



SA GOVERNMENT ACCEPTS UN INTERVENTION

The South African government has accepted progressive intervention by the United Nations in the internal affairs of South Africa, especially in the monitoring, and ultimately the control, of the security forces. In so doing, it has relinquished a significant measure of its sovereignty, greatly reduced the electorate's control over its future destiny and strengthened the hand of the African National Congress immeasurably.

UN intervention began when the government agreed to a UN Security Council debate on South Africa. The sop thrown to the government was that it, together with other Codesa participants, could address the Security Council. By accepting, the homelands received de facto recognition by the UN. However, at the time of writing, no long term benefit appears to have accrued from this recognition.

In a tough speech to the Security Council on July 15, Nelson Mandela accused the government of orchestrating a campaign of terror to crush the "democratic movement" (that is, the ANC/SA Communist Party/Cosatu alliance). It was carrying out "a cold-blooded strategy of state terrorism intended to create conditions ... (for) imposing its will on a weakened democratic movement". It is clear that "violence is both organised and orchestrated and directed at the democratic movement". He described the IFP as a backed, funded, armed and trained surrogate of government forces and thus not an independent organisation with which the ANC could negotiate. He said the government had forced the ANC to withdraw from Codesa and he demanded the release of political prisoners. As an initial step, he called for a special representative to be sent to South Africa.

Following the lengthy debate, the Security Council passed resolution 765 which appointed the envoy, Cyrus Vance, called for a resumption of negotiations, condemned the killings, and urged the government to end the violence. The ANC saw the resolution as a categoric repudiation of government attempts to blame it for the violence. There is little doubt that the UN accepted the ANC president's interpretation of events in South Africa, a fact borne out by subsequent events.

"We asked in our resolution for the appointment on a special representative," Mandela said on July 19. "We never asked for anything else. And the Security Council passed that resolution. So it's a victory for us." He said he expected the UN to set up a monitoring mission after Vance had reported back.

The ANC would attempt to persuade Vance to appoint a group of international experts to serve as monitors to complement the work of the Peace Accord, ANC deputy head of international affairs, Aziz Pahad, said on July 18. If there was any hope of the government accepting it, he would opt for some kind of UN peacekeeping force, Mandela said. Until then, he would be satisfied with a "continuous-monitoring" presence.

The UN resolution "heralds South Africa's return to the world and the world's return to South Africa," editorialised the *Sunday Times* (19/7/92). "There can be no going back: the new world order has come to these shores. ... The future now slowly emerges: foreign intervention, at the very least in the form of a permanent monitoring commission."

Thabo Mbeki, ANC international affairs spokesman, told Vance on July 23 that the ANC wanted the UN to remain involved in South Africa until a new constitution has been drawn up and a new government was in place. On July 30, the ANC urged the UN and other international bodies to send observers to monitor the mass action campaign because their presence would ensure the campaign was peaceful.

Special representative of the UN secretary general, Cyrus Vance, arrived in Johannesburg on July 21, accompanied by four senior UN officials. Vance, well known for his hostility to South Africa when he was US secretary of state in the Carter administration, is a long standing member of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). His mandate was to "recommend measures" to help end the violence and restart negotiations. During his 10-day visit, Vance met with a wide spectrum of political and other leaders, including the head of the Goldstone Commission and the chairman of the National Peace Secretariat. Apart from a visit to Boipatong under the auspices of the ANC, Vance bent over backwards to appear impartial.

Immediately following Vance's departure on July 31, a 10-member UN team arrived to monitor the ANC's week of mass action starting on Aug 3. Their arrival followed a request by Mandela to the UN on July 29 to send observers to watch the mass action and a statement by State President FW de Klerk in which he said he had "no objection to the presence of impartial and objective observers representing the (UN) secretary-general for the purpose of observing the proposed mass action campaign". Team leader Hisham Omayad, a Ghanian,

has been involved in the Namibian independence process since 1978 as a senior aide to Untag leader Martti Ahtisaari. He was also one of the four UN officials who had accompanied Vance. Another member was Kallu Kalumiya, a Ugandan who, as UN High Commissioner for Refugees in Johannesburg, has been facilitating the return of ANC exiles for the past nine months.

