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TOM LODGE

State Of exile: the African
National Congress of South
Africa, 1976_86

The environment of exile politics is usually viewed as hazardous. sterile, corrosive and demoralising. Political groups which are forced out of their domestic terrain are understood to be especially 'vulnerable': loneliness. frustration, inactivity, hardship and insecurity generate ideological dissent, personality conflicts. and escapist delusions. Exile politicians are forced into a dependent relationship with their hosts and patrons, whose hospitality and generosity may be conditional and subject to capricious change. Survival and success in such an environment may depend on skills and talents quite different from those developed in the history of the movement before its departure from home. It can require ideological innovation which risk distancing it from its original social constituency. Exile is usually perceived as an experience which is inherently detrimental and problematic.

The understanding of exile as a term of trial for political organisations has been consolidated by the study of movements which have been especially badly affected by their displacement.' Outstanding in the studies of African exile politics is John Muriim's work based on the history of Angolan nationalist organisations.² Marcum's analysis of the difficulties of exile has influenced many other academic commentaries.³ Those historians of exile movements which have prospered or flourished have understood their success as being achieved despite the pitfalls of exile, usually as the result of the reinsertion of leadership and followers back within their native territory.⁴

' See. for example. Sheridan Johns. Obstacles to guerrilla warfare: a South Africa case study.

Journal of Modern African Studies. 11(2) 1974; Kenneth Grundy. Guerrilla Struggle in Africa

New York: Grossmann, 1971; Richard Gibson. African Liberation Movements. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1971.

² John Marcum. 'The exile condition and revolutionary effectiveness in Southern African liberation

movements'. in Christian Pothulm and Richard Dale (eds). Southern Africa in Perspective. New

York: Free Press. 1979; John Marcum. The Angolan Revolution: Volume II: Exile Politics and

Guerrilla Warfare, Cambridge. Mass: MIT Press. 1978.

³ Including my own. See my analysis on the exile Pan-Africanist Congress in Tom Lodge. Black

Politics in South Africa since 1945. London: Longman. 1983. pp 305-17.

⁴ For this perspective see: Barry Munslow. Mozambique: The Revolution and its Origins. London:

Longman, 1983; Basil Davidson. In the Eye of the Storm. London: Longman. 1972.

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The approach in this article is rather different. Here the subject is an organisation whose bureaucracy structures, and disciplined following exists outside its country of origin yet which has not only survived exile but has, it will be argued, been strengthened by the experience. The African National Congress has been an exile body for over two decades; Its survival during the first phase of exile during which it was unable to initiate any significant political or military activity within South Africa has been described in an earlier essay by this author.⁵ Our concern here will be with its development in the post-1976 phase, in the ten years since the political awakening inside South Africa represented by the Soweto uprising. The ANC's activities inside the country since 1976 will not be detailed here. They lie outside the focus of this article which is with the ANC's external presence and functions. It is sufficient to state that accompanying the development of the exile movement over the last ten years and contributing very significantly to its buoyant morale and diplomatic impact has been the revival of an internal guerrilla insurgency. The guerrilla warfare, though still at a very modest level, has been steadily increasing its scope and effectiveness in quite exceptionally difficult circumstances. Tables 1 and 2 provide an indication of the present character of guerrilla activity. The insurgent campaign has succeeded in re-establishing the ANC as the predominant force in black South African politics even if its support is still mainly in the form of ideological inclination and emotional sentiment rather than organised membership.⁶

The apparent self-confidence and vitality of the ANC exiles at present is certainly partly attributable to the ANC's success in re-establishing a presence within the townships of South Africa. But, this article contends, this is not the whole story. The terrain of exile is not wholly disadvantageous for the development of a political movement. It can provide protection, security, powerful forms of external support, factors and conditions which facilitate the development of a form and

5 Lodge. Black Politics . . . pp 296-304.

" For details of the urban guerrilla campaign from 1977 to date: Tom Lodge, 'The African National Congress in South Africa. 1976-1983: guerrilla war and armed propaganda' journal of

Cnnlcmpnrary African Studies (Pretoria) 3111-2) 1983-4. pp 153411): Tom Lodge. The ANC in 1982'. in South African Research Service. The South African Review I. Johannesburg: Ravzm

1984zTom Lodge. 'The ANCin 19R\$KSrthAfrimn Revimvll. Johannesburg: annn. 1984z'1'om
Lodge. tMnyehlomcl-Lcl us go to war!: from Nkomati to Knhwe. the ANC.J11nll.'ll'y 1984-.1
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1985', Smith African Review III. Johannesburg: Ravun. 1985: Tom Lodge. 'The Second Consultative Conference 01' the ANC'. South Afrim Inlrrnalimml (Jnlumneslnlrg) 16(2). OCI UhCI'

1985. pp 1111-97; Tmn Lodge. 'The ANC. Kahwe :Ind nltcr'. International Affairs llullrlin
l'Jnhunneslmrg) 11112). September 1986.

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Table 1: Guerrilla activity, 1985-1986

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1.1111 1985 1 Jan 1986
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31 Dec 1985 311 Jun 1986

Attacks on police or police facilities;

police/Umkhonto clashes: . . 23 50

Attacks on SADF personnel or buildings: 6 0

Attacks on homeland politicians,

community councillors. and other

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individuals: ' 22

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Landmine explosions: 6 11

Limpet mine attacks on economic

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infrastructure (mainly Escom substations): 9 26
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Limpet mine attacks on railway

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facilities: 2 3
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Limpet mine attacks or bombings on

commercial premises used by

civilians during business hours: 1 4

Limpet mine or bomb attacks in

or Otitside hotels or restaurants

during business hours: () 4

Gunfire attacks on commercial
 premises during business hours: 0 1
 Grenades thrown in crowded business
 districts: 1 0
 Limpets in central business districts
 out 01 business hours: 15 3
 Limpets in or outside recreational '
 facilities out of hours: 2
 Attacks on government or public
 buildings: 1 ()
 Others/unsQecified 0 5
 TOTAL ' 88 1 18

Source: Both Tables 1 and 2 are compiled by the author from statistics based upon press
 reports, official statements and events mentioned in political trials. The figures may be
 slightly conservative because 01 government suppression of Information.
 quality of organisation unattainable in the precarious circumstances of
 opposition politics within the homeland.

What follows is a sketch of the bureaucracy which the ANC has created
 in a foreign environment. After examining the workings and functions

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Table 2: African National Congress guerrilla activity 1977-86

Incidents

1977 23

1978 30

1979 13

1980 19

1981 55

1982 39

1983 5(2 .

1984 1 44' I

1985 136 . .1

1986 (to 30 June) ' 118

01 different sections 01 the ANC's organisation. the article will discuss in turn ANC diplomacy. the character 01 the ANCis leadership, and the recent development of ideology. We will conclude with an assessment 01 the political implications of the ANCis experience and formation during its period of exile.

