

THE CRISIS IN THE PACIntroduction.

A crisis of the greatest dimensions has taken place within the ranks of the Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania. The leadership and the membership have split right down the middle: in the Central Admmittee, High Command, the whole army, the entire Party and its Office administration. In a word, the entire Party has been divided in a manner that has had far-reaching effects on our complex struggle, at home and abroad.

The November 1977 Coup d'Etat:

The long smouldering contradictions within the PAC leadership finally exploded in an incident that occured at our External Mission Headquarters in Dar Es Salaam last November. Unlike previous crises in the PAC, this one was marked by a determined use of violence and the utilisation of completely new recruits from the Home Front who knew absolutely nothing about the PAC's history, policies, struggles and procedures for handling internal differences. In addition to that, outside elements belonging to a different party altogether were also grossly used in the formentation, provocation, execution and perpetuation of this crisis. Aan, as has been repeatedly stated both in the PAC's Central Committee meetings that followed, and to the OAU/ALC and the government (PMO), the whole ugly, disruptive and tretogressive episode was deliberately engineered from the topmost position in the PAC Leadership, with clear and unyielding political objectives to be accomplished.

What happened last November can be simply recounted with precision. First, Leballo (our Acting President), acting without consultation with other Central Committee members and our army commanders

resident in Dar and, instead, wrongly going over their heads in army and military matters, started frequenting our camp, made inciting speeches there, told our army men there that he was giving them the right to go to Dar or Mbeya without bothering to get appropriate authority, and that nobody had the power or right to stop them or to refuse them permission to leave the camp, and then in subsequent weeks, he began drawing a few army cadres to Dar. These cadres had been newly appointed to the PAC's High Command and into the latter's suborgans.

And when they came to Dar, they simply went right on to ignore and even defy well-known procedures regarding the presence of trained men in Dar Es Salaam; they only dealt with Leballo in everything. There came then increasing complaints from the Commanding Officers of the Special Duty Unit, both in Mbeya and Dar Es Salaam. They brought these concerns to the attention of the PAC commanders in Dar Es Salaam, whom they recognised as being in charge of its military affairs. However, it transpired that the SDU Commanding Officers themselves knew very well who the culprit was in this now, disruptive "procedure": Leballo himself. For their own part, the PAC commanders did not only question him about these unlawful "procedures" but actually told him how concerned authorities were over them, and then asked him to desist. But he would simply deny any implication, would promise to send these cadres back to the camp and, once, he even went to apologize to SDU, promising that he would from then onwards do the procedurally correct thing. However, subsequent activities between him and these cadres, totally unknown to PAC commanders and the SDU, showed that he had not only "failed" to send them back, but that he was in fact using them to disturb the work of the properly constituted departments of the PAC's High Command. They did not return to the camp; instead, they encouraged a steady flow that increased their initially small number in the city. Thus a new situation where Leballo and the commanders were clearly working at cross purposes had been deliberately

brought about, despite the commanders' efforts to stop it in several consultations with him. That situation escalated rapidly.

In the meantime, other things were happening among the new PAC recruits in Dar Es Salaam over whom he exercised total monopolistic influence. As a direct result of his bad personal influence over them, which has poisoned the young, untrained minds, many began hating whosoever happened to have been pointed out to them by him as "plotters that conspired against the leadership" or those whom he painted as "anti-Party" or "counter-revolutionary" elements, etc, etc. Yet the simple fact is that all such people were Party members, old and new, who, having been officially assigned the task of giving the young new recruits initial political education, to prepare them for the rigours of their forthcoming training abroad, as well as for the greater hazards in the Azanian struggle than they had witnessed in the June 1976 Uprising, would naturally go straight into the fundamentals of their assignment, and not dwell on eulogizing Leballo. On occasion they would make a critical analysis of the situation in our country and its inter-relationships with other national struggles in Southern Africa, as well as the needs of the present phase and the immediate future. In all this, they saw no need for leader-hero-worshiping, empty sloganeering, and the like. But this is precisely the kind of disregard that Leballo hates most vehemently; so they fell out of favour with him. Consequently, he repeatedly agitated for their removal from the assignment and the residences of the young recruits, upon failure of which he ordered the young recruits to throw them out by force. As a result, one of the stalwart cadres of the PAC was subsequently attacked and stabbed early one morning, right on the premises of our offices, by the more psychopathic of Leballo's "new blood". Coincidentally, this happened a few days after Leballo had unilaterally and most arbitrarily dismissed this man from his broadcasting functions with Radia Tanzania. The fact that the departmental

head of this comrade was absent from the country did not deter Leballo. Nor did the other fact that other leaders were physically present in Dar, he did not consult them on this inexplicably inductive action. He hardly gave the man the chance to defend himself against his accusations. At any rate, both incidents were never properly handled, even as other Central Committee members tried hard to bring Leballo to his senses and resolve the matter in a fitting manner.

