

## Commercial

The ANC drive to get its own publications comes after a failed attempt by the organisation to purchase the Sowetan newspaper.

It is unhappy at what it regards as the over-concentration of ownership of the press in South Africa. It has said that an ANC government would introduce legislation to bring about the unbundling of ownership of the press.

While the ANC is sinking considerable capital of its own into the project — an estimated R20-million — it is planning the publications as commercial ventures.

In addition to a daily newspaper and a weekly news magazine, it is planning an up-market women's magazine targeted at the black market and another magazine directed at the coloured community.

The ANC has begun accelerating the launch date of its publications, in particular the newspaper, with an eye to the elections which are expected to take place early next year.

The project is being headed by ANC director of information Pallo Jordan and Cosatu media expert Moletai Mbeki.

The two travelled to London with Mr Dali Tambo, son of the ANC chairman, a fortnight ago, when they met Mr Rowland and a number of other businessmen, including Liberty Life chairman Donald Gordon.

Liberty Life denies that it is investing in the project. But Sanlam spokesman Andre

Coetzee said his company had been approached to "help with financing a newspaper as an investment proposition, but a final decision has not yet been taken".


Chief Abiola attended last week's SA Development Co-ordination Conference in Zimbabwe. He is almost wholly funding the news magazine, which will have an all-Africa focus.

The management board of the publications will include top ANC and Cosatu leaders, and also representatives of international backers, which are believed to include Lonhro, Time-Warner, US News and World Report, and SA companies.

An undertaking by Mr Rowland in London 10 days ago to support the project has ensured that publication dates can be brought forward.



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**STEADFAST** . . . Dr Buthelezi refused "independence".

# Buthelezi can't be manipulated

A GREAT deal has been made by the Government and others of the alleged manipulation of the president of the Inkatha Freedom Party, Dr Mangosuthu Buthelezi, by "whites" and "international advisers".

If there is one thing that this country, and especially the Government, should know from long experience, it is that Dr Buthelezi cannot be manipulated by anybody.

The Government need only look at its own unsuccessful record of trying to coerce Dr Buthelezi into accepting so-called "independence" for KwaZulu.

How short are memories of various abortive attempts to lure him into co-operating with non-starter Government "Cabinet Councils"?

The racist overtones in these allegations are transparent; as is the attempt to divide Inkatha's multiracial con-

stituency, using apartheid-type tactics.

As a democrat, Dr Buthelezi actively seeks diverse viewpoints and constructive input from IFP members (black, white and brown) for debate and decision-making. No black, white or brown South African, within the Party or abroad, can claim credit for his perspicacity.

If the Government and others object to "whites" and "international advisers" supporting Dr Buthelezi, perhaps they should tell us whether they intend to re-enact the Political Interference Act in the "new" South Africa.

Inkatha benefits from the advice of members and supporters who happen to be white. Perhaps the NP, and indeed the Government, could be well-served by "advisers" who happen to be black.

**Suzanne Vos**  
Member, Central Committee, IFP

Johannesburg



DIVISION SPELLS no negotiations with NP deadlock

# Democracy for SA under threat

**Nat crisis:** Confusion in the ruling National Party threatens negotiations just as it begins to look like all systems go for the new South Africa.

**By DAVID BREIER**

POLITICAL CORRESPONDENT

SERIOUS divisions in Government over negotiations have emerged as a major threat to democratic rule this year.

ANC spokesmen told the Sunday Star they had been alarmed to discover in recent talks that Government negotiators had no clarity among themselves on their own bottom line when it came to power-sharing.

Sources close to the negotiations have revealed that the Government is increasingly aware that its official line on power-sharing is untenable. It has failed to sell its "troika" idea that leaders of the top three parties in the first election be equal partners in a revolving presidency, giving a minority party such as Inkatha the same power as the ANC.

Incredibly the Nats now in effect have no power-sharing policy to put to the negotiation table.

Hawks such as Minister of Justice Kobie Coetsee, Minister of Law and Order Hennie Kriel and Minister of Local Government Tertius Delpoort, are said to be increasingly out of step with chief Government negotiator Roelf Meyer and his senior officials.

Unless they find a new policy, there can be no meaningful negotiations, according to key sources.

The ANC has expressed willingness to share power even beyond the interim phase.

This week's defection of veteran Nat Vryheid MP Jurie Mentz to the Inkatha Freedom Party is said

to be a symptom of growing confusion in the NP as the moment of truth approaches.

Hard bargaining on other crunch issues lies ahead, which could also set back timetables — the ANC wants nonracial elections this year, the Government by April next year.

The Government wants the elections to be held on a regional basis, which means determining borders and agreeing on regional powers before elections. The ANC wants the elected constitution-making body to decide on regional powers and borders.

The drawing of new regional boundaries, especially in the Transvaal, is regarded by negotiators as a highly complex and contentious task.

A compromise could take months to thrash out. This could involve holding some elections on a regional basis — for example in KwaZulu, Natal and Bophuthatswana. The rest of the country could vote on a national list.

Complex negotiations still lie ahead on the incorporation of the TBVC "independent" homelands in time for an election. There is also the thorny question of registering millions of voters.

It emerged this week after the latest talks that the will exists in the Government and ANC to stick at least to the Government's timetable.

But ANC and Government negotiators are only now beginning to deal with the crunch issues.

Their sheer scope could cause serious delays, despite the sense of urgency due to the economy.

The Government and IFP have not yet even begun to talk about constitutional details after the bad blood of the past few months. Their current talks centre only on the convening of a planning conference — talks about talks.

Informed political and diplomatic sources are now steeling themselves for a much longer and dirtier negotiation process than had been hoped for recently.

## More Nats may go

**By JOHN MACLENNAN**

JURIE MENTZ, the veteran Natal politician who shocked his colleagues by joining the IFP, has forecast that other Natal Nats could follow his lead as the first democratic elections draw nearer. He believes the fight in the province will be between the ANC and the IFP and everybody else is likely to be ground into paste.

One political observer said: "This is a warning light. If the government and the ANC get too close together it will trigger more defections."



# Deal on black vote a finger's breadth away

OBSERVER

31 JAN 1993

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BEHIND the cautious statements by President F. W. de Klerk and ANC leaders, it is clear last week's talks have narrowed the gap between the two sides to a finger's breadth, and that South Africa is well on its way to transitional government, writes Allister Sparks.

This will hold the ring while the first democratic elections are held, probably in November, with the major parties then forming a coalition 'government of national unity' to run the country for about five years before there is full majority rule.

'Success is being recorded on an incremental basis,' the ANC's chief negotiator, Cyril Ramaphosa, told guests at a German foundation function on Thursday night after the six-day talks in an isolated Cape nature reserve. They seem to have produced a measure of mutual understanding if not actual fellowship. 'There was not the breakthrough we had hoped for, but we reached some common ground on some issues,' Ramaphosa said.

When opening what will almost certainly be the last session of South Africa's white parliament the following day, De Klerk, though equally cautious, spoke of a 'broad consensus that is beginning to develop in respect of the course we have to take'.

These old antagonists still jab and spar at one another, and political violence continues to sputter across the land, but insiders on both sides make it clear that they are now very close to agreement. The two teams of negotiators, 20 a side, agreed on a set of recommendations covering most of the outstanding issues between them. These must now be approved by De Klerk and his full cabinet and Nelson Mandela and his 100-strong National Executive Committee.

Some of the compromises may be difficult to sell. But endorsement will mean the government has dropped its demand for permanent 'power-sharing', and the ANC its demand for immediate majority rule. They will have agreed to a

temporary period of multi-party coalition rule.

The Government also appears to be backing away from its plan for a rotating presidency in which each of the three main parties takes turns at having its leader serve as Head of State. It now seems likely that the leader of the party that wins the first election will become president, but his powers during the period of interim government and after the election have yet to be agreed.

There are still some differences. The most serious is over integration and control of the security forces. The ANC wants its armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation), to be merged with the South African Defence Force but the government insists Umkhonto must be disbanded and its members made to apply individually to join up.

There is still argument over constitutional principles which would bind the elected constituent assembly, and over control of broadcasting services during the election campaign.

Another round of talks to resolve these issues will be held in 10 days' time, followed by a planning conference which, in Ramaphosa's words will 'open the way for a resumption of Codesa', the multi-party constitutional convention that broke down last May.

Codesa's job will be to get multi-party endorsement of the agreements reached. Then, according to De Klerk on Friday, a multi-party Transitional Executive Council will be installed in June.

In effect this will be an interim government. Although De Klerk will still be president and his cabinet in office, they will merely rubber-stamp Transitional Executive Council decisions.

An interim constitution will come into effect in September, providing for the one person one vote election, the constituent assembly to serve as an interim parliament, and the major parties to form a joint government. Then the election — South Africa's real moment of transition.



# Boers say grass is greener in Zambia

OBSERVER

31 JAN 1993

(1)

**Allister Sparks in  
Bothaville watches  
white farmers  
prepare to emigrate  
to the once-despised  
black African States.**

IT IS the ultimate irony. For years white South Africans have pointed to Zambia as the epitome of all the horrors of black rule. From the collapse of its economy to Kenneth Kaunda's tendency to tears and his hosting of the exiled ANC, it became the subject of their scorn and the butt of their racist jokes.

Now, as black rule looms for South Africa itself, hundreds of deeply conservative white farmers, such as Jeremie Combrink of Bultfontein, Orange Free State, are thinking of emigrating to Zambia. More than 1,000 have made their way there over the past six months to scout out the prospects in this Afrikaner version of Conrad's *Heart of Darkness*.

Pieter Gous, president of the Orange Free State Agricultural Union, is due to lead a veritable Great Trek of several hundred more in a convoy of buses to see, as he puts it, 'whether it really is such a good story'. If it is, he predicts thousands could settle there.

The reason, says Gous, who is also an MP for the far-right Conservative Party, is only partly political. The farmers, nearly all Afrikaners, are bitterly resentful of President F.W. de Klerk's National Party, which they accuse of betraying the *volk* and handing the country to the blacks.

For some, threatening to get the hell out is a way of venting their political angst. But most, according to Gous, are leaving for economic and security reasons.

'They are broke and scared: the combination of recession and a series of bloodthirsty attacks on lonely farmsteads, which they see as signs of the times, has them looking for a bolt-hole.

Zambia, which ousted Kaunda and elected a new capitalist-minded government under President Frederick Chiluba a year ago, is trying to breathe new life into its economy by offering attractive incentives to commercial farmers to settle there.

Since the future South Africa is going to be under black rule anyway, whether they stay or go, Zambia suddenly looks attractive to these restive farmers. As one of them, Cornelis Labuschagne, puts it: 'Zambia has gone through its dip. Ours is still ahead of us. So it's better to get on the side of the one that's going up.'