The ANCis political and bureaucratic organisation is elaborate and extensive. At the summit of the movement is a thirty-member National Executive Committee (NEC) elected and enlarged at the 1985 Kahwe Consultative Conference. The NEC had last been elected at a similar meeting in 1969, its membership augmented through co-option rather than election from an original group of nine to the twenty-two members on the eve of last years selections. At Kahwe it was decided that consultative conferences should be held at five-year intervals and elections should accompany them. With many of its office-holders located in different countries, the NEC meets infrequently and everyday decisions are in the hands 01 a smaller Working Committee based in Lusaka and chaired by Oliver Tambo, or in his absence the Secretary-General, Alfred Nzo. NEC policy decisions are put into operation by two committees, responsible respectively for political (including trade union) and military activity within South Africa. A coordinating body supervises the work 01 these committees. All are subject to the authority of the NEC and were established in 1983 to replace the Revolutionary Council which from 1969 had had the task of directing operations inside the Republic. In 1983 the Military Committee was chaired by Joe Modise Commander In-Chief of Umkhonto we Sizwe the ANCS military wing. while the first chairman of the Political

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Committee was John Nkacimeng. General Secretary of the South African Congress 01 Trade Unions (SACTU).7

A secretariat. based in Lusaka since the early 1970s. employs thirty people in three sections. a president's office. a treasury. and a division for external affairs. The external affairs section administers the ANCis diplomatic offices and representatives. a network which today comprises twenty-two countries, as well as the cultural. educational. and health facilities which the ANC provides for its members. These include a complex 01 schools in Morogoro. southern Tanzania. The Presidents Office oversees the ANC's military establishment as well as its Information and Publicity Department. Parallel though simpler structures exist for the Youth and Women's Sections as well as SACIU which has its headquarters in Lusaka. Altogether 300 ANC people and their departments are concentrated in Lusaka. Their departments include the eighty-man workforce on Chongella Estates. an old tobacco farm bought for the ANC by a Swedish development agency on which is grown much of the bureaucracy's requirements (as well as crops for sale). Its 1,000 cattle graze peacefully in fields adjacent to a ranch owned by Anglo American.9 The ANC also runs a nursery school for children of people at the Lusaka headquarters. It provides food. health care. and a uniform 14 kwacha a month pocket money to all its members.

Estimates of the numbers of people involved in the exile movement vary. In particular observers disagree about the size 01 the army.

' Umkhonto we Sizwe. Howard Barrell, a London-based journalist whose writing is usually informed by ANC sources, suggested in a recent report that Umkhonto forces numbered 10,000 01 which only 400 or so were operating inside South Africa." American intelligence estimates are

similar, though they have a larger number as operational.11 South African sources are more conservative. the Pretoria Institute of Strategic Studies assessing ANC strength at between two and four thousand.'2 In 1980 Steve Davis. an American scholar drawing upon interviews with ANC people argued that the total ANC establishment numbered 9,000 of which 5,400 were military personnel (200-300 inside 7 South Africa: People' swar now .MII'CII N(III August 1983. pp 21-221110use nfCtImInnns. Foreign AIlairsCommittec.Minutes.290ctnber1985 TlIc SiIIImInIIiII SnIIIlIA/rira. testimon Y of Oliver Tambo p 1. :Souwan (Johannesburg). 12 February 1986. iIII'd. "' ll'cckl) MailHohanncsburg).18.1IIly 1986. p 8. 'Ciled In The Sunday S'Im (Jnhanneshmg).19JlInuar) 1986. ibitl. 'I

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South Africa) and the rest administrative or educational.'3 ANC sources claim Umkhonto recruitment has increased very dramatically since September 1984 as an effect of the exodus of refugees from South Africa. In May 1984 the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) distributed funds through the ANC for about 9.000 South African refugees.'5 so the higher estimates of ANC strength appear quite reasonable. Umkhonto we Sizwe is clearly the largest structure within the exile organisation and it seems sensible to begin any survey of the ANC's bureaucracy with an examination of Umkhonto's essential characteristics. _

For the majority of the men and women who join the ANC's external organisation, joining the ANC means joining an army. Much of this army is accommodated in five training camps run by the ANC in Angola. two near Luanda, and the others in the north and north-east. Umkh'onto recruits have been trained in Angola since 1977, before then most of the ANCS military instruction was conducted in Tanzania." Umkhonto guerrillas often spend two years in Angola and a chosen elite supplement their basic training with advanced courses in the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic.

From the testimony of state witnesses and defectors at political trials a fairly coherent picture of the contents of the military training programme has emerged. ANC recruits 'join the organisation in territories neighbouring South Africa-most frequently Botswana or Swaziland-and after a screening process which is intended to weed out police agents they are offered the choice of immediate military instruction or the completion of their academic education.'7 Only in 1985, at the Kabwe Conference, was experience of the military camps made compulsory for all ANC members. Prospective guerrillas after their U Stephen Davis. *Smxon of War: Inxurgncy in South Africa*. 19774980. Medford. Mass: Fletc her

School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. 1982. p 207.

" Howard Barrett. *TExiles swell ANC ranks'*. March 1986. Barrell cites reliable estimates of 7.000

for the size of the Umkhonto trained forces before the exodus. ,.

'5 *Capr Times* (Cape Town). It May 1984. Not all recipients of UNHCR funds though the ANC need

necessarily be ANC recruits. The statistic merely provides an indication of the scale of the refugee

community. In 1986 the UNHCR provided 3 10 million to the ANC to take care of displaced people'

(Steve Mufson. *New Republic*. August 1986. p 22).

" Sec John D Nelson. *Some External Aspects of Internal C(mjlr! Within South Africa*, PhD dissertation. George Washington University. 1975. p 193. Umkhntds Tanzanian camp today accommodates only trained men.

'7 Captured ANC activists as well as defectors sometimes claim that they were lured in to joining

the ANC with promises of scholarships and then compelled to join Umkhonto. Such allegations

have become less common: this may reflect ANC recruiting successes and the wider acceptance by

black South Africans of the legitimacy of political violence.

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induction into the organisation and a few educational sessions concerning ideological essentials. are given from Lusaka where they are placed in a reception camp. Here they receive introductory lessons in South African history and politics, lectures on explosives, map reading, and military tactics. as well as physical drilling and exercise sessions. Weapon handling begins in a second camp; recruits are taught to handle automatic rifles. RPG 7 rocket launchers. hand-grenades. as well as the light weaponry employed by the South African Defence Force. The instruction is usually supervised by Cuhansm and its quality is excellent. according to South African police sources. W The trainees learn how to use explosives and deploy them in sabotage. they are taught the principles of clandestine organisation and communications. and they are instructed in guerrilla tactics as well as the military techniques employed in more conventional forms of warfare. The range of weaponry and equipment to which trainees are introduced is much

wider than the variety actually used by Umkhonto in South Africa; apart from theoretical classes in the operation of heavy artillery, the 'Angolan trainees programme has included lessons on the use of land-mines since 1977 (eight years before such devices were introduced into South Africa) as well as radio communications. After the completion of basic guerrilla training Umkhonto members are given more specialised courses. sometimes in a different camp: different programmes are arranged for rural and urban warfare. some people receive special training in ordnance and logistical support, and others (especially women) graduate as couriers. The more proficient are sent to Europe. often to the Ukraine in the Soviet Union where they learn to handle more complicated weaponry: Grad P rocket launchers, anti-tank weapons, mortars, and heavy machine guns weapons which require a team to operate them and which are usually associated with mobile or conventional warfare rather than small-scale

' " According to one ANC defector. nine Cuhans Were present at ("1C camp which otherwise had an ANC complement of 450. Testimony of Jeffrey Boshigo to the Subcommittee (on Security and Terrorism of the United States Senate, 24 March 1982. mimeo (henceforth. Demon Committee in hearings). . . .

m See for example statement by Lieutenant-Colonel Jack Buchner. Cited in TlirSiar: 13 May 1982.

t Boshigo testimony. op. cit. Danton Committee hearings. According to Ephraim Mfalapitsa. another witness in the Demon Committee hearings. the Umkhonto command intended to initiate a rural land mine offensive based from Botswana as early as 1981. Mfalapitsa's m m

M flfectinn apparently thwarted this, '

t The vast majority of Umkhonto cadres who have been tried in South African courts have been men but recent trials suggest the pattern is changing.