A little while afterwards, the new recruits themselves, some of whom had begun having doubts and misgivings about all these goings-on, held some general meeting on a Wednesday in which they attempted to review the situation and mend their relationships. One of their decisions was to call all Central Committee and High Command leaders into a Sunday meeting, where they would air their views and ask for explanations from all the leaders, and not just listen to one man (Leballo) always vilify his colleagues in their absence. However, the following day, some of these recruits piled into the Party Offices and laid siege to them, generally behaving in a wild manner. They claimed to have come to ask the office and the leaders for the same explanations they would want in the forthcoming Sunday meeting. After some very long persuasion from Central Committee and High Command members, they finally left, having accepted the leaders' promise to come to the general meeting on that Sunday to thoroughly explain things to them. Others had simultaneously gone to Leballo's house for similar purposes, and were likewise persuaded to await the Sunday meeting. Thus when a smaller number attempted to repeat the siege the following day, they were easily persuaded to stop it. Leballo and Central Committee members present met to look into the matter. They decided to attend the Sunday meeting and lay down the line on discipline most firmly. Leballo was to lead this move.

On the appointed Sunday afternoon, everybody went to the meeting and the recruits, as well as some Party members, spoke their grievances, criticisms and views with great clarity. In the process, however, it became clear that not only was the house divided between "pro-Leballo" recruits and "anti-Leballo" critics, but also that Leballo had earlier on mobilized "his forces" (as he is fond of calling them) to hackle, threaten or actually assault any of his critics physically. Thus the tension that had obviously built up long before this meeting exploded when "his forces" took out their long knives, attacked some predetermined targets (Party members and non-members critical of Leballo's "methods" in handling PAC affairs and internal relations), beat and stabbed them in a general pandemonium that ensued, and broke up the meeting in an unprecedented manner. Victims were rushed to hospitals, all other people were advised to go home, and to remain calm. A little later, some Central Committee members spontaneously agreed on the advisability of asking Leballo to issue a general mandatory order to all our residences to the effect that all should remain in their houses and not go about visiting, and to remain calm, awaiting the decisions of the Central Committee which would meet the following morning to deliberate on the whole situation. When contacted, Leballo readily agreed to all these emergency proposals, so the other Central Committee members turned in for the night. All seemed to have subsided.

Yet at about 2 am in the night, a whole gang of the new recruits, clearly under the leadership of those army cadres that Leballo had been drawing out of the camp, as well as some members of the Basotholand Congress Party, attacked the residence of all the other Central Committee and High Command members, as well as some PAC and BCP members and new recruits (Mwanauchi Flats on Nkrumah Road). The attackers woke everybody up in the rudest manner, manhandled everyone on sight, wielded their long knives

in a clear menace to their lives, demanded briefcases, working documents of the leading persons, and the keys to the High Command's cabinets and office. In the process, they were turning everything upside down in search of some mysterious revolver allegedly kept in that house of the imagined "purpose" of assassinating Leballo. Not finding any gun, they left, taking all the other things with them.

But at 6 am they returned looking for one Central Committee member whom they had not found in the night raid, the mysterious revolver, and some other unspecified things. In the course of their noisy search, they once again stabbed, manhandled and then captured one Party functionary of the High Command office. Finally, they took him and other captives as hostages to another PAC house (Upanga West), allegedly for some "interrogation". But since some had escaped seizure in the morning uproar, it became possible to alert the police, the Prime Minister's Office, and the OAU Liberation Committee; and that was done, speedily. Thus towards midday, an official of the OAU/ALC, in the company of Leballo, went to the rescue of the hostages. They were all released then. The following day, Tuesday afternoon, a "joint" meeting of all the victims of stabbing and terror, kidnapping and confiscation, and "a representative few" of the culprits, as well as Leballo, Central Committee and High Command members in Dar Es Salaam and the office staff, was held. Some decisions under the chairmanship of Leballo, were taken:

- (1) a "temporary truce" (as he himself called it);
- (2) return of the working paraphernalia seized to the officials concerned;
- (3) return of normal working conditions in the offices with nor further molestations, and
- (4) the setting up of a Commission of Inquiry into the disturbances and their causes.

It was agreed that first, all the things to be returned would be

brought back to the office the following morning. Then Leballo himself asked those who had not attended that "joint" meeting to return to their desks and functions. The meeting to choose the Inquiry Commission would be held the following day.

As things turned out the following day, nothing was returned that morning, instead, the culprit army men demanded access to the High Command's bank account and safety deposit box where cash was kept for the High Command's emergency operations. More than that they, together with many of the culprit new recruits, behaved in a threatening manner that once more raised tensions in the office. All this was happening right before Leballo's eyes, but instead of calling it off, he allowed it to go on, obviously since he was not being personally menaced. At any rate that afternoon the meeting took place as scheduled, all parties concerned participating. But what emerged was a rancorous argument between all the victims on the one hand, and Leballo and the culprit army men on the other. They (Leballo and Co) had obviously decided in the intervening period that (1) nothing would be returned to normal, and that the overthrown commanders (Chief of Staff, his Deputy, Deputy Chief Political Commissar and Secretary for Logistics) remained "suspended", and (2) the proposed Commission of Inquiry should be headed by one of the chief culprit army men, and should consist largely of the other culprits (army men and recruits involved in the raids, etc). He openly refused to play any stabilising role in this meeting, preferring to be identified with the culprits in every way instead.

