massacre in Boipatong, 10 minutes' drive away. Sebokeng had long suffered at the hands of the killers in the KwaMadala hostel who struck at Boipatong 10 days ago. It was in Sebokeng in July 1990 that the war in the Vaal region began, when 32 were murdered, the killers widely held to be Inkatha Freedom Party supporters.

Another 5,000 have died across the country since. In Sebokeng, the killing became routine. People were murdered in their beds, travelling to work, at funeral vigils for earlier victims.

Then last month, two young men were burned beyond recognition after petrol was poured on their faces. It drove people on to Sebokeng's streets, frustrated and terrified, and the barricades went up. The African National Con-

gress planned the self-defence strategy, but the people of Sebokeng forced its implementation.

The race home from jobs in the factories in neighbouring white towns begins at dusk. On the edge of the township, crowded minibus taxis line up at the barriers. Groups of men look them over, searching for any strange face. "Does anyone know this person?" "Yes, he is from Zone Six," comes the reply. The minibus is waved through, travels a few yards, weaving between the rocks, and meets another barricade.

The sight of a white face brings closer scrutiny. Shouts go up, men come running. Some people back away from the scene, fearing the uncertainty. Once the stranger is vouched for, attention turns to the next minibus.

By 6pm, Sebokeng's chaotic rush hour, it is already dark. An hour later, only those on the barricades are still outside. Apartheid tore the guts out of black community life, but the violence killed the social heartbeat of Sebokeng. Bars - the shebeens - close at dusk. Celebrations are all held during the day.

Close to Isaac's lookout post, Esther Mazibuko peers from her house, fearing for her brother's safety, but glad for the sake of her five-year-old that he is on the barricades. Esther was wounded last year at a funeral vigil. The bullet went through her ribcage, chest and arm. Thirty-eight died.

She does not leave the house after dark. During the day she only goes out to shop. She is a Zulu and an ANC supporter, a combination which in the eyes of some is straddling the fence. But at night it makes little difference. If the attackers come, they will not ask who or what she is before they shoot.


The black policemen who live in the township know this too. Some, out of uniform, man the

(1)
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Barricades in a township of fear

JHANN KOOS/REX



Ablaze with anger: a car burns in a Sebokeng street. The hostel killers preyed on this township until residents mounted barricades. Since then only one attack has succeeded

barricades, wielding service pistols. They are among the better-armed, and treated with less suspicion than policemen, from outside. Some men hold AK-47s under their long, thick coats. But Isaac and his friend have only a large knife between them.

Some like to boast that they

have driven their attackers and the white police from the township. There has only been one successful attack since the barricades went up, and the killers in KwaMadala hostel would be lucky to escape with their lives if they tried to follow the routine of descending on a row of houses

and murdering everyone inside. But if, as evidence suggests, police sometimes escort the killers, the danger is still present.

From his post, Isaac spots the police Internal Stability Unit from the position of the lights on the armoured car. He breaks off in mid-sentence and runs, whis-

ling furiously. The whistling is picked up, and warning shots scatter into the air from those on the barricades, before they flee into the warren of box homes. Lights flick off, a small contribution to survival. Eyes are locked on the armoured car to see if it stops, and who emerges.

Isaac says his sister pushed him on to the barricade to protect her three young children. "We're trying to search for enemies, Inkatha and the sellouts. Sellouts are the same as Inkatha," he says without elaborating.

Matter-of-factly he points to a spot down the street where a man

he says was a killer was "neck-laced" with a burning tyre the previous morning. He does not express any pleasure or regret at the gruesome burning of a man he considers his enemy.

The rhetoric is political, but Sebokeng's streets are permeated by anger and fear, not ideology. Isaac should be at home studying for his exams, but the terror has even hit the school.

"There was a problem at school after some pupils beat up the Vaal Monster's girlfriend. The Monster sent people from KwaMadala and they shot two pupils. Then the teachers stayed away from school," he said.

The Vaal Monster is much talked about in Sebokeng. His real name is Khethisi Victor Kheswa, a KwaMadala hostel resident linked to several massacres. He was jailed for six years in September, but released after only a few months in prison. When his name comes up, people swing between rage at his unexplained release and terror at what he might do next.

After Boipatong, Sebokeng's residents crowded a visit by Nelson Mandela, the ANC leader, to demand weapons to protect themselves. The next day, seven KwaMadala residents were acquitted of murdering 38 at a funeral vigil, for lack of evidence. Sebokeng seethed. The barricades were well-manned that night.

