

AS1992-2-3-18

EMBARGOED UNTIL DELIVERED

MEMORANDUM FOR DISCUSSION WITH MR CHRISTOPHER WILLS

BY MANGOSUTHU BUTHELEZI, CHIEF MINISTER OF KWAZULU  
AND PRESIDENT INKATHA FREEDOM PARTY

ULUNDI : 17TH MARCH 1992

---

Mr Wills, I really do welcome you to Ulundi. One of the advantages that I have of being the same person, with the same basic principles and the same pragmatic commitment to translate principles into reality, is that as I go through life I gather friends.

The IFP has been totally constant in its commitment to democracy, both in theory and in internal practice, ever since its inception as Inkatha. I find it extremely gratifying that now that there appears to be real prospects of dismantling apartheid and establishing an open multi-party democracy all political parties, including the National Party, the ANC and the Democratic Party, are gravitating down to centre-stage politics which the IFP has espoused for so long.

The IFP has not had to change its politics nor its policies to participate in moves today to break away from apartheid and to introduce a new parliamentary democracy. It is the ANC and the National Party which are facing having to make radical moves away from their political past. Much in South Africa depends upon whether they can succeed in doing so.

As far as I am concerned, it is vital for South Africa that they do succeed. I am struggling for an open, race-free, multi-party democracy in which strong parties compete seriously with each other to gain the electorate's confidence. I am struggling for a new South Africa in which governments can, and will, come and go as they correctly or incorrectly assess what voters want. In short I

am struggling for a political system in which other parties could, and indeed would, from time to time, take over the reins of government.

Perhaps Europeans, who have not been faced with what we face here and in Africa, would not understand the importance of that commitment to multi-partyism which has so characterised the IFP.

The ANC has, for decades, patterned itself on Marxist revolutionary movements around the world. It has not only regarded itself as THE vanguard political movement in the country but it has assumed that it is the only successor to apartheid governments, and that it would take control of South Africa as a one-party State.

Prior to Mr de Klerk's now famous February 2, 1990 address, the ANC was facing up to the fact that it had lost international support because it was just not succeeding in winning over the workers and peasants to its cause. Russian theorists, who perhaps had sniffs of perestroika in the early winds of change, were impressing upon the ANC the need to take the proletariat struggle seriously. They argued that the ANC could not leap from apartheid into a Socialist one-party State.

The ANC was also witness to the importance of popularism in Black politics and they had seen the phenomenal rise of Inkatha and they were earlier witness to the popular rise of Black Consciousness, and the emergence of leaders such as Steve Biko. More latterly,

they had seen the importance of on-the-ground developments in the country which COSATU and UDF leaders had been able to generate.

Their past failures, the withdrawal of African support in particular, and clear evidence of the consequences of their not being in South Africa on-the-ground, where the struggle was really taking place, made the ANC and its South African Communist Party ally take stock and re-think their positions.

They accepted the advice of thinkers at the Africa Institute in Moscow and evolved a two-phase strategy. In the first phase they would seek on-the-ground alliances and accept the importance of popularism in politics and seek to dominate in the proletarian struggle.

They set about preparing for these victories in the proletariat struggle which would lay the foundations for a second-phase socialist struggle.

I am certainly not crying wolf and looking for Communists under every political bush. Communism is dominantly defunct as a political force in South Africa. The South African Communist Party is irrelevantly small and only has some status because its leaders are included in the ANC's National Executive Committee.

I am worried, however, about the extent to which the ANC cannot shed the previous image it had of itself being the only real contender for power in the country.

I am also worried about the ANC's tactics and strategies, and the political idiom of everything they do does not reflect a deep commitment to multi-partyism. They continue to use the Harare Declaration as a guiding document which dictates the ANC's fight when it takes on all-or-nothing battles and sets up arenas in which it can seek all-or-nothing victories.

The ANC refuses to become a political party and remains a liberation movement and retains its private army - Umkhonto weSizwe. It refuses to concentrate its political activity on constituency politics in which it has to make progress in gaining constituency support for its policies.

