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Johannesburg, 19 April 1994 -- The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) released for distribution today **The Point of No Return: South African Politics on Election Day, April 1994. The Point of No Return**, written by Padraig O'Malley, provides a succinct explanation of the electoral process, an introduction to the main protagonist and a cogent overview of the negotiations and the social and economic conditions that have paved the road to this historic election day. It is being distributed widely to thousands of observers in South Africa and around the world.

The US-based National Democratic Institute is internationally recognized for its contribution to elections in transition societies, having sponsored more than 75 election related programs in over 30 countries. In South Africa, NDI's four year effort to support the upcoming elections has featured:

* Project Vote, a 2.5 million dollar massive voter education initiative conducted by community based organizations and the broadcast media;

add 2

* international conferences to examine constitutional and structural experiences of elections in other countries;
* training and technical assistance to political parties that have never competed in elections;
* election observer/study missions;
* submissions to the Goldstone Commission and the Independent Election Commission on criteria for certifying an election as substantially free and fair;
* consultations with the IEC on monitoring, regulations and adjudication.

Padraig O'Malley is affiliated with the Center for Emerging Democracies at the University of Massachusetts in Boston. Acclaimed for his writings on the conflict in Northern Ireland, Mr. Malley has spent the last five years in South Africa writing a book on the country's transition which will be published in 1997 by Viking/Penquin.

NDI has a 20-person staff located in Johannesburg and Cape Town headed by the Institute's Senior Associate for Political and Civic Education, Patricia Keefer. In addition to Ms. Keefer and Mr. O'Malley, the staff include: Michael Stoddard, Deputy Director for Electoral Processes; Carl Larkins, based in Cape Town, who directs the voter education effort; and Eric Payne, who is coordinating the election observer mission. They are available to provide information and background to journalists and observers. Please direct all requests for interviews or meetings to Anna Wang or Sean Carroll at the above phone numbers.

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The Point of No Return:

The Politics of South Africa on Election Day

April 1994

National Democratic Institute for International Affairs
Padraig O'Malley

Cover Photo by Eric Payne

The Point of No Return:

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National Democratic Institute for International Affairs
Padraig O'Malley

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

From April 26 to 28, millions of South Africans will cast their first vote in an election that will establish the popular mandate for a constitutional democracy. After decades of massive civil disobedience, armed struggle, international protests and, more recently, three years of negotiations, South Africans will take a giant step in the dismantling of apartheid and the creation of a new political system. Elections in South Africa, in and of themselves, do not constitute democracy. However, if the results are accepted by the people, these elections will provide an opportunity for addressing the social, political and economic disparities that are the history of this divided society.

THE POINT OF NO RETURN: The Politics of South Africa on Election Day, April 1994 is published by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) in Washington, D.C. and Johannesburg, South Africa. This publication is intended to serve as a context for those who are observing, studying and evaluating the electoral process. We hope that the information contained in this document will contribute to a better understanding of the issues that confront South Africans in their transition to democracy.

NDI is indebted to Padraig O'Malley for his contribution to the research, writing and editing of *THE POINT OF NO RETURN*. Mr. O'Malley, affiliated with the John W. McCormick Institute at the University of Massachusetts in Boston, has provided his services to NDI while, at the same time, writing his own book on the transition in South Africa. His work has been augmented by the contribution of Pat Merloe, NDI Senior Associate for Election Processes, and Michael Stoddard, Assistant Counsel for Election Processes.

During the six years that NDI has been working in South Africa, the Institute's programs have benefitted from the dedication of many talented individuals. Smydge Perry has compiled much of the recent information related to the negotiations, election law and the political parties competing in the election. She has handled her research with diligence and proficiency, while also contributing to the editing and production of the publication. Over the years, several others have contributed to this document through the research and writing of briefing papers. Specifically, we would like to acknowledge the work of Matthew Eldridge, Brian Kelliher, Tim McCoy, Celena Slade, and the late Amy Biehl. The layout, design, production, and distribution of the publication was undertaken by Anna Wang and Nomsa Ngakane. Beyond our own original research, we have drawn from the work of others who have written for the Institute for Multi-Party Democracy, the South African Institute of Race Relations, the Financial Times, the Sowetan, the Economist and the Journal for Democracy.

NDI is also grateful to the many civic and political experts who volunteered their time to participate in the Institute's political training programs in South Africa. These experts came from 22 countries in Africa, North America, Latin America, Europe and Asia.

The Institute began it's program initiatives in South Africa in 1988 at the invitation of the then-exiled director of the ANC's Department of International Affairs, Thabo Mbeki. He requested that NDI begin to work with his and other political organizations to help prepare them for multiparty elections. NDI embarked on a multi-faceted, Multi-party program of voter education, political party and civic organization training, legal and administrative guidance, and election studies and observation. The support provided by the National Endowment for Democracy, which has made this publication possible, and the US Agency for International Development has been instrumental to our work.

Kenneth D. Wollack
PRESIDENT

THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE

FOR

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), based in Washington, D.C., conducts nonpartisan political development programs throughout the world. By working with political parties, legislatures, civic organizations and other associations, NDI seeks to promote, maintain and strengthen democratic institutions in new and emerging democracies. Since 1985, NDI has sponsored more than 75 election related programs in over 30 countries. Included among these initiatives, has been the Institute's work in the Southern Africa region -- Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia and Zambia.

In collaboration with the Centre for Development Studies at the University of the Western Cape, NDI has carried out an extensive four-year effort to educate millions of South Africa's first-time voters about the language, modalities and procedures of democratic elections -- **PROJECT VOTE**. Throughout the country, in its most remote villages, rural communities and urban locations, staff and trainers have worked with community educators to demystify the election process and minimize intimidation that is rooted in fear of the unknown. The Project has been enthusiastically accepted by South Africans and acclaimed by the international community.

In a separate program, NDI, together with the International Republican Institute and the Joint Center for Economic and Political Studies, has worked with 13 political parties to enhance their organization capacities to participate in election. These are political organizations that have never been afforded an opportunity to participate in national elections and that represent the majority of the previously-disenfranchised South Africans. The Project is designed to support the long term development of political parties.

NDI has sponsored South Africans to study election procedures in 20 countries around the world. The Institute has also sponsored three delegations of political leaders and election officials from 10 countries in Africa to observe and study the preparations for elections in South Africa. At the time of the voting, there will be a delegation of 50 people affiliated with the Independent Election Commission as international observers under the Institute's auspices.

The Institute's program offices are located in Johannesburg and Cape Town and are under the direction of Patricia Keefer, NDI Senior Associate for Political and Civic Organizations. The projects are additionally staffed by Anna Wang, Project Officer for the South Africa Election Support Project; Carl Larkins, Program Officer for Project Vote; Michael Goldberg, Program Assistant for Project Vote; and Michael Stoddard, Assistant Counsel for Election Processes.

THE POINT OF NO RETURN

The Politics of South Africa on Election Day

April 1994

On April 27, after several years of on-again off-again negotiations, South Africans of every color, race, and gender will have an opportunity to vote in South Africa's first democratic election.

It has been a long and arduous process, accompanied by horrific levels of violence, especially in Natal and the townships of the Eastern Rand; shifting political alliances; and acrimonious disputes between the two major players, who are in the end mutually dependent on each other, if a 'new' South Africa is to emerge out of the ashes of apartheid. South Africans will vote for a 400-seat assembly, which will serve as an interim government of national unity for five years, and write the new constitution.

April 27, 1994 will mark the end of 300 years of colonial rule in South Africa. The transition has been a remarkable process as the two main protagonists have sought to, and in the end found, common ground. Within the last year a 227- page interim constitution has been written and enacted into law. The Transitional Executive Council (TEC), gave blacks a significant say in government in the run up to the elections. A legal framework for elections was codified, and an Independent Election Commission (IEC), an Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA), and an Independent Media Commission (IMC) are in place. In addition, a National Peace Keeping Force (NPKF) has been formed, and sanctions are a thing of the past.

At the same time, the country is gripped by the most tragic violence, which appears to be impossible to bring under control because the animosities that fuel it are themselves the legacy of apartheid and the political intolerance it incubated in the townships. Furthermore, the economy, which for the first time in years is beginning to show signs of recovery, may only be

arrested by the establishment of a legitimate, democratically elected government.

The turning point in the negotiating process came on April 10, 1993, when the popular and charismatic Chris Hani, one of the most important leaders in the African National Congress (ANC), former Chief of Staff of *Umkhonto we Sizwe* (the military wing of the ANC), and the General Secretary of the South African Communist Party (SACP), was assassinated. The mass anger generated by Hani's death at the hands of a white, right-wing extremist ignited riots, violence, and boycotts which signalled to participants in the on-going negotiations process, especially the ANC, that they must project, however symbolically, evidence of significant progress towards transition and elections. In the Negotiating Forum, ANC Secretary General Cyril Ramaphosa pushed through a compromise to provisionally set an election date as a palliative to the restless youth who were increasingly voicing their sense of betrayal and frustration. In exchange, the ANC agreed to the demands of the South African Government and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) that the 26-party Negotiating Forum would draft an interim constitution, which would be the basis for a non-racial transitional government until an elected Constitutional Assembly would write a permanent constitution within two years of the April 1994 elections. Whites, who were taught to see the ANC as the agent of godless Communism, and told to be prepared for a "total onslaught" from its malevolent practitioners on South Africa's borders are apprehensive at the prospect of change that points to the inevitability of their having to live under black majority rule.

And then there are questions related to the nature of democracy itself: Is majority rule democratic rule? Is *black* majority rule democratic rule? What kinds of checks and balances are necessary to protect the rights of minorities in a divided society? Is majority rule democratic rule when a white elite controls the economy? Does black political enpowerment mean much if it is not accompanied by economic enpowerment? The ANC's decision to agree to a five year government of national unity, in which every party that receives 5% or more of the vote will get a place in the cabinet, was made partly to diffuse some of the explosive issues these questions raise.

Moreover, the elections which begin on April 26 and run through April 28, are only the beginning. There are many obstacles to a speedy, yet peaceful transition. Among them is the importance of building among the main political entities a broad consensus on the transition to a post-apartheid South Africa. These groups face the repercussions of a rapidly deteriorating economy, widespread political and criminal violence, and the need to mediate differences within their respective organizations. Not only must an agreement be reached among the elites across the broad spectrum of political opinion, but the agreement must also be cogently translated and sold to the fractious South African populous. Furthermore, it must be effectively implemented during the highly-charged transition period so as to preclude an exacerbation of violence-inspiring rivalries and turf battles.

THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS

The Negotiating Table

During 1993, negotiations under the auspices of the Multi-Party Negotiating Forum (MNF) made progress. The structure of the talks was multi-layered. At the top was the Plenary, *i.e.* all the political parties and their leaders. There was no permanent chairperson. Rather, the delegates relied on six revolving chairpersons. At the next level, there was a Negotiating Forum consisting of 208 members--all the members of the Plenary without the leaders. This body confirmed decisions of the next layer, the Negotiating Council (52 delegates plus 52 advisors), comprised of two delegates (including one woman) and two advisors from all 26 political parties meeting four days a week in public until an agreement was reached. A 10-person Planning Committee met daily *in camera* to develop recommendations, decisions and compromises to be fed into the Negotiating Council. The bottom layer consisted of technical sub-committees with specific issue mandates. These sub-committees reported directly to the Planning Committee. There were technical committees on: (1) constitutional matters; (2) fundamental rights in the transition; (3) the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC); (4) the Independent Media Commission (IMC); (5) the repeal of discriminatory legislation; (6) the Transitional Executive Council (TEC); and (7) violence. Seats on the technical committees were filled overwhelmingly by lawyers and experts who thrashed out some of the thorniest issues, *i.e.* those which the politicians chose to pass on.

The negotiations addressed, *inter alia,* such issues as: (1) the powers and functions of a TEC, which would take over functions of government and prepare the way for ensuing national elections; (2) the powers and functions of regional governments in a new constitutional order and whether this issue should be decided in multi-party negotiations or by an elected constitution-writing body (with the government and Inkatha preferring the former and the ANC preferring the latter); (3) the nature of a transitional constitution which would set out the powers and functions of an interim government of national unity (selected by the Constitutional

Assembly) that would serve as the basis for governance until the Constitutional Assembly drafted a permanent constitution; (4) whether, an interim government should govern for five years or longer; (5) the definition of a "government of national unity" as opposed to the definition of "power-sharing;" (6) the composition of electoral and media commissions; (7) the possibility of joint control of the security forces during the transition, to ensure free and fair elections; (8) the future of Transkei, Venda, Bophuthatswana, Ciskei (the TVBC states), and the KwaZulu region. The parties to the talks showed an unprecedented willingness to rise to the occasion, putting their efforts to forge a consensus above issues of partisanship. With April 27-28, 1994 named as the official dates of South Africa's first democratic elections, which would include for the first time the nation's African majority population, a massive effort has been undertaken to quell the violence and educate previously disenfranchised voters, so as to maximize their participation in the process.

Pre-negotiations

Throughout South Africa's modern history, the white minority, which makes up less than 13% of the country's population, has ruled over a disenfranchised black majority. Since 1948, under the leadership of the National Party (NP), the system of apartheid was introduced and refined so that less than 5 million whites controlled nearly all of the country's material wealth and political power. Despite the existence of domestic anti-apartheid forces, the waging of armed combat by exiled paramilitary forces, and pressure from the international community in the form of economic sanctions and boycotts, the South African government continued to maintain the system of *de jure* apartheid until the early 1990s--for more than 40 years.

Regionally, the implementation of United Nations Resolution 435, which led to the independence of Namibia in 1990, marked a turning point in Southern African politics. At the global level, radical changes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union--namely the collapse of Communism, had a direct influence on South Africa. With the collapse of communism, the government's rationale for the "total onslaught" it constantly warned against

became irrelevant. Moreover, the drying up of funds which communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union supplied the ANC with during its long years in exile severely curtailed the ANC's capacity to sustain its activities. The withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and the decline of the cold war in Africa paved the way for negotiations aimed at ending the military conflicts in Angola and Mozambique.