His son-in-law, Willem Buys, who visited Zambia in October, puts it slightly differently: 'They've learnt up there that they can't do without the whites. Our blacks have still got to find that out.'

Behind the racism which such attitudes reveal lies solid logic. South Africa, with its arid climate and poor soils, is tough agricultural country. The subtropical regions further north have double the rainfall and deeper, richer soils.

Gous, who is a soil scientist, believes a logical reapportionment of roles in a future common market region would be for the northern countries — Zimbabwe, Zambia, Mozambique, Angola, Zaïre and Uganda — to be the food producers, while South Africa provides the manufacturing base and the transportation network.

He believes the South African government ought to aid the settlement of white commercial farmers in the black-ruled countries to the north. They should be settled in blocks, Gous suggests, so that supply depots and other infrastructure can be provided.

South Africa would benefit from the growth of export markets for its fertiliser and implement manufacturers, while food for the region as a whole would become cheaper and more plentiful.

'That's been my dream for a decade and a half,' Gous says. It is a surprising vision for a leader of the xenophobic Conservative Party that wants to establish a separate whites-only Boer State, but not untypical of the contradictory attitudes one finds in South Africa in these changing times.

The contradictions appear again in the pangs of guilt some of the farmers feel when they contemplate leaving South Africa. For an Afrikaner, leaving the 'promised land' of their ancestors comes close to being an act of treachery and many are reluctant to talk about their plans. 'They are embarrassed



## NEWS

# Stoic whites await the revolution

by Fred Bridgland  
in Cape Town

LIFE in Cape Town yesterday morning was strikingly calm following President de Klerk's warning at the opening of Parliament of a potential Yugoslav-style civil war in South Africa.

Newspapers devoted more space on the front pages to the big horse race of the season, the R750,000 (£160,000) Metropolitan Stakes over a mile at Cape Town's Kenilworth track, than to the revolutionary change that is coming.

There were no signs of panic — in spite of Mr de Klerk's warning that the African National Congress would share government by June, that the present white-dominated Parliament must now vote itself into oblivion and that within nine months legislation will be passed paving the way for general elections in which the black

majority will be enfranchised.

Willem van Ryswik, a chartered surveyor, took breakfast tea with his wife and children on the lawn of their detached house beneath Table Mountain and vowed that he would not leave South Africa.

"I've watched Umbeki

(Thabo Mbeki, the foreign relations director of the ANC) and Ramaphosa (Cyril Ramaphosa, secretary-general of the ANC) on TV, and they're actually quite nice and they're very clever," said Willem, whose Afrikaner forefathers fought at Blood River where a force of less than 500 whites killed

some 3,000 Zulu warriors. "When we were brought up we were conditioned to think all blacks were dumb."

Like many intelligent, pleasant whites, Willem, 40, and his 36-year-old wife Lisette, a nursery school teacher, admit that they have baulked at the rhetoric that has spewed from the mouths

of politicians since the reform process began three years ago with the release of ANC leader Nelson Mandela from 27 years imprisonment. "I don't think I understand what is happening (in the constitutional negotiations)," said Lisette. "It's been going on for such a long time that I got bored with it."

"I'm pretty philosophical about the future, neither optimistic nor pessimistic," said Willem. "I think the government and the ANC will work something out. Anyway, how bad can it get really? The whites still survive well in Zimbabwe and Zambia even though the general economy has collapsed around them."

"I want to stay in this country even if we have a bad government. After all, we've had bad government before and I've survived."

Lisette feared drastic changes to the education system that would be damaging to her son Andre, nine, and daughter Monique, seven.

"The standards of education for whites have been high, and with the integration of the education systems (which were organised on a race basis) there will be a fall in standards. If I had to leave, it would be because of the children's education," she said.

## MOBUTU BLOCKS RESCUE MISSION BY BELGIAN COMMANDOS

PRESIDENT Mobutu of Zaire yesterday refused to allow a team of commandos to enter the country to rescue Belgians caught up in a bloody two-day rampage by dissident troops in which dozens of people have been killed. Belgium sent 330 troops to Brazzaville, the capital of neighbouring Congo Republic, with the intention of bringing out countrymen who took refuge in the Belgian embassy in Kinshasa, the Zairean capital, writes Con Coughlin.

But officials refused to allow the troops to cross the Congo River from Brazzaville to Kinshasa, claiming Belgium had not gone through the correct

diplomatic procedures in seeking the evacuation. As a goodwill gesture, President Mobutu offered to use his presidential yacht to release foreigners trapped in Zaire.

Hundreds have sought refuge in embassy compounds in Kinshasa after regular army troops went on an orgy of violence which has left between 50 and 100 people dead. The French ambassador was among seven foreigners reported killed and a number of Belgian nuns were said to have been raped in the Limete neighbourhood.

The violence appeared to have died down yesterday after Mobutu's presi-

dential guard restored order. The reinforcement of France's embassy security detachment and the impending arrival of Belgian troops helped to restore calm.

But while the Zaire authorities allowed 10 French paratroopers into Kinshasa to supervise the evacuation of French nationals, Mobutu refused the Belgians access, apparently fearing they might attempt to depose him. Zaire television said the Belgians had no right to enter their former colony without Mobutu's permission. Mobutu is refusing to leave office even though his last term finished more than a year ago.



# Zulu tribe comes under do

SALLY CHANCE, FEMINA



Heeding the royal house call: Dr Sibongile Zulu doesn't know why she was chosen as chief over male rivals. But she believes no one is better equipped to run the clan's affairs



31 JANUARY 1993

# doctor's orders

In Zululand, John Carlin meets a woman who has taken over a traditional male role — as the chief of her clan

SIBONGILE ZUNGU has suffered the pain of widowhood, the exhaustion of caring for two active daughters, and the challenge of being a doctor in a country where people live in extreme poverty amid extreme violence.

But Dr Zungu, now 30, looks back with nostalgia to the days when these were her only worries. Last March she became the first woman in recorded history to be appointed a Zulu tribal chief. She now lives on a hill-top in the "hlabisa", as she puts it, ruling the 70,000-strong Zungu clan.

"When my mother comes to visit me from Durban she just stands there staring, absolutely amazed," she says. "She knows nothing about all these tribal things. And then she comes here and we go to the supermarket in town and — I must say it's rather embarrassing — half the people we see come up to me and bow."

As if to prove the point, halfway through our interview a man in his twenties entered the room. A picture of servility, hunched, hands clasped, he took two steps forward, went down on one knee and, head bowed, staring at the floor, informed her that an officer of a South African Defence Force platoon was waiting to see her. He

must wait, she ordered, until the interview was over.

Quiet authority, clearly, comes naturally to her. But in other departments she has had her awkward moments. "You must understand that because of the kind of family I had — my father was a schoolteacher — I was brought up knowing nothing at all about tribal customs."

As a result she has put her foot in it on more than one occasion. "We were at a party with a whole lot of other chiefs where they slaughtered an ox. Now, according to the culture, I later discovered, women don't eat the parts of the head."

"So I was sitting there with the chiefs, and they brought along a tray for us with choice bits to eat — tongue and brains, mainly. I wanted tongue, and so there I was busy eating a piece, when one of the chiefs, totally shocked, said to me that women aren't supposed to eat that."

"It was all terribly uncomfortable, but luckily another chief broke in and said, 'Yes, that's right. But chiefs do, so go ahead.' " (An expert on Zulu customs later explained that women were not allowed to eat tongue because they talked too much and should not be encouraged to eat that.)

Dr Zungu experienced similar discomfort at a grand Zulu ceremony at which a number of "the royals" were present. "Not the Zulu king himself, but close relatives, princes. Now, to begin with, everybody turned up in traditional attire: leopard skins and that sort of thing. I was dressed in a modern, fashionable dress. Also I got the protocol all wrong. Chiefs are supposed to lend their people down the road, singing and dancing, then greet all the other chiefs before taking their seats. I just drove up in my car, got out and strolled up to the place reserved for me."

She acceded to the chieftaincy after her husband, whose line of chieftainly descent went back 100 years, died in a car accident. Quite why, or how, she was appointed would always remain a mystery to her, she said, because other blood relatives of her husband, none of them male, seemed to have forgotten to ask a claim.

"Quite out of the blue one day I received a letter from the KwaZulu government informing me that I was the chief. I have no idea to this day why they chose me."

Possibly the main criterion was that her husband had worked as a deputy minister in the KwaZulu government and was thus automatically a member of Mangosuthu Buthe's Inkatha Freedom Party, which exercises one-party rule in the homeland.

"I myself belong to no party. A chief should treat everyone equally, independent of their politics. I have my beliefs, of course, but I keep them strictly to myself," she said.

Her conversation leaves little doubt, however, that her sympathies lie more with the Inkatha conservatives than with the African National Congress, fierce rivals in a Zululand civil war from

whose consequences the Zungu clan has not been immune.

Unfashionably, for someone of her "Western" background, she thinks blacks are not sufficiently well educated at present either to run the country or to hold elections. "Democracy is all very well, but we should delay it. The thing about elections is that they will definitely bring more violence. People are not prepared to be good losers, like the whites have been in their elections."

Her fears are founded on the fact that nowhere in South Africa has the ANC-Inkatha conflict been more acute than in the Zululand area this past year. Since she became chief, more than 40 of her clan members have died. She is not taking any chances. Amid constant rumours that her life is under threat, she does not travel anywhere without an armed bodyguard. "It's not nice — but what's to be done?"

She has thought about resigning the chieftainship, but says she can't. She knows there is no one in the clan better equipped than she is to take on the responsibilities. These include analysing the community's problems — mainly the limited water supply, 40 per cent unemployment, poor education and, of course, violence, criminal as well as political — and advising the people how best to cope.

But there is more to it than that. She has a bureaucracy to run. The KwaZulu government provides her with funds that she has to administer and distribute. She is also the Zungu clan's chief justice. She runs the tribal court, an institution which does not deal with serious crime but addresses

**'Democracy is all very well, but we should delay it. Elections will definitely bring more violence'**

endless land disputes, stock-thefts and the like.

"I am, as you know, I'm sitting on now. A woman, the first of whom bore two children by another man before they married. The first wife died recently and he's decided to dismantle his home — literally pull it down — and move in with his second wife. Now, the second wife is on bad terms with the two children, who are both teenagers now, and she will not have them in her house. So, the question is, where are they to live? It's terrible. I alone have to decide what's to become of these people's lives."

"Sometimes I just look at my husband," she said, turning to a wedding picture on the wall. "If he was here now, I'd tell him to stay in this house while I disappeared. But I can't. My main problem is that I've been landed with this, and if I leave it I'll be dishonouring my husband, and I'll feel guilty for the rest of my life."



