

EMBARGOED UNTIL DELIVERED

KWAZULU LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

OPENING ADDRESS BY THE CHIEF MINISTER

ULUNDI : 1ST DECEMBER 1992

This is a Special session which we indicated would be called before the end of the year. This is because there is certain legislation which we felt it was urgent for this Legislative Assembly to pass.

Mr Speaker, Honourable Members, our decision to convene this special session of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly must have been inspired from above. The timing of it could not have been more prudent and the urgency of the issues we have to deal with could not be greater. There are important challenges that we face, both nationally and also at regional level. It is therefore unthinkable that we can hold this session without going beyond just fulfilling what was the original purpose of this session.

Violence is exploding around us everywhere in the country. The negotiation process has ground to a halt. Developments in the fields of violence are threatening to totally discredit the National Peace Accord and all its structures. It is in this situation that we have called for a Multi-Party Conference of Review to take the whole process of negotiation and the whole peace process under review.

Instead of our call being headed, Mr Roelf Meyer continues dealing bilaterally with Mr Cyril Ramaphosa, and President de Klerk has begun meeting privately with Dr Mandela to come to agreements which he then foists on the country at large through the powers he has as head of the governing party.

Members will be aware of what was taking place during the closing months of the KLA session earlier this year. Members will be aware that the ANC walked out of CODESA, leaving it totally hamstrung because they left CODESA and all its structures without a quorum. Members will also be aware that the ANC then took to street corners, and announced their plans to resort to mass action to achieve the political ends they could not achieve through negotiations. I will therefore begin my address to this special session of the KLA by updating members with what has transpired since the Assembly closed in July this year.

I believe that I should do so both because it is always good to recap on the past when faced with urgent decisions about what to do next, and also because it is vital that I read into the Records of this KwaZulu Legislative Assembly our approaches to the crucial issues that the country faces.

The time will come when we will have to look back to see where we went wrong, and the time will come when in doing so political leaders and analysts will look back through our records to see what we did. When that happens we must have a record which shows what we did.

I start with the Security Council hearing of presentations made by various political leaders, including Dr Mandela and myself. I want first of all, however, to put that whole event in perspective. The Security Council hearing was arranged by special request by Dr Mandela. His claim to the international community was that violence in South Africa was totally disrupting the negotiation process and the transitional process into the new South Africa, and that the South African Government was dragging its feet and permitting violence to delay progress.

However true it is that violence is disruptive, the whole basis of Dr Mandela's approach to the Security Council was riddled with deceit. Dr Mandela knows that it was the ANC's walking out of CODESA that terminated the CODESA process. Dr Mandela also knows that it was because the ANC was defeated on the floor of Working Group II and on the floor of the Plenary Session of CODESA II that the ANC left CODESA. Dr Mandela also knows that the final straw for the ANC was their inability to take control of the Management Committee and the Daily Management Committee after CODESA II, which led them to adopt mass action programmes instead of negotiation programmes.

Let me put it on record that the ANC had in fact been preparing for a mass action programme against the possible event of their not getting their way in CODESA. When they pulled out of CODESA and resorted to mass action, they were doing something which they had prepared for, months before.

The ANC pulled out of CODESA because it was defeated, and it pulled out of CODESA to embark on mass action programmes which the ANC knew it would have to support with intimidation.

The ANC knew that death would occur because of mass action. It organised a three day stay-away in the beginning of August knowing that people would die. Scores of people did die - and I mean scores of people. They died because the ANC took the action they took. The action the ANC took immeasurably heightened tensions in the country.

We have clear evidence that the ANC has ever increasingly begun to use Umkhonto personnel and units to back their mass action programmes. The ANC, with its private army and arsenals of arms and ammunition secreted across the length and breadth of the country, is dominantly responsible for the upward spiralling of violence.

We are all aware of what the ANC continues to do. I have for some time now been aware that they continue to train their cadres of Umkhonto we Sizwe. I mentioned at one of our caucus meetings that no less than 225 cadres of Umkhonto were sent to Uganda in June for further training. And that no less than 70 of these came from this Region of KwaZulu/Natal. After the lead story in the largest newspaper in this country, you are now aware that the 225 cadres mentioned to you were no more than just the tip of the ice-berg.

You are now all aware that more than a thousand cadres of Umkhonto have already been sent to Uganda for further training. The pretext that the ANC uses to justify this further training of its private army, is that it is justified on the basis that if they do not increase their numbers before their integration into the SADF, they will be swamped. So the programme to integrate Umkhonto with the SADF is a foregone conclusion, notwithstanding the denials that we have been given by Government spokespersons, including high-ranking officers in the SADF itself, that this would not happen.

Mr Kasril of Bisho fame stated, according to the press report, that there was a need to prepare young people, with an interest in a career in the armed forces, for a future integrated army. So the army that will be in place when a new South Africa is in place, will be the present security forces of the South African Government and members of Umkhonto. The ANC says they are doing this because they do not want to be 'swamped' when the army is integrated into one force.

