BUSINESS

HE PAST eight years have wrought fundamental changes in the relations be-tween the US and Africa. I believe the prospects for this relationship have never been as bright as they are now. For the first time in our history, the US has a President who knows firsthand Africa and its enormous diversity, problems and potential.

As a direct result of a decade-long US diplomatic effort, Namibia will soon become independent, completing the decolonisation of Africa. But the post-colonial history of Africa demonstrates that independence does not in itself solve a nation's underlying problems. It merely transfers the responsi-bility for dealing with problems to new, indigenous leadership.

There is a great deal at stake in how Namibians choose to govern them-selves. Namibians, like Angolans, need to learn how to resolve their differences through political debate rather than through violent confrontation. Namibians, like Angolans, need to find their way to national reconcilation.

stable and prosperous democratic society in Namibia would be an inspiration to fast, peaceful change away from apartheid in SA. An unstable and impoverished Namibia would set healt the prespects for such change set back the prospects for such change and would also threaten the stability of Botswana, one of Africa's few genuine democracies and the only one in Southern Africa. Careful work with the UN, with our allies and with sympathetic neighbours such as Botswana will be needed to get Namibia off to the right start as an independent nation.

SA and its regional role seems likely to remain a shared African and US obsession for the foreseeable future.

From the beginning, the Reagan adminstration had a twofold agenda with regard to SA. To the extent we could, we have sought to help insulate from the death throes of apartheid the states in Southern African whose fates are inextricably connected with that

To this end, we have worked to help these states achieve a modus vivendi with SA that, without eroding their principled stand on the issue of apartheid, would enable them to enjoy sufficient security and domestic tranquility to pursue effective economic and political development.

So we have worked to buttress the independence, democratic institutions and market economic systems of Bot-

Americans must work with SA to create a democracy

CHESTER CROCKER, retiring US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs


swana and Zimbabwe, while seeking to ensure the continuing ability of Zambia, Lesotho, Swaziland and Mozambique to pursue similarly effective courses of political and economic development as they choose to do so

The Nkomati Accord and the rapproachement between Mozambique and SA that it has made possible, as well as the Angola-Namibia accords, are especially visible monuments to this sustained US diplomatic effort. But there is a great deal more that has been done — and much more effort that lies ahead.

n SA itself we have sought to promote the most rapid possible admission of all South Africans to an equal role in the political and economic life of their country.

This is easy to say, but it amounts to attempting to play a constructive role in the re-engineering of the political culture and constitutional system of a country separated from us by 13 000km, centuries of estrangement from Western values and a dramatically different history.

The difficulty is magnified by the small — and now rapidly declining — US presence on the ground in SA, and by the obvious tensions in relations between our governments, reflecting profound differences between us. In



☐ CROCKER . . . constructive role

these circumstances, we must recognise some plain truths:

No-one other than South Africans can remake South African political culture or the South African constitution. We cannot compel them, but we can and should help them move towards fundamental change, in ways consistent with our own values.

☐ The South African government runs SA and cannot be ignored or written off. It sets the pace of change in the

country. It remains the only institution with the power to repeal the oppressive system it now so effectively enforces, and it is the key to more cooperative and less threatening South African relationships with neighbouring black-ruled states.

□ Ordinary South Africans (black, white, coloured and Indian), and a wide range of non-governmental and private organisations, set the political climate within which the South African government operates. While their direct impact on current governmental decisions is limited, we should encourage dialogue and creative thinking wherever it may take root and not give a distracted government a pocket veto over the society as a whole.

e need to talk to both the government and the groups opposed to it, and to encourage them to talk to each other. We have a constructive role to play in helping South Africans to break down the racial and political barriers to dialogue about the future of their country.

☐ We cannot hope to make any real difference in SA unless Americans are actually there to share their experience, set an example and, yes, work alongside South Africans as they make the decisions they must make to create a democratic, post-apartheid SA. ☐ The more effectively we can co-

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ordinate our policies and activities in SA with those of allies with equal or greater influence there, the better our chances of having a real impact on the course of events in that country.

