



Roca Report

A CONFIDENTIAL ASSESSMENT OF
DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

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S AFRICA'S LAST CHANCE TO AVOID MARXISM!

SOUTH AFRICA FACES WHAT IS PROBABLY THE MOST DECISIVE MOMENT IN ITS HISTORY ON MARCH 17 when White voters must choose between a unitary state with an authoritarian central government which, in all probability, will be strongly socialist with an inclination towards Marxism, and a loose association of states where most of the decisions will be made at the local level.

If the referendum produces a majority Yes vote, the country will move rapidly towards the first alternative. There will be no further opportunity to change direction. A No vote will create a pause in the mad rush of the negotiations, time to consider other alternatives. **BEFORE VOTING, THEREFORE, EVERY WHITE SOUTH AFRICAN NEEDS TO CONSIDER THE ALTERNATIVES VERY CAREFULLY.**

WHAT WILL FOLLOW A YES VOTE?

A decisive Yes vote would greatly strengthen Codesa and the pace of reform would accelerate rapidly. The direction Codesa is moving in was clearly spelt out in a document released by Working Group 3 (which is considering a transitional or interim government) on March 4. It advocates the appointment by Codesa of a multi-party transitional executive structure (TES); a type of super cabinet, which would have greater authority than the State President, the existing cabinet and Parliament! It will even instruct Parliament to amend the existing constitution to make its own creation legal!

Barend du Plessis, the chief government leader in group 3, hailed the document as "a major breakthrough" and emphasised the importance of the agreement as the first step in the reform process. He made it clear that the members of the TES would not be elected but would be appointed by Codesa participants from among their ranks. He also stressed that Parliament would have no alternative but to implement the decisions taken by Codesa. However no agreement has yet been reached to limit the powers of the TES by means of checks and balances, including a Bill of Rights, or how the legislature (Parliament) will function in the transitional period. The plan has been approved by the ANC and government approval is regarded as a mere formality. An interim government appointed by Codesa would be dominated by the ANC and would leave the NP powerless to carry out any of its referendum promises, said Conservative Party spokesman, Corné Mulder.

In addition to Mandela, others who could hold positions in this unelected cabinet are ANC secretary general Cyril Ramaphosa, deputy secretary general Jacob Zuma, national working committee member Thabo Mbeki and deputy president Walter Sisulu, according to the *Natal Mercury* (5/3/92). This super cabinet, which would meet in secret, would lay down proposals for a fullscale interim government, legislature executive and an interim constitution. "The next step (after the appointment of the TES) is likely to involve elections for a legislative and constitution-writing body which may dovetail with the present Parliament or replace it," speculated the *Sunday Star* (8/3/92).

The ANC envisages an interim government by June, a constituent assembly by later this year, and the birth of a new democratic South Africa early next year, Thabo Mbeki, ANC's international affairs head, said on March 5. He also hinted strongly at a redistribution of wealth. "It is clear that this democratic transition will not survive if nothing happens to improve the lives of ordinary people." One person one vote was not enough. Jobs, food and housing had to be provided or the transitional process would be threatened. The ANC would most certainly implement its policy of nationalisation, redistribution of wealth and affirmative action. The full effect may only be felt after the interim phase, possibly long after, like the present confiscation of farm land in Zimbabwe.

The far-reaching agreement at Codesa confirms the warning issued in *Roca Report* no 38 when it said: "The unelected Codesa is usurping Parliament as the principle legal and constitutional decision-making authority in the country!" It must be again stressed that most of the groups at Codesa have no democratic tradition and their leaders are not elected. Moreover the ANC and SACP, which play a major role at Codesa, possibly the dominant one, have very little support among South Africans, Black or White.

A self-appointed government, responsible only to itself, which can tinker with the constitution at will, is certainly to be imposed on South Africa if there is a Yes vote in the referendum. It will be in power by July at the latest. Such an unrepresentative, totalitarian government will be rejected by the vast majority of South Africans and would be a sure recipe for bloodshed. Such a government would insist on the reincorporation of the TBVC states into a unitary South Africa, with or without their consent. Attempts to replace the present administrations in Bophuthatswana, Ciskei and KwaZulu would most certainly cause deep resentment and could be resisted. Should this happen, widespread violence could be triggered.