For us in this Region of KwaZulu/Natal, there will be hardly any representatives of our Party, or the people of KwaZulu, in such an army if we take into account the fact that KwaZulu has no army because of our rejection of 'independence' a'la Pretoria. We can hardly expect Pretoria to be sympathetic to us as far as this exclusion is concerned. They must be laughing at us, and saying that we deserve this exclusion from the Army as a just reward for halting their grandiose apartheid plans of fragmenting the country into mini-independent States. We, who are the largest single Nation in South Africa, rejected their plans.

So this is the reason given as to why the ANC is continuing with the training of its army, in spite of the fact that the Peace Accord forbids any political party from having a private army. This was reiterated by President de Klerk last week, but it is meaningless if we judge this against the telling off which the State President was given by Dr Mandela at CODESA I, on the 20th of December, when he told President de Klerk, in front of the whole world, that he would never disband the ANC's military wing. It is hardly surprising that the ANC goes on in such a brazen fashion with the training of more killers for their military wing.

One wonders what the State is doing about it. All that we hear are inane and mealy-mouthed statements from the Minister of Constitutional Development, justifying aspirations of any party to have its members in an integrated South African Defence Force.

Also words to the effect that while this is acceptable for now, it cannot continue once you have a transitional government. One party can not go on with its own army.

In other words, the ANC can go on doing what it is now doing in consolidating its army as long as we have not reached the point where we have a transitional government. The cadres of the ANC's MK have killed hundreds of our IFP members, as well as other officials of the KwaZulu Government and Tribal Administrations. We must endure this until there is a transitional government. That is Mr Meyer's message. Do we or do we not have a government in South Africa at present? It really becomes imperative that we should go on with setting up a government for this entire Region as soon as possible, and which must have its own militia properly set up, according to law.

To turn the whole tide of international opinion against the government and away from criticism of the ANC, Dr Mandela staged this Security Council hearing with the aid of OAU members and the African block of United Nations, including the Unit on Apartheid. Some of his accusations concerning, for example, the training of the 200 young Zulus was reiterated by the President of the PAC, Mr Clarence Makwetu.

This was something that I drew to the attention of Mr Makwetu and his delegation, when they visited Ulundi to meet me and my colleagues, on the 8th of October 1992. We did not discuss the matter in depth with Mr Makwetu as he took the attitude that we should not go into the past. However, I thought that it was more important that Mr Makwetu and his delegation wanted to play a mediatory role between me, the IFP, Dr Mandela and the ANC. While we accepted their suggestion, it was rejected by the ANC.

From there, Dr Mandela went on a tirade against President de Klerk and in doing so he lashed out at me and the IFP, calling us surrogates of the South African Government and continuing the ANC's propaganda that the IFP only exists because it is bolstered by President de Klerk's army and the Police Force which back the IFP against the ANC. I gave members copies of Dr Mandela's entire speech a few months ago.

Mr Speaker, I was incensed at Dr Mandela's actions. I had to depart very considerably from my prepared text to react immediately to Dr Mandela's allegations.

Our only responsible course of action back in South Africa was to formally lay a charge against the ANC at the National Peace Committee. This we did, and it reads as follows:

A COMPLAINT TO THE NATIONAL PEACE COMMITTEE

Violations of the National Peace Accord in Dr Mandela's
address to the Security Council

It is our contention that the ANC has on many occasions violated the National Peace Accord by the way it has unfairly, and we would argue maliciously maligned the Inkatha Freedom Party and the President of the IFP.

There have been many ANC violations of Chapter 2, but we specifically cite the attack that Dr Mandela made against the IFP in his address to the United Nations Security Council on Wednesday last week as the most recent and most serious violation of this chapter.

We quote from his address to the Security Council:

- an independent socio-political and development agency known as Community Agency for Social Enquiry (CASE) has prepared five reports in regard to the pattern of violence.

One of these reports comes to the conclusion that:

'the violence appears to be switched off at strategic moments'

It continues :

'behind the scale of brutality .. is the clear evidence that the violence erupts at points when it most weakens the ANC and its Allies and dies down dramatically when it would most harm the Government of FW de Klerk'

It goes on to say:

'two political parties have clearly benefited from the Reef violence. The first is the National Party Government... The second major beneficiary has been Inkatha.'

Dr Mandela also said:

'Another report deals with 13 attacks on funerals and funeral vigils which took place on the Reef between July, 1990 and July, 1991. This study concludes that there is 'an overwhelming predominance of acts of aggression carried out by the supporters of the Inkatha Freedom Party. Those attacks moreover, are carried out with the active or passive support of the South African Police.'

Dr Mandela in his address to the Security Council said that 200 Inkatha members were trained by the South African Defence Force in Namibia, and cited sworn affidavits which claimed that they had been trained in offensive warfare.

Dr Mandela said "The fact of the matter however is that the IFP has permitted itself to become an extension of the Pretoria regime, its instrument and surrogate."

