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S

; \Mlmstar, Mâ\200\230F meal', klst mght re-  
jected calls for the G\_uvernmgnt to  
â\200\230revise its hbour cm drastlculfy,:'  
and warned i-\201f&f 'ig\*

tried to lmpose major changes on

â\200\230fuce mdaspseud industrial unrest.

Opemng the annual congress here  
f the Association of Chambers of  
amerce (Assocom), Mr. Vorster also  
ousinessmen not to allow their

ions to â\200\230be used for litical  
â\200\230connec(;e& with eÂçonomic

i-\202iâ\200\230Ã© Government

. changes.

' Government should

' to do what employers

~\_cannot persuade them to

- do, then this would be

- the height of irrespon-  
Âç | sibility.â\200\235

:lead to labour unrest, he  
4| said, . and apart - from  
-} harni-\201ng the economy,  
; ;womd also affect = the

g He urged buamessx lea&exs o be on theu' guardâ\200\230.  
agai

nst such moves.

. On the labour question, the Prxnle Mxmster said  
he was strprised at the frequency of callsâ\200\230en the Gov-

ernment to â\200\234force open the labour market reg urci-\201cssâ»

et

of the consequences.â\200\235

- The Government, he said. would contmue to

fï-\201 d h Id 3 honour its undertakings to labour.

Yy w LEET

e tra Â£ UNIOHS the count y st | tions of the business sector in regard to the-greater  
~utilisation of labour, and it had said that it had no

. It had gone to great lengths to meet the aspiva:

objection to the use of Black, Coloured and Asian

~labour in â\200\230more skilled work â\200\224 as long as these moves  
were'â\200\230accepted by the retognised trade unions.

Mr. Vorster said repeated calls were being made

. for the Government to â\200\234take (he leadâ\200\235 or â\200\234use its in  
. fluenceâ\200\235 to malke \*he trade unions more amenable to

. â\200\234If they are saylng the

- somehow force the trade  
unions against their will

It . would inevitably

- training which Black  
- workers depended on to  
~such a great extent.

Mr. Vorster, appealed

. to all South Africans to,

at all times display a  
spirit of confidence ' in  
the future of then'  
country, !

Unless South Africans

were prepared to declare |

their confidence to the

outside world, foreign-

investors could hardly be  
expeeted to invest with

confidence in this

country.

â\200\234Southâ\200\231 Africa is our  
product and one of which

- we can all be proud P â\200\224

(Sapa.)

' @ See Editorial Opinion

and Page 19

9, 1976.

14 ' The Natal Mercury, Tuesday, October 1

Loie e~  
P Â»

â\200\231 ot S

EDITORIA

W HEN }ie bÃ©came Pâ\200\230riâ\200\231mÃ©"i\fi:niyster  
. Y. just over 10 years.-ago, Mr...

- John Vorster committed himself to: -

improving Black-White relations.  
â\200\234 Five years later he said that for..  
. there to be peace in South Africa  
â\200\234you must make it possible for the. -  
" non-White to get his place in theâ\200\231

" Moday, five years further on,â\200\231  
-+ the-'Black 'and Brown -men and

women of this country are more

desperate and despondent than  
ever. Our 'angry and disillusioned  
Brown . Afrikaners ' have rejected .

. the Coloured Representative Coun- -

d Mr.

abinet Council â\200\224 -  
\_an

Vorster, himself has

" brought confrontation with Blacks =~

. by stating baldly that their political .  
â\200\234place in the sunâ\200\235 is the home-

lands'and nowhereelse. -Â« - < - :

As .a consequence urban and

\_yural Africans are uniting in aâ\200\231

. \*â\200\234political, economic-and social pro-  
- gramme of actionâ\200\235 to bring about

57 Sou}â\200\230t'h-Af\_ricans will be left in  
Â©7to â\200\234continue thgi\_r. traditional way

A

N

iz

OPINIC

The charisma of the â\200\234pragmat-  
istâ\200\235 â\200\224 once described as â\200\234Africaâ\200\231s  
man of destinyâ\200\235 â\200\224 has just about  
evaporated. Stripped of the ver-  
biage, his policies at home amount

to banishing the Blacks to the

homelands without any say in the  
urban areas where White South

Africa is almost totally reliant on Â¢

their labour, and quieting the  
Coloureds and Indians with con-  
cessions which seemingly lead  
nowhere.