# South Africa's 'Saddam' stakes his claim

## Communists win over disillusioned blacks

AS the duo dubbed Nelson de Klerk and F W Mandela hammered out power-sharing plans last week, one of the most powerful figures in the African National Congress sat in his run-down Johannesburg office plotting a course that would take South Africa down a very different, left-wing road.

Martin Thembisile "Chris" Hani — communist chief, former head of the ANC's armed wing and, increasingly, the people's choice as alternative leader — revealed that he would not participate in either a power-sharing administration or an ANC government.

Hani, 50, chose *The Sunday Times* to reveal a significant shift in strategy that is bound to cause tension in the movement once it is known here. He has decided effectively to 'break away' from the ANC after South Africa's first general election, expected early next year, and to set up an alternative "socialist alliance" that might stand against it at future elections.

Hani and his fellow communists, who hold several of the ANC's leading posts, have for a long time faced white charges that they are nothing

by Richard Ellis  
Johannesburg

but a Trojan Horse within the ANC. He has now laid himself open to accusations of splitting the movement. But he gave a clear sign of his intention to capitalise on growing black disillusion and to stake his own claim to power when moderate ANC figures are in government.

A friend of Fidel Castro, Hani is the white community's most feared man. His South African Communist party (SACP) — which exists as a separate entity within the ANC — boasts the fastest-growing membership of any such party in the world. A survey by an independent research company has come out with what its white director called "shocking" news: 39% of blacks might vote communist at the forthcoming election and that Hani is overwhelmingly the most popular leader among blacks after Mandela.

Taking the tactical decision to reveal his plans to a British newspaper, Hani said he was not prepared to serve as a minister either in the pre-elect-



Fighting talk: the killing of ANC demonstrators by Ciskei troops last year was blamed on the irresponsibility of Hani's communists

tion government of national unity that is likely to be formed soon, or, after the election, in an ANC-led government.

"I don't want to be involved," he said. "I want the freedom to criticise from outside, to lead marches, to organise strikes, to pressurise the new government into doing the right things."

Hani stressed that he saw

no alternative to a temporary power-sharing deal, and confirmed that the communists would remain partners with the ANC for the first election. But political observers see his statements as a calculated bid to distance himself from the deal being negotiated between De Klerk and Mandela and to establish himself as the radical contender for overall post-Mandela leadership. His de-

cision follows weeks of growing dissent within the ANC and the communist party over the plans to form a government with the Nationalists.

The move will alarm ANC moderates but will cheer those who claim the ANC is selling out to the ruling whites. "I know I may be criticised by some people who will say I have fought under an ANC



radicals. This would embrace disaffected ANC members, trade unionists, members of other parties and even Winnie Mandela, who last week accused ANC leaders of getting into bed with the National Party in order to enjoy the luxury of "its silken sheets".

Party insiders say the thinking is to play a waiting game, and let moderates like Cyril Ramaphosa and Thabo Mbeki, the top ANC figures in line to succeed Mandela, take over. "We believe they will not want to, or be able to, meet the expectations of the people," said one. "After a couple of years there will be an enormous backlash, which we will benefit from."

Asked whether he might lead his new "socialist alliance" against a moderate ANC led by Ramaphosa or Mbeki at the country's second general election in 1998 or 1999, Hani was guarded but did not rule it out.

His statements will be considered by many as an early bid for the hearts and minds of rank and file ANC supporters. The former head of the ANC's guerrilla army retains a large following and received the largest number of votes at elections to the movement's ruling body in 1991.

His tireless speech-making and unyielding radicalism makes him a favourite among the young. One township sup-

porter in Tokoza recently described him as "South Africa's Saddam Hussein, because he stands up to the big guys and tells them where to get off". Told of this last week, Hani laughed. "That's an unfortunate comparison, but I know what he means."

Any new grouping that included him and the charismatic and still well-liked Winnie Mandela — they are close friends — would be a formidable electoral rival to the ANC, particularly if Nelson Mandela were no longer there to lend his popularity to it. Ramaphosa and Mbeki barely featured in the recent poll by Markinor, a Johannesburg-based research organisation, that found Hani to be the most popular black politician after Mandela.

The sheer scale of the problems facing a new ANC-led government would be likely to work in Hani's favour. Three years after De Klerk's historic speech promising reforms, most black South Africans continue to live in run-down townships with inferior education, poor health facilities, few jobs and low wages; just 6% of black school-leavers get a job.

Should an ANC government fail to address these problems adequately, the chances of a more radical party doing well in the second general election must be good.



# PAC vows to 'crush' newspaper

By DAWN BARKHUIZEN

CIRCULATION of the only daily newspaper in the Transkei, the East London-based Daily Dispatch, ceased this week when PAC members padlocked the newspaper's Umtata offices.

They also occupied the premises and warned local distributors that "selling the newspaper would not be a safe thing to do".

PAC regional secretary Zingisa Mkhale was at pains this week to

stress that the PAC's fight was not with Daily Dispatch journalists.

The fight was with management who, unless they travelled to Umtata to iron out complaints, would force the PAC to "crush the Dispatch".

Said Mr Mkhale: "It is the right of any journalist with a guilty conscience to be intimidated. But we do believe in freedom of the press, freedom of association and the free flow

of information. That is why we are fighting with the Daily Dispatch. It is not publishing our information."

The PAC said there were five instances in which the Daily Dispatch allegedly failed to report on PAC events in the Transkei and one in which information was allegedly relayed to the SAP.

Daily Dispatch editor Glynn Williams said some of the items had been published — one with a picture.



**Tiny Rowland joins backers of newspaper venture**

# ANC STARTS OWN DAILY

By CHARLENE SMITH

**THE ANC is to launch a daily newspaper and three magazines by June with massive support from local and overseas businessmen.**

One of the top backers of the scheme is multi-millionaire Tiny Rowland, a close friend of ANC chairman Oliver Tambo and former head of Lonrho, which owns the Observer newspaper in London.

A 15-member Nigerian delegation headed by Chief Abiola, head of the Nigerian stock exchange, newspaper owner and head of several companies, arrives in Johannesburg tomorrow night to discuss final details of the proposed weekly news magazine.

ANC sources say the newspaper was at first envisaged as a weekly publication but, on advice from international backers, will be a daily paper.

A spokesman for Observer editor Donald Trelford confirmed that he had had lunch recently with "ANC people interested in a newspaper project", but referred all further inquiries to Lonrho.

A number of top South African companies have been approached to invest in the business. This week the insurance giant Sanlam confirmed it was considering a proposal to invest in the project.

The venture has also been assured of financial and training assistance from some foreign governments, including Sweden.

The ANC and its trade-union ally Cosatu have been planning the launch for more than two years, but they still refuse to comment publicly.



# LETTERS

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## Buthelezi has never been manipulated

A GREAT deal is being made by the government and others of the alleged manipulation of the president of the Inkatha Freedom Party, Dr Mangosuthu Buthelezi, by "whites" and "international advisers".

If there is one thing this country, and especially the government, should know from long experience, it is that Dr Buthelezi cannot be manipulated by anybody.

The government need only look at its own unsuccessful record of trying to coerce Dr Buthelezi into accepting so-called "independence" for Kwazulu.

How short are memories of various abortive attempts to lure him into co-operating with non-starter government "cabinet councils" (approved of, incidentally, by various "white"

newspaper editors throughout the country at the time, who attempted to urge him to comply).

The racist overtones in these allegations are transparent — as is the attempt to divide Inkatha's multi-racial constituency using apartheid-type tactics.

As a democrat, Dr Buthelezi not only actively seeks diverse viewpoints and constructive input from party members for debate and decision-making, but also from elsewhere, nationally and internationally.

Nevertheless, as a leader, he leads as he is required to do. He holds his elected positions precisely because his political insights and instincts are so valued and respected.

No individual or collec-

tive black, white or brown South African within the party or others abroad can claim credit for his perspicacity.

If the government and others object to "whites" and "international advisers" supporting Dr Buthelezi, perhaps they should inform us as to whether they intend to re-enact the Political Interference Act in the new South Africa.

Inkatha benefits from time to time from the "advice" of members and supporters who happen to be white. Perhaps the National Party and, indeed, the government, could be well served by "advisers" who happen to be black. — SUZANNE VOS, member, IFP central committee.



MANGOSUTHU BUTHELEZI: His 'political insights and instincts are valued and respected'



## Launch of ANC paper on the cards

BY SUNSTAR REPORTER

THE ANC has been holding talks with multi-millionaire Tiny Rowland and a number of foreign and local business leaders in a bid to facilitate the launching of a "democratic daily" newspaper.

But, according to ANC spokesperson Gill Marcus, talks are still at an "exploratory stage" and no firm deals have yet been concluded.

Reacting to reports that the ANC was to launch a daily paper by June, she said that this was not possible.

"Talks are still at a very early stage. No firm date has been set," Marcus said. "Furthermore, it is wrong to call it an 'ANC newspaper'. The ANC is merely trying to facili-

tate the launch of a democratic daily."

She said ANC director of information Pallo Jordan had travelled to London two weeks ago with Moletsisi Mbeki, media expert of Cosatu.

"They held talks with a number of people, including Tiny Rowland. He expressed interest but there is noth-

ing firm at this point in time."

Rowland, who is the former head of Lonrho, could not be contacted for comment last night.

The meeting with Rowland was apparently facilitated by Donald Trelford, editor of the Observer, which is owned by Lonrho.

Trelford confirmed last night that he had met an ANC delegation.

"Some ANC people interested in a newspaper project were in London a few weeks ago," he told the Sunday Star, adding he could not remember which officials he had lunched with. "I invited them to lunch and we had a talk about it, and that is all," he said. "It may be that Lonrho are more directly involved, but I can't say. The Observer had no other involvement."

### Fact Night classical concert

On Sunday February 7 at 11.30 am, the SABC

Wind Octet will perform at the Drama, State Theatre in Pretoria.




(2)

THE OBSERVER

31 JAN 1993

★★ WORLD NEWS/19



**Stim of drought, recession and violence: Orange Free State farmer Jerome Combrinck is one of hundreds of Boers planning to move to Zambia.** Photograph by Andy Hall.

ause they are supposed to stand by their *voik*, as explains. •

Although he talks enthusiastically of the advantages of producing food in the high-fall regions to the north, it is the soil scientist speaking; as an Afrikaner and a right-wing politician he is quick to

disclaim any responsibility for promoting a second Great Trek.

Whatever the complexity of the farmers' emotions, it is the reality of their plight that is shaping their decisions.

As one drives through the grain belt of the Orange Free State, this plight is evident. Abandoned farmhouses dot the

*veld*, their boxy shapes and pillared front *soeps* (porches) beginning to crumble and the red corrugated iron roofing sliding into disarray.

Sad relics of an age and a lifestyle that is on its way out. These farmers have a tawdry record of mistreating their black workers and riding the

gravey train of Afrikaner Nationalist rule, yet it is hard not to sympathise with them now in their fear for the future.

