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A-fi-ican National CongreSS
Nationa Consultatma Coafiermce
June 1985
Commissim on: (2%; ' mm
Political and lW Wm?
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Commism' mSn-mgy . mda'm'
' . z-l.&l.CwIwW C '1'.
mm: swimmghwma crv-mrd - '

would give activists a perspective of strengthening the civic bodies along a path which seeks to bring all the civic bodies throughout the country together so that they can extend their activity. and see their "Joell 39-qu w_i_t.hit_t the context of mere widely felt grievances. which have seen common among these to-me system disorganised by apartheid.

3. As part of the process of the racialisation we should encourage civic organisations to line up with trade unions within their loyalty in order to reinforce their struggle - i

I (g) Mahiudon of the White Community

Democrat: whites in the country were (and with no exception) with the rise of the BCM. They were accused of 'playing the game while the blacks stood on the sideline: looking on'. Many resorted to 'play- ing a 'supponi' role which we: innately providing funds. rampart. omhilingi' ahrth mainlae. Eyes: with the rise of the Congress movement inside the country and opponents such as Nuns mm; their support for the Freedom Charter. dmcd Whites are still caught in the trap of playing a supper: E'

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ticipism in struggle

1. They work increasingly to popularise the End Conscription Campaign. The issue of co. tsm'pdon can be explained and the youth should be convinced why they should not join the SADF.

0 The formation camps for conscientious objectors. war protesters

0 The Movement of non-white people into our ranks and persuade those who are prepared to fight just wherever they are to join the fight for the liberation of the active combatants of MK.

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'_Ci ...r

:- C White democratic organisations that have sprung .. . ? in some arms in the country should broaden their ranks and include the growing number of whites who feel uncomfortable in South Africa's new style political deal' . e. g. the PF? youth.

2. We should encourage joint actions to be taken by all white trade unions together with democratic unions.

3 We should encourage the promotion of a white youth organisation to join the side of resistance with youth congresses throughout the country. in this regard

democratic left play a leading role in the creation of such an organisation. ,
'9 4. The white student organisations should educate their constituency on the crisis in education and work - ' . relentlessly to open the doors of learning and culture. to all: in this regard they should work closely with other student organisations on the Education Charter

Omniscient

5. White university students on completion of their studies are swallowed up by the economy or various professions. Democratic professional unions. e. g. lawyers. health workers and educationists. should be encouraged when people could utilise their skills in

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V organisations?

we should ensure that church youth together with the - '
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6. Freedommmnwhite. dermemicoipnimiom
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discussioninthoeeitesswheretheyHmbued
q" 1'6elm) 13. W mm-RWI;
xTheUDF. formedih I983. hugrowmatmim-
ed rate unbilising m_d orgmising millions
of our people throughout the country. Today it
our 700 ar'tliates representing over IV: million pt:
pie. The regime has acted viciously against the UpF
sad its affiliates. Hundreds have been arrested. many
killed and may facing charges. including the' 16
leads: who Ire facing mu charges. the msin con-
.tent of the them being the: they were the front sec-
tion of the ANC/SACFISACTU allnnce. . ' . . .
. TodaythenmmissueseonfroetingtheUDF'it-e:
'1. Censoiidsrion of arguintioml 3mm. -
5 2.- The neeusity. to bring in ether constituencies in-
to the U'DF. especially the orgmisiuon of the work.
'in; class
3. Region! differehet: on questions of strategy :ahd
tactics.
:
4. Workshpng the niraimnssel. '
vi. .. 5:: ?Afnean ladetshiti of UDF structures.
6. DehniemaWahertheUDFshouldchangeipth
a; front to becoming fzh ergutisuion accepting '.the
Freedom Charter :5 its programme. .
7. The necessity .th hnye a programme of acheni. e.
strategic plsnnih'g. Fu- .5
8. Doe! UDF involvement weeken grassrdou
v.5; 3:.1!
9. Necessity to tnin activists and cadres poiititnily.
ideologically and orgmisiuionnllly.
10. Criticisms of some sections of UDF' socialist: -
that UDF londership 'populist' and petty bourgehis.
Recommendations: 7
i. We support the campaigns of the U'DF around
which mbilisuion both on regional and national leveis
is planned: .
0 High cost of living
0 Education
0 Militarism
0 Forced removals -
0 Influx control . .
0 New 2:3lan rugby ton: .th 5
0 Land issue 3 '
.0 Treason trial
In particular those en_mpaigns which are in line With
the stnategy of generating a spirit of defiance And
ungovemability. ;
2. The UDF remains a front and does not narrow
its hue. We should distribute internally a posihon
paper based on the tactics of a united frent and' the
necessity. at this stage. for the continued existenk of
such a fruit. 3
3. We establish ANC collectives Within affiliates as
well as the imdetship. 'ntese would not act as fae-
tions but as organised sections of our movement
fighting for the smgutening of and consolidatioit of
the UDF. S
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of People' 5 War is incomeivable without the main-
don of political mu military snuggle: in the ban-
hutam. in Which over half the African population' .3

. forced to live. -

Attention was drawn to the reality of the barium,
which mush puppet emn'ons of the enemy have
spawned a vast bureaucratic apparatus and civil set-
hammmawholemageofblackpwwfasjomh't
with the benefits of public office.