Remember, State President FW de Klerk has made it clear that the present referendum is the final test of his reform process. If there is a Yes vote, you will have no other chance to vote on constitutional changes!

UMKHONTO WE SIZWE

The ANC has repeatedly stated that it would only hand over control of MK to an interim government which would merge all existing armed forces, namely the SADF, MK and the armies of the TBVC states, to form a single army. There is no doubt that the ANC will have a major influence in such an army and it would rapidly cease to be impartial and give its loyalty to the ANC. In this case, the new army would be used to intimidate ANC opponents and the level of violence would inevitably rise. The police would also be reorganised and could well be disarmed as was the case during the transitional period in Namibia.

Because it knows that the future of the security forces is a great concern of the public, a number of cabinet ministers have stated emphatically that an interim cabinet would not include members who were compromised by commitments to the armed struggle or who operated private armies. In reaction, the ANC said on March 9, that its commitment to the armed struggle and the disbanding of MK would depend on the acceptance of an interim government by Codesa. These views underline the importance of the visit of a top ANC delegation on Jan 22 to Dieter Gerhardt, the former commander of the Simonstown Naval base who was convicted of spying for the Soviet Union and is now in Pretoria Central Prison. The reason for their discussion? "Gerhardt is now advising the ANC on joint control of the South African security forces" (*Sunday Times* 8/3/92)! "As a former high-ranking South African Defence Force officer, Gerhardt has information and insights that the ANC wants to take into account in its submissions to Codesa on the normalisation of the security forces," said the ANC in a statement. By "normalisation", the ANC means combining MK with the SADF!

WHAT WILL FOLLOW A NO VOTE?

The first result of a No vote in the referendum was clearly spelt out by the leader of the Democratic Party, Zach de Beer, on March 4: "A No majority at the referendum will kill Codesa stone dead." De Klerk explained another result to Parliament when he announced the referendum on Feb 20. "If I lose that referendum, I will resign and you can have an election." Of course, in the light of his failure to keep previous promises, it is by no means sure he will fulfil this one, especially if the result is close.

Up to 40 NP members of Parliament are rumoured to be very unhappy with Codesa and the present direction of their party. Should there be a No vote, confirming that the NP is out of touch with the electorate, they could break away and join the CP or form a new party. Should they vote with the CP against the NP, the government could be replaced without the instability of a general election in the present unsettled, emotional climate.

Mbeki foresees another alternative. South Africa would move straight to an interim government, installed immediately by Codesa, should the NP be forced to resign by a majority White No vote in the referendum, he said on March 5. This is a serious possibility and De Klerk could well be tempted to follow it. However, should the results of the referendum be ignored, the White electorate could well feel they are being overridden and that all doors for peaceful change have closed. This would be an extremely dangerous development.

Should circumstances permit the CP to implement its programme, it would immediately begin talks with Western nations, business leaders and representatives of groups within the country to explain exactly what it stood for. "We can tell them, quite frankly, the CP won't return to old-style apartheid," said CP leader, Andries Treurnicht. "That dispensation has passed. But we also have a right to determine what measures may be necessary for the protection of our own community, protection of our own political structures, social structures and education. That is, as we see it, a basic right for every community."

The CP would immediately reconstitute Codesa on the basis of cooperative self-determination of nations. This would give the various regional administrations a far bigger say in the deliberations and greatly reduce the role of the ANC and SACP which have an ideological, rather than a geographical base. It would give the people of each region a far greater say over the running of their own affairs. One of the main tasks would be to settle the boundaries between the different states. Perhaps the two which will cause the greatest difficulty would be the state which would be predominantly White or Afrikaner and an integrated (inter-racial) state which would probably incorporate most of the Transvaal and Free State gold mines and surrounding areas.

THE LIKELY RESULTS OF THE REFERENDUM

While no-one is predicting a landslide NP victory, most commentators feel, barring unforeseen circumstances, that there will be a narrow Yes vote. 35 percent of likely voters would vote Yes for a unitary state, predicted political analyst Donald Simpson on Feb 26. A further 33 percent would vote No while 32 percent would sit on the fence. If the CP could turn the question to mean "Do you want to be ruled by the ANC?" it would win.