Several days later, news of these events reached the camp, and the old Party members there decided to intervene in an attempt to help restore law and order. They came to Dar Es Salaam, and then tried. But they failed because they found that Leballo and his henchmen had already consolidated their positions. They reported their presence to the police and other government and CCM officials, where they also made their own recommendations for

the resolution of the crisis. Subsequently, the Central Committee and High Command in question drew up a memorandum requesting the government and the OAU/ALC to jointly intervene, and then presented this to both the ALC and the PMO. (That memorandum is hereto attached for reference).

Since there had been public disturbances (at Manzese) following the arrival on the scene of the Party members from the camp, they and most of those on the opposing side (Leballo's "forces") were detained and charged. However, they were all subsequently released on suspended sentences, as a result of the Central Committee's intervention.

The Central Committee met early in December, while these people were still in detention. Realising that both the government and the ALC must have most probably advised Leballo to do everything possible to put the PAC house in order, themselves not wishing to intervene at that stage, the four Central Committee members of the memorandum to the government and the ALC decided to attend the Central Committee meeting, in the last flicker of hope that perhaps the Party could just possibly be salvaged from Leballo's morass much as his chairmanship of that meeting was totally unacceptable to them.

As soon as the meeting started, Leballo levelled a whole range of fictitious charges against them and those absent from that meeting. They initially ignored all this, choosing to deal first with the detention of all our men. The rest of the day was spent towards this end. But in the evening, they came back hard on him over his false accusations and virtually indicted him on firm political grounds. Yet there was just no way of eliciting a binding pledge not to engaged in splittist and disruptive activities from him. The impossibility lay in the fact that he had clearly neutralised some CC members and rallied others to his side. But the meeting was adjourned to allow Leballo and others

to go on an official visit to Khartoum. When it resumed a week later, difficulties abounded, with he and nearly everybody else evading the major issues, engaging in subterfuges and double-talk, etc. Finally, however, some decisions were reached solely because the four CC members had sufficient good sense and courage to compromise on certain issues in a sincere bid for unity and a return of things to normalcy. Briefly, with respect to the crisis, it was decided that (1) the toppled (or "suspended") High Command men should soon return to their previous functions; (2) Leballo should convene a meeting of all commanders and army men involved, as well as members of the High Commands suborgans, and do everything under this mandate to harmonise our military organisation's affairs and restore unity in our ranks; (3) he should ensure thereby that the home-going programme for all our trained men was prosecuted between them and the Consultative Conference in April 1978, with added vigour, and (4) a consultative conference should be held in April this year (a Steering Committee for which was also chosen), to review the whole situation and work out our common way forward. He was therefore mandated to hold on-going consultations with all concerned, especially the three High Command members concerned to work out any details of the Central Committee formula.

A few days only after this CC meeting, Leballo and other CC members reported the outcome of their meeting at the ALC, Leballo held consultations with the three HC members, and then convened the proposed High Command meeting. The Central Committee decisions were delivered and explained thoroughly to all. However, while all the HC men on the one side accepted the CC decisions, the others (Leballo's men) flatly rejected them, saying that the deed had been done and was irreversible. And then there was no way forward, in spite of prolonged persuasion from other Central Committee members who had attended as observers. Leballo then said he was adjourning the meeting, and would go into protracted

consultations with all, especially the defiant group, and asked all to do their own private consultations to overcome the deadlock. He promised to reconvene the meeting the following week, when he would be coming to report success, for he could not contemplate failure in this. Yes, he did go into consultations with nearly everybody, and he kept postponing the resumption of the meeting on account of failure to convince "his boys" of the gravity of the situation. In the meantime, he was doing things with them that clearly indicated to us that he was in fact consulting them only on how to remain firm and stubborn in their defiance of the Central Committee while he kept all of us on the other side waiting for something that would in fact never come. Finally, however, he called the meeting a few days before another Central Committee meeting that was to review the execution of its earlier decisions. In the reconvened HC meeting Leballo simply announced "his complete failure" at reconciliation of the feuding sides and said that was what he was going to report to the Central Committee. He never gave any plausible reasons, much less acceptable ones, for his failure. Nor did he utter as much as a single word about possible disciplinary action against the insubordinate army men. That meeting ended in an uproar, and Leballo made it clear that he could not care less: He upheld the view and standpoint of the defiant ones - that the coup and take-over were an irreversible fait accompli.