The recession, sanctions, a series of disastrous droughts, 16 per cent inflation and high interest rates have plunged most into debt and many into bankruptcy.

Now the attacks are adding panic to the economic demoralisation. They began about a year ago, and 30 farmers and members of their families have died as nameless gangs have launched gun and grenade attacks on lonely farmsteads. Sometimes the motive has clearly been robbery. Other

times it has appeared 'aimless'. The attacks have enraged the farming community. Hundreds gathered at a meeting in Ficksburg to threaten retaliation.

But as the new Boer trekkers head north, there is a sense of irony. 'I think Africa's ready to be recolonised,' Gots observed wryly.



# The Democrat

## Talks to resume but they'll be very tough

### Comment

The mood of the people is palpable. There is a widespread belief across the political spectrum that 1993 is a watershed year because people desperately want tangible signs that the country is breaking out of the negative mould that it has been trapped in for too long. But this does not mean the democratic goal we aspire towards will be made or broken by any particular party's timetable for change. The question that should be exercising peoples' minds is not whether it is now or never, but whether we are on the right track. If 1992 is anything to go by, the answer to this is in large measure depressing.

- \* Levels of political violence in 1992 were disastrous. Neither the Peace Accord structures nor the Goldstone Commission was able to arrest this trend.
- \* The economy was a shambles in 1992 with yet another year of miserable growth, crippling drought, rising unemployment and declining productivity. The only positive trend was declining inflation.
- \* But 1992's worst failure was the collapse of negotiations. 1992 started out with great hopes with Codesa 1 and Codesa 2 initially appearing to be making great strides. Instead of seeing it through however, the ANC brought Codesa to an end, mass action and violence was intensified, and the Government appeased the ANC in a bilateral deal on the transition. In reaction, other parties, including the IFP, started their own initiative, culminating in the adoption by KwaZulu, of the Constitution of the State of KwaZulu/Natal. The year closed with a total stalemate on what was to come next.

South Africa faces a traumatic 1993, whose greatest priority is to ensure a transition process that succeeds in producing a democratic constitution from which the country's first truly legitimate governments will be formed. This will not happen of its own accord, but will come only from a bitterly contested struggle. Fortunately, there are signs that negotiations proper will resume in the near future.

Though there are many sub-themes and many diversions, the contest is ultimately to determine whether South Africa becomes a federation or a unitary state. While other issues are by no means peripheral, on this federal/unitary division, so much hangs in the balance.

It is the IFP's prime responsibility to see to it that South Africa becomes a federation, because only federalism can produce the peace, economic growth and democracy the people of South Africa need. 1993 must be the year in which federalism triumphs.

EIGHT MONTHS after Codesa was brought to an abrupt halt, agreement has finally been reached on the establishment of a planning conference to revive multi-party talks. Does this mean that the acrimony of the recent past is now history and that rapid progress is inevitable?

It would be ideal if this were so, but unfortunately, no matter the media hype following the series of bilateral Government/ANC and Government/IFP talks, the road ahead is still very uncertain.

Certainly, all that has been agreed upon is that multi-party talks should resume and that a multi-party planning conference should expedite this. But progress won't be as smooth as some appear to think (see pg 3).

Furthermore, there has been absolutely no agreement on any-

The IFP and many others favour a federal constitution, while the ANC and allies are arguing for a unitary state.

#### WAVERING

The Government, which supported the IFP on this at Codesa, and whose own Department of Constitutional Development proposed a constitution in September last year similar to that adopted by KwaZulu on 1 December, now appears to be wavering.

In the circumstances, whatever the format of multiparty talks when they are revived, this is going to present negotiators exactly the same difficulties it did at Codesa which was split 50:50 on this matter.

The second issue relates to the means by which the new constitution is to be drafted.

As far as the ANC is concerned, a sovereign constituent assembly is to perform this function. This was never agreed to

the primary impasse.

But irrespective of this, as IFP President Mangosuthu Buthelezi said on 28 January, "we are not going to rubber-stamp a process centred around a constituent assembly unless that process has been agreed through a multi-party planning forum by a truly multi-party effort of negotiation which has taken into account and discounted alternative options and new ideas."

Both these problems illustrate the futility of resuming multi-party talks as Codesa 3 simply taking over from where Codesa 2 left off. The fundamental issue relating to progress is the fact that by its very nature, a Codesa-type forum cannot succeed in providing consensus on the way forward.


#### PRECONDITIONS

In fact, even if there were now to be multi-party agreement on the transitional executive structures mooted at Codesa - which is what the Government and ANC believe should be implemented without delay - this could not happen in terms of the Codesa documents unless and until certain preconditions were first finalised. These include consensus on constitutional principles and the drafting of an interim constitution which itself has to identify the powers, functions and duties of the regions.

How then, do the Government and ANC imagine that these transitional structures and

... to page 2

The game is about to begin election candidates see page 8



Mangosuthu Buthelezi and FW de Klerk - daunting difficulties remain

thing else, either constitutional or relating to the process of transition.

#### MISPLACED EUPHORIA

And since it is precisely these issues upon which there is not even broad consensus, it is difficult to escape the feeling that present euphoria may be a little premature. There are at least two matters that are guaranteed to bedevil progress.

First is the complex matter of the powers of the regions in the new South Africa in relation to those of the central government.

In fact, there are strong indications that one result of the bosberade between the Government and ANC has been their growing convergence on "regionalism" - which is a euphemism for a unitary state with certain powers devolved to regions.

The fact that the term federal has now totally disappeared from the NP's lexicon is hardly coincidental suggests the IFP, but if the Government and ANC believe they can bulldoze any bilateral accord through multi-party talks, they are likely to be mistaken.

at Codesa, and was certainly rejected by both the Government and the IFP, but once again, it is difficult to know the extent to which the Government and the ANC have reached a recent understanding on this.

#### BINDING PRINCIPLES

Codesa thinking was that Codesa would produce a set of constitutional principles binding upon those drafting the final constitution, but since the key principle dividing negotiators is the powers of the regions, this route takes us straight back to

# Democracy Means Freedom To Choose



... from page 1

## tough negotiations ahead

subsequent elections are going to be put in place in the immediate future?

Since it is highly improbable that the preconditions will be satisfied, yet the Government and ANC remain adamant about returning to Codesa (whose package of agreements the ANC initially rejected), could it be that they have agreed to dispense with or water down the preconditions?

This was certainly the ANC's decision after it withdrew from Codesa, when its National Executive Committee stated:

"Once a settlement is agreed within the bilateral forum [ie, Government/ANC], this settlement would then be taken into a multilateral forum. But this multilateral forum should not be allowed to undermine the basic bilateral agreement."

The Government's duplicity in signing the Record of Under-

standing suggests it had accepted the legitimacy of the ANC's position - this of course, led to the IFP withdrawing from talks with the Government.

### RETRACTED?

Though the Government appears to have finally retracted its position - in its early January meeting with COSAG, the Government agreed that the Understanding would be subject to

multi-party review - the question still goes begging on how the Government expects Codesa's recommendations to be implemented in the near future.

In its Codesa 2 submission, the IFP suggested that Codesa should prepare a set of binding constitutional principles, which, having been approved in a referendum, would be fleshed out by a Constitution Drafting Committee.

However, the experience of Codesa 2 provided a salutary lesson on just how difficult it is for a forum, under the constant scrutiny of the public eye and spotlights, to achieve results on anything that is deeply divisive.

This, of course, is the supposed rationale behind the series of bilateral talks that have characterised the process since May. But these talks have been directed at getting Codesa resurrected, at which point the same problems will return to bedevil progress.

### BRETTON WOODS

This was why the IFP suggested that a multi-party forum be established to review the entire negotiating process and to find a mechanism and a means by which positive results are most likely to be produced.

One suggestion by the IFP in September was that we emulate the process that resulted in the Bretton Woods agreement - viz, that each party designate a set of experts who should meet in seclusion and negotiate a document agreeing upon all the agreed constitutional principles.

There are sure to be other options. That resulting in the speediest transition to democracy, remains, of course, the IFP's original Codesa submission (see below), which would see the entire process completed by September 1994 - there would be no complex transitional arrangements, no interim constitution, no "power-sharing" deals, and no sunset clauses. Perhaps this should be revisited.

So while 1993 is starting off with the promise of resumed multi-party talks, the difficulties ahead remain daunting.

## Senior Nat defects to the IFP

THE DEFECTION to the IFP of NP Natal Chairman, parliamentary front benchman and Vryheid MP Jurie Mentz, has shocked the NP.

Long the archtypical party stalwart, Mentz's move on 28 January was not only totally unexpected, but has signalled to the party leader and State President, that there is growing unease within the NP on the direction the Government appears to be taking in negotiations.

That much rank and file support for the NP has diminished of late was demonstrated in the most recent HSRC poll, but the signal to De Klerk, heading a traditionally monolithic and tightly unified party, is that Mentz's move could be

the spark that ignites further defections, particularly, though by no means exclusively, in Natal.

For a party whose present position is in large measure dependent upon English-speakers and for whom Natal is a key constituency, any haemorrhaging of support is a cause for deep concern.

This was underscored by IFP National Chairman Dr FT Mdlalose, who, in welcoming Mentz into the IFP, noted that there were "others in his party disenchanted with the policy being pursued by the top hierarchy of the NP."

Those "committed to our liberal democratic values", he said, "and who believe in our vision" were welcome in the IFP.



Jurie Mentz, first IFP MP

### Comment

## You're wrong, Zac

The article by Dr Zac De Beer following upon the decision of Mike Tarr to resign from the DP in order to join Inkatha makes for sad reading.

This is because the comments made by the leader of the DP reflect the sad chapters of liberal democracy in its relations with black people, not only in South Africa but throughout the world.

### EXORCISE THE PAST

Liberal democracy will only flower and come into its own when it is able to intellectually exorcise the legacy of slavery, colonialism, racism and oppression of the black people.

At the very moment that the tenets of liberal democracy were flourishing in intellectual circles, the slave trade, mercantilism and colonialism were bringing untold wealth to Europe and the Americas.

The dark history of the treatment of Black people in no way detracts from the validity of the liberal democratic message. Just as much as the fact that Christians were responsi-

ble for the evils of the inquisition in no way invalidates the divine truth and message of Christianity.

Nevertheless, the fact must be faced that in South Africa as well, the contribution of liberal democracy in providing some of the intellectual weapons against apartheid must on no account be used to conceal the failures and distortions induced by racism and oppression of the African people.

Liberal democracy, like the free enterprise system, depends for its survival on the black masses of South Africa. Just as the Japanese, with their ancient and oriental culture, have become a major centre of liberal democracy, so we can in South Africa do the same on an African cultural base.

It is not a matter of style. It is not a matter of policies which are "similar on paper". It is a reality and challenge that the DP must honestly confront.