" First used by the am in South Africa in an attack on Vourtrekkcnhmigte military base near Pretoria in 1981.

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guerrilla operations. In the USSR they learn more sophisticated sabotage techniques as well as interrupting the curriculum with cultural excursions to collective farms, schools and factories; Fully trained guerrillas are either absorbed straight away into operational duties or they are placed in holding camps and subjected to refresher courses. Only a small proportion of trainees at any one time are involved in combat in South Africa. As yet it is a small-scale war; since the beginning of 1980 to mid-1986 the number of attacks carried out by Umkhonto totals less than five hundred. If each of these attacks was carried out by a different Umkhonto unit (which is not the case) then at most two to three thousand Umkhonto people would by 1986 have had field experience-a minor proportion of their numbers. How are the rest deployed? Placing large numbers of men in holding camps for long periods of inactivity is an almost certain recipe for low morale and indiscipline. Reports of demoralisation and mutiny in ANC camps have been infrequent since 1977. The year of resumption of guerrilla operations, It is likely that a proportion of trained guerrillas are used in the logistical support given to combat units-Umkhonto is organised on the basis of a very compartmentalised division of labour.²⁵ The camps themselves require staffing and defending-Cubans and other non-South Africans provide technical expertise but much of the direct instruction in all branches of the programme is given by Umkhonto members. Other ANC facilities require defending, especially in frontline states. The training camps are supposed to provide their own food and each camp maintains a farm.²⁶ Then there is the possibility that those 1' The numbers involved in Soviet and Eastern European training are quite large. Boshigo's group numbered sixty altogether and short training periods in Europe are a fairly common factor in the experiences of guerrillas who are later captured and put on trial in South Africa. For a general description of Soviet training facilities based on trial testimony see The Star. 17 May 1934. 24 Camp mutinies in Tanzania and Angola were reported in 1984 and 1985 (The Star. 18 March 1985 and Ram! Daily Mail. 23 April 1984) the one a reaction to the Nkomztti Accord set-back h)" guerrillas impatient for action and the other related to dissatisfaction with living conditions. That there were reasons for rank-and-file dissatisfaction was obliquely acknowledged by Oliver Tambo ('We are a force. Scchaba. October 1984). However if discontent and tension was an endemic problem it would have been more apparent at the Knbwe conference otherwise no w have quite a detailed picture. No reports suggest camp demoralisation on the scale which existed in the 1960s (see The Star. 'Big Troubles in ANC guerrilla camps'. 22 December 1968) and which came to a head at the 1969 Morogoro Conference (for reference to tensions at the Morogoro Conference see Joe Slovo in The African Communist (95). 1983). 25 See Davis. op. cit. p 36R. As well as divisions with specialised military functions-ordinance. rural guerrilla activity. sabotage-different groups are assigned to financial. transport. and other administrative operations. 26 The Financial Mail (Johannesburg) of 8 June 1984 reported the camps as agriculturally self-sufficient. Poor food has in the past been the most frequent source of morale and disciplinary problems. In 1967-9 Zamhizm-based diplomats claimed that Umkhonto units in local ANC camps conducted 'food raids' in the surrounding countryside (Nelsons p 201).

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guerrillas not involved in the South African theatre may be engaged alongside MPLA troops fighting UNITA forces in Angola itself. Both UNITA spokesmen and ANC defectors have alleged that the ANC plays a role in the Angolan conflict.²⁷ It would not be the first time Umkhonto soldiers have fought on foreign soil; ANC units participated in joint offensives with ZAPU in 1967-68 and again in 1978-80.²⁸ With the exception of those who go to Europe the direct influence on them of their East European and Cuban instructors is confined to technical matters. Paralleling the military training is an extensive

academic programme with a heavy emphasis on South African history, political economy, and philosophy. The teaching is by South Africans. in the early stages of the development of the camps by eminent leaders of the ANC and the South African Communist Party (SACP). later on administered by the hierarchy of political commissars who provide a second element in the command structure of the camps from platoon level upwards. The academic programme includes courses on the history of South African resistance. ANC ideological principles. especially those associated with the Freedom Charter, the analysis of the South African economy, and the basic essentials of Marxism-Leninism. Some of the political education was reportedly a cause of dissatisfaction among recruits for it reflected the ideology of a left-wing leadership which had emerged ascendent within the ANC (during the 1950s and 1960s and which was out of step with the intellectual background of recruits influenced by the Black Consciousness of the early 1970s.²⁹ This does not seem to have been an enduring problem probably because of the shift in black political culture within South Africa since 1976. Considering the location of the camps the sources of externally supplied training and resources available to Umkhonto, and the strong association of the SACP with the Umkhonto hierarchy from its inception in 1961, it would not be surprising if the camps were an important source of a radicalising impulse within the ANC as a whole. Umkhonto operations and logistics are directed and administered through Botswana and other territories adjacent to South Africa. but

:7 Testimony of Elizabeth Matube in *Jan v5. Siplm Dinda*. 19 August 1985. UNtTA claims vary.

Savitnbi has suggested that the ANC has several thousand soldiers committed to :Inti-ttNt 'tA

Operations (*The Cilizcit* (Johannesburg) 7 May 1986). A UNITA brigadier was more conservative.

claiming the ANC to have deployed three battalions. 600 men. alongside mrm forces (Thrcitiu'n. 20 May NM). .

References to joint ZAPU-ANC operations. 1978-80: *The Washington Post*. 3 January 1981: The he

5H". 12 April 1984: Mfalutpitsu testimony. Denton Committee hearings, At the end of the y Zimbabwean conflict Illtt ANC guerrillas reported to guerrilla reception points.

' " See Davis. *up. riI.. pp IHZ-9*.

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the vulnerability of these countries and their governments attitudes to Umkhonto rules out the development of large military bases by the ANC- within their borders.³⁰ Umkhonto's command structure was. until the 1984 Nkomati accord. largely located in Maputo³¹ but that is no longer possible and leading Umkhonto officers seem to work for most of the time in Lusaka or in Angola. Political and military leadership within the ANC is closely intertwined, the three most senior Umkhonto officers are all members of the NEC, and at least a third of NEC members have military experience.³²

Umkhonto is a bureaucratically complicated technically. sophisticated, and operationally effective organisation. Its training programme produces highly motivated and militarily accomplished combatants whose quality has been proven in the progress Umkhonto has made in developing an insurgent campaign inside the Republic.³³ It is still, though, largely an exile army-only quite recently has its organisational structure within South Africa advanced beyond individual and mutually isolated cells or units.³⁴ Despite a formal commitment to democratic principles reflected in the absence of privileges associated with rank as well as periodic attempts by military , and political leaders to make themselves personally accessible to rank 3" Neither the Zimbabweans nor the Botswana authorities are prepared to tolerate any military linked activity by the ANC. The transport of guerrillas and arms across their territories 'has to be clandestine. The Swazis are openly hostile to the ANC.

