ANC concedes it lack: %}?s&tï¬\201 | sefei\fï¬\201b stâ\200\230f'l?igrgle

By John Ryan, The Starâ\200\231s Africa 2 News Service ! LUSAKA $a\200\224$ The ANC concedes that

its military wing does not have the

capacity within South Africa to intensify the armed struggle in any meaningful way at a time when the ANC sees a tactical need to do s And the ANC has identified one of the major problems facing its new joint hierarchy $\hat{a}\200\224$ whether or not to continue the struggle should the South African Government unban it. At the opening of a meeting between the ANCâ\200\231s national executive committee and the eight visiting leaders from South Africa, acting president Mr Alfred Nzo yesterday indicated that the organisation might have to reconsider its strategy in general in the light of a changed situation after the release

of Mr Walter Sisulu and other jailed

leaders of the organisation.
-Mr Nzo also indicated that it was _important that the armed struggle be continued.
For that reason the military tactic might have to be to build up the - internal force of cadres a\200\224 both to be able to fight effectively should

forces at the moment a new Squth

the need arise and to have sizeable

African army was formed. i
The ANC would also have to con-

sider what it would do if it was un-

banned. Among the issues the ANC

cksy

had to consider was whether at that $\hat{a}\200\230$ stage to operate solely as a legal movement or whether to continue | with some underground units.

The national executive committee of the ANC, at its three-day meeting this weekend, would have

to consider the role within the or-

ganisation of the released leaders | from South Africa and the position.

- of Mr Nelson Mandela after he was

freed. T

It was learnt yesterday that Mr Mandela submitted to the Lusaka meeting a 10-point plan dealing with negotiations with the South African Government.; it

' MANDELAINTOUCH

Mr Nzo referred to these proposals before the meeting. #1 He indicated that Mr Mandela had been in touch with the ANC in Lusaka this week to stress their importance and had said he would contact the leaders on Sunday to find out what the meeting had decided. $\hat{\mathbb{Q}}\hat{\mathbb{A}}$ \mathbb{R} ANC president Mr Oliver Tambo, recovering from a brain spasm in a Swedish clinic, has responded to therapy and is determined to return to Lusaka to take up his position. An ANC spokesman yesterday said Mr Tambo was now able to walk with little assistance and could use his right arm and hand again.

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â\200\230Trio liken
å\200\230charmingâ\200\231
De Klerk
- By DAVID BRAUN, =
- The Star Bureau
please as Ronald Reagan, but he isâ\200\235
unable or unwilling to envisage a
political system where the whites -
will not have special privileges andâ\200\235"
will not control power. W
These are the private views of -
three US congressmen who recently
spent more than 90 minutes in deep;
discussion with the South African
leader. © ) i
â\200\230 Congressmen Howard Wolpe;"
Constance Morella and Alan Wheat
_this week told all and sundry ina\200\235
Washington how disappointed they a \geq 00 \leq 31
were to find there was no evidence
of any commitment to real change .
in South Africa. o
Their views on this issue were
previously publicised in South Afris, ]
ca after they gave a press confer-"
a\200\230ence before leaving the country.
Americans have also been curious, ,
to know what they thought of Mr de:*
Klerk, who remains a somewhat en-
igmatic figure to them. o
Privately, one of the trio de-~
scribed him thus: \hat{a}200\234If there was a
person I would want to compare.:
him with, it would be Ronald Rea-~
gan. He is a charming, charming.,
man. There isâ\200\230no doubt about his-
personal appeal. While we discussed
issues, we could not help but smile....,
a\200\234He knows the right things to say -
and their context. He basically tells .
you â\200\230to trust him, while promising
nothing.â\200\235 . ; Al
Another lawmaker found Mr de
Klerk to be personally sincere and
generous with his time (at no stage-
\did he make moves to get rid of
«
themye:
to Reagan .
WASHINGTON â\200\224 President F W de"*
Klerk is as charming and willing to-; -
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~core issue because

This lawmaker said: â\200\234He seemed —

to want to persuade. It was not easy
Jfor him to be elected. He is a new

¢ â\200\230then his predecessor, Mr PW

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â\200\234De Klerk was charming, ver
sincere and trying to impress.

wish him well.â\200\235 i;

" The third congressman said Mr

de Klerk appeared to be more open
andlqlgss ~d£f%enaÂ\$ive (than his predecessor). —
â\200\234He tried to understand what our

s were and he talked at

s were and he talked at some depth about his intentions and * \hat{a} 200\234But what was really disappointing was the enormous gap between

_impressions :

of th R; .on. i i $\frac{1}{200}$. \hat{A}

- $^{\circ}$ $^{\circ}$
- $\tilde{\ }$ â\200\234He did not want to â\200\224 and he .. was unprepared to â\200\224 come to the ' he was unable to see a system where whites did not .

vast majority of the

have special privileges and a hold _on political power.â\200\235 -

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T THE START of what could be-

come the most important decade in

South African history, the South African Communist Party finds itself increasingly isolated due to an ideological split with Moscow under Gorbachev.

But reports of deep division within the ANC between SACP members and non-members are false, says Africa Confidential, a fortnightly London publication.

It also believes that while the SACP has succeeded in $a\200\230$ hemming in $a\200\231$ ANC president Oliver Tambo while effectively taking control of the ANC, it is $a\200\230$ ambivalent $a\200\231$ about the possible release of Nelson Mandela, whom it $a\200\230$ fears $a\200\231$.

In its January edition, Africa Confidential writes that, with the advent of perestroika and glasnost under Mikhail Gorbachev, a â\200\230time-honoured alliance spanning more than six decades between the SACP and its elder brother, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSUY), has been ruptured.

The SACP, says the Confidential, had always been proud of its position as a loyal ally of Moscow, having faithfully supported its model of socialism while spurning the Chinese and Eurocommunist variants.

In 1986, it says, coming from the CPSU \hat{a} 200\231s 27th congress, SACP general secretary Joe Slovo \hat{a} \200\230praised Gorbachey effusively, calling the congress the most remarkable he had ever attended.

 $\hat{a}\200\230$ Since then, loud applause for Gorbachev inside the party has turned to alarm. The SACP never imagined the extent to which the new thinking in the Soviet Union would bring Moscow and Washington together.

 $\hat{a}\200\230$ The Soviets, eager to resolve regional conflicts by political means, have lost interest in the liberation of Africa. This has

threatened the SACP, whose strength within the South African liberation movement has reposed principally on the African National Congress (ANC) \hat{a} 200\231s dependence on the communist world for arms. \hat{a} 200\231

Responsible

The South African Government, according to the publication, was indirectly responsible for the close alliance between the ANC and SACP, as well as for stamping out â\200\230the only known attempt at reform in the SACPâ\200\231. This was, it says, led by Ruth First, Slovoâ\200\231s late wife, who was â\200\230killed by Pretoriaâ\200\231s agents in 1982 before she could muster a movement for reformâ\200\231.

The $\hat{a}200\230$ dramatic success $\hat{a}200\231$ by Moses Kotane and J B Marks in the 1940s in $\hat{a}200\230$ piloting the SACP into the era of mass struggle $\hat{a}200\231$ led to its banning in 1950 by the National Party, elected two years earlier. This, it adds, played into the SACP $\hat{a}200\231$ s hands, as party cadres were $\hat{a}200\230$ driven for cover into still-legal mass organisations like the ANC $\hat{a}200\231$.

Marks, it says, preceded Mandela as

Slovo . . . \hat{a} 200\230alarmed \hat{a} \200\231

 $a\200\230$ South Africa $a\200\231$ s

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president of the most powerful ANC province, Transvaal. â\200\230Dan Tloome, today the SACP chairman, lost by a mere six votes to Walter Sisulu in the 1949 election to the post of ANC secretary-general. When the ANC itself was banned in 1960, the underground experience of SACP members equipped them for leadership roles.

 $\hat{a}\200\230$ With the cold war in full swing, the West chose to snub the ANC in favour of Pretoria $\hat{a}\200\231$ s rabid anti-communism. Left with no other choice, the ANC went East. $\hat{a}\200\231$

In 1965 during the Sino-Soviet split, the ANC was, says the article, we aned from the Chinese influence, with the SACP scoring a $200\230$ definitive victory $200\231$ at the ANC consultative conference in Tanzania in 1969, where the ANC adopted a number of resolutions advanced by the SACP caucus.