"A clear majority of Yes votes, of the order of 57 percent or more, will reinforce the impetus which has produced Codesa," said the political analyst, Lawrence Schlemmer, in the *Sunday Star* (8/3/92). "A majority for the No vote, on the other hand, no matter how small, will have the promised consequence of a general election, a probable Conservative Party victory and a period of intense ferment. ... The really perplexing and

disconcerting outcome is the third possibility - a narrow majority for the Yes vote: say 51 to 53 percent. This result will deepen and intensify the very 'crisis' of confidence which made the referendum necessary in the first place. ... It could erode the very structure of the negotiation process itself. Of these three outcomes, a majority of No votes is the least likely. At least four major research organisations have conducted recent opinion polls and not one has suggested White majority opposition to the negotiation process." (*What is true, however, is that the polls were conducted before the CP campaign got fully underway.*) One factor which could whittle away the size of the Yes vote, continued Schlemmer, "is the size of the abstention rate; the number of voters who simply feel too uncertain, worried and confused to make a choice either way. ... Perhaps the wildest cards in the contest, however, are unpredictable events in our political scene over the next few days."

Warning the NP of apathy, disillusionment and discontent among the electorate, the *Sunday Times* (8/3/92) describes the voter as "battered by crime, recession, inflation, uncertainty and a sense of deprivation. He is fed on platitudes while U-turns in policy were made without anyone bothering to explain why they are necessary. Put bluntly, a person is so fed up with being treated as voting fodder that he is prepared to forgo what could be the most important political decision he will ever make or, even worse, give vent to his anger by voting No."

GOING FOR A YES VOTE

South Africa is in the midst of the dirtiest campaign in its history, as was predicted, by a number of observers. The National Party, which is in alliance with the Democratic Party, appears to be using every trick available to bamboozle and stampede Whites into voting Yes. Consider the following:

The Conservative Party has insisted for months that the government hold a general election to test its mandate for reform. In the 1989 election the number of votes polled by each party was far closer than indicated by the number of seats won. With 48 percent of the votes the NP won 94 seats or 56.6 percent of the 166 seats. The CP got 31.2 percent of the votes but only 39 (23.4 percent) of the seats. The DP received 20.4 percent of the votes and 33 (19.9 percent) of the seats. In other words, although only 17 percent of the votes separated the two main parties, the NP got 2.4 times more seats than the CP. If just nine percent of the electorate switched their vote from the NP to the CP, the CP would have the majority of votes and probably the majority of seats. With the swing shown in recent by-elections, the CP believes it can win an election. Knowing this, the NP chose a referendum, instead of an election, to prove its support.

THE QUESTION

White South Africans are being asked to say "Yes" or "No" to the question: "Do you support continuation of the reform process which the State President began on February 2, 1990 and which is aimed at a new constitution through negotiations?" The question stresses the process, not the end result of the negotiations. It gives no indication of what the new South Africa will be like. Will it have a strong authoritarian central government and be ruled by a Black majority with tendencies towards Marxism and totalitarianism? These valid concerns are not addressed. Although Codesa is not mentioned, at least it is implied because the way those negotiations are going and the direction they are heading is causing widespread concern. Treurnicht wanted voters to choose between cooperative self-determination and one man, one vote in a unitary state.

THE TIMING

The speed with which the NP got its referendum campaign off the ground is one of the many indications that the referendum was not panic reaction to the results of the Potchefstroom by-election. While a closer result may have delayed the referendum, it is clear that the NP had already realised it was losing support rapidly and the longer it delayed renewing its mandate, the less likely it was to get it. The date of the referendum was only announced on Feb 24 allowing just three weeks for campaigning. The CP therefore started at a major disadvantage. It first had to decide whether to boycott the referendum or take part in it. It then had to plan its strategy for the campaign. As a result, its campaign got underway a week after the NP's campaign.