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document which he claimed to be an official agreement between the Mozambique government and Umkhonto representatives. in return for Mozambican provision of field equipment. transport has areas and houses. the M16 would hit targets of strategic significance to the

Mozambican economy. There is no evidence that such plans were ever implemented and whatever help the Mozambican government provided came to an end in April 1984 (Scope (Durban) 18 March 1983). It does seem likely that Maputo was an important operational centre for Umkhonto. ANC and SACP publications have conceded that among the casualties of the SA DF

raid on ANC houses in Matola were several experienced Umkhonto officers. (See for example profile 01 Motso Mokgahudi in Unuebenzi 2(1) 1986).

The three leading Umkhonto Officers are Joe Modise. Commander in Chief. Thembu Chris Hani. Political Commissar. and Joe Slovo, Chief of Staff.

The training seems to be weakest in educating prospective combatants in the techniques of clandestine operation. A significant number of Umkhonto cadres have been arrested in South

Africa as a result of their own indiscretions. Careless driving is one especial cause for them

attracting police attention. On the other hand the fact that Umkhonto units are able to survive in

the field undetected for increasingly lengthy periods suggests that this may not be a universal problem.

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Several trials have suggested that a command structure located within South Africa's borders

the activities of different groups of units. South African police were prepared to concede this at

the beginning of 1986 (The Citizen. 18 March 1986)

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In 1982 a Mozambican intelligence official detected to South Africa bringing with him 3 Since mid-1984 Umkhonto units have been recruiting and training activists within the country. 'ryz. '

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and file. the organisation is hierarchical.³⁵ elitist.³⁶ and disciplined.³⁷

This is in keeping with its East European models of external military inspiration and is also appropriate with a military organisation whose leaders conceive its future development as advancing through increasingly sophisticated phases of warfare. South Africa is a modern

industrial state; the armed force which seeks to overcome its defences requires a matching bureaucratic and technological quality and this is difficult to reconcile with prerequisites of democracy.

The second largest wing of the ANC's organisation also provides a haven for a substantial number of its youthful recruits. The ANC's educational establishment is situated in Morogoro, the isolated area in south-eastern Tanzania where the organisation used to have its guerrilla training camps. The need for the ANC to provide secondary schooling for its adherents became especially pressing in the wake of the Soweto riots when it began receiving large numbers of refugee school children. A school was first established in a few farm buildings on a 600 acre site in Mazimba, Morogoro, the land being donated by the Tanzanian government in 1977.³⁸ The following year the ANC created a Department of Education and Culture, a complex pyramid of committees which

35 All reports suggest that the spartan regime of the training camps is shared by everybody within

them. Promotion within the Umkhonto hierarchy seems to be the reward of combat experience and quite high-ranking Umkhonto officers continue to be deployed in the field. Most defectors'

accounts do not claim that a hierarchy of privilege exists within the ANC.

3" Within Umkhonto there are elite combat units, such as the Special Operations Unit (see Thr'

Weekly Mail, 11 April 1986; The Citizen, 22 May 1986; R Kasrils in Seelmln, May 198(1). (ts we

have seen. Umkhonto training is graded according to ability and potential of trainees.

and the graduates of Angolan camps are regarded overall by the ANC leadership as the officer

corps of a future people's army. "We have to bear in mind the fact that the comrades we are

training outside constitute the core of our army. They are the organisers and the leaders of the

mass army that we have to build inside the country. They are our officer corps. we cannot deploy

them forever as combat units. They are our officer corps. For obvious reasons, no army in the

world fights with combat units composed of officers'. Documents of live Seminar! National Consultative Conference of the African National Congress, Zambia, 16-23 June 1985. Zambia /

London: ANC, p 35.

Police sources claim a harsh disciplinary system prevails which includes a prison camp in Quatro, Angola (The Star, 17 May 1984). Such reports should be treated with reserves. Nevertheless changes instituted at the Kabwe conference may have been prompted by resentment of the disciplinary regime in the camps. One of the two former members who failed to be re-elected was Andrew Maseko, National Political Commissar and Head of Security. The conference established a grievance procedure to act as a check on abuse of leadership authority. On the more positive side Umkhonto discipline had the effect of restraining units in the field from attacking civilian targets at the end of 1985. It is not clear

Whether the recent series of attacks on shopping arcades and commercial premises is the effect of

a breakdown in discipline or rather, as Howard Batrell has argued (Weekly Mail, 18 July 1986).

the result of units in the field being given greater tactical autonomy.

Seelmln, August 1987; The Independent (1-1987), 4 September 1985.

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linked leading office-bearers in the ANC, SACTU. Youth and Women's sections to the administration 01 the schgolxw Starting With fifty students. by the end 011980 student enrolment had increased to 'neaily 200 taught by twenty teachers. An elaborate building programme began in 1980 and three years later 1,000 pupils were accommodated at Mazimba. Numbers seem to have stabilised since then; today the ANC community at Mazimba totals about 1.500 including teachers. administrative staff and infants and primary school ehildreth" As well as the secondary school. the Solomon Maglangu Freedom College (SOMAFCO), the complex houses the Charlotte Maxeke Child Care Centref' a creche, a hospital and a maternity home. three small factories which supply furniture, clothing and food. a photographic laboratory, and 800 hectares of farmland which make Mazimba self-sufficient in maize. sorghum, and beans. The farm is the nucleus of an ambitious project .to establish a 5,000-strong community accommodated in ten villages supported through industrial workshops. agriculture and ranching. SOMAFCO itself has well-equipped classrooms. a library, and several dormitory buildings. The planning and construction 01 the buildings were executed by ANC members but the finance for the facilities came from outside. The single most important donors have been Swedish, both private and governmental.- though Dutch anti-apartheid organisations, and UN agencies have given substantial support as well. In 1982 SOMAFCO'S budget alone amounted to \$5.5 million.⁴² As well as externally derived financial support the ANC has also begun to appeal for volunteer teachers; certain Labour Party-controlled local education authorities in Britain recently announced plans to recruit and pay British teachers to work at Mazitnba.⁴³

Apart from the normal concerns of education itsw. the teaching staflat Mazimba have two particular preoccupations. First, there-is the object 01 providing the ANC community with the vocational skills required for government. In the words 01 SOMAFCO's principal, Comrade Njobe: We are thinking of educating to take over a country which is highly developed and therefore in our curriculum we stretch over ordinary academic subjects -"'' ibirl. .

4" tA people's etlucalion'. SASPU National (Braamhmtain). April 1986.

1' .Childcarc: Imperative for our future'. Srirtulm. November 1982.

J: Inlcrnnlimml It/(WUld TriImm' (Paris). 12 September 1985.

J" The nulhnritics concerned were those of Brent. 1-laringcy and II.IZA. The help is all the Axes

request. The Star. 23 Nnvcmbcr 1985.

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t0 skills in the vocatitmal and technical fieltls-commercial skills.
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secretarial skills. and all skills along those llllCS.