He may, but WE should not  
continue to believe, that when  
White Rhodesians have been made

w

| VORSTER'S. FAILURE

' Nationalists having nothing more

" out of politics who are committed

thought him to be, D  
his commanding strength in the

w

Â» created for themselves,â\200\235 as cynic  
Nationalists. would have \*it,yx-lanaĩ¬\2021  
South West AfriÃ@a has its inde-

- pendence some four million White

peace

\_of life.â\200\235

to â\200\234liec down in: the bedthÃ@y

He is . not the wverligte we  
nor, in spite of

National Party, is he prep :  
to use that strength in the interests  
of all the people in the land.

Now, with Mr. Vorster and his

to offer in the search for solutions  
in South' Africa, hope lies only with  
those Whites who are prepared to

talk with the Blacks and, like the South Westeners at the Turnhalle, are ready to fashion a new future in amity. There is little point in hoping for any change in heart on the part of the Government. Ten years of power in 28 years of domination have not made a new man of Mr. Vorster and there is not the time for the making of another from within Government ranks.

What time there is must be used by all who care at all to re-establish the credibility of Whites. That - will require men and women in and

to change. New leadership must be found untainted by sterile party arguments, for the primary task of that new leadership will be not only to re-establish White credibility, but to convince those Black moderates who are under growing pressure from extremists that there is still some point in talking at all...

~ the liberation of the people. Those are the words of Mr. David Thebehali, newly elected mayor .

- There may be Whites who think they can go on as before, but our Africans and Coloureds' do not.!

of Soweto, where Sunday brought: . .  
~ more - disorder after - weeks. of

" bloody rioting and civil disorder -

" had earlier sent Whites scurrying

~ for their guns. A sad commentary .

. \_indeed on the state of race relations which the Prime Minister once promised to improve. g

dgat -

\* But, like other promises

bitter taste of . Many have not forgotten his give us six months and see where South Africa will stand. That impassioned plea, too, has proved as empty as Mr. Voster's commitment in support South Africa's Ambassador to the

. s he has made, all that has survived is the .

- dxl'iven t}(l)oloureds â\200\230to â\200\230the  
- Where they feel that justice in

+South Africa is not for them. She  
- Calvinistiese Beweging in Pot-

â\200\234Coloured adults took part in the  
recent violence,

of

United Nations, Mr. Pik Botha, to

move away from all unnecessary  
discrimination.

Mr. Vorsterâ\200\231s political credibility  
has worn thin. It is now as thread-  
bare as his Governmentâ\200\231s barren  
policies which provide little ho  
of equitable solutions to  
countryâ\200\231s problems.

e

â\200\230Mr. VorstÃ©râ\200\231s bona fides:. Too

~ stance. Too many of his promises  
[ yemain unkept: . -7 â\200\234

.They' feel the}r ha  
long for their â\200\234place

'Miâ\200\230.â\200\224 Vorster, the man wh " â\200\230  
nised them better thin .

in the sun.

words of Professor Erika Theron, !  
point

told the'congress of the Afrikaanse

chefstroom that, whethÃ©r or not

I â\200\234they did - not -  
accept the present situation any  
longer.â\200\235 ]  
. Against that background this .  
newspaper -can--no-longer aecept

many of his fine words and hints  
at change have failed to have sub-

ve waited too |

mi â\200\230has  
. alienated the Blacks and, in the |

New York Bureau

MR IAN SMITH

~appears to have  
carefully  
structured a strategy in which the  
United States  
figures heavily,  
to go into effect  
if the forthcoming = conference  
with Black  
leaders in Geneva  
breaks down,  
according to an  
editorial in the  
New York Times.

Mr Smithâ\200\231s colleagues;  
| the editorial says, claim  
| that he was told by US  
. Secretary of State Dr  
Henry Kissinger, that  
if he accepted the  
\* British-American \pro-  
posals â\200\230for 'a Rhodesian  
-solution - but . the - Black  
leaders rejected them,  
the United States would  
favour the  
\_\_economic . sanctions  
against the country and  
would help. provide  
- logistical support for the  
-Whitesâ\200\231 war effort.

" The stratÃ©gy is said to  
rely on the notion that  
the rival Black' na-  
â\200\230tionalist groups will - be  
unable to come together  
.on a. sensible pro-  
gramme at Geneva and  
will try\*to outdo one  
another in pressing  
demands

- community: & Â¢

o that hnp  
- Smi ouhtlessly  
! pro se a ~ Britain, â\200\230as

conference chairman, in-  
vite other, more  
moderate, Black leaders  
to negotiate on behalf of  
the countryâ\200\231s six-million  
Blacks. These would  
mostly be the traditional

tribal leaders who are  
on the  
payroll, - some in the  
cabinet since last April.