Omayad made it clear from the beginning that the monitors would not be passive observers but would interact and advise the regional peace committees. "They will not stand off and wait if violence breaks out. They will also be involved in negotiations to end violence during the mass action." Predictably when he addressed participants in an illegal ANC march in Krugersdorp on Aug 5, he said: "The UN is very proud of you. We are with you all the way. We wish you all the best." The monitors can hardly be called impartial!

In accepting informal international mediation, the government suggested the UN use words like "observing, fact-finding or evaluation". It objected to the word "monitoring" as this implied direct international intervention in South Africa's constitutional future which the government opposed. The ANC, on the other hand, wants long-term UN involvement until a new constitution and democratic government are in place.

UN REPORT ON SOUTH AFRICA

Acting on Vance's report, UN secretary general, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, recommended, on Aug 7, that about 30 UN observers should be stationed in South Africa to work closely with the National Peace Secretariat. "As necessary, their number could be supplemented by other appropriate international organisations, such as the Commonwealth, the European Community and the Organisation of African Unity," he said. He felt the experience gained by the 10 UN observers would define the tasks and methods of the larger group. His report made the following recommendations.

On the Goldstone Commission:

- It should investigate the operations of the army, police, KwaZulu police, Umkhonto we Sizwe, Azanian People's Liberation Army and certain private security companies (self-defence units were not mentioned);
- The UN should provide help to the commission, including the secondment of jurists;
- All Goldstone reports should be released to signatories of the National Peace Accord within 24 hours.

On the National Peace Committee:

- 30 UN observers should serve with the National Peace Secretariat in different parts of the country;
- 24-hour offices should be established at flashpoints throughout the country to prevent violence.

On negotiations:

- All parties should return to negotiations as soon as possible. Remaining political prisoners should be released and the state broadcasting services should be impartial;
- Codesa appoint an eminent and impartial person (not necessarily a foreigner) to provide cohesion;
- A deadlock-breaking mechanism should be established at the highest political level.

On the future role of the UN:

- The UN should dispatch emissaries to assess progress on a quarterly basis - or more often if required.

As these points are all in line with ANC demands, it is not surprising that the ANC immediately endorsed the proposals. Less comprehensible is why the government agreed to them. Was it because, having accepted the principle of UN intervention, there was no way it could avoid doing so? Or is it as naive as National Party general secretary, Stoffel van der Merwe, appeared to be when he said on Aug 14 that the ANC's attempt to gain the support of the UN and the international community had boomeranged against it and that it had lost more than it had gained?

The report identified the release of the remaining political prisoners as a key to breaking the deadlock in the talks. Justice Minister Kobie Coetsee is attempting to link this with a general amnesty which would extend to clandestine acts committed by the security forces. This however is being vigorously opposed by the ANC.

The UN report "signals unprecedented international intervention in the resolution of South Africa's political conflict," said the *Sunday Times* (9/8/92). "Mr Vance, by throwing the weight of the international community behind the Goldstone commission and the Peace Accord, has greatly strengthened the authority of these institutions." The Goldstone Commission "has been chosen for the taxing task, both delicate and tough, of rehabilitating the police and the armed forces. Neither police nor military forces can recover legitimacy ... until they have undergone a catharsis: public disclosure, confession and absolution. There can be no cover-ups, no hidden crimes or assassinations, no concealed CCB cells, no more lies."

THE ANC'S STRATEGY

The strategy which the ANC/SACP/Cosatu alliance has been following since before Codesa 2 is now becoming clearer. Initially it saw Codesa as the channel by means of which power would be transferred from the present government to the ANC, the nominal head of the alliance. In the run-up to Codesa 2, it became apparent that

moderate Black groups, led by the Inkatha Freedom Party and the governments of Bophuthatswana and the Ciskei, were opposed to the alliance and were numerically strong enough to block any agreement not acceptable to them, even if the ANC had the support of the ruling National Party. This meant that, from the alliance's viewpoint, Codesa had proved to be unsuitable for its purposes. Codesa therefore had to be dumped or drastically restructured.