FAIT ACCOMPLI

When he announced the referendum on Feb 20, State President FW de Klerk asked for suggestions for the referendum question and procedures. However when he finally got around to meeting with Treurnicht, on Feb 24, it was merely to inform him of the question and how the referendum would be handled. "The government leans backwards to find consensus with the ANC on extremely vital constitutional matters, but refuses to find consensus with the CP on a referendum, and rejected all conditions raised by the CP," complained Treurnicht. The CP wanted the referendum to be based on voters' rolls and constituencies, the guarantee that it would get equal time on radio and TV and the assurance that no taxpayers' money would be used to promote a Yes vote. It expressed its strongest disappointment that "the time for such a head-over-heels referendum is ridiculously short. ... It is altogether unfair." Treurnicht insisted that he would still demand that the people be allowed to express themselves on specific proposals for a new constitution once these are decided upon.

FOREIGN SUPPORT AND THREATS OF INTIMIDATION

De Klerk sent letters to 70 foreign governments to enlist their support for a Yes vote (*Citizen* 6/3/92). Similar letters were undoubtedly sent by the ANC. Predictably the governments responded favourably and, in many cases, warning of the dire consequences of a No vote. These threats became a major aspect of the NP's campaign. A return to full sanctions is threatened, together with international isolation and ostracism.

International sports ties will again be severed. Foreign investment will dry up (even though new investment has only trickled in since the current reform process began). Zach de Beer climaxed these threats by warning that battleships would appear off the Cape as an outraged international community implemented a naval blockade of South Africa, according to the *Sunday Star* (8/3/92). He warned that foreign action could be comparable with that taken against Iraq's Saddam Hussein. Treurnicht however scoffs at apocalyptic warnings of international action and notes that other countries are dependent on trade with South Africa. Equally important is that these tactics could prove counterproductive. Many people, especially independently minded Afrikaners, resented being told how to vote by foreigners for that smacks of colonialism and imperialism. They want to know whether they, or foreigners, take the final decisions on internal South African matters. Is South Africa so entrenched in the New World Order that it has already lost its independence?

FALSE PROMISES

In its desperation to get a Yes vote the NP is resorting to making promises it will not be able to keep. De Klerk spelt out 16 key principles that constitute his bottom line for the new South Africa on March 7. His party's minimum requirements are:

- The maintenance of standards (*but standards across the board have already dropped!*);
- A free market economic system (*but the government is already engaged in a massive socio-economic upliftment programme, a key element of socialism!*);
- Prevention of domination and the abuse of power (*but the government is already using its enormous power to stampede Whites to vote Yes!*);
- Effective protection of the ownership of private property against arbitrary actions by a future government (*but how? Zimbabwe's fine Lancaster House constitution has not prevented Mugabe from pushing for legislation which will confiscate land, at his price, from farmers who have no recourse to the courts!*);
- Job and pension security for civil servants (*but the government is in the process of firing 4 000 teachers!*);
- Impartial security forces that could never be at the beck and call of any political party (*but after two years the government still has not disbanded MK. The security forces of both Zimbabwe and Namibia are instruments of the ruling political party, not the government, because the armed wings of those parties were intact at the time a transitional government was instituted!*);
- Maximum devolution of power (*but the government keeps making arbitrary decisions, such as in education!*).

De Klerk assures voters that the new constitution would provide for:

- A multi-party democracy;
- A bill of rights;
- Separation of powers;
- An independent judiciary;
- Proportional representation elections;
- Strong regional government;
- The maintenance of language and cultural as well as community-orientated education for those who want it (*but no agreement on these items has yet been reached at Codesa and an interim government is imminent!*).

Commenting on De Klerk's promises, Ken Owen (*Sunday Times* 8/3/92) says, "He asks us to trust his judgment in preserving them. He says, for example, that he will insist on free enterprise, but he does not say exactly how that will be achieved. He talks of protecting private property, but does not really explain whether it will be achieved by the bill of rights, or tell us when and how the state might expropriate land. He says the constitution will protect minority representation, and he puts forward such curious mechanisms as a revolving presidency, which is unlikely to last, but he does not explain to the voters the more important concept of proportional representation (which not one in a hundred South Africans understands)."