Secondly the curriculum itself and the way in which the school is administered is calculated to strengthen the in llttence Of certain political and social principles. So. for example. considerable emphasis is placed on bridging the gap between mental and manual labouf-tcachers and students spend several hours each week working on the farm. As far as is possible the school stresses material self-sufficiency. Amongst the various subjects taught is a course. on the llevelopment of society. Corporal punishment is prohibited. Student representatives participate in the deliberations of the School Administrative Committee.^{J5} Students run the hostels and also contribute. to disciplinary decisions. To quote Njobe again: lWe are teaching to destroy all tendencies towards stratification of societies into exploiting classes. We would like to create a school 01e011lrades1lip14"

The ideas are of course very similar to those which are orthodox within the educational system 01 the ANC's host. and major benefactor, Tanzania. Over the seven years of the centre's existence donors have clearly remaihed impressed. 101' the ANC has apparently gained a reputation for thonest and competent use 01 resources'.⁴⁷ Scandinavian aid, which is principally directed at the ANC's educational projects. has increased rapidly; nearly \$12 million was received by the ANC from Norway and Sweden in the course of 1985.⁴⁸ Twenty million dollars is expected this year from these sourcesw

The ANC,S resources do not stretch to tertiary education. In 1983 it was estimatedS" that 'about 1.500 ANC members were being trained in

British, European and American universities. This represents an impressive proportion of the total membership of the exile organisation. There are sizeable groups of students attending institutions in the Netherlands, East Germany, and the USA. Communist countries seem to have been especially significant in supplying technical skills to the organisation: agriculturists, paramedical workers, and engineers. The wide variety of higher educational systems experienced by people destined to occupy senior positions within the movement is likely to

interview with Njnb'. Scrlmlm. February 1980.

l; . Sjtsru N(Ilt'mtlll. April 1986.

n b.t'rnhrl. February 1980.

h S.ASr-U National. April 1986. .

w (Ittrrlmlimml Hrrulfl Tribune. 17 August 1985.

m Ihl(l._ 12 September 1985.

t Financial Mail (jolumncshurg). 8 June 1981. citing: Davis in Harper's. December 1983.

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ensure that it remains subject to eclectic intellectual influences. Regional educational committees in different parts of the world where there are concentrations of ANC students do provide one means of regulating the ideological predisposition of the student diaspora. Within the facilities at Mazitnba this is the task of political commisszirs appointed to the governing committees. --

From 1977 the ANC has become predominantly an organisation of young men and women surmounted by senior echelons of soldiers and bureaucrats whose exile had in many cases preceded the births of their new followers. The townships exodus in the couple of years following the Soweto uprising brought to the ANC a mass of vigorous recruits whose intellectual development had been unaffected by the ideological tradition represented by the older ANC leaders. Davis, writing in 1981. refers to the tneo-Africzismi of the post-1976 recruits and their impatience with the heavy emphasis on class analysis in the education received in the catnps.5' In 1980 the victory OfZANU in the Zimbabwean C/zimurcnga was rumoured to have reinforced the questioning within rank and file of the ANC's customary political alignments.52 Xan Smiley, writing in The Times (London) in June 1983, reported that the ANC was contemplating a restoration of la more traditional black African image.53 In the same year Tom Karis, an authoritative analyst of the ANCi suggested that the abolition of the Revolutionary Council and its replacement with committees more directly subject to the NEC may have been intended to emphasise the pre-eminence of Africans in the organisation.54 In the case of the ANC'S African leaders, their manner and bearing as diplomats, and increasingly, statesmen, conflicted with the sartorial expectations of the teenage graduates of Soweto street battles. Oliver' Tambo, an essentially unpretentious man, is not in the habit 01" donning combat fatigues on public occasions, and this has allegedly been a source of some grumbling among ANC student communities.55

Administrative measures such as the provision of educational programmes or a political commissariatc can help tozbridge the gulf between different generations and echelons of ANC membership,--but 5' Davis. Op. (iL. pp 182-9.

5: ilml.. p182.

53 'A new and bloodier image for the ANtT. TIIC Times. 27 June 1983.

5' T Karis. tRcvolution in the making: hlaek politics in South Africa'. Foreign Affairs. Winter 1983/11) 395.

55 Testimony 0! Elizabeth Matuhc. 5mm I'J'. Sip/m Hindu. 1985. This (leietor's claim has been

corroborated by similar complaints from intormunts of the author who remain loyal to the AV(.

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they can only be part of the solution. Since 1981. which the ANC designated as the Wear of the Youth'. a conscious effort has been put into fostering an ideological base for young people. The Youth Section was rc-invigorated at a special conference in Mazimba in 1982 under the leadership 01 Umkhonto cadres. The predominantly military role you ng people play inside the ANC was a theme which influenced much of the discussion:

. . . ANC youth have to fully come to terms with the fact that we nre at war inside South Africa and we are not just here outside the country . . . It zitso means that membership of Umkhonto we Sizwe is not only for those who are tless educatcd'-intellectuals are needed in the field of bank. We are not talking about the lbattle of ideas' but the actual armed confrontation. We need engineers. scientists, technicians etc-in the past we tended to concentrate 0:: social sciences but now there is a shift in our ranks towards natural scrences: T The fifteen-man Youth Secretariat is apparently composed of men and women said to be tsteeped in conspiracy and tclandestine methoclsi with a reputation for fearlessness earning for them a good deal of respect from the older leaders'.57 By the mid-19605, though. the young lions' had left lne0-Afrieanism' a long way behind them: many of their leaders were said to have joined the Communist Party as well as the ANC58 and an extensive process of discussion and debate preceded the election at Kabwe of the ANC's first lnon-raciall National Executives" Since 1980,

of course, the ANC's youthful intake is being shaped by a popular political culture in which Black Consciousness is no longer pre-eminent. In South Africa the most powerful influences are being supplied by the burgeoning trade union movement, as well as the massive federation of local community and youth organisations led by the United Democratic Front. The UDF has itself been radicalised since its inception partly as a result of the absorption into its leadership structures of the men from Robben Island, the pioneers of the first Umkhonto guerrilla offensive of 1961-5. Today the ANC's ideas and iconography are intrinsic to South African black teenage sub-culture; and ideological disaffection with the 'second wave' of post-1984 recruitment is rather unlikely.

:2 'Impressions of the ANC Youth Conference'. Satcha. November 1982.

two The vacuum. 21 October 1985.

' The Sunday Star. 20 October 1985. Leaders of the Youth Section delegation to an international

youth festival in Moscow found in Soviet achievements evidence of the superiority of Socialism

W over Capitalism (Nyuwuza in Satcha. October 1985.. pp 18-19) _ e

' Sec 11 J Simons. The Freedom Charter. equal rights and freedoms . in Selected literature on the

Freedom Commission. London: Sechuhu Publications. 1985. p 1115.

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The original purpose of the ANC organisation which began to be built outside South Africa after 1960 was diplomacy and this still remains as one of the most important functions of the ANC, S bureaucracy. Diplomacy is a vital sphere of ANC activity. It can secure financial and other forms of assistance in such a way as to minimise reliance on a single or narrow range of foreign allies. international legitimacy is crucial for the ANC in a conflict which already involves many powerful external interests. With foreign governments poised to implement various sanctions against South Africa the extent to which the ANC is recognised by these powers as being popularly representative has become all the more important. Most recently ANC diplomacy has assumed a fresh dimension, - that of defining or developing the movements relationship with a variety of interest groups and organised bodies inside the Republic.