The dramatic changes in both the region and the world had an important impact on South Africa, providing a window of opportunity for enlightened leadership. Moreover, the South African economy was bleeding, caught in the vise-like grip of a severe economic recession, exacerbated by internal and external factors such as the decline in the price of gold, capital flight, disinvestment and international sanctions. The governing NP was loosing the support of both liberal and conservative elements within the white population. Besides that, it had to face an internal resistance movement--the United Democratic Front (UDF)--which had become increasingly more effective. In fact, large parts of the country had become ungovernable, and the government knew that while it could suppress the mass resistance, it could not defeat it. On the other hand, the ANC found it increasingly difficult to wage its guerrilla war. The forays into South Africa began to taper off in the late 1980s. Mozambique, which had assisted the ANC for many years was plagued by attacks by South Africa. As a result, Mozambique signed an accord with South Africa which prohibited the Mozambican government from providing assistance of any kind to the ANC. In short, it was in the interests of both the ANC and the government to negotiate. The NP government which came to power in August 1989, under the leadership of State President F.W. de Klerk, concluded that immediate political changes were essential for economic survival. This is not Afrikaner heresy: PW Botha, former State President and other National Party (NP) government ministers had met with Mr. Mandela on a number of occasions dating back to 1986.

When the ANC adopted the Harare Declaration in 1989, which was based on the 40-year-old Freedom Charter, the then-exiled African National Congress, set forth the conditions that would ultimately create a climate for negotiations. The Declaration called for the

"unconditional" release of the ANC's Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners, the legalization of previously banned organizations, and the removal of the state of emergency.

In February 1990, de Klerk agreed to legalize the entire spectrum of anti-apartheid forces, including the ANC, the SACP, and the PAC, and to release Mandela and other political prisoners. In addition, he committed the government to begin a process for negotiating the repeal of apartheid legislation and the establishment of constitutionally guaranteed, full-rights of citizenship for all South Africans. Shortly thereafter, the government and the ANC reached general agreement on the pre-conditions for beginning informal talks. This was followed in August 1990, by an outbreak of politically motivated violence that continues to destabilize the country and fracture the parties to this day.

Negotiations: CODESA

Despite the government's failure to fully meet the preconditions for talks and the continuing violence, 19 political entities agreed to convene the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) on December 20, 1991.

The Conservative Party (CP) and other right-wing forces demanded that the NP call new national elections, maintaining that the 1989 elections did not give the NP the mandate to pursue the course it had chosen. In a February 1992 by-election in Potchefstroom, the CP won a seat formerly held by the Speaker of the Parliament that had been held by the NP since 1948. In reaction, de Klerk called for a referendum among white South Africans on whether to proceed with the reform process. While in principle the ANC opposed the calling of the referendum, it reluctantly urged whites to vote "yes." The CP, after a fractious debate on whether to call for an electoral boycott or urge a "no" vote, opted for the latter; 68.7% of whites voted yes on the referendum, and de Klerk claimed an overwhelming mandate for continuing the reform process and negotiating for a power-sharing government.

The government, emerging with renewed confidence from its referendum victory, proposed that it would require a majority of 75% for the amendment or replacement of the interim constitution and 75% for the Bill of Rights. The ANC proposed a two thirds majority for changes in the constitution and 70% for changes in the Bill of Rights. After much negotiation, the ANC and the NP agreed to a 70% majority for changes in the constitution and 75% for the Bill of Rights. However, the ANC added a rider: It raised the issue of a deadlock breaking mechanism. It suggested that if the Constitutional Assembly was unable to achieve a majority, but not a 70% majority, for changes in the constitution, there would be a referendum after six months, with a two-thirds majority being sufficient to approve a new constitution. The government rejected this offer, arguing that the ANC had only to stall for six months and it would be in a position to write a constitution of its own making, and the ANC used the government's rejection to argue that everything had to be agreed to in the constitutional package or nothing was agreed to. Hence the impasse.

Mass Action

CODESA collapsed as a result of a series of tragic massacres occurring in May and June, 1992. On June 17, 1992, 40 residents of the Boipatong township were massacred, allegedly by Inkatha supporters living in nearby hostels. The attack was reportedly an act of revenge for a similar action that had taken place three weeks earlier when 20 Inkatha supporters were killed by what some witnesses claim were ANC Self Defense Units (SDUs). The Boipatong incident intensified the pressure on Mandela to pull out of negotiations and return to mass action as the means for ending apartheid and bringing down the government--the "Leipzig Option" employed so successfully in bringing down communist regimes in Eastern and Central Europe. On June 21, Mandela announced the ANC's withdrawal from CODESA, and issued a series of demands for action by the government to curtail violence.

He also appealed for intervention by the international community. The focus of action moved from CODESA, to the streets, and into the U.N. Security Council. The ANC said it

would not return to the negotiating table until the following demands met:

- The creation of a democratically elected and sovereign assembly to draw up a post-apartheid democratic constitution.
- An interim government of national unity.
- An end to state assassination squads; dismantling of special forces; prosecution of officers involved in violence; and an end to repression in tribal homelands.
- Fencing of migrant-worker hostels seen as focal points of violence, permanent police patrols, regular searches for weapons and a plan to turn hostels into family homes.
- Banning of dangerous weapons in public.
- International monitoring of violence.
- Release of all political prisoners.
- Repeal of all repressive legislation.

Boipatong became another crucial turning point on the road to democracy because it put pressure on de Klerk to agree to a U.N. investigatory mission as stipulated by the July 16, 1992, U.N. Security Council Resolution 765. Special Representative to the Secretary General, Cyrus Vance, was dispatched to South Africa to try to revive the stalled talks and secure a multilateral commitment to the curbing of violence.

In September, in the absence of a government response, the ANC's mass action campaign reached its climax when over 20 ANC supporters were gunned down by troops of the nominally independent homeland of Ciskei while marching on its capital, Bisho. The incident attracted international condemnation of both the ANC's alleged proclivity to provoke violence and the government's overt and clandestine backing of anti-ANC actions. A pall of political apprehension fell over South Africa after Bisho, forcing the major actors to reconsider their strategies and goals. The result was the resumption of bilateral talks between the ANC and government, principally between ANC Secretary General, Cyril Ramaphosa and South African

Minister of Constitutional Development, Roelf Meyer. As the two major players tried to achieve consensus, they simultaneously conducted talks with allies and adversaries from other parties both in and out of CODESA.

Following months of closed door negotiations, the ANC and the government bridged formidable gaps and were able to present similar proposals for the upcoming transitional period. These proposals were set out in a jointly agreed upon "Record of Understanding." Chief Minister Mangosuthu Buthelezi and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), balked at what they saw as the government's capitulation to the ANC/SACP alliance, particularly in matters relating to hostel residents and cultural weapons, which they interpreted as a slap in the face at Zulu traditions.

A significant step forward came when the ANC endorsed a policy proposal, which had its origins in a November 1992, discussion paper written by South African Communist Party Chairman Joe Slovo, entitled *"Negotiations: A Strategic Perspective."* The outline of the policy position envisaged the majority party ruling as part of an interim government of national unity, *i.e.* "power sharing" for possibly five years. Under the ANC plan, all political parties receiving more than 5% of the vote should be represented in the cabinet in proportion to their respective polling success. Slovo's argument for advancing this arrangement, viewed as pure pragmatism by its proponents, was based on the assumption that the interim constitution would provide a guarantee of continued employment for the existing civil service--the largest employer in South Africa--which might be hostile to an in-coming ANC government and disrupt the implementation of its policies. He maintained that should the ANC alliance win an outright majority in the first democratic elections, it would find it nearly impossible to make the government function in the interest of those who had elected it, if the white power-structure, in the form of the NP, were excluded. In short, if the ANC wanted to succeed in government, it would have to co-opt the NP.

Slovo's proposal was sharply criticized by various political factions within the ANC.

Pallo Jordan, Chris Hani and Winnie Mandela argued that it represented a departure from the principle of a "transfer of power" to support for "power sharing." However, the ANC leadership succeeded in securing the support of the National Executive Committee (NEC) for using the proposal as a basis for the January/February 1993 negotiations with the government and other parties.

Negotiations: The Multi-Party Negotiating Forum

The bilateral talks between Ramaphosa and Meyer produced, in addition to the agreements announced on February 12, 1993, a quasi-consensus on the parameters for multi-party talks. Official multi-party talks resumed on April 1, 1993, under the auspices of the Multi-Party Negotiating Forum (MNF). The new forum was much more inclusive than CODESA, with 26 parties convening at the first formal session. Notable participants, at least at the beginning, included the PAC, the CP, and its less militant off-shoot, the Afrikaner Volksunie (AVU), as well as previously excluded traditional leaders. The major hold-outs were the neo-fascist Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) on the extreme right and the Azanian People's Organization (AZAPO) at the other end of the political spectrum.

On April 1, 1993, the 26-party Multi-Party Negotiating Forum (MNF) convened at the World Trade Center outside of Johannesburg to resume negotiations over the rules and structures to govern the transitional period. The talks were suspended following the Hani assassination on April 10th, but resumed April 26th. The Negotiating Council (the working group of the Negotiating Forum) announced April 27, 1994, as the date for the election. This decision was reached with opposition from the IFP and the CP, who withdrew from the MNF in July. These two parties, along with the governments of Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, and other right-wing organizations, formed an umbrella organization called the Concerned South Africans Group (COSAG), which was later expanded and renamed the Freedom Alliance (FA).

The white right demanded a separate Afrikaner-majority state or region in which

Afrikaners could enjoy their right to self-determination through different classes of citizenship. These parties also warned of their intention to engage in a sabotage campaign targeting such state facilities as dams, electrical transmitters, and railroads.

At the center of the IFP's demands are regional autonomy and genuine federalism, in addition to other matters related to the electoral and constitutional process. For example, the IFP took particular exception to the notion of "sufficient consensus" as the mode for decision -making. Sufficient consensus was defined as a consensus that would allow the process to proceed. Which, in reality, meant the government and the ANC had to be in agreement.

After painstaking deliberations, the Negotiating Forum hammered out an interim constitution and provided for black participation in government, which would effectively level the playing field in the run up to the election. Given the severe divisions within South African society, and the unique nature of the now-crumbling apartheid state, the transition has been described by Steven Friedman termed as "reluctant" in his article, "South Africa's Reluctant Transition" in the Journal of Democracy. For both principals to the negotiations viewed the negotiated transition as a second-best option. Both Mandela and de Klerk, in their separate ways, came to realize their mutual dependence on each other and hence their unavoidable conclusion that a government of national unity was the only tenable option.

South Africa's whites compose approximately 13% of the population, but control nearly 98% of the country's wealth. Therefore, they are economically indispensable. The ANC, on the other hand, may enjoy a permanent majority in the eventual parliament and possibly a two-thirds constitutional majority in the Constitutional Assembly that will write the next constitution. At times, the two protagonists have shown an almost unseemly willingness to accommodate each other. Indeed one observer, Bill Keller of the New York Times, described the relationship between Mandela and de Klerk as a "minuet of wary respect."

THE INTERIM CONSTITUTION

On September 7, 1993, the South African Parliament voted to allow black South Africans to participate in the first multi-party national elections. The announcement of the election date was a significant victory for the ANC, but like most victories won in negotiations, it did not come without compromise. In exchange for the announcement, the ANC agreed to the NP demand that the Negotiating Council would draft an interim constitution to govern until the Constitutional Assembly wrote the permanent document within two years of the April election. This was a crucial concession to the NP since it believed it wielded more power in the Negotiating Council than they would in the Constitutional Assembly. Throughout the course of negotiations there were many attempts to change the election date but the ANC held firm. Meyer and Ramaphosa maintained that once they settled on the date the pressure of time was critical to the resolution of controversial issues.

The Constitution approved by Parliament will come into effect on April 27, 1994. The negotiators at the MNF worked to produce a constitution based on compromises. As stated, the new constitution would be a transitional one. South Africa's final constitution will be written by a Constitutional Assembly in accordance with the principles and guidelines of the Interim Constitution.

THE TRANSITIONAL EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

The Transitional Executive Council (TEC) is a multi-racial council that is responsible for overseeing the police, the army, the budget, foreign affairs, and civil service during the transition to a democratically elected system of government. Furthermore, it has representation from each of the parties who participated in the MNF, and who also agreed to participate in elections on April 27. The TEC was charged with facilitating the transition to democracy by:

- eliminating impediments to legitimate political activity;
- ending intimidation that might affect the transition;
- enabling all political parties to organize and canvass in all areas;
- ensuring the full participation of women in the transition;
- ensuring that no government or administration uses its powers to promote or prejudice a desired outcome.

In this regard, the TEC, recognizing that many of the 26 parties in the electoral process would be extremely skeptical of the SAP's or the SADF's capacity to behave impartially, set up the National Peace Keeping Force (NPKF). The NPKF is composed of 3,500 members of the SADF, SAP, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, and some homeland police and security forces. The NPKF has had 'teething' problems which have only been partially worked out.

Decisions of the TEC are taken by consensus, if possible or else (in most cases) by a 75% majority. A 75% majority is also needed in its subcouncils on policing, defence, and intelligence. A two-thirds majority is needed in its other subcouncils, such as regional government, finance foreign affairs, and the status of women.

The TEC may also direct the South African government, governments of homelands and independent states, political parties and organizations not to proceed with planned legislation or action which the TEC "has reason to believe" would be detrimental to the objectives of the

Council. On the other hand, the IEC is chiefly responsible for administering and monitoring the election and certifying whether the election is "substantially" free and fair. The IEC is empowered to promulgate and enforce regulations, including codes of conduct for election observers and regulations pertaining to political advertising. Among the IEC's subordinate structures are an Election Administration Directorate, an Election Monitoring Directorate, and an Election Adjudication Secretariat. A hierarchy of three judicial structures will resolve any disputes which come out of the election process, including Electoral Tribunals, Electoral Appeal Tribunals and the Special Electoral Court.

CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES

Parties involved in the negotiations can be divided into two groups: those who wanted as much as possible of the constitution to be entrenched before the Constitutional Assembly began drawing up the permanent constitution, and those who wanted the Constitutional Assembly to be free to amend the interim constitution in any way it wished.

After much discussion, heated debate, threats of walk-out, and actual walk-outs, the Negotiating Forum agreed that the Constitutional Principles agreed upon, would be binding on the Constitutional Assembly and guaranteed by a Constitutional Court.

These principles are:

(1) The Constitution of South Africa shall provide for the establishment of one sovereign state, a common South African citizenship and a democratic system of government committed to achieving equality between men and women and people of all races.

(2) Everyone shall enjoy all universally accepted fundamental rights, freedoms and civil liberties, which shall be provided for and protected by entrenched and justiciable provisions in the constitution, which shall be drafted after due consideration to *inter alia* the fundamental rights contained in chapter three of this constitution.

(3) The Constitution shall prohibit racial, gender, and all other forms of discrimination and shall promote racial and gender equality and national unity.

(4) The Constitution shall be the supreme law of the land. It shall be binding on all organs of state at all levels of government.

(5) The legal system shall ensure the equality of all before the law and an equitable legal process. Equality before the law includes laws, programs or activities that have as their object the amelioration of the conditions of the disadvantaged, including those disadvantaged on the grounds of race, color or gender.

(6) There shall be a separation of powers between the legislature, executive and judiciary, with appropriate checks and balances to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness.

(7) The Judiciary shall be properly qualified, independent, and impartial, and shall have the power to safeguard and enforce the Constitution and all fundamental rights.

(8) There shall be a representative government embacing multi-party democracy, regular elections, universal adult suffrage, a common voters' roll, and, in general proportional representation.

(9) Provision shall be made for freedom of information so that there can be open and accountable administration at all levels of government.

(10) Formal legislative procedures shall be adhered to by legislative organs at all levels of government.

(11) The diversity of language and culture shall be acknowledged and protected, and conditions for their promotion shall be encouraged.

(12) Collective rights of self-determination in forming, joining, and maintaining organs of civil society including linguistic, cultural, and religious associations, shall, on the basis of non-discrimination and free associations, be recognized

and protected.

(13) The institution, status and role of traditional leadership, according to indigenous law, shall be recognized and protected in the Constitution. Indigenous law, like common law, shall be recognized and applied by the courts, subject to the provisions of the fundamental rights contained in the Constitution and to legislation dealing specifically therewith.

(14) Provision shall be made for the participation of minority parties in the legislative process in a manner consistent with democracy.

(15) Amendments to the Constitution shall require special procedures involving specified majorities.

(16) Government shall be structured at national, provincial and local levels.

(17) At each level of government there shall be democratic representation. This principle shall not derogate from the provisions of principle (13).

(18) The powers, boundaries, and functions of the national government and provincial governments shall be defined in the Constitution. Amendments to the Constitution which alter the powers, boundaries, functions or institutions of provinces shall in addition to any other procedures specified in the Constitution for constitutional amendments, require the approval of a special majority of the legislatures of the provinces, alternatively, if there is such a chamber, a two-thirds majority of a chamber of Parliament composed of provincial representatives, and if the amendment concerns specific provinces only, the approval of the legislatures of such provinces will also be needed. Provision shall be made for obtaining the views of a provincial legislature concerning all

constitutional amendments regarding its powers, boundaries, and functions.

(19) The powers and functions at the national and provincial levels of government shall include exclusive and concurrent powers as well as the power to perform functions for the other levels of government on an agency or delegation basis.

(20) Each level of government shall have the appropriate and adequate legislative and executive powers and functions that will allow each level to function effectively. The allocation of powers between different levels of government shall be made on a basis which is conducive to financial viability at each level of government and to effective public administration, and which recognizes the need for and promotes national unity and legitimate provincial autonomy and acknowledges cultural diversity.

(21) The following criteria shall be applied in the allocation of powers to the national government and the provincial governments:

(1) The level at which decisions can be taken most effectively in respect of the quality and rendering of services, shall be the level responsible and accountable for the quality and the rendering of the services, and such level shall accordingly be empowered by the Constitution to do so.

(2) Where it is necessary for the maintenance of essential national standards, for the establishment of minimum standards required for the rendering of services, the maintenance of economic unity, the maintenance of national security or the prevention of unreasonable action by one province which is prejudicial to the interests of another province or the country as a whole, the Constitution shall empower the

national government to intervene through legislation or such other steps

as may be defined in the Constitution.

(3) Where there is necessity to speak with one voice, or to act as a single entity -- in particular in relation to other states--powers should be allocated to the national government.

(4) Where uniformity across the nation is required for a particular function, the legislative power over that function should be allocated predominantly, if not wholly, to the national government.

(5) The determination of national economic policies, and the power to promote interprovincial commerce and to protect the common market in respect of the mobility of goods, services, capital, and labor, should be allocated to the national government.

(6) Provincial governments shall have powers either exclusively or concurrently with the national government, *inter alia:*

(a) for the purposes of provincial planning and rendering of services; and

(b) in respect of aspects of government dealing with specific socio-economic and cultural needs and the general well-being of the inhabitants of the province.

(7) Where mutual cooperation is essential or desirable or where it is required to guarantee equality of opportunity or access to a government service, the powers shall be allocated concurrently to the national government and the provincial governments.

(8) The Constitution shall specify how powers which are not specifically allocated in the Constitution to the national government or to a provincial government, shall be dealt with as necessary ancillary powers pertaining to the powers and functions allocated either to the national government or provincial governments.

(22) The national government shall not exercise its powers (either exclusive or concurrent) so as to encroach upon the geographical, functional, or institutional integrity of the provinces.

(23) In the event of a dispute concerning the legislative powers allocated by the Constitution concurrently to the national government and the provincial governments, which cannot be resolved by a court on a construction of the Constitution, precedence shall by given to the legislative powers of the national government.

(24) A framework for local government powers, functions, and structures shall be set out in the Constitution. The comprehensive powers, functions, and other features of local government shall be set out in parliamentary statutes or in provincial legislation or in both.

(25) The national government and provincial governments shall have fiscal powers and functions which will be defined in the Constitution. The framework for local government referred to in Principle (24) shall make provision for appropriate fiscal powers and functions of different categories of local government.

(26) Each level of government shall have a constitutional right to an equitable share of revenue collected nationally so as to ensure that provinces and local governments are able to provide basic services and execute the functions allocated

to them.

(27) A Financial and Fiscal Commission, in which each province shall be represented, shall recommend fiscal and financial allocations to the provincial and local governments from revenue collected nationally, after taking into account the national interest, economic disparities between the provinces as well as the population and development needs, administrative responsibilities and other legitimate interests of each of the provinces.

(28) Notwithstanding the provisions of Principle (12), the right of employers and employees to join and form employer organizations and trade unions and to engage in collective bargaining shall be recognized and protected. Provision shall be made that every person shall have the right to fair labor practices.

(29) The independence and impartiality of a Public Service Commission, a Reserve Bank, an Auditor-General and Public Protector shall be provided for and safeguarded by the Constitution in the interests of the maintenance of effective public finance and administration and a high standard of ethics in the public service.

(30) 1. There shall be an efficient, non-partisan, career-oriented public service broadly representative of the South African community, functioning on a basis of fairness and which will serve all members of the public in an unbiased and impartial manner, and shall, in the exercise of its powers and in compliance with its duties, loyally execute the lawful policies of the government of the day in the performance of its administrative functions. The structures and functioning of the public service, as well as the terms and conditions of service of its members, shall be regulated by law.

2. Every member of the public service shall be entitled to a fair pension.

(31) Every member of the security forces (police, military, and intelligence) and the security forces as a whole, shall be required to perform their functions and exercise their powers in the national interest and shall be prohibited from furthering or prejudicing party political party interest.

(32) The Constitution shall provide that until April 30, 1999 the national executive shall be composed and shall function substantially in the manner provided for in Chapter 6 of the Constitution.

(33) The Constitution shall provide that, unless Parliament is dissolved on account of its passing a vote of no-confidence in the Cabinet, no election shall be held before April 30, 1999.

THE ELECTORAL FRAMEWORK

The Constitution and Parliamentary Structure

The 1993 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Interim Constitution) guarantees universal suffrage. The right to vote may be exercised by citizens and permanent residents who are 18 years of age or older and who are not subject to legal disqualifications, such as being ruled of unsound mind or incarcerated for certain serious offenses. The Interim Constitution also guarantees a secret ballot and the right of citizens to stand for election to public office.

Parliament is to be composed of two houses, the National Assembly (elected directly by the people) and the Senate (elected indirectly by the provincial legislatures). Parliament's term of office is to be five years following the 1994 elections, although it may be dissolved after a vote of no confidence in the cabinet or in the event that a new constitution is not adopted within the requisite time.

Parliament will function as a governing legislature and as a constituent assembly. Both houses sitting jointly will constitute the Constitutional Assembly. The Constitutional Assembly is to pass a new constitution within two years. A vote of at least two-thirds of all members of the Constitutional Assembly will be required to pass the new constitution. If that vote is not obtained within the two-year period, but a draft is supported by a smaller majority, the draft, under specified conditions, can be adopted in a referendum by 60 percent approval of the electorate.

The National Assembly will elect one of its members as the President of the Republic. The President will be the head of state and will exercise executive authority. Every party holding at least 80 seats in the National Assembly will be entitled to appoint an Executive Deputy President from among their members in the National Assembly. If no party or only one party holds that number of seats, the parties holding the largest and second largest number

will each be entitled to designate an Executive Deputy President from among their members of the National Assembly.

The National Assembly will consist of 400 members elected by proportional representation: 200 members from regional lists of candidates submitted by the contesting political parties; and 200 members from national lists submitted by such parties (or from regional lists if a party did not submit a national list). The Senate will consist of 90 members, 10 elected by each of the nine provincial legislatures.

Provincial legislatures range in size from 30 to 86 members. Members of these legislatures are elected by proportional representation from party lists submitted for each province. In addition to electing members of the Senate, these bodies exercise provincial legislative authority.

The Electoral System

On April 26-28, elections will be held for the National Assembly and for the provincial legislatures. The 400 members of the National Assembly will be elected from one ballot, counted according to different formulae for the 200 members to be selected from the parties' regional lists and the 200 members to be selected from their national lists. A separate ballot will be cast to elect members of the provincial legislatures.

In addition to the Interim Constitution, South Africa's electoral system includes the Transitional Executive Council Act, the 1993 Electoral Act, the 1994 Electoral Amendment Act, the 1993 Independent Electoral Commission Act, the 1993 Independent Media Commission Act and the 1993 Independent Broadcasting Authority Act. These documents taken together comprise a comprehensive system for governing South Africa's electoral processes.

Election Administration

The elections will be administered by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), which is composed of eleven South African Commissioners and five non-voting International Commissioners. The IEC is divided into three sections: administration; monitoring; and adjudication.

The Election Administration Directorate is responsible for preparing and administering the balloting and counting processes. The Monitoring Directorate is responsible for training and accrediting official IEC "monitors" as well as "observers" (who come from domestic and foreign nongovernmental organizations) and for accrediting "international observers" (who come from intergovernmental organizations, including the U.N., OAU, E.U. and the Commonwealth). It is also responsible for monitoring compliance with the Electoral Act and lodging complaints for adjudication. The Election Adjudication Secretariat is responsible for trying complaints against political parties and persons for violations of the Electoral Act.

Only those political parties that registered as participants in the election and that submitted candidate lists are permitted to contest the election. Such parties may receive financial assistance from the State Electoral Fund. If a registered party received a two
percent rating in an opinion poll accepted by the IEC, or if the party submitted the requisite number of signatures of eligible voters, the party qualified for an initial grant from the Fund. Parties that win at least one seat in the National Assembly will receive equal grants from one-half of the remaining revenues in the Fund, while the remainder of the Fund will be disbursed to the parties in proportion to the number of votes it received in the National Assembly and in the provincial legislatures.

Political advertising on broadcast media is not permitted, but political parties contesting the election are included in information programs addressing issues relevant to the

election. The equitable treatment of parties and non-discrimination in news coverage is required under the Independent Media Commission Act and the Independent Broadcasting Authority Act. The Independent Media Commission is empowered to monitor all South African broadcasting services to ensure equitable treatment of all political parties and to monitor state-financed publications to ensure that they are not used to advance the interests of any political party.

Augmenting these administrative bodies are the political party liaison committees created under the Electoral Act. The Party Liaison National Committee includes national party election agents from all parties contesting the elections at the national and provincial levels as well as IEC representatives. Party liaison committees are contemplated at the provincial and district levels as well, although it is unlikely that liaison committees will function in all districts. Party liaison committees consider administrative matters (such as the number and location of voting and counting stations) and ways to avert infringements of the Electoral Code of Conduct, which is part of the Electoral Act. They also take up violations of the Electoral Code of Conduct in hopes of resolving problems without resorting to formal complaint procedures.

The IEC's Monitoring Directorate independently monitors compliance with the Electoral Code of Conduct and other aspects of the Electoral Act. The directorate's monitors attend campaign rallies and other events and will be present in the voting and counting stations. Monitors have the power to investigate electoral abuses, may seize evidence and may bring complaints before the IEC's adjudication bodies. Political parties and individuals may also initiate complaints by contacting the Monitoring Directorate. The directorate's investigators follow up such contacts to determine whether a complaint has a substantial basis to be pursued and whether valid complaints should go adjudication, to mediation or whether they can be resolved informally.