Against all the evidence to the contrary Dr Mandela maintains that "its activities have been financed by the South African Government. There is an abundance of evidence that it continues to benefit from covert co-operation with the South African Government".

In speaking about the IFP he said "However, it is not an independent force with whom the ANC must enter into an agreement to end the violence in the country as the Pretoria regime asserts."

These assertions were made before the whole world which was focused on what was being said in the Security Council debate on violence on South Africa. The damage to the IFP is enormous and is indeed incalculable.

This was not the first occasion on which Dr Mandela has made these kind of accusations against the IFP. Appearing in an ITV Granada television programme "World in Action - South Africa" on 27th January 1992, viewers were told that the Government is aiming to kill, while talking reform. After Dr Mandela stated that the Government could stop the violence if they so wished the commentator added that the SAG gave funds to the IFP because they wanted to build it up at the expense of the ANC.

The commentator added that Inkatha supporters caused most of the violence and that IFP rallies are often funded by Government. He said that IFP rallies often led to killing. After showing scenes of commuters in trains, the commentary added that the police not only stood by and watched the IFP kill people - they also asked them to do so.

Our complaint is, inter alia, that Dr Mandela participated in this type of programme. He actually participated in a programme in which he said that the Security Forces had taken over the violence and were using certain Black organisations to carry out the violence that they themselves wanted. Quite clearly Dr Mandela was referring to the IFP.

We cite the Granada Television programme as evidence of the seriousness with which Dr Mandela's malicious attack against the IFP in his Security Council address, must be regarded. These attacks are not isolated attacks but are part of an ongoing violation of Chapter 2 of the National Peace Accord.

There are numerous instances of similar attacks. We cite only one additional instance of many instances. Dr Mandela, in a wreath-laying ceremony, said that those responsible for 13 000 deaths, were members of Inkatha, the KwaZulu Police and certain elements in the SADF's Military Intelligence and SAP.

We reserve the right to make detailed submissions indicating the extent and duration of the ANC's attacks against the integrity of the IFP. We have very substantial evidence of what has been a continuing attempt to marginalise the IFP for

over a decade. ANC propaganda has had disastrous consequences for peace and negotiations in this country. Our submission is not exhaustive and we will make more detailed submissions at the appropriate time.

Dr Mandela's address to the Security Council must be seen as part of an ongoing vendetta against the IFP which incites ordinary people to violence against it.

The mock trials held in Pietermaritzburg and Cape Town recently, are further evidence of a systematic attempt by the ANC to develop grassroot anger against the IFP which has the effect of increasing tensions and precipitating more violence. We have already lodged complaints with the NPC about these mock trials.

It is against the total background of these attacks against the IFP which form a continuing ANC violation of Chapter 2 of the Accord, that Dr Mandela's address to the Security Council must be seen as a culminating event.

The gravity of the situation can not be over-stressed. Until this matter has been resolved and Dr Mandela withdraws from the position he adopted in his address to the United Nations Security Council, bi-lateral relations between the IFP and the ANC can not be sustained and the requirements of clause 2.5 of the Accord can not be met.

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The National Peace Committee could not resolve the dispute that we raised, and the ANC did not even respond to our complaint. We had therefore, in the end, to seek recourse in exercising our rights as defined in Chapter 9 of the National Peace Accord. Chapter 9 provides for adjudication measures and we successfully in the end argued that because the complaint we were raising was about what Dr Mandela had said at an international venue and since it was broadcast to the whole world, we needed international adjudicators.

We successfully argued for the need to approach Dr Kenneth Kaunda and Dr Julius Nyerere to act as adjudicators. In the end Dr Kaunda accepted, but Dr Nyerere declined and we agreed finally that Dr Kaunda and Mr Justice Kotze, from the Appellate Division of the Bophuthatswana Government would be our adjudicators.

Adjudication finally took place on the 19th of October. Both the IFP and the ANC presented their arguments to the adjudicators and both employed Senior Counsel to do so. Our legal advice by Counsel was that the substance of the IFP's complaint was that the basic intentions of the Peace Accord had been violated and that this could not be dealt with within the procedures laid down by the Peace Accord itself. The only adjudication permitted by the Peace Accord was for adjudication about disputes relating to the conduct of political parties as set out in Chapter 2 of the Accord.

In the end we could only argue that Dr Mandela's statement at the Security Council had heightened tensions and increased the level of violence in the country. This limited scope for adjudication was recognised by the adjudicators and they found that they could, in fact, make no determination in the matter.

Dr Kaunda proposed then that we find an alternative approach to the problem and he offered to use his good offices to arrange a meeting between myself and Dr Mandela. I agreed that he should do so, Dr Mandela agreed that he should do so, and he did so. I agreed that we should meet and Dr Mandela agreed that we should meet. It was then agreed by both Dr Mandela and myself, that Mr John Hall, Chairman of the National Peace Committee, be requested to draw up an agenda for a meeting between myself and Dr Mandela. I agreed that Mr Hall should do so and Dr Mandela agreed that Mr Hall should do so.