These are rather obvious points. Many or all of them could be made with respect to Eastern Europe or other areas where we seek to promote an evolution towards more open and democratic societies. But SA is different

I would like to be able to say we have had a serious debate in the US about how to advance our interests in SA. There certainly have been a lot of words expended on the subject. But, frankly, most of the debate has been about sanctions, which no serious observer of the South African scene—and none of our major allies—considers to be a viable answer to a problem that is clearly going to require much time and considerable diplomatic and political ingenuity to resolve.

Some of the proponents of sanctions in the US and abroad are well-meaning, and I share their sense of frustration with the slow pace of change in SA and the elusiveness of any denouement to the South African drama. But, again quite candidly, there has been no serious discussion of what role, if any, different kinds of sanctions might play in helping South Africans to resolve the dilemmas they face.

Instead, sanctions have become a symbol of the frustration they are designed to address. They have been advocated as an article of faith, as an end in themselves. No credible case has been made for broad, open-ended sanctions against SA.

Our experience with such sanctions to date is that they are counter-productive. The argument for them has seldom risen above the level of a kind of junior-college Marxism, economic determinism of a simplicity that would make a Communist blush.

Be that as it may, it is obvious we as a nation need to engage in serious reflection on how we deal with SA on the two issues of greatest concern to us: Pretoria's regional behaviour and institutionalised racism in SA.

Reaching consensus in the US on these issues will tax the political skills of the new administration and the willingness of Congress to work with the White House. But there is so much at stake that we cannot afford not to

□ Extract from an article by Dr Crocker in the Centre for Strategic and International Studies' publication, Africa Notes. 31-3-89

Black Africa - a mockery of democracy

WASHINGTON — Black African leaders demand political power-sharing in South Africa, but it does not exist in black Africa, a Ghanaian analyst has told readers of the New York Times.

In a prominently displayed article, the analyst, Mr George B N Ayittey of America's prestige Hoover Institution, described butchery and terror throughout much of black Africa.

"Many Americans feel uncomfortable about the mere mention of such tyranny. They believe it might provide a dangerous jsutification for apartheid, and divert attention from the noble cause of South African blacks," he wrote.

"This attitude suggests that they

apply a lower moral standard to black African leaders than to white South Africans.

"Black Africans vehemently object to such thinking. To their dead compatriots, it made little difference that the hand that pulled the trigger was black. Military insanity and barbarism run amok."

Mr Ayittey said the hopes and aspirations of blacks around the world were lifted when the Rev Jesse Jackson ran for the Democratic presidential nomination. But, he added, Mr Jackson would have been

BY NEIL LURSSEN, The Star Bureau

A black political analyst states that while the aspirations of blacks around the world were lifted when the Rev Jesse Jackson ran for the US presidency, the fact remains that he would have been able to seek office in only two of Africa's 41 countries.

able to seek office in only two of Africa's 41 countries.

"Twenty-two are military dictatorships. The rest are farcical 'democracies' in which only one candidate, under a one party state system, runs for president, wins 99,99 percent of the vote and declares himself President for Life."

Since 1957, he wrote, there had been more than 150 African heads of state, of whom only six gave up power voluntarily and the rest were booted out in military coups or assassinated. Only in Botswana and Senegal were black people allowed to choose their own leaders.

Mr Ayittey's article, given prominence in a newspaper more accustomed to publishing attacks on South Africa, is bound to cause a stir among Africanists in the US.

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The Rev Jesse Jackson . . . would have been able to seek office in only two of Africa's 41 countires.

In recent months, liberal Democrats here have attempted to put some balance in their anti-apartheid campaign by criticising human rights abuses in black Africa.

But they have concentrated almost exclusively on Zaire, which has ties with South Africa, and on Ethiopia, where civilians have been caught up in a vicious struggle be-

tween the government and rebels.

Mr Ayittey casts his net over virtually all Africa, citing horrific incidents in Nigeria, Uganda, Burundi, Angola, Chad, Mozambique, Somalia, the Sudan, Benin, Burkina Faso and Liberia.

Mr Ayittey argued that when whales or zebras were slaughtered, world protests were deafening.

"Why? Is it morally acceptable for black tyrants to butcher black people?" he asked.

Throughout Africa, blacks were demanding political freedom, power-sharing and the right to choose their leaders.