The IFP stands for federal principles, a multi-party, non-racial democracy, a bill of rights, a market driven econ-

omy, and a constitutional state with an independent judiciary. Snide cocktail party remarks about the unlikelihood of Zulu warriors becoming the defenders of liberal democratic values will get us nowhere.

The same was said about the Japanese Samurai before we all depended on the Japanese Yen to sustain the unmanageable deficit of the United States. The crisis we face in South Africa demands an end to dilettantism in politics.

### COOPERATE WITH IFP

The DP must find a way to co-operate with its natural allies in the Inkatha Freedom Party. The notion that the destiny of this country depends on co-operation between the National Party and the ANC is as naive as expecting the ANC to tolerate DP meetings in Gugulethu.

The time has come to realise that to predicate the leadership of liberal democracy on the basis of European descent is to cling to precepts that are as dead as apartheid.

## Buthelezi says the Government & the ANC delaying moves to democracy

Democracy in 15 months or continued impatience, confusion and even anger? Politicians, political parties and the entire negotiation process are the target of ordinary people sick and tired of the morass the country is falling into. Is there any alternative?

### TARDY PROGRESS

Three years after President De Klerk's fateful 2 February 1990 address before Parliament, South Africa is still unsure on how long it will take before the country becomes a democracy. They ask what on earth is going wrong and why progress is so tardy.

The answer, says the IFP, is to be found in the absurd manner in which

the Government and ANC have dug in their heels over a negotiations process that cannot produce quick results.

South Africa could have a new constitution and new government in 15 months. But if the Government and ANC have their way, this will not



Dr Buthelezi at Stanger meeting

happen before 1996. So said IFP President Dr Mangosuthu Buthelezi at a 24 January public meeting in Stanger, Natal.

"As the Government and the ANC are putting it, the final constitution may not be finalised before 1996. For this reason they are envisioning the creation of transitional arrangements consisting of a transitional constitution, an interim government of national unity and a Constituent Assembly."

"The IFP has opposed this further delay in completing the process of transformation of our society. There is no reason why we should not have the final constitution for South Africa by September 1994 when we will be called for elections under the present constitution."

"At that time general, fair and free elections should be held under the terms of the new and final constitutional dispensation for South Africa."

"There is no reason why a Multi-party Forum of Negotiations should not be able to produce a constitution for our country in 15 months time."

### ONE STAGE PROPOSAL

The IFP's original proposal at Codesa 1 was for a very speedy transition. Flowing from Codesa, a constitution-drafting body would be created to formulate the new constitution. Once approved, elections would be called, and the new government (s) elected.

If consensus could be found, it was envisaged that the entire process would be completed long before the imple-



mentation of proposals emanating from either the Government or the ANC.

### FINAL CONSTITUTION IN 1996?

This was not to be, however, and the hugely complicated proposals that flowed from Codesa 2 were the result. The effect of following this process will be a new constitution in about 1996 instead of at the end of the present Government's term of office in September 1994.

The Government/ANC timescale goes something like this: after the planning conference has sorted out certain details, multi-party talks reconvene in March this year, and unresolved Codesa 2 issues are finalised. This complex task includes the drafting of a full interim

To page 7



## Multi-party Planning Conference:

# What happens next?

NOTHING was going to eclipse the drama of February 1990, but in a generally weak address at the opening of Parliament this year, State President FW de Klerk appeared to be mostly concerned with restoring his image among his constituency - thus the touch of old-fashioned kragdadigheid in the emphasis upon law and order. On negotiations, he was surprisingly cautious on the details of precisely what happens next. But no matter his reticence, the IFP has very specific expectations of what is to follow.

Following a series of bilateral talks, consensus has at last been reached by the Government, ANC and IFP on the need to set up a multi-party planning conference to review the negotiations process. That the Government and ANC have conceded to this key IFP demand potentially sets the stage for real progress.

After its second round of bilateral talks with the Government on 27 January - which IFP National Chairman Dr FT Mdlalose described as an "improvement" on the previous meeting - the IFP agreed that this planning conference should meet in mid-February and that if all goes well, full-scale multi-party negotiations will resume in March.

Current negotiations are therefore centred around the planning conference and its agenda, but whether the envisaged time-scale is adhered to is really dependent on the planning conference making sufficient progress.

The IFP sees this conference having to tackle the following four areas:

### KITCHEN ARRANGEMENTS

First are the "kitchen arrangements", including the venue for the negotiations forum, administrative matters (such as minute-taking and distribution), and security. These were not handled very well at Codesa and caused problems.

### THOSE INVITED

Second is the matter of who is to be invited to the negotiating forum. One of the IFP's major difficulties with Codesa was that it was insufficiently representative.

At its meeting with Cosag in early January, the Government agreed that invitees include parties declining to be present at Codesa (such as the PAC, CP, Azapo) as well as the self-

governing territories, such as KwaZulu which were excluded. The ANC and its allies in Lebowa, Kngwane and KwaNdebele are resisting this, but it is an issue that has to be settled once and for all prior to multi-party negotiations being resumed.

### REGIONAL INITIATIVES

Third is the complex question of regional initiatives. The IFP is not

happy with an exclusive top-down approach to negotiations, and believes bottom-up regional initiatives should also be on the agenda.

One obvious item is KwaZulu's Constitution of the State of KwaZulu/Natal, adopted by the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly on 1 December last year.

This issue is likely to be difficult not only to the ANC which wants everything constitutional to be formulated by a constituent assembly, but also

to the Government which appears to be weakening in its resolve to implement regionalism during the transition.

### PRIVATE ARMIES

Fourth is the status of private armies, and especially the ANC's Mkhonto we Sizwe. The IFP believes this question must be sorted out prior to the resumption of multi-party negotiations.

In addition to these items on the agenda of the planning conference, this body is going to have to agree on the agenda for the new negotiating forum.

Here there are at least four matters that will have to be discussed:

### CODESA ARRANGEMENTS

\* transitional arrangements, including the Transitional Executive Council and sub-councils;

\* arrangements for elections;

\* the interim constitution;

\* constitutional principles; and

\* the proposed time-scale.

Many of these remain contentious, and resolving them may be very difficult. The fact that parties are resuming negotiations is an advance upon the past eight or nine months, but this does not in itself guarantee success or rapid progress.

## ... quickly followed by Democratic Party MP

## Are there still more to come?

IF THE MOVE by Vryheid MP Jurie Mentz shocked the NP, it was the turn of the DP less than a week later. Pietermaritzburg North MP Mike Tarr crossed the floor of Parliament and took his seat alongside the IFP's first MP, Jurie Mentz.

Just as the NP must be wondering just how prescient IFP National Chairman Dr Mdlalose was in his comment that there are others in the NP waiting in the wings likely to follow Mentz's example, so too, will the DP be looking over its shoulder.

There is no party less secure in its future than the DP. Comprising an uneasy amalgum of the Zac de Beer's PFP, Wynand

Malan's National Democratic Movement and Dennis Worrall's Independent Party, the DP has always struggled to maintain its identity against rival sections, exemplified by one group's *en masse* shift to the ANC.

Whether this is about to be repeated is unknown, but what is certain is that as we get closer to election time, whatever internal tensions there are, are likely to intensify.

Tarr's joining the IFP is thus a perfectly rational choice because DP and IFP policy is very similar (IFP policy "does not differ in any major aspects from the DP policy proposals", he said).

DP leader Zac de Beer said he couldn't "pretend to understand Mr Tarr's action" - but as Tarr noted, it "makes little sense having two parties propagating similar views".

Since he wanted to make a

political contribution to Natal, "the IFP is the best place."



Mike Tarr, second IFP MP



# Nats split on federalism?

The defection of the Chairman of the National Party in Natal to the IFP signals more than a general dissatisfaction with the negotiations process. It is also premised on a deep appreciation of the importance of federalism to the country's future constitution.

IF THE State President and his chief negotiator Roelf Meyer are no longer willing to publicly commit themselves to federalism, others in the NP are a little less reticent.

The 16 January meeting between the IFP and the Natal NP showed a high degree of consensus on the shape of the future constitution.

But is this shared by the rest of the NP hierarchy?

Part of the problem facing State President FW de Klerk, and probably party responsible for his declining popularity must be the confusing signals he and his party are giving out.

One difficulty with bilateral talks behind closed doors is that no one really knows what type of agreements are being reached. *Business Day*, for

instance, states that it appears as if "differences between government and the ANC over policy matters such as regionalism may be narrowing".

The trouble is, in the absence of strong and unambiguous statements laying down NP policy, the government is open to charges that it is vacillating and caving in to the ANC under pressure.

## CREDIBILITY GAP

But as the transition gets underway, it is increasingly clear that there is a substantial gap between the party's grassroots support and its leadership. Last year's March referendum is being taken by De Klerk as a blank slate to lead his flock where it may have no particular desire to

go - for instance, there is significant unhappiness over details of the transition.

But when it comes to the constitutional future of South Africa, De Klerk has a real problem if the party is seriously considering a unitary state with limited powers devolved to the regions - the ANC's model.

Despite poll after poll demonstrating his constituency's belief in federalism, the NP and Government appear to be wavering - thus its attack on KwaZulu's constitutional initiative.

This is all the more ironical given the Department of Constitutional Development's technical report submitted to the Conference on Federalism last year.

But will all Nats automatically support their leaders' rejection of KwaZulu's initiative? No, if the meeting between Natal's Nats and the IFP is anything to go by.

The NP delegation headed by George Bartlett and that of the IFP headed by Dr FT Mdlalose, were in large measure unanimous on the acceptability of KwaZulu's constitution. There were a few quibbles from the Nats on some of the detail - "technical things", said Bartlett - but overall, they were fully behind the proposals.

## FIRST ISSUE

Bartlett said that when multi-party negotiations resumed, "the first issue that needs to be settled is what form of constitution we are going to



George Bartlett

have - a unitary or federal system." There was no doubt in his mind of what was needed.

"The National Party and the IFP are close on the federalism/regionalism concept". He

added that federalism was the only constitutional model capable of securing peace in South Africa, and this entailed States enjoying autonomous powers.

## ONE SHARED VISION?

Did Bartlett go out on a limb here and is he now being reigned in? Many are asking whether Bartlett and others have the same vision as the Meyers of the NP.

It is interesting that Mentz, for instance, left the NP immediately after having attended a Natal caucus, and did not attend the national caucus which followed immediately thereafter. Is this because Bartlett had been given instructions to take a harder line on the IFP?

## PRESSURE ON NP

Where does this leave the NP if indeed, its negotiators are moving closer towards the ANC?

- \* For one thing, it weakens the hand of those in the NP (headed by Constitutional Development Minister Roelf Meyer) trying to cut a deal with the ANC.

- \* In addition, it substantially increases internal pressure on the NP and Government to state unequivocally, their commitment to federalism.