First, we need an apology

NO ONE knows the poverty of the townships better than Mamphela Ramphele. Once the lover of the Black Consciousness Movement leader, Steve Biko, who was beaten to death by police in 1977, she has since clawed her way up South Africa's academic and corporate ladders. In the process she has acquired a string of medical, social and anthropology degrees that have made her probably the leading authority on poverty in the country.

Ramphele, petite and witty, is now deputy vice-chancellor of the formerly whites-only University of Cape Town. This month she was appointed a director of the Anglo American Corporation mining giant which established white economic hegemony in South Africa while relying on cheap black labour.

She is the first woman, and only the second black, to have penetrated the Anglo American's caste system to join the board. On black poverty she said: "It's enormous. We have increasing poverty and unemployment against a background of population growth and ever-shrinking economy. The scale of the problem has probably quadrupled in the last three years."

"The despair is deep among people who work hard and have nothing much to show for it at the end of the day. Not only that, but people's expectations have risen greatly since Nelson Mandela's release from imprisonment in

The first black woman to make it to the very top maps the way ahead for her nation. Fred Bridgland in Cape Town reports

February 1990. "After he had been free only two months, a woman from Kayelitsha [a black township] writing to the Cape Times asked: 'Where is my house?' People imagined that when the political space began to open the socio-economic space would open also."

Ramphele echoed the thoughts of Biko when she said that the ultimate purpose of political reform had to be as a catalyst to change the black people's image of self-worth and to raise their social and economic status.

"It's important for the rest of the world to realise that black people are people. Like people everywhere, they aspire to dignity, a decent abode, jobs which give their lives purpose, and peace so that they can interact with their families and friends."

"Further than that, in South Africa they need to be given a sense of belonging. In decent societies someone comes to repair your phone if it doesn't work, someone clears your garbage."

"If you live in a black township in South Africa these norms don't apply. You've seen how our townships are immersed in uncollected garbage. How do people remain sane? It's important that richer people become sensitive to our glaring inequalities."



Ramphele: call for dignity

Ramphele sees social and economic change as essential even before a new constitutional dispensation is agreed. A future government elected by one person, one vote might otherwise find that the economic erosion of recent years has been so severe that its efforts are totally undermined. The shape of future South African society depends critically on foundations that are laid now.

"Our uneducated are truly uneducated," she said. "There are 60 per cent rates of illiteracy in many areas. Others have very low levels of

education. For blacks who have made it to universities, the foundation of their degrees is very shaky and the majority remain cut off from career paths to contribute to the future of the country."

"A major problem, because of these poor foundations, is a widespread inability to use conceptual, analytic skills to stand back and look at problems."

She is deeply concerned that the present political impasse is further delaying economic and social change.

"We need such change like we need oxygen," she said. "Something that would help to change black motivation would be if President de Klerk said publicly and unequivocally that his community is really sorry about the wrongs of the past."

"Black people would be greatly relieved by it. I know their generosity. It would create goodwill, and that's what's needed in the wake of Boipatong."

"If de Klerk doesn't use his imagination, he will end up in a Gorbachev situation. I commend him for his reforms, but if he doesn't rein in those who want to hang on to power and to undermine the African National Congress, he will preside over a state of anarchy. Extremists from the Left and Right will really burst forth. There will be a com-

plete breakdown and many more Boipatongs."

Ramphele, who was sent into seven years of internal exile shortly before Biko was killed, recalled her reaction when she first heard of her loss: "Everything went dead. I literally wondered whether I could walk across that room. If I could survive physically."

Sitting in her university office looking across the pine-clad slopes of Table Mountain, she spoke of her Anglo American post.

"Yes, at one level it's a symbolic appointment. But it's important because Anglo American is one of the major players in this country. In the past women and black people have been excluded from the boardrooms of the powerful industrial conglomerates where the major socio-economic decisions are taken."

She said she would not have accepted the appointment if she had thought that the chairman of Anglo American, Julian Ogilvie Thompson, and his other directors did not intend to take her seriously.

"I have refused other board appointments," she said. "I have no intention of being a decoration on the Anglo board."

Ogilvie Thompson told The Sunday Telegraph that he had invited Ramphele to join his board so that she could guide the corporation towards "affordable and effective programmes of poverty alleviation which can be taken within a framework of sound macro-economic policies".

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White plotters aim to divide and rule

THE ACTION by the ANC in breaking off South Africa's constitutional negotiations, while still committing itself to a negotiated settlement, epitomises the agonising position it has been forced into, squeezed between the rising militancy of its followers and the obduracy of the De Klerk Government.