Bamnisadou hudeveieped a mum ofits
ownandasigmhamnumberofgwemmmnm.

official: civ- .1 servants and other hangers-on have ae-
quiredanecoomieahdsocialstakeinuheifmrvivatl;

We must isolate the inocrripble collaborators and win'
av: those whcee job opportunities are hbt irreversibly
dependent on the bahtuszan syscem. t t ,

Within the com ofthe zhme out Mcvanent mist
eensider and be sensitive (D the: van'mu shad: of dif-
fereeee amongst the banuma government: and
leaders. Some bannmzns are strategically located
Vzlongor hen: the borders lending themselves as mug:
for penetrating the rust cfthe country. Yet others are
run by brutal puppies. like Seine and Mphephu, who 4
do not hesitate to employ the most savage repressive
mum against the people.

A lively debate also ensued on enemy for the
bamam. The Commissxon felt that the cmdon of
bazmtstan armies opens up new opportunities for the
Winning over of black soldiers to our side and to cap-
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that the Movcmtz should lam firm: the historical
experience of regions Where peasant uprisings and
revolts have thrown up organisational font: and
- organs of struggle - such as the Mountain Commit-
_ ... in Pondoland - which could become core groups
of a revolutionary undetgxound.

Green attendon needs to be paid to the revolu-
' tionary slogans and programmes of struggle we place
before the bantustan people. We cannot expectao
modvate them effectively without placing before them
perspectives of struggle against the bantustan ad-
ministration: themselves. Land hunger remains one
of Lhe major national grievances which' must be
hammed to"aetivate the masses into struggle. The
changing social stnttititntion ot' the humans also
reeeived our mention. The emergence of a working
cm within these areas was noted as was the dump-
ing of the unemployed from the urban arm and the
rule that migrant labour must play In linking the ban-
tustans with the urban arm and industry. The Com-
mission submits that it has become feasible to build
up working class organisational forms in some ban-
mszzxts. including organisations for the unemployed
to demand work. Urban areas that have been tneor- ..
prorated into bantustans such as Mdantsahe. must
become revolutionary spnngooards for mobilisihg the
people in the vatztustam.

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The openly eouhtet-tevolutiamry role that Qtief
Gash: Buthelm' has assumed we: noted. Buthelczi.
fmtntheenmttyandptetendswpursuenatiomiaim.
His eonmer-revolutionuy rule must be exposed and
we must work to win over his supporters and deprive

him off his social bubble. The more notorious puppet:
like Sebe in the Ciskei. have placed thumbdyes,
through their actions. squarely within the enemy attack
and must be dealt with accordingly. ' Clearly the hummus should also be the targets of.
our Movement's efforts to render South Africa
unmanageable. However. these people and mechanisms of
'e' t' f' o' m' i' l' l' b' e' d' e' c' e' m' i' n' e' d' b' y' o' u' r' M' o' v' m' s' o' m' e' d' S' t' r' e' n' g' t' h' i' n' t' h' e' s' e' a' r' e' a' s' .

One of the questions most extensively debated, was
whether we should seek to advocate the overthrow of
the bantustan administration: or whether we should
focus exclusively on the struggle against Pravda. 1!
the former applies. it would involve the mobilisation
of (if only for a short period) a radical administration
with sympathies for the liberation movement. Would
such an approach wait: our correct policy of un-
conditionally rejecting the legitimacy of the bantus-
tans? It was generally felt that we should be flexi-
ble in our approach. .

The issue is that the P. t. - e. t. o. r. i. a. would intervene im-
mediately to save it: puppets. Such intervention would
reduce the whole bantustan policy to shambles. By
removing the puppet: we would bring the people into
direct confrontation with the racists. opening up the
possibilities of transforming these areas into bases for
the advancement of People's War.

Addition and: by the Plenary Session
We require an in-depth study of the bantustan to give
us a more adequate knowledge of social stratifica-
tion. crystallisation of classes (if any) within these
KW areas: patterns of land ownership
and the distribution of power. the system of
patronage. etc.