The IEC's Election Adjudication Secretariat is composed of Electoral Tribunals (sitting at each of the country's 374 magisterial districts), Electoral Appeal Tribunals (sitting at the provincial level and potentially on circuits), and the Special Electoral Court (sitting as a circuit

court). Complaints with minor penalties, such as warnings and fines, may be brought before Election Tribunals; appeals may then go to the Electoral Appeal Tribunals. Matters where more serious penalties are sought go first before the Electoral Appeal Tribunals, and sanctions imposed must be approved by the IEC. IEC decisions on such sanctions may be reviewed by the Special Electoral Court. Serious electoral offenses, where imprisonment may be appropriate, are also to be referred for criminal prosecution.

Voting Procedures

Eligible voters who present a "voter's eligibility document" and who have not previously voted in the election may cast ballots at any voting station in the country. Voter's eligibility documents include: an identity document or a temporary identity certificate issued under the 1986 Identity Act or similar law; a temporary voter's card issued under the Electoral Act; a reference book issued under the repealed 1952 Blacks Act; an ID referred to under section 13 of the 1950 Population Registration Act; or, at a foreign voting station, a valid passport.

On April 26, persons who are unable to go to a voting station and who inform authorities of this will be allowed to cast "special votes." Ballot boxes will be taken to hospitals, homes for the elderly, and prisons on this date for special voting. Party agents will be allowed to inspect ballot boxes and observe special voting under conditions ensuring a secret ballot.

General voting will take place on April 27-28, between 7:00 a.m. and 7:00 p.m. Eligible persons inside a voting station at 7:00 p.m. will be allowed to vote. Approximately an hour before voting begins, election officials, party voting agents (PVAs), monitors and observers will inspect the ballot boxes, which then will be sealed. The steps in the voting process include:

- a person presents a voter's eligibility document;
- election officials inspect the document to determine the identity of the person, the

person's eligibility and that the person has not already voted; PVAs may observe and object to allowing a person to vote if they believe these criteria are not met;

- election officials then examine the person's hands to determine whether ink is present, showing that the person has already voted; PVAs may observe and object to the person voting at this step also;

- election officials then mark the voter's eligibility document and apply indelible ink to his or her hand to show that the person has voted;

- one election official will then tear a ballot for the National Assembly from the ballot book, and another official will place a stamp on the back of the ballot, thus authorizing its use; the ballot is then folded and handed to the voter;

- the voter proceeds to a voting compartment and marks the ballot, then goes to the ballot box, displays the official stamp on the back of the ballot to an official and places the ballot into the ballot box;

- the voter then goes to another table, where officials tear out and stamp a ballot for the provincial legislature (for the province where the voting station is located) and give it to the voter;

- the voter proceeds to a second voting compartment, marks the ballot, goes to a second ballot box, displays the official stamp on the back of that ballot, deposits it and leaves the voting station.

When voting ends each day, ballot box openings will be sealed, and election officials will account for all ballot papers. Ballot boxes will be kept in guarded places (e.g., local jails) until they are moved to counting centers. PVAs, monitors and observers will be allowed to watch

over ballot boxes in these places and to accompany them to counting centers. New ballot boxes will be used each voting day.

Any objection lodged against a voter by a party agent must be in writing. After consultation with the PVAs present, election officials will examine the voter's credentials and accept or reject the objection. If the objection is rejected, the voter is allowed to vote in the normal manner. If the objection is accepted: a) the voter is allowed to vote; b) the ballots are placed into an envelope with a serial number; c) the serial number is placed on the written objection along with a notation of the official's ruling; d) the envelope is placed in a special box for disputed ballots; and e) the objection is placed in a special packet. At the close of voting each day, the special ballot box and the objections are to be sent to the district electoral officer. In the presence of PVAs, monitors and observers, this official will review the objections and determine which ballots are to be discarded and which are to be counted.

Counting Procedures and Announcing Results

Ballot boxes will be transported under guard and with IEC monitors from their secure locations to the approximately 1,200 counting stations on the morning of April 29. PVAs, observers and international observers may follow the transport vehicles.

Before counting begins, the Counting Officer at each station must inspect the seals on the ballot boxes as well as on packets containing statements and other materials from the Presiding Officer at each voting station. The Counting Officer must then verify the statements by comparing them with the number of ballots in the boxes and information in other packets. Simultaneously, all ballots will be inspected to be sure they bear the official stamp validating them. Irregularities between the statements and the ballots must be reported to the Chief Director of the IEC's Administration Directorate (Chief Director).

Once the reconciliation process is completed, ballot boxes will be pulled at random,

brought to the various counting tables and their ballots mixed together. This process is intended to make it impossible to know the vote at any particular voting station, thus minimizing the basis for retribution against voters after results are announced.

A ballot will not be counted if: it lacks the official mark; more than one party is marked; or it is not possible to determine which party is selected. Any other ballot on which there is a mark or writing showing that the voter clearly indicated his or her choice of party must be counted. A PVA may dispute the acceptance or rejection of any ballot. That ballot is then marked "disputed" (as well as "rejected," if this is also the case). Disputed ballots are kept separately in "accepted" and "rejected" packets and are ruled upon by the Counting Officer. Accepted ballots are counted in favor of the party selected.

Before the results at any counting station are unofficially announced and reported to the Provincial Electoral Officer and to the Chief Director, the Counting Officer must report the count to the PVAs and allow them to challenge the tally. PVAs may also bring any alleged irregularities or inaccuracies to the Counting Officer's attention at that time. The allegations must be reported to the Chief Director. If no challenge to the tally is lodged, PVAs must sign the tally, and it is deemed accepted by the parties. If an objection is lodged, the Counting Officer will determine whether a recount is required. That decision may be appealed to the IEC.

In addition to these procedures, any party will have the right, within 48 hours of the close of voting, to lodge an objection to any aspect of the election that is relevant to certification of the election results. The IEC is required to investigate any such objection and to rule upon it. The IEC may, upon finding a serious irregularity and upon good cause, order a deduction of votes from a voting station or even from a particular party or parties responsible for violence, intimidation, fraud or any other irregularity of a material mature.

Unofficial results will be made public at the counting station and at the IEC as they are reported. Not sooner than 48 hours after the close of voting -- and after all alleged

irregularities, challenges and objections have been resolved -- the IEC will combine all of the tallies. Seat allocation for each party for the National Assembly will be determined before those for the provincial legislatures. The IEC may then certify the election as "substantially free and fair" and designate, from party lists, the representatives of each registered party for the respective seats.

VIOLENCE

The greatest threat to the prospect of a smooth transition to a democratic South Africa is political violence. South Africa ranks among the most violent in the world. Johannesburg has the rather dubious distinction of being the murder capital of the world, with a per capita murder rate that is higher than any other city in any other country.

Eighteen thousand people have died as victims of political violence in the last ten years. The level of political violence has escalated dramatically since 1990: 3699 deaths in 1990; 2706 in 1991; 3347 in 1992; and 3706 in 1993. The figures for 1994 are even more appalling. According to the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), 1994 could be the most violent year to date. Here are two examples: at least 111 people were killed and 402 injured in election-related violence and intimidation in the last ten days of March, 1994; and 101 people were killed in KwaZulu/Natal in the first six days after a state of emergency was declared.

In the usual course of things, the ANC would point the finger of blame at the government and Inkatha, and talk about a "third force"; Inkatha would blame the ANC; and the government would blame the ANC and Inkatha. And then the bombshell: Judge Richard Goldstone released an interim report on criminal violence by elements within the South African Police (SAP), the KwaZulu Police (KZP) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) on March 18, 1994. The report disclosed that a "third force" did in fact exist, and that its tentacles reached into the highest echelons of the SAP's command. The report named a number of senior officers, including the Deputy Commissioner of the SAP, and the head of the Department of Counter Intelligence, as having full knowledge of organized hit squads, train violence, hostel violence, and the supply of armaments to Inkatha members.

However, there are numerous other causes of the violence, including dire economic conditions, the slow pace of change, acts of revenge, and the brutal war over political turf,

especially in KwaZulu/Natal. Conditions there had become so precarious by the end of March 1994, that the TEC and the government were compelled to declare a state of emergency, in order to prevent the region's free fall into anarchy.

The youth are at the heart of the problem. At least one generation of the youth have come to adulthood since the Soweto uprising of 1976, when the government tried to make Afrikaans the medium of instruction in African schools. "Liberation before education" became the rallying cry in 1984. Uneducated, unemployed, and perhaps unemployable, the young have known only a culture of protest and confrontation, of mobilization and resistance; where a different point of view is a wrong point of view, when every action, no matter how heinous, could be justified in terms of the liberation movement.

For the young, militancy is part of the culture of resistance. The suspension of the armed struggle appear to many of them to be a capitulation to the government. In the four years since de Klerk unbanned the ANC and the SACP, and released Mandela, they have seen little change. They were told to be tolerant--a concept that has little meaning to a generation brought up on the intolerance of the repressive state and their own intolerance of all who would question their tactics and methods.

The fighting in Natal began in 1985. It is a war between two factions of Zulus which has claimed at least 10,000 lives since 1987. At that time, the main protagonists were supporters of Inkatha and the United Democratic Front (UDF), which later disbanded after the legalization of the ANC. The fighting resulted from rising tensions between the two organizations over dominance of geographical territory and ideological differences. These differences were exacerbated by conditions of poverty, unemployment and homelessness.

In the lush valleys, it is Zulu against Zulu, a struggle for territory and political control, the have-nots murdering the have-nots, the ANC intent on marginalizing Buthelezi, whom it brands a collaborator with the apartheid regime, and Inkatha intent on maintaining

its power base.

It is a bitter war, both sides vociferous in their blame of the other, each seeing every killing strictly in terms of the narrow context of its own righteousness. The ANC claims that the KwaZulu police and the South African police are using Inkatha to destroy the ANC, Inkatha claims the ANC are out to destroy Inkatha just as it had tried to destroy the PAC, AZAPO, and BCM. It is a zero sum gain in which neutrality is the most dangerous position of all. Not to support either side leaves you open to the predations of both.

The violence is also fueled by the desperate socio-economic conditions and the cultural imperative to avenge every killing. Each murder initiates its own cycle of killings. Revenge is a primordial but ever present motive.

But when the violence swept down from Natal to the Transvaal along the Eastern Rand, engulfing the townships of Kagiso, Tokoza, Sebokeng, Katlehong and Soweto, leaving thousands dead, the character of the violence changed. It became tribal. On one side, Zulu migrant workers and hostel dwellers see the ANC as a Xhosa-dominated movement that is out to destroy all opposition to it and establish a one-party state. On the other side, the ANC sees the violence as being orchestrated by cabals within the security forces and Inkatha to disrupt the ANC from organizing on the ground. To "the comrades", Buthelezi is the enemy of the people, a collaborator who built his power base in KwaZulu in collusion with the apartheid regime. Buthelezi's refusal to negotiate with the government until Mandela was released and the ANC unbanned counts for little. In South Africa, opinions don't just harden, they become embedded in concrete.

The accusations are familiar. The ANC insists that the government can stop the violence; the government insists that it cannot. Inkatha insists the violence is tribal, the ANC insists it is not. However, not to acknowledge that there is a strong tribal element to the killings in the Transvaal has become increasingly difficult.

The reluctance to do so has much to do with the nature of the problem itself. Since the ruling National Party justified its policy of separate development on the grounds that each African tribe constituted a separate nation that had the right to self-determination and an independent Homeland, to argue that there are tribal differences insinuates somehow that the government is correct; one becomes, if only by the flavour of one's opinion, an apologist for the regime, and therefore a racist.

The National Peace Accord (NPA) created the Natal Regional Dispute Resolution Committee (RDRC) to monitor unrest in the region. Last year, the RDRC reported that "deficiencies in police investigations and court procedures, an inadequate witness protection system, bureaucratic delays in funding the NPA, and a failure to fully implement its police code of conduct...compound the problems [in Natal]."

In fact, these violence-inspiring cultural, economic, and social conditions are often exploited by both organized and rogue elements in the security forces and political leaders to undermine the opposition and advance their respective causes. Many argue that no party or faction approached the negotiating table with clean hands; all are culpable, but one cannot emphasize enough the role of the South African Police.

An agreement was reached on November 25, 1991, securing a good faith agreement between Buthelezi and Mandela to hold a peace summit in the near future. On June 23, 1993, Mandela and Buthelezi met for the first time in over two years in a church-brokered meeting. The two leaders committed themselves to making joint appearances in areas of endemic rivalry-fed violence--but the commitment was never kept. They also agreed to the prohibition of weapons at political rallies and to the allowance of free political activity in their respective parties' so-called "no-go" areas--but that commitment too was never kept. The two have only met three times since then--at the convening of the Multi-Party Negotiation Forum in April, 1993, a year later in March 1994, and most recently at the four-party summit with King Zwelithini and President de Klerk. All three meetings have proved

to be inconclusive.

Even though the killings have continued, intensifying in Natal and the East Rand, steps have been aggressively pursued to try and stem the violence. The SADF replaced the Internal Stability Units (ISUs), which were accused of initiating violence in the East Rand. The TEC implemented training plans for the National Peace Keeping Force (NPKF) and arrangements were made for international observers from the United Nations, the Commonwealth, and the Organization for African Unity to be deployed to monitor the elections.

The National Peace Committee, established in 1991 to oversee compliance with the National Peace Accord, has had limited impact. In an effort to enforce the principles of the National Peace Accord, an independent commission, under the leadership of Justice Richard Goldstone, was established to investigate specific incidents of violence, as well as the social and economic conditions which create an atmosphere conducive to violence. The Goldstone Commission, which has been widely praised for its even-handedness and impartiality, has conducted several investigations and issued numerous reports which have contributed to an understanding of the complex nature of political violence in South Africa.

Three landmark reports--one published on July 6, 1992, the second on July 23, 1992, and the third on March 17, 1994 illustrate the breadth of the Commission's work. In the first report, which entailed an investigation into the Boipatong massacre, the Commission severely chided the government for failing to heed the warnings and implement the recommendations of its previous reports concerning township violence. In particular, the Commission reiterated its suggestions that the government fence off and police worker- hostels and ban the public carrying of cultural weapons, which had been previously exempted from the 1991 ban on dangerous weapons. It was not until September 1993, after the Bisho massacre, that de Klerk agreed to implement these recommendations. In addition, this report labeled the ANC's charge of the government's complicity in the violence "unwise, unfair and dangerous."