Another facet of the  
strategy is to insist that  
the five-point British-  
American programme,  
which Mr Smith ac-  
cepted three weeks ago,  
is a 'â\200\234packageâ\200\235 which  
must also be accepted in  
its entirety by the Black  
leaders. But the Blacks  
have = emphatically - re-  
jected some aspects, in-  
cluding the provision  
that Whites will serve as  
ministers of defence and  
justice in the interim  
cabinet.

con-

lifting of

unacceptable i  
to Rhodes fâ\200\230 a,Whlte !

|s Mr

Governmentâ\200\231s .

Rhodesiaâ\200\231s Ian â\200\230S;nith could be

keeping his cake and eating it â\200\231.

believes the New York Times

which sees an end to sanctions,

US military support and a reten-

tion of White initiative if Black

leaders cannot reach agreement.

as â\200\230tbe Â«epitome â\200\230of  
reasohagmu.â\200\234 Whitithe

courageously a



only to have it rejected  
by unreasonable Black  
leaders who â\200\224 he will  
imply -â\200\224 are probably  
taking their instructmns  
from Moscow P

AccordingA US  
Government amlyst;.  
Rhodesiaâ\200\231s economyâ\200\231 is  
faltenng and it is fal-  
tering less because of  
economic sanctions im-

. posed by other countries

than because of serious  
transport difficulties  
and "an increasing out-  
flow of skilled labour.

. They predicted that .  
the countryâ\200\231s economy .

would experience â\200\230zero  
growthâ\200\235this year, des-

pite a good harvest and -

the opening of several  
new nickel and gold  
mines.

The most critical pro-  
blem for Rhodesia, they  
said, was the inability to  
move all its export  
goods, including chrome,  
nickel and tobacco, to  
South African harbours  
for shipment to world  
markets.

-M â\200\230

programme leading Kin o  
Black rule in two years

The  
Smith  
plan

transport â\200\230 needsâ\200\231 cver  
those of Rhodesla. ,

They added that South

- Africa could probably  
ehmm\*ate the bottleneck

e involvxng switching  
facilities â\200\224 rathercgul-

bly. if it desired. .

But as a result of the tieups, ' they said, a substantial portion. of

- Rhodesia's annual total

of 7 to 8-million tons of exports has had to be

stockpiled or warehous-

ed in Rhodesia for lack

, of transport. There is

only one rail line available to Rhodesia, running south to the South African ports, since Mozambique closed

the . other ~ line last rd1

In addition. the-

analysts: remarked, increased Black nationalist guerilla ac-

tivity has compelled the Rhodesians to move goods only in daylight.

As for the economic .sanctions, imposed by the United Nations in 1966, the analysts

remarked that about 98

percent of ' Rhodesia's imports and would be regarded today as violations of the sanctions.

exports '

The analysts said that while = there was no direct evidence of active complicity by American oil ' companies in this traffic it was obvious that a substantial portion of oil and petrol going to Rhodesia came from South African subsidiaries of Mobil Oil Corporation, Caltex and Shell-British Petroleum.

Prior to the Mozambique transport embargo, Rhodesia also received oil on the rail line through that country. .

The traffic in railway tank cars and truck tankers to Rhodesia does not carry company markings, they said. Nor was it a practice, they added, for American intelligence operatives to spy on the activities of American companies, such as oil concerns, overseas.â\200\231

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 - JÂ»"â\200\230:.\*' ;K -

P TR > â\200\231 Y 4T I  
 ] A \* " 4 I ' â\200\231 e & e  
 /

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SIR, â\200\224 Mr M. B.  
 Naidoo in his Jet.  
 ter (The Daily  
 News, October 8)  
 ' takes an Indian  
 ' â\200\230'woman of Chats-  
 â\200\230worth to task for  
 ~considering that  
 Rhodesian Afri-  
 cans are not yet  
 â\200\230ready to take  
 over Rhodesia.  
 He says Afri-  
 cans in Rhodesia  
 and South Africa Rk  
 can rule things b5  
 and will come