C. The Working Class

The Commission found the document on the labour
front submitted by SACTU extremely useful. The most
significant feature of the situation in our country has
been the dramatic growth in trade union organisation
(which. for the first time in South African history. has
more black than white workers) the escalating strike,
movement and the increasing involvement of the work-
ing class in the popular upsurge.

The special role of the working class was emphasised
at the Morogoro Conference and enunciated in our
1969 Strategy and Tactics document. Stressed at that
time was the observation that the 'militant and political
consciousness as a revolutionary force' of the workers
'will play no small part in our victory and the con-
stitution of a real people' in South Africa".

The present draft Strategy and Tactics document is
not as emphatic on the working class role as the Moro-
goro Document and must be accordingly improved. 15

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" Movement.

4. We take initiatives to resolve the regional and 'ideological' differences. and Otherwise. that exist Within the UDF. .

2. Development of the ANC

Underground and MK Network

111: development of our underground is critical to our capacity to lead all-round People's War. Conditions in our country have matured to a stage where the possibilities for the creation of this underground have never been as favourable as they are now. Our activity has generated and steered thousands of activists who are more than ready to join and become organised contingents of 'our revolutionary vanguard

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Recommendation: . ' -

. I. The development of 'the ANC underground and MK network will take a qualitative leap forward by the adoption of the approach that underlay the AFC document with the necessary modifications which would take into account subsequent developments. The execution of this task should be given special attention and constant supervision. The emergence of an experienced leadership at home at the mass level is a positive faster and ways. and means should be found to draw on it in erasing the APCs. _

Particular attention must be given to the specialised mining programme aimed at producing suitable cadres to be sent into the country to reinforce those who are drawn from within the country into the AFC: so as to ensure that the leadership of 'APCs develops into a truly all-round leadership fully imbued with the strategy and tactics of our Movement. and functioning according to MCW rules.

2. As part of Our underground we must ensure that the ANC :core groups are organised and active in all the mass democratic organisations.

3. The vanguard organisation must have a significant role to play in our struggle. We must ensure that cadres who through these mechanisms go into the country. become familiar with the conditions in their operational areas and thereby become suitably equipped to provide guidance to the structures within the country' is well as increase their competence to brief and prepare cadres who are being infiltrated.

4. - We must ensure that our best organisers are immediately deployed in the ANC underground at once.

5. in the period ahead we need to give urgent and special attention to carrying out agitational work and to infiltrate the SADF and bantustan armies as well as the police force.

6. The emergence of a leadership in the broad front of mass Struggle has made it imperative that our vanguard movement ensures closer communication and collaboration with the leadership in the further development of our struggle.

3. Armed Struggle

The Green Book under the section entitled "What is our aim? to the Revolutionary People's Political Military Struggle? 5.7.5 out 3 general principles which

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remain him. We quote hereunder certain sections:

The armed Struggle must be based on. and grow out of. mass political support and it must eventually involve all our people. All military activities must. at every stage, be guided and determined by the need to generate political mobilisation. organisation and

resistance. with the aim of progressively weakening the enemy's grip on his reins of political, economic, social and military power. by a combination of political and military action. The form of political and military activities and the way these activities relate to one another, go through different phases as the situation changes. It is therefore vital to have under continuous survey the changing relationship between these two inter-dependent factors in our struggle and the piece which political and military actions (in the narrow sense) occupy in each phase, both nationally and within each of our main regions.

In his political report to this Conference, our President characterised the current situation from the following perspective:

... As a result of the strength and consistency of the people's offensive, many areas in our country are emerging, perhaps in a dramatic way, as such as: revolutionary bases. The people are engaged in active struggle as a conscious revolutionary force and accept the ANC as their vanguard movement. They are organised in mass democratic organisations. They have destroyed the enemy's local organs of government and have mounted an armed offensive against the racist regime, using whatever weapons are available to them. What is missing is a strong underground ANC presence as well as a large contingent of units of Umkhonto We Sizwe.

We must aim this way: in a deterring and systematic manner because it is within these revolutionary bases that we will succeed to root our army. It is the risen masses in these areas who have to be organised into larger formations of Umkhonto We Sizwe, turned into organised groups of combatants, and replenish and swell our military ranks. We must bear in mind the fact that the masses we are gaining outside constitute the core of our army. They're the organisers and the leaders of the mass army that we have to build inside the country. They are our officer cadre. We cannot deploy them forever as combat units. For obvious reasons, no army in the world fights with combat units composed of officers. Our will be no exception. What we have said does not rule out basing our units in suitable terrain where they can hide. That, however, is no solution to the imperative obligation on us to actually spread the armed struggle as rapidly as possible, taking into account the internal and international situation. It is true that we want to reduce our dependence on enemy structures by organising and leading the struggle from within the country. We must, however, accept the reality that we shall always need these arms.

Recommendations . . .

1. The process of finalising the people's war document