These included:

 \hat{A} ® The establishment of $\hat{a}\200\230$ the powerful Revolutionary Council, charged with day-to-day management of the struggle. This immediately fell into party hands in the person of Joe Matthews, the council $\hat{a}\200\231$ s first secretary. $\hat{a}\200\231$

 \hat{A} ® The opening of ANC ranks to non-blacks. \hat{a} \200\230The first few who joined were all party members, including Joe Slovo, Yusuf Dadoo, Jack Simons, Reg September and others. \hat{a} \200\231

Heresy

 $\hat{\mathbb{QA}}$ ® A formal declaration of alliance between the SACP and the ANC, which $\hat{\mathbb{Q}}$ 00\230made it a heresy for anyone within the liberation alliance henceforth to be anticommunist.

 $\hat{a}\200\230$ The formal declaration of alliance . .; closed the ANC to other ideological influences. The arty alone was to preside over matters of political theory. $\hat{a}\200\231$

It says the SACP â\200\230quarantinedâ\200\231 Mr Tambo, â\200\230bestowing on him an aura of adulation as a successful tactic to manoeuvre him out of the day-to-day political life of the ANC, by keeping him on an exhausting round of diplomatic visitsâ\200\231. The presidential staff, under Anthony Mondalo, became largely an SACP â\200\230fiefâ\200\231.

â\200\230So pervasive is the party influence that it is hard to distinguish party from non-party in the ANC, as all and sundry speak one language, Marxism. The oft-repeated allegations of tensions between party and non-party is a lie.

 $\hat{a}\200\230$ It is wishful thinking on the part of Pretoria. Owing to its success in hemming in Tambo, the party is ambivalent, about the possible release of Mandela, whom it fears.

â\200\230There is thus a suspicion that the party is behind the ugly rumours circulating within the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) tht Mandela may strike a deal with F W de Klerk. The object of such rumours would be to discredit Mandela in the MDM and to alienate him from his recently release comrades, who are reported to be disturbed by the news. With

Oliver Tambo . . . \hat{a} 200\230hemmed in \hat{a} \200\231

Reds

Moscowâ\200\231s new look

From KIN BENTLEY in LONDON

his power-base eroded, the party could take on Mandela. $\hat{a}\200\231$

On the ideological front, it notes that the $\hat{a}\200\230\mbox{ANC}$ coat-tails and the harshness of apartheid government have worked well for the party.

 $\hat{a}\200\230$ Literally thousands of black activists have embraced socialism at a time when the communist world is shrinking. In rallies within South Africa the once unknown party flag now competes with the ANC flag for prominence. It has become chic to be Marxist in South Africa today. $\hat{a}\200\231$

Challenge

After Ruth Firstâ\200\231s attempt at reform was aborted by her assassination, others like Ben Turok were $a\200\230$ simply expelled because it is almost impossible to reform the party without violating regulations which would open the questioner to the risk of expulsionâ\200\231.

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ This is probably why Thabo Mbeki has elected to challenge the party positions through his work in the ANC rather than from within party structures.

 $\hat{a}\200\230$ Mbeki is one of the party $\hat{a}\200\231$ s authorities. on Marxist philosophy. He did a two-year stint at Moscow $\hat{a}\200\231$ s Lenin School after his graduation from Britain $\hat{a}\200\231$ s Sussex University. He so impressed his Soviet teachers that to this day they cite his example to new Lenin School students. 3

 $\hat{a}\200\230$ Mbeki, however, lacks the common touch and shuns organisational tasks, so his reformist ideas have not gained currency with the rank and file, who remain diehard Stalinist. $\hat{a}\200\231$

Within the SACP itself, the Africa Correspondent detects two main factions, both Stalinist.

Returning to the schism between the SACP and CPSU, the article states that the fact that the Seventh Party Congress, in June, 1989, was held in Havana and not Moscow, was indicative of the split.

It notes that Soviet theoreticians had $\frac{3}{200}$ even gone so far as to state publicly that socialism is unattainable in South Africa in the foreseeable future. This and other acts of $\frac{3}{200}$ betrayala $\frac{200}{235}$ by the Soviets have led

to a polemical combat between Slovo and CPSU ideologues which has received extensive coverage in the Soviet mediaâ\200\231.

The SACP, it concludes, $\hat{a}\200\230$ in spite of its rhetorical support for perestroika, has joined Fidel Castro, Deng Zhao Ping, Igor Ligachev and the late Nicolae Ceausescu as the last loyal defenders of orthodoxy $\hat{a}\200\231$.

It notes that at the SACP congress last year, the new party programme adopted, The Path To Power, was an $\hat{a} \geq 00 \geq 30$ updated version of The Stalinist Road to South African Freedom, adopted in 1962 and allegedly authored by Joe Slovo and Joe Matthews.

 $\hat{a}\200\230$ The programme still talks of the inevitable collapse of capitalism and the triumph on a global scale of socialism. Old habits indeed die hard. $\hat{a}\200\231$

By Charlene Smith

LUSAKAâ\200\224The African National Congress has admitted that it does not have

sify its armed struggle effectively.

The admission was made by ANC secretary-general Alfred Nzo at the opening of the national executive committee conference with the internal leadership and observers from the Mass Democratic Movement in Lusaka yesterday.

While accepting the grmciple of intensifying he armed struggle,
â\200\230looking at the situa ion realistically we do not have the capacity to intensify an armed struggle in every meaning of

the wordâ $\200\231$, Mr Nzo said.

In a speech regarded as one of the most significant ANC policy statements for some time, Mr Nzo told delegates diplomats and Zambian officials, that the ANCâ\200\231s Harare declaration makes provision for the mutual suspension of armed hostilities and a negotiated end to hostilities.

 $\hat{a}\200\230$ While this has not happened the armed struggle must continue. $\hat{a}\200\231$

they did not have the capacity to do this effectively, Mr Nzo said the main military task for the future was precisely the building up of that capacity in the country a\200\230both to fight effectively

should the need arise $\hat{a}\200\231$ or to form a future South African army.

Mr Nzo said the conference had to consider what to do when the

ANC was formally unbanned.

Exiles â\200\230We should consider whether to operate solely as a legal movement or continue to maintain some underground units.

Mr Nzo, who is the actinï¬\201 president of the ANC ile Oliver Tambo recuperates from a brain spasm in a Swedish hos-

stand behind the fence with our feetshackled by old perceptions and fear to confront a new realityâ\200\231.

Discussing President F W de Klerk, he said â\200\230we must expect it that the Pretoria regime will also work to engage us in negotiation once it has tackledâ\200\231 the issues of ending the state of emergency, unbanning the ANC and other organisations and allowing the exiles to return.

 \hat{a} 200\230De Klerk could well \hat{A}°

seek to move with some speed to CFet; us unprepared off balance, allowing us no time to regain our balance so that 1n1tiatlve remains in their hands.â\200\231

Critical to this appears to be a secret pro-Rfsal drafted by Nelson

andela and conveyed to the conference.

He contacted the organisation late yester-day afternoon to enquire about progress thus far and said he

would telephone the ANC in Lusaka on Sunday to discover what resolutions had been adopted with regard to his proposal The NEC is also to discuss the tasks Mr Mandela must assume after his release from 27 years in prison. Mr Nzo made it clear that the ANC expects B ¢ TURN TO PAGE 2 the means to inten-Acknowledging that { pital, said \hat{a} 200\230we must not . A â\200\224â\200\224â\200\224

Acting leader admits

ANC can

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OUTH Africa has unquestionably, in the words of Walter Sisulu, $\hat{a}\200\234$ entered a

' new eraâ\200\235. Most whites

recognise (without necessarily understanding what this means) that the apartheid days are over. And they are beginning to realise that the new political order has to be worked out by all South Africans and have the stamp of â\200\230approval of a majority of South Africans if it is to work. - Important as all this is, expectations both inside and outside the counti7\201' are running away from reality. Quick solutions are as unlikely in SA as theY are in Northern Ireland or the Middle East. And as with these two situations, the contribution outsiders can make to finding answers is limited.

Two major political actors $\hat{a}\200\224$ the NP government and the ANC $\hat{a}\200\224$ are definitely moving towards agreement on the preconditions for negotiation. The extra-parliamentary or-

ganisations, and the ANC in particular, have said there will be no negotiations unless they are in a position to engage in political activity on the same basis as the NP.

President F W de Klerk and his government accept this, and inter-Pret it to mean that there should be a $a\200\230$ normalised security situation $200\235$.

There is therefore a rough convergence between the NP and the ANC on the preconditions set out -in the Harare Declaration of August 21 1989. These are the release of all political prisoners and detainees (including, of course, Nelson Mandela); the lifting of all restrictions on political organisations and individuals; the removal of troops from the townships (already virtually complete); the cessation of all â\200\234politicalâ\200\235 trials and executions (less agreement); and an end to the state of emergency.