Because crime is a major cause of dissatisfaction, the government launched a major crime-prevention plan on March 5, which, among many other measures, involves the recruitment of 11 000 police assistants. However for several months prior to this, the recruitment of policemen had been stopped as well as overtime payments and danger money because of shortage of funds. Announcing the plan, Law and Order Minister Hernus Kriel linked it directly to the referendum, saying: "I trust this will have an effect on voters." Both the CP and ANC agreed. The timing of "the announcement is clearly aimed at gaining votes for the referendum," said Moolman Mentz, the CP spokesman on Law and Order on March 5. The measures were solely aimed at persuading Whites to vote for the NP in the upcoming referendum said the ANC in a statement issued the following day.

Even here the tactic could prove counter-productive. The electorate has not forgotten that the NP won the 1989 election on promises it did not keep. Although there is an inherent faith in people to do what they say, many are sceptical about the fine words the NP is uttering.

PRESSURE FROM THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY

Immediately the referendum was announced, a group of businessmen launched a campaign (did they have prior knowledge?) to raise money for a Yes vote. More than R5 million has been raised and many full-page adverts have been placed in all major newspapers, up to two pages per issue. In addition, the general managers of some major multi-nationals and mining groups have instructed their employees to vote Yes. Sporting bodies are following the same procedure.

THE HUGE PUBLICITY BILL

The NP has hired the publicity firm Saatchi & Saatchi Klerck & Barret to run its referendum campaign. Expenditure is expected to exceed R5 million, according to the *Sunday Times* (8/3/92). The Private Sector Referendum Fund of the business community has already raised more than R3.4 million while the CP only has about R1 million although it hopes to spend more than R2 million. The only advertising it will pay for is that announcing public meetings. Clearly a victory for the No vote will be compatible with David beating Goliath!

MEDIA BIAS

All the media is rooting unashamedly for a Yes vote. This is clear from both the editorials and the cartoons lampooning Treurnicht. Perhaps the worst bias is displayed by the electronic media. Two examples suffice. A top SABC employee was dispatched to Britain before the referendum was announced in order to interview two British parliamentarians who favoured a Yes vote on popular TV programme, *Agenda*, on the evening of the announcement. Former State President, PW Botha announced on March 7 that he would vote No. His statement was carried in a short item on the 7:00am radio newscast the next morning. This was followed by a long, critical reaction by De Klerk and Dawie de Villiers, the Cape NP leader, totalling about three times the length of Botha's statement. However on the next newscast (8:00am), with a far larger audience, Botha's statement was omitted, making nonsense of the first two or three sentences of De Klerk's reaction!

THREATS OF A RETURN TO APARTHEID AND OF WIDESPREAD UNREST

Another scare tactic is that if the CP wins the referendum, it would reinstitute apartheid, thereby triggering off internal violence. Mandela and its trade union wing, Cosatu, joined the NP in harping on this theme. "Instead of answering the questions of the voters, the politicians indulge in an orgy of doom-saying, and they try to frighten people out of their wits," is how Ken Owen of the *Sunday Times* (8/3/92) described the campaign.

VOTING DAY FRAUD

Instead of using voters' lists and constituencies, voting in the referendum will be done simply with the presentation of an identity document. Both the document and the voter's left hand will be marked to prevent him voting again. However many people have more than one identity book and some will certainly make every effort to remove the mark from their hand. The possibility of fraud has been greatly increased by a provision exempting those who object to having their hand marked. It is very probable that many people will vote more than once.

When the New Republic Party disbanded in 1988, it stated that it still believed its policies were the best for South Africa but that it had been unable to convince the electorate of that fact. This statement shows that the NRP stood squarely within the democratic tradition. The NP undoubtedly also believes its policies are the best for South Africa. However, it seems unsure of its ability to convince the electorate (or at least a very large section of it) of that fact. Could it be, that instead of accepting the verdict of the voters, the NP is determined to impose its will on them by bamboozling them with false promises and stampeding them into voting Yes? Should that be the case, when the electorate discovers they have been deceived (if indeed they have been) a deep and bitter resentment will build up and, if they feel that they are unable to bring about change through peaceful, democratic means, they could well turn to violence.