Mr Hall then arranged for a two day getaway for the whole of the National Peace Committee Executive to assist him in drawing up a suitable agenda. That getaway did take place and an agenda was produced which was agreed to by senior members of the ANC and senior members of the IFP, as well as senior members of the National Party and Government.

Mr Hall then came to see me to get my approval for the proposed agenda. I approved the agenda. I was informed that Dr Mandela had approved the agenda the day before.

Let me pause here to put that agenda in perspective. When it was finally worded, it became clear that the agenda could well be an agenda for a Multi-Party Conference of Review. The proposal finally was that Dr Mandela and I should meet to discuss the agenda for a Multi-Party Conference, and the agenda for the Multi-Party Conference would be the subject matter at our discussion.

This was what I agreed to and this is what Dr Mandela agreed to. Dr Mandela did, however, state that he would have difficulty with some sections of his constituency and that a lot of work would have to be done to make a meeting with that agenda possible.

Then the very next day following Mr Hall's visit, Dr Mandela made a public address in Port Elizabeth, and said there that he saw no reason to meet with me and he then, and subsequently, said that he would only meet me as part of a delegation of leaders of self-governing states. He also said that he saw no purpose in us meeting since we had met before, and that nothing had come of the meeting.

Members will now be aware that Dr Mandela went on later to add further conditions for a meeting between himself and myself. They amount to me complying with the dictates of the Record of Understanding, which I totally reject.

It was in these developing circumstances that the National Peace Committee Executive reconvened on the 10th November to establish how to move forward. At that meeting the ANC demanded the convening of a meeting of the signatories of the National Peace Accord. Our position, ever since we tabled our complaint about Dr Mandela's address to the Security Council, was that until the surrogacy issue had been disposed of, and until Dr Mandela withdrew from the statement of not having to deal with me or to form agreements with Inkatha Freedom Party to act against violence, that I could not meet with him. I could not meet with him if that meeting could in any way be construed as me accepting a surrogacy status, which Dr Mandela was attempting to force on me and the IFP.

The IFP insisted that we could not attend the signatories meeting and finally it was recognised that if the only way forward could be generated by a meeting at which Dr Mandela and I were present, that that meeting could take place in a Multi-Party Conference. The Government agreed to that proposal, the IFP agreed to that proposal and the ANC representatives at that National Peace Committee Executive meeting agreed to that proposal.

We then began looking at dates for such a meeting. Mr Roelf Meyer argued that the 2nd or 3rd of December - which we were hoping for, would not give us the needed time to prepare for it. He also questioned the wisdom of the agenda being proposed (and this after a full Cabinet meeting had approved of the agenda). We subsequently learnt that Mr Cyril Ramaphosa had objected to the agenda. Mr Ramaphosa went on to rap representatives of the ANC for having agreed to the Multi-Party Conference and its agenda, which were in conflict with what he and Mr Roelf Meyer were negotiating about.

At the National Peace Committee Executive on the 10th November, it was agreed that the way forward in getting a Multi-Party Conference off the ground was to call a full meeting of the National Peace Committee on the 24th November, which would then approach the Government to jointly convene the meeting with the National Peace Committee.

At the meeting of the National Peace Committee on the 24th November, the ANC rejected the Multi-Party Conference proposal and again called for a meeting of the signatories of the Peace Accord.

There was, of course, a deadlock with the IFP delegation insisting that a Multi-Party Conference needed to be held. Finally, the meeting was adjourned to enable IFP delegates and ANC delegates to caucus together, to find a way out of the deadlock. The report of the National Chairman of the IFP, Dr FT Mdlalose, about that caucus reads as follows:

"At the meeting of the National Peace Committee on 24 November at Barlow Rand, under the Chairmanship of Mr John Hall, the following was agreed upon:

1. The President of IFP and the President of ANC accompanied by their Central Committee and National Executive Committee Members respectively will hold a meeting to discuss, inter alia, the problem of violence.

2. The agenda of this meeting will be decided upon at a meeting of members from both sides.

At a caucus discussion between IFP and ANC Members it was decided as follows:

- (a) A meeting of 5 appointed by His Excellency the President of IFP and 5 appointed by ANC President would be held on 30 November at the Royal Hotel in Durban at 10H00.
- (b) This meeting would be hosted by the ANC.

Present at this caucus meeting were:

Mr Thabo Mbeki : ANC - Leader
 Mr Sidney Mufamadi : ANC
 Dr FT Mdlalose : IFP - Leader
 Inkosi SH Gumede : IFP
 Dr DRB Madide : IFP
 Dr BS Ngubane : IFP
 Mr WS Felgate : IFP
 Ms Sue Vos : IFP

I would therefore respectfully request His Excellency to appoint five IFP members to attend the Preparatory Committee meeting on 30 November in Durban. Guidance is also sought on:

- The Agenda for the Leader's Meeting.
- The Venue and possible dates for the Leader's meeting."