The ANC has helped De Klerk by not insisting that the remaining apartheid laws, such as the Group Areas Act, the Population Reï¬\201traâ\200\224 tion Act and the Land Act, be repealed before serious talks can get under way.

_My guess is that on February 2, .

' when he opens Parliament, De Klerk will express his governmentâ\200\231s will-

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Hopes run ahead of reality as SA peace talks still a way off«

SouswESS DAY DENIS WORRALL | 9 AN 990

ingness to act on most of these preconditions, on the basis that he gets a quid pro quo from the ANC on the use of violence.

With ANC and NP leaders hotly

ing with one another tooccugg' the high moral ground and win international i{mpathy, the differences betvq%en em lie in what is not being said:

O The NP regards the present racial

oupings as the main constitutional buildi lg bltlscks forfthat: f&tg,re. gl;h;tls is y a legacy of the NPâ\200\231s aparthesdar;t)ast. Butc \Box \201 reflects also the NPâ\200\231s new power base: it is no longer the party of Afrikaners â\200\224 the CP has become that $a\200\224$ but of racially selfconscious English-speakers and

white Afrikaans-speakers.)

The ANC and MDM, and the DP among whites, reject this. Their commitment is to a non-racial democracy, in which the groups that emerge do so as the result of free choice.

O The NP, not unnaturally, believes in a step-b{-:lte process. The ANC, etc., is looking to a dramatic and

- fundamental transformation of the

situation.

[O The NP is looking to incorporating black South Africans into the politi-

cal system. The others are committed to a transfer of. power.

O The NP government regards itself as the res)rwentative of white SA, and the coloured and Asian parties in the tricameral parliament as the representatives of their respective communities; and it says that blacks should determine their representatives by election. £1e)

This view is rejected by the ANC and others who sa colour groupings. They are holding out for a constituent assembly elected on a nationwide and adult suffrage basis. i _

O There is also a fundamental difference between the NP and the ANC and others on the negotiating tgam dure itself. The NPâ\200\231s view is that, as the government of the day, it should $a\200\234$ manage $200\235$ the process. The ANC sa that before the constitution can

written, there must be an interim -

government to supervise the process of constitution-making and the election of the constituent assembly. So while there is a great deal of movement as the various political actors $\hat{a}\200\224$ and they are increasing by the week $\hat{a}\200\224$ make space for them-

selves, and the dominant political -

I ETrrTrrmneâ\200\231

it entrenches

rhetoric is heady with hope and expectation, a word of caution is needed. A negotiating breakthrough is not around the corner.

As the DP views the situation, the first priority is for there to be agreement between the NP and the ANC on the preconditions as set out in the Harare Declaration and on the use of violence.

There will be no beginning to the process unless this hapKens. And only in this way will the ANC begin to participate in political activity on the same basis as the NP.

The second priority in the DPâ\200\231s view must be to open up the process to all other political parties and organisations. This means persuading the NP and the ANC that they, indi-

vidually, cannot hope to control the process and produce a settlement -

which is acceptable to all other parties.

Aside from the fact that the ANC/NP juxtaposition is a recipe for racial polarisation, the NP does not speak for white SA, and there are significant divisions also on the extra-parliamentary side.

On the white side the CP, which

draws over 30% of white voters, presently rejects altogether the idea of negotiation. And the DP, which draws 25% of white voters, is committed to a non-racial democracy.; The DP believes that if whites look beyond the colour of their skin, if they focus on values and interests, they can be part of a future politic

nlaâ\200\231lj:ril?.

e NP, on the other hand, is set on winning for whites some special constitutional niche (2 la Ian Smith in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe), so condemning them to being a political minority in the longer term.

I might add here that once serious talking gets under way, SA politics will quickly enter an ancemaking phase. And given the DPâ\200\231s principles, programme and strategic positioning, it is bound to draw increasing support from the NP as that partyâ\200\231s limited support base becomes evident.

How can a negotiating process in--volving all parties be started up?

One way would be by electi:g a constituent assembly as happened in Namibia and as pro) in the Harare Declaration. This is likely to be strongly resisted by the NP $\hat{a}\200\224$ especially if it entails the setting up first of an interim government.

The other way would be to create a groc&ss independent of the present NP government, the ANC and all other parties by appointing an independent facilitator. The most likely candidate would be the Chief Justice. The judiciary â\200\224 especially in recent times as a result of some boldly liberal judgments â\200\224 has come to command black respect.

Were the Chief Justice to be mandated in autonomous terms, given a budget and all the technical help he might need, and on the clear understanding that all parties are committed to the process so initiated, I believe he would have the co-operation of all ir: $\hat{a}\200\230$)]portant parties.;

_ It would be the beginnintg of writing an agenda. And, given the nature of the Chief Justiceâ\200\231s terms of reference, the NP government would, ineffect, become a transitional government.

[J Worrall is a DP co-leader. This is an extract from his speech to the Oxford Union last night.

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 $\hat{a}\200\234$ When spokespersons of a trusted ally start interpreting your policy in * ways which cannot be regarded as anything less than a prescriptxve; \tilde{A} ©} $\hat{a}\200\230$ mode, something has gone wrong!', with the alliance.

 $\hat{a}\200\234Despite$ repeated assurances that Moscow has not changed its policy towards the ANC, a careful reading of statements by both Soviet leaders and publicists reveals that this is exactly what is happening with the Soviet-SACP-ANC alliance. $\hat{a}\200\235$

With these words, Dr Philip Nel, head of the Institute for Soviet Studies at the University of Stellen-

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the ANC under pre

Perestroika in the Soviet Union has led to a divergence between

ican National Congress but perhaps to an even s $aa\200\231ta\200\234$ {bet:feve::r;a%gcow:)nn: the South African C?mm_unlst lfa\200\231aa\200\230,rr:a\200\230y, South African Sovietologist. GERALD La\200\231ANGE of The

Starâ\200\231s Africa News Service reports.

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says a noted

its military activities and has been $_$ the inspiration for SACP ideology and strategy s $\tilde{\ }$ sl

_The switching of Moscowâ\200\231s support from armed struggle to negotiation has changed â\200\230attitudes not only in the ANC hierarchy but also in Pretoria, and may have a profound effect not only on relations between the ANC and the SACP,

which have long been close, but

bosch, sets out to argue in a recent publication that there has been a di-

ANC and Moscow as a result of the $a\200\234$ new political thinking $200\235$ in the Soviet Union.

"And while the ANC has recently come to accept some aspects of the $a\200\230$ new thinking, he says, this appears not to apply to the SACP.

getting farther and farther away from the Soviet government.

Important

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ Ironically, it may be no longer true that the SACP represents the Soviet viewpoint in the ANC but rather that the ANC remains closer to Moscow than does the SACP, $\hat{a}\200\235$ he says.

y[Y)r Nel does not discuss in any detail the implications of his conclusions but clearly these are impor-

ing the fact that for more than a decade the Soviet Union has been the main source of foreign support

vergence of interests between the

In fact, Dr Nel sees the SACP

tant for all South Africans, consider- .

also, by projection, on $a\200\230$ the ANC $a\200\231$ s

ability to negotiate with Pretoria. In this light, Dr Nel's conclusions '

are of more than academic interest. _He sees nothing surprising in the

development of a divergence be-

tween Moscow and the ANC and the -

SACP. f

He regards it as inevitable that
Moscowâ\200\231s interest in stabilising international affairs in order to gain
- access to Western technology and fi| nance had to clash with the parochialinterests of the ANC and SACP.
. The prospects of these two organâ\200\230 isations depend, he says, on the con-

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' tinuation of some form of instability
in and around South Africa. While
inesta
\hat{a}\200\230 Moscow has been careful to avoid a | ;g\hat{a}\200\2311\hat{a}\200\230{le replacement of clas
s inter-
\ings with ANC
\hat{a}\200\230Dr Nel says.
* \tilde{a}\200\234Aecording to ANC sources, the
rmessage that came through loud
\hat{a}\200\230 and clear was that the Soviet
,8overnment would be pPrepared to
a\200\230continue its support for the ANC
only on condition that the ANC (and
the SACP) commit itself clearly to a
1pol:jutcal- prog{amegle which could
\hat{a}\202 ad to a negotiated stabilisation o
the South African situation.â\200\235 X 'Of
use the message was unpop-
ular, pressure had to be applied.
a\200\234Soviet officials and commenta-
tors prescriptively interpret ANC
policy and add nuances over which
there is no unanimity in the ANC.\hat{a}\200\235
Dr Nel says Soviet \hat{a}\200\234new political
thinking \frac{200}{235} has three basic elements
as far as southern Africa is con-
cerned. '
® The Soviet leadershipâ\200\231s commit-
ment in 1986 to the resolution of all
Third World conflicts by diplomat-
ic-political means,
and SACP leaders,
Cal
- @ The emergence in 1988 of a wils
lingness to co-operate with the West
bilising the Third World.
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[ \hat{a}\200\234he signalled the death of the tradi-
tional Soviet belief that socialism is
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. a natural choice for newly indepen-

_dent cotgi iesâ\200\235.