The second report examined the SAP's response to Boipatong and township violence generally. This report, authored by Dr. Peter Waddington of the United Kingdom, condemned the "woefully inadequate" response of the SAP to the Boipatong massacre. Although Waddington found the white police force's leadership and organization to be alarmingly unaccountable, the Commission uncovered no evidence to suggest the government's complicity, forcing the ANC subsequently to pull back from its accusation.

In the third report, the Commission alleged that senior police personnel, including the Deputy Commissioner of the SAP, were engaged in "third force" activities, designed to destabilize the country. It is expected to more fully document these findings in the near future.

Responses From The International Community

Prompted by the continuing violence, both the United Nations and the Goldstone Commission called for a drastic change in the command structure of the security forces. They suggested that the forces first be brought under multi-party control, and secondly, be subjected to international monitoring and sensitivity training. De Klerk refused to acknowledge widespread police misconduct--although he may be compelled to alter his view, in the light of Judge Goldstone's recent findings and on-going investigation--describing it instead as a series of individual unsanctioned aberrations. Notwithstanding his past reticence, he agreed to allow international monitoring of the violence by the United Nations and other inter-governmental organizations such as the Organization for African Unity (OAU) and the Commonwealth.

On July 15, 1992, the U.N. Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 765 out of its concern for the escalating violence in South Africa. The key provisions were: (1) a condemnation of the massacre at Boipatong and its subsequent handling by the SAP; (2) an urging of the South African government to take "immediate measures to bring an effective end to the ongoing violence and to bring those responsible to justice; and (3) an invitation to the Secretary General to appoint a Special Representative, Cyrus Vance, to meet with the parties,

reconvene negotiations, and end the violence.

Both the ANC and the government agreed to the presence of an impartial U.N. team to observe demonstrations and township violence. Upon the culmination of Vance's 10-day visit, Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali reported to the Security Council the need for approximately 30 observers to be stationed throughout the country. The OAU, the European Community (EC), and the Commonwealth also stationed observers, bringing the total number to 100.

The observer mission was initially headed by Hisham Omayad, a senior U.N. Secretariat official. The mission drew criticisms of inefficacy and Omayad was replaced after 6 months by Angela King. Noting the United Nations' prior experimentation with a civilian police monitoring force, which was successful in Namibia, some argued that such a force could be the United Nations' most important contribution to peace if international monitoring in South Africa proved ineffective. Prior to his assassination, Chris Hani had been designing a peace corps intended to combine international and domestic forces to maintain law and order in the context of an election environment. Dispelling widespread fear of violence among the disenfranchised could pave the way for greater voter turnout and enhance confidence in the voting process.

All parties and factions in South Africa are guilty to varying degrees of their respective failures to fully control their constituents and accept full responsibility for actions taken in their names. Stability will not be easily achieved by a new government or new constitution. There will still remain a wide gap between white and black, and the haves and have-nots. It will persist as long as apartheid remains as deeply ingrained in the economy, culture and demography as it is now, and as long as blacks are denied meaningful economic rights and equal opportunities. Most disenfranchised South Africans are under the age of 35 and lack the educational opportunities afforded to whites. A study by the International Monetary Fund concludes that 50% of blacks are unemployed, most of the other 50% are "underemployed", and many are arguably fearful, angry, and impatient.

Many experts contend that sincere efforts must be made multilaterally in order to rein in violence and subdue exploitation of fear and political intolerance. A strengthening of the international monitoring of the violence and the justice system and a restructuring and retraining of the South African police force, both consistent recommendations of the independent Goldstone Commission, are essential to an environment of subsiding violence. Rigorous enforcement of the National Peace Accord's principles and code of conduct and more pronounced efforts by the National Peace Committee to mediate and resolve disputes among the various parties would also contribute greatly in this regard.

THE ECONOMY

Caught between the First World and the Third, South Africa teeters on the brink of economic catastrophe. The sheer weight of the Third overwhelms the First and drags down South Africa to a level where the country could succumb to the African malaise: slow growth, big families, low investment, and now AIDS.

During the glorious boom days of the 1960s, the economy grew at an average rate of 5%-8% per year; in the bust years of the 1980s the growth rate fell to 1.9% per year, and then to a meager rate of 1.4% per year. Since the population grew at a rate between 2.4% and 2.8% per year, average income per person fell, and continues to fall, reflecting the inability of economic growth to keep pace with population growth. Per capita incomes at the end of 1993 are likely to hit their lowest level since 1970. Since 1973, inflation has exceeded 10% per year except for 1993.

The gold mines, which used to generate half of South Africa's exports, at least 20% of its taxes, and most of white wealth and black employment, are gradually winding down; the shafts get deeper, the ore gets poorer; in the 1980s output fell by 10%. With the price of gold pegged at R933 or thereabouts, 40% of South Africa's gold is produced at a loss, and 45% of the industry's labor force of 190,000 men work on mines unable to make a profit.

The root cause of the industry's problems are a relentless cost-price squeeze. While the price of gold continues to hold firm, costs have risen inexorably at an inflation rate of about 14% per annum. The result: labor has been shed on a vast scale, approximately 40,000 workers lost their jobs in 1990, and a similar number in 1991. In the 1970s the mines also began to run out of skilled whites, cheap labor, energy, and ore.

Exploration has dwindled to a fraction of what it once was. By 1992, gold production which had peaked in 1970 at 1000 tons, was down to 614 tons. New mines are not being

opened to replace depleted ones. Most of the best prospects are very deep mines which would cost about R3 million to start. The price of gold would have to double before such projects would be viable. Banking sanctions, including the denial of International Monetary Fund funding, have cost South Africa $3 billion since 1985. In order to meet its foreign debt obligations, South Africa had to run its economy on a cash basis. It had to export more than it imported. But in order to do so, the government had to curtail the rate of economic growth to keep imports under control. Although some estimates put the loss of foreign exchange due to trade sanctions at $2 billion, the South African government is emphatic: trade sanctions did not break the South African economy. On the contrary, it insists, it encouraged the development of an export culture.

In the late 1980s the government, in an attempt to offset the effects of international sanctions, began a phased program of privatization to sell shares of state corporations and other public enterprises. The ANC compared the government's actions to "selling the family silver without even consulting the family," and forced the government to retreat from the active pursuit of privatization.

The public sector faces substantial problems of a different kind. From 1962 to 1985, its share of the economy jumped from 22% to 38%, and by 1989 the government employed more than one-third of all whites. Much of the budget financed the police, the prisons, the military, and the huge bureaucratic apparatus it took to run the apartheid state, along with a slew of inefficient state-owned industries. This costly system requires the world's highest tax rates.

Moreover, despite the vast sums which were spent to relocate 3.5 million blacks and to encourage industry in the ten homelands (all of which were bankrupt by the 1980s), those subsidies consumed 9% of South Africa's budget. Unemployment in the homelands has risen to to at least 50%. Meanwhile, one half of the country's 27 million blacks have taken up residence in townships on the edges of South Africa's cities. In the 1980's the urban population grew at a rate of 7% a year and more than 6 million blacks became squatters. This created a

housing problem of undefinable proportions.

The catalogue of inequalities is exhaustive. South Africa has one of the most unequal distributions of income in the world. Three-quarters of the people receive only 30% of the income. Average white incomes are thirteen times those of blacks; 60% of blacks live below the poverty line; 50% of the black labor force cannot find jobs in the formal sector of the economy. Inequality between urban and rural blacks is also very high with up to four-to-one differences in income levels.

Out of the 13% of surface land that is arable, whites own about 83%. Since a third of the 30,000 full-time white farmers account for three-quarters of farm output, the concentration of productive land ownership is even more pronounced.

Inequalities in the distribution of income are reinforced by inequalities in the distribution of social spending. State spending per capita is five times as much for whites as it is for blacks, with Indians and coloureds coming somewhere in between. White pensions are twice as large as those of blacks; in the past, white state schools got four times as much per pupil; whites have four times as much spent on their health compared to non-homeland blacks, and ten times as much compared to homeland blacks. Various surveys suggest that one-third of black children under 14 years of age are underweight, and half the rural population suffer from malnutrition.

Another statistical overview: the richest 5% of the population own 88% of all personal wealth. The income received by over 50% of the population is insufficient for families to maintain themselves at a minimal standard of living; 81% of households in the homelands, the majority of which are female-headed, are living in dire poverty; over 30% of the working-age population is unemployed; in 1986, 8 million urban Africans lived in half a million "small housing units", with an average density of 16 inhabitants per unit.

Despite these enormous disparities, some blacks were able to better their economic status.

In the last 20 years, white living standards have fallen and black unemployment has risen. The main winner has been unionized black labor. Between 1976 and 1985, pay inequality between blacks and whites was reduced by roughly half, and by 1989 the gap had shrunk to the point that blacks got 15% less than whites for doing the same job. The shift in power towards black trade unions, rapid upward mobility, and more skill-intensive production techniques, should all ensure that black wages will continue to rise. Ironically, South Africa's real economic divide is no longer strictly racial; it is between the haves and have-nots.

The political future of South Africa cannot be divorced from the debate over the country's economic future. Economic factors resulting from international isolation, apartheid's drain on national resources, and external factors (such as the decline in the price of gold), played a pivotal role in persuading the National Party that change was inevitable. Economic changes, and particularly the redistribution of wealth from the minority to the majority, are also essential components of the anti-apartheid platform. Opinions on the economic future of South Africa vary greatly across the political spectrum, from laissez-faire free enterprise to the total nationalization of the economy. However, it is clear that economic restructuring will be critical to the success of the political transition. There is general agreement that the country must sustain a 5.5% per annum growth rate, as opposed to the 1993 low of minus 2%, to absorb its work force. In order to maintain a 5.5% growth rate between 1990 and the year 2000, some economists have estimated that at least $10 billion in foreign capital annually, or an inflow of $100 billion over a ten year period would be required--a target that would be difficult, if not impossible to meet.

Currently, the South African economy could best be described as being in a state of limbo. There are two major policy issues to be addressed:

- can social reform by a post-apartheid government legitimate the economic and the political system and address the aspirations of the poor; and

- can such political and social reform take place without excessive market intervention that undermines investor confidence--a crucial precondition for economic growth in a mixed economy.

The government published their Normative Economic Model, which emphasized the structural flaws of the economy as the root cause of the past decade of stagnation: persistent double-digit inflation, declining investment and efficiency, increased government spending, and the juxtaposition of rising real wages and falling formal sector employment.

ANC policy-makers realize that in order to break the vicious cycle of South Africa's failing economy, it must re-establish business confidence and reassure South Africa's business community and financial institutions. The ANC's economic policy, as stated in its reconstruction and development program, supports a mixed economy in which cooperative and private ownership co-exist. The ANC pins its hopes for addressing unemployment on heavy investment in new housing construction. The organization submitted to the Negotiating Forum, a draft bill of rights, which would guarantee basic economic rights, including the "progressive expansion of a floor of minimum rights" and the right of the state to divert resources from richer to poorer areas. The Forum however, turned down these provisions. Within the ANC there are capitalists, socialists and communists, and all argue for a different "mix" of the economic basket. However, most agree that a total reorganization of the economy will be necessary. A Swedish-style social democratic economic program, where the government controls a significant percentage of productive resources, has become popular among some ANC economists. These same economists, however, acknowledge the absence of the wealth that sustains the Scandinavian system.

Mandela has issued what critics call conflicting statements on the ANC's economic views, from reassuring future investors that the ANC will pursue an open capitalist economy, to threatening to nationalize key industries such as mining. Mandela is also on the record as saying that the state will take ownership of mineral rights away from the mining houses. Cyril

Ramaphosa told journalists that the ANC would have to reconsider the honoring of foreign debt accumulated by South Africa under the apartheid regime. Such statements have made the NP and possible international investors extremely nervous. However, Derek Keyes, the Minister of Finance, and Trevor Manuel, head of the ANC's Department of Economics, in appearances before the IMF and the World Bank successfully made the case for the economic and fiscal policies that the government of national unity would pursue, and were promised the assistance they sought, much to the relieved sighs of the business community.

The difficulty for the ANC leadership will be to respond to the inevitable demands and high expectations surrounding a new government. Trade unions will demand greater say in industrial restructuring, with members complaining of the slow pace of black economic advancement or of uneven access to capital. The impoverished masses will cry out for government spending on expensive social service programs such as government housing, job training, and rural/township electrification.

The NP has clearly stated that a free-market economic system in a future South Africa is "non-negotiable." Ironically, it was under a NP government that the South African economy was nationalized. It is well known that most experts believe that apartheid has been the most tremendous drain on the South African economy.

The major actors in South Africa realize the importance of economic recovery and growth. Currently, one-fourth of the country's population of about 40 million controls 70% of the country's income, and at least 60% of the black population lives below the poverty line. About 7.2 million people live in the nominally independent "homelands" of Transkei, Venda, Bophuthatswana, and Ciskei--technically outside of South Africa. Unemployment, homelessness and poverty of daunting proportions await whatever new government comes into power. The black population is growing at a rate of 3% per year. By the year 2010, there will be nearly 60 million people in the country. Derek Keyes, NP Finance Minister, maintains that in the short run, at least four to five years, the best the economy can do will be to generate a 1% increase

in employment per year. (The ANC of course, strongly disagree.) Whatever the case, given the endemic unemployment in Third World countries and the chronic unemployment in Western Europe, it will be very difficult to generate, on a yearly basis, a sufficient number of jobs to absorb the new entrants to the labor market, not to mention, reducing the backlog by the end of the first five year term of the new government. These facts are sobering for all sides of the economic debate. Moreover, the continuing violence and instability has frightened even the most positive future investors. Discussion on the role of economic organizations and the business community in future negotiations has continued. While progress toward economic compromise has occurred, this progress has occurred, via the National Economic Forum (NEC), primarily in the industrial sector of the economy, where the trade unions and other economic interest groups have always enjoyed a considerable amount of influence, and have had previous experience in negotiations.