Horia ve i e Wor ) o les #  
 opportunity. HEas 34 58 Yrrith

Under the Kissinger but the four factions of Rhodesia first, continue  
 plan Rhodesian â\200\230the AN.C, instead - of to quarrÃ@l â\200\230 bitterly  
 Africans - have been taking advantage of the . among themselves and  
 given the opportunity opportunity, uniting . Jockey for power, iyt

| work towards' - and ll)llltg:'lg the v;eliarg : m 'ti r;a arl  
 : ority rule, of all the peoples o : iâ\202~ pattern in nearly  
 pelceful uj y ru i s 2 LN S Â¥ SECUIEIL eve'y BllCYâ\200\231 StttÃ@ jn  
 : ~ Africaâ\200\231 has been the  
 same; ' 'violence, civil  
 wars, coups,â\200\231 ending in  
 dictatorships" with their  
 â\200\230ace ompanying sup-  
 pression of peoples and  
 deprivation of â\200\230freedom  
 of speech and the press.  
 In the process â\200\230Asians  
 have been th; ' out  
 of AfricaÂ® and the  
 " Whites in â\200\230Angola and  
 Mozambique have Jeft  
 ecause Y - saw no  
 future in remaining.  
 e d 3 3  
 Bearing all this oA  
 mind hardly inspires  
 Whites, ~ Asians - and  
 Coloureds = with. - con-  
 fidence and the woman  
 of Chatsworth can  
 therefore hardly be  
 blame \* for being ' ap-  
 prehensive. :



By Allen Pizey  
\_ The Daily News  
Afrlca News Service

South Afrlus racial  
\* problems are making  
life . somewhat com-  
.pllcated in neighbouring  
Lesotho. RS

When" the: June: riots

broke out â\200\230the South

- â\200\230African = Minister of  
Water Affairs, Mr  
Braam Raubenheimer,  
was in Maseru: discuss-  
ing the possibilities of

. the water scheme near

Oxbow, in the Maluti  
Mountains.

The Lesotho Govern-  
ment felt it could hardly  
â\200\234sup with the devilâ\200\235 at  
such a time, and so ask-

ed Mr Raubenheimer to

leave, it is said here in  
Maseru.

Curtailling of  
discussions on Oxbow  
was untimely for the  
Lesotho Government.  
They want to get the  
giant scheme out of the  
planning stages and into  
gtiotim as soon as possi-

e

When = the idea of  
selling the Oxbow water  
and power - to South  
Africa was first mooted  
.the asking price by  
Lesotho was too high.  
With South Africaâ\200\231s fast-  
rising need for elec-  
tricity and the problems  
over Cabora Bassa  
however Lesotho feels

Pretoria may soon be  
forced to be more  
amenable to bargaining  
over Oxbow.

But being a Black na-



â\200\230tion they cannot deal

while =~ their brethren  
across the border are  
rioting.

The riots also affect  
the 200 000 Basotho who  
work in the South Afri-  
can mines. They are  
liable to be imbued with  
the radical political  
ideas of the wave of  
Black unrest â\200\224  
something which the

.Jonathan = Government,

based as it is on less  
than complete popular  
support, does not want  
brought into the already  
lively Lesotho political

atmosphere.

South African unrest  
also shifts the focus of

world - attention away,  
from the overall  
political scene where

Prime Minister Leabua  
Jonathan would like to  
make his mark.

â\200\230While he  
there is little chance of  
being considered a ma-  
jor statesman in  
Southern Africa, Chief  
Jonathan would  
nevertheless like to play  
a more prominent role.

He is reportedly  
somewhat miffed by the

. Lesotho

realises.

fact â\200\230that he u not

included in the  
â\200\234frontline statesâ\200\235 â\200\230meet-

ings, â\200\230because as he sees

it Lesotho is â\200\234behind the

nn@â\200\230) .

. With 150 years ex-

perience in dealing with

the Boers he feels  
could give  
valuable advice on the  
thinking of the Vorster

Government.

" Besides that, leading a

Government regarded as

a major force in the

area would make it con-

siderably easier for him  
to hold power back  
home, by boosting his  
prestige.

The issues of the so-  
called Conquered Ter-  
ritory, which Lesotho  
would dearly like to  
discuss in earnest with  
Pretoria, also fall by the  
wayside as long as there  
is internal trouble for  
the South African  
Government.

The territory includes  
a large slice of the  
Orange Free State from  
the Caledon River al-

most to Welkom, Bloem-

fontein and . Thab  
Nâ Chu and are lands the

Basotho claim were .

granted to Moshoeshoe  
I, founder of their  
nation, and then stolen  
by Boer and British  
around the turn of the

178  
'Y

century. -

The areas claimed  
includes some of the  
Free State's finest  
farmlands, something of  
great value to Lesotho,

only about 12 percent of.

whose land is arable.

There is little reason  
to think Chief Jonathan

really expects South  
Africa to cede the land  
to him, but if the issue  
was at  
discussion some other  
concessions could possi-  
bly be wrung.

least under .