Moscowâ\200\231s attitude to South Africa was also shaped by the perception that the Republic was one of the flashpoints where Soviet and Western interests could clash head-

'l on.;

Soviet commentators then disco-

vered the factors inhibiting a nego-

tiated settlement and those which:
could contribute to it: the legitimate =
fears of whites as an impediment
and the divisions among them as a |
positive factor; the intransigence of
the South African Government as an
impediment, offset by the Governmentâ\200\231s isolation; the commitment of
the ANC and SACP to a revolutionary â\200\234peopleâ\200\231s warâ\200\235; the inability of the ANC to consolidate its gains in
international stature and exploit the
divisions among the whites.

While working to soften white in- | transigence, Moscow put discreet pressure on the ANC and SACP to | discard the notion of a revolution- | ary takeover and to prepare for a negotiated settlement.

The evolution of $a\200\234$ new thinking $a\200\235$ since 1985 has introduced new factors that have led to a gradual divergence between Soviet interests and those of the ANC and SACP, Dr Nel says:

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ While in private discussions Soviet leaders have increased their

1 pressure on the ANC to become

more receptive to the idea of nego-

straigp; iorward choice between jts $\hat{a}\200\230$ ests by more universal values as a own interests and theirs, such basis for international relations.

choices could not be avoided altogether. g e \hat{a} 200\230 One way of avoiding such choices

| is to get your allies to broaden their $200\230$ perspectives and Moscow has tried |

When Soviet leader Mr Mikhail Gorbachev told the UN General Assembly in 1988 that Moscow would not prescribe the road of development to be taken by other countries, Stellenbosch University aca" demic Dr Philip Nel.

tiation, the public image is one of continued solidarity with the ANC and SACP.

â\200\234Despite some backtracking and |
deliberate ambiguity, the ANC and
SACP did get the message that the
Soviet Union was adamant that
-eventually negotiations must take
place.â\200\235

- While the debate on negotiations continues within the ANC, says Dr Nel, the joint ANC-UDF-Cosatu ne- gotiations platform agreed on in 1989 shows evidence of a greater receptiveness to the idea of eventual negotiations. >

Suspecting that Moscow may be losing patience with it, especially as the Angola-Namibia negotiations convinced Moscow that compromises with Pretoria could be found, the ANC leadership published material intended to pre-empt accusations that it was not taking the Soviet Union seriously enough.

Dr Nel says the SACP has also moved marginally closer to the Moscow position. - ,

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ Yet, judging from its new programme, $\hat{a}\200\230$ The Path to Power $\hat{a}\200\231$, the SACP still seems to be far removed from the spirit and letter of the most recent phase of Soviet $\hat{a}\200\230$ new political thinking $\hat{a}\200\231.\hat{a}\200\235$

Hoofminister
Mangosuthu Buthelez!
Is die afgelope jare

- een van die mees
omstrede figure in die
- politieke arena.
Ondanks aansprake
dat hy besig Is om
â\200\234steun te verioor en sy
imples Natal In 'n
- bloedbad verander
het, beheer en legeer
hy Inkatha steeds met
'n ysterhand.
CHARLES LEONARD
het met hom In Ulundi

gaan gesels

_ BOOFMINISTER Maogaative Gatsha Buthelezi veswys gmag nn sy lamg verhouding met Nesom Mandela. "Dt gran Oo fare e toe one albei lede van die ANC wes. Hy was oy noait skaam om te sEdet by oy as o speler im die polificke ovel beskoo mie - en dit ferer] heelwat ader melï¬\201hyfn!prubeer wegwens.â\200\235

Asn die corkcard vandzc biimk houitafel in die weelderige ondes-lun&mncrmaqmwü¬\2020eh en kristaiglase in die vertonkas sit nister van Kvwrafuhs., _

Dié man wat die affgelcpe jare wit » lindse sweast oorde s "o uitveskoper en selfs n vyaod van bevrpding besbon is, iz nie skaam om howself ag 'n vryheidswegier te bestempel en oox ry ou viiendskspsbande met Meo- @ dela, Sisulu en Tembo be paat nie.

; Hyis!m!sdaampdgtï¬\201clmn Mandele nie sy ol in 'n toskonastipe Suid-Afriles poflen nie enetken dat Inkatha die seg bet om nass dief

faman ¥

 \hat{a} 200\230Wie is me deel van die sfelsel me?

" _

Vryheldsvegter en vriend van

Mandela

moet word cu dsatom het ek dis | Buthelezi-kommissie tof stand & bring, Dif was hel opdreg om voorstzile te meak wasrdenr alic mense in EwaNatal-voorstelle is oos ths s van dic land ver voor.

"z veeste opsic is steeds $\hat{a}200\2300$ eonmens-cen-shen-sielsel bivoe 'West-minister-bestel. $\hat{a}200\230n$ Meng kan mie Somuorige swartesense dink dac jy emstig afwyk en o vermeste is as \hat{j} 4 $\hat{a}200\2300$ altemsticf ap ceo-mens-een-sien voorsiel. Amerika en Doitsbed, hoewel bufle fedefale stelsels het, is steeds eenheidstate. $\hat{a}200\235$

Buthelezi was onfangs in die mous oor sy verbale skermmtselings md die Transkeise militÃ@re stastsiwoof, genl Bantu Holomise. Hy verdmidelik die onmintussen homen Holomiss ss

"Ek het hon cindlik nie voorheen gekeanie. Hy is jook, selfi jonger as paxiy van nay kitabess.

"By diie besbepraiings wan Hoofiman Sabata op 30 Descenber verlede juer, wat in die Transkei plassgevind het, het UDF- en Cosstn-beiers ny smam beswaddes. Daar was emstige onder-

waa vesiede janr pehon wasrop tais--woon nie. Twes welne gelede het budls 'n soorigelyke vergadering i Undtata gebon wat ek ook nie bypewoon het mie. Bk is cgier nie kwand vir hom

Oor die hooforinister van Kamgwane, Enos Mabwea, het by ook steek stadpunt ingeneens. Mabuza het al met die ANC-leiers in Losaka gesels en is bekeod vir sy gocie bande met die UIDF.

"Die ANC bebuoont te vexdu:ddlk

Dleselfdcgelmeanlbo "Ditis nie waar dat Tambo eoit probleme pehad het amdat ok die KwaZuiu-leier is nÃ@e. Daar &s mense in die buitelandse vleueld van die ANC wat iy ne ko veodra niÃ@.â\200\235

 $\hat{a}\200\234n$ Lid van dic Bmineat Persons Group, wat Suid-Afrike $\hat{a}\200\230o$ pasr jasr gelede besock het, bet aan oy ges \hat{A} © dat Mandela oy as 'n weybeidsvegier in eie reg beskou, boewel hy nie met alles wal ek doen saamstem nie. $\hat{a}\200\235$ -

Op dic vraag oor wat n vryheidsvegier biwe die sielsel doen, het Buthelezi sy stem ook cffens knat siyg. "Wie is nic decd van dic stelscl

nic. Dit is goedkeop, betckenislose retoriek wat teen ey gebmik word.â\200\235 Indic blocdige geweldpleging wak
Miadad in â\200\230o bloedbad versnderhet, was
Buibelesi se Inlostha-impies in
e gevegte feen vegters van dic
en Cosatu betrokiee.
"Die wortel van dic geweld is
pewsonnkike vendesta wat die ANC
been my voerâ\200\235, is Buthelezi se

VAKANTE BETREKKING

e Kodrdinpsdey

Afraplx Posbus 260860 Excom

2022

Die Afraplx Fotografiess Kollektief benodig 'n desitydse redakslonsie 5 assistont met sekretaridle veardighede. | Die suksesvolle aansoekersalop'â\204¢m | demokraiiese grondslag saam met ons | administratiews span werk. o Shsur asseblisf 'n geskrewe CV met

twee berelkbare verwysings aan:

r

Die shultingdatuns is 31 Januarie 1980

nomicse oestand waarin dic mense lmlle bevind. "Ben van die oorsais vir dic geweld is die soeloop van swartmense ta die Durbac-ompewing waar 1,7 miljoes plakiens weds woost, Dt werooesauk haglile toestandie waar wanorde en geweld vithroed.â\200\235

in twryfied getrek en beskuldigings dat tmfie Inkatha bevoordeel, word efioe dag gehoor.