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This proposal for a Summit ANC/IFP meeting is, of course, quite acceptable. Such a meeting was in fact called for at a Caucus Meeting of KLA members.

I believe that that meeting should take place, but I believe that we do have some restrictions on the agenda of that meeting. When President de Klerk signed the Record of Understanding with Dr Mandela, I reacted strongly and immediately in a Press Statement as follows:

" P R E S S S T A T E M E N T

BY MANGOSUTHU BUTHELEZI, CHIEF MINISTER OF KWAZULU
 AND PRESIDENT OF INKATHA FREEDOM PARTY

AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE STATE PRESIDENT AND DR MANDELA

ULUNDI, 27th SEPTEMBER 1992

It is with a deep sense of sadness that I have to state that I reject the Record of Understanding signed by Mr de Klerk and Dr Mandela. The IFP and the KwaZulu Government withdraw from further discussions with the South African Government until it has been possible for me to consult with colleagues and democratic leaders in South Africa.

We will either have bilateral negotiations between the Government and the ANC which will lead to the victory of revolutionaries over institutionalised South African influences and democratic forces, or we will have multi-lateral negotiations leading to a fair, race-free democracy in which the ANC is one party amongst many, in which it can not hold the South African Government up to ransom as it is now doing.

The IFP and the KwaZulu Government will go to its constituencies in Black South Africa, and in English and Afrikaans speaking White South Africa, to seek the rejection of the terms of the Record of Understanding signed by Mr de Klerk and Dr Mandela.

I will withdraw both the KwaZulu and the IFP participation from further discussions with the Government until I have had the opportunity to consult widely on the way forward. My view now is that negotiation for the future constitution for South Africa can not go ahead. We need:

1. Agreement to be reached in a multi-party negotiation forum that Umkhonto we Sizwe be immediately disbanded and Umkhonto personnel be demobilised.
2. Agreement to be reached in a multi-party negotiation forum about how democratic South Africa should respond to the ANC's withdrawal from CODESA.
3. Agreement to be reached about the structure and the process of negotiations which would have built-in safe guards against the ANC ever again disrupting the negotiation process, and which would also be safe guards against any party doing what the ANC did to kill negotiations after CODESA II.

The IFP and the KwaZulu Government will not be bound by decisions reached in bilateral negotiations between the Government and the ANC. I declare that any laws which the South African Government may be able to pilot through Parliament giving legal effect to bilateral agreements between itself and the ANC, will be rejected as spurious and illegitimate by the IFP and the KwaZulu Government.

We will either have multi-party negotiations which capture a true South Africanism in political idiom, or we will have bilateral negotiations between the Government and the ANC which violate every negotiation canon known to us. The choice is ours.

I serve notice that the IFP is a national political force and that the KwaZulu Government is an historic reality which can only be ignored at the peril of the negotiation process.

The IFP and the KwaZulu Government are not marginalised and it is my sincere hope that we will not have to prove the reality of the statement, either on our own, or in unity with whoever rejects the notion of the right of Mr de Klerk to unilaterally deal with Dr Mandela on issues which affect the whole of the

negotiation process and the constitutional future of the country. Mr de Klerk deals with Dr Mandela as head of state and therefore as a servant of the people of South Africa.

THE RECORD OF UNDERSTANDING SIGNED BY
MR DE KLERK AND DR MANDELA

The Inkatha Freedom Party and the KwaZulu Government are appalled at the notice given by the Record of Understanding agreed to by Mr de Klerk and Dr Mandela, that South Africa's future could be decided by the South African Government and the ANC.

In a meeting which was billed as a SUMMIT meeting, Mr de Klerk and Dr Mandela agreed that their meeting "laid the basis for the resumption of the negotiation process". The IFP and the KwaZulu Government reject with contempt the notion that two out of the eighteen participants in CODESA have the right to decide unilaterally, when and under what conditions, negotiations can be resumed.

The Record of Understanding signed by Mr de Klerk and Dr Mandela not only assumes that the two parties have the right to declare that the basis for the resumption of negotiations has been agreed upon, but Mr de Klerk actually signed a document which states that "negotiation would be resumed, whereafter extensive bilateral discussions will be held".

The Record of Understanding further stated that "it was agreed that the practicalities with regard to bilateral discussions will be dealt with through the existing channel". Not only do Mr de Klerk and Dr Mandela think that they can unilaterally decide when South Africans can or can not reopen negotiations, but Mr de Klerk signed a document which spells out that bilateral negotiations will continue between the Government and the ANC while negotiations continue into the future.

The IFP and the KwaZulu Government reject the right of the Government and the ANC to take the destiny of South Africa into their own hands. Unless there is a genuine multi-party negotiation process leading to a new democratic dispensation, that dispensation will not be democratic.