On January 22, the Central Committee met, and Leballo delivered his mindblowing report on the CC decisions and his "efforts". He concluded with a personal recommendation that called for the final and total overthrow of the whole High Command, that is, commanders both in Tanzania and out of the Home Front or in our Forward Posta. This was nothing less than asking the Central Committee to do what he and some thirty-five young ones had agitated for a little before the November 1977 coup d'etat and the resultant

crisis, and to ask the Central Committee to throw away its December decisions and instead endorse his military take-over through the instrumentality of the few army men, some mentally poisoned recruits and some members of the Basotholand Congress Party of Ntsu Mokhehle. Thus the enraged members of the Central Committee who had all along witnessed and combatted Leballo's politics of tricks, and were now seeing the final collapse of the PAC, made their feelings known to everyone present and then walked out. As it is right now, they have despaired of ever getting proper leadership from Leballo.

The meaning of these events.

It is all too easy to narrate and lament the devastating effects of the November 1977 events on the PAC as a whole; but the crucial thing is to understand what Leballo's motives are in piloting such a pervasive dislocation of the entire movement, and then going so far as to sabotage nearly all the good work that has taken us such a great deal of time, effort and resources to accomplish. For he has not simply stopped at generating widespread hostilities in the movement, fomenting mutiny in our Party and army ranks, and finally staging the unprecedented in the PAC - a coup d'etat from the top; he has subsequently gone one, with veritable desperation, to (a) try using the governments of the countries that matter most to the Azanian Revolution to victimise us and all those he considers inimical to his ambitions, (b) attempting to uproot the Party's military and civilian operatives in the PAC's Forward Posts (Botswana and Swaziland), where he believes we have a firm foothold that threatens to ultimately thwart his motives, (c) speedily sending instructions to all PAC offices, centres and personnel abroad (e.g. London, Lusaka, etc), ordering them to have nothing to do with us (or our "envoys"), (d) cause the frustration of our efforts at carrying out the Party's official programme (as opposed to his unofficial make-shift programme)

to wit, the suspension of material aid from the ALC, and (e) secretly spreading the word around to the effect that we (CC and HC members) are in fact already expelled from the PAC (see their Circular of 23/1/78, and hear the questions asked by outsiders whenever they meet us).

What then are Leballo's aims in all this?

The motives and aims of Leballo's evil methods and outrageous politics are far older than the ostensible causes and execution of the November '77 coup, and they can be summed up in very simple political language; He most greedily craves for ABSOLUTE PERSONAL POWER over both the whole Party and the entire army, as opposed to the PAC's founding principles of collective leadership, common responsibility and democratic centralism. This is the life-long ambition of the man that has caused one crisis after another in the tortured history of our Party ever since its inception, especially after he became its acting leader (1962). If the question arises as to how this verdict is arrived at, then a few salient examples only are in place, leaving out all petty things that are of little political consequence.

THE AREAS OF OUR DIFFERENCES:

(a) On collective decisions and co-ordinated action

Over the years, one set of leadership after another has had serious conflicts with Leballo over an apparently simple matter, but one that invariably turns out to be the foremost root cause of leadership and organisational crises every so often : wilful disrespect and calculated disregard for, as well as malicious violation of important decisions democratically and collectively arrived at by the leaders of the PAC, with him included. Times without number a PAC leadership will meet to review and debate crucial issues of organisational and national importance under

his chairmanship, finally reach a unanimous viewpoint, or even a mere general consensus, and then take a unified official decision only for him to do pretty much as he pleases, contravene and sabotage its letter, spirit, import and purpose afterwards, when he is in fact mandated to carry it out with faith and seriousness. Afterwards, he will fling left, right and centre all sorts of false accusations against his colleagues in the leadership, claiming all the while with tongue in cheek - they (not he) are undermining such a decision, thus it would appear that whenever a collective decision that goes against Leballo's personal wishes is democratically arrived at, a crisis is sure to take place in the PAC.

But not only that, more often than not, Leballo has, without full and proper consultation with his leading colleagues, gone right ahead to take personal decisions on crucial matters of life and death importance to our oppressed nation and its struggle, and then report afterwards. The essence of this maddening style lies in the fact he does this, not in their physical absence from our External Mission HQ in Dar Es Salaam, but in their presence, yet without their appraisal; to wit, the Mgzashe case, i.e. the story of the Party cadre who was summarily dismissed from his broadcasting job with RTD and then assaulted. In a meeting that tried to discuss the case, Leballo went so far as to dare our Acting Treasurer General to try reversing the Radio Order, then the latter would see where power lies. To be precise: Well Gqobs, you have talked much about my not having any dictatorial powers, as though you have forgotten Clause 14(b), and as though you did not hear me say this was an emergency. "Well, just go on and try and reverse my decision on this Mgxashe fellow and see if you will succeed. You just dare to then you will see where power lies." Was there any grounds for more discussion or persuasion after this height of arrogance? And for another salutary example. In an earlier crisis he surprised his colleagues with a premeditated

summary at the camp calculated to completely sabotage well known procedures in military affairs by which he pronounced himself the new Chairman of the Military Commission -therefore summarily pushing its officially appointed head (the Commander-in-Chief) to the secondary position of deputy and that he would increase the Military Commission from three to five members. Furthermore he announced his call on the army men to consult privately and then elect new members into the High Command. A totally unheard of style in our military appointments procedures! But more than that, he had not had prior consultations with the two Central Committees, or the three High Command Members, who were all present at that camp meeting. Needless to add, he had obviously violated the mandate of the Central Committee which had asked him and the two CC men in his company to go and investigate the situation at the camp, stress discipline, restore our army men's unity, and to maintain that the leadership in the process, allowing no petty agitators to split the leadership at whatever level. He and they were to report back to the Central Committee in Dar Es Salaam, where a resolution of that crisis would be worked out. But by his infuriating surprise summary he attempted to achieve the direct opposite of that mandate. He failed in this sabotage move solely because the other CC members put their foot down on this quite firmly.