"Dz wol wat die polisic beboort te speel, is om vrede te handimaf, \hat{a} \200\235 s Buthelezi.

â\200\234Diasr is besknldigings en toenbeskuddigiops dai dic polisic kant kics. Hulle getalle is klein en dit bemoeilik kel tsak. Bk bet op 19 Descanber moct Adrisan Viek gepraat em hy het my verseker dat dear vessieriings s Natal gestonw sal veoed.

 $a\200\2340$ esw het af vepsiocie enimostings

pechad on groordesd aan wat i die

vedede gebenr het, ie ck heclicmmal

beimimic pact wat Viek doen. Hy het

polisie-vessterkings na Piefcrma-ikzbung pesbmer o dig het dic geweld lsat afncem,â\200\235 â\202¬ lay.

"Wak oo nodig het, i icis wat vir almal nanvaarbssy sal wecs. Op 19 Desember verizde jasrbet o Inkatiafvasndiging met dr M en Alec Brwin van UDF/Cosatu gesels,â\200\235 s& Butiebz

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ Hulle son 181 dat ek wet dis vrggelate ANC-lsicrs praat. Bk weet

Buthelezl sî hy wil | nie profeot speel nie, maar dat dit wat in ander wîrelddele gebeur het, ook in Suid-Afrika gaan gebeur. Hy verwys hier weer eens na die demokratisering van Cos-Europa.

"My elo rol? Ek is steeds berefd om te dien indien nodig. Ek is bereld om ondes enigiemand te dien. Hulle behoort egter ook bareld te wess

om onder my e

dien.â\200\235

in die buitcland en =k west nic wan-

"Ek weet n $\tilde{\text{A}}$ ©e of die geweld gran cimdig mie. Dit gaan s lang tyd neem as die menee nie cmstig oor vrede is mie. $\hat{\text{A}}$ 200 $\hat{\text{A}}$ 235

Oor gy ol in â\200\230nooswe, post-apart-Theid Soid-Afrifos s Bothelez dat die Zoedors Soid-Adikwnees i, rosar eecds daarop trois is om deel van die Zoofoe-wolk te ween.

- "k het of lankal bosef dat dasr 'n

hoekom â\200\230o wistaodleier wir hulle

sanvaarbasr te. Dit slasn my th:m%

"Eangwane het nocit e!

geekiedkundige Swari-stast bestasn

: me.DnnamlcnquaZnhwat

wWas.

Buthelezi bet ook cimatigs ver'n groep tradisionele hoofmanse wst
Imlie now by die mie-rassige demolkratiese beweging skasr. Volpens oo
gebnaik die ANC dié srganisagie s 'n
front. Hulle is 'n voorbeeld wan hoe

Buthelezi glo dat De Klerk enderhsndelings san dic pang gasy kry omdat by met almal praat. Hy bet peloofwasdigheid. Seife pres Kenpeth Ksands of dat by eerdikin

â\200\234Ek glo nic by is so behep net die

grocpaidee wic. Hy bes $\hat{a}\200\2300$ lang pad

gekom bot waar by now is. \hat{a} \200\235

Butheleri glo da dsar â\200\230n ke vir Snid-Afrilon vt gebheure fn Ou-Boropa te leer is. Hy glo dit het reeds ogin maet die Bescczneifo-comeedhons Angole cn Swid-A fiika resohoe 435 wesklik nun die gang gelory el

i Nivenihiti et Svapo ecns gewreld voorgesinns. Hnlke et sntwssesdsarvans affgesien en dit lan dieselfide witwegleingg op ouss broeders hier pliaslil bã©. Hulle sl hopelik bal wipens neexlE.â\200\235

Buibelezi s8 hy wil mic profiect speet nie, waar dat dit wat i smder wirelddele gebenr bed, ook in Soid-Afrika gaan gobear. Hy werwyn hier

" weereens nadie demokrativering van Oos-Evmpe. "My eie wol? Bk iv stocds bereid am: te dien indien nodig. i is bensid om coder emgicmand b dien. Hulle I:ebmtegluootbemdwmom nmhrmykd:m.

Veye Weekblad, 19 Inamaci: 1990

1

n

1 Ihkétha-groep Val UDF-buurt in

Christina Scott

EK het gister gesien hoe 'n vigilmlegroop wat Inkaths goedgesind is, 'n UDPF-woonbuurt noord van Durban aanval, |

Gewapmde mans van d:c plakker-

skamp Richmond Farm het die vallei

deur die bosss enlang gras ingsstorm wanr sionies Koen van die Kwarnasn-wooenbourt krufs,

Krete soog "bululaâ\200\235 { (mask dood)
&n â\200\234ona {3 die amaSinyora" en vers.
keie skote, wat met met tuisgemaakte
vunrwapens afgevuur is, is gehoot.

Die Sinyorss - vemnoem na 'n,

bekende liedjis van Brenda Fassie - is volgens dls polisie se onrusversiag 'n misdasdbends.

Hul basis is Richmond Farm, 'n deel van die plakkerkamp te Linde-

lani, wat tot onlangs st deur
Thomas Mandla Shabalaia \::;M
se sentrale komites behoerfs,

Lede van Sinyors geen vervolg word weens die moard op dis voor malige hongerstaker Christy Ntuli. Hulls iz ook genoerd in verklaringa oor die dood van tientalle jong aktiviste in die woonbuurte noord ven Duiban, -

Toe die Sinyoras gister tosgesinan het, het ma's met babas en kinders met kleuters in hulle arms oor die gporivelde van die Ndabazezwe Primary School in die rigting van die

- Enhlachteni-winkel geviug,

Die Sinyores het dis eerste ry huise, nassts asndie plakkerskamp, geplunder. Bk het â\200\230n vur vroedr in dlessifde straat ondeshouds gevosr mat mense wie se hulse Maandag in 'n soonige. lyke sapval beroof en met petrolbomme bestook is.

- Betting Khanyila was basxg o met hasr besittings $\hat{A} \ll \text{potte} = 'a \text{ matras} - \text{en 'n fwes-jatige seuntjle ne}$ hass afgebrande huis terug te trek. Sy most nd die sgnval buite slaap,

Torwyl ong gesels het oor haar vrees vir vaidere aanvalls, hat ons mense in dis verts by Richmond Barm

gien sasumirel $\frac{3}{200}$ dtshulla, "hetMofi¬\201t'n under inwoner van die gebied ges\$, "Dis

* Inkatha, Hulle hou cus die hele tyd

P"ohmmamn van Suid-Afrika en KwaZuly het verbygery, maar geen

; mngungawndmnd:gwm

uitmekaar te jnag nie,

Bk was in $\hat{a}\200\230$ n ander desl van sekuie K om nonderhoud met 'nvroute voe: sot $\hat{a}\200\230$ nafvaardiging wat by die polisiehooflowattier beswaar wil maak cor beweerde betrokkenheld van die

KwaZulu-polisie by Inkatha-geweld toe die sanval plassgevind het.

Huiseienanrs en mans met pangas onder dle srms hst sy-san-sy met corrades, geklos in rokke, voorikiote, en e en gewapen met pangas,

 \hat{a} 200\230messe et stokke, in die pasie gestaan,

Die comrades het later varduide-

lik dat hulle vroueklere gadra het om

te verhinder dat hulle deur die veiligheidemagte en/of vigilantes herken word.

n Township-wldwcrke: vun die Demokratiess Party bet ns my gedrmad en gesd "jy méét die menss help... hulle kry swaar.â\200\235 Ons het weggery orm dia SA Weermag van dis gebeurs in kennis te stel.