- \* Third, it strengthens KwaZulu's position and that of the IFP in seeking acceptance of the constitution.

- \* Finally, it might well also prompt the Nats' other provincial organisations to rethink their positions.

All in all, it constitutes a useful rejoinder to the party's leadership to take both federalism in general and KwaZulu's proposals in particular, a lot more seriously than it is apparently doing at present.

## What is the official National Party policy?

Despite the NP leadership's present reluctance to laud the virtues of federalism, party followers are certainly under the impression that federalism constitutes the official line.

While the NP's September 1991 document - *Constitutional Rule in a Participatory Democracy* - avoids using the term federal, it accepts not only that power should be "divided among various authorities", but that:

**"functions must be distributed among the different tiers of government in such a way that the constitution confers autonomous authority on every tier. (That is, original and entrenched authority with which the other tiers of government may not interfere)."**

This is the hallmark of federalism, and contrasts vividly with the notion of the regions being granted certain powers by the constitution, but which may still be over-ridden by the central government

THE unveiling and subsequent adoption by KwaZulu of the Constitution for the State of KwaZulu/Natal on December 1 last year, drew strong reaction and wide-ranging comment from political commentators and parties.

While many people applauded KwaZulu's initiative, some were highly critical and even hostile. What credence can be given to their claims that the constitution is a disastrous unilateral move and/or a recipe for secession?

## CRUCIAL DOCUMENT

These criticisms need to be addressed, because this document is going to play an important role in negotiations. It is thus significant to note that in our view, the criticisms are based either on political malice, or ignorance.

Many initial reactions concentrated upon the supposedly "unilateral" nature of KwaZulu's actions. The Government responded (it later turned out without even having read the constitution or more importantly, the KwaZulu resolution) by bluntly warning IFP leader Dr Buthelezi "not to take any unilateral steps".

## DE KLERK & MEYER

State President FW de Klerk warned that any unilateral initiative would be incompatible with the agreed goal that constitutional reform should be the result of multi-party negotiations.

Constitutional Development Minister Roelf Meyer reportedly threatened that Dr Buthelezi should "re-enter negotiations or face the risk of being excluded" (though he later denied saying this). He added that if the timescales for transitional government which had been broadly agreed on by the government and the ANC could not be met then "we might proceed... without the participation of all parties".

Meyer said that the IFP's unilateral demands for quasi-

autonomy were not feasible because the structure of regionalism had to be decided from the top-down, rather than from the bottom-up.

IFP National Chairman Dr Frank Mdlalose described Meyer's stance on federalism as insane and undemocratic, pointing out that the process of dictating a federal formula from the top by a unitary government had never happened.

The ANC's response was characteristically militant, with ANC Natal Midlands leader Harry Gwala claiming his organisation was "not going to take this lying down. We are going to organise the people against it... Buthelezi is not the person to decide a referendum. This can come from central government only. There will be trou-

ble if this is allowed to go on." Asked whether the referendum would cause violence if it

went ahead, Gwala said: "Of course - we'll use any method to reject it."



The SACP went one step further with Central Committee member Jeremy Cronin issuing a direct threat of unprecedented industrial action should the referendum proposal be "flirted with". He issued a stern warning to "white monied interests" not to accept "this sordid proposal" or else "you will come to regret that you ever even heard the word federalism in your life... We will fry your (business's) backsides," he said.

Lauding Dr Buthelezi's federal credentials, DP MP Tony Leon said the Buthelezi Commission and the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba truly promoted the concept of shared power and federalism. But he expressed concerns over any unilateral action which might be taken in order to implement it.

These fears are not founded in any real substance however, and the IFP has gone to great lengths to allay them. Far from intending to go-it-alone, Dr Mdlalose stressed that the envisaged process was totally reliant upon a consensus approach.

## CONSENSUS APPROVAL

Having been approved by the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, the constitution would then be put before the region's Joint Executive Authority. Thereafter there would be very wide-ranging, inclusive and thorough public debate in the region, following which a referendum would be called.

Since the referendum itself would require the endorsement of the present government, unilateral action is impossible.

Furthermore, since it is the people of the region that will be deciding on their constitutional status within a united South Africa, neither the KwaZulu Government nor the IFP could do anything unilaterally.

If this were not enough, the constitution, once approved, would then be placed before the national negotiation forum for further multi-lateral endorsement.

And finally, for the constitution to transcend its present status as what Dr Buthelezi described as a "discussion document", and to become a legal document, it would have to be ratified by Parliament.

In other words, these are anything but unilateral acts.

## FEDERAL DOCUMENT

If the intention of the IFP and KwaZulu were truly secessionist, the constitution would not have been drafted as a federal constitution.

Unfortunately, shabby reporting that took absolutely no notice of the content of the document, whipped up a hornet's nest that robbed the public of a sober debate of the merits and demerits of federalism.

That the constitution is genuinely federal will be taken up in our next issue.

From page 4

systems include: the USA, Canada, Germany, Switzerland, Spain, India, and Australia.

## CONFEDERAL SYSTEM

The essential difference between a confederal system and a federal system is that a confederation usually consists of different countries while a federation is only one country.

In a confederation, countries, by agreement, delegate certain powers to a joint administration or a confederal government.

The Southern States of the USA constituted themselves as a confederation in the civil war against the northern states. Present European integration shares many confederal characteristics.

A confederation of Southern African states is the official policy of the Conservative Party.

For this to become a reality, certain parts of South Africa would have to become independent before forming a joint body for some level of co-operation.

The IFP does not support the confederal system as an option for this country because it believes in a united and democratic South Africa.

Confederation here represents nothing less than balkanisation, which is unacceptable to the vast majority of South Africans.

## SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATAL?

The IFP does not "claim sovereignty" over Natal, and has never done so.

But the IFP is saying that the new constitution for South Africa must reflect regional interests, and no matter the areas of disagreement among the various parties, there is at least agreement that Natal and KwaZulu constitute a logical unit of second-tier government. It is commonly accepted also by the people of the region, that KwaZulu and "white" Natal must merge into a single unit.

What KwaZulu has done in adopting the Constitution of the State of KwaZulu/Natal, is to put this reality on the table. In a federation with its federal constitution, each State also has its own constitution.

KwaZulu has proposed such a constitution for this region as a State within the federation. It is envisaged that other regions could do likewise.

But the key point is that there is nothing unilateral about this. KwaZulu and the IFP have stressed that the formal adoption of this constitution (or any other for that matter) for KwaZulu/Natal is dependent upon the people of the region first agreeing to it via a referendum.

Clearly, if the referendum rejects the constitution, then it will not be. Furthermore, the party envisages a process of very thorough and wide-ranging discussion, debate and consultation prior to the referendum.

The net result is that the future constitutional status of Natal and KwaZulu will be determined by the people of the region.

In fact, what the IFP is really saying is that it is the people of the region who are sovereign. It is their will that should prevail.

The party merely believes that it is closer to the political pulse of KwaZulu and Natal than any other party, and that the vast majority are likely to support the IFP come election time. EDITOR.

## LETTER TO THE EDITOR

SIR

Thank you for *The Democrat* which I have found in my post box the last few months. I find your newspaper interesting if somewhat confusing. I wonder whether you could explain the following to me, either in the October or November issue of your paper or directly by letter to me (not telephonically):

1 What exactly does *The Democrat* see as the great differences between a federal and confederal system for South Africa (your first and second options according to your article "Federalism - or else" in your September issue)?

2 On what basis does the IFP lay claim to sovereignty over the whole of Natal, eg historical, present population, etc. (your article "Whites always a minority")? In order for you to adequately answer these questions I shall not ask any more just yet. You must admit that you have not defined these underlying matter and bit would therefore be wrong to deduce your answers which could lead to an incorrect evaluation of your standpoint.

It would appear that although I obtained a BA degree from the University of Natal with political science as one of my majors, that university did not provide me with all the knowledge which you now attribute to the ordinary man in the street!

Thanking you in anticipation, yours faithfully  
M Falck, Sherwood, Durban.

# Unitary, Federal & Confederal

Mr Falck asks two questions, which, in the light of the great debate on so-called regionalism and in the light of KwaZulu's constitutional initiative and its implications for the population of any region, are very important.

## THE TYPE OF CONSTITUTION

The extent to which regions/States enjoy constitutionally entrenched legislative powers determines whether a country has a unitary, a federal or a confederal system of government.

The mere act of "devolving" power to regions does not in itself make for a unitary or federal system - what matters is

whether the States/regions have autonomous powers in respect of those functions of government that they enjoy.

## UNITARY SYSTEM

A unitary system of government is one in which the supreme law making power is vested in a single, central body or legislature, usually called a parliament. France is a classic example.

In an archetypal unitary system, powers delegated to the regions are not constitutionally entrenched, but are delegated and can be given or taken away at the discretion of the central government.

This characterised the old South Africa, whose provincial councils were abolished by ex-State President PW Botha in

1986.

Somewhat weaker is a unitary system in which regions do have constitutionally entrenched "original powers", but regional legislatures exercising these powers are not permitted to contravene policy determined by central government.

This is the ANC's model. In effect, only administration is devolved, since regions' policy/laws are only valid if they do not contradict national laws determined by the dominant party in the central government.

In both cases, there is only one supreme legislature since central government can override decisions taken by the regions.

The IFP rejects a unitary system for South Africa because it is too centralised and fails to accommodate political pluralism.

## FEDERAL SYSTEM

In a federal system, such as is advocated by the IFP, legislative power is divided between different levels of government within one country.

This is constitutionally entrenched in such a way that each authority exercises responsibility for a particular set of functions and maintains its own institutions to discharge those functions.

Neither central or regional government is subordinate to each other - each is subject to the constitution which marks out the spheres of authority for the central and State governments.

The central government has autonomy of those functions over which the constitution grants it exclusive authority - usually including foreign affairs, national

defence, national monetary and fiscal policy, currency, etc.

The constitution also grants a State government sovereignty or autonomy over its set of specified functions, including health, housing, education, economic development, state taxation, etc.

A federation ensures a balance of power between the Federal and State governments, but clearly there is a sliding scale in which certain federations have stronger State governments than others.

There are also examples of federations in which certain States enjoy greater autonomy than other States within the same federation - Quebec in Canada and Catalonia in Spain.

Classic examples of federal

To page 5

# The Constitution of the State of KwaZulu/Natal: is it unilateral?



THE CENTRAL feature of the political violence on the Natal south coast over the past few years was the campaign to overthrow traditional authorities.

This was the gist of the IFP submission by Muntomuhle Khawula to the Goldstone Commission sitting in Port Shepstone on 25 January.

The report said that although there had been political violence during the mid-1980s, "this was severely intensified from late-1988 and early 1989 with a switch in emphasis from urban to rural areas."