The alliance's goal remained to have power transferred to it, initially through an interim government. In order to achieve that goal, it had to ensure that rival political groups were sidelined and the ANC and National Party were recognised as the only two significant negotiators in South Africa. It therefore resorted to two of the four pillars of its struggle, the international community and mass action.

Whether the Boipatong tragedy was triggered by the ANC or not, the alliance used it most effectively to once again grab world headlines and recapture the support of the international community, which had been waning. The immediate consequence was the Security Council debate and the decision to send Vance and UN monitors to South Africa. With the government unable to fully control events in South Africa, especially the political violence, and anxious to win the favour of the international community, it unwisely agreed, thereby falling in with the ANC's plan, SURRENDERING SOUTH AFRICA TO THE NEW WORLD ORDER AND GREATLY INCREASED THE ANC'S CHANCES OF BECOMING THE NEXT GOVERNMENT.

THE ANC'S WEEK OF MASS ACTION

The prime goal of the ANC's week of mass action (Aug 3-9) was for the alliance to project an image of power. It had to be seen as representing the overwhelming majority of South Africans, of controlling its followers in the mass action and as having the ability to destabilise the country. It had several target audiences in mind, including the international community, the government, the business community and the media. Although violence in which more than 40 people were killed preceded the mass action (before the UN monitors were in place) and although the ANC only got 70 000 people at the Union Buildings, Pretoria, on August 6, not the 200 000 it claimed, it clearly succeeded in achieving its goals. There is now little doubt that all of the groups mentioned above see the ANC as the only significant player on the South African scene.

"When ANC general secretary Cyril Ramaphose told the crowd massed in Pretoria, 'we are at the door of the Union Buildings - next time, FW de Klerk, we will be inside your office', the message could not, for the first time, be dismissed as bluster," said the *Weekly Mail* (7/8/92), summing up the week of mass action. The article compared de Klerk with Gorbachev, saying neither were able to control the forces released by their reforms and the pressures mounting against them were aggravated by a deteriorating economy.

Although, at the last minute, the business community failed to reach an agreement with the ANC/SACP/Cosatu alliance ahead of the week of mass action (see *Roca Report* no 43), the further weakening of the economy has convinced the business community that stability and the desired upturn in the economy will only come about once an interim government is in place. So the alliance has succeeded in swinging businessmen behind its demands for the installation of a interim government as soon as possible.

By projecting itself as the only significant player on the political scene, the alliance has effectively sidelined the Black moderates who so successfully frustrated its plans at Codesa. It is imperative for these moderates to quickly get back into the limelight by some new headline-grabbing initiative (see below). IF THEY FAIL NOW, THEY WILL BE REDUCED TO IRRELEVANCY.

WEAKENING THE SECURITY FORCES

The ANC alliance is fully aware that ultimately the authority of the government rests in the power of the security forces. A main goal therefore is to weaken the army and the police. The means it is using to achieve this include killing policemen, discrediting the security forces, prising them out of government control and ultimately replacing them with MK. The ANC is constantly repeating its allegations that the security forces are undisciplined, out of control, inefficient, oppressive and unacceptable to the Black community. It has been assisted in this by the great publicity given to incidents like the Trust Feed killing.

To a large extent, the government has accepted these allegations. This is seen in its disbanding of the crack 31 and 32 Battalions at the insistence of the ANC despite Defence Force objections (see *Roca Report* no 43) and in the harsh measures taken against individual policemen who step out of line. For example at Boipatong, three days after the massacre, a man attacked another with a panga. When a policeman intervened, the attacker turned on him and was shot when he refused to drop the bush knife. Instead of being commended for saving a life, the policeman is charged with murder!

In an attempt to enhance the credibility of the security forces, the government has handed over much of its responsibility for them to the National Peace Accord and the Goldstone commission. More recently it has brought in foreign experts to monitor police actions, creating the precedent for UN intervention.