"If the world won't help, perhaps it is better to stay out of Africa. Application of a standard that recognises only white-on-black tyranny is bound to aggravate the plight of all black Africans, including those in South Africa," Mr Ayittey said.

AMAJORITY of black South Africans oppose economic sanctions and violence as a means of ending apartheid, according to a poll conducted on behalf of the *Independent* and ITN, the television company.

Although a minority said that sanctions should be imposed on South Africa — even at the cost of their own jobs — the findings reveal that most blacks are unwilling to jeopardise job opportunities and financial wellbeing, and see the presence of foreign companies in the country as helping

to sponsor change rather than support apartheid.

The survey, conducted by Markinor, an independent South African research company, of 550 South Africans living in all the main metropolitan areas showed that 54,7 percent were against the imposition of economic sanctions to bring about the abolition of apartheid.


Of the minority who supported sanctions, nearly three-quarters wanted them imposed even if it meant black job losses. However, a much smaller proportion of the total polled (only 8,8 percent) were in favour of sanctions if it cost them their own jobs.

According to the survey, not only do most black South Africans dismiss sanctions as a solution to the country's racial problems, they are also opposed to violence as a means of ending apartheid.

Over 61 percent said it was wrong to use violence. About one third of the more radical respondents (those who support sanctions even if it caused unemployment), believed violence was justified.

The survey shows that a majority of blacks believe South Africa's most pressing problems are economic rather than political.

Almost 58 percent said their biggest concern was either jobs, wages or unemployment. Only 13,5 percent mentioned petty apartheid regulations and a surprisingly



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SANCTIONS, VIOLENCE NOT RIGHT WAY - POLL

A SURVEY by the London newspaper the *Independent* and ITN television network shows surprising resistance to sanctions by black South Africans. They oppose violence as a way to end apartheid.

They fear that sanctions could jeopardise jobs and undermine living standards, and see the presence of foreign companies as a hope of bringing change.

small 1,6 percent the Group Areas Act which demarcates residential areas along racial lines.

Regardless of attitudes to sanctions, nearly a third singled out unemployment as their P. 2

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key concern — partly a reflection of the fact that over 60 percent of those polled were unemployed.

The greatest concern about unemployment — 33.3 percent — was registered among those who supported sanctions but not if they entailed job losses.

Paradoxically, 30 percent of those who favoured sanctions at any price shared this concern about lack of jobs.

Handicap

The primacy of economic over political considerations was also reflected in answers to the question: "Which aspect of apartheid affects you most?"

Over 40 percent said it was the wage differentials between black and white. Only 17,3 percent said it was having to live in separate areas and 12 percent that not having the vote was the greatest



ARCHBISHPOP Tutu ... pro-sanctions.



MARGARET Thatcher ... anti-sanctions.

handicap.

In the context of these concerns, it is not surprising that nearly two-thirds of those polled said that a boycott of South African exports by foreign countries would not help to end apartheid. Interestingly, 37 percent of those who support sanctions did not see such a boycott being of any use.

There was equally little support for foreign countries refusing to sell goods such as cars and television sets to South Africa. More than 64 percent said it would not have any impact on apartheid.

The survey also revealed that disinvest-

ment by foreign companies had little popular support. The vast majority — 77,9 percent — said that foreign firms should stay in South Africa and improve the conditions of their workers.

Only just over a third of those who supported sanctions even if it produces general unemployment said that foreign firms should sell their businesses and leave South Africa.

There was also considerable support — 37,3 percent — for the notion that foreign companies have a beneficial role to play in helping to end apartheid. Under a quarter saw foreign businesses as supporting apartheid.

It is therefore something of a contradiction that the majority of those questioned believe that Margaret Thatcher, who arrived in Southern Africa this week, is incorrect in her belief that sanctions will not bring down apartheid.

Some 46 percent said sanctions would not help to end apartheid, while 43 percent said that it would. However, the 46 percent includes a distorting 82,4 percent from the more radical group who support sanctions.

More than one third of those polled said the British Government was helping to support apartheid.

The poll indicates that blacks living around Cape Town—a coloured preferential district in which blacks were said to have semi-permanent residential status—are more radical than in other parts of the country.

Cape Town is the only metropolitan region which shows a majority in support of sanctions and in support of an end to foreign imports. — The Independent News Service.