Needless to say, such individual decisions and action have often been arbitrary and disruptive, subjective and divisive, as well as totally removed from reality, satisfying only personal motives. Thus Leballo's long enduring style in pursuance of his objective of personalised political power within the PAC is simplicity itself: Always create an irreversible and outrageous fait accompli, then let them burn in their indignation!

(b) On handling internal relations

After unnecessarily provoking differences between himself and his leading colleagues in the manner here above outlined, Leballo will invariably go to the rank and file members (nowadays this includes the very young new recruits since Soweto June 1976), to junior Party officials (such as representatives in the office), and even to total outsiders of any rank - e.g. members of the BCP and vilify his Central Committee colleagues, behind their backs, and to the worst extent possible. He will unjustifiably call them all sorts of ugly political names, fabricate hair raising tales about them, falsely accuse them of everything and anything that takes his fancy. But worst of all, he will get so carried away by his own imagination that he will blurt out Party confidences and strategic or tactical secrets of a most sensitive nature! So it is today that, in point of fact, all concepts of revolutionary or military security and the maintenance thereof are virtually worthless slogans indeed. This is one particular thing that has very often driven our commanders and some political leaders mad to say the very least. And then, once he has done all this to a desired level of his audience's hostile reaction, he will then turn round and present these to the PAC leadership as the "grievances" of the rank and file, representatives, new recruits and 'outside friends'. Then he will agitate for one kind of punitive action or other against him who proves to be the most vocal or persistent of his critics, for example, he has for a long time been urging our Central Committee to expel first Makoti (Publicity and Propaganda department's head), then Jako (Security Chief) and Gqobose (Acting Treasurer General). His reasons have always been varied and various, but always totally unequal to the proposed punitive action. For that reason, these scheming moves have hitherto been thwarted by those who uphold justice and fairplay in the PAC leadership. He has therefore never found a majority vote for his vindictive designs in the Central Committee.

Let us repeat and emphasize: Any PAC member, be he/she a rank and file member, a junior officer, or a leader, must sooner or later face relentless harrassment, demotion, and finally the spectre of expulsion if he/she has the guts of his/her political convictions to say "no" to Leballo's wrong doings, or dares to criticise his political, organisational, ideological, strategic or tactical errors. The evidence hereof is all over the world: Kenya, Europe, North and West Africa, Britain, RSA, America and even Matanzima's Bantustanite Transkei!

(c) On Cadres' Policy

People called cadres in any revolutionary political organisation are the type that is always handled with the greatest care, the aim being to afford the struggle in reservoir of tried and tested leaders and successors. While this is especially true for the old and experienced men and women of the movement, it is equally important with respect to the thousands of the younger generation who take up to the revolutionary cause. Proper education and guidance of the latter is an undertaking that needs to be handled with the care that its sensitivity deserves.

Yet just the two examples in the foregoing subheadings point up another field of chronic differences between ourselves and Leballo. Over the years, we have experienced grave difficulties resulting from diverging approaches to the question of how to handle and develop Party and army cadres, both old and new. While we have always upheld the right of all Party Members to freely air their own views on any subject of our common endeavour, up to and including the most vehement criticism of our leaders' styles of doing things, Leballo has always resented their courage or political maturity in trying to help their leaders right things and contribute in shaping our advance to victory. Similar divergencies exist also in dealing with the PAC's army cadres, and they abound. So it

is that while we shall for ever be making all conceivable efforts to develop what we hope will be fine, resolute and staunch political and military leaders of the immediate and distant future, Leballo will simply be looking out for, and actually finding potential and real and willing personal stooges amongst the very same cadres under such training. Little wonder therefore that he succeeded in splitting even the young, new, innocent ones from Soweto. But nowhere was this most clearly shown than in the disintegration of the camp administration whose new structuring by the High Command, with Leballo's blessing both before and after the exercise, had been designed to elevate our army men's discipline, unity and war preparedness in such a way as would enable them, one and all, to withstand the trying rigours of our liberation war. For no sooner was this accomplished and reported to him, eliciting his approval, than he went about pulling it apart by every conceivable stratagem. One thing stands out like a sore thumb in our experience with Leballo. He will never run dry of even the flimsiest excuses, the most glaring or the worst maddening tricks, for drawing closer to his person anyone betrays the slightest self-interest or lack of principle, and push out of office and away anyone who fails to exhibit the "qualities" consistent with his own scheming mind. And quite often doing so most dictatorially! It is therefore quite natural that so many otherwise fine people were thoroughly disgusted with his methods, and are today outside the movement and the Azanian struggle. How many more must so needlessly fall by the wayside?