The ANC walked out of CODESA and took to the streets in mass action programmes, which are directly responsible for scores of deaths, because it could not force its will on CODESA. Something like half of all parties at CODESA rejected the ANC's constitutional proposals and its intention to establish a Constituent Assembly which would become the country's Constitution Making Body.

Not even all the participants of CODESA meeting together would have the right and the authority to make the decisions that Mr de Klerk and Dr Mandela have made unilaterally. The future of South Africa is at stake. The ANC wrecked CODESA. We now need an all-party convention or conference to determine where we go to from here.

The IFP has called for a National Multi-Party Conference of Review to take the whole peace process and the negotiation process under review. One of the things which would have to be reviewed is the Government's connivance with the ANC, now so classically illustrated in the signed Record of Understanding following the meeting of Mr de Klerk and Dr Mandela.

The IFP and the KwaZulu Government have very fundamental objections to many of the details of the agreement between Mr de Klerk and Dr Mandela.

REJECTION THE NOTION OF A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY BECOMING THE CONSTITUTION MAKING BODY OF THE COUNTRY.

We reject the right of Mr de Klerk and Dr Mandela to unilaterally decide when there could be fair and free elections for any kind of interim government, and we reject the right to say, as they agreed in the Record of Understanding, that a Constituent Assembly will "be elected in an agreed predetermined time-period".

The South African Defence Force yesterday stated that the ANC had mobilised two Umkhonto we Sizwe units to destabilise KwaMashu where a Shaka Day celebration will be held today. Yesterday virtually the whole of the IFP leadership in Richmond were slaughtered. We reject the right of Dr Mandela, as Commander in Chief of Umkhonto, to decide for South Africa when elections will be held for a Constituent Assembly.

A Constituent Assembly elected in the present climate of intimidation could not be expected to be truly representative of South African opinion.

Not only would a Constituent Assembly elected now be unrepresentative, but it would also be extremely divisive. The IFP will not participate in such an election and it will join forces with every true democrat in South Africa who rejects an early election of a Constituent Assembly which would both become an interim government and a Constitution Making Body for the following reasons:

1. Violence and intimidation would make fair and free elections totally impossible.
2. Before any election for a Constituent Assembly could be held there would have to be agreement on the constitution for such an Assembly. Agreement on a constitution for an interim government is nowhere in sight, and a prior condition for arriving at an agreement for such a constitution would be the development of a national will to do so, which by definition will be destroyed by bilateral agreements between Mr de Klerk and Dr Mandela.
3. Not only do we reject the right of Mr de Klerk and Dr Mandela to unilaterally decree that South Africa should follow the route of a Constituent Assembly now, but we emphatically reject the notion of an elected Constituent Assembly becoming the Constitution Making Body of the country.

4. We reject an elected Constituent Assembly as a Constitution Making Body for the following reasons:

- Democratic constitution making should be all about limiting the power of the state and securing the freedom of individuals and groups.

The majority party in an elected assembly would write a constitution to serve its own party political party interests and would not limit its powers as a future government. This would be potentially and dangerously true if ever the ANC's command over forces of violence and intimidation should make it the majority party in a Constituent Assembly.

The ANC is a revolutionary party, and no revolutionary party ever, in the history of the world, wrote a constitution for a multi-party democracy in which an opposition party to it could win an election and form a government.

- The Constituent Assembly route makes the Constitution Making Body of the country a highly centralised body which would predispose events to produce a unitary state constitution. This would be disastrous for South Africa as a plural society.

First there must be the definition of the powers of the central government as a government in a consensus political system, which a federal formula would provide, and then there must be the empowerment of states in the federation to run as autonomously as their residual power entitles them to run.

A Constituent Assembly determining the powers and the boundaries of states emphasising regionalism would leave the central government with residual powers which could, and would, be developed by a revolutionary party to perpetuate its life as a ruling party.

Two other provisions of the Record of Understanding reached by Mr de Klerk and Dr Mandela are rejected by the IFP and the KwaZulu Government - provisions governing matters to do with cultural weapons and hostels.

CULTURAL WEAPONS

The carrying of cultural weapons by the IFP is being defined by Mr de Klerk and Dr Mandela as the carrying of dangerous weapons. This is subterfuge and amounts to Government support for ANC in its vendetta against the IFP. The IFP and the KwaZulu Government will reject any attempt by Mr de Klerk and Dr Mandela to prohibit Zulus from carrying cultural weapons as a smoke screen to hide the continuing slaughter of people by AK 47's stockpiled in their tens of thousands by the ANC.

As President of IFP, and as Chief Minister of KwaZulu, I will never ever under any circumstances ever ask anybody for permission to carry a Zulu cultural weapon. The nation-wide blanket ban on the carrying of cultural weapons, under the guise of them being dangerous weapons, will be unenforceable. Any attempt to force such a ban on the Zulu nation will heighten tensions and escalate violence.