With respect to banking, there is a yawning chasm between the formal banking sector and the black community. The symptoms, as in other aspects of South African society, present South Africa as both a First World country, with sophisticated banks with automatic teller machines, and a Third World country, with very few blacks having checking accounts or access to consumer credit. The black community stands to be a huge, untapped growth market for South Africa's banks; but bridging the gap offers one more daunting challenge.

The Land Issue

With the repeal of the Land Acts and the Group Areas Act, the government acceded to a fundamental demand of the ANC, and paved the way for future negotiations on land claims and redistribution. However, these legislative repeals were followed by swift parliamentary actions to codify land ownership and entitlement, and the government commissioned a discussion paper on land reform.

While welcoming the repeal of the laws that were responsible for the forced removal of

blacks from 87% of South Africa's land, the ANC was not satisfied with the government's proposals. The ANC established a Land Commission to develop a strategy for land reform which rejected the government's proposals and called for the establishment of a National Land Commission. The ANC's constitutional guidelines call for a program of land reform that will: (1) abolish all racial restrictions on ownership and use of land; and (2) implement land reform which employs affirmative action to take into account those South Africans who have been the victims of forced removals.

The redistribution of land is an explosive issue, but central to the economic and political debate. The Africans' entitlement to land is central to the policies of the PAC and AZAPO. The expectations of rural blacks, who have been forcibly removed from their ancestors' land, will be difficult to meet. Rural blacks have already begun to occupy land they believe is theirs. In an early campaign speech in Western Transvaal, Mandela announced that all land would be expropriated by the state and made available to Africans. Likewise, rural Afrikaners have begun to arm and organize themselves to resist any attempts to repossess their land. Many argue that the potential for confrontation is great. Thus, the land issue will be one of the most difficult obstacles to tackle in a new South Africa.

POLITICAL ACTORS

Indeed, the legalization of the anti-apartheid forces in February 1990, led to a new set of complex relationships among various political parties, the democratic movement, and interest groups in South Africa. Organizations that had operated in exile and through the internal Mass Democratic Movement (MDM), which had already established infrastructures within the country, were compelled to accommodate each other as well as political entities that functioned within the apartheid legal framework, and leaders who were released from prison. By March 11, 1994, the final deadline for registeration of parties, 29 political organizations registered, although not all will untimately contest the election. The following is a discussion of the major political organizations currently involved in the South African transition.

African National Congress (ANC)

The ANC was founded in 1912 in an effort to unify African people in the fight against oppression by the white population that had settled in the region and, in 1910, had formed the Union of South Africa. From 1912 until 1960, the ANC followed a program of nonviolence and legal resistance. Following the 1960 Sharpeville Massacre, in which 67 demonstrators were killed by police, the ANC, in 1961, initiated a campaign of armed struggle against the government and established an external military wing, *Umkhonto we Sizwe* (MK), which means "Spear of the Nation". The ANC was banned that same year.

Over the next decade, most of the ANC's leaders were imprisoned or forced into exile. Others who remained in the country were banned from political activity. Leaders such as Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo enjoyed wide appeal among black South Africans. The ANC soon became known as the leading organization in the anti-apartheid movement. In the four years since the ban on the ANC was lifted and Mandela was released from prison, the ANC has emerged as one of the two crucial players in the negotiations process.

Nelson Mandela represents those in the ANC who are committed to the negotiating process. But despite their considerable influence, Mandela and the leadership must occasionally defer to the more militant elements within the ANC and its allied organizations. However one characterizes the protagonists, the debates have centered around the strategy for the transfer of power.

At the top of the ANC's leadership structure are Mandela, who was elected Executive President in July 1991, Deputy President Walter Sisulu, Thabo Mbeki, who became National Chairperson following the death of Oliver Tambo in 1993, and Secretary General Cyril Ramaphosa, a former trade union leader. The ANC has 56 elected positions on its 91-member National Executive Committee (NEC), which implements the organization's policies. A 20-member National Working Committee (NWC) selected from the NEC is responsible for day-to-day decision making. The ANC receives most of its funding from sources outside of South Africa. These consist of private and public funders who have been responsible for sustaining the organization over its many years in exile.

Active within the ranks of the ANC are the ANC Women's League (ANCWL), and the ANC youth, which are represented by the South Africa Youth Congress (SAYCO), the Congress of South African Students (COSAS) and the ANC Youth League (ANCYL). The ANCWL has a long history of involvement in the liberation struggle, and was at the forefront of putting pressure on the leadership to pursue a gender-positive policy in the negotiations. The ANCWL was instrumental in the slating of candidates for the National Assembly, with one-third of the positions going to women in placements that should reflect similar numbers in government.

The youth is one of the most radical influences on ANC policy. Youth organizations have exhibited strong cohesion and have spearheaded some of the most successful mass action campaigns. However, the youth in the townships, often known as "comrades" or "young lions," still identify closely with the armed struggle and are an unpredictable force. They form the corps of the Self Defense Units (SDUs), or Street Committees, which are heavily armed. Often

unrestrained cadres operate as vigilante groups, both terrorizing and protecting residents in the townships. With nearly two-thirds of the black population in South Africa under the age of 25, the youth will play a critical role in the future of South Africa.

Nelson Mandela is the President of the ANC.

South African Communist Party (SACP)

Founded in 1921, the South African Communist Party has played a special role in the liberation struggle. Until 1985, when the ANC leadership ranks were opened to non-Africans, it was the main organizational force for white and Indian participants in the liberation struggle.

The SACP was banned in 1950, and co-founded the MK in 1961. The MK received education, training and arms from the former Soviet Union and other Communist governments. The SACP's leaders, Chairman Joe Slovo and Secretary General Charles Nqakula, are also central figures in the ANC leadership.

The SACP's notorious reputation was, for the most part, the product of the government's relentless warnings that a "total Communist onslaught" threatened the entire region. Anti-communism was used by the government to justify the maintenance of apartheid. This propaganda deeply penetrated the political psychology of the Afrikaners. With the end of the Cold War, and the collapse of the regimes in the Eastern Block, the SACP has lost its ideological backing and has been forced to redefine its position. The SACP held its first party congress since legalization in December 1991, at which it announced an economic policy based on a "democratic socialist order". This new "order" would encompass common ownership of key means of production but include protection of personal, "non-exploitative" property. In recognition of the new post cold-war realities, the SACP supports regular, multi-party elections and religious freedom, yet faces difficulties with the concerns of some church leaders over the atheistic tradition of Communist ideology.

At the 1991 party congress, the SACP reaffirmed its faith in Marxism and Leninism. The party acknowledged lessons learned by the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe, stating that "it is impossible to sustain and develop socialism in an authoritarian environment." At this conference Chris Hani, Chief of Staff of *Umkhonto we Sizwe* (MK), resigned from his ANC post to assume the Party leadership post of Secretary General. Simultaneously, Joe Slovo became SACP Chairman.

As noted earlier, the ANC-SACP relationship is considered a key issue in the context of the transition. While the SACP had its own seat at CODESA, the MNF, and the TEC, it often plays a decisive role in strategic maneuvering within the ANC. It is unlikely to pursue an agenda different from the ANC's. The SACP is contesting the elections under the banner of the ANC. The SACP has identified 34 of its members on the ANC's list of 200 national parliamentary candidates with 16 of them being in the top 50 positions.

Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)

As the umbrella for the ANC-aligned trade unions, COSATU represents a powerful political force in the ANC/SACP/COSATU alliance. COSATU boasts a paid membership of nearly 1.3 million workers within the 14 member unions. Because the trade unions in South Africa were not banned, they developed a nationwide network of urban, industrialized workers. COSATU argued for the inclusion of a Workers' Charter in a future ANC bill of rights.

Despite COSATU's leading role in shaping ANC policy, particularly on economic matters, the ANC's economic platform calls for a "living wage", as opposed to labor's traditional stance for a "minimum wage". COSATU was instrumental in the establishment of the National Economic Forum (NEF), in which employers, trade unions and the government negotiate all national macro-economic issues. COSATU has conducted its own negotiations with the government for labor law revisions and a minimum wage. Prior to the convening of CODESA, COSATU called for all-party talks to include full participation of economic

organizations, such as trade unions, in addition to political parties. This was not agreed to: instead COSATU members were incorporated into the delegations and working groups of the ANC and SACP.

COSATU nominated and ANC accepted 20 candidates from the trade union federation for the ANC's candidate list. However, officers such as former General Secretary Jay Naidoo, had to resign from their union positions. Sam Shilowa is the General Secretary of COSATU and heads the federation's political action drive.

Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)

Founded in 1975, as a cultural movement by Zulu Chief Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi, Inkatha constituted itself in 1990 as a political party called the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). Supporters of Buthelezi and the IFP have praised the organization for its "nonviolent" position, its opposition to sanctions, its support of a free market economy, and its pragmatic approach to negotiations. As the chief minister of the KwaZulu homeland in the Natal region, Buthelezi refused to accept the status of "independent homeland" for KwaZulu, opposed apartheid and demanded the release of Nelson Mandela.

Buthelezi maintains that the IFP represents the Zulu nation of 6 million people. A recent survey conducted in early February 1994, by the Institute for Multi-Party Democracy concludes that it currently has national support of about 5.3% of the 22.7 million projected electorate. Its support is mainly concentrated in the rural areas of Natal, referred to as KwaZulu. The IFP has in the last two years opened its ranks to non-Zulus and has viable political organizations in the Johannesburg-Pretoria area, where it is strong among migrant laborers.

Some observers argue that KwaZulu is, for all practical purposes, run as a one-party state. Although it is widely acknowledged that intimidation occurs on all sides of black politics

in the Natal townships, critics of Inkatha claim that Buthelezi requires all KwaZulu government employees and traditional chiefs to join IFP. Those who refuse are threatened with the loss of position, services, or land. Inkatha relies on a network of warlords, many of them quite well-known, to maintain the discipline of the organization in the region.

Inkatha is an important player in the transition. The IFP has deftly sided alternatively with the NP and the CP and non-integrationist homeland leaders to win concessions from the ANC. Chief Buthelezi led the walk-out by a number of parties in the MNF in July 1993.

As the NP reached accommodation with the ANC, the IFP occupied the center ground in advocating a highly decentralized system of federal government. It coalesced with the "independent homeland" administrations of Ciskei and Bophuthatswana and the more right-wing elements of political opinion. This coalition, the Concerned South Africans Group (COSAG), called into question Buthelezi's claims to leadership in the liberation movement. The association weakened the political message of the IFP.

The "Record of Understanding" between the ANC and the government infuriated Buthelezi, who saw the agreement as a calculated attempt to marginalize him. Increasingly, he spoke of an ANC/NP alliance working in tandem to ensure that a new government would, essentially be their government. Increasingly, Buthelezi spoke of the ANC as a Xhosa-speaking people that would establish a one-party state and destroy the Zulu nation. Buthelezi, an uncle of the King, continued to play the "Zulu card", calling on the Zulu people to heed his request and come to the aid of King Goodwill Zwelithini. In bilaterals with the ANC and the government, Buthelezi's attitudes hardened; when one of his demands was met, it was immediately replaced by another one. His demand for federalism, with the national government having extremely limited powers, became a demand for virtual autonomy; his demand for postponing the elections ran onto opposition from virtually every other party. As a result, the IFP is not taking part in the elections.

Mangosuthu Buthelezi is Chief Minister in the KwaZulu government and leader of the IFP.

Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC)

The Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) was formed in 1959 when an "Africanist" faction left the ANC. Arguing that the continued involvement of non-Africans perpetuated racist ideology and the subjugation of Africans, the founders of the PAC identified an Africanist socialist democracy as its goal. Following the Sharpeville Massacre, the PAC was banned under the 1960 Unlawful Organizations Act. In 1990, they were unbanned along with other political organizations.

As a liberation organization, the PAC has several wings: a student organization, the Pan Africanist Student Organization (PASO); a women's wing, the African Woman's Organization (AWO); a youth wing, the Azanian National Youth Unity (AZANYU); and an armed wing, Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA). While not formally connected, it also has a close association with the National Congress of Trade Union (NACTU).

The armed engagements by APLA were allegedly targeted at security personnel and facilities. Until recently, the armed struggle attracted little attention, although its adherence to the use of violence in the battle for liberation did attract a following of the more militant youth. However, due to substantial in-country and international pressure to cease the armed conflict, the PAC announced a moratorium on the armed struggle on January 15, 1994. The following week, APLA's command structures announced their concurrence with the policy of the political leadership.

The PAC has long been opposed to negotiations with the South African Government. Historically opposed to an internal settlement, they had condemned the ANC's decision to negotiate with the government and refused to participate in the first round of negotiations--

CODESA I and II. They advocated a transfer of power to the majority population. After a series of bi-lateral talks held with the government, they were one of the 26 parties that joined the Multi-Party Negotiating Forum (MNF).

At the MNF, the PAC was a constructive and articulate opposition to the proposals that emerged from the alliance between the government and the ANC. Significantly, the PAC tabled the proposal which committed the South African Government to transferring Walvis Bay to Namibia. This PAC initiative boosted the organization's credibility and stature.

The PAC has not taken its seats in the TEC. They reason that by participating in the TEC, they would implicitly legitimize the authority of the South African Government. They are, however, contesting the elections and will take seats in the Constitutional Assembly and provincial legislatures, for the purposes of writing the new constitution, and providing a voice of opposition.

The PAC draws its strength from the disaffected youth in the townships. Polls indicate that the softest constituency support of the ANC is among the 17-25 age group, who overwhelmingly choose the PAC as their second preference. Consequently, the PAC actively canvasses this group. Their position as the first party listed on the national and provincial ballots may help to advance their electoral standing. The Cape regions and the PWV region are the strongest bases for the party.