There is today no need to prove to anyone who has witnessed the PAC's current problems that now that he feels he has some power base of sorts in the misguided handful of army cadres, the badly poisoned new recruits and in the psychophantic members of the Basotholand Congress Party he and Mokhohle infiltrated into the PAC, Leballo has ultimately decided to dispense totally with all those veteran and trained Party cadres who have stood

squarely behind him in previous PAC crises (here and in Zambia). Today he hates the very sight of them; so, for his own part, they must go, the time and effort invested in their political development regardless. And that is to say nothing of their ages old and cherished desire to go home and make revolution, a desire that he has so maliciously undermined and thwarted all along, and which he is sabotaging right now by every means at his command.

Our own position on this point of principle is simple. Since leaders in any national struggle or social revolution come and go, we ourselves shall not always be there. Nor are we enough to do all that needs to be done in our struggle. The logical conclusion is therefore patently clear: We must persevere in our historical task of bringing up and developing many more cadres for all the revolutionary tasks before us, and for tomorrow's leadership. And that regardless of Leballo's or anyone else's momentary and transient ambitions.

(e) On Party Building

On April 6th this year the PAC will be nineteen years old. While this is not a very significant age in the life-span of an individual human being, it certainly is considerable for a revolutionary political organisation, and is therefore surely worthy of a serious and soul-searching contemplation for those of its members at the top. In so doing, there is but one overriding question. Has this Party learned anything in all those years of its existence and struggle? Has it tried to benefit by its rich experiences?

Yes, the PAC has learned quite a great deal, and has benefitted substantially from its experiences. One is beyond all question, the fact that we should certainly have failed to come as far as we have done had we stubbornly refused to stop and reflect for

a moment. No one knows better than we do that, in our relatively short existence we have not carved up a place for ourselves as a political entity in Azanian and African History. But we have also tested the bitterness of grave setbacks and staggering disasters since we came on the South African scene. Right from the beginning, we blundered almost unforgivably even as we most courageously took some of our most important strides towards our inevitable destiny. So when we had some respite, we sat down and reviewed ourselves, our efforts, our achievements and our failures. At the end of it all, we arrived at what we then regarded as logical conclusions, which we still hold to be true to this day. We did all this in the present of Leballo, with his full approval, participation and contribution. The conclusions we reached in this unprecedentedly democratic exercise identified our political, ideological, military and organisational flaws, and then went on to point out the new road we were to embark on from then forward. It was then agreed that first, all our common views be summarised in a book or booklet that would also contain our proposed new measures. The outcome was subsequently called "the New Road of Revolution". Second we were to make all possible efforts to ensure that our summary of experience and new proposals reached the Home Front for study, contributions, ratification and approval of all the other members and leaders of the PAC in the country. Thus, with fences mended nearly all round here abroad, the successful 'seminar' showed every hopeful indication that we were entering a completely new era of mutual understanding, unity and prosperity. But, alas, it was not to be. For no sooner were the manuscripts completed than Leballo picked up a very ugly fight over them. From that day onward, he has lamented and decried the fact that he had not been duly glorified in "The New Road of Revolution", and that struggle (for the retention of the ideological, political and organisational propositions, as well as their validity and authenticity, on the one side, and for their total betrayal on the other) has gone on without let up over the years.

Leballo has in the course of time contemptuously turned upside down, thrown overboard, some of the most fundamental propositions in "The New Road of Revolution". For instance, suddenly finding new hope in the young new recruits from Soweto and elsewhere for his long cherished ambition of putting together a personal army for himself and dispensing with the PAC army he one day unilaterally declared that every one of the new recruits had become a full member of the PAC simply by dint of having come into contact with it at the points of our military recruitment. He told them in no uncertain terms that he was taking it upon himself to proclaim their membership, and nobody, no matter who would reverse that proclamation.

Quite apart from the total lack of any consultation with his colleagues on this matter, the gravity of this arrogant, arbitrary declaration lies in its malicious violation of an agreed principle based on our known common experiences, as so lucidly reflected in "The New Road of Revolution". Secondly, it betrayed a terrible inconsistency in our leadership, since those Party and army leaders who actually recruited these young ones and sent them abroad had told them quite a different story - honestly persuasively and convincingly. For the recruiting leaders had openly told the new ones that they were being recruited, not directly into the PAC, but into the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA) and its war programme, that they would all have to apply individually at their own time, for PAC membership; that the voluntary formal applications for PAC membership would then be followed by a period of probation during which certain desirable qualities would be observed and/or developed in the applicant before acceptance. All the reasons, or most of them, that had to do with this new membership policy were fully outlined to them, and they had understood and accepted the wisdom and necessity thereof. The same explanations were even once made to some of them at our camp after they returned from training, and that further clarified