Mat cas tapughesr loop ous i blonds polisieman van dis onhussenheid rask,

terwylhy uit 't Casspir met o gewesr

aan ay sy klim, Hy het op sy genmak

dis esen of ander

elvk, "Ja, g&hiows." het hy gesd. "Dis metue van Richmond Fazm val san." : â\200\234Is dasr enige beserings?" het ek

gevea. "Nee," was dis sntwoord, "Hulle

skiet masr vrot, Hnakom vra jy, isjy

begeer?â\200\235 Hiema het ons na die spits van die kopple gery. en polisie-vangwaens van Kwazudy e Suid-Afrilo het dis gabled gepatrollear, Tnworers hat 'n grys semenigabou

teen die oorkantate heuwel san my

uitgewys. V hulie het dis bende hulle daar skuilgehou, Gewapends

o8 vm dic

s kon voor die husis gesien word, Dip Sinyoras het in die rigting van die township gekyk en nie gesien dat ', Casspir venuit die rigting van die plakicsrakamp nader gery het nie. Die Casspirhet by diehosk gedraai, mam het in slle rigtings geha:d.lo skots et In die vallal geklap. 'n Klamp polislemanne het wit die Causpir gebondsl: kitskonstabals in blou

 \hat{a} 00\230ootpakke, manns Ln uniform, burger- \hat{A} 0 -drag =n in kamoefleerdrag.

'n Swart polisieman het sydelings lange dis pad afbewseg met sy geweer voorhom inposisie. 'n Sinyora het uit l)â\200\231 nhulpkk gekom, twes skote gorklet

ggehardloop.

"Uupphnbzï¬\2011" (Hy's blunel), bet die inwoners geskres. Terwyl die polisie bul mlmg'bogin,m inwon-

s af aanwysings
in dis garage", "oorkant

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ die pld en "met die heuwasl op.

Vier Sinyoras et verby ons na die

' Siyande-plakisrskamp gehardloop,

Die hele township was op steaat, al dkteounnde dat die Casspirs most weggaaL.

~-'n Swartman in kambeflesrdrag bet uit die Casepir gespring.

"Waar is hy?" het hy vir 'd groep van 50 comradas wat met pangss en messe gewapen was, gevra. "Duaar,

å\200\234daar, å\200\235 hpthuunguâ\200\234ngcwyldh

lang gras waar 'n man beslg was om

.8y pad ocop te veg na 'n nabutige

woonbuurt.

Hy het rwee keer geskiet. â\200\234"Bophalâ\200\235 (veng bom) het dis jeugdiges hom sangemoedig. Verskele kitskonstabels het met die koppie afgehardioop en die verdagde in hegtenis geneem.

Nog'nman, inâ\200\230ngmmoot?nkmot

~'nstuklap wat agter tithang, 14 op dis

van dis commades nitgevia
Hiulls het iwoness wat die man vitgejon
het, gevrs om stil ta bly sodat die
palise n verrassingsaanval kon ioods,
"Shays" (slsan hom), bet een com-

 ${\rm \hat{a}}\ 200\ 230\ tade$ geskres. Hy is dadelik stilgemask.

- Durbanews

Vrye Weekblad, 19 Junuarie 1990

Ve brebhl 1

a0

INCCVV O

:Death toll

R0

by CARMEL RICKARD MORE than 100 people have died in Natal political conflict during the first 16 days of this year $a\200\224$ an average of more than six a day.

The figures include deaths in the midlands area around Pietermaritzburg and the rural and urban areas around Durban.

At the end of last year unrest monitors predicted the violence would spread from the urban to the rural areas this year, and the fig-

ures bear them out. More than half of those

killed died in rural areas..:
Another alarming trend is that over half of
;hose killed died in mass murders, like the 11

WINESS a3 \
reaches over 100 1n Na

killed in Sweetwaters on Tuesday this week, and the 14 killed last Thursday in Cottonlands. The consistently worst-hit area in Durban is kwaMashuâ\200\231s K Section, where residents are under constant attack from the Sinyoras â\200\224 a gang of thugs formed last April. The Sinyoras charge protection money of

between R10 and R200 a month per house, and

after an attack they leave behind a trail of deaths, injuries, rapes, looting and burnt-down houses.

Residents said yesterday the Sinyoras had infiltrated the squatter areas of Siyanda and Richmond Farm, which adjoin K Section.

Al violence up to January 16

They won the confidence of the local people, and were now inciting the squatters to attack their neighbours in K Section.

One woman said: $\hat{a}\200\234$ We people of K Section

are really in danger from all sides. Children, schools, shops, clinics, churches. No one and nothing is safe. \hat{a} 200\235

The people of K Section feel particularly

angry because they helped the people in the squatter areas when they first arrived, giving them access to schools, water and toilets.

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ What we get is war instead of gratitude, $\hat{a}\200\235$ said one woman whose home has been extensively damaged.

Α

On Monday night after intense 'fighting, many injured K Section residents fled to the local polyclinic for medical attention.

They were chased by the Sinyoras who continued their attack inside the clinic, threatening staff who tried to prevent them killing patients. \hat{a} 200\234In fact they finished off one boy who was lying on the table being stitched, \hat{a} 200\235 a resident said.

Residents praised the SADF and the S.A.P,, saying whenever they were called they came to help. $\hat{a}\200\234$ It is only due to them that some of our houses are still standing, $\hat{a}\200\235$ one resident said.

Nusas urged to

MR Lambson of the University Freedom of
Speech Association asked
the Acting Vice-Chancellor of Wits, Prof Shear.
some pertinent questions
(The Citizen, January 5).
Since I hardly think the
learned professor will
have the courage to respond. allow me to.

As a senior student at the University of Natal (PMB), serving on two faculty councils and editing two students newsletters, surely I would have been involved had Nusas consulted the student body regarding the Freedom Charter? But not once was this brought to our attention. Not that it surprises me since Nusas is not a democratic organisation.

Since enrolling as a student I have been conscripted by Nusas and am forced to pay membership fees $a\200\224$ the amount is not the issue, the principle is.

I and thousands like me are used to swell the number of $a\200\230$ protest votes $a\200\235$

$\qa?s\$ and0<d

without the option of an own opinion. Freedom of speech on campus is tolerated only as long as it agrees with the radical left-wing.

I for one am not prepared to accept the Freedom Charter and I reject Nusas for its undemocratic principles and means of operation (not dissimilar to Communist and Nazi strategies). Isnâ\200\231t it ironic that the supposed intelligentsia of South African society are unable to un-

uestions on

the impending re-

ase of Nelson Mandela and given the fact that he has consistently refused to be released until ANC preconditions have been met, i.e., unban the ANC, release all political prisoners, etc., etc., would it be correct to conclude that this govern-

terpret the signs in Eastern Europe?

To the Nusas exec: Follow the example of the

Communist parties in Eastern Europe. Disband! Re-establish

yourself as a voluntary body and see how unrepresentative you have been. The silent majority on each campus will no longer swell your coffers through apathy.

H J OSCHADLEUS Pietermaritzburg

CoAW2enN

ment has agreed to meet these preconditions and, accordingly, sustained a defeat at the hands of the ANC?

Or is the reverse true in that Mandela and the ANC have dropped their preconditions and that the ANC is ready to negotiate without precondi-

Mandela

tions?

An answer to these questions is vital if the public is to be kept informed of ongoing political events in their country and not, as always, be presented with a fait accompli.

N HARDING : Sandton

THE CITIZEN

CON_I_MENT
" Reactive

WE canâ $\200\231$ t help but feel that the government is reacting to events rather than determining them.

The opening of the beaches came about as a

. response to the beach demos.

With the Christmas holiday season approaching, it was thought better to open all

- the beaches by Presidential decree rather than risk demonstrations on the beaches and heavy handed police invervention.

In the event, the scenes at Durban beaches over the New Year holidays have done the government itself harm.

Protest marches were allowed not because the government had decided this as a matter of deliberate policy. g

They were allowed on the eve of the big Cape Town march because it seemed this demo might result in a massive confrontation, which was to be avoided at all costs.

After that, it was difficult to stop other marches, though a few were banned by chief magistrates in some places.

Mr Walter Sisulu and the ANC leaders were released from prison in a deliberate decision to test the waters ahead of the release of Nelson Mandela.

Receptions to welcome the ex-prisoners were expected, but the holding of a mass ANC rally, against a backdrop of ANC and Communist Party flags, was not.

The law was being flouted, but the government could not intervene, because if it did, its new air of sweet reasonableness would have been shattered.

When there were no serious clashes during marches, the government was relieved. When Mr Sisulu did not do any rabble rousing, the government was pleased.

Yet what was happening was that the ANC was openly mobilising the masses, Mr Sisulu was openly promoting the aims and objectives of the ANC and acting as its internal spokesman, and the ANC was acting as if, de facto, it had been unbanned.

~ Mr Sisulu only needed to get out of the country to show his hand, telling ANC exiles in Lusaka that they had to intensify the political and $a\200\234$ armed struggle $200\235$ and warning countries that supported South Africa that the ANC when it came to power would remember $2200\234\200\234\200\230$ the friends and collaborators of apartheid.