There is not doubt that the UN decision to have the Goldstone commission investigate the security forces will

greatly assist the ANC by further discrediting them. It can already be taken for granted that the security forces will be portrayed in a very bad light while only a few blemishes will be detected in the "liberation forces". By accepting UN intervention, the government has surrendered ultimate control of the security forces to the UN.

On top of the above, there has been a drastic cutting down of Defence expenditure, with old equipment been taken out of service and plans to acquire new equipment shelved indefinitely. It is therefore of little wonder that the morale of the security forces is low. The government seems unable to realise that to the degree the security forces are weakening, to that degree its own authority is eroded.

In view of the major steps the government has already take to meet ANC's demands, there is little doubt that, under UN pressure, the remaining demands will soon be met, clearing the way for negotiations to resume.

ANC'S ARMED WING, SELF DEFENCE UNITS OUT OF CONTROL

As this report has noted on a number of occasions in the past, elements of the ANC alliance's armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe, and the so-called self-defence units are out of control.

"Communist Party boss Chris Hani this week charged that ANC self-defence units were committing atrocities and running riot among communities they were expected to protect," said the *Sunday Times* (9/8/92). "Mr Hani said in many areas of the country, but particularly in the Vaal, self-defence unit members simply had no conception of democratic tolerance. Mr Hani, who was asked by the ANC to investigate self-defence units, said he had found that:

- There was a clear absence of community control of SDUs.
- SDUs in Sebokeng were fighting among themselves in a battle for political turf ...
- Defence units in the Vaal and Soweto had 'necklaced' political opponents.
- In a squatter camp outside Bloemfontein 'kangaroo' courts had been introduced by defence unit members who flogged those found guilty of the spurious charges put to them.
- In the northern Transvaal, SDUs had imposed a tax on Black businessmen. Those who refused to pay were threatened with a consumer boycott.
- Phola Park defence units had been infiltrated by criminals. One armed group had overthrown a democratically elected residents' association. Its members wanted the squatter settlement to be a no-go area even for normal policing. It had become a popular hideout for car thieves.
- SDU members in the Vaal were guilty of firing indiscriminately on vehicles travelling on the highway."

Defending himself against charges by Hani that he had been misquoted, the journalist, Mike Robertson, said: "Far from 'putting words in his mouth' or 'distorting' his views, the story I wrote ... not only accurately reflects what Mr Hani told me in the interview, but is backed up by what the SACP leader himself wrote in *Umsebenzi*", the ideological mouthpiece of the SACP.

The *Weekly Mail* (7/8/72) confirmed that the ANC had begun a top-level probe into reports that SDUs and MK fighters "had run amok in various townships around the country". From the unbanning of the ANC to July 1992, 173 SDU members had been arrested for a variety of crimes ranging from murder to necklacing, rape, armed robbery, fraud, attempted murder and illegal possession of firearms, said the police on Aug 12.

Michael Mantu, a member of the ANC-aligned National Union of Mineworkers in Sebokeng, was murdered on July 5 by members of a rival ANC faction despite an peace accord between the warring groups brokered by the ANC national and regional leadership the previous month. He was the second member of NUM to be killed by renegade ANC members since May (See *Roca Report* nos 42 and 43). One of these allegedly implicated in Mantu's death was killed by unknown gunmen a few days later.

Amid the tremendous media campaign against the security forces, sight is often lost of the fact that it is relatively easy to instil discipline into a group of men who have passed a rigid selection process, have undergone formal training, are accountable to a well-established officer corps, held up to public scrutiny and, in the event of indiscipline, are accountable to a judicial system.

None of these safeguards apply to the SDUs and even to MK. Many of those involved in the SDUs come from the uneducated, indisciplined "lost generation" of youths who were victims of the ANC's "liberation before education" policy of the 1980s. Many in MK fled the country following the 1976 riots and the 1985 crackdown on political violence. When this is understood, the chaos and violence described here is fully predictable.

Despite all the above evidence, the government "will not press for the disbanding" of MK before talks resume in terms of an agreement reached between the government and the ANC, according to a senior spokesman. However on July 19, the IFP called for the disbanding of MK before Sept 14, the first anniversary of the signing of the National Peace Accord.