The ANC receives its military equipment from the Soviet Union and other allied states. As we have seen these countries also give military training and various forms of tertiary and vocational education of selected groups. The German Democratic Republic prints ANC and SACP literature. The help is significant for the ANC but does not represent massive allocations of these states resources. Much of the weaponry is fairly old and unlike other insurgent armies in Southern Africa (for instance, SWAPO or UNITA) the ANC's arsenal seems limited to automatic rifles, hand-grenades, mines, and side-arms. The ANC receives very little cash from Warsaw Pact donors. It is accorded hardware which no other states (with the exceptions perhaps of China and one or two African countries) are willing to supply, hospitality and recognition. The ANC's representatives in Eastern European countries are granted diplomatic status and treated with elaborate courtesy. It is a relationship of long standing; key ANC leaders visited the socialist bloc during the 1950s and the channel of military assistance was opened in 1962. Obviously the alliance with SACP helped to keep it open without being a necessary condition for it. The affinities developed by the ANC in the international cold war tensions of the 1950s and early 1960s also helped to bring it into alignment with the ideologically similar MPLA and Frelimo of Angola and Mozambique, establishing a relationship with both which was to be very helpful later on.

To what extent help from socialist countries is reciprocated by the ANC is difficult to say. It is true that the ANC is supportive of leftist positions. According to Oliver Tambo when he met South African businessmen in September 1985.

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in foreign policy; Tambo, for example, in his presentation of the NIEC report at Kahwe indicated sympathy for Soviet perceptions of issues in Afghanistan and Czechoslovakia, but neither are of vital concern to Southern African politics. It is likely that socialist donors place less value on such formal gestures of rhetorical courtesy than on the development of several generations of soldiers, technocrats, and scholars now holding high office in the ANC who can be expected to have been intellectually influenced by their training in socialist institutions. Western derived aid is of considerable importance to the ANC and probably needs more diplomatic effort to secure and maintain. The ANC has an international network of offices, though these are modest establishments and representing the ANC publicly is often allocated to fairly junior people. The ANC does not maintain a vast cadre of diplomats, but the few it does support in the USA, Western Europe, and, since 1984, Australia, are extremely active. In these countries the ANC has traditionally benefited from the activities of local anti-apartheid or anti-racist pressure groups; in the case of the British Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM), the ANC had a role in its establishment and continues to work very closely with its leadership. Britain has always been a centre of ANC diplomatic work and this is logical. Britain's links with South Africa are stronger than any other foreign power, there is an expatriate community of 50,000 South Africans living in Britain, and a long history of contact between left-wing and liberal British politicians and their black South African counterparts. The ANC's headquarters once was situated in London and a large number of older ANC and SACP members live in Britain permanently. The long-established ANC presence in Britain is beginning to reap dividends. Quite apart from symbolic gestures of recognition - freedom of several British cities for

Nelson Mandela and his statue on the bank of the Thames-the ANC has begun to have contacts with both the Foreign Office and Conservative politicians and has been promised more substantial favours by the Labour Party. ANC spokesmen use a language and have a manner which seems to evoke a warm public response in Britain; this is partly a 6: Francis Mcl. for example. the author of an historical PhD dissertation on the history of the C(mintcrn written at the University of Leipzig in the Watts. Today he is editor of the m The (zbltuary in the m (January 1982) of a leading personality in the Wumenk section. M Shangaia. refers to ten years she spent in the USSR undergoing medical training. M This is a reputation they have enjoyed since the 1960s See Nelson. 0/). nL. p 200. "001 Scr/mlm and the African (mnmunixl are edited in Lumlmr

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' reflection of the skill of their representatives but also the result of 5.1, ' familiarity and common elements of culture.⁶⁴ i ' Notwithstanding the lobbying experience of Mfanafuthi Makatini, their seasoned UN representative, the ANC's position in the US is less g certain. Until recently ANC presence in America was limited largely to 8' students. Official American hostility to Marxism and the lack of American experience in dealing with radical anti-colonial movements used to ensure that ANC contact with US politicians was slight or inconsequential. Nevertheless, the ANC has had a considerable impact on non-government circles. Oliver Tambo began what has become a _i, succession of meetings with or addresses to multinational corporation . 2, executives from 1981. In 1982 the New York group of ANC activists had succeeded in attracting considerable media attention through pickets 0f i ' ttribal' musicals and were being asked to check and advise on 3:3: 5 forthcoming productions of South African-related material.⁶⁵ The ANC ?l' presence in the US was at least sufficiently developed to enable it to be cast in a leading role when the disinvestment campaign exploded on t . college campuses in 1984. This has now compelled the present US Administration to grudgingly concede aidegree of official contact with ANC representatives. , t' a The frontline states apart, the ANC seems to accord Africa rather a ' low priority in its diplomatic agendzi. It is represented in only a,,_:, sprinkling of African states outside Southern Africa. African aid, with the exception of Zambia, Tanzania; and Ethiopia, is usually '1 administered through the Organisation of African Unity, and as Oliver Tambo has often publicly indicated is neither dependable nor ,- substantial.⁶⁶ It is chiefly in Africa in which the ANC finds itself u confronted with the presence of a competitor, the Pan-Africanist Congress. which is still able to intiuence public and official perceptions in at least Nigeria. Zimbabwe, and Libya. The most important help, oi course, which the ANC obtains from any foreign power is the 1 accommodation provided by Zambia. Angola. and Tanzania. but this today is the Outcome of a relationship which is of a much deeper and more intimate character than that characterised by diplomacy. Thes & Western European recognition is by no means confined to Britain. ANC representatives ar e given semi-omcial status in Scandinavian countries (in which they receive Government hid). were signatories to the Geneva Convention in 1980. and have had several meetings with European Economic Community officials (The Star. 10 September 1985 and 26 September 1985). ⁶⁵ The Star. 4 February 1982. "" Sec Tamlm's criticisms of the ()AU reported in The Tinu-x. 11 August I084.

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ANc's relationship with other frontline states is more problematic because of their vulnerability to South African pressure. Outstanding in its absence from the various expressions of congratulatory support from foreign governments and organisations at Kabwe was any mention of a greeting from Mozambique ('7 The ANC 5 experience in Mozambique and the way it was kept ignorant of the events which culminated in the signature of the Nkomati pact is a telling instance of the uneven quality of its African diplomacy. 68 It serves as a reminder of just how important diplomatic activity can be, especially in the case of a foreign country with the potential to influence South African events and with a none committal approach to the ANsc-the US and Britain are two such examples. ?

The M465 usuzii tliplumzttic ' work hats hcen augmented by the beginning of a new phase of formal contacts with South African groups. Since September 1985 the Lusaka or Harare offices have entertained at least a dozen deputations. Beginning with 2: group of businessmen led by the Anglo American chairman, these have included representatives of the Progressive Federal Party, the Soweto Parents' Crisis Committee (59cc), the Federated Chamber of Industries. the National Convention Movement, Roman Catholic and Protestant churches, the Kngwane inyandya movement, the Congress of South African Trade Unions, the National Union of South African Students, and the National African Federated Chambers of Commerce (NAFCOC). In some cases, as with the white businessmen, these talks have been exploratory to elicit from the ANC its position on particular issues. In the case of COSATU and NAFCOC, intentions may have been more ambitious; both represent constituencies which may favour the ANC,S accession to power subject to certain assurances. In the case of Inyandya and the SPCC, visiting the ANC was a significant political statement: in Inyandyais case, setting it apart from other homeland-based groups and with the SPCC in endorsing its attempt to represent and lead the school children boycott movement. These contacts are obviously beneficial for the ANcZ they help to confirm its ascendancy in black South African politics and open up the possibility of eroding the Smith African government's support lmse within the white community. They have their difficult dimension, th0ugh. Commenting on the talks. a SAC? Politburo document observed:

.21 political readjustment in the ruling power bloc which favours its liberal
V See list of greetings in Documents from !/I(' Secoml Conxiiliulive Conference of ilie AN
C. pp 60-I.