FACTORS FAVOURING A NO VOTE

After a slow start, the CP's campaign finally got going by insisting that it will not return to apartheid or end negotiations. Instead it will be a more reliable negotiator on behalf of Whites. It also maintains that a No vote will not commit voters to the right wing. Rather it will be a warning to De Klerk and would give voters another chance in the later election. Because it cannot afford newspaper adverts, the CP is concentrating on getting its message out in the form of a letter to every household as well as old-fashioned door-to-door canvassing.

The CP's main theme is "cooperative self-determination". By this it means that it will continue to negotiate a constitutional settlement but instead of a unitary state being the basic presupposition, it wants a commonwealth of nations in which Zulus, Xhosas, Vendas, Whites and other ethnic groups would have their freedom. That is, a loose association of states, each of which would have wide powers over its own affairs. The CP has not outlined the boundaries of the states, saying these would be determined in bilateral negotiations between any two ethnic groups having a common border.

BLACK DISILLUSIONMENT WITH CODESA

The CP proposals are finding favour with some of the TBVC states and self-governing territories who, having managed their own affairs for many years, now fear they will be under the authority of a person from a different tribe. Moreover they are growing increasingly disillusioned with Codesa where they feel their concerns are not being addressed. Instead they are required to rubber-stamp secret agreements between the NP and ANC.

A mass action campaign by the ANC to destabilise the Ciskeian government, topple its military leader, Brigadier Oupa Gqozo, and set up an interim administration brought some of this disillusionment to the surface. Following unsatisfactory discussions between the Ciskeian government and the ANC on March 6, the Inkatha Freedom Party leader, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, warned that the ANC always attempts to destabilise those areas in which it tries to promote itself. In a surprise move on March 9, Ciskei, the IFP and Qwa Qwa called for the suspension of Codesa until the dispute between the Ciskei and the ANC had been resolved. They argued that

the ANC's campaign was contrary to the spirit of the National Peace Accord and the Codesa Declaration of Intent. These developments should be watched very carefully because they could badly damage Codesa.

The ANC's action is certainly confirmation that Communists can be trusted to break every agreement they sign and should be a clear warning to all who believe that their future interests can be safeguarded by guarantees in a constitution and a bill of rights. It should also serve as a reminder to the Black-ruled states that the ANC will not be satisfied until it controls their territories.

Should one or more of these states withdraw from Codesa before the referendum, it could have a profound impact on the voting. Many Whites support a negotiated settlement as the only alternative to major bloodshed. However they are most unhappy with Codesa because of the strong SACP presence and a unitary state which will guarantee Black majority rule. Also worrying them is the ANC's refusal to disband MK and its constant talk of nationalisation, redistribution of wealth and affirmative action. Because of ignorance or the intensity of the propaganda barrage, they are sceptical of the CP's plans for negotiations. However if these were accepted by one or more prominent Black leaders, MANY VOTERS WOULD HAPPILY VOTE AGAINST CODESA. SUCH A NO VOTE COULD SWING THE REFERENDUM.

PW BOTHA TO VOTE NO

An unexpected boost for the No vote came on March 7 when former State President, PW Botha, announced that he and his wife would vote No. He gave three reasons for his decision. "It is clear from the information that I have obtained that the SACP is dominating Codesa, in particular in working groups 1, 2, 3 and 5;" "Why the unnecessary haste? Consultation and negotiation done thoroughly take time;" and "I don't believe in a man-made New World Order." Expanding on them, he said, "Codesa is a wrong way of doing things. It is an expensive, artificial political Tower of Babel. I cannot participate in what I perceive as a direction of suicide for my own people. I cannot vote for a direction which will create an ANC-SACP-dominated government in South Africa and which will send us over the precipice." Although he did not support the CP, he believed in the self-determination of peoples. Other surprises which could affect the referendum are in the pipeline, according to rumours. Retired judges, army officers and other important personalities are expected to endorse a No vote.