CHAOS IN BOIPATONG

A further indication of what rule under indisciplined SDUs is like comes from Boipatong and neighbouring

townships where municipal services have totally broken down since the area was taken over by ANC-aligned groups following the tragedy of June 17.

First the towns became no-go areas when ANC-aligned civic associations set up self-defence units. Then young comrades instituted a reign of terror and young thugs with no particular loyalty took over. Youngsters knock on doors late at night and command the residents to come outside, patrol the streets and, in unwilling forced-labour gangs, to dig deep trenches across roads in the dead of night to keep out police and municipal vehicles. Older residents are also forced to pay "protection money" by children. "The teenagers rule here. Its anarchy for anarchy's sake - and the status and wealth they can accumulate," said one official.

"Chris Hani said the youth must go to the trenches and this is what we are doing," explained the 25 year old publicity secretary of the Sebokeng ANC Youth League who mans the barricades. "There are thugs on the barricades who have looted houses and stolen cars," complained a resident.

Sewers, water mains, roads and other municipal installations have been vandalised. Cement blocks thrown into sewerage systems resulted in pipelines having to be replaced at a cost of R3 million. Raw sewerage gushes out a sabotaged manhole at the rate of 8 000 litres per minute, creating fears of a cholera outbreak. Municipal and health services have all but collapsed. Municipal and health workers face threats and physical abuse while their vehicles and equipment have been hijacked. Even ambulances have been prevented from entering the towns.

The cost of repairing the "wanton and stupid damage" is estimated at more than R8 million but funds are not available and less than 20 percent of residents are paying for municipal services.

SOUTH AFRICA'S DECLINING ECONOMY

South Africa is in the third year of a severe and prolonged recession which has already lasted six months longer than the Great Depression of the early 1930s and, despite the optimism at the time of the referendum, the recession is deepening.

The gross domestic product has fallen by 4 percent since the downturn began in 1989 although the retail sector only began declining in early 1991. However drought and lower consumer spending caused a 2.6 percent decline in the GDP for the three months to June 1992. About 200 companies are being liquidated a month, the highest number since 1986. Car sales for the year have been revised sharply down to the lowest levels since 1977 and are expected to drop even further. Fixed investment spending was at its lowest level since 1971 and was continuing to decline. Economists generally do not expect any recovery before next year. Even then, they do not believe 1993 offers much chance for significant growth.

Meanwhile inflation was increasing and a further decline in living standards could be expected. Government expenditure exceeded income by R4.09 billion for the first two months of 1992 and is expected to rise to R21 billion for the 1992/93 fiscal year. This is 56 percent higher than the previous year and is more than 6 percent of the projected GDP. Because of accelerating violence, the political impasse, mass action and talk of strikes, South Africa can forget about any meaningful foreign investment for a long time, Barlow Rand chairman said on July 27.

Already fragile business confidence deteriorated again in July, falling to its fourth lowest level since the beginning of 1985. "Business sentiment was eroded by the continued political impasse and the events leading up to the mass stayaway, as well as further evidence that the economic recession is continuing to deepen," said a leading economist. There was widespread concern in business circles that the economy would continue to be used as a political battleground and that irreparable damage would be done to its growth potential. The economy will only recover when there is higher business confidence and economic activity, catalysed by "significant progress around the political negotiating table", say economists.

With its repeated calls for the continuation of sanctions, its threats of nationalisation and its mass action, the ANC alliance is largely responsible for this state of affairs. Other contributory factors include the high level of violence, the uncertain future, the severe drought and the general world economy.

A declining economy is obviously in the interest of the ANC because it puts pressure on the government and the business sector to reach a settlement as soon as possible. Both are desperate for foreign investment and know none will come unless violence and uncertainty are ended and a stable future can be foreseen.

THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY SPLITS

The long predicted split in the Conservative Party finally occurred on August 13 which five members of Parliament, led by former secretary general, Andries Beyers, resigned. CP leader Andries Treurnicht said the leadership had bent over backwards to accommodate the group and had agreed with most of their points except for the size of a Afrikaner homeland and the definition of an Afrikaner. The CP proposes that the existing parliamentary constituencies be the basis for a volkstaat while the breakaway group want a far smaller homeland. The group, on the other hand, cited a lack of realism and a workable CP strategy for the future as

the main reasons for the split. It also wanted to join the negotiations on future regional government "with the aim of promoting our ideal of self-determination". Following the split, five editorial staff members of the CP's weekly newspaper, including the editor, were fired.

MODERATES MUST REGAIN THE INITIATIVE

As already indicated, it is absolutely essential that the moderate Black group that so successfully frustrated ANC plans at Codesa regain the initiative by showing South Africans and the world that they are a force to be reckoned with. They must create an event startling enough to grab the headlines and they must do it quickly, certainly before September 14, the first anniversary of the signing of the National Peace Accord.

Probably the best form this initiative can take is the formation of an alternative negotiating alliance, a kind of moderate version of the Patriotic Front, the ANC's broad "anti-apartheid front" through which it tried to draw other groups, like the Pan Africanist Congress, into its plans.

The three leaders who control territories and have the loyalty of their respective peoples, Chief Minister Mangosuthu Buthelezi of KwaZulu, President Lucas Mangope of Boputhatswana and Brigadier Oupa Gqozo of Ciskei, all of whom agree on the need of a federal state, must meet together to protect their common interests. Having hammered out a plan of action, they must call a joint press conference, announce the formation of the alliance and give it a name. The press would not be able to ignore such an initiative. The alliance would project an image of power, declaring to the world that it is a force to be reckoned with and that ANC and the NP are not the only players in South Africa.

By showing strength and unity of purpose, these leaders will win the support of waverers like Kenneth Mopeli of QwaQwa and Hudson Ntsanwisi of Gazankulu. It is even possible that one or both wings of the CP would participate in an alliance of this nature. The groundwork for such an alliance has already been laid at Codesa. It is merely a matter of formalising it and giving it a higher profile.

One of the main purposes of the ANC's mass action was to sideline the moderates by convincing the world that it has the support of the vast majority of South Africa's Blacks. **It has succeeded in this goal. Unless the moderates snap out of their passiveness, sink their differences quickly and overcome ambition to personal power outside their own spheres of influence, they will be unable to reverse the perception the ANC has created and they will be relegated to insignificance!**

They would be well to meditated on the words of Shakespeare: "There is a tide in the affairs of men, which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune; Omitted, all the voyage of their life is bound in shallows and in miseries. On such a full sea are we now afloat, and we must take the current when it serves, or lose our venture."

OTHER MATTERS IN BRIEF

- Based on 17 318 blood specimens from pregnant women, the Dept of National Health estimated that more than 200 000 people in South Africa were HIV positive at the end of 1991. At 2.97 percent, Natal had the highest rate, up from 1.61 percent in 1990. The infection rate had more than doubled in other areas. An average of one in 30 pregnant women tested in Baragwanath Hospital and Soweto clinics in June 1992 were HIV positive.
- The former Soviet Union gave the ANC nearly \$158 million (R440 million) in military assistance between 1963 and 1990 according to Russian sources quoted in the *Sunday Times* (9/8/92).
- All candidates of the ruling party in Bothuthatswana were elected unopposed because opposition parties failed to nominate candidates. **If the ANC has the support it claims, why didn't it fight the election?**
- One of South Africa's top academic doctors, Prof Demetri Demetriades, resigned at the end of July to go to America because of the crime and violence sweeping the country. He pointed out that South Africa has 35 million people and 18 000 murders per year while Los Angeles county with 9 million has 670 murders.
- The National Party retained its seat in Florida on August 12 in a 30 percent poll, the lowest in South African by-election history. The HNP candidate received 23 percent of the votes cast, roughly the same as the No vote in the referendum. This is an indication of the level of Rightwing support countrywide.
- The withdrawal of the ANC/SACP/Cosatu alliance from Codesa was his "happiest day" since 1990 because the talks were destroying the liberation movement, SACP general secretary, Chris Hani, told a rally in Pietermaritzburg on July 26.

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