Now the United Democratic Front has caught the government on the wrong foot.

It has $a\200\234$ unbanned $a\200\235$ itself and will be openly politically active.

It is a shrewd move because the government $\operatorname{can\hat{a}}\200\231t$ clamp down on the UDF without its critics saying it is not as reasonable and reformist as it pretends. :

The Minister of Law and Order, Mr Adriaan Vlok, suggests that the UDF was never banned but only restricted, and he invites it to apply for the right to resume its previous activities, and presumably this will be

granted if it does.

If it acts without permission, it may face prosecution.

It is hardly an offer the UDF will accept $a\200\224$ or a warning that will frighten it.

To make matters worse, the Minister of Justice, Mr Kobie Coetsee, rushes to announce the government is to review the position of restricted organisations.;

Which is a signal to the UDF that it will probably be unbanned anyway.

If the government had lifted restrictions on the UDF off its own bat, because the situation no longer requires the UDF to be restricted, the government would have received the credit.

Now, if the UDF is unrestricted, or if it successfully defies the government, this will be trumpeted as another triumph for the radical opposition. ; $_$

We suggest the government should start planning all the things it is inevitably going to have to do and take the initiative in bringing them about.

At the same time the government must consider all the things it $mustn\hat{a}\200\231t$ or $shouldn\hat{a}\200\231t$ do if it is not to lose the initiative, the high ground and the ability to control events. .

It must then stick to these bottom lines and not budge from them whatever pressures there are locally or internationally.

It cannot afford simply to react to events.

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L W
By THE INDEPENDENT Friday 19 January 1990

L ANC ready for talks with Pretoria

THE NATIONAL Executive of the African National Congress, supplemented by its recently released leaders from inside South Africa, has announced that it is working towards a position for negotiations with the South African government, and yesterday debated negotiation proposats drawn up by Nelson Mandela.

Alfred Nzo, General Secretary of the ANC, toid the first mecting of the organisation $\hat{200}$ leaders from inside and outside South Africa: â\200\234Work must begin without delay o prepare our negotiating positort ... If we do not do this we will definitely surrender the initiative to the regime and enable it to impose its own solution . . . We shall also consider what w0 do in the event that the ANC is formally uobanned.â\200\235 Mr Nzo asked if the ANC should then operate $\hat{a}\200\234$ solely as a legal movement, or whether we will continue to maintain some underground units.â\200\235

Mr Nzo also said that the National Executive had received proposais from Mr Mandela, who remains detained in South Africa. According to sources here, the proposals relate to a negotiating Strategy.

On Tuesday Mr Nzo called for

* $\hat{a}\200\234$ an intensification of the armed

struggleâ\200\235, but yesterday, in a marked departure from past polity, Mr Nzo candidly acknowidedged that the movement could not do this. He said: â\200\234We must admit that we do not have the capacity within our country to intensify the armed struggle in any meaningful way."â\200\235

_Thcâ\200\230re'is no louger any doubt

From Johin Mukela

that the ANC and the South African government will shortly enter into talks of some sort. The oaly question now is when and on what terms $\hat{a}\geq00\geq24$ difficult questions for the ANC. Last year the Harare Declaration adopted by the Organtsation of African Unity latd down that there could be no nego-

tiations until certain conditions.

are met. These are that political prisoners are released, people and political partics are unbanned, troops are out of the townships, the state of emergency is lifted, and political trials and executions are stopped.

Many thought Pretoria would never fulfill these conditions but F W de Kledk, the South African President, does 2ppear to be fulfilling some of ther to create the climate for negotiations. There are fears in the movement that if it refuses this chance to meet with Pretoriaâ\200\231s leaders, it will remain in opposition indefinitely.

However, as a liberation movement committed to the overthrow of the apartheid state, the ANCis unused to diplomacy and negotiating. Until Mr Mandefa is released, there is no clear leader. Oliver Tambo, the ANC President, suffered 2 stroke last year and is in a Stockbolm clinic, unlikely to play a major role again, The movement must unify itself by finding places on the National Executive for the recently-released members and others within South Africa, but this cannot be

done while the movement is banned. The leadership issug must be resolved at its conference later this year.

Some members disagree with ncgotiations altogether. Last year there was a lull in guerrilla attacks inside South Africa and many saw this as a gesture of goodwiltl by the ANC. Chris Hani, army commissar of the ANC's military wing, said in Eusaka this weck, however, that the lull was due to logistical problems and oot to a change of strategy, and he promised an increase in military activity

While the movement makes up its mind whea to talk, it must maintain unity and international pressure. Pretoria will try to split the ANC, possibly by unbanaing it but not the South African Communist Party, many of whose members hold senior posts in the ANC. And once talks start the ANC may find it is stuck to the table. Superpower détente, the Soviet Unionâ\200\231s quiet abandoament of militant movements in Africa and the inability of the Frontline states to support armed force against South Africa mean it will be difficult for the ANC to cver go back to war and boyeott. -

While there is optimism about talks begining, there is little evidence that the two sides can agree on a future South Africa, The ANC's Freedom Charter, even with its recent modifications, cannot be reconciled with Pretoriaâ\200\231s five-year plan put forward by the National 'Party in September, which still speaks of group rights and retains aspects of apg_rthcid.

Alfred Nxo, General Secretary of the African Natloaz] Comgress, takes in a question. He met with other ANC ieaders in Lusaka yesterday

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in South Africa

From Jan Raath in Harare and Gayvin Bell In Johannesburg

Mr Alfred Nzo, the secretarygeneral of the African Nat-Jonal Congress. vesterday admitted the organization did not have the capacity within South Africa to intensify its armed struggle.

His admission came afier the South African Government announced that it is reviewing the banning orders on the ANC and the South African Communist Party.

. Mr Nzo was addressing a meeting in Lusaka, Zambia, where Mr Walter Sisulu and seven other ANC veterans, released from prison in South Africa in September, sat with the organization's National Executive Committee, its chief policy-making body, for the first of three days of talks crucial to the ANC's strategy for handling the reforms of President de Kierk and the prospect of the first negotiations with his Government,

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ We must admit that we do not have the capacity within the country to intensify the armed struggle in any meaningful way, \hat{a} \200\235 said Mr Nzo. It was one of several unexpected disclosures made by Mr Nzo, when he opened the meeting in public session. He also announced that Seflor Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, the United Nations Secretary-General, had offered to play a â\200\234leading roleâ $\204$ \$ in negotiations, and that Nelson Mandela, from his imprisonment near Cape Town, had sent proposals for debate tn Lusaka.

It is the first time the ANC bas admitted the limitations of its armed struggle, but it is clear the organization has

been in trouble since last year when the agreement between South Africa and Angola leading to Namibia's independence forced the ANC to withdraw from its military bases in Angola, 8 move that deprived it of ¢lose access into South Africa,

A relentless process of military and psychological pressure by South Africa on ijts neighbours, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Botswana, in recent years had already scaled the other potential entry points for guernllas,

Also this year, sources have confirmed, the ANC lost a vital source of military material as Moscow, in the process of ending its support for costly overseas wars, radically reduced its arms supplied to the movement.

The disclosure is expected to weaken significantly the ANC's position in any-futnme talks, and there was no disguising the ANCâ\200\231s concern over its readiness, or lack of it, for talks with Pretoria,

However, observers say that the significance of the ANC's military front may be dwindling with the internationaliezation of the issuec.

Sefior Pérez de Cuéllar is already armed with the Harare Declaration, a document which was approved by the UN General Assembly last

month and which definitively sets out the conditions and aims of negotiations towards democracy tn South Africa.

Mr Nzo did not reveal the
substance of Mandela's propasals,
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but indicated that the y meeting would be

Mr A:H'red Nza: PaÃ@ii¬\201i¬\201 â\200\230Ã@i¬\201of surprises for ANC leaders,

devoted to crucial practical ities. $\hat{a}\200\234$ We shall have to consider what to do in the event

that the ANC becomes formally unbanned, $\hat{a} \geq 200 \geq 35$ ke said, referring 10 Mr de Klerk's softened approach to the ANC. The mavement would also have to consider $\hat{a} \geq 200 \geq 34$ if we operate as a legal movement or continge {0 maintain an underground unit $\hat{a} \geq 200 \geq 35$,

Mr Nzo said it was vital for the ANC to maintgin the initiative it won with the Hararc Declaration, or else $\hat{a} \geq 00 \geq 34$ we will definitely surrender the initiative and enable it (Pretoria) to impose their will on us".