Disillusionment at the slow pace of negotiations and the continuing violence in the townships has been building up for months. It boiled over with the Boipatong massacre and the mini-Sharpeville which I witnessed afterwards. When Nelson Mandela went to nearby Evaton to address a rally last Sunday, angry people in the 20,000 crowd yelled at him: 'You are like lambs while the Government is killing us.'

Suspending the talks was the least the ANC could do to appease that anger. Otherwise it would have forfeited wholesale support to the extreme Pan-Africanist Congress, which has been denouncing the ANC as sellouts for sitting down to talk with the Government, instead of fighting it to the finish.

The ANC knows the white establishment cannot be overthrown by force. It knows there is no viable alternative to negotiations, and so it must hang in there even though President de Klerk and his Ministers have been making it increasingly difficult. Hence the egg-dance of breaking off negotiations while setting what Secretary-General Cyril Ramaphosa called 'these perfectly reasonable and do-able demands' for getting back. Now we must see whether De Klerk will respond — or keep up the squeeze.

De Klerk has been toughening his stance ever since his big white referendum victory in March. Instead of seeing

Allister Sparks, in Johannesburg, exposes President de Klerk's manoeuvring to frustrate a deal with the ANC and cling to power.

that as clearing his path to move faster, as most observers expected, the President took it as a sign of booming support for his National Party. This stirred hopes that maybe he would not have to relinquish power after all; that if he could forge alliances with conservative non-white movements he might yet emerge at the head of the biggest political bloc in the country, or at least force the ANC into a coalition that would neutralise its ability to undertake any significant post-apartheid restructuring.

De Klerk needs to play for time, which he believes is on his side. Time to lock South Africa's major trading partners in as allies of his government, to see sanctions collapse, take credit for an economic recovery — and to let the ANC twist in the wind as disillusionment sets in among its followers at the lack of progress in the negotiations.

So the Government deliberately stalled Codesa II. It did so by playing hardball on the issue of the majority needed to agree on a new constitution, making demands it knew the ANC could not accept. Then came the alliance-building phase. On 16 June, Soweto Day, the most important anniversary in black South Africa's calendar, President de Klerk made a high-profile appearance as Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi's guest in the KwaZulu capital of Ulundi. Next day the National Party announced a campaign programme naming the ANC 'enemy number one'.

Some analysts believe — and this is the critical question — that part of this strategy is a

covert operation to destabilise the ANC. Those who believe this claim that Military Intelligence and the Security Police are now manipulating cleavages in the black community to promote 'black-on-black' violence by 'vigilante' groups in the townships, mainly rural Zulus living in the migrant workers' hostels of the Witwatersrand.

The purpose is, first, to convince Western powers that black South Africans are unfit to govern the country alone, and, second, to destabilise the ANC by disrupting its ability to organise, making people fearful to be associated with it. Those who hold this theory say they are uncertain whether De Klerk himself is directing the operation; whether it is being pursued freelance by anti-reformists in the security forces — old securocrats still loyal to ex-President P. W. Botha — whom De Klerk cannot control; or whether it is a bit of both, that De Klerk cannot fully control them and has rationalised this by taking the view that a whiff of destabilisation will help his cause.

There is no conclusive evidence of these allegations, but the circumstantial evidence pointing to security force involvement in the violence has become overwhelming. Even more important, the perception in the townships that the police are involved is now universal.

The Human Rights Commission, a private research group in Johannesburg, reports that between July 1990 and April 1992 armed gangs from the migrant hostels carried out 261 attacks on

black township residents, killing 1,207 and injuring 3,697.

In March 1990 police opened fire on a crowd of demonstrators in Sebukeng township, near Boipatong, killing 11 and wounding 28. A commission of inquiry into the shooting found the force used by the police was 'quite immoderate and disproportionate to any lawful object to be attained'. Twenty-seven months after the shooting there is still no trial.

All this has whipped up a huge sense of outrage in the townships, and the ANC is having to respond to that mood in its constituency. It must respond or it will be dead. Yet it must also keep the hope of a negotiated settlement alive. If the squeeze becomes too great and it fails in that, there will be no hope for South Africa.

De Klerk is a clever and subtle man, very different from the crude P. W. Botha who preceded him, yet perhaps he has been too clever by half. It never did make sense to try to destabilise the ANC.

What De Klerk and his colleagues have never understood, is that the ANC is essentially a moderate organisation, yet one that is widely acceptable in the black community because of its record as the primary resistance movement and its long list of heroes and martyrs. That placed the ANC in the unique position of being able to carry a black community radicalised by years of apartheid into a negotiated settlement.

The sensible thing would have been for De Klerk to harness that capability and work with it. Instead, the desire to keep his own party in power has caused him to try to destabilise it. In the process he has destabilised South Africa and the future security of his own people.

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