Clarence Makwetu is the President of the PAC.

Azanian People's Organization (AZAPO)

Founded in 1979, AZAPO advocates a marxist Azania (the Africanist term for South Africa) to be achieved by the overthrow of the white colonial establishment. Consequently, AZAPO refuses to enter into negotiations with the current South African government. Of

crucial importance to AZAPO is returning land to Azanians. AZAPO has criticized Mandela for "betraying the solidarity of the oppressed people" through his negotiations with the government.

The Azanian People's Organization and the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) represent the Africanist school of thought within the liberation movement. These organizations are adamant about a transfer of power to the majority. As the transition moves forward, these groups have become more driven with internal differences over their respective positions in the negotiating process and the elections.

The BCM merged during the 1970's under the leadership of prominent dissident Steve Biko. Biko's message emphasized black pride and encouraged the psychological liberation of blacks though nonviolent means. Biko's death, while in government custody, prompted renewed radical streams of Africanist thought as characterized by AZAPO. As an active political movement, BCM has largely been replaced by other organizations. However, Biko's ideas remain an essential component of the philosophy of Africanist organizations.

Historically, the Africanists have emphasized black power and advocated socialist or marxist economic policies, with a high priority on the return of land to black Africans. They also reject the principles of the ANC's Freedom Charter. While the Black Consciousness Movement espoused a nonviolent philosophy, AZAPO supported the armed struggle, although they do not have an armed wing.

Neither AZAPO nor the BCM are contesting the elections. AZAPO's advocacy of a electoral boycott has it urging people to either not vote or spoil their ballot.

The President of AZAPO is Itumeleng Mosala.

National Party (NP)

Since 1948, the NP has presided as the ruling party in the all-white South African Parliament, and as such, created and maintained the system of apartheid. NP leaders gradually consolidated a tightly controlled security state, supported by an over-employed civil service that supported the standard of living of the NP's core constituency--the Afrikaner middle class. The NP has amended the constitution three times since 1948. The third constitution of 1983 created a tricameral parliament that included Indians and "Coloureds" in a second and third house, respectively.

The leadership of the NP is divided into at least two camps. The older "securocrats" or "hawks" believe in the strong executive-security force relationship of the 1980s and resist change. The "old breed" include the current Minister of Law and Order and candidate for premier in the Western Cape, Hernus Kriel; former Minister of Defense Magnus Malan; former Minister of Law and Order Adriaan Vlok; and former Defense Minister Gene Louw. They are opposed by the younger generation of negotiators, who advance the notion of power-sharing. One of the more difficult tasks faced by President de Klerk has been the reconciliation of these forces within the government as well as sustaining the ranks of the key negotiators on his team, six of whom have been removed for personal and health reasons.

The "new breed" of NP leaders include such people as Minister for Constitutional Development, Roelf Meyer, Minister of Planning, Leon Wessels, Minister of Economic Coordination and Public Enterprise, Dawie de Villiers, and Finance Minister Derek Keyes. They are the architects of the constitutional framework for a power sharing government and guarding the economic restructuring.

The NP lost support from both the left and the right in the period prior to, and immediately following, February 1990. There have been defections to the Conservative Party and the reactionary white right wing. However, having moved forward with its reform

initiatives, the NP has regained some support from those previously affiliated with the Democratic Party (DP). In 1991, the NP abandoned its white exclusivity and began an active recruitment of other racial groups. While the NP can no longer claim it represents the majority of white Afrikaners, it does boast that it is the largest political party in South Africa (with emphasis on "political party" since the ANC is identified as a liberation movement). It recently took steps to recast its image for broader appeal by changing its colors, flag and symbols to ones its polls suggest are more attractive to African voters. It now calls it self the "new" National Party.

The "new" NP recently began to implement a strategy to expand its constituent base by engaging in such activities as organizing branches in townships and conducting motorcar speeches in a "European-style" campaign. De Klerk, in a move to bolster the NP's image, followed these efforts by appointing Indian and Coloured ministers to his cabinet. The candidate lists of the NP is sprinkled with non-whites in the top echelons.

However, the 4-6 seats the NP is likely to win in the new cabinet of government are all slated by white males from the "New Breed" faction of the party.

The leader of the National Party is President FW de Klerk.

Democratic Party (DP)

The DP and its predecessor, the Progressive Federal Party, have long advocated systemic reforms within the white parliament and a federal structure in a new constitution. Former DP leaders, such as Helen Suzman and Frederick Van Zyl Slabbert, have been outspoken opponents of apartheid and strong supporters of human rights. The party has engaged actively in the international debate on apartheid and is a member of the Executive Committee of the Liberal International.

In addition to its white liberal backing, the DP also has the support of many pragmatists within the business community who have long recognized that ending apartheid would serve South Africa's future economic interests. The party's opposition to international sanctions has suited these business interests.

President de Klerk's initiatives and the NP's dominant role in the negotiations threatens the future of the DP. Faced with the danger of being marginalized, DP leaders have recently emphasized the importance of the center in finding a common ground. They played a critical role in CODESA, the MNF and TEC, where their advocacy of "liberal" constitutional principles suited the agenda of compromise. Their most significant contribution at the MNF was in connection with the appointment process for the Constitutional Court. The DP succeeded in deleting a clause from the Interim Constitution that would have allowed the state president to have sole authority in appointments to the Constitutional Court.

The NP has posed more of a serious threat to the political autonomy of the DP than the ANC. Although many DP members are comfortable with the ANC as an ally, the communist influence within the ANC tends to repel potential DP defectors, particularly those in the business community. Five DP members of parliament joined the ANC in April 1992, while others moved in the direction of the IFP.

The leader of the Democratic Party is Zach de Beer.

Afrikaner Volksfront (AVF)/ Freedom Front (FF)

A group of retired military and police generals in late 1993 constituted a "Committee of Generals" to stage a political campaign to unify the far-right wing and resist the transition. The Committee, led by Constand Viljoen (former head of the South African Armed Forces and currently leader of the Freedom Front), sought to ensure self-determination for Afrikaners in an Afrikaner Volkstaat (white homeland). The AVF was created in recognition that right-

wing leadership was splintered and ineffective and that Afrikaners had a deep respect for military leaders. Other members include Tienie Groenewald, former head of military intelligence, Koos Bischoff, former army chief of operations, and Lothar Neethling, former deputy commissioner of the South African Police.

The Afrikaner Volksfront was an umbrella group consisting of the Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP), the Conservative Party (CP), the Afrikaner Volksunie (AVU) and other small right-wing organisations. The delegates agreed to set up armed local security committees to protect farmers and farm workers from attacks. Most of the committees would be comprised of SADF and SAP reservists. Currently, about 40,000 Afrikaners belong to reserve units called "commandos". Groenewald hinted at the possibility of a military option: "If we cannot reach our aims through negotiation, other forms of action could be considered. These include mass action and ultimately violence."

The generals have boosted the Right in terms of both respectability and vision. Afrikaner conservatives have now shifted their focus to self-determination and an Afrikaner Volkstaat, instead of apartheid and white supremacy. Groenewald's Unity Committee has even mentioned a specific location for the volkstaat: a major portion of the Transvaal and Orange Free State, less a few large tracks set aside for "black nations" who wish to exercise their own right of self-determination. Its capital would be Pretoria. Whites would be a majority in the proposed volkstaat, which comprises 16% of South Africa. (Barely more than the 14% Hendrik Verwoerd once allocated to blacks on which to exercise their right to self-determination.)

The neo-fascist Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) has greeted the birth of the Volksfront very coolly. This may be an asset to the Volksfront, for the bullying tactics of the AWB and its demagogic leader, Eugene TerreBlanche, have been targeted in the past as discrediting the Afrikaner right. The prospect of an alternative to an ANC-dominated government may cause a renewed hemorrhaging of the NP's hawkish right, posing an ominous threat to de Klerk, who has already lost some Member of Parliament to the IFP.

When the time came to decide whether to register the Alliance and its component parties for the election, Viljoen broke ranks and registered a new party -- The Freedom Front. The Freedom Front with Viljoen as its leader filed a slate of 191 candidates on the national list and eight regional lists except for the Western Cape.

Conservative Party (CP)/AVU/HNP

The Conservative Party (CP) represents the traditional right of white South African politics. The CP split from the NP in 1982 over the issue of the tricameral parliament and the enfranchisement of "Coloureds" and Indians. By 1989, the CP had become the official opposition within the whites-only Parliament. Established and formerly led by Andries Treurnicht, who died of a heart attack in April, 1993, the CP membership is mostly of Afrikaner descent with concentration in rural South Africa. The CP has supported the partition of South Africa into separate nations for blacks and whites, with the whites maintaining the 87% of the land that they currently control. The CP has been prepared to negotiate these boundaries, but nothing else.

Following Treurnicht's death, the CP elected hardliner and deputy leader, Dr. Ferdi Hartzenberg, as party leader. Hartzenberg served as Education Minister in the NP government, but left office to follow Treurnicht in 1982 when the NP split over the issue of power-sharing. As Education Minister, he refused to authorize repairs at black schools involved in education boycotts, forcing many of the schools to close. Moderates in the CP managed to broker a compromise, prevailing in the election of moderate Dr. Willie Snyman to the post of deputy party leader. In April 1993, during an address to Parliament by de Klerk concerning the ANC's exploitation of the Hani assassination, Snyman was thrown out of the chamber when he dumped a bag of coins in front of de Klerk and accused him of being a sell-out for dismantling apartheid.

The CP refused to participate in the negotiations, at the National Peace Accord and

CODESA, and has maintained strong opposition to all reform initiatives. They agreed to participate in the March 1992 referendum although they maintained that the process was stacked against them. They said that the referendum was about future black domination. However, in the wake of the referendum loss in which the CP advocated a "no" vote, the CP split. Leaders in the party who believed the party should have boycotted the referendum and who advocated a direct negotiating position formed a new party, the Afrikaner Volksunie (AVU). The CP initially joined the MNF but walked out with Inkatha in July 1993. The AVU continued an active membership with the MNF, however, did not enter the TEC nor is it contesting in the elections.

Although the CP officially opposes violence, extremist groups under the CP's sphere of political influence, such as the AWB, have increasingly engaged in acts of terrorism. Treurnicht often used the threat of right-wing violence as a bargaining tool, claiming "...there's no form of explosive we cannot make," adding, "I've told Mr. de Klerk, it isn't me stirring up the people. It's you and your statements and what you envision for South Africa. I have to calm them down." The CP claim that it, not the NP, represented the white population in South Africa and pointed to recent by-elections as proof, but the referendum results have weakened this argument.

To the right of the CP and AVU is the Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP). A solely Afrikaner party, it advocates white supremacy and a strict separation of races with a rigid homeland policy for "ethnic" groups. The HNP holds no seats in the current Parliament, but is represented on local councils in the Orange Free State and Northwest Transvaal.

Apartheid Political Formations

The 1983 Constitution created three houses of the National Parliament in a so-called reform by which individuals who were racially classified as "Coloured" or "Indian" could vote and have representation in a legislative body. The House of Delegates was created for

"Indians", and the House of Representatives was constituted for "Coloureds." While the majority of these designated population sectors did not vote in elections, nevertheless many political parties emerged. The most prominent and viable entities included the Democratic Party (unlike the party of the same name listed above, it is for "Indians"), the Labour Party, the National People's Party, and the Solidarity Party. All of these parties were members of the MNF and took their seats in the TEC.

The so-called "homelands" and "independent states" also have generated a number of political formations. The governing bodies in these territories have usually included one-party legislatures --some of which do not continue to exist, such as in the Transkei and Ciskei--as a result of coup d'etat. Regardless of the current situation, a number of political parties have organized with more traditional ethnic orientations. Some of the more developed include: the African Democratic Movement (ADM), the North West Christian Democratic Party (NWCD), the Dikwankwetla Party of South Africa (DPSA), the Intando Ye Sizwe Party (IYP), and the Inyanza National Movement (INM).

Other Parties

There is total of 26 parties contesting the April 26-28 elections, representing a wide range of issues and constituents. Those that were not previously mentioned include: the Rights Party (RP), the South African Women's Party (SAWP), the Sports Organization for Collective Contributions and Equal Rights (SOCCER), the Green Party (TGP), the Keep It Straight and Simple Party (KISS), the United People's Front (UPF), the Wes-Kaap Federaliste Party (WKFP), Women's Rights Peace Party (WRPP), Workers International to Rebuild the Fourth International (WI), Workers' List Party (WLP), the Ximoko Progressive Party (XPP), the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP), the African Democratic Movement (ADM), the African Moderates Congress Party (AMCP), the African Muslim Party (AMP), the Federal Party (FP), the Islamic Party (IP), the Luso South African Party (LUSAP), the Merit Party (MP), and the Minority Front (MF).

THE POINT OF NO RETURN

In April 1994, the process of transition began to assume a life of its own. First Lebowa found itself in such financial distress that it ceded its authority for its financial affairs to South Africa. In Bophuthatswana, when some of the police joined other public servants in a strike concerning pension pay-outs, Lucas Mangope was unceremoniously dumped from office and replaced by two TEC appointed South African administrators. Lucas Mangope's political demise was particularly welcomed by the ANC since they were prohibited by Mangope from campaigning in Bophuthatswana.

Next in line was Brigadier Oupa Gqozo, who was forced to step down as Ciskei's Head of State when militant policemen demanded to have their pensions paid out before April 27. Again, the TEC appointed two South African administrators to run Ciskei's affairs.

The new South Africa is finally emerging from the darkness of the past into the light of hope.

Appendices

DECLARATION OF THE OAU AD-HOC COMMITTEE ON SOUTHERN AFRICA ON THE QUESTION OF SOUTH AFRICA

Harare, Zimbabwe - 21st August, 1989

I. PREAMBLE

1. The people of Africa, singly, collectively and acting through the OAU, are engaged in serious efforts to establish peace throughout the continent by ending all conflicts through negotiations based on the principle of justice and peace for all.