The South African Government has also invited the
United Democratic Front, &
prominent anti-apariheid orge
anization, to apply for the
removal of restrictions against
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senlor Cabinet ministers yesterday followed an announcement hy tha Frant, the principal surrogate of the ANC, that it would no longer submit to restrictions. Mr Murphy Morobe, a UDF spokesman, said that the organization intended to reopen offices throughout the

country shortly, with a viewto |.

inteneifying it anti apartheid defiance campaign.

Mr Adriaan Viok, the Minister of Law and Order, said in a statement that if the UDF Ielieved its activities were no longer a threat to the public the maintenance of law; order, or the ending of the state of emergency, it was free to apply to him to have the restrictions lifted, and he invited it to do so. But he said that if it violated the restrice tions without permission, it

.could be in contravention of

the emergency regulations.

Mr Kobie Coetsee, the Justice Minister, said the Gova ermmment Wwas reviewing restrictions on all banned organizations. Asked whether

the ANC and the Communists were included, he reiterated it was 2 \hat{a} 200\234comprehensive review" of all organizations.

However, Mr Mohammed Valli, the UDF assistant sece retary-general, said his organization had no intention of applying for the restrictions to be lifted. â\200\2340ur decision {0 operate is not dependent on Mr Vlok's consent, â\200\235 he said,

The UDF {s the most important anti-apartheid alliance still operating in South Africa. It claims more than iwo million members and orchestrates national campaigns in consultation with the ANC leadership in Lusaka,

The abolition of bans and restrictions on anti-apartheid groups is one of the measures wnsisted upon by the ANC and its gllies as a precondition for negotistions on constitutional reforms. Others include liftin the state of emergency an releasing political prisoners.

Dr Denis Worrell, joint leader of the liberal Democratic Party, called on President de Klerk yesterday to accede to the demands when hec opens parliament in Cape Town on February 2. â\200\234We have to grab the imagination, the wonder and respect of the international community very quickly, â\200\235 he said.

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t has been pointed out before that

political progress in this country has frequently been due to the actions of ordinary men and women, or institutions, acting ahead of, or sometimes in defiance of, the law \(\frac{a}{200\224}\) which is thereupon shown up as unworkable and an ass \(\frac{a}{200\224}\) and subsequently changed to accommodate reality. Thus the abandonment of the pass laws and beach apartheid, to quote but two examples.

The great protest marches of last year, starting with that in Cape Town, were undertaken in violation of the emergency regulations. That the De Klerk Government acquiesced in them is to its credit, and the country has already gained the benefits of a considerably improved political climate as a result. One I hopes now that the declared inten-; tion of the UDF to resume its activities despite the emergency curbs, will be responded to by the authori-

Mr F.W. DE KLERK . . . welcomes Ciskei document

ties with similar good sense . \hat{a} 200\234P&.EQ \hat{a} \200\224 \N"N \ddot{a} 201\$ \hat{a} 200\2303 &

ies with similar goo nse. . There is evidence that the restric- ClSkel hands F

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damage at the time they were im-

posed, bringing muc}l aid and com- BISHO $\hat{a}\200\224$ The Ciskei Government yesterday prefort to the sanctions lobby. Let us sented the South African Government with a docupray that the Government will ment setting out the homeland $\hat{a}\200\231$ s thinking on constituterefore do both itself and us the tutional options for a future South Africa.

favour of bringing the de jure situa- Welcoming the State President, Mr F.W. de

: : 25 . Klerk, on an official visit to Bisho, Ciskei President 882 I?Jgr}Ã@??'a\iÃ@tehrttl}]]eaS?af:taeclâ\200\230lto posl Lennox Sebe said the documents contained the de-

- $\hat{\mathbf{A}}^{\, \mathrm{o}}$ tails and motivation in support of the concept of a

| q . A qu Q confederation.

Dr Sebe said Ciskei believed this was the only type of government that adequately served the needs

of southern Africa with its groups of people of different cultures and raccs. He added it 'was not intended to be prescriptive in any way. Ciskei. he said, was eager to participate in the negotiation process.

MrdeKlerk said he welcomed the document and it was time that people who shared the same values in southern Africa stood together putting aside ideological differences and resisting radical influences.

Mr de Klerk added Ciskei had an active role to play in shaping a new southern Africa.

Both leaders agreed that the future political developments in the region had to be based on ongoing consultation between governments.-

Bilateral and multilateral talks with the governments of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei would continue, not only on constitutionas! matters but also on ecoromic development, Mr de Klerk

[said. â\200\224 Sapa.

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- 4 LUSAKA \hat{a} 200\224 The ANC and Mass Democratic
- " Movement will establish .trainin $\ensuremath{\mbox{"}}\ensuremath{\mbox{"}}\ensuremath{\mbox{201spro}}\ensuremath{\mbox{rammes}}$
- in and outside SA to upgrade ski
- alternative futures for unemployed young peo-
- ple, say senior ANC sources here.
- \hat{A} \hat{A} \hat{A} \hat{A} 00\231 .'The sources expressed concern about the . education crisis and the large number of unem-
- loyed youths, which they estimated at about
- two-million. \hat{a} \200\235
- ' They said the ANC conducted a skills survey
- * in SA some time ago.
- ' The surve found there was a dearth of skills in areas such as engineering, mining engineeringf hi-tech, management and administration.
- i The ?rogrammw would attempt to redress some of those skills imbalances.
- " Details of the planned programmes were not \hat{a} \200\230available.

and provide

ANC plans training programmes for youths

> = qo larly in rural areas.â\200\235

CHARLENE SMITH

The sources said business should be a microcosm of the kind of society the ANC wanted.

A senior ANC economics official said the ANC envisaged a mixed econor:&r. However, there were different types of mixed economies.

He said the organisation was opposed to privatisation as it eroded the ability to upgrade services and to implement effective wealth redistribution.

Privatisation served those who could afford to buy shares and those who already controlled a substantial chunk of the economy.

 \hat{A} «We are taking away one part of a monopoly to serve another monopoly.

 $\hat{a}\200\234$ We are talking about huge wealth in the hands of a few, and massive poverty, particu-

The ANC, which met Anglo American executives last weekend, said it was compiling an action programme for businessmen.

Areas identified, of agreement and disagree-

ment, included business communities $a \geq 00 \geq 31$ leverage with government and the fact that they were involved in arms manufacture and the supply of essentials to the police and military.

Whenever there were disagreements with the labour force, the business community called in the police, the senior sources said.

Business paid huge taxes to the government and had taken no position on conscription.

The ANC was also disturbed that businessmen travelled to Lusaka to hold talks with the ANC, but had not done the same with the MDM or Cosatu, the sources said.

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Shall end up with g rotten constijtution, corrupted by attempts to
make it serve ag the instrument of
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Both the government and the ANC

have adopted strategies for negotia-

tion that are destined to end jn frus- many otheg'

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the ANC plans to dominate jt â\200\224to Persuades a police o rto let a

the exclusion of al) lesser parties. family remajy n its $a\200\234$ ulegal $a\200\235$ abode, the South African reality changes. $a\200\234$ White $a\200\235$ suburbs turn $a\200\234$ grey $a\200\235$, and Perhapg $a\200\234$ black $a\200\235$ and old laws fa]) into disuse, discredited by a new reality. Whep the Transvag] Educa-

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Consu'tuti(ms, after al, important to be left to lawyers.

 $\hat{\mathbb{A}} \mathbb{B}$ Ken Owen is the editor of Businesg Day.

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. tary option; otherwise we will soon be back to square one.

Does a working measure of trust exist to make negotiations viable? We must hope so. For it does indeed seem that Mr Mandela is about to leave prison and that the ANC is to be unbanned. If this were not about to happen, Mr de Klerk would be reckless and foolhardy indeed to have raised such expectations.

For the moment the ANC â\200\234armed struggleâ\200\235 is continuing at a scaled-down level of intensity (with hand grenade attacks on policemen and their families rather than car bombs aimed at civilians outside rugby stadiums or supermarkets). Whatever the level of intensity, ANC violence—will have to stop. A tacit or explicit truce or suspension of violence will be essential in any unbanning or lift—ing of the state of emergency.

On the assumption that this does come to pass in the next month or so, 1990 will be a momentous year. South Africa and the sub-continent will break out of a vicious cycle of violence into an era of negotiations. No matter how long it takes, negotiation as the new South African way of life will be infinitely preferable to what has gone before. ¢ Gerald Shaw is associate editor and political columnist of the Cape Times.