the confusion that Leballo had caused with his silly proclamation. At any rate, serious differences over this most crucial point remain and persist, and they have resulted in the big rift that today pervades the whole PAC. In a nutshell, all of our proposals to consciously and painstakingly transform the PAC into a truly revolutionary vanguard Party of the Azanian Revolution capable of guaranteeing that struggle's successful conduct have been undermined, torpedoed and shattered. For Leballo has not only blocked any advancement, but has gone to ban "The New Road of Revolution". Repeat: Leballo has banned "The New Road of Revolution". And then, in a desperate set of consolidation measures, an entrenchment of these major reversals, he has arbitrarily appointed some of the most ill-disciplined and rapidly ambitious of his knights-of-the-long-knives with the most astounding rapidity. Not only that; he has also sent them forth into some of the most sensitive areas in Southern Africa, areas that obviously demand the experienced hand of those experienced in 'that kind of job' long before the knights-of-the-long-knives were born politically. As a result, a terrible mess is unfolding in the south, and Leballo is rubbing his hands with glee, hardly stopping for a moment to reflect on the terrible and tragic consequences for the governments and nations under the menace of his boy adventurers. In a word, this is the outcome and effect of the November '77 take-over very wide and devastating in its ramifications. There is hardly a PAC member who understands or interprets it otherwise. For the PAC as a whole, the question still stands, imperiously demanding a clear, unequivocal answer: To go on traversing the old bitter road of our past setbacks and disasters (and reaping more of the same now), or to embark on the obvious logical alternative path of proper development and sure victory for the Azanian Revolution?

(f) On Army building

Sharp differences and fostering quarrels arose and grew out of all control over the question of building our army. To be quite sure,

both sides have always acknowledged the necessity of any army and a strong one at that to carry out the task of fighting Racist South Africa (RSA) and defeating the devilish system there. But how should we go about building this army? What type of army?

To cut a long story short, we have always believed that only a strong, disciplined and politically motivated army, and a true people's army for that matter, is the answer to mighty RSA. Such an army would not be labelled a "People's Army" simply and solely by reason of its outward signs. Such an army would be called a people's army on the firm ground of a solid political and ideological grounding through systematic and patient education over and above its technical training. The finest weapons and military skills in the hands of highly politically motivated liberation troops are more than a match for the toughest imperialist army; such soldiers will even defeat "the bomb"! That combination is the sole guarantee for an oppressed people's victory. On the other hand, the best of this world's military expertise and arms in the hands of a bank of adventurers, misguided and without direction are simply no match for RSA, much less a guarantee of our people's victory in a life and death contest with Vorster's war machine. As far as we are concerned, this can no longer be in dispute. But of course, Leballo believes and behaves otherwise. Thus, while we have persevered in our efforts to impart the requisite political motivation to our army, Leballo has gone to all sorts of lengths to thwart, sabotage and write off every programme of political education in the PAC army. As it were, he has most groundlessly alleged that all such instruction makes cowards out of otherwise brave people. Fantastic, to say the very least. At all events, the biggest victims of his tragic standpoint are the very young new ones in our army. For instead of being taught unflinching loyalty to our people and their fundamental interests, they are being stuffed full with absolute

loyalty to individual leaders, chief amongst them Leballo.

Needless to add, these things had been agreed upon in years gone by. Today they are no longer just a bone of contention but the rock upon which the PAC seems bound to flounder and crash to oblivion.

(g) On waging armed Struggle

After all the differences here above outlined, especially over army matters, it will not be very difficult for the readers to visualise serious differences over the question of how to fight RSA. For after all will have been said and done in the arena of ideas, the battlefield will still be waiting for us and beckoning us to come and test all our feuding theories.

There are today clearly two opposing lines in the PAC in the issue of armed struggle. There is the old official line of people's war, a line that Leballo has urged all along, to which we remain unflinchingly loyal and there is now the "new line" of precipitate direct armed confrontations with the enemy in his citadels - the cities. Leballo, his Central Committee supporters, and his misguided followers among the young new ones subscribe to this "new" ill-defined and obviously ill-fated line of quick decision battles without a stitch of adequate or proper preparations. While to us painstaking planning and perseverance in the admittedly arduous tasks of thorough political preparation make up the life-line and the surest path for the desired victory, Leballo and the little boys bury their heads in the sand and proclaim that they can "pull it off" with sheer man-to-man confrontations in the streets of Johannesburg, Capetown, Durban, etc. Without any demonstrably real preparations. They are men in a desperate hurry to show some fighting to the outside world, so as to justify and account for its financial contributions to the PAC. The political, strategic and, what is more, the moral implications of such a

policy are just too tragic to reflect upon. They are really mind-boggling for us simple and honest people.

Even if we suppose the leadership had this "new line" not inherently involving the threat of throwing away the lives of so many people, especially those of the very young militants, we probably could consider affording ourselves the luxury of relenting on our stand for a people's war suited to the specific conditions of our country (a large African population predominantly colonised in RSA's countryside, and advanced industrial economy that is vulnerable to all sorts of attacks, and suitable geographical conditions for a victorious guerrilla war). But then, we, like any leadership worthy of that title anywhere in the world, carry an inconceivably heavy responsibility for the thousands, nay, millions of lives that are just itching to come to grips with our oppressors. As trained military commanders, we cannot but take fully into conscious account our nation's lives and destiny in all our strategic thinking, planning and actions. Genocidal or suicidal adventure, no matter how high the financial stakes in international market-places, simply won't do. For that reason alone, we are quite prepared to scrape along in abject poverty, so long as our people's final liberation is assured.