HOSTELS

The Record of Understanding also commits the South African Government to take urgent and immediate action to deal with certain hostels. This, in actual practice, will mean putting barbed wire around those hostels which the ANC finds problematic. The IFP and the KwaZulu Government reject the intention to fence hostels in and warn that the inmates of hostels will tear down any fences put around them - and do so with their bare hands if needs be.

I warn against the danger of South Africa indulging in what would amount to 'ethnic cleansing' which is taking place in Yugoslavia right now. The ANC's action against hostels is motivated by the anti-Zulu racism first evidenced in Dr Mandela's open letter to the State President in April last year, in which he regarded hostels as IFP strongholds augmented by SADF and SAP trained Zulus, which the Security Forces used to attack the ANC."

I effectively cut all negotiating ties with the Government until the whole question of the Government dealing bilaterally with the ANC has been dealt with and we are back on a multi-party track. I have since not had any negotiations with President de Klerk and the IFP has not negotiated with the Government on any constitutional matters.

Dr Mandela was also a signatory to the Record of Understanding and I must similarly refuse to have anything further to do with the ANC in terms of constitutional negotiations until the Multi-Party conference is convened to handle the whole matter.

We really are desperately in need of that Multi-Party Conference and until it does take place there can be no progress. Whatever progress Dr Mandela and President de Klerk think they can make will not be real progress. Their decisions, reached by bilateral negotiations, will not be binding and will not be valid unless amended or ratified by a Multi-Party Conference.

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Mr Speaker, Honourable Members, allow me to sum up. Firstly on the side of dealing with Dr Mandela's calling the IFP a surrogate organisation, we can only move forward in a Multi-Party Conference. Secondly, in dealing with the negotiation impasse we can only also move forward in a Multi-Party Conference.

President de Klerk is now issuing statements about holding a Multi-Party Conference and the steps that will have to be taken thereafter and a timetable for those steps. Those steps and that timetable have been formulated as a result and as a consequence to the bilateral discussions which have been ongoing between the Government and the ANC.

That is not good enough. We need the Multi-Party Conference to consider President de Klerk's timetable. The steps that we will eventually land up taking, after there is a Conference, may well be very different to the steps that he now has in mind. President de Klerk and the whole of the South African Government must know that we have drawn a line through history, and that the Government is not in a position to dictate events either on its own or with the help of the ANC.

Mr Speaker, Honourable Members, in debate about my address to this special session I ask you all to debate the issues I have raised and to comment on the steps that have been taken, and the decisions that have been made and the way that I have handled matters.

Mr Speaker, Honourable Members, I now turn to look at wider issues. The whole negotiation process is floundering. It has in part floundered because the negotiating base was too narrow, and was too manipulated by the ANC. Members will remember that right at the outset of CODESA I, we strongly disputed the exclusion of KwaZulu, and also right at the beginning we refused to sign the Statement of Intent, because the Statement - as formulated, pre-disposed CODESA to look at unitary state solutions to our constitutional problems.

We finally succeeded in gaining acceptance for an amendment to the Declaration of Intent and we could then sign it. The fatal flaw of CODESA of being too under-representative however remains a final stumbling block. That, and the weaknesses and flaws in CODESA which permitted the ANC to ham-string the whole negotiation process, dictate that we cannot return to CODESA and continue as though these fatal flaws do not exist.

Again we emphasize the need for a Multi-Party Conference. It is only in a Multi-Party Conference that we can possibly now find a way forward by establishing an alternative negotiating forum.

There is another issue that has constantly worried the IFP and the KwaZulu Government. It is the difficulty facing a highly-centralised national negotiation process about the constitutional future of the country, when it comes to transforming South Africa into a federal state.

We have argued the need to define state boundaries for future federation and to annunciate the principles of federalism as essential ingredients in the way forward. We had, in fact, already taken the step of seeking admission of the JEA as a legitimate negotiating partner in the negotiation process. This was rejected by the Management Committee at CODESA because they rejected KwaZulu.

We now need to place negotiations firmly on track and point them in the right direction by taking initiatives amounting to a KwaZulu/Natal negotiating base which could formulate proposals for the kind of central government to which this region would be prepared to devolve some of the regional powers, which are there in this region, by dint of historic precedent and political reality.

We have said before in this House, that we need to begin negotiations about the future of this region by picking up where the Buthelezi Commission and the Natal Indaba left off.

The time has now arrived for us to take a bold step to establish a KwaZulu/Natal proposed Constitution and to spell out the national requirements as we see them, in order to make that Constitution a reality. The draft constitution for the KwaZulu/Natal Region has been distributed for study and comment. It is vital that everyone of us become thoroughly conversant with every aspect of this constitution.

Mr Speaker, Honourable Members, I would suggest we propose that an expeditious adoption of this type of constitution (suitably amended with regard to any specific requirements you may have) will allow us to seize the initiative of the entire negotiation process in our country and, in tandem, immeasurably enhance and strengthen the position of the IFP and the KwaZulu Government nationally and internationally.