2. We reaffirm our conviction, which history confirms, that where colonial, racial and apartheid domination exist, there can neither be peace nor justice.

3. Accordingly, we reiterate that while the apartheid system in South Africa persists, the peoples of our continent as a whole cannot achieve the fundamental objectives of justice, human dignity and peace which are both crucial in themselves and fundamental to the stability and development of Africa.

4. With regard to the region of Southern Africa, the entire continent is vitally interested that the processes, in which it is involved, leading to the complete and genuine independence of Namibia, as well as peace in Angola and Mozambique, should succeed in the shortest possible time. Equally, Africa is deeply concerned that the destabilisation by South Africa of all the countries in the region, whether through direct aggression, sponsorship of surrogates, economic subversion and other means, should end immediately.

5. We recognise the reality that permanent peace and stability in Southern Africa can only

be achieved when the system of apartheid in South Africa has been liquidated and South Africa transformed into a united, democratic and nonracial country. We therefore reiterate that all the necessary measures should be adopted now, to bring a speedy end to the apartheid system, in the interest of all the peoples of Southern Africa, our continent and the world at large.

6. We believe that, as a result of the liberation struggle and international pressure against apartheid, as well as global efforts to liquidate regional 22 conflicts, possibilities exist for further movement towards the resolution of the problems facing the people of South Africa. For these possibilities to lead to fundamental change in South Africa, the Pretoria regime must abandon its abhorrent concepts and practices of racial domination and its record of failure to honour agreements, all of which have already resulted in the loss of so many lives and; the destruction of much property in the countries of Southern Africa.

7. We reaffirm our recognition of the right of all peoples, including those of South Africa. to determine their own destiny, and to work out for themselves the institutions and the system of government under which they will, by general consent, live and work together to build a harmonious society. The Organisation of African Unity remains committed to do everything possible and necessary to assist the people of South Africa, in such ways as the representatives of the oppressed may determine, to achieve this objective. We are certain that, arising from its duty to help end the criminal apartheid system, the rest of the world community is ready to extend similar assistance to the people of South Africa.

8. We make these commitments because we believe that all people are equal and have equal rights to human dignity and respect, regardless of colour, race, sex or creed. We believe that all men and women have the right and duty to participate in their own government, as equal members of society. No individual or group of individuals has any right to govern others without their consent. The apartheid system violates all these

fundamental and universal principles. Correctly characterised as a crime against humanity, it is responsible for the death of countless numbers of people in South Africa. It has sought to dehumanise entire peoples. It has imposed a brutal war on the whole region of Southern Africa, resulting in untold loss of life, destruction of property and massive displacement of innocent men, women and children. This scourge and affront to humanity must be fought and eradicated in its totality.

9. We have therefore supported and continue to support all those in South Africa who pursue this noble objective through political, armed and other forms of struggle. We believe this to be our duty, carried out in the interests of all humanity.

10. While extending this support to those who strive for a non-racial and democratic society in South Africa, a point on which no compromise is possible, we have repeatedly expressed our preference for a solution arrived at by peaceful means. We know that the majority of the people of South Africa and their liberation movement, who have been compelled to take up arms, have also upheld this position for many decades and continue to do so.

11. The positions contained in this Declaration are also consistent with and are a continuation of those elaborated in the Lusaka Manifesto two decades ago. They take into account the changes that have taken place in Southern Africa since that Manifesto was adopted by the OAU and the rest of the international community. They constitute a new challenge to the Pretoria regime to join in the noble effort to end the apartheid system, an objective to which the OAU has been committed from its very birth.

12. Consequently, we shall continue to do everything in our power to help intensify the liberation struggle and international pressure against the system of apartheid until this system is ended and South Africa is transformed into a united, democratic and non-racial country, with justice and security for all its citizens.

13. In keeping with this solemn resolve, and responding directly to the wishes of the representatives of the majority of the people of South Africa, we publicly pledge ourselves to the positions contained hereunder. We are convinced that their implementation will lead to a speedy end of the apartheid system and therefore the opening of a new dawn of peace for all the peoples of Africa, in which racism, colonial domination and white minority rule on our continent would be abolished forever.

II. STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES

14. We believe that a conjuncture of circumstances exists which, if there is a demonstrable readiness on the part of the Pretoria regime to engage in negotiations genuinely and seriously, could create the possibility to end apartheid through negotiations. Such an eventuality would be an expression of the long-standing preference of the majority of the people of South Africa to arrive at a political settlement.

15. We would therefore encourage the people of South Africa, as part of their overall struggle, to get together to negotiate an end to the apartheid system and agree on all the measures that are necessary to transform their country into a non-racial democracy. We support the position held by the majority of the people of South Africa that these objectives, and not the amendment or reform of the apartheid system, should be the aims of the negotiations.

16. We are at one with them that the outcome of such a process should be a new constitutional order based on the following principles, among others:

16.1 South Africa shall become a united, democratic and non-racial state.

16.2 All its people shall enjoy common and equal citizenship and nationality, regardless of race, colour, sex or creed.

16.3 All its people have the right to participate in the government and administration of the country on the basis of a universal suffrage, exercised through one person one vote, under a common voters' roll.

16.4 All shall have the right to form and join any political party of their choice, provided that this is not in furtherance of racism.

16.5 All shall enjoy universally recognised human rights, freedoms and civil liberties, protected under an entrenched Bill of Rights.

16.6 South Africa shall have a new legal system which shall guarantee equality of all before the law.

16.7 South Africa shall have an independent and non-racial judiciary.

16.8 There shall be created an economic order which shall promote and advance the well-being of all South Africans.

16.9 A democratic South Africa shall respect the rights, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries and pursue a policy of peace, friendship and mutually beneficial co-operation with all peoples.

17. We believe that agreement on the above principles shall constitute the foundation for an internationally acceptable solution which shall enable South Africa to take its rightful place as an equal partner among the African and world community of nations.

III. CLIMATE FOR NEGOTIATIONS

18. Together with the rest of the world, we believe that it is essential, before any

negotiations can take place, that the necessary climate for negotiations be created. The apartheid regime has the urgent responsibility to respond positively to this universally-acclaimed demand and thus create this climate.

19. Accordingly, the present regime should, at the very least:

19.1 Release all political prisoners and detainees unconditionally and refrain from imposing any restrictions on them.

19.2 Lift all bans and restrictions on all proscribed and restricted organisations and persons.

19.3 Remove all troops from the townships.

19.4 End the State of Emergency and repeal all legislation, such as and including the Internal Security Act, designed to circumscribe political activity; and

19.5 Cease all political trials and political executions.

20. These measures are necessary to produce the conditions in which free political discussion can take place - an essential condition to ensure that the people themselves participate in the process of remaking their country. The measures listed above should therefore precede negotiations.

IV. GUIDELINES TO THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION

21. We support the view of the South African liberation movement that upon the creation of this climate, the process of negotiation should commence along the following lines:

21.1 Discussions should take place between the liberation movement and the South African regime to achieve the suspension of hostilities on both sides by agreeing to a mutually binding ceasefire.

21.2 Negotiations should then proceed to establish the basis for the adoption of a new Constitution by agreeing on, among others, the Principles enunciated above.

21.3 Having agreed on these principles, the parties should then negotiate the necessary mechanism for drawing up the new Constitution.

21.4 The parties shall define and agree on the role to be played by the international community in ensuring a successful transition to a democratic order.

21.5 The parties shall agree on the formation of an interim government to supervise the process of the drawing up and adoption of a new Constitution; govern and administer the country, as well as effect the transition to a democratic order including the holding of elections.

21.6 After the adoption of the new Constitution, all armed hostilities will be deemed to have formally terminated.

21.7 For its part, the international community would lift the sanctions that have been imposed against apartheid South Africa.

22. The new South Africa shall qualify for membership of the Organisation of African Unity.

V. PROGRAMME OF ACTION

23. In pursuance of the objectives stated in this document, the Organisation of African Unity

hereby commits itself to:

23.1 Inform governments and inter-governmental organisations throughout the world, including the Non-Aligned Movement, the United Nations General Assembly, the Security Council, the Commonwealth and others of these perspectives, and solicit their support.

23.2 Mandate the OAU Ad-Hoc Committee on Southern Africa, acting as the representative of the OAU and assisted by the Frontline States, to remain seized of the issues of a political resolution of the South African question.

23.3 Step up all-round support for the South African liberation movement and campaign in the rest of the world in pursuance of this objective.

23.4 Intensify the campaign for mandatory and comprehensive sanctions against apartheid South Africa: in this regard, immediately mobilise against the rescheduling of Pretoria's foreign debt; work for the imposition of a mandatory oil embargo and the full observance by all countries of the arms embargo.

23.5 Ensure that the African continent does not relax existing measures for the total isolation of apartheid South Africa.

23.6 Continue to monitor the situation in Namibia and extend all necessary support to SWAPO in its struggle for a genuinely independent Namibia.

23.7 Extend such assistance as the Governments of Angola and Mozambique may request in order to secure peace for their peoples; and

23.8 Render all possible assistance to the Frontline States to enable them to withstand

Pretoria's campaign of aggression and destabilisation and enable them to continue to give their all-round support to the people of Namibia and South Africa.

24. We appeal to all people of goodwill throughout the world to support this Programme of Action as a necessary measure to secure the earliest liquidation of the apartheid system and the transformation of South African into a united, democratic and non-racial country.


SA Regions
N. Tvl
E. Tvl
PWV
W. Tvl
KwaZulu/
Natal
O.F.S
Eastern Cape
Northern Cape
Western Cape

Voters and Seats per Province

Province	Voters	National Assembly Seats	Provincial Legislature Seats	Percentage of total voting population
Eastern Cape	2,858,400	26	52	12.8
Eastern Transvaal	1,562,881	14	30	7.0
KwaZulu/Natal	4,513,037	40	80	20.2
North-West	1,913,152	17	34	8.6
Northern Cape	434,930	4	30	1.9
Northern Transvaal	2,275,178	20	40	10.2
Orange Free State	1,625,222	i5	30	7.3
Pretoria/Witwatersrand/Vereeniging (PWV)	4,786,980	43	86	21.4
Western Cape	2,369,881	21	42	10.6
TOTAL*	22,339,661	200	424	100.0

Note: 200 of the 424 Provincial Legislature seats are represented in the National Assembly, which will comprise a tota of 400 seats. The balance of 224 Provincial Legislature seats remain in the provinces.

Voting Population by Racial Groups

Racial Group	Voting Population	Percentage of Total Voting Population
African	15,921,000	71.3
White	3,740,000	16.7
Coloured	2,033,000	9.1
Asian	645,000	2.9
TOTAL*	22,340,000	100.0

*Total refers to an estimate made on 30 June 1993. The current estimate is 22.71 million.

Sources: Independent Electoral Commission and the Sowetan

Voting Population by Province and Race Groups

Province	Total Voting Population	Percentage of Total Voting Population	Percentage of Africans in the province	Percentage of Whites in the province	Percentage of Coloureds in the province	Percentage of Asians in the province
Eastern Cape	2,858,400	12.8	81.5	9.5	8.6	0.4
Eastern Transvaal	1,563,881	7.0	86.6	12.3	0.6	0.5
KwaZulu/Natal	4,513,037	20.2	77.7	9.9	1.4	11.0
North-West	1,913,152	8.6	89.2	9.5	1.1	0.3
Northern Cape	434,930	1.9	31.1	19.4	50.2	0.2
Northern Transvaal	2,275,178	10.2	95.5	4.2	0.2	0.1
Orange Free State	1,625,222	7.3	81.4	15.9	2.6	0.1
Pretoria/Witwatersrand/Vereeniging (PWV)	4,786,980	21.4	62.0	32.4	3.5	2.1
Western Cape	2,369,881	10.6	18.0	27.7	53.2	0.9
TOTAL*	22,339,661	100.0				

*Total refers to an estimate made on 30 June 1993. The current estimate is 22.71 million.

Source: Sowetan

BALLOT PAPER

SAMPLE ONLY

Make your mark next to the party you choose.
Etsa letshwao pela mokgatlo wo o o kgethang.
Yenza luphawu eceleni kwelicembu lolikhetsako.
Endla mfungho etlhelo ka vandla leri u ri tlhawulaka.
Baya letshwao go lebagana le lekoko la gago.
Yenza uphawu lakho eduze nehlangano oyikhethako.

Plaas u merk langs die party van u keuse.
Dira leswao la gago go lebana le phathi yeo o e kgethago.
Kha vha ite luswayo phanda ha dzangano line vha khetha.
Yenza uphawu lwakho ecaleni kwegela elo ulikhethayo.
Qweba uphawu esikhaleni esiseduze kwenhlangano oyikhethayo.

PAN AFRICANIST CONGRESS OF AZANIA		PAC	
SPORTS ORGANISATION FOR COLLECTIVE CONTRIBUTIONS AND EQUAL RIGHTS	SOCCER PARTY	SOCCER	
THE KEEP IT STRAIGHT AND SIMPLE PARTY		KISS	
VRYHEIDSFRONT - FREEDOM FRONT	VF	VF-FF	
WOMEN'S RIGHTS PEACE PARTY		WRPP	
WORKERS' LIST PARTY		WLP	
XIMOKO PROGRESSIVE PARTY		XPP	
AFRICA MUSLIM PARTY		AMP	
AFRICAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY		ACDP	
AFRICAN DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT		ADM	
AFRICAN MODERATES CONGRESS PARTY		AMCP	
AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS	ANC	ANC	
DEMOCRATIC PARTY - DEMOKRATIESE PARTY		DP	
DIKWANKWETLA PARTY OF SOUTH AFRICA		DPSA	
FEDERAL PARTY	FP	FP	
LUSO - SOUTH AFRICAN PARTY		LUSAP	
MINORITY FRONT	MF	MF	
NATIONAL PARTY - NASIONALE PARTY	NP	NP	

Presented by the Voter Education Programme of the Independent Electoral Commission.

Notes

Notes

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