And when it did break out, it was "particularly ugly and qualitatively worse than other rural areas." For instance:

#### ATROCITIES

- \* 1990 saw such horrors as an attack on an induna who was assaulted and left for dead after having had his genitals cut off. His "crime", according to his attackers, was that he was a "spy" for the chief.
- \* In July 1990 a missionary

# Natal South Coast: first war ...

priest reported that one of his parishioners was necklaced by comrades who hacked her to pieces and danced around her body as she burned.

In fact, 1990 was characterised by a string of necklacings, whose low point was the burning alive of two young children - a nine-year old girl and a fourteen-year old boy - accused of having supplied "muti" to the other side. Since the Commission's brief was limited to "non-IFP/ANC rivalry" the IFP requested the

Commission to investigate attacks on traditional authority structures, and attacks on communities.

#### 17 AREAS UNDER ATTACK

In the four tribal regions of the south coast, 17 tribal authorities, each under a chief, were the target of militant youths. Because each chief had between 6 and 30 tribal wards under his jurisdiction, each headed by an induna below whom were several councillors,

the youths did not lack targets.

The goal, stated the report, was "an attempted revolutionary overthrow of the traditional order and its replacement with a new order."

In 1989, Chief Ndwalane lost complete control of his area and had to flee after being forced to watch the ritualised killing of one of his indunas. In 6 wards around Port Shepstone, comrades took total control, replacing tribal courts with "people's courts". These bodies dealt with their opponents in a totally ruthless fashion. In 1990, the same thing happened to Chief Luthuli in Ummini.

In due course, traditional authorities rallied, and in most cases regained control.

The second area the Commission was asked to investigate was the attack on the communities.

The IFP report noted that this took many forms. In addition to violence brought about by stayaways, attacks on tribal courts and the disruption of schooling, there was:

- \* Mob rule, geared towards "terrorising" whole communities. Necklacing, assaults, mutilation, "modelling" and murder were all typical "people's court" punishments. Ndwalane's "Lusaka killing field" was the most infamous.
- \* Forced attendance at meetings, followed by "night camps" - with punishment for those not attending.
- \* Attacks on commuters en route to work - 8 people were killed and 4 injured in one attack in September last year.
- \* Random violence directed at communities. The report referred to five massacres on ordinary community members from August last year.

#### NOT ALWAYS ANC/IFP

The IFP said this campaign was not necessarily occasioned by ANC/IFP political rivalry, because the IFP was frequently not involved at all. But there was a clear political motive in the attempt to destroy a key IFP constituency.



Since December, the sounds of bullets have been replaced by the sounds of silence

tive member of the ANC, apologised to those who had been vilified by his colleagues and said that the peace rally was a challenge to other chiefs and leaders.

#### ARE ALL MY CHILDREN

Chief Mavundla asked people who had left their homes in his area, to return. Chief Ndwalane said that he did not know why people were killing one another - "All the people in this area are my children, no matter the organisation to which they are affiliated." Chief Ndwalane added that political toleration was the only answer to peace in the area.

After the speeches had ended, a committee was formed to look after returning refugees, the restoration of homes and structures damaged by the violence and future long-term development.

#### BRAAI

Members of the community reported that for the first time since June 1992, there had

been no sounds of shooting. The new peace initiative was cemented further when youths from the ANC-dominated Madegane area and youths from the IFP-dominated Mtengwane area met for a braai during the week after this historic peace initiative.

#### FURTHER MEETINGS

Foundations for peace continued to be laid when two further meetings were called by Chiefs Mavundla and Ndwalane.

Amongst the 500 people who attended Chief Mavundla's meeting at Uvongo, were the Rev Ron Brauteseth of the Port Shepstone Local Dispute Resolution Committee, Prince Madlala (a cousin of King Goodwill Zwelithini) and James Zulu (leader of the IFP contingent).

Chief Mavundla and Mr Zulu stressed the need for discipline and urged refugees to return home. They and refugee spokesman Simon Gaba, called on the community to work together for reconciliation and to rebuild homes destroyed through violence.

Appeals were made for an end to the killing and robberies of the past few years. Mr Gaba also called on the security forces to continue doing a service to the community, but to refrain from taking part in, or instigating the violence and for leaders to respect everyone's views.

Key speakers at Chief Ndwalane's meeting included Dr Moses Anafo, the IFP's Mandla Shabalala and the ANC's Bheki Cele.

#### CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE INITIATIVES

The peace initiative has led to the safe return of about 250 refugees to the Murchison area and the subsequent stabilisation of the area.

Levels of violence in the area have fallen drastically with 2 confirmed deaths recorded in that area since December. Last year an average of over 30 people were being killed in the same area each month.

#### RECONSTRUCTION

Work has already begun on rebuilding homes burnt down during the violence and funds from the National Peace Secretariat may be used to help in the reconstruction process.

The positive attitude of the local police and political leaders in the area were highly praised during the first session of the Goldstone Commission sub-committee sitting in Port Shepstone.

However, concerns have been expressed at the activities of hit squads, functioning of the judicial system and SAP bias.

# ...and then peace

After more than three years of bitter political violence and savagery, peace has at long last come to Natal's infamous South Coast region. As was the case in Mpumalanga, it seems people have become so sickened by violence, that peace was accepted as the only alternative.

The breakthrough came at an historical peace rally at Nyandezulu Primary School in December, when leaders of all interest groups came together and spread the message of peace on the same platform.

Attended by about 2 000 people, the meeting was arranged to allow Commonwealth monitors, the Local Dispute Resolution Committee and Ensimbini Chiefs Aaron Ndwalane and Samuel Mavundla from Ensimbini area to meet.

Representatives of both the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), the African National Congress (ANC), returning refugees and local community mem-

bers were present at the rally. Dr Moses Anafo, a Commonwealth monitor from Ghana, said that the time for truth had come and to forget past events and face the future. He urged people to work together to end the divisions and to prevent disruption of education. Cyril Shezi (ANC) said that both political parties had "lost out" with the killings in the area. He emphasised that now was the time to isolate those who instigating violence and senseless killings from those wanting peace. Only peace would lead to unification, he said.

#### APOLOGY

Dr Siyabonga Cele, an execu-

# IFP rejects third Goldstone report

"Partial", lacking "objectivity" and possessed of a number of "serious lapses" - this was the IFP's initial public reaction to Judge Goldstone's third interim report, submitted to the State President on 21 December.

The Commissioners are not likely to be impressed with the IFP's response, but there are sound reasons for the IFP taking the line it has.

The bulk of the report deals with the Commission's findings resulting from its preliminary hearing (30 November - 4 December, and 14 December) into violence in Kwa-Zulu and Natal from May this year.

In the IFP's view, there was "practical merit in some of the recommendations made" in the report. These include the Commission's view that adequate notice be given to existing authorities of public meetings; that breaches of the Peace Accord be penalised; that the release of suspects on bail be reviewed; that parties refrain from inflammatory and

confrontational attacks on authorities presently constituted; and that the role of tribal chiefs be defined and recognised.

However, the party also considered the report "partial" and condemned "a number of serious lapses". In particular:

#### UNGOVERNABILITY

- \* A major cause of the violence, according to the IFP, was the on-going programme of ungovernability which, since 1989 has taken the form of a full-scale assault on rural communities and on the IFP's constituency. The report makes no reference to this at all - there is just one clause blandly requesting political parties to desist from making con-



Mr Justice Richard Goldstone

frontational political attacks on "authorities that are presently constituted".

- \* The Commission states that "little significant advantage is to be gained by it multiplying its enquiries into specific incidents of violence." Yet the Commission did investigate Boipatong and other single incidents, and despite IFP requests that it investigate the eight massacres of

IFP members and supporters that have taken place since August 1992, and despite the majority of these taking place under decidedly strange circumstances, the Commission ignored them.

#### ASSASSINATIONS

- \* The IFP also found it strange that the Commission took absolutely no cognisance whatsoever of the continuing assassination of IFP leaders, more than 240 of whom have been murdered in Natal/KwaZulu as part of a long-standing and deliberate strategy. The IFP questioned why the Commission failed to investigate this. Surely the serial killing of so many leaders of the IFP, it said, warranted urgent and major investigation. The party asked to whom responsibility for these killings should be ascribed.

- \* Indeed, there was absolutely no mention in the report, of the voluminous statistical evidence the IFP submit-

ted regarding attacks on and deaths of its supporters. There appeared to be an implicit view that since lives are lost on both sides, there was no point in pursuing this. Yet the IFP was particularly asked to furnish the Commission with this evidence - in the IFP's eyes, some comment was deserved.

#### MKHONTO WE SIZWE

- \* The IFP was aghast at the Commission's failure to make any reference to Mkhonto we Sizwe and its role in the violence. The announcement that the role of "private armies" was still to be looked at was considered useful, but the IFP saw no reason at all for the omission in this interim report, of proven MK complicity in violence, of cross-border raids, of Transkei training, and of its use of security force uniforms in attacks on the IFP. Yet the Commission found it important to make reference to G3 rifles issued (and being withdrawn) by the Kwa-Zulu Government to tribal authorities for their self-defence.

The IFP concluded that "some of the Commission's recommendations are weighted more heavily in favour of one party than the other and we thus feel the Commission has not reported as objectively as it should." The party also noted that it had prepared a more detailed response which would be communicated to the Commission itself.

Copies of the IFP submission can be ordered from the IFP Information Centre (details on back page). Cost is R25 including p & p.

# Bekkerdsal: Azapo & IFP agree on ANC violence

AZAPO AND THE IFP have agreed that the security forces and ANC are to blame for instigating recent violence in Bekkersdal.

Situated in a mining area west of Johannesburg, Bekkersdal is predominantly IFP and Azapo supporting, with ANC and PAC influences in the nearby hostel and informal settlement.

Despite the political divergence of its inhabitants, the area had never been a major flash-point for conflict. The only notable violence was sporadic attacks targeted against Azapo and the Inkatha Freedom Party.

In December 1992, the media began to focus attention on what it viewed as conflict between the IFP and Azapo. These reports led to increased polarisation between the two parties and rumours started to spread that the IFP

had been responsible for the deaths of 21 Azapo members since 1991.

#### ACCUSATIONS

Azapo began levelling unsubstantiated accusations at the IFP, which the IFP denied, saying that it was also being attacked.

The Bekkersdal Monitoring Committee, established to resolve differences between political organisations,

set up a meeting for January 6 this year but did not invite the IFP.

The IFP leadership, only hearing of the meeting on the day, decided that in the interests of peace they would attend - this despite an IFP member being shot just before the meeting.

However, the IFP Chairman for Bekkersdal, Charles Loliwe, was prevented from addressing the meeting by demonstrating ANC and Azapo youths.

It was thus postponed and a multi-party committee was formed to take the matter further.