THE EDUCATION CRISIS

Widespread dissatisfaction is being generated by the government's handling of education and this could certainly help the No vote. Over the past 18 months, parents have had to decide which of four models their school should follow. This has generated a lot of controversy and resulted in numerous meetings for parents. Now, a quarter of the way through the school year, the government has unilaterally scrapped the decisions taken by the parents and imposed a single model on the schools. Moreover it is reducing the number of teachers and increasing the cost of education to the parents, many of whom are already battling with heavy taxes and a high inflation rate. In addition, the government is unable to answer many of the questions arising from the change of policy, creating the impression that it does not have a clear, well-thought-out policy but is operating on an ad hoc basis. Parents fear an interim government will bring further, major changes.

THE CP'S STUNNING VICTORY AT POTCHEFSTROOM

The referendum was launched in reaction to the CP's victory in the Potchefstroom by-election on Feb 19. It won with a majority of 2 140 in a 75.4 percent poll, a record for a by-election. The size of the CP victory surpassed all expectations. In the last election, the NP held the seat, regarded as its safest rural seat, with a majority of 1 583. The NP defeat was especially bitter for De Klerk who has long-standing family ties with the university town. He had repeatedly said that the outcome would be a reliable barometer of White voter sentiment.

VIOLENCE ESCALATES AGAIN

After the customary quiet start at the beginning of the year, political killings flared up again in February. The weekend of Feb 21-24 was particularly bad with at least 35 people dying, 18 of Natal, 11 in the Transvaal and six in the Cape, in a number of separate incidents most of them involving indiscriminate shooting at cinemas, funerals and bars. A further 16 died in five incidents around the country on the weekend of March 6-9, most when funeral processions of Inkatha supporters were fired on with AK-47s at Sharpeville and Alexandra.

In the first 6 weeks of 1992, 95 people were killed in Natal and KwaZulu compared with 979 during 1991, Hernus Kriel said in Parliament on Feb 19. The killings peaked in Natal in December with 85 deaths and in KwaZulu in March with 54 murders. He gave the following figures for South Africa, omitting 1987 and 1988.

1985	823 people killed, 2 626 injured
1986	973 people killed, 2 548 injured
1989	659 people killed, 1 425 injured
1990	2 674 people killed, 4 328 injured (Mandela was released in 1990)
1991	2 239 people killed, 3 185 injured
Total	7 368 people killed, 14 112 injured

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The referendum was launched in reaction to the CP's victory in the Potchestroom by-election on Feb 19. It won with a majority of 2 140 in a 75.4 percent poll, a record for a by-election. The size of the CP victory surpassed all expectations. In the last election, the NP held the seat, regarded as its safest rural seat, with a majority of 1 383. The NP defeat was especially bitter for De Klerk who has long-standing family ties with the university town. He had repeatedly said that the outcome would be a reliable barometer of White voter sentiment.

VIOLENCE ESCALATES AGAIN

After the customary quiet start at the beginning of the year, political killings flared up again in February. The weekend of Feb 21-24 was particularly bad with at least 32 people dying, 18 of Natal, 11 in the Transvaal and six in the Cape, in a number of separate incidents most of them involving indiscriminate shooting at cinemas, funerals and bars. A further 16 died in five incidents around the country on the weekend of March 6-9, most when funeral processions of Inkatha supporters were fired on with AK-47s at Sharpeville and Alexandra.

In the first 6 weeks of 1991, 95 people were killed in Natal and KwaZulu compared with 979 during 1991. Herms Krügel said in Parliament on Feb 19. The killings peaked in Natal in December with 85 deaths and in KwaZulu in March with 54 murders. He gave the following figures for South Africa, omitting 1987 and 1988.

1991	2 339 people killed, 3 185 injured
1990	2 674 people killed, 4 328 injured
1989	639 people killed, 1 452 injured
1988	973 people killed, 2 248 injured
1987	825 people killed, 2 656 injured
1985	825 people killed, 2 656 injured
Total	7 368 people killed, 14 112 injured

(Mandela was released in 1990)

March 10, 1992

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
Dear Chief Minister,

I believe that you will find the attached analysis in understanding the current situation in our country.

Do be assured of our continued prayers,

With Sincere Christian Greetings,

Yours sincerely,


Edward Cain