Instead, it remains committed to mass action programmes, and seeks to maintain international pressure against South Africa which keeps confrontation politics just below the surface of whatever we are trying to do in negotiating a new South Africa into existence, with reliance on reason and goodwill.

This is clearly evident in CODESA. I am personally not in CODESA because CODESA has excluded a delegation from His Majesty, the King of the Zulus and from KwaZulu. The ANC prefers a smaller based CODESA in which it can be more dominant, and in which it can possibly succeed in establishing a situation where Dr Mandela sits on the one side of the negotiating table and Mr de Klerk sits on the other side, with everybody else lining up behind one or the other.

We say NO to this, and I am totally convinced our NO will triumph. We must broaden the base of CODESA. We must bring in the Conservative Party and the AWB from the right and we must bring the PAC and AZAPO in from the left. We must find ways of weighting the scales in such a way that the interests of big business and professional organisations in South Africa, help tip scales in one direction or another.

I find myself constantly having to argue that the South African electorate of the future will be just as capable of rejecting right solutions as it will be capable of rejecting wrong solutions. Correct solutions arrived at prematurely by too small a group of parties cloistered behind closed doors will be trampled under foot

in street corner politics because people have not been drawn into the negotiation process.

We want to slow down the proceedings in CODESA because unless we increase the representativeness of CODESA, the best that we could do in it will not be good enough. The ANC on the other hand want to rush into the future, and want CODESA to author a rapid move to the election of an Interim Government. This is the way they will maximise the prospects of us ending up a unitary state with highly centralised political power structures and a political system which incorporates the all-or-nothing Westminster type political battle.

The IFP is totally committed to ensure that no South African Government of the future will ever again be able to amass the kind of monolithic power structures around itself which successive National Party Governments have gathered around themselves.

We want a decentralised political system; we want government to be small and efficient. We want very substantial devolution of powers to second and third tier levels of government. We want consensus politics introduced and we want balances and checks so that Regional or State governments can curb any excesses in Central government behaviour.

We want a constitution in which political parties at the national level cannot play party political games with constitutional

principles and amend the constitution in their favour. We want strongly entrenched clauses in the constitution, guaranteeing the autonomy of Regional governments in clearly defined Federal or Swiss Canton type allocation of power.

We want the vertical separation of the three tier levels of government entrenched in the constitution and we also want the fiscal independence of Regional governments with their own tax bases to be entrenched in the constitution.

We most certainly do not want a simple Westminster-type winner-takes-all parliamentary system. The kind of victories we want for democracy are not the kind of victories the ANC could use as stepping stones to a future Socialist State.

We in the IFP believe that economics and politics are but two sides of a single coin. There will be no economic development and there will be no political development unless politics and economics are harmonised. We want a society that rests on a market driven economy, and we want the spirit of contract to be dominant in a society in which there really is the rule of law and the judiciary is truly independent.

Perhaps, above all, the difference between the IFP and the ANC emerges in practice on the ground. We insist that constituency politics is vital for democratic progress. We insist that the negotiation process must draw the whole population into a movement forward. We insist that any conclusions reached at CODESA must be

referred back to the people by the negotiators for endorsement, and we insist that we should not wait until we finally produce a constitutional blueprint behind closed doors, before we refer to the people.

We therefore have an approach to CODESA in which not only do we want CODESA to be fully representative of the whole political spectrum, but we want CODESA procedures to be open procedures taking place under the full scrutiny of the public and institutional South Africa.

Then, of course, there is the total rejection by the IFP of violence for political purposes. The IFP is being battered by violence. Since the signing of CODESA there have been something like 180 violations of the National Peace Accord in ANC attacks

against IFP members. More sobering is the fact that in recent years, 193 IFP office bearers have been assassinated with shocking brutality in the manner of their deaths.

Our people are actually being killed daily. The levels of violence in South africa are prohibitively high. We simply must slow down CODESA so that all parties in it can help establish the necessary conditions of stability and political calm to enable real negotiations, based on consultations with the people, to go ahead.

I know that I have painted a picture in broad strokes but I thought that it would be useful to gain an overall view before we talk about anything in detail.

\*4619

-----O-----

*Kingspress 17932*