To a very large degree the thinking outlined below will be familiar in that we have followed on from our previous initiatives, namely the Buthelezi Commission and the Natal/KwaZulu Indaba. To this end we believe the consistency of our political vision for South Africa, over many decades, flows through the document and will be amply illustrated (and recognised by all democrats) in the public strategy suggested for immediate implementation.

Critical to this proposal is timing and process. In essence, we can be sure that the KwaZulu Government, and the entire region of Natal/KwaZulu, must now be mobilised around what we are calling "democratic militancy" in leading South Africa towards universally adopting the fundamentals of Federalism and pluralism (as outlined) which will save the country from destructive division and despair.

We propose that this "impeccable" constitution (when completed and enjoying the sanction/acceptance of leading constitutional bodies/experts worldwide, which it will obtain) be approved and adopted by the Inkatha Freedom Party, the KwaZulu Government and the Joint Executive Authority. In this regard it would be essential that the KwaZulu Government takes the lead in a lobbying team (influential policy/opinion makers and the populace at large).

A process will follow in that the constitution will then be submitted in Natal/KwaZulu in a referendum, possibly within thirty days from its adoption. (The referendum date can be postponed by a specially created referendum committee to reflect political convenience and other factors).

This move by us, in adopting a constitution for Natal/KwaZulu, will put a hard fact of history on the negotiating table.

The national negotiating process will be forced to take account of this new reality and two things can happen:

- (1) The Region's Federal position will be accepted in its entirety.
- (2) It will be unreasonably rejected and we will have called the game of the SA Government and the ANC/Communist Party alliance (and others) and exposed them to South Africa at large and the world.

It is our aim to fully produce the first ever democratic constitution in South Africa.

It will be a record of what we stand for and what we believe in.

It is quite clear that more and more the ANC/Communist Party alliance are poaching some of our ideas and changing their position to reflect many of our own on numerous issues (see latest ANC document attached) to a cynical degree. The traps and pitfalls are all too apparent to us but not to the politically naive and gullible.

This move of ours will go down in history as an historic record of our ideas and totally democratic vision. If and when the ANC alliance attempts to try to propose similar impressions (suitably manipulated for their own ends, as they will be) we can state that such concepts are in our constitution and expose their manipulation.

The ANC/Communist Party alliance will never build in the checks, balances, judicial and other safeguards and pursuit of political, economic and social pluralism inherent in our constitution. Our constitution will confront the ANC/Communist Party alliance and, equally important, the Government.

Our constitutional proposals and their democratic implementation in Natal/KwaZulu will ensure our political supremacy in the region as Step One.

We will embark on a campaign of "democratic militancy" regionally and nationally in support of our endeavours to implement the first democratic constitution of South Africa in Natal/KwaZulu.

Our constitution will be circulated throughout the region and Step Two nationally. We will ask commerce and industry, professional people, religious leaders et al and the electorate at large to endorse it and even to sign approval of it personally.

The document will be undersigned by millions of people who by supporting our constitution will support us.

The constitution will make ongoing news nationally and internationally. As we build the new constitutional structures in Natal/KwaZulu ("Governor", General Assembly, Constitutional Court etc) we will create an image of irresistible power and democratic imperatives.

We, the force of democratic institutional change, will be doing it while the others will be fighting about it.

We expect, in addition to the IFP and the KwaZulu Government, that individuals in the National Party and other political forces (Democratic Party, Conservative Party) within Natal will support the constitution which is parliament-centred and will induce coalition governments.

We will clearly demonstrate to South Africa how we want the constitution of South Africa to be written. Our constitution will become the reference parameter against which any future constitutional proposal in South Africa will be measured. We will become the centre of the debate.

The adoption of this constitution will prove our point that a good constitution can be written and democratically approved without a Constituent Assembly.

Finally, with us moving up-front, the self-governing territories and other alliance "partners" of ours will, in enlightened self-interest, no doubt adopt a similar constitution/process, thereby further entrenching our political authority and supremacy as authentic leaders in the quest for true freedom and democracy in South Africa.

Quite clearly, Members of this House, Mr Speaker, will be faced with the necessity of popularising our constitutional thinking in their own constituencies. We should therefore set ourselves the task of producing seminar material, or workshop material to assist in the process of mass education.

The KwaZulu Government could perhaps commission the Inkatha Institute and the IFP Information Centre to undertake the responsibility of developing the educational material needed and we should ask them to work out proposals for submission to us for mass distribution of educational material and the holding of district by district workshops to establish teaching teams who will go to the people.

Mr Speaker, Honourable Members themselves would greatly benefit from in-depth presentations of the constitutional principles that are embodied in the draft constitution we are now tabling. The first task of the Inkatha Institute and the Inkatha Information Centre should perhaps be the holding of a workshop for KLA members as soon as possible.

I am quite sure that the proposals that I have made for the constitutional development of the KwaZulu/Natal region and the procedures I am suggesting we take to popularise the constitution, will make a very significant contribution to the development of constitutional debate in South Africa at large.

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