#### JOINT PEACE RALLY

The IFP and Azapo leadership then entered bi-lateral talks aimed at ending the animosity. These talks proved to be extremely fruitful and it was decided to hold a joint peace rally in the area to show their joint commitment to peace and reconciliation.

In a joint statement after the meeting, Azapo and the IFP said that third parties - namely the security forces and the ANC - had been responsible for creating and exploiting the animosity to their own advantage.

#### ANC THREATS

Mr Monwabisi Duna, Azapo deputy national organiser, also stated that certain ANC members had threatened to "come down heavily on us" should they negotiate with the IFP.

A very successful joint IFP/Azapo rally was then held on January 17, despite the refusal (endorsed by the UN Observer Mission) of sponsorship because the ANC were not involved. Notwithstanding this, the rally resulted in a dramatic improvement in relations between the two parties.

No incidents of violence against or between the two parties have occurred since then and the area has been effectively stabilised.

## Douglas Commission

THE REPORT of the Douglas Commission's investigation into human rights violations in the ANC's Angolan camps was released on 13 January, implicating at least 70 ANC leaders - 14 of whom are senior - in the "litany of unbridled and sustained horror".

The Commission stated that the "saga of the ANC/SACP in exile is one of tyranny, terror,

brutality, forced labour in concentration camps and mass murder."

IFP Central Committee member Velaphi Ndlovu said these acts were not an aberration, but reflected systematic and deliberate policy.

He said that the senior officials involved and those who "showed tacit approval of brutal methods to achieve political goals" were "accomplices to the crimes" committed in the name of the freedom struggle.

From page 2

## new constitution

constitution. A Transitional Executive Council is then established which, inter alia, prepares the country for elections sometime next year.

After the elections, and while the transitional government assumes responsibility for governing the country, the new constitution is drafted and then approved. Thereafter fresh elections are held and the new government takes office.

With the best will in the world, this process cannot be concluded in a short period.

#### COSY ARRANGEMENT

Moreover, there are just so many suggestions from the Government and the ANC of joint rule, sunset clauses and "power sharing", that there are sound reasons for believing that what is envisaged by the Government and the ANC is nothing less than a cosy arrangement that denies the country ordinary parliamentary democracy for an extended period.

Popular understanding is that since both sides desperately need each other, they'll be compelled to share power for an unspecified but possibly extended period.

The IFP offers a vision that strongly contrasts with this - national consensus on the formulation of the new constitution followed by the election of the new government. Yet it is the IFP that is consistently painted as the spoiler and for seeking to delay elections.

The truth is, the IFP's vision is of democracy already firmly in place while others are still talking about it!

# Goldstone repudiates IFP Renamo links

Goldstone Commission investigators have found no link between Renamo and the KwaZulu Police.

Repudiating claims by the ANC of express KwaZulu Police and Renamo collusion in violence, Commission chairman Mr Justice Richard Goldstone found on December 21 that such claims were based on nothing more substantive than the flimsiest of conjecture.

#### MERE RUMOUR

Commission investigations showed that the claims were based on the pres-

ence of 10 armed Portuguese-speaking men in a bar at Ntsele township near Empangeni in August last year.

The presence of the men was the sole origin of the belief or rumour concerning an alleged relationship between the KwaZulu Police and Renamo, Mr Justice Goldstone found.

In September reports said Northern Natal ANC leaders had claimed Renamo soldiers were in KwaZulu and their presence was linked to hit-squad training.

But an extensive probe by the commission's team in Natal found "there is no justification for the allegations".



# IFP and ANC meetings: very tortuous progress

IFP President Mangosuthu Buthelezi's statement in mid-January that he was ready to meet the ANC leadership anytime and that they could make an immediate start on joint rallies to promote peace in violence-torn communities, received a typically guarded ANC response.

The two organisations, it said, were already engaged in negotiations intended to culminate in a Mandela/Buthelezi meeting - but only once a host of difficulties had first been sorted out.

Trouble is, the process is tak-

ing a long time; ANC expectations of guaranteed success might be unrealistic; and there is significant opposition in the Natal ANC to peace with the IFP.

## ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED

Despite the last of these in particular, bilateral talks were agreed to, and the meeting of 9 December identified four areas that had to be resolved prior to the presidential summit:

- \* Issues around the implementation of the accord reached on 29 January 1991;

- \* Issues around the normalisation of political relations;
- \* Issues around the effectiveness of the NPA and its structures; and
- \* Issues around reconstruction work among communities.

Two further issues identified at the meeting of 29 January were the militarisation of politics in South Africa and the Government/ANC Record of Understanding (which includes the conduct of multi-lateral negotiations in general).

Priority, however, was to be placed on free political activity (and remedying the difficulties),

as well as on covering enough ground so that the two presidents could nurture solidarity on them when they met.

## TWO PROBLEMS

One problem identified was securing popular support for a joint presidential meeting.

The other problem was the ANC's insistence on guarantees of tangible results if it went ahead. The meeting agreed that sub-committees should be formed to deal with all the problems identified.

15 January saw the two par-

ties meeting again to consider the reports of these sub-committees, none of which, however, had completed their work.

Having warmly welcomed the positive developments on the south coast (see page 6), both parties agreed that at the next meeting (probably 11 February), the preparation process should be completed, and firm recommendations will be made to the principals about the summit meeting.

Assuming these meet with their approval, the summit will then go ahead.

## NATAL HOSTILITY

The trouble is, the ANC faces a serious problem in at least two of its Natal regions - the midlands and north coast - which have expressed grave reservations about the peace talks and the peace process.

The militancy of the midlands

as a Stalinist bastion is legion, and it was this region that stopped the ANC President holding joint peace rallies with the IFP President in February 1991.

But the north coast is not that different, and has become markedly more militant of late.

At the end of the day, no matter the dramatic impact joint Buthelezi/Mandela rallies may have, they will not work unless this militancy is radically altered to a more conciliatory approach.

This equally affects the ANC's insistence on guarantees, because if its own supporters are sabotaging the peace process, then the whole endeavour may be an exercise in futility. As the Mpumalanga and Shongweni accords in particular and, hopefully, that of the south coast demonstrate, warring groups can find peace if they have the political will. This is really the issue at stake.

## A CALL FROM PRESIDENT MANGOSUTHU BUTHELEZI TO ALL REGIONS, BRANCHES, MEMBERS, SUPPORTERS AND WELLWISHERS OF THE INKATHA FREEDOM PARTY THROUGHOUT SOUTH AFRICA.

Sisters and Brothers,

As you all know, constitutional negotiations are proceeding, albeit with difficulties caused by those who wish to impose bilateral agreements on the country instead of genuine national multi-party agreements.

Our cause is just. We fight for a United Federal Republic of South Africa; we are for freedom and multi-party democracy; we believe in a liberal democracy based on fundamental human rights, private enterprise and a market driven economy; social justice and equal opportunities for all our citizens; the provision of education, health care, food, clothing and shelter for all our people; we are for a government that cares for the people and is not prepared to sacrifice them on the altar of political expediency or failed economic experiments which have led to joblessness, famine and hunger all over Africa.

A just cause is not enough. Whatever course the negotiations take we need right now to create an effective and well-oiled general election machine capable of mobilising

the electorate in support of the Inkatha Freedom Party. We need such support at the State/Regional elections and in the National General elections.

I call on all of you to ensure the following:

- \* That all our supporters of 18 years and over possess identity books.
- \* That all regional offices are functioning properly.
- \* That all branches are working properly.
- \* That where there are not formal IFP structures, active election committees must be formed throughout South Africa.
- \* Where there is intimidation of our members and supporters, means must be found to enable the message of the IFP to reach the mass of the voters.
- \* The Constitution of IFP provides for procedures for constituencies to select candidates for elections. But even before such procedures are put in place, regions, branches must search for the best candidates to represent our people in

the National Parliament and in the State/Regional Assemblies.

- \* Persons wishing to be considered as candidates for the IFP must submit a detailed curriculum vitae and recent photograph by registered post to the IFP Head Office (PO Box 4432, Durban, 4000). Final decisions regarding candidates will await compliance with formal constitutional procedures and ratification by the leadership of the IFP.

- \* That funds must be raised at local and regional level in strict compliance with the accountancy rules of the Party which will be communicated to all branches, regions, and election committees in due course.

Our opponents anticipate victory long before the electorate votes. If we work hard and selflessly we could together produce the biggest election up-set in recent history. Remember the only poll that counts is the one in which the people vote for their chosen candidate and Party.

## No peace yet in sight in troubled Natal Midlands

Optimism that 1993 would usher in a period of peace in the troubled Natal midlands was shattered within days of the new year, the first five days of which saw no less than four arson attacks on the Bruntville NPA hostel outside Mooiriver.

The last of these, carried out by an estimated 200 youths resulted in the total destruction of the hostel and its contents. The IFP Natal Midlands leader-

ship expressed outrage at inept policing and the inability of the Goldstone Commission facilitator or the RDRC to do anything to prevent the attacks.

## 70 HOMES

More than 70 IFP homes have now been destroyed and their owners killed or driven out since the Bruntville violence erupted.

Systematic attacks on the IFP in other areas of the Natal Midlands such as around Pietermaritzburg, Imbali, Wembezi and Richmond show that peace in this region is being deliberately impeded.

The IFP has called for urgent attention to be paid to restoring peace to the region and has proposed peace meetings and the holding of joint IFP/ANC rallies in strife-torn areas. The IFP believes the ball

is now in the ANC's court.

## WAR TALK

Unfortunately, Imbali violence towards the end of January saw ANC midlands regional leadership warning of "war" and encouraging their supporters to take "an eye for an eye".

What will it take for the midlands to follow the example of the south coast?

## MEMBERSHIP

All political parties should belong to their members and the IFP is no exception. If you subscribe to the principles of the party, we urge you to join as a member so you can fully participate in the IFP's deliberations and share with your fellow South Africans in the shaping of the New South Africa.

## IFP HEAD OFFICE

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## MEMBERSHIP APPLICATION

Title (Mr/Mrs/Ms, etc) .....  
Surname .....  
First names .....  
Residential address .....  
..... Code .....  
Postal address .....  
Telephone .....  
Occupation .....

I the undersigned declare that I subscribe to the principles of the Inkatha Freedom Party and further that my application is of my own free will.

Signature ..... Date .....

## SUBSCRIPTION:

ADULTS: Joining fee R10,00 + annual subscription R5,00, or  
Joining fee + 5 year subscription R30,00  
YOUTHS: Joining fee R3,00 + annual subscription R3,00, or  
Joining fee + 5 year subscription R15,00

- 1 Joining fee + 1993 subscription R .....
- 2 Joining fee + 5 year subscription R .....
- 3 Donation R .....
- 4 Total amount tendered R .....

NB: If your application is posted, please use a cheque or postal order. Please do not enclose cash. Thank you.

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