(h) On Handling External Relations

Over many years now we have had rather very serious differences with Leballo over the issue of how to approach established supporters and potential friends. To trade in outright lies, elaborate half truths, distort facts and make false promises in any presentations to governments, international organisations, fellow liberation movements and personages of goodwill, and making large and groundless claims everywhere in the world, or, the simple truth, the hard facts of our situation, and a fair appraisal of our own standing at any one time? Surreptitious back-stabbing

of colleagues at sensitive moments in our dealings with outsiders, or, a democratic and co-ordinated approach and mutual respect and trust amongst ourselves even before going to address ourselves to outside people whose respect and trust we desire? Double-talk or straight talk inside and outside the PAC? What could be said to be so revolutionary about a national liberation movement whose topmost leader knows no better than all the negatives in the above questions? Or is it being overly moralistic on our part to be always insisting that all our true friends and supporters need to know the truth as it is about our efforts and the level of our people's struggles at any one time, in order for them to very nearly accurately assess the extent of their own commitment?

Needless to say, we have lost some of the most valuable opportunities, offers and promises - to say nothing of the goodwill of very trusting and very serious governments, workd bodies and capable personages of goodwill, who all give up in total disgust. And still our ways will not change, much less our fortunes, because our top man just will not listen to most persuasive advice, argument, reason or entreaty. Instead, he goes on to strengthen himself in these ways by continually collecting around himself like-minded people; and together now they are fighting tooth and nail to purge those who stand by truth in the PAC! In Europe, and most conceivably in North America too, the word is now out, "Help to fight and purge the Communist Spectre in the PAC!"

CONCLUSION:

In the lengthy narration of the origins, the root causes, and the wide ranging repercussions of our present crisis, we have left out much that otherwise needed to be said. Amongst things correctly left out are Leballo's one thousand and one childish accusations - old and new - against us and whoever else has opinions similar to ours, even to the slightest degree, as well as a

full refutation of such false charges. Also excluded is an account of the views of PAC members at home and abroad, who already learned of Leballo's disruptions and sabotage as well as other numerous charges against him over organisational matters - some small, other big - but all provable and well known in the PAC and outside it. For judging by the size of this analysis, the points excluded are advisable in order to avert a bulkier outline. After all, these may be compiled in a separate paper altogether should the need arise. At this point therefore, we wish to pass on to our conclusions.

Firstly, all the differences shown in the fields enumerated above, reveal that we have had, and still have, irredeemable conflicts in the realm of ideas concerning our political organisation and national struggle. Thus, our political, organisational and military differences have always stemmed from, and then boiled down to ideological differences, as a matter of fact. True enough, Legallo has no identifiable body of systematic ideas of his own; he has always been erratic and sporadic in his 'ideas' and doings, electing to play it by the heart at all times. However, he does have ideas, has always had them, and with them he has always caused frustrations, disruptions and dislocation in the movement. It is the unavoidable interplay of these unorganised, contradictory and underdeveloped ideas of his with those of other PAC members and leaders that account to quarrels and lead to crises. Indeed, it is today a law governing PAC internal life that to stop Leballo's provocation of disunity in our ranks you have to pitch into the fights he provokes so often. The present crisis has brought a clear message from Leballo, namely, that our long-fostering ideological differences are irreconcilable. Thus he has set us all on a collision course for so long that it is extraordinarily difficult to envision a reconciliation.

Secondly, all the facts elaborated above, as well as countless others not included in this brief outline, lead us inexorably to one conclusion about Leballo - he is absolutely incapable of leading any community of sane and serious men and women - he just cannot lead the PAC or the Azanian Revolution. He has an intrinsic and incurable sickness that prevents him from offering the kind of political guidance that we have always desired for, from the day he took over the reins of leadership. Thus, unless the members of the PAC take time out to get themselves a new, sane serious and honest leader, they are still going to experience one crisis after another for the next decade or two. For Leballo is a restive and restless man by nature: he cannot afford long-lasting harmony and peace in the ranks of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania.

But those Leaders of the Party, with whom he has quarrelled in the past four months are faced with the unpalatable prospect of coexisting with him further, and stomaching more of his fouldoings. Thus until the PAC is in a position to choose for itself a leader, worthy of the responsibility of leadership, especially in the wake of our beloved Sobukwo's untimely death; it seems only natural and inescapable that a marriage of convenience be contracted - for the sake of responding to the pressing current demands of our struggle's present phase.

That is the situation in the PAC - and these are our views.

April 4th, 1978.

T M NTANTALA - DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF
THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE PAN
AFRICANIST CONGRESS OF AZANIA.