M Joseph Hunlon. Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire. London: Zed Books. 1985. p 26!.

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bourgeoisie wing would undoubtedly create better objective conditions for the continuing struggle by the revolutionary forces to achieve the aims of national democratic revolution.

Tactically, what flows from this?

On the one hand we are justified in helping by all means (including talks) to advance the process of breaking the cohesion and unity of the ruling class and to isolate and weaken its most racist and politically reactionary class brothers . . .

We must expose their objective of co-opting forces from among the oppressed in order to frustrate the achievements of the main aims of the national democratic revolution.

We must not play into their hands by working out compromises (or being seen to) work out compromises for some hypothetical negotiating table . . .

Nor must a genuine desire to project a public image of irreconcilability tempt us to paddle softly on the true nature of the liberation alliance and its revolutionary socio-economic objectives. i

At the same time we must not mechanically dig in our heels against any future possibility of negotiation with brother forces?"

The difficulty for the ANC leadership is that in such a process it can become increasingly difficult to distinguish between a tactical position and one representing a principle. This is especially the case when the ANC leadership itself is eclectically diverse and lacks a detailed conception of such issues as the precise role the state would play in the economy in a liberated South Africa. There is also the problem of whatever the intentions of the participants in such talks these cannot always be easily communicated. This difficulty has obviously been worrying the ANC leadership:

There is the possibility that our movement will be in contact with levels of the ruling circles . . . that it has never dealt with before . . . it is vital (that we should be of one mind about this development . . . to ensure . . . it does not have a negative effect on the development of the struggle.⁷)

ANC spokesmen do seem to have made some allowances for the preoccupations and special concerns of their partners in these various talks. The key question for both businessmen and Western governments has been the extent and nature of economic nationalisation advocated by the ANC. Oliver Tambo and other ANC leaders have insisted on their commitment to a mixed economy and have suggested that the level of private enterprise which would be a matter of debate, not something. to the Politburo document released to South African State President's office. 12 June 1986.

⁷ Documents from Iran: the Second Conference (London: Imce. p 36.

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quote Tambo, that we . . . envisage fighting in the street over.⁷ The same point incidentally, was made by Joe Slovo in his speech at the sixty-fifth anniversary celebrations of the SACP in London: 2 . . . the continuing drive towards a socialist future . . . could well be settled in debate rather than on the streets'.⁷² Oliver Tambo at the September 1985 meeting with South African businessmen speculated that ANC nationalisation measures might be limited to a 51 per cent state shareholding. This moderation well may be the reflection of principled beliefs rather than a tactical negotiating ploy: even the SACP has a theoretical commitment to a transitional phase of national democracy.⁷³ Nevertheless ANC ambivalence on economic issues is out of step with more radical economic philosophies which prevail inside South Africa: UDF leaders proclaim the virtues of a people's -not just in_ which private ownership would be restricted to boutiques and barber's shops.⁷⁴ Clearly this was not the vision Sam Moyo and his colleagues in NAFCOC brought away with them from Lusaka.

The ANC like any other organisation in such a situation uses different language for different constituencies. The gentle and courteous language of diplomacy and discussion with outsiders contrasts sharply with the strident and jargonised prose employed in its journal, Sek'oku, in its radio broadcasts to South Africa. directed presumably at a popular audience, the language is especially harsh:

The. regiments police and soldiers who have been massacring our people in millions over the years still return to their homes and spend comfortable nights in the warmth of their beds . . . They must be haunted by the mass offensive.

We must attack them at their homes and their holiday resorts just as we have been attacking their bootlickers at their homes. This must now happen to their white colleagues. All along it has only been the black mothers who have been mourning. Now the time has come that all of us must mourn. White families must also wear black costumes. (Domestic servants must play) a leading role; WEZYCEEZW where their employers keep their weapons and they are the ones even plans of transferring the ownership of these weapons.76

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7: conversation with Oliver Tambo of the ANC'. Cape Times. 4 November 1985.

" communist blueprint for South Africa'. The Guardian 11 weeks 17 August 1986. p 9.

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. June 1986. The Freedom Charter and socialist strategy in 50th Anniversary. Polilikuu, 13(1).

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_5 Swan Press. 1986. pp 179-80-

5: & f! ux mexx Pay (Johannesburg). 30 May 1986 and WNC in far

3. R- uenytneI Weekly Mail. 11 July 1986. p 5-

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The issue of just whom violence should be directed at seems to be one over which there is disagreement in the ANC. Reddy Mazimba, the ANC representative in Harare was attributed with the injunction that 'White parents would have to go to the graveyards when the ANC's offensive reached white areas and white schools',⁷⁷ a threat which was swiftly repudiated by the ANC's Lusaka office.⁷⁸ ANC leaders maintain that white civilians must not be targets of attack, only incidental victims of crossfire.⁷⁹ Joe Slovo referred to recent Limpopo mine explosions which killed or hurt civilians at bus stops and a Wimpy Bar as 'a diversion' and 'a blemish'.⁸⁰ Even within the narrower field of diplomacy the ANC employs variations in rhetoric: in the United States its personalities describe the organisation as 'a community of love and justice on a pilgrim's road to freedom' and speak of their admiration for the values enshrined in the American Constitution⁸¹ while in a different context they proclaim their 'natural alliance' with the Soviet Union and the world socialist system as a whole.⁸²

Such alterations of language and tone are inevitable and necessary in an organisation which has to preserve a balance between the requirements of loyalty and gratitude to its military patrons, assuaging the potential hostility of Western governments and reassuring liberal allies within capitalist democracies, while at the same time retaining and expanding support within a heterogeneous collection of constituencies inside South Africa. They only represent a threat to the ANC's integrity if they open up ideological and strategic divisions within leadership or between leadership and following. As yet this does not appear to be a serious risk but it should be borne in mind that the ANC's leadership is socially and ideologically an eclectic one. We will conclude this survey of the exile organisation by looking briefly at the composition of its leadership and the different political traditions it represents. - . : 1 . H y , -

The men and women elected at the Kabwe conference can be placed in four categories each of which represent a significant group within the organisation. First there are the people whose political experience dates back to the nationalist revival of the ANC Youth League in the 1940s and who predominated in the mass-based militant populist campaigning of the 1950s. Oliver Tambo is representative of these. a former attorney

⁷⁷ The Sun. 28 May 1985.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ See for example Oliver Tambo's statement to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee. The Situation in South Africa. minutes. 29 October 1985. p 6.

⁸⁰ Joe Slovo interviewed on the BBC World Service. 4 July 1986.

⁸¹ Joe Slovo quoted in The Sun. 3 November 1983. and Tom Karis. (ed.). pp 394-45.

⁸² Joe Slovo quoted in The Sun. 3 November 1983.

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and school teacher whose moderate philosophy and lack of interest in economic questions recall a period when the ANC's ideology expressed the concerns of a class alliance which had strong roots in the African middle class. Of the same age as the veterans of populist nationalism are the working-class leaders of the 1940s and the 1950s many of them former trade unionists and SACTU office holders and some of them also office holders within the Communist Party. Nkomo, the late Moses Mabhida. and also Joe Slovo (never in fact a trade unionist, but currently the Chairman of the SACP) can be put in this group. More radical in their socio-economic ideals they nevertheless share many common areas of experience with the older nationalists: the decade of open multi-class and multi-communal campaigning of the 1950s, an aversion to extreme degrees of violence, the patience and caution of long years of exile, a dislike of utopian sectarianism⁸³ and other elements of a common political outlook.

Then there are two younger groups. A considerable proportion of NEC leaders spent their politically formative years in the politics of violent and clandestine action of the 1960s when the ANC's methods of necessity had to be those of a conspiratorial and clandestine elite. Within the country the ANC was reconstituted underground and in the process considerably radicalised. Some of these men, Mac Maharaj and Jacob Zuma are two such cases, underwent lengthy prison sentences on Robben Island for their role in the first Umkhonto campaign. Meanwhile a fourth group of young men left the country to join the ANC in exile; virtually the whole of their political experience has been in the

external bureaucracy. Simon Makana, Francis Meli and Thabo Mheki, all students who completed their academic training at foreign Universities, are representative of this category. The younger men have matured in an ANC which for them has always been a revolutionary organisation and despite the self-control and diplomatic restraint which they are often called upon to exercise they are likely to be less conciliatory and more radical in their attitudes. See for example 'Conlencnc expel: left-wing (lcvialionistsl Srclmba. August 1985. for a detailed history of the ANC's treatment of a group of Trotskyite dissenters. For instance. contrast Thabo Mbeki's position with relationship to black entrepreneurs with that of Nelson Mandela. as expressed in the 1950s: Thus black capitalism instead of being the antithesis is rather continuation of the parasitism with no redeeming features whatsoever. without any extenuating circumstances. In excuse its existence' (thki In Sclrrlcd Wrmngx on (Its Frrrdnm CImrrrr. p 4K). The breaking up and democratisation of these municipalities will open up local fields for the development of the Non-European hourglass class. For the first time in the history of this country the Non-European hourglass will have the opportunity to move in their own name and right mills and tectonics and trade and private enterprise will boom and flourish as never before' (Nelson Mandela. tln 0111 liletlme'. LIhr-nuum. No. 19. June 1956. p b.)

They are presently being joined by a fresh influx of potential leaders from the post-1980 era of open working-class mobilisation inside South Africa. These bring with them the politics of a conflict which increasingly is popularly perceived in the terms of a polarisation of class. Many external commentaries devote a great deal of attention to the extent to which the SACP influences the ANC leadership. This is very difficult to quantify exactly. The SACP keeps the identity of most of its membership secret. This is partly the consequence of the ingrained habit of always functioning in hostile terrain but also because of the sensitivity of SACP involvement in the affairs of the ANC in the context of both African and Western hostility to Communists. Of the thirty NEC members less than a quarter can be authoritatively said to be SACP members though there is evidence which suggests that the SACP influences several others as well. As has been argued above, life experiences are at least as important as formal political affinities in determining the ideology of different members of the NEC (and presumably the ANC as a whole). Two other points are relevant to the evaluation of SACP influences. First, recent SACP documentation suggests that the manpower resources of the Party are very stretched at the moment and this has inhibited the degree to which the Party can function as a deliberate and unified presence within the wider liberation movement. For example, between 1983 and 1985 the Central Committee did not hold a single meeting. Secondly, adherence to Marxism is by no means confined to Communists within the ANC. Both well-educated recruits from South Africa and the graduates of Western European universities are influenced by an intellectual background in which Marxism is a powerful constituent. Interestingly Thabo Mbeki, a British and US-trained economist, and one of the more radical young NEC members, was criticised in a Zimbabwean newspaper recently for his incomplete study of the SACP and the ANC. Mbeki was taken to task by this contributor for allegedly asserting that the SACP was responsible for the shelving of socialism. Of African nationalism, Christian liberalism, clandestinity, technocracy, communist popular frontism. Western Marxism, and indigenous working-class radicalism as well as residual elements of black consciousness are constituents in the ANC's complicated ideological recipe. Within this mixture individual ideological identities are very different. The inner Party line taken by South African Defence Force members raiding ANC facilities in Gabombe in June 1985 and later given to South African journalists. "Zimbabwe Herald. 28 November 1985.

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difficult to chart and plot. There are, though, several issues which observably provide differences of emphasis and even implicit disagreement. Two have already been referred to: the nature of the violence employed by ANC guerrillas and the ingredients in the ANC's projection of a mixed economy. A third, which with future diplomatic activity may become accentuated, is the question of how the conflict will ultimately be resolved. Three years before his death, Moses Mabhida provided a clue illuminating different perceptions between SACP revolutionaries and the wider movement on the mechanics of transition: 3 (There is) one issue, on which the Party (the SWC) follows Communist doctrines in preference to the (Freedom) Charters proposals. The issue is concerned with the nature of the State organisation to be established after the democratic seizure of power. In our opinion it will be necessary to destroy the apparatus of the racist state and replace it with new political institutions to safeguard the revolution and clear the way for a new social order. Obviously, the form of seizure (a favourite word in ANC phraseology) will be a decisive factor in the attainment of such a goal. There do seem to be two different perceptions within the ANC of how transference of political power is likely to take place. On the one hand is the scenario favoured by Umkhonto strategists (probably irrespective of political affiliation): here the denouement of the struggle is conceived in terms of an overwhelming general insurrection: Armed insurrection, in some form or other, rather than guerrilla warfare, but often as a culmination of guerrilla warfare, is the classic method of making a

revolution. There appear to be two main categories into which insurrections fall-the spontaneous mass uprising as in Iran. and the planned uprising. as in Petrograd. October 1917. These stand at either end of a scale of varying possibilities.

In the first category there is no prearranged plan or date. with an entirely unexpected. even extraneous. event sparking off the conflagration. In such a situation, revolutionaries struggle to gain control. and organise the seizure of power.

In the second category, insurrection is deliberately timed as the final move in a carefully prepared plan of revolutionary action-in which the balance of forces has been finely calculated. The Bolsheviks struggled to gain control over the forces unleashed by the February Revolutions as an unexpected event. and directed these forces to the planned seizure of power in October 1917. What we can be sure about is that every revolution which must depend for its ultimate

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Muse Mbembe. Speech to ANC Youth (in Ntshongwe Murugoro. 17-23 August 1987. .-1987 (unpublished. No. 93. First Quarter. 1987).

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i" An ANC representative at the Nassau Conference appeared willing to contemplate the possibility of a truce proposal (The Star. 25 October 1985). ANC preconditions for negotiation with the South African authorities seemed to soften significantly in the days which immediately succeeded the 5mm raids on ANC buildings in Zimbabwe. Zambia and Botswana (liminm: Day.. Two peace package is still on the rails'. 2! May 1986). ' ' T t i , I .. SACl' Politburo documentt
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leaders reported by Howard Barrcll (Sunday Tribune (Durban). 19 December 1982) has at le

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been partially corroborated by defector testimony (see statement by Ephraim Mtala. Dcntnn Committee hearings. p 19).

The ANc's reputed overall budget of \$100 million in 1983 (Financial Mail. 8 June 10RJ) is COmparable to that of the reformist business gloup. the Urban Foundation. and minute When contrasted with. for example. the 1981 South African military budget ot \$2.76 billion (Washington Post. 2 January 1984). Recently the ANC's budget was estimated more conservatively at between \$25 million and \$40 million a year. Swedish contributions were estimated at \$6 million in 1985. equal in value to the weaponry provided by the Soviet Un ion

(Stew: Mulson. New Republic. August 1986. p 22).

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